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of the PFP Consortium Study Group
„Regional Stability in South East Europe“

**"Transforming National Armed Forces
in South East Europe –
from the Social to the Military Challenge"**

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PREFACE

The transformation of the national armed forces in South East Europe is one of the key elements in the stabilization process. The reasons for the armed forces reform in the individual Balkan countries have been different: post-totalitarian, post-conflict, good governance and counter-terrorism. The drive for NATO, PfP and EU membership strongly stimulated the reform processes in the security sector in South East Europe.

The specific features of the reform of the armed forces in these different contexts and with different meaning of the incentives of institutional memberships for the different Balkan countries were discussed at a workshop, held by the working group *Regional Stability in South East Europe* of the PfP Consortium in Sofia 21 – 23 October 2004. Military experts from the NATO countries in South East Europe as well as from the Western Balkan countries that in the meantime are also on the path of EU and NATO integration in this study especially focus on the following issues:

- How is the mentality of the public and of the politicians changing from the traditional territorial defence concepts to the concept of expeditionary forces?
- How should the expeditionary forces be subsidized – by the Ministry of Defence budget or by a separate one, run by the Government?
- Should there be an international pooling of the budgets for expeditionary forces, including by countries that do not provide forces but are potent to provide money?
- Is there a shift of the geopolitical focus eastwards from the Balkans – to the Caucasus, Caspian Sea area and the broader Middle East and is this reflected in any way on the armed forces reform in South East Europe?

- And finally, how to combine national capabilities assigned to NATO and EU – a problem that more countries in South East Europe will be facing sooner or later.

It is important to admit that many of these questions are not topical for post-conflict countries, facing other issues and tasks. Further more it is obvious that there are different armed forces reform agendas in the different countries in the region and this creates disparities and eventually - tensions. Yet there is the opportunity to set objectives and implement tasks that could homogenize the armed forces reforms in the broader context of the indispensable security sector reforms in each of the Balkan countries. Modernizing the national armed forces and the Ministries of Defence; adapting the armed forces to the new global, regional and local strategic environment; making them capable to deal with the new kinds of security threats and conflicts; acquiring adequate capability for international interoperability and for contributing to solving crises and tackling with the terrorist threat by individual and collective acts – these are directions of the thought and actions that could lead to certain improvements

Beside a more effective fight on terrorism it is a big challenge to achieve a higher level of homogenization of concepts, doctrines and strategies for the security and defence of the individual Balkan countries and of the region in general. The societies in the Balkan countries should be given good explanations why the existence and transformation costs of the armed forces are needed.

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PART 1:

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF GLOBAL SECURITY

Brad Freden

THE CHANGING NATURE OF GLOBAL SECURITY AND ENSUING CHALLENGES TO NATIONAL ARMED FORCES IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE

Changing Nature of Global Security

The major security problems of our time are international terrorism, failed states and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These are challenges on a global scale.

I will begin with a brief overview of U.S. counterterrorism efforts: Following the September 11 attacks, the U.S. Government developed a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which outlined the policy framework for coordinated actions to prevent terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and its friends around the world.

We have implemented this strategy to act simultaneously on four fronts:

- Defeat terrorist organizations of global reach by going after their sanctuaries, leadership, finances, and command, control and communications;
- Deny further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by cooperating with other states to take action against these international threats;
- Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by enlisting the international community to focus its efforts and resources on the areas most at risk; and
- Defend the United States, its citizens, and interests at home and abroad.

To achieve these ambitious aims, we have sought, with great success, to create and sustain a broad international coalition:

Our multilateral counterterrorism (CT) efforts start at the United Nations. UN Security Council Resolution 1373, adopted with strong U.S. leadership shortly after 9/11, places binding obligations on all UN member states to:

- Prevent and suppress terrorist financing by criminalizing financing, planning, preparing or perpetrating terrorist acts;
- Prohibit nationals from making funds or economic resources available to terrorists;
- Freeze funds and financial assets of terrorists and related entities;
- Refrain from supporting terrorist entities, take necessary steps to prevent commission of terrorist acts, and prevent use of territory for terrorist acts;
- Deny safe haven and prevent movement of terrorists across borders;
- Exchange operational information and enter into agreements to prevent and suppress terrorism, including ratifying the 12 CT conventions and protocols;
- Ensure refugee/asylum laws prevent abuse by terrorists; and
- Prohibit active and passive assistance to terrorists.

Roles of NATO and the OSCE

- NATO invoked Art. 5 after September 11, 2001, sent AWACS to defend U.S. airspace.
- NATO is now training the new Iraqi army.

- OSCE, under Bulgarian leadership this year, is working to control MANPADS, improve shipping-container security, and make border crossings more secure.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)— nuclear, biological, and chemical—in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the world today. We must pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat in all of its dimensions. An effective strategy for countering WMD, including their use and further proliferation, is an integral component of the National Security Strategy of the United States. As with the war on terrorism, the U.S. approach to combat WMD represents a fundamental change from the past. To succeed, we must take full advantage of today's opportunities, including the application of new technologies, increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis, the strengthening of alliance relationships, and the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries.

Weapons of mass destruction could enable adversaries to inflict massive harm on the United States, our military forces at home and abroad, and our friends and allies. Some states, including several that have supported and continue to support terrorism, already possess WMD and are seeking even greater capabilities, as tools of coercion and intimidation. For them, these are not weapons of last resort, but militarily useful weapons of choice intended to overcome our advantages in conventional forces and to deter us from responding to aggression against our friends and allies in regions of vital interest. In addition, terrorist groups are seeking to acquire WMD with the stated purpose of killing large numbers of our people and those of friends and allies—without compunction and without warning. We will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons. We accord the highest priority to the protection of the United States, our forces, and our friends and allies from the existing and growing WMD threat.

What Bulgaria is Doing to Fight Terrorism and Proliferation of WMD

Bulgaria is one of only three countries in Europe that has troops in Operation Iraqi Freedom and both international missions in Afghanistan, as well as SFOR and KFOR. Bulgarian soldiers in Karbala have performed with courage and professionalism, and you should be proud of them. To aid in the fight against terrorist financing, the Government of Bulgaria enacted in February 2003 the Law on Measures Against the Financing of Terrorism, which links existing laws against terrorism with the financing of those crimes. The law was drafted in accordance with the international Financial Action Task Force's Eight Special Recommendations Against the Financing of Terrorism. The Bulgarian Financial Intelligence Agency has full authority to obtain information without a court order, to share information freely with law-enforcement agencies, and to process and act on allegations of terrorist financing. In the past year, Bulgarian Ministry of Interior and Customs training has begun to include nuclear, biological, and chemical detection and handling. Customs officers have begun using the so-called "TRACKER" licensing system as their primary permit-screening tool to control potentially dangerous exports. Sofia is a party to all 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. We can truly say that the United States and Bulgaria are partners in the Global War on Terrorism.

Conclusion

I hesitate to make recommendations regarding the armed forces because I am a diplomat, not a military officer. However, I think I can make a few general observations:

- The world has changed dramatically since 1989, and again since September 11, 2001.
- The fight against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction is as much political and economic as it is military.

- Information warfare – offensive as well as defensive – has become more important than ever. We must be able to gather and process intelligence in real time if we are to defeat the terrorists.
- In the fight against terrorism, a military's greatest strength is its human capital – the quality of its soldiers, their training, and the support network that keeps them strong and motivated.
- Weapons systems are important as well, but they are only as good as the soldiers who operate them.

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CHANGING NATURE OF GLOBAL SECURITY AND ARMED FORCES TRANSFORMATION

After 1989, with Bulgaria turning into part of a system under collapse and facing the challenge to provide alone its own security in an entirely new geopolitical environment, two teams for drafting a national security concept were formed – one led by General Stoyan Andreev and the other – by me. Our concepts were ready by 1991 and handed over to President Zhelyo Zhelev with the sole purpose to help the reorientation of the Bulgarian military and society as a whole towards a new model for granting security. Recently I went over this concept on Bulgaria's National Security under Global Structural Changes, a 380-page volume, containing a thorough analysis of the newly emerged situation along with scenarios for possible developments and feasible solutions for granting security. I also glanced over the other team's work titled Scientific Prerequisites for Building up a National Security System in the Republic of Bulgaria (Theses).

Thirteen years have elapsed since then, years of enormous changes, during which an entirely different situation had evolved. For this reason these concepts seemed to be rather outdated, in need of significant amendments, new accents, new priorities. I do not envisage here the facts that the USSR no longer exists and that we have joined NATO. The issue concerns significant changes in the array of possible threats on which a national security concept, strategy, and policy should focus in order to be feasible in the long term and to be consistent with real life. Perhaps the most important among these changes is globalization and the whole interrelated variety of security issues.

1. Changes in Security

Back in 1991 we could not have possibly taken into account globalization and its consequences in relation to security. Even the US National Security Agency in its analytical forecast “Global Trends 2010”, created with the efforts of the entire Intelligence analytical staff and leading university professors and published in 1997, does not contemplate enough on the role of globalization and IT in regard to security. This lapse has been corrected in the 2000 forecast Global Trends 2015.

Globalization has four principle features leading to substantial changes in threats and the nature of security risks.

The first feature comprises the phenomena of space compression, the loss or sharp decline of the role of distance as a factor for undergoing various processes, which creates preconditions for major increase of security risks, since they can originate not only from the neighbouring countries, but practically from any place in the world. Deployment of soldiers to border areas where threats could possibly arise no longer is a decisive factor since threats can come from practically anywhere.

The second aspect of globalization, causing changes in the very nature of global security, is the world’s blurring borders related to the sharp decline of regulatory and monitoring resources of the national state, since information, culture, finances and many other processes cannot be confined to certain boundaries. This just about makes restricting the bringing in of any kind of threats inside the country more and more difficult, distorts these threats and leads to the vanishing of the typical for modern era distinction between frontline and rear.

The third feature consists of the multiplication and tightening of the links, of the dependencies among various processes within the state or any other process, thus making society much more vulnerable, complex, dynamic, complicated, crisis-prone, susceptible to sudden changes, which could not have possibly been predicted in the past. This substantially increases the role of the analytical and information

endeavours in the field of national security, which should try to embrace as many potential risk factors as possible. It is not simply the army of one or another nation but a variety of threats posed by certain non-state actors that plays a major role. The previous distinction between the functions of the internal and external forces begins to fade away.

The fourth characteristic is time compression, relevant to the acceleration of all processes – from the speed of computers and transport communications to the rate of innovations, of implementing new components in the technological processes and societies as a whole. The response to this acceleration in an environment of hi-tech development presumes a transformation of armed forces which involves a substantial increase in the professionalism, intellectual level and implementation of modern technologies in the armed forces.

Hence the emerging of the following trends, influencing the nature of global security:

1. In the years preceding the First Industrial Revolution, wars were fought mainly on a territorial basis, for protecting and for conquest of territories, this being the cornerstone of national security. Industrial revolutions lead to the idea that industrial power, big manufacturing plants and heavy industry play a vital role as far as a nation's security and defence are concerned. As a result of the Third Industrial Revolution, information became not only the principal resource for social development, but also the basic instrument and target of subversion or increasing national security. Informatization gives impetus and new magnitude to such a traditional tool for waging war as is psychological warfare. A great deal of contemporary conflicts seek to acquire, exploit, and protect knowledge and information in their capacity as resources. The new type of warfare is based on advanced information technologies with computers and communications being crucial factors for enhancing war fighting capabilities. This creates preconditions for employing high-precision and hi-tech weapons, for conducting contact less wars based on the achievements of the Third Industrial Revolution. Very often these types of wars are referred to as information warfare or cyber wars because of the crucial role of

information. Such warfare involves global satellite communication and intelligence system which monitor the whole infrastructural system of the enemy. The enemy is no longer regarded as a physical system but as an information system which must be corrupted or destroyed. A crucial factor is the impact not so much on a system's hardware but on its software. This does not mean that physical weapons cease to exist; it is their software and other non-material factors that are becoming more substantial.

2. Globalization of risks and their multiplication, the acceleration of the social processes and the problem of containing them within the national boundaries *lead to the increase in the non-linear character of all processes, risk effects included*. This means that little efforts can cause great devastations, that unexpected small threats can have lethal consequences. This nonlinearity is displayed in the unexpectedness and asymmetry of both threats and wars. They are closely related to the fact that exerting power, investing huge amounts of money and designing high-tech weapons cannot guarantee enough the security of a nation. This becomes evident in Iraq, where the most powerful and technologically advanced forces in the history of mankind are facing unforeseen difficulties. Actually in the 20th century's late 80s and early 90s the collapse of the Soviet Union illustrated the fact that in spite of being one of the two super powers and possessing armaments enough to destroy this planet, it can still collapse like a card house due to circumstances unforeseen in any defence doctrine.

3. *Society's increased technological vulnerability* as a result of the distribution and low cost of advanced technologies, which could easily be acquired by various groups and individuals. On one hand, millions of people depend on modern infrastructures which could be rendered useless by a small group of people. On the other hand, small-scale nuclear, biological and chemical weapons could also be acquired by small groups and individuals and inflict huge casualties.

4. The state is facing difficulties in controlling the processes within the country, this being one of the major factors for *rising corruption and crime on a global basis*. Globalization facilitates the formation of

transnational criminal networks with huge profits which threaten the very existence of entire states. Starting from the 60s, the total number of crimes worldwide doubles with each decade thus creating preconditions for the military to get mixed up in various corruption schemes which affects their ability to deal with the new threats. The situation in Chechnya, North Ossetia and Ingushetia is a typical example of this.

5. Under these circumstances wars become *globalised, not in the sense of a global nuclear war between the USA and the Soviet Union which seemed imminent between the 60s and 80s of the 20th century, but as globally interrelated local and civil wars*. Formally speaking, most of the wars are local and not between states, but practically things are much more complicated because civil wars are not simply an internal issue nor have they evolved as a result of purely internal problems, but are more or less part of the process of globalization.

6. The information revolution favours horizontal and network forms of organizational relationships at the expense of hierarchical and pyramidal forms. This affects the nature of social conflicts and the organization of the actors involved. According to John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, analysts from RAND Corporation, there is a trend of transition from today's typical conflicts, contradictions and wars amongst various hierarchical organizations, such as nation-states, corporations, political parties, trade unions, armies, etc. towards conflicts among networks. "Power is migrating to small, non-state actors who can organize into sprawling networks more readily than can traditionally hierarchical nation-state actors."¹ Wars are and will increasingly be waged not by armies, but by groups. Various ethnic, national, religious, ideological groups can be situated a great distance apart, in different countries, but they can still keep in touch by means of advanced communication technologies, Internet in particular. Al-Qaeda has turned Internet into its major instrument and is urging Muslims worldwide to unite into a single nation. Some of the netwar actors can

¹ Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. A New Epoch and Spectrum of Conflict, In: *In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*, Eds. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1997, p. 5.

represent a nation-state, while others can try to use the nation-state for their own purposes. In this case no formal, stable, hierarchical interrelations and strategies exist. Decision making is decentralized. Relationships among the actors are unfolding in the form of fragmented polycentric network. Practically there is no leader issuing orders to all participants; leading are those interactions in which actors along with their resources get organized into easily forming or disintegrating networks which consist of individuals and groups with different status, of representatives of a new type of civil society without boundaries, spreading into the global network like a spider web, with no centre and periphery. Actually globalization renders meaningless the role of boundaries and the border line between frontline and rear as far as warfare is concerned.

7. Emerging of the phenomena *post-modern terrorism*. This reflects the real problem concerning the changes in the nature of violence, in the actions of forces, movements and individuals who confront one state or another. What makes this type of terrorism different is that its very existence depends on the global media to provide a broad audience. It is also the result of the decline of the nation state's role and the increased migration of people and information all around the world. It is also related to the capabilities of the even more destructive high-tech weapons. Today's terrorist is well-educated and familiar with IT innovations, lives in an urban environment and can easily travel from one continent to another, to take part in the life of the community he is preparing to attack, and has enough financial resources to do this. His war theatre are big cities and infrastructures, which are becoming more susceptible to terrorist attacks, because this type of wars aims at civil rather than military targets, trying to demonstrate that the authorities are incompetent and incapable to protect the population.

8. Spreading out of *asymmetric threats and asymmetric wars*. A new type of war is emerging – asymmetric war rather than war between armies. Asymmetric threats and asymmetric wars are gaining impetus as one of the key developments in the beginning of the 21st century. With the increase of social complexity and number of interrelations, whose severing might have huge destructive consequences, asymmetric threats

are becoming more and more important. A key feature here is the fact that advanced IT innovations make it possible for an individual or a small group to cause immense damages to a much more powerful adversary. Asymmetric threats can be characterized with unexpectedness, irregularity, incompatibility of counteracting measures. They involve unconventional methods for waging wars which render traditional military or police counter steps useless. From where and from whom will these threats come cannot be foreseen. The winning strategy is to behave in a way which the enemy least expects. Usually states collapse due to unexpected rather than expected threats. They can inflict large-scale damages affecting the physical and military power or the legitimacy of a nation. A country with an enormous military power can easily collapse as did the Soviet Union. The new type of war is based on the presumption that each system has an Achilles heel and the best way to success is through asymmetric threats, which although at a given moment might seem unrealistic or minor can still cause severe damage. Therefore, the issue lies in countering asymmetric threats while at the same time posing such threats to the adversary.

9. Stockpiling and preserving credibility capital and destroying the credibility capital of possible adversaries are yet another aspect of the changing nature of global security. This includes the reputation, the image, the social credibility of a given state, community or company. As we know, the price tag of a company, especially in the field of advanced technologies, is based not only on its material assets, but also on a myriad of invisible elements including its trade-mark, reputation, and advertising products. Foreign investments depend greatly on the image of the country. This explains the severe struggle for creating credibility capital and ruining the rivals' credibility capital. Publicity, commercial and political marketing, PR techniques are all elements of the struggle for establishing and destroying credibility capital. In a number of cases Bulgaria suffered severe blows in this aspect due to negative publicity and black PR. A recent example of this is the negative image in the West in regard to the safety of the Kozludui Nuclear Power Plant insisting on shutting down costly but reliable reactors. The competition in regard to the Bulgarian military export is even more severe, with continuous

efforts to discredit Bulgarian companies. The significance of these factors is still underestimated and no counter strategies are available.

10. The globalization process at the end of 20th century based on faster and easier communications led to a *qualitative leap in regard to the possibilities for conflict internationalization*. The reason is that all local conflicts involving local population turned out to be supported and encouraged by a global network of actors, which might include nation states not necessarily having the leading role. According to world media and politicians, threats are becoming more and more localized and linked to a specific person, like Osama Bin Laden, implying that the elimination of these people will solve the problem. The truth, however, is that threats are getting de-concentrated, they are organized in a network on the basis of common ideology and hatred rather than a common command post. Organizations engaged in a political struggle against the state no longer have the traditional hierarchical structure – they are trans-national and amorphous, much more mobile and much less vulnerable. Globalization has greatly facilitated their actions – they are no longer confined to one country and can freely travel around the world. They do not need centralized leadership and underground books and materials since they are available on the Internet. Thus they can keep in touch with active terrorist structures or recruit followers, as well as obtain weapons and technologies. The plans of many public works and infrastructures are available on the Internet which makes planning and preparation of attacks easier. As a result, any local political opposition can easily become global and turn into a large-scale phenomenon. This resulted for instance in Al Qaeda's presence in 68 countries in 2004.²

11. The traditional perception of victory as a territorial conquest is no longer valid in the globalised world, neither in Palestine, nor in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Iraq, since as a result of the globalization local and territorial conflicts quickly turn into global ones. Any ineffective solution of territorial issues makes them global and destabilizes security in the world as a whole. Local wars unlock global

² Иванов, Вл. и Мухин, Вл. Такие разные войны с терроризмом, в. *Независимое военное обозрение*, 25 декабря 2003

“boxes of Pandora” and need serious reconsideration and a much more complex response rather than merely a military one.

2. The Counteractions

The changing nature of global security calls for changes in the national security concept and policy, the key ones being the following:

1. The challenges modern nation-states are now facing make large conscript armies seem outdated and archaic. The trend in recent years is to downsize existing armies at the expense of boosting soldiers’ professionalism and ability to engage in modern warfare. Our epoch was the time of mass national conscript army, which every young man could join to fulfill his duty of protecting his homeland; nowadays this army is being replaced with a smaller but professional army of mercenaries.
2. With the existence of global security challenges response can by no means be on a national level – this would be meaningless. The transformation of the armed forces should be directed towards sharply increasing the interaction among national and multinational actors, jointly responding to various threats either by being part of permanent organizations like NATO, or, when need arises, in ad hoc coalitions.
3. The transformation of the armed forces should be directed towards adaptation to an environment of risk fragmentation, in which the enemy is not confined to a specific territory but carries out most of its activities in virtual space using different types of networks. This makes radical changes in the strategies and ideas of warfare crucial.
4. As clearly defined frontline and rear cease to exist, the army should be trained to be able to function also as a police force. As the chief adversary is no longer another country’s national army but a network of difficult to track down non-state actors, the army should find the right way to respond to such an adversary. We are facing the challenge posed by asymmetric wars which mass conscript armies are not trained to deal with. These wars should be fought in a new manner.

5. In the globalised world, crises in nation-states and the downsizing of army personnel find reflection in the privatization of military performance – there is a boom of private companies engaged in typically military activities. The number of private enterprises in the field of warfare and security is rising. We are witnessing the emergence and growth of global companies offering various logistics, intelligence, training and security services to nation-states and trans-national companies. There are such companies in Bosnia and Kosovo, in Iraq and Afghanistan. The existing trend is to privatize peacekeeping operations, the UN commissioning special companies for restoring order in different regions. Since 20th century's 90s, the private companies set up private armies for intelligence purposes, as consultants in the field of security, for training soldiers, security guards, secret agents, procuring weapons and providing logistic support, for taking part in operations in high-risk areas, for fighting wars. The greater the chaos and insecurity within a country, the greater is the demand for private security services.

6. The numerous difficulties a nation state is facing in the capacity of the institution holding the legitimate monopoly on violence on a given territory and on warranting security to its population, result in the need to initiate the privatization of police operations, whereas the nation transfers functions of its own to private security, detective, etc. agencies. This trend applies to all countries and security-selling private armies already outnumber the national armies. In the US there are nearly 500 000 federal and state police officers and approximately 800 000 private security officers, whose income is nearly 73%. In Great Britain the police force totals 142 000 people, while the number of private security companies employees is 162 000. In 2003 in Bulgaria's private security sector worked over 130 000 people; this number exceeds the total number of military and police officers (approximately 60 000 in each institution), which possess the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force on behalf of the state structures. In the field of security more than 1500 companies and commercial agents have been granted licenses.

7. The growing processes of informatisation and internetisation of the society and the resulting threats, the rising technological

vulnerability of nuclear, biological, genetic, geological and chemical weapons entail radical changes in the military structures towards achieving a highly professional and well trained armed forces.

8. Dynamic organizational structures, either non-state actors such as Al Qaeda or nation states are becoming key factors in the new type of warfare. These structures comprise of autonomous units, which are organized ad hoc for fighting a specific enemy at a given time. This makes it extremely difficult for the traditional hierarchical structures of the nation state to cope with such dangerous networks. They have to adapt their organization and countering strategies to the new type of “network” adversary, and not to the similar structures of other nation states.³ Hence the need of coalitions with a “varying geometry”, quickly responding to threats which might require considerably longer time and coordination on behalf of “hard” organizational structures unable to face today’s non-conventional threats. These type of wars disregard the dominating in the years after World War II national sovereignty principle, replacing it with principles based on pre-emptive actions, antiterrorist attacks and humanitarian operations. They are not waged for

³ Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt. *The Advent of Netwar*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-789-OSD, 1996; Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt. *The Emergence of Noopolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-1033-OSD, 1999; Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt, *Swarming and the Future of Conflict*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, DB-311-OSD, 2000.

conquering new territories or driving back enemy forces, but for defying de-concentrated politically motivated violence, internal turmoil, civil wars, drug trafficking, i.e., all factors which might lead to privatization of violence so that the state can safeguard its monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force.

9. Preparing an increasing number of people for the future trend of transferring warfare from real time into virtual space with cyberterrorism, cyberwars, cyber counterattacks. We are still in the initial stage of this process which will evolve in the years to come. Virtual space monitoring and the response to national security risks and threats within this space is becoming a key issue to be considered in the process of armed forces transformation. Many military and permanent terrorist groups have their own Internet sites, offering information for their scope of activities, promoting their actions and recruiting followers. Conflicts among networks rather than among hierarchies are becoming more imminent. This characterizes the new type of information warfare with mostly low-intensity conflicts. These conflicts emphasize on procedures such as information operations and perception management, or making efforts to convince or deceive the enemy, to orientate or disorientate him, rather than physically forcing him to do something. The key factor here is psychological coercion and not physical pressure. The Information Revolution gives impetus to setting up a network organization, doctrine, strategy of this type of conflicts.

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CONCEPTUALISING DEFENCE DOCTRINE AND STRUCTURE REFORMS IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE – THE QUEST FOR STANDARDS AND ORIENTATION

Speaking about transformation of the national armed forces in the South East Europe we have to bear in mind this region is comprised by different nations and societies with different traditional and cultural heritage, more or less different legal framework, institutional structure and different mix of influences and legacies of the past. In these circumstances it is only fair to expect all these differences will lead to unavoidable differences in pursuing the Security and Defence Reform processes. Neither we, members of these societies, nor outside observers or decision makers should expect the same approach in pursuing the reforms. As there are no two same states or societies so definitely there will be no two same Security and Defence Reforms. This has been emphasized by many of the speakers in almost all the panels we had during our workshop.

In pursuing our Security and Defence Reforms we have to make it clear to ourselves, to our nations, institutions, general public and individual citizens, but also to our friends outside of our national borders, what we exactly want to achieve through the reform process. Even the best executed reform process will eventually fall short of expectations and result in a failure if there is no clear objective what is the end goal. Otherwise we will be jumping from one issue to another, changing focus of the reform, use our scarce resources (money, time, credibility, personal effort, commitment and knowledge) in vain repeatedly. During our workshop I think we all agreed it was not necessary to make too many explanations why these nations simply could not afford it.

In order to avoid wasting of our resources in South East Europe we need to establish such an approach to our Security and Defence Reforms that will ensure integration of efforts within our societies. All state institutions, scientific institutes, NGOs, media, etc. can find their place in pursuing this task. There is enough room for everybody to participate. This is the result of necessity stemming from the sheer long-lasting importance of the reform processes. This also leads us to the need for all the Security and Defence governmental institutions to work in unison, to unite efforts, to forget their partisan affiliations and interests, to let aside bureaucratic, personal and group interests.

Our reforms present the social and the military challenge at the same time. Whoever – politicians, individual citizens or media - tries to approach and treat our reforms as strictly military issue and military effort will no doubt contribute to the possible failure of the reform process. However, there is also no justification for the professionals – soldiers, policemen, intelligence officials, civilians within the Security and Defence structures – to wait for somebody else to resolve most important issues in our reforms. Both sides have to do their part of the job, they have to communicate with each other, and what is probably most important they have to invest a lot of effort not to think first how to put their own demands on the table, but to pay more attention to listen carefully what other side can say, offer or do in order to contribute to the accomplishment of their mutual task.

All that has been said by now is mostly connected with internal elements deciding the outcome of our reforms. We should not forget also international scope and importance of our reforms. Failure or suboptimal outcome of the reform in one country sends bad waves and vibrations all around. It has been proven many times before; countries in our region are definitely not isolated islands. They all suffer or benefit from other nations' undertakings. Notwithstanding how we see our own country's position we are one way or another part of the wider region and often share the same borders, or at least similar problems. With that we also share advantages or disadvantages of our belonging to the region or problems coming from our historical inheritance. So in pursuing our tasks we should shape our Security and Defence reforms to suit our

national as well as international needs and we should not refrain neither from sharing our problems and achievements alike with each other nor from letting others to participate in sharing the benefits of our deeds. Workshops are definitely necessary and helpful but not enough to accomplish such an objective. Most of the speakers recognised that and spoke more or less in unison towards the necessity for more institutional, structural cooperation from the countries in the region. In doing so we should not hesitate to offer our experience where and when we have some, and even more we should not hesitate to admit we are not the keepers of eternal wisdom and knowledge and to learn from somebody else's experience. It is hard not to agree there is the ground for even more *bona fide* cooperation between our nations.

For quite some time all of our countries are well under way towards the reform. Some are leading, some are lagging behind, but all are more or less clearly committed to it. Our speakers clearly confirmed this throughout the Workshop. The reform processes last long enough to make it possible to draw some conclusions. There was an ungrounded expectation the Security and Defence Reform is something that could be achieved in a short time. Hand in hand there was an expectation the reform would save money for some other purposes. Even professionals, supposedly keepers of the expertise, believed it was possible to concentrate on some reform issues and leave others for better times without tangling with the complexity and variety of the demands, problems and issues inherited from the past. Without trying to prioritise its elements the Security and Defence Reform can not succeed without finding a way to address, more or less at the same time, following issues:

- downsizing,
- personnel management,
- conceptual changes,
- doctrinal and operational changes,
- equipment modernisation, and
- restructuring military budgets.

Downsizing can not be substitution for the Security and Defence Reform as a whole. There were too many politicians (and even some

professionals) in the past believing reform will come as a result of downsizing. It is just one, probably the first step towards making the reform processes possible and viable. It has to be followed immediately with the attempts to improve education and training of the remaining personnel, improving their quality of life inside and outside of the military barracks, and setting the clear criteria what is expected from the new generations of soldiers. Clear vision about forthcoming conceptual, strategic, doctrinal and operational changes has to be taken into account immediately as the element that will decide who will stay in the armies, who will have to go and what criteria have to be fulfilled by those entering militaries for the first time. On the sideline, as an example of the wrong approach I can not forget the statement made by one of the top military commanders in the region saying: "First we will downsize the Armed Forces and then we will build our strategy and doctrine around those who stayed!" Our equipment is everything but even close to the state of the art. Percentages showing the operational readiness of our equipment tell all that is necessary to know about this issue. Finally, structure of our military budgets has to be addressed. Spending 60-70% of the military budgets on the personnel salaries makes it impossible even to think about any reasonable Defence Reform. Getting to the acceptable structure of the military budgets and how to spend leftover money as a result of that process have to be one of the key elements in pursuing those five above mentioned elements. Those first five elements will be influenced by the broader vision of the restructuring budgets, but their implementation will also definitely influence achievement of this goal. They are mutually connected and depend on each other. Their implementation will at the end decide the outcome of our reforms. If there is something like "the end" in the Security and Defence Reform. And all of the above mentioned elements taken together are the only safeguard that our Security and Defence Reform process as a way of management of the strategic change within our structures will not become obsolete before they even begin in earnest.

Without any intention to overemphasize importance of some elements on the expense of the others it has to be said however there are unfortunately some issues, mostly politically rooted, that are likely to decide the outcome of the reform before and against all the other

elements. It has been mentioned by some speakers that long term financing of the Security and Defence structures is unknown quantity. Without the firm commitment of the political institutions, first and foremost the Parliaments, to secure necessary amount of the financing it will be almost impossible to execute successful reforms. Without that it might become impossible for the Armed Forces to fulfil the expectations of their nations. Having in mind grave needs of our Armed Forces, rooted in the long years when they were sadly neglected, it seems overly optimistic we could achieve our reform goals with military budgets around or even below 2% of the GDP. Something will have to be done in order to change decreasing trend of the security and military expenditures. But it is not likely it might happen before all of our economies start to grow at steady rates. So it seems that we have made a full circle and economical growth has become national security and defence issue number one.

As a conclusion we have to repeat and bear in mind that all our Security and Defence Reforms started with the general objective to have smaller forces under the general notion: the smaller is the better. Just think of how many ministers of defence told to their public their goal is to have smaller forces, and then sometimes in the next sentence they tried to explain the smaller forces would be better. But it has been said over and over again: smaller is just what it says – smaller. Nothing more, nothing less. Our intention to have smaller forces does not necessarily guarantee we will end up with the better forces. So it seems we should change our operational objective in pursuing reform processes. Instead the attempt to have smaller forces we have to switch our efforts to build better, more capable forces. Such an operational goal will most likely at the end lead us to the point when we will get what we wanted – better, more capable forces, and as a bonus we will also get smaller forces.

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DEFENSE CONCEPTS AND STRUCTURE REFORMS IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE

Introduction

Eleven months ago I was invited in Sofia to introduce the English and Bulgarian versions of the handbook on the parliamentary control over the security sector edited and published jointly by the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces and the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

Since then this small booklet has been made available in many other languages, to include Mongolian, Chinese, Tagalog, Albanian, Arab to quote a few. Specific versions are under study, especially in Africa, in order to reflect the specificity of some regions.

- And that is the first idea that I would like to introduce and develop here: the *specificity* and the *diversity* of the countries, of the regions, of the political structures, of the social, ethnic, economic, cultural, linguistic and historic background, make it impossible to have one model for all.
- The second idea which is not foreign to the first one, is that democracy brings about a certain number of prerequisites and of *principles* that ought to be respected by any nations claiming to be “democratic” in the true sense of the word. Democratic criteria are universal and well known. They are monitored by specialized institutions, namely the regional defence and security organizations but also and mainly, on a global scale, by the United Nations.
- The third idea is more “*technical*” in kind: the use of force is now widespread to tackle defence as well as security problems; most often these forces have to switch from a task to another. In

previous times, as reflected by the white papers, national security strategies and defence estimates of the early nineties, a stiff separation used to exist between the tasks of the police and the missions of the military. In theory it is still true; however, the day to day reality is different. In operations other than war, such as peace operations, peace making, peace keeping, peace restoration etc... the police and gendarmerie forces, generally very few to be deployed, are assisted, supported and protected by the military which has therefore to retain two abilities: - one to make war with traditional, but hi-tech assets, tanks, aircraft, weapons, communications etc... - and one to carry out peace and security missions. This double capability does not only require a new brand of soldiers but also a new type of structures, a new mode of recruiting and of training, a new concept of judicial support, new modes of logistical support, increased budgets and an improved civil military relationship.

- Another initial idea to be developed is of a *political* nature. Defence is not only –and no longer- a purely national business. It is inscribed in a regional and even a global context -except for rogue countries which still pursue a personal agenda or for “Continent like nations” which are so powerful that they think they can do it alone. Regionally, the states should comply with the regional security and defence organizations they are part of; of course not blindly, but at least on the principles and on the goals which are set collectively, in general according to the rule of unanimity. And globally, the unique and overall reference is and should remain the United Nations, an organization to reinforce and not to curb to our own interests.

Of course, this does not exclude bilateral relations, either within a region or globally, as bilateralism often translates in cooperation and efficiency; but it should not degenerate in a new coalition aloof of the other existing organizations: integration is the key word under the current international circumstances; not disintegration.

Preliminary Observations and Quotes

Having stated these few ideas in my capacity of a non dedicated specialist of South-East Europe, but of a man knowledgeable of the different brands of problems that have popped up through the Centuries and until now in this very fractured part of Europe, I would like to address them in more detail.

My experience in the field of defence reform goes back to the mid-nineties. Then a member of the MOD staff, I was personally involved not only in the drafting of the French white paper on defence, but mainly in its implementation, up to the planning of the three programme laws stretching from 1997 to 2015, the second of which is being currently enforced. I shall not even try to compare the experiences made in your countries and mine, but I shall state and bear some personal judgements on your own endeavours and on ours. There are no recipes, no universal guidelines, no models, no patterns, and no templates but there are many pitfalls and many examples of failed efforts.

In an effort to convince my students, and later, members of the national military staffs, parliaments and governments in charge of conceptualizing defence doctrine and structure reforms in countries, I used to refer to certain formulas, in no way magic, just inspired by common sense⁴.

For instance, I used to recall that Marshall Foch, the Supreme Allied Commander of the Western Alliance in 1918 used to welcome his subordinates and most of his visitors with a single question, always the same, calling for a precise, intelligent, timely and responsible answer: *"What is your problem?"* The answer had to be prepared, thought about and contain part of the resolution of the problem. The visitors had to figure out and to make a quick choice between what was relevant and what was not.

⁴ Alain FAUPIN, Chapter 4 : "Defense reform , the French Case Study" in " Post Cold War defense Reform (Editors Gyarmati and Winkler)- Brassey's Inc. Washington D.C.- 2002

I also used to recall that in most cases, whatever the efforts made to adapt to the new era and to answer the new threats, one condition of the success remained, beyond any doubt, in the change of habits and of mindset. I used to translate that in an old and colloquial American saying: *“Sacred cows make the best hamburgers”*.

Another quote, from Frederick the Great of Prussia, a true expert in strategic and military matters, comes also to my mind and relates closely to our topic: *“He, who attempts to defend too much, defends nothing”*.

And, last but not least, a complementary remark from General Gordon Sullivan, a former Chief of Staff of the US Army, currently President of the Association of the US Army in Washington, D.C.: he had to conduct the difficult endeavour to draw down the US Forces right after the fall of the wall and the first Gulf war. *“Smaller is not better, better is better”*: what he meant was that reduction of forces, base closures and restructuring was not enough in themselves; the goal was clearly to have a tool altogether:

- responding to the real needs and to the capabilities of the country,
- coherent with the national, regional and global security and stability requirements, and
- Comprised of the latest technological developments in the field of equipment.

Furthermore, experience shows that even in developed, stable and wealthy democracies, it takes at least one full year to produce a sound white paper and not less than 18 month to plan its implementation and have a decision made as to the selected options. *Time* is a strategic factor with which every reformer has to comply.

Experience allows avoiding mistakes and the study of lessons learned by others saves time and money while sparing efforts.

Money is another issue and it would be totally wrong to think that reducing forces and restructuring the defence and the security sectors would save money. It will cost money, at least during the first stages of the implementation of the plan. Members of parliament, ministers and executives of the Administration, of the Forces (armed forces, police, gendarmerie, border guard, etc) and of the civil society have to plan as far ahead as possible and be ready to stick to their plan and to defend it against the legitimate appetite of others ministries, namely, equipment, social and health, education, treasury to quote just a few ones.

Diverging and/or Converging Elements

Therefore I consider it fairly difficult, if not irrelevant, to speak in bulk of the reform of the security and defence sector in South East Europe. There are as many reforms as states involved and, once again it would be wrong to compare Bulgaria and Romania, Macedonia and Albania, Slovenia and Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia. Every one of these countries has a different perception of the threats to its national and regional security. Every one of these countries has a different status and level of commitment regarding the main institutions of defence and Security (EU, NATO, OSCE, and UN).

There are however some common points which can be highlighted, namely the will to be integrated in the EU and in NATO, lagging economies (in comparison to the West), important social requirements, which result in very limited *defence budgets*. One temptation was, for some states, to trade weapon orders against the promise of integration: costly tools that do not correspond to the true needs of the nation but please the ego of some heads of state or of ministers of defence: this is not defence planning but almost bribery. This kind of behaviour is a strategic nonsense and its effect will be felt in the long term without clear benefits for the country, neither in the operational field, nor in the political one. I do not think that any country in the Balkans and in the SEE escaped this vicious endeavour perpetrated by large defence industry groups with the support of their host countries. We are speaking here of expensive fighters, frigates, patrol boats, helicopters, missiles, communications systems etc...

Following this line, the criteria for admission into the NATO and the E.U are roughly the same, except for the figures and some specific problems related to minorities, geography and environment. The same prerequisites apply to all the candidates in the field of human rights and for the surrendering of war criminals currently at large.

There are also these fallacious incentives which might mislead the governments and the militaries of many states. Take, for instance the “global war against terrorism”⁵. It is now some kind of dogma to which every state is invited to comply otherwise it would be considered as a rogue, rebel and suspect state; this declaration of intention should become , in the eyes of the Superpower, hit for the first time in her history on her soil, the number one priority of every state in the world.

But I would personally consider that the first responsibility for a democratic state is **to exist** as such. And, for that purpose **institutions** are needed: that is the first priority. The second step is to have these institutions, including the defence and security ones to function properly and democratically. Nothing can be imposed from the outside until then, except the need for democratic institutions and certainly not incentives to participate to external operations in the name of “Global war against terrorism”. Defence Institution Building needs to be the main, and I would say the unique, objective of the coming decade for most of the countries of the region.

The framework is clearly the European Union, with the backing of the UN, the monitoring of the OSCE and the technical assistance, support and advice of NATO.

I am certainly not in a position to point out and to criticize such or such country which would have made the choice to send forces abroad to fight “global” terrorism whereas domestic terrorism is taking its share of lives and of the economy back home. Most of these countries have not yet defined their defence and security concept; do not know yet what format, structures, assets, budgets their forces and their defence

⁵ GWOT in the US jargon

institution will have, and they are already wasting their scarce resources in costly and minuscule participations far away from homeland where security is lagging behind the requested level for joining EU or NATO. One could say: “that is the best way to be recognized as a full member of the International Community”, or: “we need experience and only this kind of operations will provide us with the opportunity to get it, or, most often: “that is none of your business”.

I do not want to shock you, but I personally think that with the same amount of resources, the impact on homeland and regional security would be far greater than that of a very often ignored participation far away in the anonymous middle of a huge coalition. There is so much left to do locally and I cannot help thinking of three examples: Bosnia, Cyprus and Kosovo.

“Conflict resolution must always be considered as a purely political process, focused on the search of compromises between the different parties”⁶. And, in that sense, it is possible to say that the Bosnian problems have finally been provisionally solved (late, by lack of an initial agreement between the Western powers, namely US vs. Europe), whereas it has been and still is a failure for Cyprus and Kosovo. For Cyprus, the compromise was not reached because the Turkish side has been favoured and the Greek side found it detrimental to its interests. Another round of political- and not military- initiatives will be necessary. As far as Kosovo is concerned, the failure has been total. The problem is pending. Ethnic cleansing has not been checked. The military solution has only brought about the inversion of the roles: from a threatened Albanian minority in Serbia, we have switched to a persecuted Serbian minority: the April 2004 events, has shown the extent of the problem when the Albanian mobs managed to destroy totally or partially 22 of the 32 guarded Serbian cultural and religious sites. Isn't terrorism on our doorstep?

NATO and the EU have focused the attention of the states on the so-called “New Threats”. It is wise. However, one should not underestimate

⁶ Carl Bildt in « La politique de sécurité et de défense de l'UE, les cinq premières années »- Institut d'études de sécurité de l'UE- Paris summer 2004.

le remaining and more ancient problems still alive in surrounding regions.

I do not want to elaborate more on this issue which relates to our topic in that *the first responsibility of the states in the region is to be able to promote, achieve, support and guarantee regional stability.*

This goal can only be reached through national political consensus, through a democratic process, through national parliaments but also through a thorough review of the strategic and security environment.

The EU, once again, shouldered by the OSCE is the key player in that field. It has already defined the intermediary objectives and is providing a dedicated support, through different assistance funds and donor countries, to (the processes. But my personal feeling is that we have put the cart before the horse. It is not too late, but high time to revert the trend... and our contribution to the fight against global terror will be more efficient and more durable.

The Components of an updated Concept of Defence

Now it is important, in my eyes, to pose the right questions as to the changing contents of the defence concepts in the region. Once again, it is impossible to review piecemeal the different national defence concepts in existence -or in being- in South East Europe where large nations, middle size states and smaller ones strive to co-exist and to cooperate.

For that purpose, I highly recommend the reading of a recent study written by Mr Stein Henriksen⁷, and soon to be edited and published. It successively focuses on the following points

- The constitutional and the legal contexts

7 Mr Stein Henriksen is Senior Adviser, Norwegian Directorate of Civil Protection and Emergency Planning;. This draft, entitled “ The changing content of the Total defense Context in Norway” is part of a wider study: “European Experiences of Total Defense- Impact on Transatlantic Homeland Security” to be published by Dr. Dan Hamilton (a senior fellow at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University)

- The strategic context
- The National Security Strategy (-range of risks, dangers and threats, -national interests and objectives, - integration in international security structures)
- The National Military Strategy
- The domestic political context and the public attitudes of the State regarding the current issues
- Homeland security tasks and mission areas (-intelligence and warning, - Border and transportation security, - domestic counter-terrorism, -critical infrastructure, protection of the key assets – Emergency preparedness and response, civil protection.)

There is neither the need nor the place, in my opinion, to develop here each one of these points. My feeling is that for small or middle size states, the experience of Norway and the way this NATO country has reviewed its security and defence problems and switched to a new system are interesting and worth consideration... even though it is not part of the European Union, ...yet.

Conclusion

South East Europe is still very far away from its objectives.

Considerable amounts of efforts and of wealth are still requested from the international community, especially from Europe, to stabilize the region and even to maintain peace and order.

At the same time, many other spots in the world are afire or in deep crisis and need urgent help and assistance from the donor countries: remember Africa's outcry, comparing the lack of support of the West with what was done with Bosnia (deployment of 50.000 soldiers, staffs, NGOs etc...) in a time when one million Rwanda's were being

slaughtered without a sigh from the West (with some exceptions however).

Europe is not yet, if it has ever been, an island of prosperity in the middle of a dangerous world. Wars and crises still mar the Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia) and other spots in the direct vicinity of this area. Not only do terrorist acts aim often at Europe, but they are also often concocted **in** Europe. The recent enlargement processes have brought the European borders closer than ever to the arc of crises (Caucasus, Middle East).

Moreover, it is obvious now that Europe is no longer the main strategic concern of the US which has considerably reduced their presence in Europe. Less than 7% of the American forces are now earmarked for NATO. And the transatlantic link is not at its best, probably for several years. Through intricate economies, Europe is intimately part of every single crisis in the world, willy nilly.

Under these conditions, it is high time for processes of reconciliation to take place between the different communities and it is essential that centuries long squabbles find their conclusion now. Nothing will ever be possible without this. The role of the SEE parliaments and political leaders is first and above all to reach a fair level of reconciliation within and with their close neighbours, through political settlements. EU and OSCE, in accordance with the UN principles of good governance will do the rest.

Compromises should be found by negotiation and enforced by the sub region itself. It is totally abnormal for any given European country to have to be militarily present, today, in the 21st century, in another European country, unless invited for an exercise or for technical assistance. Europe has better to do than to waste its youth, its budgets and its energy in sterile village squabbles of another age. Europe has to complete its construction and to take step in all the main areas of the international life. The sooner, the better.

Seemingly, all the necessary assets are in the hands of the local political leaders, and the support of the international organizations is still available, but perhaps not for long: the West European and international resolves have limits. The popular and political shall take over without further delay.

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ECONOMY – THE NEW SECURITY PERSPECTIVE FOR SEE

The Balkans has been and remains an important strategic and political factor in international affairs and especially in European politics. Obviously, peace and stability in this region would have far reaching effects. Needless to say, differences among the Balkan countries exist. However, a historical review of their economic links, as well as their recently acclaimed aspirations to be part of the European integration process, show that cooperation is logical for the benefit of all in the region. Perhaps for the first time in history, the emergence of a common cause in the region, namely integration with Europe, is an opportunity not to be missed. The future of the Balkan countries lies in regional cooperation. But in order not to repeat the mistakes of the past, certain guidelines have to be developed and strictly adhered by all. Since economic integration seems to be the most promising area for now, efforts should be canalled into that field.

For all too long western governments have failed to achieve constant engagement at all levels, but after a long absence, optimism has returned to Balkan politics. The nowadays wider Balkans is an example, which proves how incentives of Euro Atlantic integration could and have brought stability and advancement towards democracy and functioning market economy.

In my presentation I will concentrate upon two key aspects. After an account of the current state of play and the historical overview, I will try to show one of the possible ways to bring stability as a new perspective in strengthening security. One of the ways to achieve security objectives in nowadays interdependent world economy is by using economic instruments, such as economic sanctions and economic incentives. But we still do not have a clear understanding of the conditions under which economic statecraft can achieve security objectives. Of course, mmost

experts estimate that the chances of rapid economic revival in the region are very slim in spite of the numerous integrative initiatives, both external and internal, aiming at promoting regional economic co-operation and development...

Frankly speaking, Southeastern Europe is the most conflict and troublesome region on the Old Continent. In his book "The Light That Failed" Joseph Kipling even stated: "The world outside receives information about the Balkans only in occasions of terror and turmoil occurring therein and for the rest of the time this region is contemptuously ignored." These words were written in the end of the XIX century and a lot of time has passed, however, the image of Southeastern Europe as a place of unrest and insecurity still remains. During the past two or three years the interest towards the region significantly decreased, but somehow only to confirm the words of Kipling. The transformation process is yet to be completed and future political practices will probably lead to positive changes related to the returning of a number of Balkan states into the family of European democratic countries. Along with this clearly defined tendency, we also expect a new country fragmentation. It is our hope that this time, this will take place in a peaceful and civilized way, without violence and victims, but there is a possibility that the need for security will have to face new challenges and threats. This is why the issues related to the particularities of the region, its complex historical path and the contemporary peacemaking and security problems will be the most challenging topics for researchers for years to come.

Now, let me get to the point. From a traditional perspective, national and international security has been primarily determined by military factors. But it may be said that the non-military challenges are far more numerous and threatening. Developments throughout the world demonstrate more and more that security and stability, political and social alike are multi-dimensional concepts, and that economics is one of the most important dimensions. Europe, including the Balkans, is becoming more stable and peaceful, and there are no indications that there will be any armed conflicts in the near future.

In fact, a review, even a cursory one, of these developments clearly indicates a direct link between economy and security, which in most cases translates into the reality that where the economy is more developed, prospects for security and stability are much better. Within the region of SEE discrepancies of the last century, combined with economic stagnation, backwardness, primitivism in the agrarian sector and the low standard of living generate dissatisfaction among many social groups, collision of interests, social unrest and frequently, particularly if related to ethnic communities position, to interethnic and even broader conflicts. So, *one of the main factors contributing in the past years to the insecurity on the Balkans is related to the total economic drop in the countries in transition*, the repeated reduction in living standard, high unemployment, the high taxes, the grey economics, the incontrollable crime and corruption and privatization at any cost. Following the big depression of the 30's, no other region in the world has registered a greater cutting in production during peaceful time, a faster unifying of the population and a deeper social stratification. For example, according to EBRD the production and consumption per person in Bulgaria is about five times lower than in the Check Republic, four times lower than Hungary, nine times lower than Slovenia. Bulgaria will be able to achieve the average production and consumption of the countries in the EU at the earliest in 2069, provided that the other countries stop their development and our own economics hits an annual economic growth of 4%. Vienna's Institute for International Economic Research data shows that compared to 1989 the GDP of Albania has decreased by 14%, for Bosnia and Herzegovina – by 66%, of Bulgaria – by 33% and of Croatia and Romania – by 22% each.

Statistics show that while in the end of the 80s the GDP of the Balkans was three to five times lower than the average indicator for Western Europe, and at the end of the 90s this difference increased to ten times. This blocking of progress was caused by the scarce raw materials and energy resources, the high indicators of foreign debt of the countries, the inability for competition and the high production value for the greater part of Balkan countries – mainly these with economics in transition.

What have been said, does not mean at all a one way approach, since it is equally clear that economic development depend on the policies promoted, be they at national or international level. Appropriate policies generate a greater feeling of security, which in its turn generates increased incentives for economic activities and, as a direct result, more prosperity. To try to put it in other words, security can thus be achieved more easily, provided of course that one paramount condition is fulfilled, namely that prosperity spreads to the greatest extent possible over all the members the society. It is an objective that can only be properly obtained when economic development and prosperity are the result of democratically established policies.

It suffices to look to the map of the world, especially Western Europe, North America and Japan, to see this assertion confirmed.

Perhaps, an even more convincing confirmation of the strong link between economics on the one hand and security and stability on the other is provided by the way countries in CEE, south-eastern included, evolved after the cold war.

A little bit of history...

Since the early nineties, on the background of a vanished bipolar conflict and increasing globalisation, economic factors have increased in importance, and the prospect of economic welfare has become a major instrument to control existing or potential conflicts. The complex business problems of most of the Balkan countries originate also from the occurring globalization which is understood as an ever increasing integration of national markets. This irreversible process is bringing an increase in the wealth and influence of the countries with developed economies. At the same time, the copy-paste policy of their business structures is not always the correct response to the long-lasting interests of the individual Balkan countries. Through globalization these countries are losing a greater part of their sovereignty by transferring it to the powerful multinational companies and banks. The economic limitations of the Balkan countries do not allow them to partake in the division of the globalization benefits. Instead of integration in the world economy through progressive business restructuring and increase in the volume of

high technology production the Peninsula remains in the periphery of world economics and is actually continuing to move away from the level of the West European countries. The experience of developed countries in regard to reducing to a minimum the damages caused by globalization is at the cost to the less developed countries, including the Balkan region. This is carried out mainly by means of mechanisms of international economic relations and main organizational structures. Currently there are no foreseen changes in the methods used in the activities of organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, etc.

The problems connected to the economic development, are experienced all over the region, relating to the common transitional difficulties and specific national solutions. The fundamental readiness to provide economic assistance by the current EU member states and *a perspective for unstable areas to participate in the successful integration process within the European Union somewhere in the future may be appropriate means to induce the respective countries to cooperate and to solve their territorial, ethnic, ideological or religious differences*. Of course, the speed as well as the magnitude of the process has been different from country to country. The reality is, as indicated *inter alia* by the recently published annual report of the European Commission on candidate countries, that some are more advanced, others are lagging behind. It is, however, extremely important that in all cases the process has become irreversible.

The Euro-Atlantic integration

Today the key question now is the smooth, and here I want to stress on smooth, integration of the region in the existing European economic and security structures. The EU is running the biggest economic reconstruction package in its history in the Balkans. As always, efforts have been hesitant, often contradictory and sometimes inefficient. The contribution made by different external projects for social and economic cohesion and stability in the region for the region turned out to be quite limited also. The European initiative Royamon originating at the end of 1995, the American plan Shifter from 1996, as well as the Stability Pat in

South-eastern Europe did not achieve the required economic and political stability and show low results in regard to the so called out-of-region factors. Yet, after a number of conferences and feasibility studies, the EU funds seem insufficient to kick-start local economies and cannot act as a substitute for genuine political integration, but... Since the Thessaloniki Summit the region acquired concrete prospects for EU membership. The perspective of EU membership will help, and is already helping tremendously those countries to carry out the difficult political and economic reforms and restructuring. EU membership will guarantee sustainable peace and stability for the future generations. EU enlargement will affect positively the broader neighbourhood and international security. Enlargement must not create new dividing lines in Europe. The expanded EU area of stability and prosperity can only be sustainable if it also extends to the neighbourhood. This goal can be reached by jointly addressing common threats and by promoting shared values and enhancing economic development, interdependence and cultural ties. This strong determination to implement market reforms, the clear vision of Euro Atlantic integration, the desire to foster regional dialogue and co-operation and the support of neighbouring countries have transformed the region into an area of political stability, security and economic advancement. These changes occurred in the last years. From a region of ethnic hate, religious intolerance and conflicts, the wider Balkans, thanks to the mutually reinforcing actions of the EU, NATO and the OSCE, gradually turned into an area of increased stability.

One of the most significant changes in the state of affairs of the regional security is the accession of Bulgaria and Romania for full NATO members.

So, in conclusion I think *we can* say that the Euro-Atlantic perspective for all countries in the region is a quite significant factor for stability. The even, balanced and sustainable social and economic development of the region, development which should primarily rely upon collective utilization of the regional resources and potentials, human, natural and cultural is an essential prerequisite for the efficient collective security system. Each of the countries is at a different distance away from

entering the European Union. Many of the countries already have deadlines specified for completing the negotiations, such as Bulgaria and Romania. Some will officially deposit their application for membership in 2004 and others already entered the circle of the developed West European countries.

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PART 2:

EXPERIENCE IN REFORM BY NATO MEMBERS

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THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW PROCESS AS A TOOL FOR CONCEPUALIZING DEFENCE DOCTRINE AND STRUCTURE REFORMS IN THE BULGARIAN MILITARY - THE BULGARIAN EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS LEARNED

The Bulgarian Strategic Defence Review (SDR) was designed as an essential element of the overall defence transformation process. It served as a tool for tailoring our response to the new defence requirements and security commitments as a result from our NATO membership and active engagement in and contribution to international efforts to fight terrorism and bring peace and stability to conflict regions and countries.

As a result of the SDR we produced a Long-term Vision for Development of Troops and Forces – 2015. This Vision provides the basic parameters of the manpower, structure, armaments and equipment of the Armed Forces and serves as a foundation of the Plan for Organizational Build-up and Modernization of Forces till 2015 that we have just drafted.

Another follow-up of the SDR was the drafting of new Security Strategy as well as a concept for participation of the Republic of Bulgaria in military operations abroad while the principles and approaches to force build-up and employment shall be determined in a new National Military Strategy.

The new requirements and responsibilities set a new security agenda for the Republic of Bulgaria. I shall not elaborate on the relevance of defence reforms to this new agenda. Defence transformation is a must in the present security reality. And yet, we should aim to make our forces

not just respond but correspond to the security needs. Building modern capabilities through transformation, modernization and professionalisation is a general objective that can be achieved only by precisely targeted and prioritised actions. That was the very intent of the SDR – to identify where we are now, where we want to go in the future and how best to do it.

The SDR was meant to provide alternatives to align our forces and capabilities to our defence strategy. And the very core of this strategy has changed. It is now based on non-traditional, preventive and pre-emptive approaches and solutions, on complementing and coordinated efforts to employ political, economic, technological, information, military and civil resources. This strategy builds on the indivisible nature of security and the collective environment in which it is guaranteed. Membership in NATO gives new opportunities to achieve the national security objectives but also allocates new responsibilities. It implies a collective guarantee for the national security as well as a collective setting for joint decision-making, planning and employment of capabilities and forces.

And intentionally we picked up the time to conduct the SDR – following the successful implementation of Plan 2004 and right on the doorstep to NATO membership, the first one providing a solid foundation for further development of new and better capabilities and the latter outlining the future collective defence setting.

Building on the threat assessment, we have identified what capabilities our forces should have so that we could respond and perform effectively. The defence capabilities are our potential to execute defence missions and tasks to support national security policy. They integrate doctrine, education and training, organization, manning, equipment, technologies, infrastructure, combat readiness and logistics. Thus, defence transformation should entail all those elements so as to make our forces modern, usable and effective.

Our major task is to continuously develop and improve our capabilities. Its successful implementation does not simply mean more troops and

assets. It means forces that are more usable though less in number. It means concentration of efforts on the development of expeditionary forces that could deploy quickly and effectively.

The SDR concluded that our forces must comprise combat capable, multifunctional, mobile, manoeuvrable and modular units with high combat effectiveness. They should be useable across the full spectrum of missions and deployable for operations in the NATO area of responsibility. They should also be kept at an appropriate level of graduated combat readiness and be interoperable with the forces of our allies.

One of the essential conclusions of the SDR was that fewer units but interoperable, better manned, equipped, and trained shall generate better and more effective combat capabilities. At present, the majority of our in-place forces are outdated and non-interoperable. We still need to decide what in-place forces we need to retain, both for training purposes and for NATO Article 3 demands, and how best to plan their modernisation.

A key message of the SDR has been that interoperability, deployability and usability are the major requirements to our forces. They should be ready to participate in NATO-, EU- or UN-led peace support and stabilization operations in the immediate vicinity or in geographically distant regions and have more than the traditional combat capabilities. They will be increasingly interacting with local authorities and populations and involved in post-conflict reconstruction that require enhanced skills and capabilities.

The Republic of Bulgaria's accession to NATO and our strong determination to be an effective and efficient member require that national policy, planning and procedures are aligned with those of the Alliance. Bulgaria is determined to ensure that national decisions for deployment of forces are taken timely; that force planning is designed in a way that would enhance the effective fulfilment of the Alliance missions as well as its successful transformation.

The deployable forces are a priority in the Armed Forces' development. Their combat and expeditionary capabilities shall allow them to fulfil most missions and tasks that are currently assigned to in-place forces. Major efforts shall be focused also on multifunctionality in order to increase operational effect and reduce cost of personnel, infrastructure, combat equipment and training.

Planning shall be transformed from a threat-based to a capabilities-based one and be aligned with NATO Force Goals Package. Attention shall be focused on building new structures of the Armed Forces that have the necessary defence capabilities and reach better operational results.

The Armed Forces need to be structured so as to perform effectively the missions and tasks assigned to them. The force structure has been determined based on the operational visions and scenarios that have been developed for the services as well as based on the forces and assets required for the completion of their basic tasks.

Functionally, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria shall consist of active forces and support elements and forces of lower readiness. The Active Forces shall comprise a package of modularly structured deployable forces that could be used across the full spectrum of NATO-led operations and a small package of highly capable forces that generate immediate reaction forces to contribute to national security in peacetime and counter potential asymmetric threats in particular. The support elements and forces of lower readiness shall include in-place forces for logistic and maintenance support, bases, depots, etc.

The new structures and capabilities of the Armed Forces shall be effectively managed by a three-level command structure, comprising strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

In the SDR process we identified the need to improve the leadership and management of forces on the strategic and operational level. As a result, we made a comprehensive review of the existing administrative and management practices in the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff. Its objective was to help ensure effective and efficient management of

forces by abolishing duplicating structures and functions and optimizing the human resources.

In order to maintain effective operational command and control we established a Joint Operational Command (JOC) as an instrument for implementation of the principle of jointness. The JOC shall execute the planning and the operational management of units from the Bulgarian Armed Forces during their participation in operations both inside the country and abroad while the Services HQ shall be responsible for recruitment, manning, training and providing units and sub-units to JOC for both joint training and participation in operations.

In order to achieve an optimal balance between capabilities and resources we have established a Force Development Management System that ensures the development of capabilities to perform security and defence tasks. The system integrates 3 complex subsystems: the Required Operational Capabilities Subsystem, the Integrated Defence Resource Management Subsystem and the Acquisition Subsystem. We have been working on an Integrated Professional Development and Personnel Management Subsystem that will be an integral part of the Force Development System.

The need to develop usable and effective forces has been one of the incentives to start the process of full professionalization. We believe professional forces are more effective than conscript ones. According to our plans the Air Force and the Navy shall be fully professional by the end of 2006, and the Land Forces – by the end of 2010. Despite the tendency to build fully professional Armed Forces, recruitment of conscripts shall continue till 2010. Modernization of forces, in accordance with the projected manpower, armaments and equipment, is an essential element of the process of their comprehensive transformation. It is a major tool for building the required operational capabilities and our intention is to plan it so as to ensure development of priority capabilities. To that end, in May 2004 the Government approved 11 priority modernization projects.

Modernization shall require considerable funding that amount up to 20-25% of the annual defence expenditure in the next 10 years. And following the Parliament's decision to fund operations abroad separately from the defence budget, I believe we would be able to allocate more resources for R&D and modernization. The long-term force planning requires stable defence resources. The main principles in the resource allocation and spending are the maintenance of a balance between the defence requirements and the national potential, the efficiency and effectiveness as well as the prioritization of capabilities of forces.

The defence resource management is carried out using the Integrated Defence Resource Management System based on the programme approach. The Bulgarian Government has declared its commitment to maintain the annual defence expenditures within 2,6% of the GDP for the period 2005-2007. For 2007-2015 the forecast relative share of these expenditures shall be the same so that we can allocate the appropriate resources for implementation of the Plan for Organizational Build-up and Modernization of Forces till 2015. A major task of the Ministry of Defence in the next decade shall be to reduce the operational and maintenance costs and increase the capital investment.

Effective membership in NATO and defence management call for prompt solution of a few other issues, such as the alignment of defence related legislation, targeted investment in human resources and mainly in education and training, guarantee of security in all its aspects, adoption and implementation of NATO standardization agreements, etc.

I would like to conclude by saying that the comprehensive transformation requires a new security philosophy, strategy and culture. Such transformation shall allow us to develop our forces and procedures so as to be able to perform effectively the assigned tasks both at home and in Alliance or coalition environment.

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TRANSFORMING THE BULGARIAN ARMED FORCES AND THE CHALLENGES OF DIVERSITY IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERN HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT POLICY DEVELOPMENT

1. Introduction

In the recently approved Strategic Defence Review in Bulgaria the establishment of modern human resources management policy is recognized as a basic requirement to ensure sustainable development of defence capabilities. It should provide an “effective system to recruit, employ, educate, train, motivate, retain and discharge personnel” (Strategic defence review policy framework, 2004). The equality in employment and integration of minority groups and females in the military organization is a key dimension of this policy in the context of the transformation of Bulgarian armed forces and the emerging post-modern trends.

The aim of the paper is twofold:

First, to analyse the potential of the Bulgarian armed forces for social integration of diverse ethnic groups. In addition, it aims at exploring how possible systemic and attitudinal barriers operate and influence the successful development of equal opportunity policy in the Bulgarian armed forces.

Second, to summarize some recommendations for the development of equal opportunity policy in the military based on critical analysis of domestic practice and lessons learned from the comparative study on the European and the North American experience.

The analysis in the paper is based on the results from a research project carried out by the author in 2003-2004 on the topic “Managing Ethnic, Cultural and Gender Diversity in All-Volunteer Forces: Applicability of the US Model to the Bulgarian armed forces”.

2. Managing Diversity in the Post-Modern Military: Theoretical Framework of Analysis

The main post-modern trends of military institution are related to implementation of non-traditional missions; abolishment of conscription and development of small professional military to respond to the new security threats; changing the roles of the military professionals from “soldier-warrior” to “soldier-statesman”; full integration of women in the armed forces; increasing role of civilian employees in the military, etc. (Moskos, Ch. C., Williams, J. A., Segal, D. R., 2000). In brief, the post-modern military can be characterized by the processes of diversification of the missions and tasks as well as diversification of personnel. These trends can be observed and are common also for the contemporary Bulgarian armed forces. Under these challenging circumstances a key research agenda of both academic and policy interest focuses on introduction of Equal Opportunity Policies (EOP) in the post-modern military and a number of reasons are presented in support of the making armed forces representative of the populations they serve. Most of these reasons are valid to the present-day Bulgarian military.

The first group of arguments raises the issues of social justice and citizenship building and relates to the military institution’s contribution to the process of social integration of minority groups. Charles Moskos argues that the US Army provides “bridging environment” in which “black and white social attitudes can become significantly closer in egalitarian settings with shared experiences.” (Moskos, Ch. C., 1998, 25)

With respect to the UK military, Christopher Dandeker and David Mason argue that the “military service can provide ethnic minority communities with a sense that they are valuable elements of the social and political system. They feel included not excluded; skills enhance

their socio-economic mobility; and a range of leadership skills can be transferred back to local communities. All these could be seen, then, as facets of a process of citizenship building” (Dandeker, Ch. & Mason, D., 1999, 62).

The second group of arguments often characterized as “business case” is related to the abolishment of conscription and the shift to All-Volunteer Forces (AVF). On the one hand, it is argued, “the services could benefit from being seen to live up to the ideal of being an equal opportunity employer. While this may enhance their standing in ethnic minority communities it is just as important to sustain the legitimacy of the armed services and thus to found good will amongst the general public (Dandeker, Ch. & Mason, D., 1999, 61). In addition, the development of AVF raises the question of how to keep the military fully integrated into society. As Donna Winslow writes “it is important that the Canadian Forces be integral to the society it serves, not isolated from it, therefore the composition of the military must reflect the population it serves [Winslow, D., 1999, 35]. On the other hand, in the context of the shift to AVF, “the pursuit of greater representativeness would improve access to a wider recruitment pool as the armed services compete with civilian companies for scarce labour both in terms of quantity and quality.” [Dandeker Ch. & Mason D., 1999, p. 61].

The third group of arguments relates to the greater effectiveness of “race and gender mixed” military organization, particularly in the case of international peacekeeping operations [Miller, L. & Moskos, Ch. C, 1995, 635]. The accumulated skills to work in multicultural environment in the course of diversity management training could be very important for the success of contemporary international military operations.

The discussions on the issue of managing diversity in the post-modern military puts the question of equitable representation of minority groups and females in the armed forces in a new context. The diversity is understood as a challenge to the traditional integration and a generator of institutional innovation.

3. How Diverse are the Bulgarian Society and the Armed Forces today?

Bulgaria has multiethnic and multicultural population. According to the last national census of March 2001, the group of ethnic Bulgarians composes 83.6% of the country's population. The two major ethnic groups, Bulgarian Turks and Roma, represent correspondingly 9.5% and 4.6% of the whole population. Small ethnic groups like Tatars, Armenians, Jewish and others represent 1.5% of the population. The rest of 0.8% did not show their ethnicity (National Statistical Institute, 2002).

As far as the religious communities in Bulgaria are concerned, 83.8% of the population identify themselves as Christians, 12.1% as Moslems, 0.2% as others and 3.9% did not show their religious identity (National Statistical Institute, 2002).

There are no officially published statistics about ethnic and religious self-identification of the military. For that reason, data from a recent representative sociological survey carried out among the military will be utilized to give general impression about diversity among the service members. Among the conscript soldiers, 81.8% identify themselves as Bulgarians; 12.4% as Turks; 2.7% as Roma and 3.1% – others. As regards professional service members, Commissioned officers (COs), Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and volunteer soldiers, 98.0% identify themselves as Bulgarians, 1.5% as Turks and 0.4% as others. Concerning religious diversity, 75.9% of conscript soldiers identify themselves as Christians, 12.2% - Muslims, 1.4% - with other religion and 10.4% atheists (Tomova, I. T., Yanakiev. Y. V., 2002, 54).

The above figures illustrate equitable representation of main minority groups among conscript soldiers. In the same time significant under representation exists among the professional military corps. This situation needs clarification. As a rule, before the democratic changes in Bulgaria in 1989 the predominant part of the young people of Turkish and Roma communities used to do their military service (including conscript) in paramilitary formations like the Construction or Transportation troops, which did not pertain to the regular armed forces.

Handful representatives of these groups could join the military academies or NCO's schools. This was an "unwritten law", guaranteed and supported by the Communist Party structures, security services and administrative system of the totalitarian regime. Obviously, one of the reasons for the under representation of Turkish and Roma communities among the professional military nowadays is the lack of tradition during the totalitarian period of the Bulgarian history. It is not realistic to expect a rapid growth of their representation among the professional military corps for only a decade. The other factor that can explain the situation is relatively weak interest among the representatives of these minority groups to join the military as professional service members probably due to lack of information about the procedures, requirements, career opportunities, etc. Finally, there are some objective barriers such as the level of education and proficiency in Bulgarian language which some of the young men and women from Turkish and Roma groups cannot meet.

For instance just 23.7% of Turkish ethnic group and 6.9% of Roma have graduated from high school. Regarding the university education the trends are even more negative. Merely 2.7% of Roma and 7.2% of Turkish people have completed university or college education (National Statistical Institute, 2002).

In spite of what the reasons for this significant under representation of minority groups among the professional military corps are, the situation deserves particular attention, research and implementation of an effective EOP in the Bulgarian armed forces.

Regarding the issue of females' integration of in the military, there are real achievements and a good basis for further development. The first group of female cadets has been accepted in the Army academy in 1988. Following female cadets have been accepted also in Air Force and Navy academies. Currently 2326 women serve at different positions in the BAF. The share of females among volunteer soldiers is 13.3%, among NCOs and sergeants - 6.8% and among COs - 1.9%. (Official report of Personnel Department of the General Staff, 2004)

4. Existing Legislative and Policy Framework for Promoting Diversity in the Bulgarian Armed Forces

The democratic legislation adopted in Bulgaria after 1989 has established political representation for the minorities and a working model of representative democracy accepted and upheld by the society. The equality before the law and the ban on discrimination are regulated in the Constitution which states that "all people are born free and equal in dignity and rights" and "all citizens are equal before the law. No restrictions of their rights or privileges are permitted on the grounds of race, nationality, ethnic belonging, sex, origin, religion, education, convictions, political affiliation, personal or social position, or property status" (Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, Article 6 (1) (2), 1991)

With the recently approved Anti Discrimination Act, Bulgaria complied fully with the EU requirements on the ground of equal opportunity policy and on the protection of human rights. It "bans any direct or indirect discrimination based on gender, race, nationality, ethnicity, citizenship, origin, religion or belief, education, political affiliation, personal or social status, physical disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, property as well as any other criteria defined by the Law or by the International treaty on which Bulgaria is a part" (Anti Discrimination Act Article 4 (1), 2003).

Important legislative and administrative measures have been undertaken to ensure equal rights for all Bulgarian citizens to join the military. The Law of Defence and the Armed Forces clearly states, "All men, citizens of the Republic of Bulgaria, fit for military service, without difference of race, nationality, religion, social descent and family position, which have 18 years of age, shall be liable to military service." (Law of Defence and Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria, art. 97, Para 1, 1995)

To summarize, there are many important developments in legislative and political sphere, which pushed forward the process of building a new legitimacy of the Bulgarian military as an institution, which represents its parent society. In the same time, new challenges have emerged that need detailed study and formulation of practical recommendations. The

importance of the research is growing because the equality before the law is just one of the basic prerequisites for introduction of equal opportunity policy in the public sector, including the military. The next more difficult step is to implement the law or to put equality into practice.

5. The Potential of the Military Institution in Integration of Ethnic and Cultural Groups

The Bulgarian armed forces, like the other military organizations all over the world, comprise some specific features that could be viewed as prerequisites or factors that may support the process of social integration of ethnic and cultural groups. Charles Moskos, when analyzed the process of racial integration in the US Army, described as one of the main strengths of the military the fact that “black and white social attitudes can become significantly closer in egalitarian settings with shared experiences.” In addition, “the more contact white soldiers had with black troops, the more favourable was their reaction toward racial integration.” [Moskos, Ch. C., 1999, 13] Despite significant contextual and cultural differences between the US Army and Bulgarian armed forces, one can find many common features between the two military organizations. The reformed armed forces after the democratic changes in Bulgaria has been developed as an institution, which unites all service members, despite of their ethnic and religious identification, around common goals. The military provides “egalitarian settings” based on equal rights and obligations of all service members despite of their ethnic, religious or cultural identification. In addition, it provides good opportunity for “shared experiences” forcing personnel to work and live 24 hours together and stimulating teamwork.

Another essential strength of the military organization, which could be interpreted as a prerequisite for ethnic integration, is the specific risky environment accompanied with many difficulties for the service members. They are forced to work together to overcome common risks and difficulties. As Moskos argue “a rule of thumb is that the more military the environment, the more effective the integration. Interracial comity is stronger in the field than in the garrison, stronger on duty than

off, and stronger on post than in the world beyond the base.” [Moskos, Ch. C., 1988, 17]

Next important “specific nature of military life”, which could support the process of ethnic minorities integration, is the hierarchical structure of the military, based on order and discipline. The US experience shows that “the main reason that integration succeeded in the military has to do with the special nature of military life. Orders, once given, must be followed, whatever a soldier’s private feelings or misgivings.” [Moskos, Ch. C., 1988, p. 19] In addition, the military institution has power mechanisms to regulate tensions, including possible tensions on ethnic or religious base.

Assessing the professional education and training of the military in the BAF, one can say that this is another important strength of the organization and prerequisite for successful implementation of the process of minorities’ integration. The commanders are highly educated and qualified and the military institution has the capacity to develop additional specialized education and training of the cadre to cope with specific, new situations like integration of minority groups into the BAF. Most of the COs and NCOs have internalized the requirements of the good leader - to treat in just and in equal manner their subordinates, to take care of them, to stimulate teamwork. Most of the military leaders demonstrate high morale, sense of responsibility, obedience and humanism that is an important prerequisite for development of skills to manage diversity in the Bulgarian armed forces.

Last but not least, the high public confidence in the military⁸ as a non-partisan, national institution that all Bulgarians despite of their ethnic, religious or cultural background perceive is vitally important to the country is also an important factor in support to the process of minority’s integration. In this sense, the Bulgarian armed forces can play the role of nation-building institution and to support the process of social integration of minority groups at national level.

⁸ Opinion pools carried out in Bulgaria in the period after the democratic changes in 1989 found confidence in the Army as an institution to have varied between 63% and 70%, and lack of confidence, between 10% and 12%.

In brief, the military institution combines very important specific features that could be interpreted as prerequisites for integration of minority groups. One can hardly find other state institution in Bulgaria that combines all these features which gives reason to define it as a “bridging environment”. The problem is that these potential strengths are not fully utilized yet.

6. Main Barriers to the Implementation of Equal Opportunity Policy in the Military

The analysis of the legislative and political developments in Bulgaria in the past fifteen years shows that despite important achievements in guaranteeing equal treatment of minority groups and females in the military, there is still no comprehensive EOP in place in the Bulgarian armed forces. One of the indicators in support of this conclusion, which is being usually applied to measure the progress in the EOP implementation, is the fact that the main ethnic minority groups are significantly underrepresented among the professional military. In addition, there are also some indicators of inequality in employment with respect to females, related with obstacles to access to so-called “battle positions” (Yordanova, Sv., 2003). The completed studies proved the existence of certain problems that can be interpreted as barriers to the process of practical implementation of EOP in the military, which must be carefully analyzed and measures to their gradual overcoming should be taken. Therefore, the main stress in this paper is laid on identifying the main system and attitudinal barriers to successful execution of equal opportunity policy in the Bulgarian military and to summarize some recommendations for the improvement of the present situation.

6.1 System Barriers to the Implementation of Equal Opportunity Policy in the Military

The term *system barrier* was defined in the research as “policies, guidelines or procedures, which intentionally or unintentionally favour one group over another” (Winslow, D., 1999, 48). One should add that the lack of transparent, appropriate and adequate policies, guidelines and procedures for selection and recruitment of military personnel free of

ethnic, religious, sex, etc. criteria could be interpreted as system barriers as well.

According to the results from recent expert study one of the most important system barrier for the professional realization of minority groups in the military is the requirement of the Armed Forces Act for the candidates for volunteer soldiers and NCOs to have completed high school education. Having in mind comparatively low educational level of young people from Turkish and Roma minority, this requirement automatically excludes large proportion of these groups from the recruitment pool for professional military service (Angelov, A. Z., 2004, 118). Those are 20.7 % of Bulgarians, 53 % of Bulgarian Turks and 44.9 % of Roma, who have completed elementary education and might be suitable candidates for some positions providing they demonstrate appropriate qualifications and positive aptitude to military service.

Beside this problem attention should be paid to the lack of well-established system for personnel education and training in working in a multiethnic, multicultural and gender mixed environment. The analysis of survey's data shows that there exist low awareness among the military about ethnic, cultural and gender diversity and sporadic attempts to recognize and to accommodate differences. Furthermore, attention deserves also unsatisfactory developed military system for psychological support, which has to assist the commanders' work, including the activities in interethnic relations management.

With respect to the equality in employment of females in the armed forces, one can say that there are no legislative barriers to join the institution and to make professional carrier. In the same time, according to the results from recent studies there exists a possibility for restrictive treatment applying different procedures for selection and recruitment for particular positions through insertion of specific requirements in the job descriptions. Ethic considerations and the interests of the military organization usually motivate these acts. (Yordanova, Sv., 2003). Therefore, the experts recommend to change the normative basis for the females' service in the military and to provide free access to all positions

excluding only those that could impose danger for women's health and generative abilities.

6.2 Attitudinal Barriers to the Implementation of Equal Opportunity Policy in the Military

The term *attitudinal barrier* was defined in the research as “beliefs, and/or behaviours that can lead to a non-supportive work culture and environment” (Winslow D., 1999, 48). In accordance with this definition the completed sociological surveys identified three basic problems that could constitute attitudinal barriers to the realization of the EOP in the Bulgarian Armed Forces. The first problem is related to comparatively widespread and stable prejudices and stereotypes towards the main minority groups among different generations Christian Bulgarians both in the military and the society. In the same time, there exist reciprocal prejudices and stereotypes against Christian Bulgarians among the representatives of minority groups as well. The second one concerns existing comparatively high interethnic distances between Christian Bulgarians, Bulgarian Turks, Muslim Bulgarians and Roma. The third issue is related to the predominantly negative attitudes of the majority towards possible appointment of representatives of the two biggest ethnic groups – Bulgarian Turks and Roma at key positions in State administration, the armed forces and police. (Yanakiev, Y., 2002) All these problems could be interpreted as potential source of ethnic or religious based harassment and could produce tensions in the introduction and successful implementation of EOP in the Bulgarian armed forces.

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

The integration of minority groups in the Bulgarian armed forces has become one of the most important issues that affected civil-military relations during the last fifteen years. The reason is that under the conditions of transformation of the Bulgarian military from a “guard of socialism” to a “guard of democracy”, the integration of previously adverse ethnic groups like Bulgarian Turks and Roma into the regular armed forces is one of the bases of building a new legitimacy of the

military institution. A significant progress in the legislative and political sphere was achieved during the period of democratic government in Bulgaria as a result of which many legal barriers for the full professional realization of the minority groups' representatives in the public sector, including the military were eliminated.

The decision of the Bulgarian National Assembly for gradual abolishment of conscription and development of All-Volunteer Forces⁹ put the issue of equitable representation of minority groups in the armed forces in a new context and made it even more sensitive for both the society and the military. In a completely different situation when the BAF switch to manning entirely on voluntary basis, the institution has to develop as an equal opportunity employer in order to attract broader public support and to keep the military fully integrated into society.

Under these circumstances the main challenge in front of the political and military leadership is to develop a policy and to implement a strategy for providing equal opportunity for professional realization in the military adequate to the changing situation in the organization and consistent with the international experience and the national specifics. The main stress should be laid on the development of comprehensive institution-level policy as an integral part of state-level anti discrimination policy.

In order to fulfil this strategy some important practical steps have to be undertaken by the society and the military. Briefly they can be summarized as follows.

First, the reach of a higher representation of the basic ethnic communities among the professional military corps should become a priority in the equal opportunity principle implementation. In this regard a pro-active personnel policy for attracting qualified applicants for professional service members from the basic minority groups' should be implemented.

⁹ According to the Bulgarian Strategic Defense Review this process has to be completed until 2010.

Second, the successful implementation of EOP in the Armed Forces requires a review and actualization of the active duty service legislation according to recently accepted national anti-discrimination legislation. In this regard, the necessity of keeping the of Armed Forces Act requirement for soldiers and sergeants' candidates completed high school education needs a careful assessment.

Third, the realization of the Armed forces equal opportunity policy will not be successful without the establishment of a specialized institutional body for coordination, analysis and control of the equal opportunities' principle implementation process. At national level the newly established ombudsman can play this role. At institutional level it would be useful to establish "Equal Opportunity" section at the Personnel Department of the Ministry of Defence.

Fourth, some consideration should be given to the establishment of a system for personnel education and training in working in multiethnic and multicultural environment.

Fifth, some concern should be given also to the Bulgarian Armed Forces units staffing with specialists which to assist the commanders work with their subordinates, the so called "human relations management specialists", which will have an additional training in Bulgarian basic ethnic groups' customs, culture, traditions and psychology.

Last but not least, to be successful in the implementation of an Armed Forces equal opportunity policy the Ministry of Defence will need comprehensive, multi-disciplinary and policy-oriented studies. The research is expected to fill the gap in theoretical elucidation and particularly translation and adaptation to the Bulgarian cultural, legislative and organizational context of concepts as "affirmative action", "managing of integration", "gender mainstreaming", "valuing differences" and "diversity management". In addition, little is known on how different organizational barriers are operating at the point of entry during the recruitment and selection process as well as inside the institution. With respect to attitudinal barriers it is important to know how the specific Bulgarian military culture and the traditional combat

training are related to the effectiveness of equal opportunity programs. Furthermore, the ability of minority groups to integrate into organization and to participate effectively in the organizational culture is another basic question, which deserves additional research attention. Not the least, there is clear need to promote study of advantages and possible disadvantages of the concept of diversity for military organization from the perspective of military effectiveness, cohesion and teamwork in the units.

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CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY IN ROMANIA AND BULGARIA (1989-2004)

Abstract

This paper tries to determine the nature of the post-Communist Eastern European systems of civilian control over the armed forces. In addition to this, it tries to identify why and how most Eastern European countries have adopted since 1989 Western models of civilian oversight of the military, formally abandoning their previous Communist models. The combination of Western paradigms, Communist legacies and pre-Communist patterns of civil-military relations have led since 1989 to new, hybrid forms of civilian control over the armed forces. The continuity of traditional types of civil-military relations (before and after 1989) has clashed during the post-Communist period with the discontinuity created by the adoption of new norms and principles in the interaction between civilian institutions and military organizations. The new Eastern European models include, in addition to Western characteristics, a commonly-agreed civil-military division of labour in policymaking processes dealing with security and defence issues.

Introduction

Acknowledging a direct relationship between systems of control over the military and countries' stability and security is commonsensical. As early as the 19th century, various scholars claimed that the way civil-military relations are organized in various countries influences their political stability, their military presence in the world and, ultimately, their own security. Since then, there has been a growing understanding that different systems of control over the armed forces lead to different security outcomes. This issue, therefore, transcends the area of domestic policies and acquires international significance. On the one hand, the type of relationship between the military establishment and civilian authorities in

a certain polity is important for the latter's political character and its development. On the other hand, it is one of the key elements in assessing a country's place in the international arena, facilitating, delaying or blocking the accession of a country, or a group of countries, to military or political international organizations.

This paper puts this relationship in the context of post-Communist Europe. It argues that most Eastern European countries agreed to adopt Western models of civilian control over the military. Thus, they agreed to abandon their previous Communist models of oversight, due to the transformation of the international strategic environment and the new nature of their domestic political systems. They have promoted the idea of a profound transformation of their civil-military relations, yet that has not happened as smoothly as initially predicted. Nevertheless, in most Eastern European countries, the formal changes have fundamentally altered the way military leaders and civilians interact when dealing with security and defence issues.

The paper, more specifically, clarifies why and how Romania and Bulgaria have adopted, since 1989, new models of civilian control over the armed forces. The research indicates, from a comparative perspective, the way in which these two countries have promoted policies of mimicry in the process of transformation of their national armed forces. It identifies the balance between domestic and external factors affecting the post-Communist evolution of the Romanian and Bulgarian civil-military relations and the process through which these types of factors have affected each other. This paper argues that changes have been triggered in two distinct ways: the willingness of these countries to join Western politico-military structures has led to processes of domestic reform in order to meet the criteria for membership in Western international organizations, while the latter have pushed Romania's and Bulgaria's military reforms in a direction that has best met these organizations' interests. Nevertheless, this process has led to a relatively unexpected situation in which the models of civilian control over the armed forces set up in these countries are based – at the same time – on Western liberal characteristics, Communist traits and national specificities.

This study focuses primarily on the issue of civilian control over the armed forces, not on the broader topic of civil-military relations. It deals with the period from the revolutionary changes of 1989 to March 2004, when

Romania and Bulgaria formally became members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, the interaction between the military establishment and political authorities during the Communist period in Romania and Bulgaria is reviewed in a separate section in order to provide a background for the post-1989 context.¹⁰

This paper presents three main arguments: (i) the transformation of Eastern European systems of control over the armed forces has been achieved, since 1989, mainly by replicating Western models; (ii) the transformation of post-Communist Eastern European systems of civilian control over the military has been triggered mostly by external factors; and (iii) the adoption of Western models of civilian control over the armed forces in Bulgaria and Romania has led to the creation of new, hybrid forms of oversight of the military. The research is explanatory, investigating the causal relations between various domestic and external factors and the achievement of new systems of civilian control over the military, as well as the nature of these systems.

I. Analytical framework

During the Communist period, the patterns in the organization of a system of civilian control over the military varied from country to country in Eastern Europe. Thus, countries such as Romania and Bulgaria followed different paths in setting up and managing systems of civil-military relations. Nevertheless, all these dynamics were consistent with what are usually known as “Communist models” of civilian oversight of the military. Until 1989, despite variations in terms of domestic organization and international relations, countries such as Romania and Bulgaria were

¹⁰ Throughout this paper the concepts of “control” and “oversight” of the armed forces are interchangeable. The group of “Eastern European” countries comprises the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), the *Visegrad* states (Poland, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Hungary), Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and the countries of ex-Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro and Macedonia). The “Western” group comprises the European countries that were not part of the former Soviet area of influence and also includes Canada and the United States of America (USA). By “armed forces” or “military” it is understood in this context the army, the navy, the air force and their General/Defence Staff; therefore, there are not included under the umbrella of “armed forces” or “military,” from the perspective of this paper, paramilitary structures or militarized types of police, gendarmerie, border guards and other similar institutions. Focusing extensively on the military establishment per se is not within the scope of this paper; the focus will be rather on civilian authorities, either interacting with the armed forces or simply making decisions on military roles and functions.

entirely part of the Communist bloc and used typical Communist models of civil-military relations.

When, in the 1990s, Romania and Bulgaria started, more or less shyly, to adopt measures consistent with “Western models” of civilian control over the armed forces, their civil-military relations became blurred. This happened because of the inconsistency between the newly adopted norms and principles (expressed through a Western type of legislation, for instance) and the historically constituted types of practical behaviour (e.g., emphasizing the importance of informal civil-military interactions and disregarding existing legislation). The *discontinuity* in terms of legal frameworks and formal rules of conduct (seen more clearly after the mid-1990s) has clashed with the *continuity* in terms of unofficial, yet very influential types of civil-military relations. This is the main reason why in order to understand post-Communist developments in Eastern European civil-military relations understanding Communist practices is imperative.

This paper proposes two models of civilian control over the armed forces by stating their main characteristics in such a way as to be clearly distinct from each other. This will prove to be particularly useful when analyzing post-Communist types of civilian control, allowing us to identify the elements of continuity and discontinuity in Romanian and Bulgarian civil-military relations as compared with the situation prior to 1989. Communist models of oversight of the military and Western models are defined here based on five fundamental features of each.

Communist (or authoritarian) models are characterized by the following traits:

- a relatively confusing legal framework, meant to consolidate not only the formal, but also the informal power of the Communist Party’s leadership;
- a focus on coercion rather than consent in implementing and legitimizing policies, ensuring the Communist Party’s control over the armed forces;

- a (mostly conscription-based) military establishment whose leaders held significant political influence;
- an authoritarian political system, concentrating the power in the publicly unaccountable leadership of the Communist Party;
- a virtually non-existent civil society.

Western (or liberal) models of civilian control over the military are based on the view that “the armed forces are by nature hierarchical structures and thus inherently undemocratic and, for that reason, have to be brought under *democratic* control.”¹¹ These models are also characterized by several key features:

- a relatively clear legal and/or institutional framework regulating the relationship between civilian authorities and the military;
- a democratic political system, providing the mechanisms to ensure the free expression of people’s will in a majority of situations and to facilitate public scrutiny of military actions;
- a (mostly professional) military recognizing the legitimacy of the political system and the rule of law, and acknowledging the need for its own political neutrality as an institution (i.e., politically non-partisan);
- the subordination of the armed forces (i.e., the General/Defence Staff) to the Government, through a civilian-led Ministry/Department of (National) Defence, and to the civilian Head of State (i.e., a clear chain of command, with civilian leaders at its top), and a significant role for the Parliament in making decisions on military (especially budgetary) issues;
- the existence of a civil society, involved in a public debate on military issues.

¹¹ Heinz Vetschera, “Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control: A European Security Policy Perspective,” in *Military Assistance to the Civil Authorities in Democracies: Case Studies and Perspectives*, edited by the NATO Defense College, (Frankfurt: Peter Lang GmbH, 1997), p. 15.

I.(1) The Communist models of civilian control over the military

During the Communist period, this field of study should more appropriately have been called “Party-military” relations. Yet, although very different from Western liberal models of civil-military relations, the Communist models of political oversight of the armed forces were also based, to a significant extent, on the superiority of civilians (i.e., Communist Party leaders) in the strategic decision making processes dealing with military issues. Key differences between the two models are the lack of a democratic component and the high level of politico-military integration in Communist cases.

Three major theoretical perspectives have been formulated for dealing with civilian control over the armed forces in Communist regimes. They are represented by the work of Roman Kolkowicz, William E. Odom and Timothy Colton. Alternative theoretical perspectives that deal with this same topic in the Eastern European context have been formulated by various other authors, the most prominent of whom is Alex Alexiev. Roman Kolkowicz’s perspective may be called, as some scholars have suggested, the “interest group approach,” William E. Odom’s perspective – the “institutional congruence approach,” Timothy J. Colton’s – the “participatory approach” and Alex Alexiev’s theoretical model – the “evolutionary approach.”

According to the *interest group approach* of Roman Kolkowicz, the relationship between civilian authorities and the military in Communist regimes (especially in the Soviet case) was conflict-prone, thus presenting a perennial threat to the political stability of the polity. This situation would have occurred mainly because of the military’s desire to cultivate its own professional and institutional (i.e., elitist) values and to remain relatively isolated from politics and the larger society. Roman Kolkowicz points to a certain incompatibility between the Communist Party’s endeavour to hold on to its monopoly of power and the armed forces’ need for professional autonomy: “as in zero-sum games, where any advantage of one adversary is at the expense of the other adversary, so the Party elite regarded any

increment in the military's prerogatives and authority as its own loss and therefore as a challenge."¹²

At the same time, the military's effectiveness was essential to the well-being or even the survival of the regime. Nevertheless, the implementation of Communist policies in the military field would have led to "various collectivist schemes whose central objective was to prevent military elitism, but whose major effect [was] to lower discipline, morale, and military effectiveness."¹³ While the armed forces – Roman Kolkowicz argues – seldom opposed the principle of civilian control, they did oppose the type of Party supervision that interfered with the performance of their professional duties. The author of the interest group approach adds that not only the establishment of a multiple control network in the armed forces, meant to indoctrinate and manipulate the military, led to this tense relationship between the Party and the officer corps. The so-called "divide-and-rule" policy, meant to accord preferential treatment to favoured factions within the armed forces, also contributed to this situation.

In opposition to the interest group approach, the *institutional congruence approach* of William E. Odom states that, in a majority of cases, "the military probably [stood] closer to the Party than [did] any other public institution."¹⁴ Odom rejects Kolkowicz's interest group approach, arguing that the armed forces' elitism was accepted by the Party, the conflict between the military professional autonomy and the subordination to Party ideology was virtually non-existent and the focus in the Party-military relations was not so much on the armed forces' detachment from society, but – on the contrary – on their integration. William E. Odom considers five different perspectives that would underline the validity of the institutional congruence approach (i.e., the lack of incompatibility or disagreement over fundamental issues, which would have characterized Party-military relations). On the issues of (i) economic decentralization, (ii) intellectual dissent, (iii) nationality problems, (iv) political and economic liberalization in Eastern Europe, and (v) de-Stalinization, the Red Army, among other armed forces, tended to agree with the leadership of the Communist Party

¹² Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 105.

¹³ Kolkowicz, p. 13.

¹⁴ William E. Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique," in *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems*, edited by Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), p. 32.

of the Soviet Union. Grouping all these points together serves to demonstrate that “there are firm grounds for arguing that a Party-military consensus on a variety of issues [did] exist.”¹⁵ This made the Party control over the armed forces much more effective and easier to implement.

In order to consolidate the argumentation for his theory, Odom tries to prove that the military was just an administrative arm of the Party: “[w]hen there were cleavages in the leadership over military policy, they were intra-Party factional divisions, not just a division of Party versus military.”¹⁶ The author argues that the military was first and foremost a political institution. Furthermore, the Party-military relationship would have had symbiotic aspects in domestic politics, by contributing to the modernization of the Communist societies. The bottom line of the institutional congruence approach is that the military leaders were acting as executants of Party policies; it was no viable rationale for challenging the existing political order.

Timothy J. Colton argues that both the interest group approach and the institutional congruence approach have important shortcomings. The weakness of the former is related to its inflexibility in accounting for change: “to define the question in terms of a single, conflictual issue ... is to limit and even distort the range of possible answers.” Likewise, the latter may also lead to an oversimplified analysis, while it implies “a disregard for civil-military boundaries.”¹⁷ What Timothy J. Colton proposes, instead, is a model portraying the military and the Party as distinct entities with different agendas; nevertheless, the armed forces were not inclined to challenge the political leadership, because the military’s interests were well served by the Party.

The *participatory approach* of Timothy J. Colton retains a notion of civil-military boundary, “one that is permeable, to be sure, but that has a definite shape and location”¹⁸. It argues, however, that the Party and the military were not totally separate institutions. Despite the conflictual nature of their relationship, the armed forces were not inclined to use force against the

¹⁵ Odom, p. 33.

¹⁶ Odom, pp. 41-42.

¹⁷ Timothy J. Colton, “The Party-Military Connection: A Participatory Model,” in *Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems*, edited by Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), p. 70.

¹⁸ Colton, p. 73.

Communist political leadership because of their effective cooperation on matters of interest for the armed forces. The scope of military participation in Communist politics – the participatory approach suggests – was not limited to influencing “internal” military matters or “institutional” issues of broader significance; it ranged through more and more general issues, such as “intermediate” ones, dealing with the interests of military officials, but being also of primary concern to other segments of society, or “societal” issues, affecting all citizens. The military participation in Communist politics (especially in the Soviet case) and the civilian supervision over military issues constituted, therefore, “a complex set of reciprocal interactions, between institutions and across institutional boundaries.”¹⁹

Despite the complexity of these theoretical models, some scholars suggest that none of them by itself can shed light on the Eastern European situation. Alex Alexiev, for instance, argues that all three main models (the interest group approach, the institutional congruence approach and the participatory approach) are very useful in increasing the understanding of *specific phases* in the evolution of civilian control over the Eastern European armed forces. He proposes an *evolutionary approach*, a model which conceives the Party-military relations in Eastern Europe “as proceeding through stages of conflict, accommodation and participation, leading ultimately to a symbiotic relationship.”²⁰ In order to analyze the evolution of types of civilian control over the armed forces in Bulgaria and Romania prior to 1989, employing the evolutionary approach is particularly helpful. It allows researchers to be more flexible in studying these issues and it also allows them to incorporate all other theoretical approaches in looking for patterns of Communist civil-military relations.

Romania was characterized between the end of the Second World War and the late 1950s by a system of civilian control over the military most closely associated with the interest group approach. Between the 1960s and 1989, however, after a short period of transition, the participatory approach seems to more properly describe the Communist oversight of the armed forces in Romania.

¹⁹ Colton, p. 73.

²⁰ Alex Alexiev, “Party-Military Relations in Eastern Europe: The Case of Romania,” in *Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats*, edited by Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 201.

Similar to the Romanian case, the period between the end of the Second World War and the late 1950 was generally characterized in Bulgaria by a conflict-prone relationship between the Communist authorities and the armed forces, i.e., by a situation most closely associated with the interest group approach. Unlike the Romanian case, however, the paradigm describing more accurately the period from the 1960s to 1989 in Bulgaria is the institutional congruence approach rather than the participatory approach.

Thus, despite their similar position on the geopolitical map of the time, Bulgaria and Romania were characterized by Communist systems of control over their armed forces proceeding through different stages of development in each particular case and from each other. The essence of the 1989 revolutionary events, in both Bulgaria and Romania, tends to emphasize these patterns of civilian control over the armed forces in the second half of the Communist era.

In Romania, the existing dissatisfaction of the military with Communist Party policies was clearly expressed in December 1989 when the armed forces played a decisive role in the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime. The military, however, only backed the actions of a second echelon of Party leaders involved in staging the uprising against the Ceausescu regime. They did not collaborate with the leaders of the revolutionary movement from the very beginning and when they agreed to collaborate they did so reluctantly (mainly because they sensed an opportunity to improve their status in the new political context). The military were, during the events of December 1989, as before, a relatively distinct institution from the Party, with their own internal agenda.

Unlike the situation in Romania, the overthrow of the Bulgarian Communist leader, Todor Zhivkov, and his clique in November 1989 was accomplished through direct cooperation between the military leadership and Party conspirators. Petur Mladenov, the then Communist Minister of Foreign Affairs, received the crucial support of General Dobri Dzhurov, the Minister of Defence, and of the armed forces per se in fostering the removal of Todor Zhivkov. The bloodless political change in Bulgaria, which allowed the emergence of a reformist regime, was achieved through the same Party-military consensus that had characterized the relationship between the two institutions for several decades.

In sum, the Romanian military's relationship with the Party authorities evolved from a conflictual stage to a participatory, yet tense, one. Although characterized as well by a conflictual relationship after the Second World War, the Bulgarian armed forces and the Bulgarian Communist leaders eventually engaged in a more congruent type of relationship. Depending on the specificities of their Communist civil-military relations, Bulgaria and Romania would undergo, during the post-Communist period, different (but convergent) organizational changes in the field of civilian control over the armed forces.

I.(2) Western models of civilian control over the military

Even more than in the Communist cases, the general Western models of civilian oversight of the armed forces are characterized by heterogeneity. Virtually every Western country has its own system of control over the military, involving different rules and procedures. The types of civil-military interaction in the USA are different from those in Canada, which are again different from the ones in Switzerland, for instance. Nevertheless, the underlying norms and principles shaping the various relationships between civilian authorities and military organizations in the Western world are common for all Western countries. They have been continually discussed over the last two hundred years and more or less systematically implemented (especially after the Second World War). Leading intellectuals have been involved in the debate on the proper and most productive type of interaction between the soldier and the state.

Since the early 19th century, when Carl von Clausewitz wrote his classic work *On War*, Western scholars and practitioners have agreed that the system of civil-military relations promoting in a most effective way the interests of both political authorities and the military is the Western one. Its fundamental thesis is that civilian authorities should be independent from the military establishment and should lead the latter. For instance, “[i]f war is part of [political] policy, policy will determine its character,” nevertheless – and this is the other essential aspect pointed out by most students of this field – policy should not “extend its influence to operational details. Political considerations do not determine the postings of guards or the employment of patrols.”²¹ Carl von Clausewitz underlined that purely

²¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 606.

military major decisions, either in peacetime or in wartime, are not only unacceptable, but also damaging. As Clausewitz put it, “[s]ubordinating the political point of view to the military would be absurd, for it is policy that creates war [for instance]. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war is only the instrument, not vice versa.”²²

Samuel Huntington adds new nuances to the Clausewitzian perspective. Underlining the need for a professional military establishment, he argues for the necessity that civil-military relations be studied as a system composed of interdependent elements and analyzes the extent to which this system “tends to enhance or detract from the military security of the state.” His model introduces two types of civilian control over the military: subjective and objective. The goal of the former is to maximize the power of civilians in relation to the armed forces; this presupposes, however, a conflict between civilian control and the security needs of the state. Moreover, in this case, “the maximizing of civilian power always means the maximizing of the power of some particular civilian group or groups,”²³ such as governmental institutions and social classes. The second type of civilian control involves the maximization of military professionalism, based on the separation of the political and the military decision making processes. Samuel Huntington recommends the model that emphasizes military professionalism, the objective type of civilian control in this case. “Subjective civilian control – Huntington underlines – achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state.”²⁴

He builds his model based on the assumption that the military institutions of a state are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative (that stems from the threats to society’s security) and a societal imperative (stemming from social forces, ideologies and institutions). Nevertheless, “[m]ilitary institutions which reflect only societal values may be incapable of performing effectively their military function. On the other hand, it may be impossible to contain within society military institutions shaped purely by

²² Clausewitz, p. 607.

²³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 80.

²⁴ Huntington, p. 83.

functional imperatives.”²⁵ Huntington’s professional military establishment has a complex relationship with the modern state, based on a clear division of labour. As a consequence of this principle, the armed forces must not only implement state decisions with respect to military security (while being allowed to run their own internal affairs), but also remain politically neutral.

According to S. E. Finer, “[i]nstead of asking why the military engage in politics, we ought surely to ask why they ever do otherwise. For at first sight the political advantages of the military *vis-à-vis* other ... groupings are overwhelming. The military possess vastly superior organization. And they possess *arms*.”²⁶ He argues that the armed forces may enjoy a highly important moral prestige, but, on the contrary, they would lack the “technical ability to administer any but the most primitive community. The second is their lack of legitimacy: that is, their lack of a moral title to rule.”²⁷ This moral title should, instead, characterize the political leadership of a state; otherwise, ruling by virtue of force would invite challenge and would lead to an unstable system of governance.

Finer’s greatest contribution to the debate on the role of civilian authorities and the armed forces in the contemporary state is actually a critique of the professional model of the military, one of whose main proponents is Huntington. Even in a system based on the principle of civilian supremacy – Finer argues – “the military’s consciousness of themselves as a profession may lead them to see themselves as the servants of the state rather than of the government in power. They may contrast the national community as a continuous corporation with the temporary incumbents of office.”²⁸ Moreover, military leaders may think that the armed forces are the only institution able to objectively assess military issues. They may also refuse to coerce the government’s domestic opponents, if asked to do so. All these three tendencies, which Finer considers to grow out of the armed forces’ professionalism, could determine the military to collide with civilian authorities. Finer concludes, therefore, that professionalism is not – as Huntington puts it – the universal solution to ensure civilian control over

²⁵ Huntington, p. 2.

²⁶ S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), p. 4.

²⁷ Finer, p. 12.

²⁸ Finer, p. 22.

the military establishment. “To inhibit such a desire” to intervene – Finer adds – “the military must also have absorbed the principle of the supremacy of civilian power.”²⁹

A related perspective on the issue of political oversight that would both enable the military profession “to perform its national security duties and provide it with a new rationale for civilian political control” is proposed by Morris Janowitz in his well-known *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. His model postulates that the armed forces (or, using his terminology, the “constabulary” forces) are a creation of the larger social structure, that the military establishment increasingly resembles police forces and that the military institution should retain close links with the society. The constabulary model argues for the need of integration of the political and military decision making processes, along with the military’s socialization within the larger society. The officer in the constabulary force, Morris Janowitz argues, “is subject to civilian control, not only because of the ‘rule of law’ and tradition, but also because of self-imposed professional standards and meaningful integration with civilian values.”³⁰

In this context, civilian authorities must find adequate solutions for the problems faced by the military establishment and must formulate standards of performance for the armed forces. According to the constabulary perspective, “[i]n a pluralistic society, the future of the military profession is not a military responsibility exclusively, but rests on the vitality of civilian political leadership.”³¹ This model of civilian oversight of the military is based on the assumption that the political authorities permit the officer corps to develop its professional skills and to maintain its code of honour, while the latter “recognizes that civilians appreciate and understand the tasks and responsibilities of the constabulary force.”³² Like the previous models, the constabulary paradigm assumes the existence of a democratic political system, including clear rules and procedures defining the responsibilities of the Parliament, the Government and the Head of State, and a significant role for the civil society.

²⁹ Finer, p. 24.

³⁰ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, (New York: The Free Press, 1960), p. 420.

³¹ Janowitz, p. 435.

³² Janowitz, p. 440.

These Western models of civilian control over the armed forces have not only proved to be successful over time, in different challenging situations for the Western world, they have also have been adopted by virtually all Eastern European countries after the fall of their Communist regimes. Despite conflicting approaches over specific types of civil-military interactions, the Western models have apparently been the ones best fitting the political and security-related needs of Eastern European countries since 1989. That is, they have been the models embracing “the accountability of the armed forces to democratic institutions and the supervision of military administration and operations by civilian authorities,”³³ which have become the goals of the leaders of both the new Eastern European democracies and Euro-Atlantic politico-military organizations. At the same time, however, the elements of discontinuity in terms of new patterns of civilian control over the armed forces (whose emergence has been facilitated by the will of the new political forces in the region) have not been strong enough to entirely annihilate the elements of continuity in terms of traditional, yet very influential, types of civil-military relations.

II. Factors Affecting the Post-Communist Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Eastern Europe

The political changes of 1989 imposed a dramatic reconfiguration of the relationship between the military and civilians in Eastern European countries. Several main factors have been identified as influencing this process: Eastern European policies oriented towards integration into Western organizations, a set of conditions imposed by these institutions and a Communist legacy, in addition to traditional patterns of civil-military relations in those societies.

One of the most underrepresented theoretical variables in the analysis of civil-military relations is the geopolitical context.³⁴ Nevertheless, there is a growing tendency to look at the impact of global threats and the influence of international institutions on the evolution of national systems of civil-military relations. Since 1989, most Eastern European countries have

³³ Ben Lombardi, “An Overview of Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe,” *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, vol. 12, no. 1 (March 1999), p. 13.

³⁴ See: Mark Yaniszewski, *The Comparative Study of Post-Communist (Transitional) Civil-Military Relations in Eastern Europe* [Ph.D. thesis, not published], (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1997), pp. 164-166.

agreed that the best option (if not the only one) to redefine positively their place in the world would be to become full members of Western structures. On the other hand, the Western countries, willing to meet this challenge, but also “to project stability” in neighbouring regions and – sometimes – guided by a sense of duty to reunify Europe, have defined specific criteria for membership in European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Thus, in order to be accepted into organizations such as NATO or the European Union (EU), the candidate countries have at least to initiate extensive programs of reform in most societal fields based on Western guidelines.

The changes in the area of civil-military relations have been formally implemented by domestic political forces. Yet Chris Donnelly, a NATO Special Adviser for Central and Eastern European Affairs, points out: “as all Western countries have had to struggle with this problem over time, there is a value in Western specialists sharing their experience and analyses of the problem, as certain elements may nevertheless be applicable to the new democracies.”³⁵ Consequently, European and Euro-Atlantic politico-military organizations have become directly involved in the process of transformation of the relationship between the military establishment and political forces in Eastern European countries.

Since 1989, when Romania and Bulgaria abandoned their Communist political system, their armed forces have been subjected to a radical process of transformation. During the early 1990s, the two countries acknowledged the necessity to reconsider their membership in the former Warsaw Pact and to look for alternative ways of ensuring their national security. The need for their association to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was expressed by the two countries in the mid-1990s, when they considered much more seriously the idea of formally applying for NATO membership. In order to achieve that status, Romania and Bulgaria had to initiate more radical reforms of their security and defence institutions and policies, to meet the criteria for membership imposed by NATO for its candidate countries. In addition to increasing their cooperation with Romania and Bulgaria, NATO member states underscored at the North Atlantic Alliance’s summits in Madrid (1997) and Washington, D.C. (1999) their “political pledge towards South-Eastern Europe, being aware that, as the developments of recent

³⁵ Chris Donnelly, “Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A Framework for Tackling the Problem,” *NATO Review*, no. 1 (January 1997), p. 15.

years have proved, general stability in Europe is closely linked to the stability of this region.”³⁶

II.(1) Eastern European factors

After an initial phase, in 1989-1990, when the control over the armed forces was formally transferred in Eastern Europe from the former Communist regimes to the new governments, the first contacts were established, in 1991-1992, with Western politico-military organizations. Piotr Dutkiewicz and Sergei Plekhanov argue that, at that moment, several options were formulated for reorganizing Eastern European countries' national defence: (1) a reformed Soviet alliance, (2) neutrality, (3) regional security cooperation, (4) pan-European security and (5) integration with the West (i.e., NATO). “On balance, however, the choice for [most Eastern] European governments (supported by the majority of population, as polls indicated) was clearly pro-NATO,”³⁷ as it was for integration into broader Western structures, such as the EU, which have been seen as guarantors of freedom and prosperity. From an Eastern European perspective, as stated in the Vilnius Declaration (2000) of NATO's nine candidate countries (Romania and Bulgaria included), the goal of NATO enlargement would be the creation of a free, prosperous and undivided Europe.

These choices were based not only on what Jeffrey Simon calls “euphoria resulting from the revolutions themselves [and] optimism about a ‘Return to Europe’ by joining NATO and the European Community, now the European Union.”³⁸ They were also based on real or imagined security concerns, given the decades-long subordination of most Eastern European countries to Moscow's interests. There were more immediate reasons as well: Chris Donnelly argues that NATO membership, for instance, would offer these countries an opportunity to “maintain their sovereignty and military systems, but at a low level of strength, and assure their national

³⁶ Claudiu Degeratu, “Civil-Military Relations in Romania: Objectives and Priorities,” in *Civil-Military Relations in South-East Europe*, edited by Plamen Pantev, (Vienna: Institut für Internationale Friedenssicherung, 2001), p. 157.

³⁷ Piotr Dutkiewicz and Sergei Plekhanov, “La politique du << mimétisme >> : les relations civilo-militaires en Europe de l'Est,” *Études internationales*, vol. XXXII, no. 2 (June 2001), p. 288.

³⁸ Jeffrey Simon, “East Bloc Military Must Be Civilian Led,” *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, September 4, 1995, p. 10.

security at lower cost.”³⁹ A *Reuters* analysis of the reasons determining Romania and Bulgaria to actively promote the idea of their NATO membership adds some other elements to this equation: “[f]or both, joining NATO has significant symbolism, anchoring them in the West, providing stability for foreign investment and rewarding painful if not complete reforms.”⁴⁰

At a time of general readjustment, with time and money strictly limited, most Eastern European countries, “sure of their national reorientation, but without a clear idea of how to achieve it, first looked at NATO as an organization which would come and solve all their problems.”⁴¹ From a more general perspective, Piotr Dutkiewicz and Sergei Plekhanov point out, the Eastern European countries “understood that the liberal-democratic regime [represented by NATO and the EU] was the only game in town for countries really wanting to gain access to Western institutions. No other alternatives were officially offered or (if existing at expert level) permitted to be officially articulated.”⁴² As a consequence, incorporating liberal-democratic principles and practices in most areas of their societies, including in the field of civil-military relations, has been perceived as a necessity by most Eastern European countries.

Similar to most of its Eastern European neighbours, Romania has promoted, since 1989, the idea of its national and regional security interests being best advanced by its integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. As Monica Szlavik, one of a handful of post-Communist Romanian journalists focusing on security and defence issues, emphasizes, Romanians understood as early as 1990 that “the world [was] changing, that the underlying principles of classic warfare – Warsaw Pact-like, based on the defence of national borders with the involvement of the entire population – [were] changing, that the risks and challenges [were] no longer classic ones, but new, asymmetrical.”⁴³ The new nature of global threats, on the one hand, and the opportunity to escape a political and military system they had

³⁹ Chris Donnelly, “Defence Transformation in the New Democracies,” *NATO Review*, no. 6 (November 1996), p. 20.

⁴⁰ Dina Kyriakidou, “NATO Hopeful Romania Offers Intelligence on Iraq,” *Reuters*, November 11, 2002.

⁴¹ Donnelly, “Defence Transformation in the New Democracies,” p. 21.

⁴² Dutkiewicz and Plekhanov, p. 289.

⁴³ Monica Szlavik, “Armata romana si provocarile razboiului contemporan,” *Jurnalul national*, October 25, 2001.

called into question for decades, on the other hand, pushed Romanians towards the West, in their search for security and defence cooperation.

Since 1989, Romania's commitment to NATO membership and its integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures have been the cornerstones of its foreign policy. An internal political consensus on the objective of joining NATO, for instance, has ensured a wide support for reform processes, especially in the military field. The Social Democracy Party of Romania (SDPR), successor of the former Romanian Communist Party and the country's leading political force from 1990 to 1996, actively promoted the idea of Romania's integration into the West. This process was intensified after 1996, when a coalition led by the Democratic Convention of Romania won the country's parliamentary and presidential elections. Since 2000, the new ruling political force, the Social Democratic Party, whose driving force is the former PDSR, has reinforced its commitment to Western integration.

A declaration of all political parties represented in the Romanian Parliament was adopted in March 2001, in support of the country's NATO membership aspirations. As a *Washington Post* analysis suggested compellingly, "[t]hirteen years after it cast off Communism, Romania is still struggling with poverty, corruption, dysfunctional politics, incomplete economic reforms – the list goes on and on. But Romania now sees a one-stop cure for many of its ills: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."⁴⁴ The goal of EU accession followed shortly after the goal of NATO membership on what most Romanians perceive to be a list of almost magical steps that would provide the country with long-expected well-being.

Unlike Romania, whose political leaders have declared since the early 1990s their desire to join most European and Euro-Atlantic structures, post-Communist Bulgaria has had a not so linear evolution in terms of shaping its foreign policy orientation. The first years of the last decade were marred by inconsistency in defining its place on the geopolitical map of a reborn continent. The Bulgarian Socialist Party, which almost monopolized the country's new political life until 1997, was clearly reluctant to commit Bulgaria to integration into NATO and even into the EU. In the early 1990s,

⁴⁴ Robert G. Kaiser, "Romania Sees NATO Membership as Remedy for Post-Communist Ills." *Washington Post*, October 21, 2002.

the Atlantic Club and the MRF (the Turkish minority's party) were some of the few promoters of the idea of Bulgaria's NATO membership, although their influence on the country's political life was slim.

Nevertheless, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, the diminishing influence of Russia in Eastern Europe and the increasing involvement of the West in post-Communist countries' processes of reform, as well as the dramatic degradation of the security environment in the Balkans, were factors determining Bulgaria to review its military doctrine, its economic plans and its foreign policy. In late 1993, the Bulgarian Parliament announced the country's willingness to join key European and Euro-Atlantic politico-military organizations, such as NATO and the Western European Union (WEU); the steps taken towards Western integration were, nevertheless, unconvincing. The elections of 1997, bringing the Union of Democratic Forces to power, represented the actual starting point on the road to NATO and EU membership. As Emil E. Mintchev points out, "[i]n contrast to domestic policy, where controversy prevailed over how to manage the transition, consensus on the need to work for closer cooperation with the European Union and NATO [became] the dominant feature of Bulgarian foreign and security policy."⁴⁵

The political victory, in the 2001 parliamentary elections, of a coalition led by the Simeon II National Movement, a party founded by former King Simeon Saxe Coburg Gotha, guaranteed the continuity of Bulgaria's Western-oriented foreign policy. Today's Bulgaria sees its national security "as being directly linked to regional and European security. In this sense, accession to the European Union and NATO, and the stabilization of South-Eastern Europe are matters of national, regional and European interest."⁴⁶ As indicated by the official and private discourse in both Bulgaria and Romania, one of the reasons for high-level enthusiasm about these countries' Western integration is the hope of improving not only their security situation, but also their domestic economic and social conditions.

⁴⁵ Emil G. Mintchev, "Democratic and Civil Control over Armed Forces in Bulgaria," in *Democratic and Civil Control over Military Forces – Case Studies and Perspectives*, edited by Ernest Gilman and Detlef E. Herold. Rome: NATO Defense College, 1995, p. 48.

⁴⁶ "Бяла книга за отбраната на Република България," 2002, <http://www.md.government.bg/white_book/wb.html>, March 08, 2002.

II.(2) Western factors

Interested in accepting post-Communist countries as members in various European and Euro-Atlantic organizations, the West has defined relatively clear criteria for accession to these structures. “The strategic aim,” Javier Solana, the EU’s chief diplomat, points out, is “to finalize the reconstruction of Europe after almost a century of ideological division, dictatorship and war.”⁴⁷ One of the reasons for NATO and EU enlargement, as many analysts argue, is the consolidation of democracy and stability in Europe.

Regarding more specifically the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the German envoy to NATO, Gebhardt von Moltke, argues that accepting new democracies such as the two countries would offer the current NATO member states “a larger degree of influence over their development.”⁴⁸ For the candidates, meeting the conditions related to their Western integration has translated into complex transformations in the realms of civilian administration, legal frameworks and structure of the armed forces. NATO has equally asked for clear evidence of civilian oversight of security and defence activities. Allen L. Keiswetter, a former NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, underlines that from the very first stages of NATO’s cooperation activities with Eastern European countries one thing was undisputed: the role of the military in the new democracies would be a major subject on the Alliance’s agenda.⁴⁹

Civilian and democratic oversight of the military has become, therefore, a key component of Eastern European countries’ efforts to meet the Western organizations’ requirements for membership. As military activity increasingly takes place at the international level – Hans Born adds – civilian and democratic oversight of the armed forces, of international military cooperation and of politico-military institutions is also becoming increasingly relevant: “[w]ithout the democratic oversight of the military,

⁴⁷ Robert G. Kaiser and Keith B. Richburg, “To Join the Club, Applicants Strive to Meet the Standards,” *Washington Post*, November 05, 2002.

⁴⁸ “Romania va participa la falanga mobila a NATO,” *Mediafax*, November 6, 2002.

⁴⁹ Allen L. Keiswetter, “The Partnership for Peace and Civil-Military Relations in a Democracy,” in *Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Central and Eastern Europe in Transition*, edited by Anton A. Bebler, (Westport, CT, and London: Praeger, 1997), p. 4.

these countries were not permitted to become members of Western international organizations.”⁵⁰

Western policymakers have developed an interest in Eastern European civil-military relations since 1989 – Reka Szemerkenyi argues – primarily because “they needed to determine how the Soviet-trained officer corps would react to the political changes ... and whether they represented any challenge to democratization.”⁵¹ Therefore, organizations such as NATO defined in relatively straightforward terms what they considered to be desired models for the transformation of the Eastern European armed forces and for the interaction between the military establishment and civilian authorities. From a broader perspective, “[h]ealthy civil-military relations are an essential element of [Western] security; this is why the Alliance has made the promotion of democratically controlled military a major part of its cooperation agenda,”⁵² Allen L. Keiswetter adds.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization started to promote the idea of increased cooperation with Eastern European countries as early as 1991, when NATO’s Rome Ministerial Meeting led to the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which has had an important role in establishing links between the Alliance and the post-Communist democracies. NATO “emphasized the role of shared democratic principles by East and West. As establishing democratic civil-military relations was one of these newly shared values, NATO began actively promoting it.”⁵³ Although presenting Western-type civilian control over the armed forces as a fundamental criterion for NATO membership, the North Atlantic Alliance made it clear that meeting this requirement is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for accession to Western politico-military structures.

It was at its Brussels Summit (1994) that NATO proposed the most important organizational arrangement facilitating the Eastern European countries’ accession to the North Atlantic Alliance: the creation of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), involving both Western and post-Communist countries in various politico-military projects. “During 1994, [reforming]

⁵⁰ Hans Born, “Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector. What Does It Mean?” *DCAF Working Papers*, no. 9 (April 2002), p. 2.

⁵¹ Reka Szemerkenyi, *Central European Civil-Military Reform at Risk*, (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 64.

⁵² Keiswetter, p. 7.

⁵³ Szemerkenyi, p. 64.

civil-military relations came to be seen as a fundamental requirement for NATO enlargement, partially in response to [Eastern] Europe's request for the criteria to be clarified," Reka Szemerkenyi points out.⁵⁴ Some Eastern European leaders feared at that time that PfP was an alternative to NATO membership, not a necessary step towards that goal, as Romanian Chief of the General Staff, General Mihail Popescu, later admitted.⁵⁵ Criteria for enlargement were formally proposed by NATO in 1995. They included the existence of a civilian and democratic system of oversight of the armed forces as a necessary condition for NATO accession, alongside "active participation in NACC and/or PfP, reasonable demonstration of successful performance in democratic political institutions, individual liberty, the rule of law, and so on."⁵⁶

In 1997, at NATO's Madrid Summit, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In 1999, at NATO's Washington Summit, where these three Eastern European countries were formally welcomed into NATO, the Alliance committed itself to at least a new wave of enlargement and launched a program called Membership Action Plan (MAP)⁵⁷, whose role has been to better prepare NATO candidate countries for future membership. In 2002, at NATO's Prague Summit, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to join the Alliance. In 2004, all seven countries became full members of NATO by depositing their instruments of accession with the United States Government.

III. Compatibility between post-Communist Eastern European systems and Western models of civilian control over the armed forces

The idea of borrowing Western models to induce changes in the post-1989 Eastern European civil-military relations has been consistent with the entire evolution of relations between post-Communist countries and Western organizations such as NATO and the European Union. Adopting Western

⁵⁴ Szemerkenyi, p. 66.

⁵⁵ See: Ion Petrescu, "Gata pentru Enduring Freedom," *Observatorul militar*, no. 20 (May 21-27, 2002), pp. 4-5.

⁵⁶ Jeff Simon, "Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion," in *Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Central and Eastern Europe in Transition*, edited by Anton A. Bebler, (Westport, CT, and London: Praeger, 1997), p. 117.

⁵⁷ See: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Membership Action Plan*, April 24, 1999, <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.htm>>, December 12, 2001.

models for the Eastern European countries' processes of reform has been, for both parties, easier than proposing new paradigms: not only that these models have been available and successful, they have also provided a common platform for discussion. In addition to the Eastern European countries implementing by themselves Western guidelines, the European and Euro-Atlantic organizations and their member states have been directly involved in assisting or even directing the post-Communist democracies' evolution in the area of civil-military relations.

This raises, however, a question about the extent to which Eastern European countries, especially Romania and Bulgaria, have actually implemented the Western models of civilian control over the military they declaratively adopted. To answer this question, an investigation into the compatibility of the provisions of post-Communist legal and institutional frameworks in Romania and Bulgaria, and the provisions of a Western system of oversight of the armed forces is necessary. Also required is the examination of relationships between legislatures, executive branches and civil societies, on the one hand, and military organizations, on the other.

III.(1) Legal and Institutional Frameworks

The law, according to a Western model of control over the military, should be "an instrument that subordinates the civil authority to the people and the military to the civil authority."⁵⁸ The existence of a clear legal framework defining the relations between the armed forces and civilian authorities is a fundamental requirement of democratic civil-military relations. As Rudolf Joó, a former Hungarian Minister of Defence, puts it, "on the one hand, this provides an important prerequisite of the functioning of the rule of law; on the other, it reduces the risks of uncertain jurisdictional claims."⁵⁹ From the perspective of control over the armed forces, a Western legal framework requires inter alia a clear chain of authority linking civilian structures to the military command.

⁵⁸ Douglas L. Bland, "Civil-Military Relations in Liberal Democracies: Principles, Norms, Rules, and Decision Making Procedures," paper presented at *The Democratic Civil-Military Relations Program (DCMRP)*, organized by the Department of National Defence of Canada and AUCC, Ottawa, Canada, January 26, 2000.

⁵⁹ Rudolf Joó, "The Democratic Control of the Armed Forces," *Chaillot Paper*, no. 23 (February 1996), p. 10.

The transition from Communist to Western legal frameworks has not been an easy process in Eastern Europe since the revolutionary events of 1989. The results of this transformation are sometimes hazy and the effectiveness of the new legal provisions in terms of ensuring civilian (and democratic) control over the military is not always clear. When analyzing post-Communist civil-military relations in Romania and Bulgaria, one has to take into consideration both the existence of appropriate legal instruments meant to regulate the various relationships between civilians and the military establishment, and the degree to which the legislation is applied in a manner consistent with its design.

Since the early 1990s, both Romania and Bulgaria have been engaged in reforming their legal frameworks dealing with security and defence issues. In both cases, the principle of democratic civilian control over the armed forces was incorporated into their constitutions, adopted in 1991. Nevertheless, more specific legal provisions were provided several years later. Except for the laws on defence (of 1994 and 1995 in Romania and Bulgaria, respectively), more significant changes have been made only in the late 1990s and early this decade. The pace of change during the post-Communist period has been slow and the content of the legal frameworks resulting from this process, although democratic in essence, has been relatively vague.

Identifying the necessity of their integration into Western structures (such as NATO and the EU), Romania and Bulgaria have promoted policies whose aim has been to meet the requirements imposed by these organizations. Among these policies, reforming their legal frameworks regulating the activity in various fields according to Western principles has been a very important element. NATO's *Membership Action Plan* (section V, article 1), for example, states, "[i]n order to be able to undertake the commitments of membership, aspirants should examine and become acquainted with the appropriate legal arrangements which govern cooperation within NATO; this should enable aspirants to scrutinize domestic laws for compatibility with those NATO rules and regulations."⁶⁰ Similarly, the EU's basic set of laws, usually known as *acquis communautaire*, has to be incorporated into the Eastern European states' national legislations as a precondition for membership in the European

⁶⁰ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Union. Nevertheless, in Eastern Europe the outcomes have tended to be slightly different from Western ones, since the old work procedures, informal networks of influence or poor civilian levels of expertise in the military field have continued to survive.

Legal frameworks in both Romania and Bulgaria are supposed to define inter alia the spheres of activity of the institutions involved in national systems of oversight of the military establishment. They do provide important guidelines for the roles of these institutions, stipulating some of their responsibilities and setting up a system of relationships between them. Nevertheless, their shortcomings are significant. Neither the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria nor the Constitution of Romania, for example, as fundamental legal instruments, defines the concept of “armed forces.” This creates a series of problems in terms of conceptualizing the relationship between civilian authorities and the military establishment. Both Constitutions also lack a clear division of power between the various actors involved in the system of civilian control over the armed forces. This leaves enough room for the military to impose their viewpoints on defence issues. Moreover, this situation creates confusion about the precise responsibilities of civilian institutions in the fields of security and defence.

As Ognyan Avramov, legal adviser and later head of the administrative staff to former Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev, points out, the Bulgarian Constitution gives the President the power to proclaim a state of war or emergency whenever the National Assembly is not in session and cannot be convened, but it says nothing about what should happen when the National Assembly would not endorse the President’s decision.⁶¹ A similar problem appears in the Romanian case, when the President may declare partial or general mobilization of the armed forces with prior approval of the Parliament. The decision would have to be discussed, however, some legal experts argue, by the country’s Supreme Council of National Defence, which, according to the Romanian Constitution, is supposed to conduct the unitary coordination of the activities concerning the country’s defence and its security.

⁶¹ O. Avramov, “Management of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria,” *Bulgarian Military Review*, vol. 1, no. 2 (April 1993), p. 28.

The situation is complicated in both cases by the existence of several relatively similar institutions. In Bulgaria there can be included in this category (i) the Consultative Council of National Security, headed by the President, (ii) the National Assembly's permanent National Security Committee, (iii) the Security Council, assisting the Council of Ministers, employing both civilian and military staff, and (iv) the Supreme Headquarters in wartime. In Romania, it is about (i) the Supreme Council of National Defence, headed by the President, (ii) the Parliament's Committees on Defence, Public Order and National Security, and (iii) the Grand General Staff in wartime. The responsibilities of these institutions, compared with the ones of the National Assembly/the Parliament, of the Council of Ministers/the Government or of the President, are loosely defined by the two countries' legal documents.

The fact that the legal frameworks have been set up during the post-Communist period based on Western requirements in the fields of security and defence is obvious when one scrutinizes them. The frequent references to organizations such as NATO, the WEU and the European Union, and to their standards are relevant indicators of Romania's and Bulgaria's efforts to adapt their legal frameworks regulating civil-military relations to the Western type of legislation in these fields. However, their lack of precision and unity, expressed by their confusing provisions, undermines the very idea of an efficient civilian system of control over the military. They do not only make civilian oversight of the armed forces a difficult process, they also encourage the involvement of the military establishment in a larger discussion of Eastern European countries' security and defence policies.

III.(2) Legislatures and armed forces

Legislatures have a very important role in the framework of a Western model of civilian control over the military. According to a 2001 *Model Law on the Parliamentary Oversight of the State Military Organization*, for instance, drafted and submitted to the *Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Participant States of the Commonwealth of Independent States* (CIS) jointly by the Geneva-based *Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces* and the Moscow-based *Centre for Political and International Studies*⁶², the

⁶² This model law was adopted by the 18th Plenary Session of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Participant States of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Resolution no. 18-13 of November 24, 2001).

parliamentary oversight of the armed forces is regarded “as the central component of a broader democratic civilian oversight of the state military organization.”⁶³ Based on a Western perspective, the document more concretely identifies the parliamentary oversight of the military as “activities aimed at the establishment and the insurance of the adequate application of the system of legal provisions and administrative measures put in place by the Parliament in cooperation with other bodies of state power and institutions of the civil society.”⁶⁴

The legislatures discuss and adopt laws on security and defence issues, decide on budgetary matters and control spending, request information from other institutions, control the activity of the government, ratify and denounce international agreements, and have the power to declare or suspend mobilization and the state of war. One of the most important means by which they exercise civilian oversight of the armed forces – alongside setting up the legal framework regulating the military activity – is the parliamentary control of expenditures. Nevertheless, this may prove to be a rather ineffective way of approaching the issue of oversight. Morris Janowitz calls it an “outmoded technique of rather limited consequence,” arguing that “[i]ts effect on the military profession seems to be that of generating hostility and tension, rather than effective control and political consent.”⁶⁵ Organizing hearings and requesting information on security and defence issues are other important mechanisms allowing legislatures to gain knowledge and make decisions more effectively when dealing with the military establishment. In post-Communist Eastern Europe the role of the legislatures in the oversight of the armed forces has been considerably increased by the need to provide a new legal framework for security and defence activities.

Parliamentary oversight of the military field, Andres C. Sjaastad argues, involves two elements: accountability and influence, i.e., “holding the government accountable for the defence funds it requires and for the way it spends these funds, ensuring, in other words, that defence resources are used in the most efficient and cost effective manner; and influencing the

⁶³ Commonwealth of Independent States, *Model Law on the Parliamentary Oversight of the State Military Organization*, 2001, <www.dcaf.ch/publications/DCAF_Documents/DCAF.DOC1.1.pdf>, April 11, 2002.

⁶⁴ Commonwealth of Independent States.

⁶⁵ Janowitz, p. 354.

development and implementation of defence policy.”⁶⁶ However, the degree to which different parliaments are able to shape the content of the defence budgets presented to them by the governments, the ways the funds are spent and the nature of various military activities varies widely. Alfred Stepan, for instance, in his well-known *Rethinking Military Policies: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, identifies different responsibilities of the legislatures. These responsibilities vary because they with the level of military institutional prerogatives in different societies. The dimension of these prerogatives refers to those areas where “the military as an institution assumes they have an acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extra-military areas within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the state and political or civil society.”⁶⁷

This means that in a society where the military institutional prerogatives are high, the legislature “simply approves or disapproves the executive’s budgets; there is no legislative tradition of detailed hearings on defence matters; [and] the military seldom if ever provides the legislature with detailed information about the defence sector.”⁶⁸ Nevertheless, when the military institutional prerogatives are low, “most major policy issues affecting military budgets, force structure, and new weapons initiatives are monitored by the legislature; [and] cabinet-level officials and chief aides routinely appear before legislative committees to defend and explain policy initiatives and to present legislations.”⁶⁹ The latter situation is the one best describing the role of the legislatures according to a Western model of civilian control over the armed forces. The extent to which the Romanian and Bulgarian legislatures have managed to exercise their prerogatives in the military field has probably placed them in a situation characterized by medium military institutional prerogatives, rather than low ones.

The Romanian Parliament comprises 485 members (its Chamber of Deputies comprises 345 and its Senate – 140 members), while the Bulgarian National Assembly comprises 240 members. As institutions directly representing the political will of the two peoples, they are supposed to have

⁶⁶ Anders C. Sjaastad, “Parliament – Control and Oversight or Spoilers of Ministerial Ideas?” paper presented at *NATO Workshop on Civil/Democratic Control of Armed Forces*, Warsaw, June 13-15, 1994.

⁶⁷ Alfred Stepan *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 93.

⁶⁸ Stepan, p. 95.

⁶⁹ Stepan, p. 95.

one of the most important roles in ensuring the existence of a democratic type of civilian type of control over the armed forces. A major weakness, however, of both the Romanian and the Bulgarian legislatures regarding oversight functions lies in their lack of continuity. Only a relatively small part of the Romanian and Bulgarian MPs (about 25-40%) have represented their constituencies in more than one legislature. In the period 1997-2001, for instance, about 60% of the Bulgarian MPs were at their first mandate with the National Assembly; moreover, “[i]n contrast to other transition states where parliamentary expertise is slowly expanding with each Parliament, Bulgaria’s seems to be shrinking.”⁷⁰

This situation contributes to a lack of parliamentary expertise in the fields of security and defence. This is noticeable – Marina Caparini indicates – “in the absence of sustained or in-depth parliamentary debate on crucial defence issues and in the often low-prestige and acquiescent behaviour of parliamentary defence committees.”⁷¹ Not only that these committees consist of insufficiently prepared MPs, but the staffs affiliated to them are [themselves] usually unable to “undertake deeper analyses and independent assessments of defence issues.”⁷²

Thus, although intended to play a very important role in the oversight of the armed forces, the post-Communist Romanian and Bulgarian legislatures have been rather superficially involved in these processes. The weak parliamentary control over the military can be explained by MPs’ lack of expertise on military issues, but also by the limited audience for military issues, and, subsequently, by the generally unsatisfactory parliamentary interest in the fields of security and defence. At the same time, as Marco Carnovale puts it, “a parliament limited to a rubber-stamp role betrays poor democratic control of defence.”⁷³ The Romanian and Bulgarian legislatures have exercised a limited degree of control over the military due to a relatively inadequate application of the system of legal provisions – that is, they have been little involved in debates over defence issues, voluntarily and informally accepting to delegate some of their responsibilities to executive institutions and the military establishment.

⁷⁰ Rachev, p. 69.

⁷¹ Marina Caparini, “The Challenge of Establishing Democratic Civilian Control Over the Armed Forces of Central and Eastern Europe,” *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, vol. 27, no. 2 (Winter 1997), p. 18.

⁷² Caparini, pp. 18-19.

⁷³ Marco Carnovale, “NATO Partners and Allies: Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of the Armed Forces,” *NATO Review*, no. 2 (March 1997), p. 33.

III.(3) Executive institutions and armed forces

The executive institutions having responsibilities in the fields of security and defence are represented in Romania and Bulgaria by the Head of State (President), the Government/Council of Ministers – i.e., Prime Minister, Minister of (National) Defence, Ministry of (National) Defence staff, the armed forces' General Staff – and other related institutions (e.g., various security councils). The President is in Romania and Bulgaria the Commander-in-Chief and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief respectively of the armed forces; the President is also the Chair of the Consultative Council of National Security (Bulgaria)/the Supreme Council of National Defence (Romania). The Government initiates legislation, directs and coordinates the activity of the armed forces, submits to the Parliament the draft defence budget, allocates financial resources to the military establishment and negotiates treaties and agreements concerning international military cooperation.

The Government controls the military through one of its departments, the Ministry of (National) Defence. The operational activity of the military is coordinated by the General Staff, which is directly subordinated to the Minister of (National) Defence. A distinct executive body is an institution whose title is Consultative Council of National Security in Bulgaria and Supreme Council of National Defence in Romania. These institutions are specialized authorities of the central public administration, whose tasks include coordinating policies of national defence and national security, and formulating recommendations on security-related issues.

The executive institutions do not only provide efficient means of control over the armed forces, they are also essential links ensuring the legitimacy of a democratic civilian system of oversight of the military. The continuous supervision by the executive institutions in the military field is achieved through various devices, such as mechanisms of budget control, allocation of missions and responsibilities, and the administration of foreign affairs.⁷⁴ The post-Communist period has marked a controversial transition of the Romanian and Bulgarian executive institutions from a Communist model of organization, based on the subordination to the authoritarian leadership of a Communist Party, to a Western liberal one. In both cases, the

⁷⁴ Janowitz, pp. 361-365.

transformation has been complex and difficult, while the practical results have not always been satisfactory.

The fact that the legal frameworks regulating their activity are Western-like is not enough to justify Romanian and Bulgarian official arguments that these institutions are similar (if not identical) to their Western counterparts. Setting up limitations on the powers exercised by democratically elected Presidents or appointing civilian Ministers of (National) Defence does not mean acquiring democratic civilian control according to Western standards. As many students of the post-Communist Eastern European civil-military relations have emphasized, “[t]hese attempts [have] achieved only an illusion of civilian control.”⁷⁵

As the Romanian and Bulgarian cases demonstrate, the lack of enough civilian experts dealing with military issues has been one of the greatest problems faced in setting up a system of democratic civilian control over the armed forces. This leads to, and is reinforced by, the lack of a professional civil service, “a corps of administrators whose political neutrality is unquestioned and who are competent and expert enough to execute governmental policy,”⁷⁶ upon whose existence depends an effective implementation of civilian decisions in the fields of security and defence. The political instability and the virtual absence of an educational system to prepare civilian experts in the military field, have only exacerbated the problem over the years. Rudold Joó says, “the image the [armed forces] have of civilian politics suffers: politicians are seen as very temporary creatures, whose impact on defence policy is, after all, negligible. Last but not least, democracy itself is discredited. To some, the division of power can be seen as equating to weak government, pluralism as synonymous with disorder.”⁷⁷

Even when the democratic system does not suffer, it is generally difficult to call the system of control over the military “civilian.” If most advisers to security and defence policymakers are military, and the latter are not

⁷⁵ Laura Richards Cleary, “Defence Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe,” in *Civil-Military Relations: A Guide*, edited by Laura Richards Cleary, (Sofia: The Atlantic Club of Bulgaria, 1999), p. 102.

⁷⁶ James Sherr, “Civil-Democratic Control of Ukraine’s Armed Forces: To What End? By What Means?” in *Army and State in Postcommunist Europe*, edited by David Betz and John Löwenhardt, (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 66.

⁷⁷ Joó, p. 99.

experts in the military field, then “the army, not the government, is controlling defence policy.”⁷⁸ This situation is related to an unwillingness of the countries’ political forces to challenge the military establishment: “[t]he apparent trend among ... Eastern European ministries of defence ... is to wait for a new generation of administrators to emerge, leaving the current qualified but overwhelmingly military ministry staff in place.”⁷⁹ Meanwhile, Romania and Bulgaria function based on a hybrid system of control over the armed forces, characterized by both a democratic legal framework giving civilians a final “say” in military matters and a commonly accepted practice of military influence on security and defence issues.

III.(4) Civil society and armed forces

Whereas in a Communist regime the involvement of the civil society⁸⁰ in a system of control over the military is virtually non-existent, in a Western one the civil society usually plays a very important role in a public debate on security and defence issues. The role of the civil society in a democracy is very important given the fact that agreements reached by its component groups with official bodies in discussions of security and defence issues confer further legitimacy to decisions made by a political regime in the military field. Ben Lombardi underscores that the role of the civil society is “to foster public discussion of defence and security matters, as well as to create a pool of interested and qualified specialists whose expertise can be drawn upon by policy-makers.”⁸¹

Public discussion of military issues and the civil society’s awareness of these matters facilitate public accountability. From a more functional

⁷⁸ Donnelly, “Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A Framework for Tackling the Problem.” *NATO Review*, no. 1 (January 1997), p. 18.

⁷⁹ Caparini, p. 18.

⁸⁰ The term “civil society” used in this paper refers to the combination of different groups such as mass media, NGOs (including unions of reserve military officers), pressure groups, academia, research institutes, think tanks, advisers to political parties, local government personnel and churches. Their involvement in discussions of military issues is facilitated by the information provided by Government’s public relations services, mass media subordinated to the Ministry of (National) Defence, various officials and civil servants (e.g., members of Parliament), and by their interactions with the previous groups. The most important players belonging to the first category are, nevertheless, mass media, NGOs and academia. Together, all are supposed to form what – in the Western world at least – is known as a “strategic community,” one dealing primarily with security and defence issues. Such a community would provide, among other things, the link between policymakers and the general public.

⁸¹ Lombardi, p. 27.

perspective, Reka Szemerkenyi argues that “[p]ublic support for the military is a prerequisite for stable civil-military relations in a democratic society;” nevertheless, this public support “requires an understanding of the military and of its professional and social needs.”⁸² The problem in Eastern Europe is that, although the civil society, with most of its component parts, has tended to be actively engaged in public debates on military issues since 1989, its expertise in this field is extremely weak and its involvement ambiguous. Thus, academia is still isolated and is perceived as a purely educational establishment, the mass media are superficial and “can become easily politicized, independent research institutes and NGOs are only nascent at best, pressure groups tend to focus on a single issue – mostly conscientious objection – and government public relations is in its infancy.”⁸³

Efficient programs aimed at improving public expertise and involvement in the fields of security and defence are necessary if the Eastern European states are really committed – as they say they are – to implementing Western models of oversight of the armed forces. Academia could play a significant role from this perspective, not only through involvement of qualified academics or academic units in discussions of military issues but also through specialized programs offered for students interested in these fields. Nevertheless, either aspect is marred by lack of expertise in the fields of security and defence, lack of interest in the academic activity or lack of proper funding. Acknowledging the need for improving the competency of civilians and military personnel, Laura Richards Cleary contends that not only educational institutions or mass media, but also “NGOs can provide an independent forum for the discussion of international or institutional problems.”⁸⁴ They can significantly contribute to the public debate on military issues and to the efficiency of the “strategic community.” But NGOs’ occasional involvement in political life or the interest of some of them in funding opportunities rather than in the activity for which they have been set up make Eastern European non-governmental organizations qualitatively different from their Western counterparts (especially less efficient).

⁸² Szemerkenyi, p. 54.

⁸³ Szemerkenyi, p. 54.

⁸⁴ Richards Cleary, p. 105.

The mass media should have one of the most important roles in involving the civil society in a discussion of military issues. Nevertheless, journalists' lack of expertise in the fields of security and defence, mass media's tendency to focus on superficial and spectacular, mostly negative, aspects of military activity, or their lack of accurate information make them in – at least in Eastern Europe – inefficient instruments of oversight of the armed forces. A specific category of media, the ones specialized in military matters, are still subjected, formally or informally, to direct control by the Governments (usually the Ministries of Defence). Some of them were the armed forces' propaganda machines during the Communist period and they still maintain their identity as instruments of public relations for the military. Independent media specialized in military issues are virtually nonexistent in Eastern Europe. But “to be effective, the media need to have as much information as possible from domestic sources, within the limits of national security. The military tends only to provide positive information and to delay giving out negative information.”⁸⁵

Therefore, in addition to an informed national discussion of security and defence issues, in which a special role is played by civilian experts at various levels, in a Western system of control over the armed forces there is a need for “sufficient transparency of decision making to allow for a thorough public scrutiny” of military matters, Marco Carnovale points out.⁸⁶ A public relations service set up by the Ministry of (National) Defence, for instance, should provide accurate information and should avoid propaganda as much as possible. From a Western perspective, Eastern European Ministries of Defence should avoid abusing the concept of military secrecy in order to deny information inquiries formulated by various groups or individuals. Nevertheless, as Chris Donnelly puts it, “[p]ost-Communist military society is still a society closed to civilians and which resists civilian interference ... The military fears depredations by ignorant civilians. It has a strong sense of its own loyalty and, in defence matters, it is convinced that it knows best.”⁸⁷

An analysis of the relationship between the armed forces and the civil society in Romania and Bulgaria reveals the immature nature of the civil society and its weak degree of influence in decisions concerning military

⁸⁵ Szemerkenyi, p. 63.

⁸⁶ Carnovale, p. 33.

⁸⁷ Donnelly, “Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A Framework,” p. 19.

affairs. This situation seriously challenges the idea of a Western system of control over the military in the two countries. A comparison of the two case studies shows that, overall, there are also differences between the Romanian and the Bulgarian case: civil society structures dealing with security and defence issues are more developed in Bulgaria than in Romania.

By focusing on the civil society, executive institutions, legislatures, and legal and institutional frameworks in Romania and Bulgaria leads us to the conclusion that although the models used by the Eastern European countries in order to reform their field of civil-military relations have been Western ones, the outcomes are only to a certain extent similar to the situation in NATO member states, for instance (the source of these Western paradigms). The continuity of patterns of interaction between civilian institutions and military organizations since 1989 has been a constant reminder of the difficulty to implement Western models of civilian oversight of the armed forces in Eastern Europe. The role of the Romanian legislature seems to be slightly more important in a system of control over the military than the Bulgarian National Assembly's role (a positive aspect according to a Western paradigm of civil-military relations). Similarly, the Bulgarian civil society seems to be better organized in an attempt to articulate a community of independent voices expressing alternative perspectives on security and defence issues than the Romanian civil society. Nevertheless, the situation in both countries suggests that, in the current context, an attempt to subordinate the armed forces exclusively to the will of civilian forces (i.e., political forces outside the military establishment *per se*) is not only difficult to materialize, but also undesirable.

IV. Conclusion

Encouraging the emergence of democratic systems of control over the armed forces in post-Communist Eastern Europe is part of a larger Western concern "to project stability" in the world (especially in neighbouring regions), through implementation of democratic principles. A review of the main characteristics of post-Communist Eastern European systems of civilian control over the military reveals, nevertheless, a relatively unsuccessful attempt to transform civil-military relations in this part of the world according to Western standards.

Analyzing comparatively the findings from the perspective of both Communist and Western models of control over the military suggests that the new Eastern European system of oversight of the armed forces are characterized by both Communist and Western traits. Thus, although the legal and institutional frameworks in Romania and Bulgaria are based on democratic principles, they are still relatively confusing when it comes to describing specifically how the armed forces are controlled and, even more important, who exactly is responsible for that. The Romanian and Bulgarian political systems, democratic as they are, do not manage to aggregate the interests of various groups potentially interested, or already active, in the fields of security and defence. Although it would be somewhat inappropriate to say that most decisions taken in military areas are imposed illegitimately (on the military establishment by a few political leaders or on the civilian authorities by the military), they certainly do not reflect a broader societal consent, obtained through public and informed debates, since no such consent can be achieved. The formal subordination of the armed forces to the Government, to the Head of State and to the Parliament is only partial, while it is still the military itself providing the civilian authorities with professional advice on most security and defence matters. Regarding the involvement of an emergent civil society in the discussion of military issues, this process is hardly significant in Romania and Bulgaria.

The research seems, therefore, to be consistent with the idea that the transfer of Western liberal norms in the area of civil-military relations in Eastern Europe, even through policies of mimicry, has not led to the achievement of Western systems of control over the armed forces. Although the transformation of the Eastern European systems of oversight of the military has been carried, since 1989, mainly by copying Western models and has been triggered to a large extent by external factors, these systems are, so far, stuck in a grey area, being characterized by both Communist and Western features.

The continuity in patterns of civil-military relations in Romania and Bulgaria (before and after 1989) has clashed, during the post-Communist period, with the discontinuity represented by the adoption of new models of civil-military interaction. Romania, characterized by participatory relations between the Communist Party's leadership and the armed forces during the last decades of the Communist period, has been able since 1989 to more easily adopt Western models of civilian control over the military. The

Western focus on a professional, politically non-partisan military establishment, for instance, has been relatively compatible with a Romanian notion of civil-military boundary, whereas in the Bulgarian case the post-Communist transformation has been complicated by the country's previous type of civilian control over the armed forces. The post-1989 influence of Bulgaria's institutional congruence approach, analyzed in the first section of this paper, has been one of the factors preventing a radical transformation of the type of its civil-military relations. The larger the extent to which a country's political authorities and military institutions were integrated during the Communist period, the more difficult the transformation of their civil-military relations based on Western models after 1989.

Nevertheless, as the previous section underlined, Eastern European countries' decision to join European and Euro-Atlantic structures, combined with the requirements for membership in various Western organizations have led, since 1989, to specific dynamics involving systemic changes in Eastern Europe, based on Western recommendations. The changes have not been superficial, as some analysts suggest; nevertheless, the processes of transformation have not led every time to the expected outcomes designed by Western and even Eastern European political architects. Often, the programs of reform have been set up and implemented because the West has required them, "not because they [have been] seen as intrinsically necessary and worthwhile."⁸⁸ Regarding the issue of oversight of the military, most researchers tend to agree that Eastern European governments have promoted it as a priority specifically because European and Euro-Atlantic organizations have defined it as such. Although finding the assessment harsh, Marina Caparini acknowledges that Eastern European governments (often composed of leftist or former Communist parties) "have been [repeatedly] accused of valuing civilian control mainly as a means to the end of NATO membership, rather than inherently attaching value to the concept as a hallmark of democracy."⁸⁹

Piotr Dutkiewicz and Sergei Plekhanov propose an original approach, the "politics of mimicry," to explain these developments. They argue that the Western models adopted for the post-1989 transformation of the Eastern European countries are only occasionally compatible with the models

⁸⁸ David Betz *et al.*, "Conclusion," in *Army and State in Postcommunist Europe*, edited by David Betz and John Löwenhardt, (London: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 149.

⁸⁹ Caparini, p. 23.

previously used by those societies, which has the potential to lead to a situation in which the new paradigms are adopted primarily as “a cover for the intractable old norms.”⁹⁰ Moreover, as the field of civil-military relations is “an especially persuasive case study of the politics of mimicry, [involving] institutions which are deeply conservative by nature,” the synthesis of old and new norms, even (or especially) in cases of low compatibility between them, would “allow a society to protect from external challenges, through mimicry, its search for an indigenous path of transformation.”⁹¹ The approach proposed by Dutkiewicz and Plekhanov suggests that the Western models adopted by the Eastern European societies in the field of civilian control over the military have been used not only as vehicles for the integration of these countries into the Western world. They have also been used as instruments facilitating a smooth transition from Communist models to new paradigms regulating the relationship between post-Communist political forces and military organizations in Eastern Europe.

Most researchers focusing on the issue of post-Communist transformation of Eastern European civil-military relations have noticed a significant degree of incompatibility between the Western models officially embraced by the new Eastern European political forces and the previous patterns employed by these countries in the military field. Mentioning the different social and political traditions, “as well as the elites’ habits and proclivities” separating the West and Eastern Europe, Anton A. Bebler argues that “[t]hese discrepancies should warn against the mere copying or simplistic transplanting of the Western institutions and procedures to the East.”⁹² Adding to this view, Ben Lombardi tries to explain the rather rhetorical adoption of Western norms through the existence in Eastern Europe of political cultures “unable to provide adequate support for Western beliefs – beliefs that run counter not only to those views officially sanctioned by the former Communist regimes, but also to societies that preceded World War II.”⁹³

⁹⁰ Dutkiewicz and Plekhanov, p. 277.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² Anton A. Bebler, “Postscript,” in *Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Central and Eastern Europe in Transition*, edited by Anton A. Bebler, (Westport, CT, and London: Praeger, 1997), p. 135.

⁹³ Lombardi, p. 29.

Both the Romanian and the Bulgarian armed forces have tended to be involved, since 1989, in various debates concerning not only the two military establishments' future development or the two countries' military involvement in international affairs, but also issues affecting the society as a whole, from a broader perspective (which are, in a Western context at least, the responsibility of political leaders alone). Civilian attempts to subordinate the armed forces have been successful to a certain extent only.

The Western models of oversight, underlying the need for military's political neutrality and its strict subordination to the state's political authorities, have proved to be rather inappropriate for describing the civil-military relations in the two countries and unsuccessful as a basis for changing these relations since 1989. The need for fresh approaches became obvious in both Western and Eastern European circles, especially in the mid-1990s, when the first significant problems of implementing the adopted models suggested a possible incompatibility between the new paradigms and local practices in the area of civil-military relations. Three new approaches may be particularly useful in this context.

Trying to overcome the lack of an appropriate theoretical basis able to describe, and to be used in reorganizing, the interaction between civilians and the military in other parts of the world than the West (represented primarily by the USA), Rebecca L. Schiff proposes a so-called "theory of concordance." She argues that the physical and ideological separation between political institutions and the militaries is historically and culturally bound to the West, especially to the American case. By contrast, her theory argues that "three partners – the military, the political elites and the citizenry – should aim for a cooperative relationship that may or may not involve separation, but does not require it."⁹⁴ Taking into account the cultural and historical conditions that may encourage or discourage civil-military institutional separation, the theory of concordance "highlights dialogue, accommodation and shared values or objectives among the military, the political elites and society."⁹⁵

Nansen Behar proposes the "paradigm of partnership," an approach based on three key ideas: "distributed responsibility, mutual trust and support in

⁹⁴ Rebecca L. Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 22, no. 1 (Fall 1995), p. 7.

⁹⁵ Schiff, p. 12.

defence management. Partnership suggests not merely control over the military on the part of civilians, but a policy of building inner consensus.”⁹⁶ He argues that the models currently employed in Western democracies are not only unadjusted to processes of transformation of the kind undergone in Eastern Europe, but to the conditions of the 21st century themselves. He adds that “[t]he trend to impose the Anglo-Saxon meaning of the notion ‘control’ [in countries like Bulgaria and Romania, for instance] is an inadequate purpose.”⁹⁷ The notion of civil-military partnership proposed by Behar would solve the problem of an “exhaustion” of the Western models in providing valuable outcomes for Eastern European countries.

Douglas L. Bland proposes his own perspective, the “theory of shared responsibility;” it argues that most of the previous theories “are too narrowly conceived and miss critical aspects of the problem [of civilian control over the armed forces], and they are too bound by the culture and national politics of their proponents.”⁹⁸ Instead, the essence of his approach is that civilian oversight of the military is “managed and maintained through the sharing of responsibility for control between civilian leaders and military officers. Specifically, civil[ian] authorities are responsible and accountable for some aspects of control and military leaders are responsible and accountable for others.”⁹⁹ Their interaction would be regulated by sets of rules and sanctions, different from country to country, placing constraints on both civilians and military organizations. Bland sees the proposed approach as a useful instrument for organizing Eastern European civil-military relations in the historical, cultural and political context of that part of the world: before Western models – he suggests – can be transferred to Eastern Europe, “leaders require the support of a theory of civil-military relations that more closely resembles their own experiences and that transcends ethnocentrism, political systems and time.”¹⁰⁰

⁹⁶ Nansen Behar, “Civil-Military Relations and the New Defence and Security Legislation in Bulgaria,” paper presented at the seminar *Legal Framing of Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Security Sector: Norms and Reality/ies*, organized by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva, Switzerland, May 4-5, 2001, p. 13.

⁹⁷ Behar, p. 12.

⁹⁸ Douglas L. Bland, “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 26, no. 1 (Fall 1999), p. 8.

⁹⁹ Bland, “A Unified Theory,” p. 9.

¹⁰⁰ Bland, “A Unified Theory,” pp. 22-23.

The analysis of post-1989 Eastern European civil-military relations tends, therefore, to suggest that neither the Communist models of control over the armed forces nor the Western ones are appropriate to describe the interaction between civilian institutions and military organizations in post-Communist democracies. New models, based on the idea of *cooperation* between the two parties, according to clearly defined standards, may more objectively express the post-1989 type of civil-military interaction in Eastern Europe and constitute the basis for its healthy future development. Therefore, although similar to the Western models of civilian control over the armed forces, new post-Communist Eastern European systems of military oversight could be further conceptualized as based on both (i) a relatively clear legal and institutional framework regulating civil-military relations and (ii) a significant level of involvement of the military establishment in the general discussion of security and defence issues. While (iii) the political system would be democratic and (iv) the civil society would be involved in a public debate on security and defence issues, a commonly agreed civil-military *division of labour* in policymaking processes dealing with military matters could more appropriately describe the post-Communist situation in Eastern Europe.

The armed forces' involvement (although not a violent one) in Eastern European countries' political processes since 1989 has suggested not a risk of military coup d'état, but a tendency of military organizations to express their views on security and defence issues. Especially in a volatile political context and in a European area where military organizations have traditionally provided expertise on military matters, the armed forces have expressed the need for the integration of these institutions into the larger society, according to their qualifications; this would be the opposite of a situation characterized by civilian policies of assimilation or segregation. If efficient, these Eastern European models of civilian control over the armed forces may become new paradigms used in the transfer of liberal norms to the countries of today's Commonwealth of Independent States and even other newly democratic polities.

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HUNGARY'S LONG JOURNEY TO NATO AND BEYOND

The choice made by Central and Eastern European Nations to apply for NATO membership was obviously ushered in by the transformation of the international landscape due to the fall of Soviet Union, the emergence of the United States as the world's only Superpower and with the rise middling polarity among the European powers... Hungary sought to join with the Western democracies via becoming a member of NATO. By the turn of the century, Hungary was a full-fledged member of the one of the most successful alliances in history. Hungary's participation in Kosovo and other various Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) have reinforced that it was a right decision to join the Alliance.

Since its admission, Hungary has had a mixed record of success. For more than a decade, Hungarian governments have been grappling with the immense task of transforming an oversized mass army into a streamlined, but much more effective modern one. In spite of this fact, and because of the imbalance and increasing overhead costs, Hungary failed to deliver the required military capabilities, and lost her credibility. During the first few years there were no significant purchases of new equipment, meaning that "technological backwardness was huge." Reductions in manpower left some units non-operational. The army has no protective gear to defend against chemical or biological attacks. Communications systems are old and Hungarian soldiers have difficulty talking to their NATO counterparts.¹⁰¹

The current government has, however, taken seriously its promise to begin to build an efficient military force that fulfils the tasks of traditional territorial defence, as well as respond to the security challenges of the 21st century. This meant considering defence issues in a new light as a result of a comprehensive "Bottom Up" defence review

¹⁰¹ Keith Richburg Washington Post Foreign Service Sunday, Nov 3, 2002

that lasted nearly a year. It marked Hungary's serious effort to develop a military force that is capable to provide security for its own nation as well as be a viable participant in Coalition and Alliance endeavours.

In order for Hungary to be fully integrated and respected by its more modern European neighbours it needs a fully functioning and interoperable military force. The Defence Review emphasized two fundamental objectives: the fulfilment of national alliance obligations and the transition to an all voluntary force.

Hungary's journey, to reach its goal of becoming a participating member of NATO, is long and though the goal is achieved there is still work to be done. This paper reviews the role the Partnership for Peace and the State Partnership Program had in the Hungarian Defence Force transformation and briefly addresses Hungary's NATO and Coalition Force participation. Hungary's experience is full of lessons learned for other aspirant nations, but is a tale a nation finally reaching its "always felt rightful place under the sun: the community of like-minded Western nations sharing similar aspirations."¹⁰²

Hungary Aims for NATO

The systemic change in the world order represented a choice for new values, which also determined the main direction of Hungarian foreign policy. Euro-Atlantic integration received a special emphasis and Hungary's joining NATO and the European Union was confirmed as the prime objective of foreign policy of both governmental parties that entered into office after the 1990 and 1994 elections. While other pressing challenges are bound to divert international attention to other regions and problems, many of the nations of Central Europe believe that NATO and its enlargement process are still key to the stability of the continent.

NATO membership has been the quintessential foreign policy goal of Hungarian governments since 1990. Seven years after Gyula Horn, then

¹⁰² Csaba, Gabor, Hungary in NATO: A Solid Bond of Common Values and Shared Interests, www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/REGIONAL/ECE/vol5nol_2

foreign minister of the last communist government (later Prime Minister, 1994-98), publicly speculated about the possibility of his country's future membership in the alliance.¹⁰³

The goal of improving Hungary's relations with their neighbouring countries, ending historic tensions of the previous centuries and achieving reconciliation, fostering mutual confidence and a rapid broadening of relations has been closely related to this endeavour. Hungary also attached key importance to avoiding any ethnic conflict that may threaten the stability of a traditionally multi-ethnic Central Europe.

The fundamentally new international political and security environment after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact gave a unique opportunity for Hungary to analyze, independently, its national foreign and security policy options. A new national, foreign policy was developed in Hungary in 1990 by the first post-communist government. It was declared that both national foreign and security policy have to promote the country's re-entering the Western community of values and political practice.

The deepening of the Euro-Atlantic integration of Hungary is a priority objective of Hungarian foreign policy in order for our country to become a full-fledged and esteemed member of the community of nations with democratic market economies. After the achievement of NATO membership on the 12th of March 1999, we are now preparing to join the European Union in 2004.¹⁰⁴

Euro-Atlantic integration is a fundamental expression of Hungary's determining political affinity as well as an ultimate anchor of its developing democracy and market economy. At the same time, it is also the Euro-Atlantic framework that is capable of providing a fundamental democratic solution to the situation of ethnic minorities in Central

¹⁰³ Zoltan Barany, *America's New Allies: Poland Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO*, Andrew Michta editor. (London: University of Washington Press, 1999) p. 74.

¹⁰⁴ Foreign Policy, Government Portal, online, <http://www.ekormanyzat.hu/english?kateg=english:1258> (29 April 2003)

Europe. This has, for a long time, been one of the main intra-regional sources of discord.¹⁰⁵ (Appendix II. Hungary's Integration)

As far as our goals related to integration are concerned, we consider all significant European and Euro-Atlantic institutions as different elements of one and the same structure, as elements, which can mutually complement and reinforce each other. From this follows our endeavour that has been pursued consistently ever since the change of system, namely to obtain membership in all of these international organizations upon complying with the necessary conditions.¹⁰⁶

Regional stability on the other hand is indispensable for securing peace, development and further democratization in Central and Eastern Europe.

In the framework of regional co-operation Hungary strives to maintain manifold, neighbourly relations with its neighbouring countries and the countries of the region. Hungary is an active participant in the rejuvenated Visegrád collaboration and in the work of Central European organisations. While in South Eastern Europe we have taken a substantive role in the permanent resolution of the crises recurring over the past decade and in the promotion of the recovery of the region.¹⁰⁷

In the current international and national political context, the foreign and security policy of Hungary is based on the twin principles of co-operation and integration. These twin principles constitute a parallel track of Hungary's developing international relations, and they have to remain parallel in the future as well. Neither can, however, they replace the other. Integration into Western security, political and economic structures limit the scope of relations to a certain number of countries for Hungary. Co-operation on the other hand has to proceed with a much wider range of countries, also including those with which integration is not, or is not yet, possible.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ <http://hungaryemb.ines.ro/hu/prioritasai.htm> (3 March 2003)

¹⁰⁶ Martonyi János, Németh Zsolt, Hungarian Foreign Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: A Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 15.

¹⁰⁷ Foreign Policy, Government Portal, online, <http://www.ekormanyzat.hu/english?kateg=english:1258> (7 February 2003)

¹⁰⁸ Government Programme, The Government of Republic of Hungary,

It pays particular attention, however, to make sure that there is a balance among these goals. It keeps in mind that none of these goals must be subordinated to another or to be asserted to the detriment of another. The successful fulfilment of these endeavours makes them interdependent on one another and closely links them together.¹⁰⁹

Hungary's so called Euro-Atlantic orientation is a natural part and consequence of the profound transition process that has placed its society on a new value foundation in the past decade. NATO membership therefore does not constitute an end, but rather served to accelerate the process of making Hungary a full-fledged Western democracy.¹¹⁰

Meeting the Challenges to World Security

The Threat to world security did not disappear altogether as it was expected for a short while in 1989/90. In fact, the events of 9/11 proved that the threats to world security are still present and much more difficult to predict. Due to Hungary's geopolitical situation, the country needs to take in account all types of the new threats in establishing its priorities for policy objectives. The common problem of these threats is the insufficiency of national ways and means to fight them. These emerging threats and realistic, pragmatic responses to them underpin the arguments for adopting the national security policy of co-operation and integration by Hungary.

Hungarian foreign and security policy should continue to create new forms of co-operation while at the same time deepen the already existing frameworks. The combination of unilateral and international action should continue to remain characteristic of Hungarian Security Policy

<http://www.kormany.hu/program/index.en.html>(2 March 2003)

¹⁰⁹ Martonyi János, Németh Zsolt, Hungarian Foreign Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: A Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 14.

¹¹⁰ Csaba, Gabor, Hungary in NATO: A Solid Bond of Common Values and Shared Interests www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/REGIONAL/ECE/vol5no1_2/csaba.pdf

and infrastructure in order to promote the national interest and to achieve the strategic goals of integration and stability.¹¹¹

It is with this in mind that the Partnership for Peace Programme and the U.S. State Partnership Program (SPP) have taken a special role and have become essential to Hungary's future.

1.1 Hungary's Integration and Participation in PfP

Hungary was a member of the political and military structure of the Warsaw Pact and of COMECON. Soviet troops were stationed on the territory of Hungary. The number of troops in the Hungarian Peoples Army was around 160,000 during peacetime. The magnitude of Hungarian military expenditure was higher than 3.5 percent of GDP (...). Hungary was ruled by a one-party system and an economy based on centralized planning. The country bordered five neighbours, three of which were members of the Warsaw Pact.¹¹²

But all of this has changed and today Hungary is a full-fledged member of both NATO and the European Union.

The new, democratically elected Hungarian Government's first and most important political endeavour was the Euro-Atlantic integration. Hungary declared that integration into the western democratic institutions was a priority for the country. The first security related institution Hungary joined was the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991.

The basic principles of security policy approved by the National Assembly on 12 March, 1993 demonstrate that one of the main endeavours of the Hungarian security policy is the rapprochement and subsequent membership in the institutions of Western European integration. The basic principles of national defence adopted on 14

¹¹¹ Government Programme, The Government of Republic of Hungary, <http://www.kormany.hu/program/index.en.html> (9 April 2003)

¹¹² Szabó, János, Hungary and NATO – The Road to Membership, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: A Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 28.

April, 1993 in accordance with the basic principles of security policy, on the other hand, confirm that the guarantees of the country's security can in long run only be ensured through the institutional framework of multi-faceted cooperation.¹¹³

A year later the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) was launched, and Hungary joined in the first wave on 8 February 1994, making it the fifth state to join.¹¹⁴ Participation in the PfP played a determinant role of Hungary's future integration. Following the procedures outlined in the Study of NATO Enlargement in 1995, outlining NATO's expectations, Hungary started a series of meetings with the Alliance in the framework of Individual Dialogue. That process allowed Hungary to intensify its cooperation with the Alliance and to present the main issues linked with the integration in detail. That higher level of bilateral dialogue enabled to the country to become more familiar with, and have a better understanding of NATO's expectations for the aspirants.

As one of the first of the former Warsaw Pact member states, Hungary officially declared its intention to join NATO on 29 January, 1996. The next milestone of Hungary's Western integration was NATO's Madrid Summit, in 1997, when, along with three other countries, Hungary was invited to join by the Alliance. One year later Hungary was also invited by the EU to begin official bilateral negotiations on integration into the EU.

In 1999 Hungary joined the Alliance, and participated in the Washington Summit as a full NATO member. In the same year Hungary also became an associated member of the Western European Union (WEU).

March 12th 1999 was a historic day: Hungary became a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Through this act Hungary officially and irrevocably became part of the Euro-Atlantic community

¹¹³ Szabó, János, Hungary and NATO – The Road to Membership, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: A Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 30.

¹¹⁴ NATO Handbook, (Brussels, NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001, p. 67.

of values as well as a part of the political and security system of alliance pursuing common interests and objectives.¹¹⁵

Hungary's accession has a fundamental and long-term beneficial effect on the security and future of the country. The foreign and economic policies of Hungary now had greater potential and interest representation capabilities, however at the same time Hungary's responsibility has also increased in issues concerning the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area.¹¹⁶

In political terms, Hungary's integration into NATO is completed. Military integration is ongoing; the consistent implementation of military reform is an important element in this process. The establishment of a state-of-the-art, effective, sustainable Hungarian military force that is able to meet new challenges is essential for NATO tasks and for the defence of the country alike.¹¹⁷

Hungarian participation in the PfP entered another dimension by its entry into NATO: Hungary's participation became increasingly a donor country, rather than just a consumer.

This is in line with our endeavour to participate, a one of few NATO-members of the region, in preparing countries aspiring for membership and more generally, in strengthening the links between NATO and the partner countries. In the course of our participation we will pay special attention to the Southern and Southeastern periphery of Europe, which is overburden with challenges and for the security of we feel a special kind of responsibility.¹¹⁸

Since 1994, Hungary has participated in a number of exercises and projects organized within the PfP and in the PfP spirit. Hungary also took part in two cycles of the Planning and Review Process. All the

¹¹⁵ Foreign Policy, Government Portal, online, <http://www.ekormanyzat.hu/english?kateg=english:1321> (3 April 2003)

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Szabó, János, Hungary and NATO – The Road to Membership, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: A Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 39.

undertakings were pursued as priority projects. The Hungarian government was fully aware that this new cooperation would enable the Hungarian Armed Forces, in a short amount of time, to achieve minimum interoperability and mutual trust.

The past few years have proved over and over again that is needed an epochal initiative. PfP has mediated a new security and defence philosophy to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Practical experience and skills accumulated in the course of PfP co-operation have played a crucial role in enabling to succeed in fulfilling the expectations vis-à-vis NATO membership and in achieving the minimum level of interoperability and compatibility required for membership in the Alliance.(...) PfP has created an extremely important practical framework for confidence building and development of relations between the Hungarian Defence Forces and the armed forces of NATO member states, as well as for the establishment of the conditions of practical co-operation.¹¹⁹

Fulfilment of Military Requirements

If we can train to common standards, procedures and doctrine and at some point put them under a Combined Joint Task Force, we have created new NATO and a new Europe¹²⁰ As President Göncz noted, Hungary's need for NATO membership was motivated by values shared with the West, by the desire to belong to a favourable security environment, and by the potential membership offered for creating a more cost-effective defence establishment.¹²¹

The benefits of membership in NATO may only emerge if members are willing to make significant contributions to the "collective security". The experience of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic (the 'V3' entrants) since 1999 offers some idea of what can be expected. One of the basic requirements of enlargement was and is the fulfilment of certain Minimum Military Requirements (MMR) by the Invited

¹¹⁹ Végh, Ferenc, *The Hungarian Defense Forces: From Preparation to Full Interoperability*, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: A Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 48.

¹²⁰ A Force for Peace, U.S. Commanders' views of the Military's Role in Peace Operations, Peace Through Education Found, 1999, p. 15.

¹²¹ See Árpád Göncz, "The Least Expensive Way to Guarantee Security," *transitions* 4, no. 7 (Dec 1997): 19

Countries.¹²² To help satisfy these requirements, and speed up this process for early membership, NATO-experts visited Hungary several times right before the accession. These meetings were not simply a means to control and monitor compliance but, rather, a clear indication that NATO wanted a successful integration of Hungary.

Post-Communist Hungary inherited a military establishment that had been prepared and outfitted as part of the Warsaw Pact's doctrine of coalition warfare.

As such, it was fraught with an oversized command structure, strategic imbalances, antiquated armaments, organizational asymmetries, and apathetic professional personnel. The number of combat, logistical and training units were excessive, and there was virtually no indigenous air defence capability.¹²³

Altogether, five areas of Minimum Military Requirements (MMRs) were identified,

- 1-2. Security and CIS;
3. Air Defence;
4. Infrastructure, and
5. Force Contributions.
- 6 "Miscellaneous Issues" — covered various manpower-related questions.

These areas were addressed and the MMRs have been met and other measures have been taken to establish initial capabilities for membership. In the long term, Hungary shall have to satisfy more demanding requirements and details. Yet, by at least minimally satisfying the MMRs, Hungary has made huge steps in the right direction, steps that have shown its commitment to the Alliance.¹²⁴

¹²² Végh, Ferenc, *The Hungarian Defense Forces: From Preparation to Full Interoperability*, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: A Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 48.

¹²³ Zoltan Barany, *America's New Allies: Poland Hungary and the Czech Republic in NATO*, Andrew Michta editor. (London: University of Washington Press, 1999) pp. 95-96.

¹²⁴ Végh, Ferenc, *The Hungarian Defense Forces: From Preparation to Full Interoperability*, Joó, Rudolf, Hungary: A Member of NATO, (Budapest, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999), p. 48.

Along the long road to NATO accession, Hungary was aided by a little known program called the State Partnership for Peace, sponsored by the Ohio National Guard, a reserve component of the United State Military. The work of the SPP was instrumental in preparing Hungary to meet its MMRs and gain entrance into NATO.

The State Partnership Program

The Republic of Hungary and the State of Ohio have developed an exemplary cooperation many fields, including the military to military exchange between the Home Defence Forces and the Ohio National Guard. It has played an important role in deepening interoperability and setting higher standards for the Hungarian armed forces, and through that, it has been instrumental in reaching the level of military capability expected from us by the Alliance.¹²⁵

Ohio's State Partnership Program (SPP), which began over a decade ago, is one of the oldest and most successful of this National Guard program. Much of its success is due to the long-standing connection between Ohio and Hungary. These ties go beyond just military and governmental agreements, but are part of a network between the people of both the state of Ohio and the Nation of Hungary.

¹²⁵ Dr. Gyorgy Banlaki, Ambassador of Hungary, Letter to Governor George Voinovich, June 30, 1997.

Historical relationship between Hungary and Ohio

Of all the states in the United States, Ohio has the largest population of Hungarians, almost a quarter million Hungarian Americans are residing in North East Ohio alone. One out of every seven Hungarians in the U.S. lives in Ohio. The largest influx of Hungarians to Ohio came between 1956-1958, “especially members of the Freedom Fighters of infamous 1956 Revolution. Cleveland, at one time, had the largest populations of Hungarians outside of the capital city of Budapest.”¹²⁶ Testimonials to the Hungarian presence in Ohio can be seen all over the state, and especially in the Cleveland area. A large statue of Louis Kossuth, a Hungarian Liberator of the 1848 Revolution stands in a prominent position in Cleveland’s prestigious University Circle. In addition, next to the Cleveland Municipal Utilities building is the Cardinal Mindszenty Plaza and statue, which is a vivid witness of Ohio’s support of Human Rights while Hungary was under Soviet Occupation. Hungarian Professional and Social leagues abound in the state and it is the home of the Hungarian World-Wide Congress.

There have been two sister-city relationships created between Ohio and Hungary. One is between Toledo and the city of Szeged and the other is between Cleveland and the second largest city in Hungary, Miskolc.

As early as 1992, Ohio was assisting Hungary with much needed aide due to the war in the Former Yugoslavia. Hungary was the first recipient of Ohio’s 1992’s Overseas Medical Supplies Mission with a total of 70 tons of supplies with a value of over \$10 million for refugees and people in need. A second mission took place in 1993.¹²⁷

With this strong environment of cooperation and bond between Ohio and Hungary, it was a natural choice for the Ohio National Guard to choose Hungary as their partner nation. On July 27, 1993, Lieutenant General John B. Conway sent a Memorandum to Major General Richard Alexander, the Adjutant General of Ohio’s National Guard. It confirmed Ohio’s selection to represent the United States and the National Guard

¹²⁶ Dr. August Pust, Notes for The Briefing to the Governor-Hungary-Ohio, dated March 23, 1998.

¹²⁷ Interview with Dr. August Pust on November 3, 2001.

Bureau for the Ministry of Defence of Hungary. In 1993 this was considered a “substantial non-traditional responsibility...[when] Ohio stepped forward to volunteer for this important and historic challenge...”¹²⁸

NATO

Support for admission to NATO was provided by the former Governor, George Voinovich (who is now the state’s Senator), as he worked closely with the leadership of ethnic organizations of Hungarian, Polish and Czech communities.¹²⁹ In June of 1997, a special resolution supporting NATO membership for these countries was created and a special request letter was sent from Governor Voinovich to Secretary of State Madeline Albright. It emphasized that “NATO membership for these nations would further promote on-going and new business, as well as other relationships. There are essential components to creating long-lasting peace and stability needed in the region to re-integrate these nations with the rest of Europe and to set a precedent for other nations in the region in the future.”¹³⁰

It was during Governor’s Voinovich’s administration that the Ohio-Hungary Military-to-Military exchange program was created, and due to its success, expanded. It facilitated opportunities to link the Ohio National Guard as citizen soldiers of Ohio to Military organizations in Hungary. “Its objective was to exchange information, assistance and most importantly, long-term personal and professional relationships.”¹³¹

1.2 Ohio’s SPP, the First Years

Ohio “hit the ground running” as soon as the SPP was established. The first few years were a flurry of cooperative activity between both the

¹²⁸ Memorandum from Lt Gen John Conway dated 27 August 1993, Subject Ohio State Partnership with Hungary.

¹²⁹ Dr. August Pust, Ohio Hungarian Relationship: Support and Partnership for Admission to NATO. December 29, 1999

¹³⁰ George Voinovich, Letter to Secretary of State Madeline Albright. June 11, 1997.

¹³¹ Dr. August Pust, Ohio Hungarian Relationship: Support and Partnership for Admission to NATO. December 29, 1999.

nation of Hungary and the state of Ohio. This proactive initiative laid the groundwork for the future success of the program.

Ohio's SPP began with a mil-to- mil contact event in January 1995. Its purpose was to assist the Hungarian MOD overhaul their legal documentation that is required for regulating the specialized issues of military justice. Special items of attention were the punitive powers of the commanders and the judicial review process.¹³² It also examined the military court system, the civil and individual rights of soldiers and closely investigated the details of the military punishment system. It began a series of meetings that were continued in Hungary to ensure that the new Hungarian Legal System was compatible with Western systems, commensurate with the defence of human and individual rights was incorporated and attained.¹³³

In March of 1995 the first high-level visit to Hungary by the Ohio National Guard leadership was made under the Ohio-Hungary State Partnership Program. The Ohio delegation met with the US Embassy personnel, Hungarian Ministry of Defence, the Hungarian Home Defence Forces, and the Ministry of Civil Defence HQs. The first MLT Chief and his Travelling Contact Team (TCT) was established and a monthly/bimonthly contact arrangement was agreed upon. The benefits of a reserve force and a strong NCO corps were the major topics for discussion. The cost effectiveness of a reserve component compared to a regular unit was stressed.

To shore up the foundation of the Ohio-Hungary relationship, the following topics/goals were covered on future FAM visits by Hungarian delegations to Ohio:

- Mobilization: The basic principles, personnel and equipment, methods of mobilization and how to include the private sector.
- Recruitment: The organizational structure of the reserve forces, the legal statutes and the sustainment of training

¹³² After Action Report: Event No: HU396, Military Law Familiarization, 24 January- 4February 1995.

¹³³ Ibid.

- Personnel Management: Automated Management software, Career Management for NATO interoperability, the accreditation of military educational institutions.
- Formal/Informal NCO advisory groups and the idea of an Inspector General System for Oversight.
- Hungarian/English language school established under PFP, with the goal to send guest lecturers from the State of Ohio to assist in teaching Americanized English.
- Peacekeeping Capability Development: Ohio would provide curriculum materials, OPLANs format, and US/NATO maps.¹³⁴

These core concepts set the framework for a successful future relationship and partnership program. The next step was to inculcate the Hungarian defence leadership about the unique civil-military relationship the Guard has within their state. Four Senior Military leaders came Ohio to gain an appreciation of both civil control of the military and the military support to authorities. The leaders not only visited military installations but went to State and Federal Agencies, Ohio local governments and various community organizations to gather information on how the military interacts with, and provides support to the community and the state.

In many of the FAM events, the organizational structure and the relationship that the Ohio National Guard has with the Federal government was emphasized. This concept of answering to the President and the Governor is a complex issue that needed much clarification. The federal and state missions and how both are accomplished with the various roles and missions of the National Guard are crucial to understanding how this once local militia, expanded into a federal mission.¹³⁵

¹³⁴ SPP Summary 1995-1996, Compilation of all After Action Reports for 1995-1996.

¹³⁵ After Action Report H-HU432 13-20 January 1996.

Targeted Training Events

A year later, after the foundation had been laid, more timely and specialized topics were approached. Ohio hosted Mid-Senior level Budapest Military District officers to become familiar with the principles and practices in the prevention of terrorism and sabotage on US Army Installation and response to mass disasters in large cities. Briefings, demonstrations, and methods training was included as well as visits to the Ohio Emergency Management Agency to show how the military works in conjunction with state agencies.

1. Hungarian Air Defence

One of the most successful aspects of the Hungarian-Ohio mil-to-mil contacts is in the scope of air defence. The Hungarian Air Defence Command began its familiarization training in order to promote standardization and interoperability in 1996. The Hungarian Air Field of Tazsar was used extensively as a forward operating base in Former Yugoslavian Conflict.

2. Guard Exercises

In 1996, Ohio and Hungary participated in two Guardex events that both gave pertinent real world training for the Ohio National Guard and gave education and training on the deployment of the Hungarian Air Forces for Peace Keeping Operations. When one looks at Annex D, the Hungary ODC 5-Year Plan, Goal 1.4, “Support to International Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)” has been achieved. Hungary now has the ability to prepare for PKO, draft lessons learned, enter into negotiations for an Acquisition and Cross-Service agreement and have developed units specifically trained for PKO according to Western standards.¹³⁶

¹³⁶ Lt Col Thomas Brown, USAF Chief of Bilateral Affairs, Annex D, Bilateral Affairs Officer for FY)# Hungary ODC 5-Year Plan.

3. *Reorganization of HDF*

As a nation in transition, Hungary was in the midst of not only overhauling its military doctrine, strategy and structure, it also had to reduce its force structure. The National Guard not only was able to help the HHDF make crucial decisions in reorganization, it is also a model of how a reserve component can supplement the large standing army which is obsolete for Hungarian national defence. In August of 1996 the Chief of the HHDF Mobilization Department, his colleagues and senior officers from the Operations Department of Budapest Central Command came to Ohio to learn about a standing reserve force. The planned topics were a review of the structure of the NGB MOB Division, planning and budgeting for large scale wartime operations, system call up and lessons learned from Desert Storm and Operation Joint Endeavour.¹³⁷ But the venue was changed due to large scale flooding of the Ohio River. What makes this so interesting is that the visiting Hungarian delegation got to witness firsthand the role that the National Guard plays in civilian disaster control and relief and it was a live example of National Guard Support to Civilian Authorities.

As Hungary was preparing for NATO integration, an apparent shortcoming was the interoperability of command post technology and operations. To address this, the Guard conducted several events covering the Planning and conduct of a U.S. Corps and Division level command post exercises using CPX (Computer Aided Exercise). These events included briefings, discussions and exchanges of manuals, hardware/software requirements and databases and other necessary data to assist the HHDF Operations Directorate and the Operations and Training Directorate of the Aviation Central Directorate to establish a command post that will be interoperable with NATO standards.¹³⁸

Since it was a former member of the Warsaw Pact, the HDF did not have much experience with information sharing to the media and general public. Shortcomings in information dissemination, especially during a crisis were identified. In April of 1997 a Hungarian delegation came to Ohio to get briefings about, and training on the incorporation of public

¹³⁷ After Action Report, HU581, 8-14 September, 1996.

¹³⁸ After Action Report, HU657(TCT), 22 January, 1997.

relation assets when dealing with the civilian population during natural or industrial disasters. Topics included the establishment of an independent information system during and emergency; mobilization of volunteers for disaster relief and the methods of interagency procedure and actions during disasters.

Goals and Objectives: Achieved

The Joint Contact Team Program has changed its mission in Hungary as the military and governmental organizations have successfully established systems in almost all functional areas addressed in the JCTP/ODC/Hungarian Government goals.

These systems are not necessarily the U.S. way of doing business, but modern and efficient methods of performing those functions and tasks determined to be mission essential.¹³⁹

The goal was the successful implementation made evident when the Hungarian government and military have institutionalized and adopted as Hungarian doctrine the basic principles of a modern, well trained and equipped NATO style military, properly configured to support Hungary's national defence and security objectives.

Though Hungary has achieved its goal of NATO membership the process continues for the restructuring of forces and meeting NATO requirements. After reviewing After Action Reports and Feedback from Host Nation members, the HDF has determined that they are sufficiently familiar with the U.S. logistic procedures and interoperability with NATO members during deployments. As part of the ongoing training, the familiarization of the HDF Air Forces with U.S. Combat fighter operations continues as well as training in combat fighter doctrine and mission operations which takes place in Canada. Simultaneously, the familiarization of the HDF IRF/RRF with U.S. Brigade/regimental, battalion and company leadership and command tasks, focusing the functions of key leadership positions, including the senior staff NCO

¹³⁹ LTC Brown, Annex D, Paragraph 3.

positions persists. Command and Control requirements have not reached a satisfactory level of interoperability and training continues with the HDF familiarization with unit exercise and simulation processes intended to assist key HDF/ IRF/RRF units with demonstrating common U.S./HDF staff and decision-making processes through integration with the U.S. exercise simulation.¹⁴⁰

The effects of September 11th have highlighted the need to increase the defensive capabilities of units against the risks of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, to include individual and collective NBC defence tasks. But it seems that there has not been much consideration for the Air Force or the Border Guards in current planning.¹⁴¹ Part of this training was to familiarize the HDF 25th Mechanized Brigade with the U.S. Army mechanized unit NBC doctrine and procedures.

Where the goal of “stability” is concerned, Hungary has been able to reduce the number of border disagreements, and develop a plan for border security. As various pronouncements and actual steps by the Hungarian government testify, “Hungary’s primary role has always been understood to be in projecting stability in its region.”¹⁴² They have developed and coordinated an international and regional disaster relief plan/system. A regional environmental protection plan has also been implemented to further security initiatives. Regarding the establishment of a force structure that is adequate for the defensive needs of the host nation and adjustment to the existing forces to Objective force structure, the JCTP contribution is assessed as complete, yet Hungary is still working with other U.S. programs. A significant accomplishment of the JCTP/SPP is its input to Hungary’s ongoing development of a National Defence Concept (strategy). Lastly, Hungary has proven its commitment to Western standards by successfully achieving compliance with regional arms control agreements and treaties.

¹⁴⁰ After Action Report HU657, 8-12 December.

¹⁴¹ LTC Brown, Annex D, Appendix 1, Goal 5.5.

¹⁴² Csaba, Gabor, Hungary in NATO: A Solid Bond of Common Values and Shared Interests, www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/REGIONAL/ECE/vol5no1_2/csaba.pdf

Pertaining to Democratization, all the goals set forth by the JCTP and SPP have been achieved. A non-political military, subordinated to a democratically elected civilian political leadership has been established. Compliance with the National and International Rules of Law have been firmly incorporated while improvements have been made with civil-military cooperation.

A major strength of the SPP is its focus on human relations, and military professionalism. Though hard to measure, the goal for increase respect for human dignity and individual rights of service members has been met.¹⁴³ To measure this progress, the Guard had several key objectives to be accessed. The HDF implemented ethical and moral leadership standards and developed a plan to ensure the tolerance for ethnic, generational and religious diversity among its service members. To help monitor this progress, the HDF created an inspector general system to help revolve service members' complaints and conduct routine inspections. Another achievement in which the Guard was instrumental was the beginning of a vigorous Professional NCO Corps. The recruitment of quality individuals who are educated and trained in leadership and decision making skills as NCO is a ground breaking accomplishment for the HDF.

Assessment of the Ohio SPP

The program is winding down and major events are dropping off. In part this is the life cycle of a successful SPP program. Overall the Ohio Hungarian Partnership is a success and many newly formed partnerships can look to the Ohio-Hungarian relationship as a model for developing their own programs. But not only can one learn from the success of others, there are lessons to be learned from failures or shortcomings.

When reviewing several years of after-action reports it becomes clear that there is too much emphasis on "familiarization training" that does not provides any concrete or quantifiable results. While one can argue that just developing trust and understanding between two cultures is a

¹⁴³ After Action Report, Military Law Familiarization, HU396, Dated 30 Jan- 04 February 1995.

major component of this program and can't be measured, one can seek out other sorts of events that involve specific training or more quantifiable objectives.

A very basic and fundamental obstacle to growth and integration of the Hungarian Defence Forces is Hungary's Strategic Plan, or lack thereof. Add to this shortcoming is that fact that there is no NATO plan for Hungary. Could the Ohio Guard have been more proactive in helping Hungary develop its Strategic Plan? Hungary, now a NATO member is being criticized for lagging behind in its growth toward full integration and Ohio could be instrumental in helping Hungary regain the momentum that it had while trying to achieve membership into the organization.

Along with the fact that too many events were centred on familiarization, from another trend that should be addressed is the personnel that attend these events. It is apparent that many of the same personnel of the same rank or even the same people themselves attended multiple events. There is a lack in diversity of ranks and people that took advantage of the program, especially in its early years.

The area that the Guard can make a significant impact is in aiding the HDF to develop its NCO Corps. There have been several events concerning this, but as Hungary prepares to end conscription, it needs to continue to grow its NCO development program and follow the Guard's lead in utilizing this valuable human resource.

As the military-to-military events drop off in numbers, the civilian to-civilian events are picking up numbers and in diverse areas. Various civilian exchanges have taken place in 2002 and more are planned for 2003. The areas of exchange are at the State Governmental level with the Minister of Interior, the Ministry of Education with the Ohio State University and events planned for fire and police forces.”¹⁴⁴

The SPP has continued to be a particularly effective advocate for

¹⁴⁴ Telephone interview with LTC Brown, Bi-lateral Affairs Officer, Budapest Hungary, January 16, 2003.

democratic ideals and the civilian control of the military. The Ohio Guard has provided Hungary with a concrete concept of the citizen-soldier and has fostered a lasting relationship with between the two states. It remains to be seen in what direction this innovative bilateral relation will go.

Future Prospects

Partner nations pursue very different objectives within the Partnership. Some seek to improve their capabilities, with a view to eventual membership of the Alliance. For others, the Partnership is an institutional door to the Euro-Atlantic community. (...) But, irrespective of these different aspirations, there is still considerable unused potential in the Partnership, particularly in the area of crisis management, the better use of the EAPC, and practical cooperation under PfP.¹⁴⁵

Outlook

The threat of large-scale confrontation has dropped considerably since the end of the Cold War, but the Global War on Terror, regional conflicts and the Iraqi War all challenge the Euro-Atlantic region and relationship. All of the actors of the region stand at the crossroads and must choose the right path to meet challenges and secure a peaceful future. Concerning ways to achieve peace, partnership and cooperation, the PfP and SPP have to face new realities.

The enhanced and more operational Partnership will continue to address the full range of objectives laid out in the 1994 PfP Framework Document. It will also introduce new quality and character to Partnership, in part to reflect the increased scope and more operational nature of PfP resulting from the enhanced process.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ Dahinden Martin, Swiss Security Policy and Partnership with NATO, NATO Review, Web Edition, Vol. 47 – No. 4, Winter, 1999, pp. 24-28, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9904-06.htm> (19 January 2003)

¹⁴⁶ Report by the Political Military Steering Committee on PfP, Towards a Partnership for the 21st Century, The Enhanced and More Operational Partnership, June 15 1999, § 8., <http://www.southeasteurope.org/documents/d990615a.htm> (22 April 2003)

There is no doubt that the achievements of PfP and SPP, involving both the Allies and Partners of Central and Eastern Europe, has become one of the main pillars of the politico-military cooperation in the Trans-Atlantic region. The programs have been recognized as the most useful tool and forum in enhancing security, stability and most importantly democracy in the former communist countries. In retrospect the progress made and the overall vitality of the East-West cooperation and partnership in political, military, economic, societal and other sectors has gone far beyond any optimistic expectations of the early 1990s.

As one of the main pillars of the NATO strategy, PfP is not just a forum of the East-West cooperation but also one of the most powerful generators of the bilateral, multilateral and regional cooperation of the involved members, from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Furthermore, for those Partners, who intend to join the Alliance, PfP serves as a practical institution for exercising practical capabilities, and offers country specific and tailored direction for developing and reviewing integration plans and determining objectives.

The momentum produced by PfP and SPP therefore should not be diminished. The development should be consolidated in the European security architecture. The enlargement of NATO is essential for carrying on that process and benefits that have already been gained. Also the enlargement should be ongoing and the Prague commitment to that effect should be developed further. But at the next wave if the integration, a simple statement that the “door should remain open” might not be enough for those aspirants, who were invited in Prague. All of the aspirants should seek a guaranteed support from the Alliance for continued openness. To that end, the idea of continuing the intensified dialogue between NATO and candidates is definitely the only way to be able to handle the dilemma of enlargement.

Regarding the issue of NATO integration, the focus shifted from PfP to the MAP initiative. With this in mind, NATO’s PfP and the MAP initiative gives a framework, forum, structure and is a guide for nations to remain transparent and objective. Maintenance of the credibility of the Alliance and the thus of the enlargement process requires a review the

lessons learned from the first four years of the MAP process so that there is the ability to design for the future, as well as to communicate these conclusions and conceptual ideas both to the Allies and Aspirants. Due to the dynamic political imperative to bring about a qualitative progression in the current NATO integration process, and in order to help improve capabilities of the candidates to gradually comply with the requirements of the membership, there is a need for a more effective and operational procedure to avoid any redundant technical and procedural debate.

Experiences gathered in the recent accession process so far has already proved the value of designing the MAP structure and outlining how NATO aspirants can help themselves. There is an obvious and justified expectation towards the three Central European NATO members to take a prominent, active and leading role in the current integration process of carrying the MAP initiative forward and make it stronger.

Croatia's joining the MAP process in March 2002 highlights the need to lay out the modalities of and procedures for accession to the MAP. There must be a balance between the declared openness for any country in the EAPC/PfP framework that is joining the process to ensure its smooth integration as well as preventing the MAP from losing its pragmatic nature or allowing for any degradation of the process.

The PfP, SPP and MAP engagement programs have proven to be fruitful for Hungary. But this is just the foundation for Hungary to take on new roles and meet the new challenges of the Euro-Atlantic and even global security environment.

Hungary: Cooperation, Commitment and Security

Hungarian society has, in general, grasped the benefits that security has brought, the way it contributed to its economic development, increased international standing and proved conducive to creating conditions that can accelerate the country's social and economic development. The fruits of a stable security environment can be seen with Hungary's admission to the European Union. Simultaneously, its participation in

Allied decision-making increased its foreign policy's international and national responsibilities. With this in mind, Hungary has been an active participant in international PKO's and Coalition forces and training for NATO interoperability.

1) Hungary has participated in NATO's SFOR and KFOR. In fact, the Hungarian Engineering contingent of over 400 troops began its operations in Bosnia well before its NATO membership materialized. The HDF has also participated in Task Force Harvest in Macedonia. Hungary has been a faithful supplier of troops to the UN mission in Cyprus and the Multinational Force Observers on the Sinai Peninsula as well. Today, more than one thousand persons from the HDF take part in peace operations at fifteen locations, upon the request of eight organizations.¹⁴⁷

2) Fighter Pilot training continues. The latest meeting of the high-level control directorate of the NATO Flying Training in Canada (NFTC), the alliance's aircraft pilot training program was held in Hungary between 22-24 September 2004. According to Brig. Gen. Paul McCabe, the military leader of the training, they are training thinking pilots during the program, who are able to perform their tasks even when flying under circumstances not experienced earlier. The pilots learn the tactical methods in line with NATO standards, which can equally be applied to older and newer aircraft types. The program is being continuously adapted to the requirements of the participating nations.¹⁴⁸

3) The Hungarian Defence Forces serve in Afghanistan in the ISAF. They train at the Peace Support Training Centre in Szolnok. The 35-strong contingent, includes doctors, specialised medical personnel, soldiers assigned to the provincial reconstruction group and to the airport, are to serve in Kabul and Kunduz . A total of 177 Hungarian soldiers are serving within the NATO-led peace support operations in Afghanistan.

¹⁴⁷ Lt Col Tamas Barnoczky, Hungarian NATO Membership After 11 September 2001. US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

¹⁴⁸ Training Thinking Pilots, <http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=17714&next=>

4) Hungary is also a member of the Coalition Forces in Iraq. The Hungarian Transport Battalion is at Al Hillah. Their mandate given by the National Assembly expires on 31st December 2004. The allies requested that Hungary remains in the region at least until the end of February, the date of the Iraqi elections, however, this requires a two-third parliamentary decision.

Conclusion

Hungary's membership in NATO has promoted the country's political and military cooperation with other Central European nations that also aspire to join the Alliance. Hungary has shared its experience, which has empowered its neighbours to make more efficient use of the MAP program, which enabled the latest admission of 7 aspirant nations into NATO.¹⁴⁹

Hungary also strongly supported to invoke Article 5 provisions for the United States after the horrendous terrorist attacks of 9/11. Viktor Orbon was the first allied leader to call for NATO's collective defence response on September 11th.¹⁵⁰ This call was quickly followed up by a contribution of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. This is just one of the evidences of Hungary's maturation as a NATO member.

Yet, Hungary needs to modernize some of its military technical equipment to achieve a higher level of interoperability with the Defence Forces of the Alliance. Several significant development programs have been launched to create the capabilities. However, up-to-date and regularly improved knowledge is also needed to operate the modern equipment.¹⁵¹

There was a motion for the development of the Defence Forces put forward to the Hungarian Parliament, which contains a program for a ten-year period. Through the consistent and predictable execution of the

¹⁴⁹ Csaba, Gabor, Hungary in NATO: A Solid Bond of Common Values and Shared Interests, www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/REGIONAL/ECE/vol5no1_2/csaba.pdf

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Lt Col Tamas Barnoczky, Hungarian NATO Membership After 11 September 2001. US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

tasks formulated by the motion, a voluntary-based defence forces complying with the altered security policy circumstances will be created.¹⁵² The fact that the defence budget increased more than the NATO average is greatly appreciated within the alliance. But reform is not only about money. Ultimately, it's about political leadership. "It takes political will, devotion, and clarity of leadership from the government to achieve successful military reform. Hungary can put huge sums of money into military reform, but in the absence of a good concept, political will and political leadership, the process is always going to fail."¹⁵³

The transformation of the Hungarian Defence Forces continues toward a smaller, more stream-lined contingent. It will be more mobile and interoperable. It aims to be designed to meet the security challenges of the present and future, not of the past. With the ongoing reform of the Hungarian Defence Forces, Hungary will be better equipped to contribute to the renewal of the Alliance and prove her value to world security.

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¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

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Ayşe Nilüfer Narlı

ALIGNING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY: TRANSPERANCY BUILDING IN DEFENSE SECTOR AND THE EU REFORMS

Introduction

The paper aims to examine the changes in the civil-military relations in Turkey by relating it to the transparency building in the defence sector and changes in the policy of accountability. The paper undertakes two tasks: First, to provide background information on the civil-military relation and on the modality of accountability of military to the civilian authority. This is important to understand from what type of the civil-military relations model Turkey has been moving to a new model in the course of constitutional changes and political reforms required to meet the political criteria of the EU. The second task is to understand to what extent Turkey has been able to meet the requirement of the EU laid in Accession Partnership Document and the expectations mentioned in the regular reports since the year of 2000 by analysing the institutional changes taking place as a result of constitutional changes and reform packages. Here the analysis has two dimensions: cultural; and structural/institutional.

The Concordance Model and Its Mind Set

The traditional organisation of the civil-military relations differs from the Huntingtonian model of the separation of civil military relations. Despite their formal separation, military and civilian authorities have forged a partnership based on an imperfect concordance among the military, political elites, and the citizenry.¹⁵⁴ This ruling style is the

¹⁵⁴ For further information on the concordance model and civil-military relations in Turkey, see Nilüfer NARLI (2000). "Civil-Military Relations in Turkey", *Turkish Studies*. Vol.1, No.1 (Spring 2000): 107-127. London: Frank Cass. This article modify's Schiff's concordance models and applies it to the Turkish civil-military relations. For the theory of concordance, see Rebecca L. Schiff. 1995. "Civil-Military

product of Turkey's specific cultural, social, and institutional context, featuring a stratified society and political culture as well as historic conflicts with neighbouring states and the constant fear of losing territorial integrity that is synonymous with national integrity. Moreover, the three major convictions in the political culture, which are internalised in the course of primary and secondary socialisation, enhance the tendency to deny the separation of civilian and military spheres and sustain the military's influence in civilian political decision-making process. They back the constitutional tools, which enabled the military to intervene in the legislative process.¹⁵⁵ These convictions are: Turks have been known as a military-nation throughout history¹⁵⁶; every male Turk is born soldier; and the military does not only protect Turkey against internal and external enemies, but it also ensures secularism and democracy in Turkey. Such conditions significantly influence the military's role in the nation and the citizen's perception of military expenses and transparency building in defence budgeting.

With the far-reaching institutional and constitutional reforms (mentioned below), which separate the civilian and military spheres and increase the parliamentary control of the armed forces, the partnership/concordance model has been going through a transformation. The change is not only in the context of the concordance model. There is also a change in the political culture that sustained the model. The change is twofold: in the mind set of the citizens and in the socialisation and perceptions of the officer corps. The most observable indicator of the change in the

Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance". *Armed Forces and Society*. Vol. 22 (Fall). No. 1: 7-24.

¹⁵⁵ Prior to the amendment, an example of the constitutional tool was Article 118 of 1982 Constitution. According to the article, Turkey's Council of Ministers must consider, "with priority, the decisions of the National Security Council concerning necessary measures for the protection and independence of the state, the unity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and security of society" (1982 Constitution, Article 118). The NSC is a constitutional body that had been created by the 1961 Constitution and its status was enhanced by the 1982 Constitution. Article 118 of the 1982 Constitution establishes the NSC as a body evenly divided between five civilians (the president, prime minister, and ministers of defence, internal affairs, and foreign affairs), and five military officials (the chief of the general staff, the commanders of the army, navy, and air force, and the general commander of the gendarmerie). The amendment to Article 118 changed the composition and functions of the NSC, as mentioned in the paper later.

¹⁵⁶ See Ayse Gul Altinay. 2001. *Making Citizens, Making Soldiers: Military Service, Gender and National Identity in Turkey*. PhD Dissertation, Department of Cultural Anthropology in Graduate School of Duke University.

political culture is the instantaneous complains about the lack of transparency, which are communicated in the media (see below) and the increased number of academic work on civil-military relations and military budgeting within the last five years. Secondly, the idea of being a conscientious objector, person who, on the grounds of conscience, resists the authority of the state to compel military service, is pronounced. It is a challenge to the idea that every male Turk is born soldier.¹⁵⁷ Thirdly, a new conviction is evolving: the time has come for regular civilian institutions to assume the responsibility of protecting democracy and secularism rather than calling the military to put domestic affairs in an order.

Manifestations of the change in the mind set of officer corps are not observable directly. However, the changes in the curriculum of secondary and tertiary military education and increased number of officers attending graduate study programs at various universities imply changes in their perception of the role of the military. This change has critical importance for the military to resolve its own paradox: the dilemma of being the pioneer of westernisation and modernisation since the 18th century and the occasional resistance against any change in the organisation of civil-military relations to meet the contemporary standards of the European countries. However, in the year of 2004, the military was more co-operative in executing the reforms re-structuring the civil-military relations.

CULTURE: *New Political Cultural Environment*

Albeit it is incomplete, Turkey has begun making substantial progress on ‘the road to transparency’ in the conduct of its defence affairs as a result of two factors and their interaction: an internal impetus that is the flourishing urge of the citizens for transparency in military budgeting and expenses; and secondly the external impetus, that is the EU harmonisation reforms that intent to increase the civilian control of the armed forces and to enhance transparency of the military expenses.

¹⁵⁷ Mehmet Bal is one of the conscientious objectors in Turkey. For information on Bal and the trial he was going through in 2002 see, www.ainfos.ca/02/nov/ainfos00067.html.

The urge for transparency first came from radical political groups, more frequently from the left and the Kurdish nationalist, in the late 1990s. Then, it has gone beyond these radical circles. In the year 2000, prior to the severe fiscal crisis of 2001 that moved many people to think about the proportion of the military expenses and the lack of civil control over the military budgeting, an economist and a columnist Osman Ulugay, talking to Nese Duzel in an interview, criticised the lower level of spending on health and education, albeit high defence spending. He also mentioned the need for accountability and transparency. Ulugay said:

"Military expenses must be subject to inspection like other expenses. I do not agree to the statement every sent spend in defence is for the well-being of the motherland. We should discuss if these defence expenses are rational or if there are alternatives to them. I do not trust the publicly announced figures on the defence budget. Because not all military expenses are transparent. No body knows the accurate amount of the money spent on military expenses. Military expenses cause higher public spending that is detrimental to anti-inflation policy".¹⁵⁸

Like Osman Ulugay, a university professor and columnist Ahmet Insel underlined the importance of transparency in public expenses and viewed it as an imperative of a democratic society. In discussing the importance of accountability of the state institutions to the public, he highlighted the problem of lack of transparency in military budgeting and in the expenses of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, a state institute that oversees religious affairs.¹⁵⁹

The 2001 crisis motivated think tanks, intellectuals and labour unions to raise the question of military expenses and the issue of transparency. For example, a retired ambassador and former minister, Ilter Turkmen wrote an article in the nation-wide circulated *Hurriyet* daily on the lack

¹⁵⁸ See the interview titled "Yine Askeri Harcamalar" ("Military Expenses Again"), Nese Duzel, *Radikal* July 10, 2000).

¹⁵⁹ See Ahmet Insel, "Askeri ve Dini Harcamalar" ("Military and Religious Expenses"), *Radikal*, April 30, 2000.

of transparency in military expenses.¹⁶⁰ A columnist Prof. Dr. Ahmet Insel wrote another article on the need for transparency in military expenses and democratic control of military budgeting.¹⁶¹ Hasan Cemal, one of the leading columnists also joined the voices and wrote an article asking "the military to be under the civilian control".¹⁶² Then in 2004, the leading union KESK (Kamu Emekcileri Sendikası, the Union of Public Workers) published a report criticising the 2004 budget by pointing out the problem of the lack of transparency in military budgeting and the lack of parliamentary control of defence budgeting in practice. The second point it made was the inverse relationship between the lower proportion of the money allocated for education and health expenses and the higher level of the military expenses.¹⁶³

The external impetus, which is the necessity to make reforms to meet the Copenhagen criteria and the EU standards of a democratic country, has fed the internal stimulus. It has increased the voices concerning the military expenses in the media and in the academic world. After Turkey became a candidate for eventual accession at the EU Summit in Helsinki in 1999, the European Commission added detail to the broad principles outlined in the 'Copenhagen criteria' by issuing an Accession Partnership Document for Turkey detailing the reforms Turkey would need to implement before the start of accession negotiations. Besides, improvements in the human right regime and expanding the civil liberties, they required the government to align the constitutional role of the National Security Council as an advisory body to the government and to build constitutional mechanism of transparency in military budgeting in accordance with the practice of EU member states.¹⁶⁴ The

¹⁶⁰ See "İlter Turkmen, "Türkiye'de Savunma Harcamaları" ("Military Expenses in Turkey"), *Hürriyet*, December 23, 2002.

¹⁶¹ See Ahmet Insel, "Askeri Harcamada Gerçek Tasarruf" ("The Real Saving in Military Expenses"), *Radikal*, December 2, 2001).

¹⁶² See Hasan Cemal, "Askerin Sivile tabii olması" (the Military under civilian control), *Milliyet*, June 18, 2003.

¹⁶³ See the article titled "Yoksulluk ve Faiz Butcesi 2004'te Sirtimizda" ("Poverty and Interest Budget is on our Shoulder in 2004"). KESK, December 2003. www.sendika.org/belgeler/keskbutce_aralik-2004.html.

¹⁶⁴ For the EU requirements to increase civilian control of the armed forces and to align civil-military relations by making changes in the composition and functions of the National Security Council, see Regular Reports from 1999 till 2003. The language of the 1999 Regular Report suggests that no improvement has been made with respect to curbing the military influence on the political decision making: 'through the National Security Council, the Military continues to have an important influence in many areas of political life'. The 2000 Regular Report was the first one after Turkey gained the official

change in the functions of the NSC was one of the aimed mid-term changes to be done to meet the 'Copenhagen criteria', as stated in the Accession Partnership Document issued by the EU Commission and in the National Program for the Adoption of Acquis (Political Criteria Section) prepared by the Democratic Left Party-led coalition government that lasted until November 2002.¹⁶⁵


In order to realise the reforms envisaged in the National Program, the AKP government introduced EU harmonisation packages and obtained parliamentary support for them in 2003 and 2004. The content of the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th EU harmonisation packages and their impact on the defence policy formulation, parliamentary oversight over defence budget and accountability of the military to the elected representatives are the major focus points of the section below.

candidate status. It was more elaborate on the civilian control issue and through the repetitive use of the word 'still' betrays some impatience: "*Civilian control over the military still needs to be improved [...]. Contrary to EU, NATO and OSCE standards, instead of being answerable to the Defence Minister, the Chief of General Staff is still accountable to the Prime Minister. It is also noted that the Council of Higher Education, which controls the activities of the institutions of higher education, as well as the Higher Education Supervisory Board, include one member selected by the Chief of General Staff*". There followed in the Accession Partnership of 2001 the first mentioning of 'alignment' as a medium term priority: 'Align the constitutional role of the National Security Council as an advisory body to the Government in accordance with the practice of EU Member States.' See, 'Council Decision of 8 March 2001 on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey', *Official Journal of the European Communities*, 2001/235/EC. The 2001 Regular Report noted headway in the legislative sphere, but hinted for the first time that this might not be enough since it remains to be seen whether this will lead to civilian control in practice.

'As part of the constitutional reform package, the provision of Article 118 concerning the role and the composition of the National Security Council has been amended. The number of civilian members of the NSC has been increased from five to nine while the number of the military representatives remains at five. In addition, the new text puts emphasis on the advisory nature of this body, stressing that its role is limited to recommendations. The Government is now required to "evaluate" them instead of giving them "priority consideration". The extent to which the constitutional amendment will enhance de facto civilian control over the military will need to be monitored". See 2001 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession, European Commission, p. 19. This line of reasoning is continued in the 2002 Report with a negative conclusion added as to whether the package has led to an improvement: 'The constitutional amendment introducing changes to the composition and role of the National Security Council has been put into practice. Nonetheless, these changes do not appear to have modified the way in which the National Security Council operates in practice.' Consequently, the European Council in Copenhagen December 2002 'urges in particular the government to address swiftly all remaining shortcomings in the field of the political criteria, not only with regard to legislation, but also in particular with regard to implementation.'

¹⁶⁵ For the National Program, see <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/>.

Figure 1: The Concordance Model



In this model, perceptual refers to the totality of the perceptions, convictions and cognitions of the citizens that shape their attitude towards the military. Contextual refers to all types of legal and constitutional rules and arrangements.

Drifting away from the Concordance Model: Changes in Policy of Accountability and the EU Harmonisation Reform Packages

Policy accountability

In order to analyse policy accountability, it is important to examine the political reforms that are contained in the two major constitutional reforms of 2001 and 2004, and in the four major packages of political reforms adopted by Parliament since the November 2002 when the Development and Justice Party won the elections till August 2004. They

have introduced changes to different areas of legislation and brought the four major categories of institutional changes that were required by the EU:

- Transformation of the role of the National Security Council (NSC) and the NSC General Secretariat;
- Removal of the NSC representatives from the civilian boards;
- Full accountability of the military to the elected representatives and full parliamentary control of the defence budgeting;
- Limiting the competency of military courts

Transformation of the role of the NSC and NSC General Secretariat

The 6th and 7th EU harmonisation reform packages¹⁶⁶ brought changes in the structure of the NSC and its General Secretariat in 2003: A number of fundamental changes were made to the legal framework of the National Security Council with a view to aligning relations between civil and military authorities on practice in EU Member States. First, the advisory nature of the NSC was confirmed in a law implementing the amendment of October 3, 2001 relating to article 118 of the Constitution, which also increased the number of civilians in the NSC at the beginning of 2003. The 7th Harmonisation package brought amendments to the Law on the National Security Council (Law No: 2945, 1983). It re-defined the functions of the NSC with an amendment to the Article 4. Accordingly, the scope of the NSC's involvement in political affairs is confined to national security issues: the NSC is to determine national security concept and develop ideas about the security in accordance with the state's security approach and recommend these security views to the Council of Ministers. Another amendment to the Law on the National Security Council abrogated the provision that "the NSC will report to the Council of Ministers the view it has reached and

¹⁶⁶ The 6th Reforms package was enacted on July 19, 2003 and the 7th package was enacted on August 7, 2003. See *Resmi Gazete*, July 19, 2003 and August 7, 2003 for the enacted reform packages.

its suggestions".¹⁶⁷ It is not going to discuss "security" in a broader term but in particular terms confining to national security issues.

Secondly, the 7th Reform Package brought changes in the functions of the NSC General Secretariat that previously functioned as an executive organ. The package introduced the fundamental changes, listed below, to the duties, functioning and composition of the NSC General Secretariat.

- Removal of Articles 9 and 14 of the Law on the NSC and the Secretariat General of the NSC which empowered the Secretariat General to follow up, on behalf of the President and the PM, the implementation of any recommendation made by the NSC.
- Abrogating the provisions authorising unlimited access of the NSC to any civilian agency. It deleted Article 19 that read: "*the Ministries, public institutions and organizations and private legal persons shall submit regularly, or when requested, non-classified and classified information and documents needed by the Secretariat General of the NSC*".
- An amendment of Article 13 limited the competencies of the Secretariat General to the functions of a secretariat of the NSC.
- Abrogation of the confidentiality of the staff of the Secretariat General of the NSC made it more accountable to the parliament and the public.
- An amendment of Article 5 modified the frequency of the meetings of the NSC and it increases the time period between regular NSC meetings from one to two months. Moreover, the NSC is to convene upon the proposal of the PM and the approval of the President.

¹⁶⁷ For more information on the 7th Harmonisation Package and changes in the Law defining the function of the NSC, see http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/ab_uyum7-1.html.

- Cancellation of the prerogative of the Chief of General Staff to convene a meeting.
- An amendment of Article 15 revised the appointment procedure of the Secretary General of the NSC; the Secretariat General is appointed upon the proposal of the PM and the approval of the President, allowing a civilian to serve in this office. The amendment provides that the post National Security Council General Secretariat will no longer be reserved exclusively for a military person. In August 2003, it was decided to appoint a military candidate to replace the outgoing General Secretariat for one year. In early July 2004, the names of the potential civilian candidates for the post appeared in the press,¹⁶⁸ and in September, Mr. Yigit Alpogan, who served for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was appointed to the post.¹⁶⁹

Consequently, the NSC which functioned as a coordinating organ, was made an advisory body with no executive powers and with a majority of civilians.

Removal of Military Representatives from the Civilian Boards

The EU harmonization packages diminished the NSC's influence on the civilian boards influencing the education and art and broadcasting policies. First, with the 19 July 2003, 6th harmonisation package, the representative of the NSC General Secretariat on the Supervision Board of Cinema, Video and Music was removed by an amendment to the Law No: 3257. The Sixth Clause in Six Paragraph of Law 3257, that is, "The National Security Council General Secretariat" was repealed from the paragraph.¹⁷⁰ However, there remained a representative of the National

¹⁶⁸ According to *Hurriyet* Daily, the government will select a potential appointee for the National Security Council General Secretariat from among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See *Hurriyet*, July 6, 2004. Two names were mentioned in *Hurriyet*: Umit Pamir and Osman Koruturk, both have served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁶⁹ *Sabah* daily reported in August that Mr. Yigit Alpogan, the former ambassador to Athens and made contribution to Turkish-Greek relations was decided to be appointed to the post of General Secretary in September. See *Sabah*, August 10, 2004.

¹⁷⁰ See *Resmî Gazete*, 19.07.2003-25173, Law No: 49228. The date of approval: 15.07.2003.

Security Council on other civilian boards such as the High Audio-Visual Board (RTUK) and the High Education Board (YOK).

Later in the year 2004, the package of ten constitutional amendments eliminated the military influence in the decision-making of these two boards. In May (2004), with an amendment to the Article 131, which previously authorised the military representative on High Education Board, the military representative was removed. With the 8th EU Harmonisation package various amendments in the Constitution were approved. Removal of the military representatives on the High Audio-Visual Board (RTUK) and the High Education Board (YOK) was among the amendments that were approved.¹⁷¹ Later, in an attempt to abolish the influence of the military on high councils, the right of the Chief of General Staff to appoint a member to the High-Education Board and to the High Audio-Visual board was eliminated by the 9th EU Harmonisation Package, passed in June 2004.

Full Accountability of the Military to the Parliament

A number of reforms executed in 2003-2004 provide the institutional and legal framework for full accountability of the military to the parliament. They improve constitutional principles for transparency of defence budgeting and expenditures by expanding the mandate of the Court of Auditors to audit military expenses and by the new law on Public Financial Management and Control.

The first one is the amendment to the Law of the Court of Audits (see below), included in the 7th Reform package. Despite a few objections from the army¹⁷², the government went ahead with the reforms to increase parliamentary oversight. The second one is the Law on Public Financial Management and Control (Law No: 5018; Enacted on: 10/12/2003) that brings extra-budgetary funds into the overall state budget; and it requires more detailed information and documents to be

¹⁷¹ Other amendment approved were the auditing of military expenses, the abolishment of the State Security Courts (DGMs), and removal of the death penalty. See *Turkish Daily News*, June 2, 2004.

¹⁷² For the objections, see the article titled "TSK objects to the 7th package", *Turkish Daily News*, July 19, 2003.

attached to the budget proposals, including the defence budget proposals. Third, with the Constitutional amendment package, passed in Parliament in May 2004, the Court of Audit has had wider mandate to inspect accounts and state property owned by the Armed Forces without any exemption and secrecy consideration.

Now we will examine these three changes in further details. The 7th Reform Package (Article 7) brought an addition to the Law on the Court of Auditors to expand its mandate to audit accounts and transactions upon the request of Parliament in all areas where public means are used. And it introduced a bylaw to establish the principles and procedures to be observed when auditing State property of the armed forces.¹⁷³

Article 7 - The following article has been added to the Law on the Court of Auditors No. 832 dated 21.2.1967:¹⁷⁴

“Additional Article 12- Upon the request of the Presidency of the Turkish Grand National Assembly based on the decisions of Parliamentary inquiry, investigation and specialized committees, the Court of Auditors may, within the limits of the matter requested, audit the accounts and transactions of all public bodies and institutions, including privatisation, incentives, loan and credit practices, and with the same procedure, audit all types of institutions and organizations, funds, establishments, companies, cooperatives, unions, foundations and associations and similar entities with regard to use of public means and resources, regardless of whether or not they are subject to the auditing of the Court of Auditors. The results of the audits are submitted to the Presidency of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to be evaluated by the relevant commissions.

¹⁷³ See the article titled "Anayasa Paketi Imzaya Acilior" (the constitution package is open to signing"), *Hurriyet*, April 16, 2004.

¹⁷⁴ Law on Court of Audits: Functions and Powers of the Court of Audits before the amendment
Section 1 – The Court of Accounts shall be charged with auditing, on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the revenues, expenditures, and property of the government offices financed by the general and annexed budgets; taking final decision by trying the accounts and acts of the responsible officials; and performing other tasks conferred on it by various laws in matters related to examining, auditing and passing judgement. (Law No: 832 Enacted on: 21/2/1967; Published in *Official Gazette (Resmi Gazete)* on: 27/2/1967 # 12 538).

Auditing of the state property in the hands of the Armed Forces shall be conducted in line with the principles of confidentiality as required by the national defence services. The principles and procedures for this auditing shall be regulated by a bylaw classified “SECRET” which shall be prepared by the Ministry of National Defence, in consultation with the General Staff and the Court of Auditors and be approved by the Council of Ministers. In cases deemed necessary, the First President of the Court of Audits shall have the authority to employ experts from outside the Court of Auditors to work together with its members in audits made according to the Law on the Court of Audits.

The audit requests from the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall be given priority by the Court of Audits. The rules and procedures on meeting these requests and the employing of experts from outside the Court of Audits by the First President shall be regulated by a bylaw to be issued. The Presidency of the Republic shall be outside the scope of this article.”¹⁷⁵

This enables the Court of Audits, on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and its inspection committees, to scrutinise all types of public expenditure, the revenues, expenditures, and property of institutions without any exception and without exempting any institute from being accountable. Then, the Court of Audits reports to the related Parliamentary committees.

The second legal arrangement was the Law on Public Financial Management and Control (Law No: 5018, Law enacted on 10 December 2003 that brought all extra-budgetary funds into the budget. Therefore, extra-budgetary defence industry funds¹⁷⁶, used to make defence procurement and expenses, were brought into the national defence budget (Ministry of National Defence Budget). The Law brings the following changes that were required in the EU Regular Turkey Reports, in their section on "public finance and transparency".

¹⁷⁵ See the Amendments in the Law under the 7th EU Harmonisation Package: Law no: 4963 published in *Resmî Gazete*, August 7, 2003-25192.

¹⁷⁶ These funds are: the Defence Industry Support Fund (DISF) and the Turkish Armed Forces Strengthening Foundation (TAFSF).

- With the Law on Public Financial Management and Control (Law No: 5018¹⁷⁷), which will enter into force on 1 January 2005, extra-budgetary funds¹⁷⁸ and defence funds are to be brought into the defence budget and into the overall state budget. Therefore, these funds are subject to auditing not only by the Directorate General of Foundations¹⁷⁹ and the Court of Audits (as it has been the case), but also by the parliament now.
- The Law on Public Financial Management and Control requires more detailed information and documents to be provided in the budget proposals (rather than those of 4-5 pages) to be submitted to the parliamentary committees and to the Parliament (Article 18). It also requires longer period of debate and negotiation on the defence budget proposals. This will enable the Parliament to have an increased voice at ex-ante accountability as well as at ex-post accountability.

¹⁷⁷ The Law on Public Financial Management and Control brings the following improvements in public finance ruling:

- Roles and responsibilities of Ministry of Finance and line ministries are defined clearly in the budget preparation and implementation process.
- Responsibilities and authorities related to financial management will be delegated to spending agencies.
- Ministry of Finance shall be a central governmental unit in setting standards and monitoring implementation in general government.
- All financial transactions will be included in related budgets.
- Tax expenditures will be reported.
- Accountability and transparency will be main values in public financial management system.
- All financial activities will be subjected to external and parliamentary control. See: www.muhasabat.gov.tr/yayinlar/IMF-Viyana.ppt. 4

¹⁷⁸ Minimising "Extra-Budget Activities" was one of the requirements for transparency of public expenses. Extra-budget activities were very common until 2001. There were almost 80 extra-budgetary funds; managed by related administrations, not under parliamentary control, using different accounting and reporting systems, using different expense procedures than governmental expense procedures. Extra Budgetary Funds (EBFs) had most of their own revenues from related sources, but some were receiving transfers from the general budget (a kind of earmarked revenue). Their activities were not being reported for public, but were audited by High Audit Board and Ministry of Finance. Under the Law on Public Financial Management and Control, all extra-budgetary funds will be abolished. See: www.muhasabat.gov.tr/yayinlar/IMF-Viyana.ppt. 9/

¹⁷⁹ For information on the funds and the Directorate General of Foundations,

see Appendix of the report: Nilufer Narli. 2004. "Governance and the Military: Perspectives for Change in Turkey", Working Paper No.4 Second draft (10 July, 2004)., Prepared for the second meeting of the Task Force formed for the project: Task Force is convened under the aegis of a project on Governance and the Military, organised by the CESS (Centre for European Security Studies), in association with the ASAM (the Centre for Eurasian Strategic Studies).

- The Law brings a change in the method of budgeting. It requires performance report for efficiency audit to be submitted to the Parliament and to the related institutions. (Article 17). This would enable the Parliament to have information about the outcome of the defence spending and to have a voice on the outcome and process side of the budgetary process.
- The Law expands the scope of control beyond budgeting or resource allocation and budget execution (the traditional audit function). It now enables the Court to do value- for-money inquiries and to involve in resources management issues on behalf of the Parliament.¹⁸⁰
- The Law improves the mechanisms of internal control and provides better tools to scrutinise the defence budget bills and the expenses.

Third, an amendment to Article 160 of the Constitution deleted the last paragraph of the article on the Court of Audit is deleted, which restricted Court of Auditors to inspect the accounts of the Armed Forces by exempting the state property it owned from being inspected by the Court of Audit.¹⁸¹ It also repealed the secrecy clause to delete the exemption of the "state property in possession of the Armed Forces in accordance with the principles of secrecy necessitated by national defence" from the control of the Court of Auditors (Sayıştay).

Now, the Court of Auditors has a full mandate and the constitutional right to audit the accounts and transactions of all types of organisations including the state properties owned by the armed forces. It shall inspect the revenues and property of the armed forces, on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

There are additional laws to inspect the budget, which have been in force before the introduction of the EU harmonisation reforms. Nominally, the

¹⁸⁰ The consequences of the Law on Public Financial Management and Control were discussed in an interview with Dr. Bulent Gedikli, who is an MP and the member of the Budget Committee. The interview was conducted by Dr. Mustafa Sahin from ASAM in June 2004.

¹⁸¹ See the article titled "Değişiklik Paketi Anayasa Komisyonu'ndan geçti" (The Amendment package was approved by the Constitution Commission"), *Radikal*, April 30, 2004.

executive has been required to oversee the budgeting. The defence budget (we mean the budget of the Ministry of Defence) has always required *explicit formal approval* of the Grand Turkish National Assembly within the overall state budget.

The Court of Auditors (Sayistay) is an independent court, which has been fully authorised to inspect the revenues and property of the Armed Forces and the defence budgeting and spending. In the field of defence spending, the court has tended to confine itself to the traditional audit function (the legality and propriety of spending) rather than valuing for money inquiries (looking at the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which the taxpayers' money is used). This is more likely to change with the implementation of the Law on Public Financial Management and Control in the year 2005. The change in the mind-set of the citizens, whose demands expressed in the media to value money before allocating the resources for defence purpose, would compel the institutions to value for money inquiries.

Although the Court has tended to confine itself to traditional audit functions, there have been occasional critical notes, particularly on "undocumented" defence spending since the year 2001. For example, in the year of 2001, the Court's Annual Report (Report of General Appropriateness of the Budget of the Year 2001) pointed out that the Ministry of Defence's spending of 834 trillion, 752 billion 840 million TL foreign project loan was not documented in the defence budget.¹⁸²

With the reforms listed above, the constitutional and legislative authority has wider constitutional rights to have a parliamentary control of the defence budgeting: to *reveal, explain and justify* policy and plans in the defence. The parliamentarians will have more detailed information and time to review and debate the defence budget proposals and the bills submitted to the parliament. The Court of Auditors, on behalf of Parliament, has the mandate to require the government to *reveal, explain and justify* policy and plans in the defence domain. The defence

¹⁸² The Court's Report noted this inappropriate budgeting in its report: *2001 Yılı Genel Butce Uygunluk Bildirimi Raporu*, p. 72-73. This was quoted in the article titled "14 milyar dolarlık savunma fonu" (The 14 billion US \$ Defence Fund", in *Medyakooop* on May 23, 2003, available at www.medyakooop.org.


commission and sub-committees of the ‘budget’ commission *are* empowered to scrutinise the actions of the executive in the defence and security arena. All these new laws and constitutional amendments are more likely to bring a new modality of defence budgeting.

Limiting the Competency of Military Courts

The, 7th harmonisation package included the decision to abolish the trial of citizens in military courts. It brought an amendment to the Military Criminal Code and the Law on the Establishment and Trial Procedures of Military Courts (Law No: 353, dated 25 October 1963). Consequently, it aligned the detention procedures of the military courts with those of other courts.

All these four categories of reforms referred to above have aligned the civil-military relations by increasing the civilian control of the armed forces. This leads a drift away from the concordance model and evolving of a new, illustrated in Figure 2. In the new model the military dominated constitutional organ, the NSC, has lost its legislative and executive powers; and the constitutional tools of the armed forces to influence civilian legislative authorities diminish. Now, the civilian authority has constitutional tools to control the defence policy making and budgeting.

Figure 2: The Drift from the Concordance Model



Financial Policy

Defence Budgeting, Expenditure and Procurement in the Previous Model

Parliament has always controlled governmental expenses as major policy texts, and the five-year plan requires *explicit* parliamentary approval. The budget of the Ministry of Defence has been subject to Parliamentary control and auditing even before the amendments brought by the 7th EU Harmonisation Package, the Constitutional Amendment Package of May 2004 and the Law on Public Financial Management and Control. However, the defence budgeting and procurement in the previous model (explained below) was largely exempted from the modality of accountability to the elected representatives.

Analysis of Defence Budgeting in the Previous Model According the Ministry of National Defence White Book

The defence budget process described in the Ministry of National Defence (MSB) *White Paper 2000*¹⁸³ gives detailed information on the defence budget method and process. This will undergo a fundamental change in 2005 with the implementation of the new Law on Public Financial Management and Control (Law No: 5018) that brings important changes in the public finance control, as discussed earlier. It is worth noting that the structure of the defence budget process (explained in the MSB *White Paper 2000*) is not going to alter. But the method of budgeting and auditing, and the types of documents provided in defence budget proposals are to change in the direction of increased transparency, parliamentary oversight, and value-for-money inquiries.¹⁸⁴

My analysis of *the defence budget method and process* described in the MSB *White Paper 2000* shows that in theory, any money spent on defence has been subject to strict administrative and parliamentary controls and to auditing. In practice, the military has exercised almost total control in defence budgeting and particularly in defence procurement, as many of the functions of budgeting reside in the General Staff. The Turkish General Staff has also had almost complete freedom to decide how the funds¹⁸⁵ are spent. Until 2001, when the government presented its budgetary proposals to the parliament, defence spending was traditionally the one item, which even the opposition did not dare to challenge.

¹⁸³ See *Beyaz Kitap 2000 (MSB White Book 2000)* T.C. Savunma Bakanlığı (Ministry of Defense), Genel Plan ve Prensipier Dairesi Başkanlığı. See Chapter Nine: Defense Expenditure and Financial Resources, The Planning and Resources of Defense Expenses. Available at www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/GnPPDBeyaz_Kitap.htm#WHITEPAPER. The MSB *White Paper 2000*, published by the Ministry of National Defence (MND) gives detailed information on the defence budget process.

¹⁸⁴ This is the opinion of an expert, Mr. Ozdemir, who was the Head of the Budget and Planning Committee (1995-1999).

¹⁸⁵ The resources of defence expenses are composed of the following items that include defence funds: allocated resources of the National Defence Budget; resources from the Defence Industry Support Funds (DISF); resources from the Turkish Armed Forces Strengthening Foundation (TAFSF); budgets of the Gendarmerie General Command and Coast Guard Command; foreign state and company loans repaid from the budget of the Undersecretaria of the Treasury; revenues based on the special laws of the Ministry of National Defence. See, Ali Karaosmanoglu. 2002. "Defense Reforms in Turkey" in *Post-Cold War Defense Reform*, Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler (eds), Washington D.C: Brassey's Inc. pp. 135-184., p. 152 and Table 2.

The exercise of parliamentary oversight over the military was not sufficient prior to the EU Harmonisation reforms that have been taking place since the year 2001. Prior to these reforms, the parliamentary input at ex-ante stage was limited. The parliamentarian was generally content to let the government and the General Staff to exercise the initiative in military matters. The parliamentary role was chiefly that of setting the organisational outline of the armed forces, providing appropriations to fund their operations, and re-affirming policies and practices set from the General Staff and Ministry of National Defence.

Defence procurement has been handled by the domestic and foreign procurement departments in the Ministry of National Defence and by the civilian Under-secretariat for Defence Industries (UDI).¹⁸⁶ Procurement is overseen by the Defence Industry Executive Committee (DIEC), which is chaired by the prime minister and also includes the defence minister, the UDI under-secretary and the chief of the staff; although in practice the DIEC is dominated by the military.¹⁸⁷ Similarly, the defence minister is theoretically responsible for approving the military's assessment of its procurement needs. In practice, the force commanders submit their requirements to the Turkish General Staff (TGS), which formulates proposals, which are then signed by the defence minister and forwarded to the UDI or the procurement departments in the MND. The domestic and foreign procurement departments in the MND are headed by serving officers, usually one-star generals, while a civilian heads the UDI.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ The Defence Industries Development and Support Administration (DIDA, or UDI) was formed at the end of 1985 to administer the 10 year, \$10 million modernisation program. "The status of the DIDA was changed to the Under-secretariat for National Defence Industries (UDI) under the auspices of the Ministry of National Defence in 1989." See Gulay Gunluk Senesen. 1993. "Turkey: the arms industry modernisation program", in *Arms Industry Limited*, Herbert Wulf, ed., pp: 251-267, p. 252, footnote 4.

¹⁸⁷ The military dominance of the DIEC (Defence Industry Executive Committee) was clearly demonstrated in 1998 when the civilian government abolished a defence fund levy on petroleum products. The DIEC, which is headed by the prime minister, protested the decision, arguing that it would restrict funds and could delay several important defence programmes. But the civilian government, also headed by the prime minister, defended it on the grounds that it needed to stabilise petrol pump prices and reduce inflationary pressures. For the details, see Gareth Jenkins. 2001. *Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics*. Adelphi Paper, 337. Published by Oxford University press for International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2001,

¹⁸⁸ During the late 1990s, the military also began to dominate the UDI, successfully lobbying for the appointment of retired senior generals as deputy under-secretaries.

The immense control of the military over planning defence resources and budget was related to its influence on the political decision-making in the previous model. Its political influence, in turn, enhanced its high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis civilian control in planning defence resources and budget.¹⁸⁹ The chief of staff, who acts as commander in chief during wartime,¹⁹⁰ does not fall under the aegis of the minister of defence¹⁹¹, and he has tended to conduct military affairs independent of the cabinet. His office is largely responsible for drawing up all programs, principles, and priorities related to personnel, operations, intelligence, training, and education and logistic services, preparing the armed forces for war, and co-ordinating among the ground, naval, and air force commands, as well as other institutions attached to the general staff. The office also used to present its views on the military aspects of international treaties and agreements, and if necessary, participate in meetings regarding such agreements.¹⁹²

The previous model of defence budgeting lacked adequate parliamentary oversight and auditing since the Court of Auditors had certain restrictions in auditing and scrutinizing the military expenses. This was changed with the reforms of the Law of Court of Audits. Parliamentary oversight will expand with the implementation of the Law on Public Financial Management and Control and with the constitutional amendments discussed above.

¹⁸⁹ For the autonomy of the military in Turkey, also see Umit Cizre Sakallioğlu. 1997. "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy", *Comparative Politics*. Vol. 29, No. 2: 151-166. p.154.

¹⁹⁰ Article 117 of the Constitution stipulates that the office of the Commander-in-Chief is inseparable from the Turkish Grand National Assembly and that the President of the Republic holds it. According to the same article of the Constitution, the Council of Ministers are responsible to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for national security and for the preparation of the Armed Forces for the defence of the country. The article says, "The Chief of the General Staff is the commander of the Armed Forces, and, in time of war, exercises the duties of the Commander-in-Chief on behalf of the President of the Republic." See www.mfa.gov.tr/b6.htm.

¹⁹¹ The Turkish General Staff is not subordinate to the Ministry of National Defence, but to the Prime Ministry as under the current constitution. Article 117 of the 1982 constitution, which closely resembles Articles 40 and 110 of the 1924 and 1961 constitutions respectively, states that the Chief of the General Staff is 'appointed by the President of the Republic on the proposal of the Council of Ministers' and 'responsible to the Prime Minister in the exercise of his duties and powers'.

¹⁹² The General Directorate of Press and Information. 1990. *Turkey: An Official Handbook*. p. 60.

Now, with the contextual changes and institutional reforms, the model is evolving towards the following: a clear authority requiring the government-in-office to *reveal, explain and justify* its expenditures for defence purposes. The parliament has the defence commission, budget commission and sub-committees of the 'budget' commission that shall scrutinise the defence expenditure proposals on behalf of the parliament. Under the new constitutional arrangements and the new laws mentioned above, the parliamentary Defence Commission and Budget and Planning Commission are very likely to have the authority to send for people and papers to facilitate the defence expenditure proposals. This is more likely to expand the parliamentary voice at ex-ante and ex-post accountability in planning the budget in the coming years.

More important, there are also observable changes in the implementation and in the planning of the 2005 budget, as discussed below.

Changes in the Policy of Accountability and New Implementations

1) Procurement in a New Context

Procurement is overseen by the Defence Industry Executive Committee (DIEC), which is chaired by the prime minister and also includes the defence minister, the UDI under-secretary and the chief of the staff. Previously, the prime minister hardly made a substantial change in the procurement proposals made by the MND and the chief of the staff. In mid-May 2004, at the DIEC meeting, Mr. Erdogan, Prime Minister, asked for changes in the procurement proposals and the defence tenders submitted. Erdogan also made a critical statement at the meeting: "What is important is to value the money and spending it in a wise (or rational) way."¹⁹³

Consequently, the members of the DIEC agreed to cut down the proposed total amount of US \$12 billion to an half. Secondly, they

¹⁹³ For the statement and details of the tenders, see article titled, "Return to National Production in Defence" *Yeni Safak*, May 15, 2004.

agreed to cancel three tenders including the tank and helicopter tenders.¹⁹⁴

This story gives a signal of a new mode of implementation, which is more compatible with a modality of accountability to the executive and to the elected representatives.

2) Reduction of Defence Budget by the Parliamentary Commission

The issue of reducing the defence expenses¹⁹⁵ was brought by Defence Minister Vecdi Gönül a few times in the year 2003. Mr. Gonul also raised the issue of the use of extra-budgetary funds to finance defence expenses.¹⁹⁶ Mr. Gonul gave an interview to *Hurriyet* during NATO Summit (28-29 June) and talked about the defence budget and what the government and parliament did to reduce the defence expenses. The interview shows that as a result of the parliamentary review of the defence budget proposal, "the proposed budget was reduced by one third".

Mr. Gonul said: "The defence budget (referring to the budget of 2005) was reduced by 4 quadrillion TL this year and our defence budget fell to the second rank after education, for the first time." ... "This year, for the first time, our defence budget was not the highest but the second highest item."¹⁹⁷

This seems to be an indication of the value-for-money inquiry in the planning of the defence budget and an increased parliamentary control at ex-antestage.

Mr. Gonul related this reduction to the cancellation of the three military tenders by saying that they had been influential on this record reduction

¹⁹⁴ For more information on cancellation of the tenders and controversy on it, see *Cumhuriyet* and *Sabah* of May 15 and 16, 2004; and Tercuman of May 18, 2004.

¹⁹⁵ For example, according to a press report dated 05 December 2003, Mr. Gonul criticised for the higher level of defence spending in Turkey, saying that "Turkey ranks very high in defence spending". See, "Savunmaya 11 Katrilyon" (11 Quadrillion TL for the Defence"), *Yeni Mesaj* daily, December 5, 2003.

¹⁹⁶ See the article titled "14 milyar dolarlik savunma fonu" (The 14 billion US \$ Defence Fund", in *Medyakooop* on May 23, 2003, available at www.medyakooop.org.

¹⁹⁷ See *Hurriyet*, July 1, 2004.

and that the defence appropriation which was 10 quadrillion 889 trillion 575 million, declined to 6.8 quadrillion, by this saving. According to an expert analysis (Mr. Biltekin Ozdemir this saving was done in the defence budget component of "Other Current Expenses".¹⁹⁸ It is not very likely to make a radical reduction in the personnel expenses.

In the interview, Mr Gonul gave some more information about the changes in the army by saying that the government is also preparing itself to a reduction in the number of soldiers. Asked about which units will be abolished, Vecdi Gonul said that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) itself was making the plan and would declare it when it was decided. According to the information obtained, an education brigade in the Greek border and two other brigades in Cankiri; and in the eastern cities will be dissolved.¹⁹⁹

Transparency in policy-making and planning

Not much information about policy options and choices has been communicated to the legislature, to the print and broadcast media, to 'civil society' and the public-at-large. However, transparency has been increasing since 2001 as a result of the transparency standards required by IMF and by the European Union. Occasional voices of the intellectuals and the civil society heart since the early 2000s also made a contribution to the transformation of the modality of accountability.

The legislators have always had an access to defence budget proposals. Now they will have more detailed information, as the new law on public finance control requires more detailed information about the budget

¹⁹⁸ The budget is composed of four parts defined by the main service groups, as explained in the *MSB White Book 2000*. Personnel Expenses; Other Current Expenses; Investments; and Transfers. "Other Current Expenses" need to be explained in details. They "form the most significant part of the budget: the modernisation projects included in the Strategic Target Plans (STP); allocations of funds for food and clothing of military personnel determined in the laws; construction; building repairs; duty travel expenses; fuel, electricity, water, natural gas; treatment and medication needs; fixed assets; stationary needs; cargo and transportation services; and procurement of spare parts. Although a significant part of the modernisation expenses included in this group are in the investment category, they are defined as "current expenses" because they are not subject to the supervision of the State Planning Organisation (SPO) according to the functional classification of the budget". *MSB White Book 2000*, Chapter Nine, p. 2.

¹⁹⁹ See *Hurriyet*, July 1, 2004.

proposals and more complicated and longer procedure to debate defence bills. Secondly, legislators shall have an access to comprehensive reports on the activities and performances after the execution of the budget.

However, there is not much information is given to the public at the ex-ante accountability or at policy-making and planning stage of the budget.

This is more likely to change too. One of the indicators of the likely change is the fact that in the year 2001, first time, a more detailed information on defence budget was given to the public in a publication of the Ministry of Finance, (*Kamu Hesaplari Bulteni*) available at Ministry's web page. Rather than putting defence expenses as "Other Current Expenses", the Bulletin provided detailed information on the expenses of the Ministry of National Defence, the Gendermarie, the "Security", how much money allocated to Turkish Republic of North Cyprus" and on the "intelligence and personnel".²⁰⁰ Now, the Bulletin regularly provides information on military expenses.

Moreover, information on military tenders is available for the public with the passing the law on public tenders, as explained below.

Two legal arrangements aiming to increase transparency in public expenses in general will enable the public to have information on defence budgeting. One of them is the new Public Tender Law No. 4734 ("Law No. 4734")²⁰¹ enacted on 4 January 2002, which entered into

²⁰⁰ See "Butce Seffalasti" (the Budget became transparent"), *Haberturk*, May 23, 2001. (available at www.Haberturk.com).

²⁰¹ Law No. 4734, which has been enacted as a part of the approximation efforts of Turkish legislation to European Union Law, mainly establishes the principles and procedures to be applied in tenders held by all public entities and institutions governed by public law or under public control or using public funds. Law No. 4734 mainly aims to provide for transparency, competition and fairness at public tenders. One of the most important features of Law No. 4734 is the establishment of the Public Tender Authority ("Authority") with public legal entity, which is administratively and financially autonomous. The Authority is assigned and authorised for the effective execution of Law No. 4734 and for the accurate application of the principles, procedures and transactions specified therein. The Authority is independent in its actions relating to the fulfillment of its duties, and no organ, office, entity or person can issue orders or instructions for the purpose of influencing the decisions of the Authority. The most important powers and duties of the Authority are to evaluate and conclude any complaints claiming that the transactions carried out by the contracting entity are in violation of Law No. 4734 and the related legislative provisions; and to prepare, develop and guide the implementation of all the legislation concerning Law No. 4734 and the standard tender documents.

force on 1 January 2003; and a Right to Information Law²⁰² of October 2003, have widen the citizens' access to information on public policy and public expenses.

Transparency in programming and budgeting

As mentioned above, parliamentarians were not very enthusiastic to have detailed information and to make input into planning of the budget due the lack of expertise and "political tradition of understanding the sensitivity of national defence.

An interview with Dr. Bulent Gedikli, a member of the Parliamentary budget committee underlined that the reforms and new legal arrangements will enable the members of the parliament to have more information and larger input at the planning and policy-making stage of defence budgeting.

There is growing demand, expressed in the media, for more information on defence expenses. Likely improvements in policy accountability and transparency could bring communication of more information to the public.

Domestic transparency in general: regular publications

Transparency is the guarantor of accountability; and publications are its lifeblood. There is an annual exposition of the defence budget in *Annual White Paper* published by Ministry of Defence (as mentioned above); and in the *National Gazette* that publishes a detailed budget bill that is around 300 pages. There were complains from the civil society organisations in 2001 that in general 4-5 pages were separated to the details of the budget of Ministry of Defence, while 8-10 pages are given

²⁰² Turkey joined the more than 50 countries with statutory rights of access to government information when the Turkish parliament voted unanimously on October 9, 2003 to enact a Right to Information Law. With the approval of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the new law was officially published on October 24, 2003.

to the items of the budget of the Ministry of Culture.²⁰³ Researchers studying military budget mention the measurement problems.

One sources of the information to the public is *Annual White Paper* that provides information on the budget of Ministry of Defence: the share of the Ministry of Defence in the gross national product; defence expenses and financial resources; and how much money is allocated for personnel expenses, for other current expenses that include special defence expenses, investment, consumption expenses, and other; for investments and, transfers, etc.

The second one is the *Annual Report of General Appropriateness of the Budget by the Court of Audits*. The Court of Audit publishes a report of auditing (*Genel Butce Uygunluk Bildirimi Raporu*), Report of General Appropriateness of the Budget where there is a section on the defence budget.

Thirdly, *Public Accounts Bulletin* (PAB) (Kamu Hesaplari Bulteni) published by the General Directorate of Public Accounts that operates under the Ministry of Finance, and the Budget Bill published by the Ministry of Finance provide information on current, past and future targets and realisations.

Fourthly, *National Gazette*, is one of the regular publications that contains information on defence budget and defence budget bills. Fifthly, web-pages of the Turkish General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Finance provide information on defence budget.

There is a regular compendium of defence statistics in the MSB *Annual White Books*. There is limited information on defence figures incorporating key manpower data (recruitment, retention, retirement), materiel and equipment data (purchases, inventories, disposals), plus

²⁰³ This was discussed by Nevzat Onaran in the article titled, "Bilgilenme Hakki ve Askeri Harcamalar ("The Right to have information on Military Expenses", Sosyal Arastirmalar Vakfı, June 3, 2001. www.sav.org.tr/vergi_askeri2.htm).

information on other matters (from aircraft accident-rates to welfare provision).

International transparency

Turkey regularly exchanges data on *military spending* with the NATO and OSCE member states under the information-exchange arrangements managed by the OSCE, currently based on the *Vienna Document 1999 (VD99)*. That document has many provisions about notification – and observation – of troop movements and military exercises, ‘Open Skies’ agreements, routine and ‘challenge’ inspections, and so on. It also places a politically-binding obligation on member-states to exchange data on military spending.

Conclusion

There has been parliamentary oversight, but incomparable to the EU standards in Turkey. This was partly due to the lack of military expertise of the members of the parliament and the political tradition of letting the military to handle its own budget formulation with the co-operation of the Ministry of Defence. Secondly, the constitutional tools of full parliamentary oversight and auditing were limited before the far-reaching institutional reforms executed within the last three years.

Structural reforms required by the EU Turkey regular reports and IMF have resulted in a new modality of accountability of the defence budgeting. These reforms have transformed the functions and composition of the military dominated National Security Council, which acted as a board of directors to set the parameters of policy making, particularly in security matters, for elected governments. The recent reforms have changed the character of the NSC. The body now has a civilian secretary-general, and military members are in the minority. Secondly, the reforms focusing on transparency-building, aim to unify the budget processes, to bring all extra-budgetary activities under full auditing and parliamentary control, and to provide institutional framework for transparency and internal control.

The reforms provide the constitutional and legislative authority with the necessary constitutional tools to have a control over defence budget process at ex-ante and ex-post stages. With several the EU harmonisation packages and constitutional amendments, new provisions were adopted concerning the ex post audit of military and defence expenditure. The parliamentarians will have more detailed information and longer time to *reveal, explain and justify* policy and plans in the defence. The defence commission and sub-committees of the ‘budget’ commission *are* empowered to scrutinise the actions of the executive in the defence and security arena. Operational spending is to be under full scrutiny after repealing the secrecy clause from the law and enabling the Court of Audits to control all types of expenses and transactions. There are more likely be more sophisticated mechanism of internal control.

The AKP government enjoyed unprecedented support and very vocal encouragement from the public in its pursuit of the reform process. The change in the mind set of the citizens, the rising demand of the intellectuals and opinion leaders for wider civilian control of the defence expenses and the decisive position of the AKP government to execute the reforms required by the EU have all contributed to the evolving of a new model of accountability of the defence budgeting.

The top military leadership also played a positive role in supporting the EU friendly reforms. The Chief of General Staff, Mr. Özkök has handled the transition with skill. The presence of the pro-EU Özkök in the top military post helped the cause of reform substantially.

The reforms have implications for the allocation of the resources in the direction of reduced defence expenditure and higher education spending. Education spending is for the first time higher than defence spending.

What is the response of the EU to the far-reaching reforms increasing the democratic civilian control of the armed forces and transparency building in the defence budgeting? The 2004 EU Regular Turkey Report praises all these reforms. Yet the Report shows that the European Commission is not fully satisfied with the changes in the civil-military relations. As regards the institutional framework, the Report

points out that "there are legal and administrative structures which are not accountable to the civilian structures. Civilians can be tried before military courts for certain crimes."²⁰⁴ The report makes a reference to laws and provisions that could be a tool to intervene in domestic politics.

It wrote: "The role and the duties of the Armed Forces in Turkey are defined in several legal provisions. Depending on their interpretation, some of these provisions taken together could potentially provide the military with a wide margin of maneuver. This is particularly the case for Article 35 and Article 85/1 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law, which defines the duties of the Turkish armed forces as to protect and preserve the Turkish Republic on the basis of the principles referred to in the preamble of the Constitution, including territorial integrity, secularism and republicanism. It is also the case for article 2a of the National Security Council Law which defines national security in such broad terms that it could, if necessary, be interpreted as covering almost every policy area."²⁰⁵

This means that the EU requires further alignment and abolishing all legal provisions that could be instrumental to the military's intervention in politics.

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²⁰⁴ See Turkey Regular Report 2004. *Regular Report 2004 on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*, The European Commission. P. 23. The report was released on October 6, 2004.

²⁰⁵ See Turkey Regular Report 2004. *Regular Report 2004 on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession*,

PART 3:

THE CHALLENGES FOR THE WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES

CROATIA ON ITS WAY TO THE ALLIANCE

In the Fall of 2004, the Republic of Croatia has entered its third cycle of the Membership Action Plan (MAP, cycle 2004-2005), setting firmly itself a goal to attain, over that specific MAP period, a level of reforms which would enable it to begin Accession Talks with NATO. Croatia bases such an ambition on the progress it was capable of achieving so far, by a range of tasks it is setting to itself during the ongoing MAP cycle, and, surely, by its determination to carry them out, rapidly and comprehensively.

Croatia views itself clearly within the light of NATO Enlargement process, aiming to make sure, once the Alliance decides to conduct the next round of enlargement, that the country will be entirely ready for membership. NATO's Istanbul Summit Communiqué, issued by the Heads of State and Government of the Member-States, made a reference to Croatia, as well as to Albania and Macedonia, in the context of enlargement of the Alliance. The Communiqué specified that the Enlargement process, including the implementation of MAP, would be under continuous review and reported by the NATO Foreign Ministers and that, based on the report, the individual progress by aspirants towards membership would be reviewed at the next Summit. Croatia finds such a wording encouraging to its strategic ambition.

In NATO, Croatia sees a uniquely efficient collective defence system, capable of adapting itself to the changing political and security circumstances, held together by some vitally important shared values and interests of its Member-States, interests and values deeply shared by Croatia as well. Also, Croatia welcomes NATO's strong positive influence in terms of promoting a whole range of stabilising partnerships across the continent, and beyond.

Main achievements from which Croatia's NATO ambition stems are to be found in its fulfilment of a whole range of political, economic and

social conditions - a progress which has been embodied notably in Croatia's EU candidate status - as well as in the fulfilment of defence, military and security criteria, reinforcing decisively its NATO bid. While developing additional contribution to the allied operations, the country has entered into an advanced stage of defence reforms, aiming to transform its defence system and Armed Forces for participation in the system of collective defence and other NATO missions and tasks.

Domestic political and economic reforms, aiming to build a modern democratic society and functioning free market economy, provide Croatia's main pillar in its energetic pursuit of the integration into the EU and NATO. On top of a full range of general reforms, applicable to any other country in transition, Croatia is putting special efforts in ensuring the fulfilment of some 'Croatia-specific' criteria, addressing its specific circumstances: in ensuring the full right to unobstructed return and restitution of property of all refugees and displaced persons willing to return to their homes in Croatia; in ensuring the full and unconditional co-operation with the War Crimes Tribunal in the Hague, ITCY; in reforming the judiciary system, making it efficient and reliable, EU-compatible.

At the defence side of its reforms, intertwined with its NATO bid, Croatia is entering into a crucial stage. During 2004, an advanced stage of defence reforms has started, with an aim to reshape the defence system and Armed Forces for participation in collective defence, missions and tasks of the Alliance. By the end of 2004 the first draft of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) should be finalised. Once adopted, after being exposed to the public and expert discussions, it is to be followed by the Long-term Development Plan for the Armed Forces (2005-2015). In shaping its defence configuration, Croatia starts from a NATO membership, from its participation in a system of collective defence, relying on its mechanisms while providing Croatia's own contribution to the security of the Alliance. Parallel with that, Croatia's defence strategy is also guided by the future EU membership, paying attention to the foreign, security and defence arrangements within the Union.

What Croatia is doing defence-wise, is developing its Armed Forces with a view of making them well-balanced, responding to the realistic security threats, making them NATO-interoperable, capable of providing a distinct contribution to the Alliance, both in terms of the Article V obligations (collective defence) as well as in terms of 'non-Article V' operations (crisis management, peace-support), deployable, adaptable, efficient and well equipped, possessing credible but affordable, predictable and transparent finances, with an increasing share of the budget dedicated to the necessary modernisation.

In particular, while supporting firmly NATO's policies and initiatives, Croatia aims to provide a tangible, meaningful contribution to NATO's operations as well. This applies notably to Afghanistan, where Croatia continues to participate in NATO-led ISAF operation with its Military Police Platoon (with its support elements, in total 50-soldiers strong, serving the fourth 6-months rotation). The Platoon is recognised as doing a distinguished service, in one of Croatia's distinct 'niche' capabilities, Military Policy. Croatia is also sending its civilian contribution consisting of a diplomat and two police officers to the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) led by Germany in Fayzabad. It will be exploring other possible contributions, both civilian and military, for operations in Afghanistan. Together with Albania and Macedonia, it is setting up a joint military medical team for ISAF, to be deployed during the first half of 2005. As for NATO's mission of training the Iraqi Armed Forces in Iraq and abroad, the Croatian Government stands ready to examine its possible contribution, according to the requirements of the Alliance, Croatia's capabilities, and subject to the Croatian legal procedures relevant for such missions.

While pursuing its NATO bid, within the MAP process, individually-based, Croatia co-operates closely with two other aspirant countries, Albania and Macedonia, aiming to make this co-operation produce concrete results. Intensified co-operation within the US-Adriatic Charter, linking our three countries and the US on our NATO project, is also focused on supporting the stabilisation of the entire region, especially on supporting reform processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro, starting with their effort to enter into NATO's Partnership

for Peace Programme. Also, the US-Adriatic Charter co-operation gets enlarged with a co-operation with the NATO Member-States neighbouring the region - Italy, Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey - as well as with NATO itself. An enlarged ministerial meeting of the US-Adriatic Charter Partnership Commission has been successfully organised along these lines, on the Brijuni Islands in Croatia 12-14 November 2004, under the Croatian 6-months chairmanship of the Charter.

One of particularly, and increasingly important aspects of Croatia's effort *vis-à-vis* NATO consists of stepping up efforts in conducting a comprehensive, open, transparent and competent dialogue with the Croatian public on all issues relating to NATO membership, on benefits and responsibilities arising from it. In terms of the functioning of the State Administration, the Government plans to reinforce coordination, integration, specialisation and improvement of work of all relevant government agencies engaged in NATO affairs, aiming to accelerate the accession to NATO as much as possible.

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THE ARMY REFORM IN SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO: FACTS AND PITFALLS

In view of its topicality, the Army reform stands out among the internal and external priorities of Serbia and Montenegro. This is confirmed by the intensive activities carried out at different levels intended to create conditions for the establishment of an Army which corresponds to the real needs, broadly accepted democratic standards and the principles of military organization of developed countries.

The reform of the entire security sector, and the introduction of civilian and democratic control over it, as the most important issues in this area, have been in the focus of state authorities and domestic and international public because of their significance in the democratic transformation of Serbia and Montenegro.

Furthermore, fundamental reform of the Army of Serbia and Montenegro is one of the main prerequisites for membership of Serbia and Montenegro in the Euro-Atlantic security integration, which is certainly among the most vital state interests. The progress of democracy in Serbia and Montenegro, its reputation in the international community and integration into modern international institutions considerably depend on the speed and success in managing this issue.

Very important steps, concerning Army reform in Serbia and Montenegro, have been taken in normative and institutional area in terms of the introduction of democratic and civilian control over it, the most important ones being as follows:

The Constitutional Charter, passed in the spring of 2003, the highest legal act of the State Union Serbia and Montenegro, puts forth the basic principles of democratic and civilian control over the Army and other subjects of the security sector, sometimes in an evidently original way:

Article 41

The Minister of Defence shall coordinate and implement the defined defence policy and shall run the armed forces in accordance with the law and the powers vested in the Supreme Defence Council.

The Minister of Defence shall propose to the Supreme Defence Council candidates for appointment and shall appoint, promote and relieve of duty officers in accordance with the law.

The Minister of Defence shall be a civilian.

Article 42

After a period of two years, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence shall switch posts with their respective deputies.

Article 54

Serbia and Montenegro shall have the Armed Forces under democratic and civilian control.

Article 55

The TASK of the Armed Forces shall be to defend Serbia and Montenegro in accordance with the Constitutional Charter and the principles of international law governing the use of force.

The Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro shall adopt a DEFENSE STRATEGY in accordance with the law.

Article 56

The Supreme Defence Council shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro deciding on the use of the armed forces.

The Supreme Defence Council shall comprise the President of Serbia and Montenegro and the Presidents of the member states.

The Supreme Defence Council shall take decisions by consensus.

Article 57

Recruits shall do their National Service in the territory of the Member State whose nationals they are, with the possibility of doing their service in the territory of the other member state if they so choose.

Article 58

Recruits shall be guaranteed the right of conscientious objection.²⁰⁶

Certainly, one of the main achievements in the Army reform in Serbia and Montenegro was a decision of the Supreme Defence Council of 6 May 2002, according to which General Staff of the Army of Serbia and Montenegro became a part of the organizational structure of the Ministry of Defence. Now, it is accountable to the Ministry, whereby the Ministry is accountable to the Parliament of the State Union and the Supreme Defence Council, whose members, as mentioned above, are the President of the State Union and the Presidents of Member States.²⁰⁷

On 20 June 2002, the Parliament of the former FRY passed the Law on Security Services of the FRY which governs civilian control over four security services at the federal level. This Law provides for the control by the Parliament and Federal Government over Military Security Service and Military Intelligence Service, besides other two existing services in the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Moreover, at the session of the Supreme Defence Council held on 15 April 2003, the decision was taken to set up Military Security Service

²⁰⁶ *Ustavna povelja Državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora* (Constitutional Charter), Službeni List SCG, Beograd, 2003

²⁰⁷ Gligorijević, Srdjan et al. *Security Sector Reform in Serbia and Montenegro* in *Economic Review*, G17 Institute, Belgrade, 2003, p. 20

and Military Intelligence Service within the Ministry of Defence of Serbia and Montenegro, terminating the jurisdiction of the General Staff of the Army SM over them. The previously mentioned Law on Security Services of FRY was not derogated by this act. The former Military Security Service has been transformed into the Military Security Agency and Military Police Department. On the other hand, Military Intelligence Service has been transformed into the Military Intelligence Agency. The Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency are directly subordinated to the Ministry of Defence and they have counterintelligence and intelligence competence respectively, whereby Military Police remains under the jurisdiction of the General Staff.

On April 16, 2004, the Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro passed the Law on Amendments and Supplements to the Law on Control of Security Services of FRY. The Law postulates that Parliamentary Commission for Control of Security Services shall have 14 members, i.e. nine from Serbia and five from Montenegro.

In connection with this, the Supreme Defence Council, at the session held on 2 October 2003, sent proposal to the Ministry of Defence to open dossiers of the Military Security Services and to make them available to all interested persons, according to the internal rules and regulations.

Pursuant to Article 66 of the Constitutional Charter, the competences of military courts, prosecutors and public attorneys shall be transferred to the civilian juridical bodies of the Member States in accordance with the law. Until the enactment of the Law on the Transfer of Competences, military courts should continue performing their duties. Pursuant to the Law on Implementation of the Constitutional Charter, the mentioned Law on the Transfer of Competences should have been adopted within six months from the date on which the Constitutional Charter came into effect (4 February 2003) at the latest. Nevertheless, Montenegrin parliament has passed the law on taking over the jurisdiction of the military courts and prosecutors, on 28 July 2004. Although the Law in question has not been passed in Serbia yet, the Constitutional Charter stipulation on transfer from military judiciary system to civilian one is a

very positive step in the process of establishing civilian control over the Army.

Also, for the first time the problem of civil service has been regulated by the Ordinance adopted at the Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro, at the session held on August 27, 2003. This Ordinance created legal grounds for civil service or military service without carrying arms. According to the Decision signed by the Minister of Defence Boris Tadic on 17 November 2003, recruits of the Army of Serbia and Montenegro who opt for civil service will be able to perform their service in one of 370 institutions all over Serbia and Montenegro. Civil service shall last 13 months. The Instruction for the application of provisos governing civil service, issued by the Ministry of Defence, emphasizes that a person performing civil service shall be equal in all rights and duties to the soldier in the Armed Forces. If possible, the recruit shall perform civil service in his residence town. Otherwise, he shall perform civil service in the nearest town where there are institutions or organizations planned for the civil service.

At the session held on December 27, 2002, the Supreme Defence Council made the decision that activities concerning the security of state borders shall be taken over by police following the enactment of the appropriate legislation, and in accordance with set dynamics and material, organizational and personnel possibilities. The Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro made a decision which came into force on August 9, 2003, according to which the Army SM will renounce material resources concerning state border security to the Ministry of the Interior of Montenegro, while officers and NCOs of the Army SM, if needed, may be temporarily disposed to positions relating to the borders security in the Ministry of the Interior of Montenegro.²⁰⁸ The deadline for the transfer of activities and resources concerning borders security and temporarily outsourcing of personnel to the Ministry of the Interior of Montenegro is December 31, 2003. Also, the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia announced that it would start taking over the state border control as of the end of 2004. This process is

²⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 25

planned to be implemented in stages, by gradual taking over of the state border sector, to end by 2005.

In financial area, a rather notable decision was made by the former Federal Government, in autumn 2002, according to which the central military Accounting Center, through which all financial transactions for the Army used to go, was displaced from the General Staff of the Yugoslav Armed Forces and put under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence, thus creating conditions for the Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro and Federal Parliament to have a full control over the spending of defence budget. This step enabled annual reporting on the budget size and structure, usually submitted to OSCE and UN.

Also, decision made by Boris Tadic, at that moment Minister of Defence of Serbia and Montenegro, from April 22 2003, concerning procurements for Armed Forces by which all procurements exceeding YuD 600,000 should be carried out through the special Office established within the Ministry of Defence, whereas procurements valued between YuD 10,000 and 600,000 should be carried out pursuant to the Public Procurement Law. The Public Procurement Office started operating on 11 July 2003. The Public Procurement Office working within the Ministry of Defence employs 75 persons; at present there are 20 persons working in the Office who underwent the appropriate training.

At the session of the Government of the former FRY held on October 31, 2002, it was decided to introduce a stricter procedure for issuing licenses for trade in armaments. This procedure stipulates that the Ministry of Defence shall prepare proposals, while the Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro examines and gives its approval to these proposals, meaning that each application for the license for trade in armaments, military equipment and services must pass internal procedure in the Ministry of Defence first, where it gets expert approval (relating to quality, compliance with regulations, etc.) and then the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has to verify that the prospective export destination is not under sanctions or international isolation. Finally, the proposal must be granted approval by the Council of Ministers of Serbia

and Montenegro, which examines received proposals once or twice a week. In the meantime, an inter-departmental office has been set up, composed of the representatives of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of International Economic Relations of Serbia and Montenegro, customs administration and police of both Member States (after the Constitutional Charter was adopted, it was limited to the representatives of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of International Economic Relations). This group has prepared a working version of the Law on Trade in Armaments, which is waiting to enter parliamentary procedure. The issue of production of armaments and military equipment is planned to be separated from trade. After the adoption of new legislation governing this area, necessary conditions will be created for pursuing efficient civilian control over the trade in armaments and military equipment in Serbia and Montenegro. The enforcement of this Law will regulate the state's relation toward the manufacturers of armaments and military equipment, at the same time preventing the scandals our country has been involved in concerning illicit exports of armaments to "black markets" such as Iraq and Liberia, from happening again.

At the session of the Supreme Defence Council held on May 6, 2003, the decision was made that the Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro should elect defence attachés at the proposal of the Minister of Defence.

Besides traditional role of Army, it is obvious that development of the Army capabilities go in two areas: peacekeeping missions and internal security risks. The Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro at the session held on 11 August 2003 approved the participation of units and servicemen of the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro in the United Nation's peace operations and missions. That participation is based on the principles of professionalism and voluntariness. At the session held on 8 October 2003, the Supreme Defence Council passed the decision allowing the preparations of the Armed Forces of Serbia and Montenegro for participation in International Peacekeeping Missions to begin. By the same decision, Ministry of Defence undertook to prepare legal and other documents

necessary for the regulation of the participation of the Armed Forces in these missions, by which the setting for final decision for the launch of the troops by the Federal Parliament should be established. At this moment, Serbia and Montenegro participates militarily in peacekeeping missions in Congo, Liberia, The Ivory Coast and Burundi.

Some significant steps have been undertaken concerning the command structure and configuration of the Army of SM, changing in a way that concentrated land forces into six corps and disbanded three Army-level HQs, one divisional-level HQ and a number of units. Furthermore, air force, air defence and navy have been transformed each into corps.²⁰⁹

Also, conscription period has been reduced from 12 to 9 months, with an idea of gradual removal of conscripts from the armed forces by 2015, at the latest.

Main pitfalls for a proficient and faster Army reform in SM are: normative-institutional restrictions, economic limitations, technological backwardness, non-standard social burden, and psychological barrier.

Efforts made by the state in the normative and institutional field and subsequent activities undertaken would make possible efficient control over the Army of Serbia and Montenegro. However, although these developments seem encouraging, there are still plenty of unresolved problems, while the enforcement of enacted laws and the enactment of new ones are to a certain extent under question. The most apparent example for such an opinion is the problem of National Security Strategy. The Constitutional Charter has not foreseen that State Union of Serbia and Montenegro have National Security Strategy, but only Defence Strategy. National Security Strategies were planned to be enacted at Member States level. Knowing well that Defence Strategy should arise from National Security Strategy, the State Union has a unique position among civilized states. In this moment, draft of the Defence Strategy is waiting to be discussed in the State Union parliament. Therefore, MoD is waiting for this supreme strategic document at a State

²⁰⁹ Edmunds, Timoty, *Defence Reform in Croatia and Serbia-Montengro 2000-2003*, Adelphi Paper 360, IISS, London, 2003, p. 44

Union level to enable shaping future reform of the Army. It is well important because, without a clear vision of threats and challenges, needs and possibilities, reform of the Army will remain just an improvisation, although sometimes a very successful one. It is worth mentioning that MoD is working on Defence Doctrine, White Paper and Strategic Defence Review. Subsequently, next on the law-making agenda are the new Defence Law, Army Law, Law on Trade in Armaments and a bulk of bylaw arising out of the Constitutional Charter and laws. On the session, held on 26 May 2004, Supreme Defence Council, have adopted the new organizational chart of the MoD, according to contemporary standards in that area.

Very similar to this, is problem concerning approval, provision and control of the budget of the SCG Armed Forces. Namely, the Committee for Defence within the Parliament of Serbia and Montenegro is in charge of control over the Army SM, but Member States and their Parliaments are responsible for ensuring approval of the army budget. Given that parliamentary defence committee in Serbia has no competences over the Army as a federal institution at present (in the Montenegrin Parliament there is no defence committee), the approval of the army's budget is in the hands of the parliamentary finance committees in Member States, which are not experts for military issues, in this case.²¹⁰

Talking about financial issues, in the period of 1996-2000 defence spending was 8% of GDP. In 2003 it was 2.9% and is tending to be approximately 2.5% in the upcoming period. Today, Army SM has about 78,000 members (0.74% of the SCG population) and defence spending per member is 7,700 \$. Main goal is to downsize Army personnel in 2005 to 60,000 (0.47% of SCG population) achieving in that way a significant increase of defence spending per member to some 13,090 \$.²¹¹

Non-standard social burden over the Army SM is a consequence of all conflicts in the course of the '90s in the former Yugoslavia. What does it

²¹⁰ Gligorijević, Srdjan et al. Ibid. p. 23

²¹¹ Djordjević, Radiša, *Reform of the Defence System-Budget for 2004 and Financing Reform*, CCMR, Belgrade, 2003, <http://www.ccmr-bg.org/analize/rec/word39.htm>

mean? After the armed conflicts in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as after the peaceful withdrawal from Macedonia, in 1992, almost all officers, NCOs of Serbian nationality, together with members of their families, went to Serbia and Montenegro. They have not been treated as refugees, but as an integral part of the Army. All of them have been appointed to new military posts, although these posts were already filled with other personnel. The same situation was with the members of their families, predominantly working in the Army facilities in separated republics. Today, we have an oversized Army incomparable with any other Army in Central or Eastern Europe at the beginning of the '90s. The principal task and even prerequisite for an efficient Army reform in SM would be to resolve the problem of these so-called "social categories", i.e. the personnel surplus which emerged after armed conflicts. For example, housing problem of 14,000 active personnel is mainly the problem of "social categories", and not of the personnel who worked in SM in 1991, before the beginning of conflicts.

There is another problem in the Army SM, also as a consequence of war, that is, the surplus of higher ranks: generals, colonels and lieutenant colonels, who constitute nearly the half of all officer cadres. This was possible due to frequent extraordinary promotions during wars.

However, some steps have been made in downsizing personnel of the Army SM, first of all through a wide retirement process of higher ranks, then through employment restrictions for civilians in the Army and through the re-education and retraining process (most notable is PRIZMA, in cooperation with British Government and the Faculty of Organizational Science in Belgrade). At this point, it is necessary to mention two bodies established within MoD: *The Reform Team*, in December 2003, as a UNDP project and *Defence System Reform Fund*.

All these issues provoked a lack of interest in military profession among youth, thus not permitting new worthy human resources reinforcement to the Army.

Inappropriate internal organization of the Army SM and its technological backwardness are characterized by a conscript based force

structure with concentration on armored vehicles and artillery. Much of the equipment is aging, obsolete and requires replacement. Of course, final plan for this depends on Defence Strategy. Over 70% of the budget is spent on personnel expenses leaving under 10% for modernization and other qualitative improvements.²¹² As a matter of facts, current plans have focused procurement policy towards key units within the Army, including Special Forces, military police, engineers and NBC defence. This is important in that these are the parts of the Army which are most suitable both to participation in multinational operations and for the internal security role. Connected with this, SM inherited over 40% of the former YU defence industry, mainly small arms, mortars and artillery. Now, once prosperous defence industry is in search for its own future. With high potentials in this field along with solid research and development experience in specific areas, mainly based within the military-technical institutes a progress could be possible in defence industry, adjusted to new needs and standards.

Among reform issues of the Army SM, special place should be reserved for restructuring of the outdated and oversized military educational system, putting emphasis on interoperability with NATO, especially in areas such as command and communications, logistics and airspace management. To that end, it is important to improve English language skills among militaries. Fortunately, in last few years, many NATO countries offered, on a bilateral basis, professional and language training for members of the SM Army. Moreover, NATO has done lot, through its tailor-made Security Cooperation Programme, in the training and education of the members of SM Army.

Conclusion

The process of reforms in the Army of Serbia and Montenegro has started with some very important steps, which may result in the establishment of really efficient institution that is subject to democratic and civilian control, separated from the conflicts among political and interest groups, organized in line with modern standards and managed following the principles of professionalism, capable to be a part of Euro-

²¹² Ibid.

Atlantic security system. This process is still in its initial stage in spite of significant progress that has been made. What lies ahead of state structures, political actors, NGOs, media and general public is a range of new legal, institutional, structural, personal, technical, social and psychological changes which will lead towards the Army that is in every respect able to protect the interest and values of the country, as an integral part of the society, not as a structure which is outside of society.

This is, above all, the crucial interest of the Army SM, but also a prerequisite for any participation in modern political and security integrations at the level of Europe and the world.

Of course, the process of reforms in the Army of SM requires a serious, professional and to the great extent, original approach, not a mere copy of other cases, sensitive for peculiar conditions in which Army SM exists, which will involve persons who are thoroughly acquainted with ideas and problems from that area. This should comprise a creation of a wide circle of authorities for the defence area, from all the structures previously mentioned as actors of reforms is vital. This *security community* is a safeguard that the process of army reforms is progressing in a responsible, well-thought-out way based on broadly accepted theoretical postulates and reliable estimates, without any improvisation and rashness. In a society which does not have a well-developed system of relations between civilian and security structures, this idea is much more significant. Only a modern efficient Army, designed in accordance with requisites of an essentially changed security environment and real budgetary possibilities, will be able to provide overall security to the state as a whole, as well as to every individual, but at a same time be an important actor in the process of strengthening regional stability in South Eastern Europe.

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DEFENCE REFORM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – A LONG WAY TOWARDS PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

A. The Current Situation of Defence Structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The current structure and composition of the armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina remain based on wartime needs and arrangements that no longer apply. Though two phases of demobilization took place in the years 1996 – 2000, the system based on Dayton Peace Accord (DPA) did not change.

Current arrangements for defence in Bosnia and Herzegovina are wholly inadequate to meet the guidelines for Partnership for Peace candidacy and to fulfil existing international commitments.

Command and Control

The entities have maintained separate military forces, organised and commanded at the entity level, with insufficient State – level command, control and oversight. Each change by one entity is made conditional on changes by the other entity, and has prevented Bosnia and Herzegovina from developing armed forces commensurate with its security needs. Past reforms have failed to address the core issue: that the State is supreme and, as a fundamental principle of Statehood, must be empowered with command and control of its armed forces to have the capacity to defend its territorial integrity, sovereignty, political independence and international personality.

The 2001 – 02 reforms that stood up the Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) and its institutions created a quasi State-level

chain of command and control; yet actual power remained with the entities whose constitutions and laws define their defence responsibilities in detail. The result was two distinct and parallel chains of command and levels of authority, creating conflicting command and control arrangements extending from both the State and entity levels.

From the perspective of Partnership for Peace candidacy, the State must be empowered with command and control authority over the armed forces, and the independent authority of the entities to control and command military forces must be deleted.

Entity Armies and Defence Laws

In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the legal and constitutional provisions relating to defence matters are inconsistent. The Constitution grants command and control authority to the Entity President, whereas the Law on Defence grants it to pre-Dayton figures, with a caveat that this must be resolved once the Dayton institutions were established. Because these interim arrangements were not updated, constitutional and legal inconsistency and ambiguity remain about whether some command and control responsibilities still rest with the institutions of the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

To a certain extent, the defence arrangements in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina have continued the parallelism of pre-Dayton, Washington Agreement structures, in the then form of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence Council (HVO). This is illustrated by the lack of a common Law on the Army. The Croat component still uses the Law on Service in the Croatian Defence Council, and the Bosniak component currently uses the Law on Service in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The absence of a common law adds to the duality and parallelism of defence structures in the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Constitution of Republika Srpska has – even more visibly than the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – perpetuated the original self understanding of the entity as a sovereign state, until the High

Representative changed it in April 2003. The competencies related to defence reinforce a view of statehood, in which the framework for defence is defined with supremacy resting with entity institutions. Both the Constitution and Law on Defence of Republika Srpska grant supreme command and control authority over the army to the Entity President, therefore failing to acknowledge the supremacy of the State for matters of defence.

The entity armed forces are currently primarily developed to defend the territory of each respective entity and do not refer to the imperative of the defence of the entire State. They lack the capacities to address mission tasks other than defending territorial integrity, and they must address compatibility and interoperability with each other and NATO forces. Bosnia and Herzegovina must also address the training, doctrine and force structures of its armed forces so that it can make an effective PfP contribution, with solid capacities to organise, train and deploy troops, and thereby to enhance the stability and collective activities of partner countries.

Defence Spending

Bosnia and Herzegovina is committed to have only those armed forces necessary for its legitimate defence needs, a concept that includes fiscal responsibility. State authorities, entity authorities and parliaments all have the responsibility for ensuring the most effective armed forces possible within affordable resource limits. Defence spending by Bosnia and Herzegovina is substantially greater than that of European countries of similar size and more than can reasonably be sustained given Bosnia and Herzegovina's limited economy and other domestic needs. Reducing the size of the armed forces and resolving outstanding personnel issues are major priorities for reform. Under – pricing and under – funding of defence budgets routinely produce crises in budget execution. Without significant reform in this area, Bosnia and Herzegovina will remain incapable of producing reliable and transparent estimates of defence expenditures, consistent with its OSCE and potential NATO PfP obligations.

Parliamentary Oversight

Parliamentary oversight of defence matters is a requirement for PfP membership. Currently, no provision in law assigns oversight capability to the bicameral State – level Parliamentary Assembly. The Rules of Procedure of both parliamentary chambers reflect this situation; thus, for example, no provision allows for a permanent committee that would examine issues exclusively within the field of defence. Entity laws provide for legislative oversight by the National Assembly in Republika Srpska and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but there is insufficient exercise of this responsibility.

Conclusion

In summary, current defence arrangements and army structure and size have led to the following deficits:

- lack of adequate command and control at the State level;
- ambiguity and inconsistency in law regarding the competency of the State and entities for defence matters;
- insufficient oversight capabilities, including democratic parliamentary control of armed forces;
- lack of transparency at all levels for defence matters;
- non – compliance with international obligations, primarily OSCE politicomilitary accords;
- an unjustifiable amount of passive reservs and, thereby, also small arms and light weapons to arm them;
- excessive, deteriorating arms at too many locations;
- waste of human and financial resources in the defence sector; and

- forces sized and equipped for missions no longer appropriate for the real security situation or PfP and NATO requirements.

These are among the reasons why Bosnia and Herzegovina currently is not a credible candidate for the PfP.

B. The Future Concept for Defence in BiH

The benefits of Partnership for Peace membership are many. NATO has assisted Partner countries in improving their defence and security capacities in numerous areas. Beyond such tangible benefits, an invitation to Partnership for Peace signals an acceptance by NATO and member nations that a country has been accepted into an association of like – minded democratic nations. An invitation also reflects a strengthened political legitimacy, with favourable implications for the political and economic viability of an emerging democracy. Nations who have joined and actively participated in Partnership for Peace have found that their involvement has facilitated further steps toward European integration. The recognition of political and military stability encourages foreign investment, which creates jobs and increases prosperity.

The fulfilment of the new defence structures of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the laws establishing those structures, would be a significant step towards harmonisation with Euro – Atlantic standards, and would help to ensure credible Partnership for Peace candidacy.

Joining Partnership for Peace is an important step. Bosnia and Herzegovina will need to undertake additional reforms in the future to meet NATO's standards. The BiH Defence Reform Commission has envisioned possible options for such future reforms and has ensured that its recommendations in the immediate period will facilitate future changes.

The Commission determined that each of its recommended reforms is consistent with the provisions of the **Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina**. Four Constitutional provisions provide the bases for the Commission's recommendations. Article III.5 of envisages the State

assuming responsibilities as necessary to preserve the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and international personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that «additional institutions may be established as necessary to carry out such responsibilities». This provision articulates a fundamental principle of Statehood: a State must have the capacity to defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty. To have this capacity, a State must control its armed forces. Article III.1 determines that foreign policy is the responsibility of the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The conduct of foreign policy includes defending borders and projecting force abroad. Article III.2 stipulates the responsibility of the entities to provide all necessary assistance to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to enable it to honour the international obligations of the State. Article IV.4 grants authority to the Parliamentary Assembly to enact legislation necessary to implement the decisions of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The **new Defence Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina**, proposed by the Commission, is supported by these Constitutional imperatives, as are the proposed amendments to the entity Constitutions, Laws on Defence, and Republika Srpska Law on Army. In addition to these legislative proposals, the Commission recommends a new Law on Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (presented separately) and a legislative framework for a new State – level Ministry of Defence. This framework includes amendments to the Law on Council of Ministers and Law on Ministries and a proposed decision by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina to transfer competencies to the Ministry from the Standing Committee on Military Matters.

Most fundamentally, the Commission's recommendations recognise the supremacy of the State for defence matters. A **single defence establishment for Bosnia and Herzegovina** is proposed with an appropriate and workable division of responsibilities between State and entity institutions. The Presidency would act collectively in exercising command and control of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in peacetime, crises, and war. A State – level Ministry of defence, headed by a Minister of Defence with assistance from two Deputy Ministers, would be created to assist the Presidency. The Minister would

be a full – voting member of the Council of Ministers and would be appointed like all other State Ministers. The Minister would be in both the chain of command for military operations, known as the operational chain of command, and the chain of command for manning, training, and equipping the armed forces, known as the administrative chain of command.

Subordinate to the Minister in the operational chain of command would be a Chief of Staff of a new Joint Staff of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Key duties of the Chief of Staff would include acting as the senior military advisor to the Presidency and Minister and transmitting orders to operational commands and units. The Joint Staff would prepare and oversee the execution of orders and plan and direct military operations. A second new State – level military institution would be created: an Operational Command, headed by a Commander. This officer would serve as the commander for any mission requiring the deployment or employment of any operational element of Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the Commission's recommendations, the State would have the exclusive right to mobilise and employ forces, except in a highly extraordinary natural disaster or accident during which an entity President could authorise an immediate, but limited use of units from the entity army to assist civil authority.

The **entities** would continue to make an important contribution to defence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They would still perform the administrative functions of manning, training, and equipping the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Army of the Republika Srpska. Each entity would have a Ministry of Defence, headed by a Minister. The Joint Command would continue to exist in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska would retain its General Staff. The duties of these two military staffs would be narrowed to only administrative functions. The Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Army of the Republika Srpska would continue to exist and provide the operational capabilities of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In addition to the day – to – day administration and support of their armies, the entity ministers and military staff would have responsibility for supporting any operations or activities of units under State operational command. The entity Ministers of Defence would report to the State Minister of Defence who would establish standards for the administrative activities of the entities. Common standards would promote compatibility and interoperability between units of the entity armies and better ensure meeting the support requirements of the operational chain of command.

The Commission's recommendations for parliamentary reforms are guided by the principles of democratic civilian control of the armed forces, transparency in defence planning and budgeting, and the need for fiscal limits for defence to be established by political authorities in a democratic manner. Key among recommended reforms is the creation of a new Joint Committee on Defence and Security in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, under the proposed recommendations the Parliamentary Assembly would have exclusive power to declare a state of war and ratify a State emergency at the request of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It would exercise legal oversight authority over the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and all State – level institutions.

The Parliamentary Assembly would have primary authority to make and approve laws governing the organisation, funding, manning, training, equipping, deploying, and employing the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It would confirm the nomination the nomination of the Minister and Deputy Ministers of Defence, Chief and Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the Joint Staff of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and all General officers. Entity parliamentary responsibilities would be amended to reflect the new division of competencies between the State and entities. The entity parliaments will need to undertake significant reforms to meet Euro – Atlantic standards on democratic parliamentary oversight and control of the armed forces

The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina are not affordable. Many areas of the defence system will need to be reduced to balance **defence**

budgets and provide modern and professional armed forces. The Commission recommends reductions in professional soldiers from 19,090 to 12,000 and in reserves from 240,000 to 60,000. The intake of conscripts would be reduced by 50 percent, and the conscript training period shortened from six to four months. The headquarters and field staff of the entity Ministries of Defence would also be reduced by 25 percent.

The Commission also recommends accelerated efforts to reduce weapon storage sites and excess property, including business holdings. To demonstrate the capacity of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina to work compatibly, under a single chain of command, the Commission recommends that Bosnia and Herzegovina combine the entity de-mining teams into a single de-mining unit organised under the State. This would have the added benefit of enhancing Bosnia and Herzegovina's credibility in the field of de-mining, thereby attracting greater attention to the problem as well as international donors. If implemented, the Commission's recommendations would have lead to lower defence budgets and reduce the defence burden on the peoples and economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

C. Ways for enhanced regional cooperation in BiH

There are many options for cooperation between NATO, EUFOR forces, or bilateral activities with BiH Armed Forces (AF) available. After 9 years of SFOR presence in the country the deterrence aspect can be «over the horizon», and one should concentrate with deployed forces on **civil military cooperation**. They could help in municipalities in the full spectrum of municipality tasks. Building firm partnerships with local communities. This would provide continuity for the work of own contingents, and create a much stronger positive perception of SFOR/EUFOR in the public.

In order to deepen the in country cooperation with BiH armed forces, the NATO/EU forces should use the concepts, which NATO had in earlier time for cooperation between allied forces stationed in Germany: Provide partnership affiliations and develop a concrete program for all

units of BiH forces in the own area. Start to train, educate and conduct the full range of activities always in a joint way, including always the Federation AF and RS AF.

No expert team being sent from a capital will change the AF of BiH quicker than permanent influence from those NATO/EU troops stationed on the ground. And it would give those deployed troops new spirit and additional motivation as well.

Reconciliation, institution – and state building and helping to modernize BiH AF and make them PFP compatible could not be done in a better way.

The **bilateral military cooperation** with BiH AF is characterized by a lot of bilateral support initiatives in order to help to build up the state level defence structure and to reorganize BiH Armed Forces. This work is important, but I have my doubts that it is coordinated and is always matching the real needs on the grounds in BiH. Such bilateral activities should be based on the real needs of the receiving country and therefore be closely coordinated with the newly created BiH Ministry of Defence and its entities. The support in training of future BiH military key personnel and the build up of training institutions seems to be of highest priority.

A major step forward would be the inclusion of BiH armed forces in existing **multinational SEE formations**, or to create a new peacekeeping unit with some states in the region, like SCG, Croatia, Albania and other countries.

D. Conclusion

BiH has mastered quite a considerable way on its transition towards NATO's PfP and European integration. With its Defence Reform and the political acceptance of the proposed steps it has proved that it wants to reform its armed forces in a promising way. The concept is now available. The challenge lies in the rapid and powerful implementation of the proposed concept.

This requires from BiH a lot of own efforts and offers to its neighbours many opportunities for support.. The Defence Reform in BiH will facilitate regional cooperation in many areas and will be a major contribution to stability in South East Europe.

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DEFENCE REFORM AND PUBLIC OPINION IN MACEDONIA

When choosing the topic for this conference the author had in mind the title of the panel “Defence Reform Consequences on Society, State and Social Structures” and consequently the public opinion on the defence reform in Macedonia, as an important input in the political context within the country regarding the defence restructuring. For Macedonia, going through transitional processes, establishing a public sphere (civil society sector), and at the same time democratizing the state and the society, it is of primary importance that the public is informed and supports the state (Parliament and Government) policies on security questions. The Euro-Atlantic integrative processes are also part of this topic, NATO integration dominating in this area as most tangible in recent years. The security situation in the country, having passed through the 2001 conflict phase, is very much related to the general attitude of the society in regard to these issues. In this way, the author coming from the research Institute made a selection of some of the questions from various studies to show what the public attitude towards defence reforms and NATO integration is.

In this paper five concrete questions will be discussed that very much concern the Macedonian society referring to what is the public attitude towards defence reforms. Do the citizens support and in what percentage do various social groups within the country support the reform. The Centre for Ethnic and Security Issues at the Institute for Sociological Political and Juridical Research in years has been following the public attitudes in security, defence and ethnic questions. In this paper will be presented just couple of questions that show what the public attitude is and what different social groups think about these important questions for the Macedonian society. Some of the general trends and differences

in opinions concerning chosen questions for this purpose will be analyzed in the explanations.

Question 1

Do you support the program of the Ministry of Defence for conducting the reforms in the Macedonian defence?

Table 1

2003 March²¹³	General	Macedonian	Albanian	SDSM	VMRO-DPMNE	DUI	DPA
Yes	57.30	61.00	44.10	74.80	40.20	55.10	26.10
No	12.80	15.10	7.00	7.30	35.70	4.40	13.00
Not familiar	30.00	23.90	48.90	18.00	24.10	40.40	60.90

Table 2

2004 January	General	Macedonian	Albanian	SDSM	VMRO-DPMNE	DUI	DPA
Yes	54.00	54.80	46.40	71.50	37.60	56.50	37.30
No	15.40	17.40	10.90	5.40	29.40	10.50	13.70
Not familiar	30.60	27.80	42.70	23.10	33.00	33.10	49.00

The presented data refers to the average results and the independent variables as ethnic background and political party affiliation. Other statistic differences on the side of the independent variables are insignificant. Maybe worth noticing are only the higher percentages in favour of the ministry policy on the side of male population, urban people and the citizens with completed secondary and university education.

²¹³ The independent variable on the political party affiliations (the voters) were among the most significant parties of which here are presented only four (current government coalition SDSM-DUI, and former government coalition VMRO-DPMNE – DPA; SDSM, VMRO-DPMNE and DPA are signatories of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, while DUI is founded by the former NLA); SDSM – Social-Democrat Union of Macedonia, VMRO-DPMNE – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity, DUI – Democratic Union for Integration and DPA – Democratic Party of Albanians.

Three important conclusions can be made straightforward concerning the first question, used in March 2003 and January 2004 poll. First, that the general public supports the policy of the Ministry of Defence for conducting the reforms in 54-57 per cent. Even though around 30 per cent of the population is not familiar with the policy, it does not mean that they would not support it (very frequent indicator in high political questions). Only 12-15 per cent do not support it. Second, in the March 2003 - January 2004 period the percentage decreased slightly by 3 per cent, due to the fatigue of the general public from the reform discourse and the current problems within the country (economic problems, corruption and crime issues). Third, the decrease of 3 per cent is due to a lower percentage of the Macedonian support vis-à-vis the increase on the Albanian side (DUI voters), also, due to the promptness of the activities to incorporate Albanians in defence structures (according to official data the increase is from 2% in 2002 up to 10% in 2004 in different defence structures – NCOs and professional soldiers quotas are reached very fast, while for the officers meeting the quota will take time bearing in mind longer education process). Understandably, while the biggest Macedonian coalition party voters, SDSM, are much above the average percentage (in favor of Government policy), the biggest Macedonian opposition party voters, VMRO-DPMNE, are much below the average percentage (DPA voters also), meaning that they do support the policy in lower figures (endless position-opposition struggle).

In general, we can assume that the wider public accepts the policy of the Ministry of Defence.

Question 2

Do you support the decrease of the number of employees in the Army and the Ministry of Defence for conducting the reforms in order to achieve more efficient defence?

Table 3

2003 March	General	Macedonian	Albanian	SDSM	VMRO-DPMNE	DUI	DPA
Yes	41.30	37.20	56.30	46.70	32.10	64.70	50.00
Partly	28.70	31.90	17.00	30.60	31.30	14.00	23.90
No	16.30	19.50	5.60	15.80	27.70	6.60	6.50
Not familiar	13.70	11.50	21.10	6.90	8.90	14.70	19.60

Table 4

2004 January	General	Macedonian	Albanian	SDSM	VMRO-DPMNE	DUI	DPA
Yes	35.70	29.60	55.80	43.70	20.10	54.80	62.70
Partly	30.30	34.10	19.10	32.90	29.90	16.90	15.70
No	23.80	28.60	7.50	17.60	40.20	5.60	13.70
Not familiar	10.30	7.70	17.60	5.80	9.80	22.60	7.80

The presented data also refers to the average results and the independent variables as ethnic background and political parties affiliation. Other statistic differences on the side of the independent variables are insignificant.

Three important conclusions can be made in a row for the second question as well. First, that the general public supports the decrease of the number of employees in the defence as a policy of the Ministry of Defence for conducting the reforms in 35-41 per cent. This is more convincing if we subsume the answers 'Yes' and 'Partly yes'. Then the support will rise up to 66-70 per cent. That would mean even higher percentage than the previous question as a support for reforms in the defence. Second, here the 'Not familiar' answer is much lower due to the fact that the question tackles and interferes with two different interests. On the Macedonian side it means that the national defence will be more weak in figures and a number of them will lose their jobs, while on the Albanian side it means that the lower the number of defence structure is

the lower is the fear of the Army interfering in the ‘domestic affairs’ – interethnic issues. This question touches the ‘national (ethnic) concerns’, for different reasons for Macedonians and Albanians, and the percentage of ‘Not familiar’ is understandably much lower. Again the answer ‘No’ is rising from 16 to 23 as the reforms are entering the implementation phase.

Even if the Macedonians think that the Albanians will take their places, still it is important to mention that whatever number of the Macedonians will lose their jobs the Albanians will have to have their equitable participation. Third, from the above mention reasons (oppositional attitude, ethnic issues concerns) the VMRO-DPMNE political party voters do support the Government policy in lower percentage, from 27% in March 2003 up to 40% in January 2004. In the same time the support from the Albanian parties, DUI and DPA, is increasingly higher for the Government policy in decreasing the total numbers (Ministry of Defence and Army).

In general, the decreasing number of employees in the Army and the Ministry of Defence for the purpose of better efficiency is slightly less accepted than the general defence reform policy.

Question 3

What will the Defence of the Republic of Macedonia gain by reducing the conscript service time and the professionalization of the Army, according to your personal view?

Table 5

2003 March	General	Macedonian	Albanian	SDSM	VMRO-DPMNE	DUI	DPA
More efficient defence system	23.80	25.80	16.30	28.40	17.90	16.90	17.40
Adjustment to NATO standards	17.00	16.90	14.80	23.30	11.60	19.90	6.50
Finance savings	40.20	40.70	40.70	40.10	42.90	42.60	50.00
Not gain anything	11.90	11.30	14.80	5.70	22.30	10.30	17.40
Not familiar	7.10	5.30	13.30	2.50	5.40	10.30	8.70

Getting deeper into the question of the reforms and the correlation with the society, besides the question of decreasing the number of employees in the defence, as we saw the differences on ethnic and political party affiliation variables, in March 2003 we asked the question on what the defence will gain by reducing the conscript service and professionalization of the Army. The time was when the Ministry of Defence announced that the conscript service time would be reduced from 9 to 6 month, and that the professionalization of the Army will speed up. Here we offered the qualitative answers in order to be more precise on the public attitude. And, not surprisingly to domestic analysts, though a big surprise for the outsiders familiar with the political spectrum and ethnic divisions of the society, the answers were unequivocally in favor of 'Finance savings'. No statistical differences on any independent variable. The public attitude concerning reforms is in favor of finance savings most probably in relations to the unemployment and the poverty figures within the country, related to the low living standards of the population in general. And with very low percentage of 'Not familiar' answers.

The general conclusion is that the Macedonian society is burdened with bad economic situation, with high percentage of unemployment

and poverty, and that the resources should be redistributed in other areas, meaning that expensive defence system is not affordable.

The Center for Ethnic and Security Issues did many researches on different aspects in relation to NATO. Still, the most interesting question is whether citizens would like Macedonia to become a NATO member, which has been asked regularly in last couple of years. It is interesting to compare 2001, when the conflict occurred, and 2004, the year when the Adriatic group countries (Macedonia, Albania and Croatia) are serious candidates for NATO membership. As we can see from the exhibit data, the Macedonians dropped in second part of 2001 and the percentage decreased on 53.2. Even in this period Macedonians saw the NATO membership as important for the country's future strategy with qualified majority. The percentage of Albanians stayed at high level all the time. The differences are a result of the perception of NATO involvement in the Macedonian crisis, seen through the prism that the Macedonians thought that NATO (Americans) acted in favor of Albanians, opinion shared in great deal on the Albanian side.

Question 4

Would you like Macedonia to become a NATO member?

Table 6

	2001 May		2001 October		2003 March		2004 January	
	Mac.	Alb.	Mac.	Alb.	Mac.	Alb.	Mac.	Alb.
Yes	62.5	78.0	53.2	84.0	58.7	84.1	67.0	88.8
No	20.2	3.6	33.0	7.5	24.4	7.0	16.9	1.1
Not know	17.4	18.4	13.7	8.3	16.9	8.9	16.2	10.1

Table 7

2003 March	General	Macedonian	Albanian	SDSM	VMRO-DPMNE	DUI	DPA
Yes	63.80	58.70	84.10	73.50	48.20	89.00	76.10
No	20.90	24.40	7.00	15.10	31.30	5.10	13.00
No familiar	15.30	16.90	8.90	11.40	20.50	5.90	10.90

Table 8

2004 January	General	Macedonian	Albanian	SDSM	VMRO-DPMNE	DUI	DPA
Yes	72.10	67.00	88.80	74.20	59.30	88.70	92.20
No	13.30	16.90	1.10	11.90	24.20	1.60	3.90
No familiar	14.70	16.20	10.10	13.90	16.50	9.70	3.90

In the last two public opinion polls (Table 7 and Table 8) we also compared the political party affiliation, and it is interesting to compare both data, from March 2003 and January 2004.

Macedonian public is very much for the country to become a member of NATO. First, the general result is rising from 64 per cent in March 2003 to 72 per cent in January 2004. Second, the Albanians are steadily with higher per cent, and the Macedonians 'grow' from 53 per cent in October 2001, 59 per cent in March 2003 to 67 per cent in January 2004. Third, the only political party affiliates that are lower than the average are the VMRO-DPMNE voters, which have 48 per cent in March 2003 and increased on 59 per cent in January 2004.

The conclusion is that the general Macedonian public is in favor of becoming a NATO member, rising in figures in the last couple of years and reaching 72 per cent in January 2004. This kind of high support can be justified with the attitude that Macedonia and

NATO in 2004 are together in ‘business’, for peace, stability and prosperity for the country and the region.

The last question tries to shed light on the issue of the benefits of Macedonian society of becoming a NATO member, seen through the citizen’s opinion.

Question 5

What Macedonia will gain with the NATO membership?

Table 9

2003 March	General	Macedonian	Albanian
Protection of sovereignty	29.8	29.7	32.2
Guarantee against other state attack	21.6	20.2	27.8
Guarantee against inter-ethnic conflict	12.7	9.3	24.8
Enhanced Army equipment	9.5	9.7	7.0
Will not gain anything	21.1	26.8	1.5
Do not know	5.3	4.3	6.7

Table 10

2004 January	General	Macedonian	Albanian
Protection of sovereignty	34.9	36.8	27.0
Guarantee against other state attack	16.5	18.7	9.7
Guarantee against inter-ethnic conflict	14.7	8.7	34.5
Enhanced Army equipment	10.5	9.4	13.9
Enhanced Army standard	6.0	6.4	4.5
Will not gain anything	11.3	14.9	1.1
Other category	0.9	1.2	0.0
Do not know	3.2	4.0	9.4

The answers shed light on couple of relations. First, far most often answer is that the NATO membership will protect the territory and the sovereignty of the country with 30 per cent in March 2003 up to 35 per cent in January 2004. The answers increased on the Macedonian citizens' side by 7 per cent and decreased among Albanians by 5 per cent. Second, among Albanians an important shift happened in the second and the third answer. While in March 2003 Albanians ranked the guarantee against attack from other state on second place with 28 per cent, this number in January 2004 dropped down on only 10 per cent. In addition, while in March 2003 Albanians ranked the guarantee that inter-ethnic conflicts will not happen on third place with 25 per cent, this number increased to 35 per cent in January 2004. In total, the Macedonians see NATO membership as protection of its sovereignty and guarantee against attack from other state, the Albanians in Macedonia see NATO membership as guarantee that the interethnic conflicts will not happen. Third, important shift in Macedonian attitude is the positive incline towards 'gaining' from NATO membership, in a way that the 'Not gain anything' number dropped from 27 per cent in March 2003 to 15 per cent in January 2004. Macedonians more and

more see NATO as a positive category related to the state policy towards full membership.

In general, the Macedonian public thinks that the country will gain something by becoming a member of NATO, mostly in protection of the territory and the sovereignty, guarantee against other state attack, with one difference in the ranking of answers on Albanian side as a guarantee that the interethnic conflicts will not happen.

As a conclusion of this bundle of questions, concerning defence reforms and NATO accession integration process, we can assume that in Macedonia:

1. The policy of the Ministry of Defence is accepted by the wider public;
2. The decreasing number of employees in the Army and the Ministry of Defence for more efficient functioning is slightly less accepted, but still positive;
3. The general public thinks that the finance savings is important in defence reforms, and that the resources should be redistributed in other areas – economy prosperity;
4. The general Macedonian public is in favor of Macedonia becoming a NATO member, rising in figures in last couple of years and reaching 72 per cent in January 2004;
5. The general public think that by becoming a NATO member the state will gain better protection of the national territory and the sovereignty.

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CONCLUSIONS

The issue of transforming the national armed forces is a theme, which is on the agenda of nearly every European country, regardless whether it belongs to the EU/NATO-zone or is still outside. In the last 15 years the far-reaching geopolitical changes in Europe and the new threat perceptions like failed states and terrorism in the military field have caused a shift from the classical homeland defence tasks to peace support operations, crisis management and security networking. This development demands among others new up to date security and defence strategies, an effective management of human, infrastructural and financial resources and new structures for decision making to achieve security arrangements, not only on the national level but also on the EU and NATO level.

Although the transformation of armed forces is not an issue, which detects only the transformation states in South East Europe, this region has to cope also with some additional challenges as military matters are concerned. Especially the social aspects of the transformation of armed forces in South East Europe seem to play a much bigger role than it is the case for instance in Western Europe. Unlike the established democracies and market economies in Western and Central Europe, where the security institutions are highly accepted by the citizens, in some South East European countries the people have a lack of confidence in their own security forces. The reasons for that are obvious: The misuse of the security forces for political aims during the authoritarian communist regimes and especially during the Balkan wars in the 1990s.

To build confidence among the Balkan people in regard of their security forces is only possible if every Western Balkan country as a state makes progress in the transformation process: that means, if democratic

institutions and the rule of law as well as social market economy develop. In the case that the transformation of the armed forces in South East Europe will not be closely linked to the other sectors of state transformation it could even affect negatively the military engagement of single Balkan countries in international peace support operations. Transparency, networking and democratic control are some of the key words, which should characterize successful Peace Support Operations. It is clear, armed forces, which see themselves as a kind of corpus separatum in their own societies will not be able to fulfil these criteria.

Only if the transformation process of the armed forces will be brought in line with the transformation of the economy and the political institutions the negative social consequences caused by measures of personal reorganisation can be minimized. Especially in the former Yugoslav Republics the veterans, who have been demobilized in a greater number after the end of the latest wars represent a very explosive factor for their societies. Without a clear vision for their life this group of people could endanger the process of democratization in their countries. If you see it this way the reorganisation of the armed forces in South East Europe, which is usually connected with a big and painful reduction of personnel, becomes an important issue for the regional stabilisation process and does not represent only a matter for the single state. Therefore the social and political implications of the transformation of armed forces in South East Europe should be stronger put on the agenda of international aid programmes. One opportunity would be to support such projects in working table 3 of the Stability Pact for South East Europe.

A conclusion that can be drawn from this publication is that there could be much more lessons learned between the SEE countries in the field of security sector reform. For example the countries of the Western Balkans could profit from the experience of Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary that had successfully passed through the NATO accession process with all the far-reaching consequences for their armed forces, described for instance in the Bulgarian contributions. But there could be also a joined effort of lessons learned in the Western Balkans itself. For instance Serbia-Montenegro now faces a very huge troop reduction, which will

cause social problems. Bosnia-Herzegovina has already gone through this painful process, therefore Belgrade could profit from the Bosnian experience in developing social and economic aid programmes for the retired military personnel.

Beside all the good proposals for a well done army reform in South East Europe, which are presented in this publication, one should stay realistic in regard of what can be achieved in a short and medium term in the field of security policy in this region:

South East Europe today is still far away from having a common system of co-operative security. In terms of security policy we can differentiate between three groups of countries: One group consists of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria as integrated members of NATO, the second group Croatia, Macedonia and Albania is on the way to be integrated in the euro-atlantic structures maybe in some years and the third group, which consists of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro is not even accepted in the NATO-Partnership for Peace. Having this differentiation in mind one important goal of NATO and EU in South East Europe should be to harmonize the armed forces of the Balkan countries by establishing the same values in order to make co-operative security easier. But this harmonization process can't mean unified and imposed solutions for the transformation of armed forces in South East Europe, which do not take into consideration especially the different economic opportunities and social conditions of every Balkan country.

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