Address of the President of the Republic of Macedonia

Ladies and Gentlemen, distinguished guests and dear friends,

The topic that you have chosen as a focus for this conference – democratisation and the security challenges in SEE (South East Europe) – embraces the two most significant issues which are in tight correlation with the future of this region. The crucial question is: will SEE manage to join the modern European and world democratic and security processes and institutions, or it will stay on the margins of the modern developments, still preoccupied with the old inherited problems, which have already caused so many human traumas and backwardness?

Despite the choice being more than clear, nevertheless, one should explicitly stress the readiness of the countries in the region to adjust to the new realities and demands of the new era. We should all ask ourselves if we are indeed prepared to overcome our mutual misunderstandings, the old mental patterns and habits, and of course, the old methods of 'conflict resolution'.

We welcome the twenty-first century with lot of hopes and expectations for the prosperity of mankind but we also should not neglect the numerous challenges we still face day by day and that still cause a lot of problems for our move forward. Some of these challenges are deep-rooted in our troublesome history: poverty, conflicts, dictatorship and various diseases have always been among the most often and most serious problems for the peoples in the region. At the same time, there are many other challenges that are more recent, such as globalisation, environment protection, etc. that also call for more attention.

Undoubtedly, all our efforts should be directed towards creation of a concept that will provide equal access to the benefits of globalisation process to all nations and individuals. The appropriate access and distribution of one's own resources, the usage of the knowledge and modern technology is supposed to facilitate smoother and easier facing with the demands of modernity to all nations. At the same time, like never before in history, we bear mutual responsibility in regard to environment protection. We have to do that right now and right here. History will make records of our deeds and they will be either condemned or praised by the future generations. Let's face our responsibility and do our best on behalf of our future generations.

Globalisation rapidly brings closer the countries and nations of the world, and thus in the new millennium we expect the United Nations to bear responsibility for promotion of more efficient world integration and strengthening of the interdependence of its member countries' behaviour. In order to make the UN being efficient and carry on its continuous path towards the future in the twenty-first century, all member countries should respect the valid norms of international law and ethics. They are also expected to respond to new challenges, including the forthcoming reform of the world organisation.

The Republic of Macedonia is rightly proud of its role and contribution to the successful realisation and promotion of the main mission of the UN.

The history of our region, that is today called Southeast Europe, has been marked with so many peculiarities, which cannot be found in some other regions of the world. The main problems in this regard should be identified in the way we comprehend the history and the historical processes, the lack of communication and shortage of effective methods of conflict

resolution, which is of utmost importance in the current era of wide integration processes that dominate in Europe and the world as a whole. Therefore, today more than ever, the countries of this region need courage to support a different perspective on the historical legacies, complexes and prejudices. In this context, civilisational human values should be posed as the main and the only valid criteria for dealing with the old and new problems. The best example of how to achieve that is already available – it is the paradigm of united and democratic Europe, and first of all, the commitment to make Europe our common home, in which the Balkans undeniably belong.

The current priority of our politics should be the transformation of SEE into a stable, secure and prosperous part of Europe, which can be achieved only through entire and permanent integration of the countries from the region in the European processes. That should be our common goal and commitment.

The Republic of Macedonia is firmly devoted to take active part in the processes aimed towards stabilisation and democratisation of the region, and is also ready to give contribution to their successful realisation as much as it is within its own possibilities.

The Republic of Macedonia is committed to go on with its policy of protection and promotion of human rights and freedoms. We have already proved our sincere devotion to this noble cause during the Kosovo refugee crisis when we provided shelter for more than 390,000 refugees. Only truly democratic states know and can make the members of the national minorities feel the state as their own, embrace them all as equal citizens through their full integration in society and state structures. Macedonia has constantly been engaged in the fight against organised crime, which is an evil that gets momentum in many states in the world. Our state is committed to realise the economic reforms that will promote market economy, but also takes great measures for promotion of the living standards of its citizens as well as the improvement of the quality of life. Our main approach is based on security and the free flow of goods and capital, of technology and knowledge.

In regard to our international position, the main contribution of Macedonia has been its permanent support of the endeavours of conflict prevention since 1993, when for the first time UN preventive forces were deployed on our territory, as well as later on through our active co-operation with the international community during the Kosovo crisis. Throughout the past decade Macedonia has been implementing the UN resolutions even at times when they had negative effect on our own economy and stability.

Let me now say a few words on the Summit that was held in Skopje few days ago, which brought together the political leaders from all SEE countries. The Skopje Meeting has shown the readiness of the region to start talking with the language of cooperation finally. It has expressed our common wish for stabilisation, democratisation and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. In the best possible manner, the countries and the peoples of this region, which have so far been recognisable as a source of instability, decided to take the fate in their own hands and to start dealing with their problems themselves.

The Stability Pact and the Process of Co-operation in Southeast Europe offer a wide framework for practical realisation of our commitments and policies. I deeply hope that we are not going to miss this big opportunity. Otherwise we will bear huge responsibility for any failure before future generations of our children.

The Skopje Summit had special significance, and even offered one more reason for optimism. Namely, after a decade-long absence and excommunication from the international and regional

scene, the FR of Yugoslavia has got back again among the countries of the region, among its neighbours. We are deeply convinced that it has come back with a sincere wish to become one of the generators and promoters of peace, stability and democratic transformations of the region as a whole. The inclusion within the Stability Pact involves a lot of responsibilities for this country, too. At the same time, with the admission of Yugoslavia, the Stability Pact gets a new impulse that will enable faster implementation of the new principles and positive tendencies. Because of all of this, we dare say that the general situation in the region has been visibly improved.

Democratic changes in the FR of Yugoslavia were greeted by all participants of the Skopje Summit with sincere hope that they would contribute to general stabilisation of the region.

The Republic of Macedonia is going to strengthen its efforts for democracy building. We will not allow any autocratic leaders to threaten democratic changes by heating up nationalist passions and by making obstacles for the political and economic reforms we have already opened. The concept based on citizen democracy is one of our main priorities and a precondition for our prosperity.

At this occasion we would like to recall the statement of the first UN Secretary General, Dag Hamarskjold, according to which “There is no life that can bring more satisfaction than the one devoted to the benefits of one’s own country and mankind. That calls for sacrifice of one’s personal interests but also courage to defend these principles”.

The issue of democratisation and the security challenges in SEE are a complex topic that includes a lot of questions related to our present state of affairs, to our past and our future. I am deeply convinced that your suggestions and opinions will be a significant contribution towards more successful continuation and realisation of the current positive developments in Southeast Europe.

I wish you fruitful discussions and successful completion of this significant scholar event, organised with joint efforts of the Macedonian partner (Institute of Defence) and the PfP Consortium of Military Academies and Security Studies Institutes.

Boris Trajkovski
President of the Republic of Macedonia

Introduction

Time and space dimensions have different meaning in the Balkans. During just one year (May 2000 to May 2001) this statement has been proven in the case of the main activity organised by the PfP Consortium Working Group on Crisis Management in SEE. At the last Working Group's meeting in Reichenau the idea on organising an international conference was born. The idea was fully supported at the PfP Consortium meeting in Tallinn and eventually realised in Ohrid, Macedonia. The scholar conference under the title "Ten Years After: Democratisation and Security Challenges in SEE" (27-29 October, 2000) without false modesty can be seen as one of the best events organised under the auspices of the PfP Consortium between two annual meetings.

The conference was co-organised by the Working Group on Crisis Management and Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Skopje (Macedonia), which Institute of Defence was celebrating its 25th anniversary. It brought together around 100 participants, out of whose around 50 scholars had a role of paper presenters and panel moderators. Prior to the conference there had been some sceptical views on the effect of participation of such a big number of participants, but since the very beginning of the event all doubts vanished. The reasons were manifold: first, there had been obvious (and probably, a decade-long) need to get together scholars from the region; second, the dramatic developments in the past decade called for comprehensive re-consideration and evaluation; third, in the eve of the conference another historical event with long-term consequences happened (i.e. fall of Slobodan Milosevic and his regime in FR Yugoslavia). One of the main qualities of the Ohrid conference was its success in bringing on the same table many distinguished scholars from the US, Western Europe, Russia (and CIS) and, what is most important – from all the countries in SEE. Maybe not visible on the surface, but the conference also consisted of representatives of different 'schools', from the security and peace academic communities, as well as scholars, professors, public persons, NGO representatives and journalists. Not surprisingly, the debates were often not only interesting and lively but also dissonant. As a result, all presentations were highly sincere, deep and with high quality of arguments. The conference turned out to be more than a nice time; our conference became a challenging and creative meeting place, even more so than the organisers had hoped.

From today's perspective the Ohrid conference deserves another careful retrospection. The collection of presented papers is the best proof of the seriousness and the big efforts invested in this event. Nevertheless, the developments that have marked the period of one year since the decision to organise such a conference was made – call for one more analysis of the real meaning of time and space in the region considered. Namely, at the time when the decision on undertaking such an ambitious activity was made, nobody could predict the dramatic events in Yugoslavia. The conference was, therefore, held under a visible excitement among the scholars and analysts for the expected positive developments in the region. Thus, the paradigm 'ten years after' changed into 'SEE after Milošević'. The optimistic atmosphere was additionally strengthened because of the Skopje Summit of the heads of states of SEE countries that had happened just a day before the opening of the Ohrid conference.

Indeed a dialogue turned out to be what we badly needed because of a decade of turmoil, ruined bridges, and ceased personal, institutional and academic communication and co-operation in the Balkans. However, this meeting should also be seen as an extraordinary opportunity for

promotion of another dimension of the dialogue – between the SEE and the Western academic communities. For almost a decade there has been no dialogue but only one-way communication coming from the Western academic and political community to the Balkan's. Democratic and security models and, especially human rights concepts were 'exported' from the West, the SEE scholars and politicians seemed to welcome these ideas – but the real achievements were lacking.

The lack of a critical thinking about the process of democratisation, conflict resolution and human rights implementation was equally present in the West and in the Balkans. The failure of the West to democratise the Balkans and the obvious conflict mismanagement in the region call for an explanation. On the other hand, in the last horrible decade the Balkans have learnt many difficult and painful lessons and seems to be ready to open the process of recovery and reconciliation. Only joint efforts of two equal partners (i.e. the Western and the Balkan institutions/academic communities that are embraced by the PfP Consortium) seem to be the right approach in giving the right impetus to the new prospects in the troublesome region.

The starting point of the Ohrid conference was that the issues of democratisation, human rights and regional security in SEE go right into the heart of the problem but, at the same time, are some of the most explored and often most oversimplified topics of the academic and political discourse. The so-called democratic transition in the Yugoslav successor states started in the most unusual way – by misuse of democratic rhetoric and principles for most retrograde purposes. 'Democracy' helped the hard-liners and worse nationalists all over former Yugoslavia to get in power in a legal way and even by mass popular support in 1990. The deep-rooted and long-lasting Yugoslav crisis culminated into an inevitable loss of legitimacy of the communist elites (both federal and republican ones). The vacuum was de facto fulfilled by nationalist ideology and practice although nationalist elites took advantage of the newly declared democratic postulates (such as multi-party system, free elections, etc.).

The worst abuse was made on expense of human rights, which in the political agendas were defined as collective rights (i.e. rights of by then 'deprived and discriminated' nations). Newly established regimes were not so much anti-democratic as "a-democratic". New rulers came to power with two slogans emblazoned on the banners. One read "Democracy," while the other demanded "Justice for the People". Undoubtedly, nationalists had no democratic credentials, and no plans to deepen democracy once they came to power. Instead, their emphasis was on the claims of nationhood. Political opposition as well as ordinary citizens who dared to question the regime and its actions were labelled traitors, international spies, foes of their country and its independence.

The scene for forthcoming wars/conflicts was set up with almost no resistance. Long time ago, Alexis de Tocqueville warned that the most dangerous period for a bad government is the moment it gets better. The moment when the ancient regime is not being dismantled completely but the control mechanisms are being made so loose and ineffective is perfect for setting the stage for various kinds of societal, political and economic deviations.

The relationship between nascent democracy and ethnic conflict is not a straightforward one. Truly, democratisation has a potential to help mitigate ethnic conflict. But, the potential can hardly be activated as the transition towards democracy produces a fertile ground for ethnic hatred, animosity and political demands of the internal and external power-thirsty political forces and leaders. Especially in the case of former Yugoslavia, ethnic mobilisation was made in the name of multi-party democracy.

War by definition is a negation of the very essence of human rights and individualism. Former Yugoslavia's dissolution was made in the name of collective rights i.e. belonging to one's own nation and self-determination. False patriotism and self-sacrifice were promoted as the most appreciated values. In the concept of the *people-victim* is the basis for the belief that individualistic values have no meaning because the individual life is completely subordinated to the community and its mission. Collective martyrdom to the cause of the preservation of the state/nation is the highest value, while self-sacrifice becomes a behavioural stereotype. Ethno-nationalism produces intolerance and animosity towards the other nations, but also leads toward deprivation of human rights and freedoms even for the members of one's own nation.

The records are not more favourable even in the countries that did not suffer from these conflicts. The poor results of the democratisation process and a long list of violations of human rights are also typical for the 'peaceful' states, such as Macedonia and/or Albania. All reports and findings of the international and domestic monitoring missions and organisations indicate continuous electoral manipulations (and even violence), police forces abuses, politically dependent judiciary, etc. Although the roots of the problems and obstacles for democratisation are of mainly internal character (i.e. are deeply embedded in the respective societies) partly these infamous records are a consequence of the regional interdependence and spilling over effects of the general crisis in the Balkans.

Having proved unable to cope with the conflict situations in a peaceful manner, the Yugoslav successor states (which is also true for Albania) became a scene of a decade-long presence and interference of the international community. In that sense the external influence (both positive and negative) has become a very important determinant of all significant developments and processes in the region. The effects of this unique external policies regarding the former Yugoslav republics can be seen through two main dimensions i.e. conflict resolution endeavours and political/economic impetus. Both efforts have been ambiguous, unprincipled, changeable and even in some cases hypocritical. The international actors (such as OSCE, EU, NATO, and USA) have not defined it yet what is the goal and what are the means how to achieve it. The dilemma security vs. stability is still hanging over the Balkans due to the disagreement and misconception among the international agents as well as among the regional ones regarding the most crucial point – what is the precondition and what is the final goal. The conflict managers who have been able just to 'fix' things in the short run, never addressed the roots of the conflicts and finally – a decade later - the only result is what can be called conflict mismanagement. None of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia has been resolved and many other potential flesh points have emerged. Nevertheless, there is lot of 'peace business' for all kinds of international, governmental and NGO missions in the region. That is a guarantee that they will stay there for years to come but there is no guarantee for the prospects of the region.

'West' and 'democracy' have been the most often mentioned paradigms in the Balkans throughout the 90s, although the reality was negation of all promoted ideas. The democratic West is perceived like the 'Promised Land' – the place where all misfortunes end and the bright future begins. The irresistible attractiveness of this illusion has served as a strong stimulus – until certain degree. The countries and people from the 'grey zone' have lost all hopes to re-build the region and their own home yards but instead have turned towards the unreachable West. Life has become a hyper real – full of expectations, false self-perception and unrealistic hopes, at least, for the unhappy citizens. The elites could only benefit from such a self-deception.

Given the disastrous results of human rights and democratic reforms in the SEE countries, regional stabilisation is usually defined as a big challenge both for the domestic actors and the

international community. Obviously even the bare definition of the goal is made in a problematic way. It is very questionable whether the priority in the region is its stability or its security. What comes first? Stabilisation of the region is perceived as a minimal goal, or better a situation in which the conflicts will cease and the reconstruction of the region will start. Even this minimal expectation does not necessarily mean that people will feel more secure and the human rights and freedoms will be better promoted and realised. Stabilisation without (human) security may be preservation of the tragic *status quo*.

Stabilisation in the Balkans can mean only security for the state(s) but does not include human security i.e. security of the individual citizen. The right to life and liberty together with the right to security of persons are defined as fundamental human rights according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is believed that human security can be achieved only through a global political culture based on genuinely shared values, particularly those of human dignity and human rights. The citizens of the majority of the SEE countries are victims of their own political immaturity i.e. of the governments they (very often) freely elect. At the same time, due to the unprincipled behaviour of the 'international community' which uses double standards in defining human rights values and 'global' culture, their feeling of insecurity often comes from the very advocates of human rights and 'exporters' of democracy.

After a decade of intra-state (and/or inter-state) conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia, these societies need economic re-construction, institution-building, but also a change in the mental state of affairs. At the moment, the shortage of fresh financial investments and the loud silence over the conflict reconciliation issues do not give much hope that human rights and democratisation endeavours will give positive and fast results. On this territory there have been deployed and engaged the biggest number of peace support missions, peace-workers, NGOs and governmental organisations *'per capita'*. Yet in some regions (Kosovo) the mass violations of human rights, forced migrations and executions are happening in front of the eyes of the entire 'international community'.

As temples of knowledge, human dignity and prosperity, academic institutions and research institutes are expected to give expertise and even to warn politicians on their activities. The Western academia has built a lot of analyses, studies, projects and degrees over the tragic experience of the former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, so far, the advice coming from the West has been one-sided in terms of disrespect for the local expertise and knowledge and in terms of picturing 'black&white' situations and solutions. The possible conclusion may be that each academia (in the West and in the region) have lot of things to do in its own 'yards' i.e. the promotion of (both negative and positive) peace begins in one's own society and only then - on a basis of equal co-operation - it can be re-directed outward. The SEE institutions still need support and expertise from abroad, but first of all they all have to finish their own homework in terms of defining their independence and relationship with the current regimes.

The memories from the conference were still vivid when the new wave of Balkan crisis occurred exactly in the country that had been the host. The question that can be rightly posed is: was the Macedonian conflict difficult to predict? From a point of view of the future activities of the Working Group on Crisis Management (and the PfP Consortium itself), there is even more important issue: what is the purpose of the meetings of the experts and scholars at such gatherings, and what should and could be done in order to promote peaceful conflict resolution?

Many issues are open and even more are pending, but one thing is clear: the existence and active engagement of this very Consortium Working Group is of utmost importance. The focus

of its activities and more importantly its purpose are not (and must not be) purely academic. Scholarship has far more important mission in this case – it is expected to deal with real human destinies, sufferings, fears and hopes. Occasionally, scholars and experts should meet and exchange their findings, but in the rest of their engagement they must be involved in field research, must be present there where they are needed, and must offer concrete assistance. Finally, looking forward to the future activities of our Working Group, let's recall wise Gandhi's messages about some of the most renounced human sins:

- Knowledge without character
- Science without humanity
- Worship without sacrifice
- Politics without principles.

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Co-operative Security in Southeast Europe

What is Co-operative Security?

The term Co-operative Security has become popular since the end of the Cold War. Although it does not yet have a generally accepted definition, it has been widely used to herald a new approach to international relations. It appeared to offer an escape from narrow Cold War "zero-sum" strategies into the broad sunlit vistas of international peace and harmony. However, as is often the case in life, events in the Balkans have demonstrated that this early burst of optimism was, at best, premature.

This paper proposes a model of Co-operative Security that encompasses the traditional international security arrangements of Collective Security and Collective Defence and adds two new elements, Individual Security and Promoting and Projecting Stability. It then explains how this concept could be extended to the countries of Southeast Europe.

Birth of a Concept

In the early 1990s, many strategic thinkers were caught up in a tide of optimism generally hailed as the New World Order. The term Co-operative Security became a catch phrase for a rather idealistic approach to the swiftly changing international climate. In 1992, three leading American strategists – Ashton Carter, William Perry, and John Steinbruner – spoke of Co-operative Security in terms of providing new avenues toward world peace: "Organising principles like deterrence, nuclear stability, and containment embodied the aspirations of the cold war. Co-operative Security is the corresponding principle for international security in the post-cold war era".[1] In 1994, writing in Foreign Policy, former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans described Co-operative Security as tending "to connote consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism."[2]

These attempts to define and shape the concept of Co-operative Security generally reflect a liberal/idealistic view of the future of world security. Unfortunately, this vision has been rudely jolted by an unwelcome "return of history" in the Balkans, in parts of the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere.

It seems to me that a more pragmatic approach to Co-operative Security is necessary if the concept is to be of real use in an unstable and dangerous world. In other words, we must seek a way of „operationalising" the term.

But before we look at how to construct a realistic and effective approach to Co-operative Security, it might be helpful to briefly examine two of the other major security concepts that came into prominence in the 20th century.

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[1] Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbruner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1993.

[2] Gareth Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intra–State Conflict," *Foreign Policy*, No. 96, Fall 1994.

Collective Security and Collective Defence

Though the concept of Cupertino and alliances between families, tribes, and states, in peace, but more generally in war, has been a common feature of the history of mankind, the terms Collective Security and Collective Defence are inventions of the last century. Both concepts imply a long-term, formal commitment between groups of states to protect the security interests of individual members within their common spheres.

Collective Security. Collective Security looks inward to attempt to ensure security within a group of sovereign states. The first modern Collective Security organisation was the League of Nations founded in the aftermath of World War I. At the end of World War II, the newly formed United Nations (UN) took up the mantle of Collective Security from the League of Nations. In the 1970s, the Conference on Cupertino and Security in Europe (CSCE), now the Organisation for Cupertino and Security in Europe (OSCE), was formed to provide Collective Security to virtually all of the states of the Eurasian-Atlantic region. At best, however, these organisations have been only partially effective.

Collective Defence. A Collective Defence organisation looks outward to defend its members from external aggression. Collective Defence organisations blossomed during the days of the Cold War. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), and the Warsaw Pact, all designed to provide Collective Defence to their members, were founded in the aftermath of World War II.

Co-operative Security: Two New Elements

To be both useful and effective, Co-operative Security must look both ways, inward and outward. But it also must incorporate two further dimensions not covered explicitly by either Collective Security or Collective Defence. The first of these is the concept of Individual Security and the second is the Active Promotion and Projection of Stability into areas adjacent to the Co-operative Security space where instability and conflict might adversely affect the security of its members.

Individual Security. Individual Security, or what former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, has popularised as "Human Security,"[3] stands at the centre of any real international security system built around liberal democratic ideals. The furtherance and protection of the basic freedoms of the individual is the nucleus from which all other forms of security must radiate. Damage to the security of individuals in one country, by external or more often by internal forces, now means that other peoples and their governments feel that their own security is diminished.

Recent gross violations of the individual security of large numbers of human beings in such widely flung countries as Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor have had a dramatic impact on the international community. These examples and others are clear illustrations of what we might call the „globalisation of concern." Individual Security is now at the heart of the international agenda.

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[3] Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World,* Ottawa: Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, April, 1998.

Promoting Stability. The second new component of Co-operative Security is the active promotion of stability outside the boundaries of the states forming the Co-operative Security system. Stability may be upset by the danger of conflict between states, but also by mass violations of individual security within neighbouring states, such as that which occurred in Kosovo in 1998 and early 1999.

Here we must sound a word of caution. Promoting Stability could be seen as a license for unwarranted intervention by larger powers or international organisations in the legitimate internal affairs of other, mainly smaller states. Active intervention – diplomatic, economic, or military – must, therefore, be very carefully sanctioned and monitored in accordance with international law and clear and widely accepted humanitarian norms.

NATO's intervention in Kosovo, in 1999, was an example of an attempt to restore and then to promote stability in an area dangerously close to its borders. In Kosovo, massive violations of individual security were an important factor in swinging public opinion behind the NATO action. No less important was the fact that the organised and widespread persecution of ethnic Albanians by the Yugoslav government risked destabilising the region and threatened NATO members Hungary, Greece, and Turkey, as well as NATO Partners Albania, Macedonia, Romania, and Bulgaria. This fear of destabilisation and the spread of conflict were certainly the determining factors in the decision to use military force, once political, diplomatic, and economic tools proved ineffective.

The following model of Co-operative Security (see Figure 1) is built on a series of widening concentric circles, or rings. It attempts to bring together the four elements of Co-operative Security in a practical framework to form a real and effective security system:

Figure I

Cooperative Security
The Four Rings



Co-operative Security is a strategic system which forms around a nucleus of liberal democratic states linked together in a network of formal or informal alliances and institutions characterised by shared values and practical and transparent economic, political, and defence co-operation. In a Co-operative Security system, individual states' national security objectives are linked by four reinforcing rings of security:

Ring One: Promoting and protecting human rights within their own boundaries and further afield (Individual Security)

Ring Two: Maintaining peace and stability within their common space (Collective Security)

Ring Three: Mutual protection against outside aggression (Collective Defence)

Ring Four: Actively promoting stability in other areas where conflict could threaten their shared security, using political, informational, economic, and, if necessary, military means (Promoting Stability)

Institutionalising Co-operative Security

As we have seen, Co-operative Security must be built around a strong institutional framework. Figure 2 attempts to match the current leading international security organisations with the characteristics of the Co-operative Security system that we have described above. This chart is based on the perceived effectiveness of the institution in a particular role rather than on its formal organisational commitment to one security role or another. "Yes?" indicates, at best, only partial effectiveness in fulfilling a particular role:

Figure 2

Institution	Ring One: Individual Security	Ring Two: Collective Security	Ring Three: Collective Defence	Ring Four: Promoting Stability
United Nations	Yes?	Yes?	No	Yes?
OSCE	Yes?	Yes?	No	Yes?
EU	Yes	Yes	No	Yes?
NATO	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

We can see from this table, that according to the model of Co-operative Security we have just described, for the moment at least, NATO is the world's only working example of a Co-operative Security system.

NATO – A Practical Example of Co-operative Security

It can be reasonably argued that although the large majority of NATO's 19 member states qualify as liberal democracies and upholders of Individual Security and human rights within their own borders, the record is not perfect. However, in an imperfect world, most reasonable observers would agree that NATO members come close to the championing of Individual Security, which stands at the core of a Co-operative Security system.

For many years NATO has been held up as a successful example of a Collective Defence organisation. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of 1949, NATO's founding document, put this

role firmly at the centre of the Alliance's core functions. However, even during the Cold War, the Alliance served as an unofficial, yet de facto, guarantor of the security of its individual member states against threats from fellow members. We can, therefore, claim that NATO has also been particularly successful as a Collective Security body.

In the years since the end of the Cold War, NATO has vigorously pursued the fourth dimension of Co-operative Security, Promoting Stability, in the states adjacent to the territory of its members. Crisis Management has become NATO's operational tool for the promotion and maintenance of stability in areas on its periphery. Crisis Management includes Conflict Prevention (active diplomacy and preventive deployments) and Crisis Response operations, like Bosnia and Kosovo.

Crisis Management was adopted as a "fundamental security task" in the new NATO Strategic Concept approved at the Washington summit of April 1999.[4] Crisis Management seeks to include NATO partner states whenever possible. It, together with the NATO enlargement process, Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Initiative, have become major vehicles for promoting stability outside the traditional NATO area as originally defined by Article 6 of the Washington Treaty.

NATO, therefore, embodies the description of Co-operative Security that we describe above. This model depicts the concept:

Figure 3
Co-operative Security
A NATO Model



[4] North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, Washington, DC: April 24, 1999, paragraph 10.

The European Union and Co-operative Security

As the European Union moves somewhat unsteadily toward a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), prospects for extending Co-operative Security in Europe beyond the NATO space look hopeful. If EU declarations of intent are indeed turned into substance, a true CFSP will herald, probably unannounced, a de facto mutual defence arrangement between members of the Union, including the so-called "neutral" nations of Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Ireland. The EU would then move into the Third Ring of Co-operative Security, Collective Defence.

If a capable European Force becomes a reality, the EU will join NATO in occupying the Fourth Ring of the Co-operative Security model, Promoting Stability outside its territory. It would then effectively operate in all four Rings of the Co-operative Security system.

Assuming that NATO and the EU come to satisfactory operational and institutional arrangements, this would broaden and strengthen the Co-operative Security space now occupied only by NATO. In addition, the parallel enlargements of both the EU and NATO will further expand the circle of states within the Co-operative Security system.

The "Fourth Ring" States

What of the states which presently lie outside both the NATO and EU areas? Many have expressed a wish to become members of these organisations either by taking an active role as candidates in NATO's Partnership for Peace as Membership Action Plan (MAP) members and/or by being on the EU's official list of candidates for early accession. In Southeast Europe, Romania, Bulgaria, and all the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, except for Croatia (the most recent member of PFP), Bosnia and Serbia, fall within this category. Are these states and those who are not at present moving toward membership of NATO or the EU excluded from the benefits of the Co-operative Security system?

It seems clear, by virtue of their active candidacy and/or their increasingly close Cupertino with NATO and the EU, that these states in the „Fourth Ring" have gained implied, but not guaranteed, security commitments from the states within the Co-operative Security space. During the crisis in Kosovo and NATO's air campaign against Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia were all extended de facto security guarantees by the Alliance.

The Balkans: Co-operative Security on the Firing Line

NATO operations in Southeast Europe are clearly an important test of Co-operative Security in action. The air attacks on Yugoslavia, the NATO-led humanitarian missions in Albania and Macedonia, the KFOR mission in Kosovo, and the SFOR mission in Bosnia, are part of a co-ordinated effort to re-establish stability in this sensitive part of Europe. NATO and other international institutions have made a long-term commitment to Balkan stability. If the situation in Bosnia and in Kosovo can be stabilised and if Serbia can continue its progress toward democracy and improving relations with its neighbours, then Co-operative Security in the region, and further afield, will be enormously strengthened.

It is possible that the SFOR/KFOR international operations in Bosnia and Kosovo and the EU-led Stability Pact for Southeast Europe will ultimately fail to bring a measure of stability and

reconciliation to the Balkans. Such a failure would be the result of a loss of interest and determination on the part of NATO, the EU, and the international community to persevere despite the difficulties and setbacks. If this does happen, the concept of Co-operative Security will be dealt a severe blow. It will be seen to have fallen short of the hopes and expectations of its creators. Such a development would not necessarily invalidate the concept altogether. But it would mean that the Co-operative Security model we have discussed had failed to clear the obstacles of indecisive political leadership, insufficient military capabilities, and the inevitable compromises inherent in any co-operative and consensual relationship between states.

Conclusion

Co-operative Security, as we have described it, can become the basis for a more peaceful and harmonious future. It combines four basic arrangements: Individual Security, Collective Security, Collective Defence, and Promoting Stability in widening rings of security. A Co-operative Security system requires from the democratic states that form it a willingness to closely co-operate with each other and to reach out, if necessary, to intervene in areas outside their territories that might affect their common peace and security.

NATO provides a real-life model for such a Co-operative Security system. It embodies, however imperfectly, all four of the basic functions. The EU is in the process of enlarging this NATO core into a wider and deeper Euro-Atlantic Co-operative Security space.

Most of the countries of Southeast Europe already benefit from the security stability provided within the „fourth ring“ of the Co-operative Security space. In the longer term, it is probable that all the countries of the region will become formal members of NATO and/or the EU and will take their places firmly within the circle of Co-operative Security. This development may herald, at last, real and enduring peace and prosperity in a region which has been deprived of both for many years.

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Preventing Future Yugoslavias: The Views of CSCE/OSCE Negotiators, 1993 and 1997[1]

Introduction

This is the fourth published report on an ongoing research project to monitor developments in post-Cold War Europe, involving efforts to solicit and analyse the views of (primarily) heads of delegation to the most inclusive trans-Atlantic/pan-European peace and security system comprising all the former enemies of the Cold War and neutral and non-aligned: the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), formerly the Conference on Security and Cupertino in Europe (CSCE), based in Vienna, Austria.[2]

The project began with my tenure as a William C. Foster Fellow as a Visiting Scholar with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) during 1989–1990 when, among other things, I served on the U.S. delegation to the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) which occurred within the context of the (then) CSCE in Vienna. This experience revealed to me the potential of the CSCE for shaping the peace and security environment of post-Cold War Europe, transforming it from a bipolar confrontational system into a system of common security. In effect, I discovered in Vienna an opportunity to apply conflict/conflict resolution theory to practice, as part of my overarching goal to participate in the development and implementation of peace and security systems for post-Cold War Europe. [3]

This opportunity was realised to some extent by a NATO Research Fellowship which enabled me to return to Vienna in 1993 to conduct interviews of heads of delegation to the CSCE (see Sandole, 1994, 1995a) and subsequently, a Fulbright OSCE Regional Research Scholarship which brought me back to Vienna in 1997 to conduct a follow-up study with heads of delegation to the ("reframed") OSCE (see Sandole, 2000). More recently, an OSCE "Researcher in Residence" award brought me back to Vienna for a third round of interviews immediately following the conclusion of the NATO air war against Serbia over the Kosovo issue, in June 1999 (see Sandole, 2001).

Conflict Resolution Theory: Some Helpful Concepts

Similar to previous reports on this project (Sandole, 1998b, 1998c, 2000), here I wish only to highlight some aspects of theory relevant to dealing with violent conflict in general, including the violent ethnic conflicts of post-Cold War Europe, having discussed some of the causes and conditions of such conflict elsewhere (see Sandole, 1993a; 1999b, Chs. 6–7).

We can distinguish, for instance, between competitive and co-operative approaches to conflict resolution (see Deutsch, 1973). Competitive approaches are power-based, adversarial, confrontational, and zero-sum ("win-lose"), associated with a Realpolitik approach to human relations and often with destructive outcomes. Co-operative approaches, on the other hand, are nonpower-based, nonadversarial and positive sum ("win-win"), associated with an Idealpolitik approach and often with constructive outcomes (see Sandole, 1993a, 1999b, Ch. 6).

We can also distinguish between negative and positive peace (see Galtung, 1969). Negative peace is what most people, including diplomats, mean when they talk about "peace": the absence – either through prevention or cessation – of hostilities. There is nothing wrong with "peace" in this sense, and I personally wish we had more of it throughout the world – e.g., earlier in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda – but it is not the whole picture. Positive peace, which helps to complete the picture, is the absence of structural violence, i.e., systems in which members of certain ethnic, religious, racial and/or other groups have unequal access to

economic, political, social and other resources typically presided over and enjoyed by members of mainstream groups (see ibid.). It is also the absence of cultural violence, which legitimises and makes acceptable structural violence (see Galtung, 1996).

A third and, for our purposes, final distinction is between track-1 and track-2 actors and approaches to conflict resolution. Track 1 deals with governmental, and track 2 with nongovernmental actors, mechanisms and processes at either the intra- or international level (see Davidson and Montville, 1981–82; McDonald and Bendahmane, 1987; Diamond and McDonald, 1996).

Track-1 warriors and diplomats have typically operated within a Realpolitik framework where they use various kinds and degrees of competitive means to achieve and maintain negative peace. A major objective of the project discussed here has been to explore, with CSCE/OSCE negotiators, to what extent, if any, there has been a shift away from a unidimensional Realpolitik paradigm comprised of track-1 actors employing competitive approaches to achieve and maintain negative peace, toward a multidimensional system comprised of these plus an Idealpolitik paradigm, with track-2 actors employing co-operative approaches to achieve and maintain positive peace; in other words, a shift away from a "cognitively simple" approach to one more likely to "capture the complexity" of the identity-based conflicts of the post-Cold War era (see Sandole, 1999b).

Some Brief Comments On The CSCE/OSCE: The Helsinki Process

The CSCE came into existence at the height of the Cold War, its initial negotiations starting in 1972 and ending in 1975, with the Helsinki Final Act establishing a basis for co-operative relations between the two rival treaty organisations of the Cold War period – the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) – plus the neutral and non-aligned.

Over the years, there have been numerous review and summit meetings of the CSCE further refining, and implementing provisions based on, the three "baskets" of the Helsinki Final Act (1975). By the end of the Cold War, these had evolved into the (1) political and military, (2) economic and environmental, and (3) humanitarian and human rights aspects of comprehensive security. Two of these, basket 1 with its emphasis on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) and basket 3 with its emphasis on human rights, helped bring about the end of the Cold War[4]

Paradoxically, the otherwise "revolutionary" developments that helped bring about the end of the Cold War took place within the same time frame that one particular consequence of the ending of the Cold War also occurred: the implosion of Yugoslavia into brutal, genocidal warfare. During the summer of 1993, some 15 months after the Yugoslavian wars had spilled over from Croatia into Bosnia-Herzegovina, I returned to Vienna as a NATO Research Fellow to elicit from heads of CSCE delegations their views on peace and security in Cold War Europe, including "what went wrong in former Yugoslavia?"

The 1993 CSCE Survey

During this phase of the project, which ran from June to July 1993, I interviewed 32 (primarily) heads of delegation from 29 of the (then) 53 participating States of the CSCE.

1993 CSCE Historical Context

Some of the major changes that had occurred in Europe between the time I served on the U.S. delegation to the CSBMs Negotiations in spring/summer 1990 and my return to Vienna in summer 1993, included:

1. the reunification of Germany;
2. the start-up and escalation of the wars in Yugoslavia and collapse of the country into five successor republics;
3. the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO);
4. democratic elections in and further democratisation of post-communist states in Eastern Europe;
5. Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe;
6. the collapse of the Soviet Union into 15 successor states;
7. the "Velvet Divorce" of the Czech and Slovak Republic (formerly Czechoslovakia) into the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic;
8. an increase in CSCE membership from 35 to 53, with the replacement of the two Germanies by a unified Germany; succession of the Czech and Slovak Republic by the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, both of which became members; replacement of the former Soviet Union by 15 successor republics, all of which became members; replacement of former Yugoslavia by five successor republics, four of which became members; plus the admission of Albania;
9. the establishment of the CSCE Centre for Conflict Prevention (CPC); the Secretariat; and Secretary-General in Vienna;
10. creation of the CSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw;
11. creation of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Copenhagen;
12. creation of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) in The Hague; and
13. NATO's creation of the North Atlantic Cupertino Council (NACC) to facilitate the pursuit of issues of common security with former members of the defunct WTO.

In general, the events of 1990 - 1993 were suggestive of major changes in the international system, primarily in East-West relations; in effect, a paradigm and behavioural shift in post-Cold War Europe, away from Realpolitik-based national security and toward Idealpolitik-based common security. Summer 1993 was an appropriate time, therefore, to gauge to what extent this shift was apparent in the discourse and, by implication, mindsets of senior representatives to the trans-Atlantic, pan-European CSCE, who, among others, were responsible for dealing with the return of genocidal warfare to Europe: to explore with them the "lessons of Yugoslavia" that might be relevant to dealing with similar conflicts later on.

1993 CSCE Research Design

Based upon information provided by the U.S. Information Service (USIS) in Vienna prior to arriving there in June 1993, I had written letters to the heads of all 53 delegations, informing them that I was a former member of the U.S. delegation to the CSBMs Negotiations and that I would be coming to Vienna as a NATO Research fellow to explore with them their views on peace and security in post-Cold War Europe. Upon arrival in Vienna, I contacted the offices of all 53 delegations and by the middle of July, succeeded in interviewing 32 of them from 29 participating states:[5]

a) 13 NATO states: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United States, and United Kingdom (not included: France, Luxembourg and Spain);

b) 6 neutral and non-aligned states (NNA): Austria, Finland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, San Marino, and Switzerland (not included: Cyprus, Holy See, Malta, Monaco, and Sweden);

c) 3 former Yugoslav republics (FYug): Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia (not included: Yugoslavia [Serbia and Montenegro][6];

d) 5 non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact (NSWP): Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovak Republic (not included: Romania); and

e) 2 former Soviet republics (FSU): Russian Federation and Ukraine (not included: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan).

For a variety of reasons, I was unable to interview individuals from all 53 participating states. Instead, I interviewed persons from convenience samples (see Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, pp. 183–184) of the five main groupings, with some samples being more representative than others:

a) **NSWP**: 5/6 (**83%**);

b) **NATO**: 13/16 (**81%**);

c) **FYug**: 3/4 (**75%**);[7]

d) **NNA**: 6/11 (**55%**); and

e) **FSU**: 2/15 (**13%**) — the least representative of all! [8]

Interviews comprised 15 closed-ended and 12 open-ended questions (see ibid., pp. 253–255). The closed-ended questions reflected Likert scale-type responses; e.g., strongly agree (SA), Agree (A), Mixed Feelings (MF), Disagree (D), and Strongly Disagree (SD), where **SA=5, A=4, MF=3, D=2, and SD=1** (see ibid., pp. 465–467). Hence, the higher an interviewee's score on a particular item, the more in agreement she or he was with that item. To facilitate comparisons between the five groupings, group mean scores were computed for each of the 15 closed-ended questions.

The interview schedule reflected basically the schedule-structured format, where all interviewees were asked the same questions, with the same wording, and in the same order (see ibid., pp. 232–237), with the one exception that, on occasion, additional information was provided to some subjects to make a question clearer.[9] The interviews were conducted usually in delegation offices, and lasted between 1 and 3 hours (which, given the busy schedules of the interviewees – the great majority of whom were delegation heads [usually ambassadors] – was rather remarkable).

1993 CSCE Research Results

Thus far, analyses of the 15 closed-ended questions have been conducted (see Sandole 1994, 1995a). This paper presents the first of the analyses of the open-ended questions, most of which dealt with the wars in former Yugoslavia:

Why hasn't the international community played a more effective role in stopping the wars in the former Yugoslavia?

1. Is "Vance-Owen" dead?
2. How would you have dealt with Yugoslavia?
3. What do you think of the "safe havens"?
4. What is the value of CSCE missions?

5. What do you believe were the causes of the wars in former Yugoslavia?
6. Is there a danger of spill over?
7. How will the Yugoslav wars end?
8. What are the "lessons of Yugoslavia"?

I focus here only on the question, What are the "lessons of Yugoslavia"? Qualitative analysis of responses consisted of noting each respondent's answer to the question, identifying common themes within each of the five groupings, and then noting dissimilar as well as common themes across groupings (see Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, pp. 292–296). This led to the results presented below in Table 1.

Table 1
Comparisons Across the Five Groupings for 1993:
Common/Dissimilar "Lessons of Yugoslavia"

	PD/CP	Force	Coord	Model	Ethnic	Democ	None
NATO	6	4	3	2	4		3
NNA	3		1	2	2	1	
FYug	1			1			
NSWP	3			3			
FSU	1	1		1	1		
Totals % of 31	14 45%	5 16%	4 13%	9 29%	7 23%	1 3%	3 10%
Ranks	1	4	5	2	3	7	6

By far, the overwhelming similarity/commonality across the five CSCE groupings for 1993 was an emphasis on the need for preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention ["PD/CP"] (**1st ranking**), followed by the likelihood that the wars in FYug would serve as a model for others elsewhere, especially in the former Soviet Union ["Model"] (**2nd ranking**).[10]

Three of the groupings (NATO, the NNA, and FSU) talked of the need to focus attention on complex, (identity-based) ethnic-type conflicts ["Ethnic"] (**3rd ranking**), but only two of these (perhaps, not surprisingly, the former superpower adversaries of the Cold War, NATO and the FSU) talked of the need for forceful action in such situations ["Force"] (**4th ranking**). Two (NATO, and the NNA) talked about the need for complementarity and co-ordination among the various actors involved in dealing with such situations ["Coord"] (**5th ranking**). One of these (the NNA) referred to the need for democracy building ["Democ"] (**7th ranking**) while some in the other (NATO) said there were "no lessons" learned from the wars in former Yugoslavia ["None"] (**6th ranking**).

THE 1997 OSCE SURVEY

The Fulbright award allowed me to return to Vienna during May – August 1997, to conduct a second round of interviews and, because of the similarity between the questions for both the 1993 and 1997 surveys, explore the external validity of the findings of the 1993 CSCE study; i.e., the extent to which the findings for the CSCE in 1993 were applicable to the OSCE in 1997 (see Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, pp. 113–115). To put this

another way, the Fulbright Scholarship allowed me to test the 1993 CSCE findings as hypotheses in the 1997 OSCE setting.

Also,between the two surveys, the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina had been brought to an end by NATO and the Dayton peace process and the efforts of, among others, U.S. negotiator Richard C. Holbrooke in summer-autumn 1995 (see Holbrooke, 1998; also Bildt, 1998). What the Fulbright award also allowed me to do, therefore, was to view the Dayton peace process and the return of negative peace to Bosnia, as a "natural" or "social experiment": "where the changes [in a situation were] produced, not by the scientist's intervention [as in a laboratory], but by that of the policy maker or practitioner" (Kaplan, 1964, pp. 164 - 165; also see Katz, 1953, pp. 78 - 79). In other words, I could do a successive cross sectional study (see Campbell and Katona, 1953, pp. 24 - 25), based on data collected from CSCE negotiators two years before and from OSCE negotiators two years after NATO and the Dayton Peace Accords brought negative peace to Bosnia.

1997 OSCE Historical Context

In addition, between the 1993 and 1997 surveys, the CSCE had been "reinvented" as the OSCE, with Macedonia and Andorra increasing the membership from 53 to 55. Other changes included NATO's creation of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) to facilitate, within the framework of the North Atlantic Cupertino Council (NACC), collaboration between NATO and its former WTO adversaries on issues of common security; the disastrous Russian-Chechen war of 1994–1996; the campaign to "enlarge" (expand) NATO, right up to the borders of the former Soviet Union, culminating in the July 1997 offer to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to begin negotiating entry into NATO (a status they would achieve by March 1999); NATO's "sweetener" to the Russian Federation in the form of the Founding Act which gave Russia a voice but not a veto in NATO deliberations; and the creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which replaced the NACC and enhanced the PfP.

The summer of 1997 was an appropriate time, therefore, to explore to what extent (if any) the net effect of this mix of developments – but especially the extraordinary cessation of the Bosnian wars – was a continuation, strengthening or change in trends noted in the 1993 CSCE survey (e.g., the trend toward preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention), enhancing or diminishing some and/or revealing other "lessons learned" by senior representatives to the OSCE about how to deal with future Yugoslav-type conflicts.

1997 OSCE Research Design

Once again, prior to departing for Vienna I wrote letters to the heads of the OSCE delegations, informing them that I had been a member of the U.S. delegation to the CSBMs Negotiations and subsequently a NATO Research Fellow, and planned to return to Vienna as a Fulbright OSCE Regional Research Scholar to conduct interviews similar to those that I had conducted during my NATO Fellowship in 1993.

Upon my arrival in Vienna in early May 1997, I contacted all delegations and, by the end of August, succeeded in interviewing 47 individuals from 46 of the 55 participating States:

a) 15 NATO states: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States (not included: Iceland);

b) 9 neutral and non-aligned states (NNA): Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Holy See, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Sweden, and Switzerland (not included: Monaco, San Marino

c) 4 former Yugoslav republics (FYug): Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia (not included: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY: Serbia and Montenegro][11]);

d) 6 non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact (NSWP): Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovak Republic; and

e) 12 former Soviet republics (FSU): Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine (not included: Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). [12]

Clearly, in terms of representativeness, I did better in 1997 than in 1993:

a) **NSWP**: 6/6 (**100%**);

b) **NATO**: 15/16 (**94%**);

c) **NNA**: 9/11 (**82%**);

d) **FYug**: 4/5 (**80%**); and

e) **FSU**: 12/15 (**80%**).

Although still a "convenience sample," 46 interviewed delegations out of a population of 55 OSCE participating states nevertheless represented 84 percent of that population, which was frustratingly close to being a "population sample."[13]

I also interviewed five officials of the OSCE Secretariat (whose responses are included in this paper) and the representatives of four OSCE Partners for Cupertino: Japan, Korea, Morocco, and Egypt (whose views will be analysed for later reports on this project).

Again, basically schedule-structured interviews, comprising closed- and open-ended questions, were conducted usually in delegation offices, with interviews lasting between one and three hours. The closed-ended questions, with some exceptions, were basically the same as those for 1993 (including the Likert-type response structure) – the exceptions dealing with updated revisions of text and recent and future developments such as NATO enlargement and the withdrawal of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) from Bosnia, then planned for June 1998.[14]

1997 OSCE Research Results

Open-ended questions dealing with the wars in former Yugoslavia included:

1. Why didn't the international community do more to stop the wars in former Yugoslavia?
2. Looking back, how would you have dealt with the wars in former Yugoslavia?
3. What do you believe were the causes of the wars in former Yugoslavia?
4. There is the view that a major cause of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the attempt to establish an Islamic republic in Europe. Have you heard of that view? What do you think of it?
5. If hostilities were to resume in Bosnia, e.g., with the withdrawal of SFOR, what is the danger of the conflict spilling over to other areas?
6. What would it take, in your view, to prevent a resumption of hostilities in Bosnia? What can the OSCE do?
7. Beyond Dayton, how will the wars in former Yugoslavia ultimately end?
8. What are the "Lessons of Yugoslavia"?

9. How could the OSCE help to prevent "future Yugoslavias"?

Again, the responses only to the question, What are the "Lessons of Yugoslavia"?, were examined, distilling from the individual responses common themes for each of the groupings and noting the dissimilar as well as common themes among them (including, for 1997, the OSCE Secretariat).

Table 2
Comparisons Across the Six Groupings for 1997: Common/Dissimilar "Lessons of Yugoslavia"

	PD/CP	Force	Coord	Model	Ethn	Demo	US	None
NATO	6	2	10	1	3	1	3	
NNA	5		1		5			
FYug	2		2		2	1	2	
NSWP	4	2	2			2		
FSU	7	4	6	2	5	1		1
OSCE	2	1	2		2		2	1
Total of 52	26 50%	9 17%	23 44%	3 6%	17 33%	5 10%	7 13%	2 4%
Ranks	1	4	2	7	3	6	5	8

Across the five basic groupings of OSCE members and OSCE Secretariat for 1997, the dominant "lesson learned" from the wars in former Yugoslavia was the need for preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention ["PD/CP"] (**1st ranking**); followed by the need for co-ordination among the various actors involved in such activities ["Coord"] (**2nd ranking**); the need to pay attention to complex (identity-based), ethnic-type conflicts ["Ethn"] (**3rd ranking**); with some in four of the six groupings believing that forceful or otherwise resolute (decisive) action may be necessary in such situations ["Force"] (**4th ranking**); and some in three of the groupings subscribing to the need for U.S. leadership in such ["US"] (**5th ranking**). Other themes were the need for democracy building ["Demo"] (**6th ranking**); the idea that the wars in former Yugoslavia might be a model for others elsewhere ["Model"] (**7th ranking**); and that there were no "lessons" learned ["None"] (**8th ranking**).

The 1993 CSCE And 1997 OSCE Surveys Compared

The major similarity between the results of the 1993 CSCE and 1997 OSCE surveys was that the need for preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention was ranked first as the dominant "Lesson of Yugoslavia" for both surveys, with the proportion subscribing to this view increasing slightly from 1993 (**45%**) to 1997 (**50%**).

The need for forceful (resolute, decisive) action remained at fourth place for both 1993 and 1997, but, in terms of respondents subscribing to such views, increased slightly from 1993 (**16%**) to 1997 (**17%**).

One of the big changes was that the need for a division of labour, complementarity and co-ordination among actors involved in preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention increased from fifth place in 1993 (**13%**) to second place for 1997 (**44%**). Another major change was that the idea that the wars in former Yugoslavia might constitute a model for others elsewhere decreased from second place in 1993 (**29%**) to seventh place in 1997 (**6%**).

While the proportion of respondents subscribing to the view that there was a need to pay attention to complex (identity-based), ethnic-type conflicts increased from 1993 (**23%**) to 1997 (**33%**), the rankings remained at third place for both surveys. Such was nearly the case for those subscribing to the view that there was a need for democracy building, which increased from 1993 (**3%**) to 1997 (**10%**), while the rankings remained basically the same (seventh and sixth place, respectively).

Finally, although the view that there was a need for U.S. leadership in preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention (and beyond!) was manifested only in the 1997 survey, it was not present at a significant level: only **13%** of the respondents subscribed to this view, which was ranked in fifth place.

Theory Revisited: Interpretation Of Findings

What are we to make of these findings, and the consistency and/or changes observed between 1993 and 1997? That proportionately more respondents referred to the need for preventive diplomacy as the primary lesson of the wars in former Yugoslavia in 1997 (**50%**) than in 1993 (**45%**), for instance, can be seen against the background of developments in preventive diplomacy. Although coined in 1960 by then UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld (Lund, 1996, p. 32), "preventive diplomacy" was not an oft-thought-of concept until 1992 when then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published his An Agenda for Peace, broadening as well as publicising the term. This was the same year that the CSCE had decided to send missions into the field to provide "early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management" and to create the office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) (see CSCE Helsinki Document 1992). It was also one year before I conducted the initial, 1993 survey and some four years before Michael Lund (1996) published his major contribution to institutionalising the concept, itself one year before I conducted my follow-up, 1997 survey.

In other words, although it was the dominant "lesson" to have emerged from both surveys, preventive diplomacy may have been referred to more often in 1997 than in 1993 – and most impressively, in terms of the need to co-ordinate the activities of actors involved in such activities – in large part because it was more embedded in the "track-1 and "track-2" conflict resolution cultures and lexicons in 1997 than in 1993. As Anatol Rapoport (1974, p. 7) reminds us, "what men think or say about human conflict ... has a great bearing on the nature of human conflict and its consequences." Quite simply, by 1997, the men (and women) of the OSCE were thinking more about co-ordinated preventive diplomacy than their CSCE predecessors had done in 1993; moreover, they had a more concretised sense of where preventive diplomacy could be useful: in complex (identity-based), ethnic-type conflicts such as those that had given rise to the wars in former Yugoslavia.

The significant decrease between 1993 (**29%**) and 1997 (**6%**) in those subscribing to the view that the wars in former Yugoslavia might constitute a model for others elsewhere (especially in the former Soviet Union) might have a lot to do with the cessation of the ("first") Russian-Chechen war in 1996, and with the relative success of the U.S./NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of the Dayton Peace Accords: a mission that had been in place some 18 months by the time I conducted the 1997 OSCE

survey. This could also explain the absence of references to the need for U.S. leadership in the 1993 survey, but their presence (although, again, not at a critical level) in the 1997 survey.

One final point worth mentioning is that in 1993, 10 percent of CSCE respondents claimed that there were "no lessons" learned from Yugoslavia, whereas in 1997, only four percent of OSCE respondents made that claim. Clearly, proportionately more respondents in 1997 felt that there were lessons learned than in 1993, perhaps because of the relative success of NATO and the Dayton peace process in achieving and maintaining the "negative peace" in Bosnia since the fall of 1995.

Conclusion

At first, these findings suggested that the "paradigm and behavioural shift" from national to common security associated with the end of the Cold War in general, and with developments in the CSCE/OSCE in particular, was on track, with co-ordinated approaches to preventive diplomacy/conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building – involving a significant U.S. presence – becoming more and more thought about, talked about and (political will "willing") more likely to translate into corresponding action as the OSCE and other track-1 and track-2 actors approached positive as well as negative peace in post-Cold War Europe.

Kosovo, building upon the co-ordinated mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina, could have been a major validation of these propositions. [16] However, as suggested by more recent events, including results of my third round of interviews with OSCE representatives conducted during summer 1999 (see Sandole, 2001), the nature of NATO's intervention in Kosovo – a 78-day bombing campaign against Serbia during March – June 1999, to halt the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo's Albanians – caused a rupture in East-West relations and, apparently, a decrease in overall consensus within the OSCE. If the contentious NATO intervention in Kosovo in spring/summer 1999 was, in fact, responsible for the decrease in consensus within the OSCE between 1997 and 1999, then it is conceivable that the relatively more successful NATO intervention in Bosnia in 1995 was responsible for a significant increase in consensus within the CSCE/OSCE between 1993 and 1997 (see ibid.), as well as for the aforementioned increase in the proportion of respondents holding positive views about co-ordinated preventive diplomacy in ethnic-type conflicts.

To conclude, an essential next step in the CSCE/OSCE project is to examine for 1999, as we have here for 1993 and 1997, OSCE respondents' answers to the question, "What are the 'lessons of Yugoslavia'?" This will extend the analysis of responses to three points in time, inclusive of NATO's intervention in Kosovo as well as Bosnia, and in the process, enhance our knowledge about what senior OSCE representatives believe the international community can do to more effectively deal with, and perhaps prevent, "future Yugoslavias," as well as what factors may have shaped their views in this regard.

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Notes

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 40th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), Washington, DC, 16-20 February 1999.

2 The first three published reports can be found in Sandole (1995a, 2000, 2001). The CSCE officially became the OSCE on 1 January 1995 (see CSCE Budapest Document 1994).

3 My other efforts in this regard include Sandole (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1993b, 1993c, 1995b, 1998a, 1999a, 1999b [Ch. 7])

4 See Maresca (1985) for an insider's account of the development of the CSCE during the Cold War; and Bloed (1993, 1997) for an "extensive analysis of the origin, development and basic features of the Helsinki process," from 1972 until 1995, with accompanying official documents. For specific discussions of the role of the CSCE/OSCE in the post-Cold War

world, see Lucas (1990, 1993); Kemp (1996); Sandole (1999b, Ch. 7); and Hopmann (1999, 2000).

For monthly, quarterly, annual and other periodic reports on the OSCE, see the *OSCE Review: European Security* (published by the Finnish Committee for European Security [STETE]; e-mail: stete@kaapeli.fi) and the *Helsinki Monitor: Quarterly on Security and Cooperation in Europe* (published by the Netherlands Helsinki Committee [NHC]; e-mail: office@nhc.nl); and documentation from the OSCE Secretariat, including the monthly *OSCE Newsletter* and *Secretary General's Annual Report* (e-mail: info@osce.org, or see the OSCE Website at: http://www.osce.org).

5 Germany, Italy, and the United States each made two representatives available for interview. Among the remaining states in the sample, one representative from each was interviewed. Hence, 29 CSCE states in the sample plus 3 additional interviewees = a total of 32 interviewees. Twenty-three of these (72 percent) were heads of delegation (Sandole, 1995a, p. 136 [fn. 12]).

6 Although a member of the CSCE, the "rump" Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was banned from attending all meetings of the CSCE at the end of the 4th CSCE review conference in Helsinki, on 8 July 1992, because of its (particularly Serbia's) responsibility for fomenting and sustaining the genocidal warfare in former Yugoslavia.

7 The remaining successor republic of former Yugoslavia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, although not then a member of the CSCE, had "observer" status by the summer of 1993.

8 Many of the successor states of the former Soviet Union either did not have CSCE delegations in Vienna by summer 1993, or if they did, they were usually "one-man shows" representing their governments at various levels (e.g., to the State of Austria and the United Nations in Vienna as well as to the CSCE) and, therefore, their representatives were generally unavailable for interview. This was also the case with other CSCE participating states that were either not represented in Vienna (e.g., Malta) or if they were, their busy representatives were not available for interview (e.g., Albania). (Albania, incidentally, does not belong to any of the five main groupings.)

9 All interviews were conducted in English. With the exception of the American, British, and Canadian representatives, for whom English was their mother tongue, the other representatives spoke English as one of their foreign languages. Some of these individuals requested additional information "in English" for a particular question to be clearer to them. On the assumption that this provision of additional information on an ad hoc basis could have affected the comparability of responses between individuals to the same item, as partial checks interviewees were invited to explain their SA-SD answers in an open-ended fashion – "in the margin," so to speak – as well as to respond to the 12 open-ended questions, many of which overlapped with the closed-ended ones.

10 Elsewhere I have referred to the phenomenon of wars in former Yugoslavia stimulating wars elsewhere (e.g., in the former Soviet Union) as one example of spillover, which I call multiplier-effect systemic contagion (see Sandole, 1999b, pp. 148-150).

11 The FRY remained banned from attending all meetings of the OSCE because of its (particularly Serbia's) role in fomenting and sustaining the genocidal warfare in former Yugoslavia: a situation which continued subsequently with the brutal Serbian repression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The situation only changed when, following the toppling of Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic from power in October 2000, the FRY was allowed, on 10 November 2000, to occupy the seat previously held at the OSCE by the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) (see OSCE Newsletter, 2000).

[12] I interviewed one person from each participating state in the overall sample, with the exception that the U.S. delegation had two persons available for interview (hence, 47 persons from 46 participating states). Thirty-seven (79 percent) of the interviewees were heads of delegation. (Two persons in the 1997 survey were also present in the 1993 survey.)

[13] As in 1993, I was unable to reach certain participating states, either because they were not represented in Vienna (e.g., Andorra, the newest OSCE member) or if they were, were represented by busy delegations (e.g., Kazakhstan). I succeeded in contacting some delegations, even talking with their ambassadors, but for a variety of reasons, was unable to conduct the standard interview (e.g., Albania, Tajikistan). (Andorra, like Albania, is not a member of any of the five main groupings.)

[14] The number of closed-ended questions for the 1997 OSCE study was also the same as that for the 1993 CSCE study (15). The number of open-ended questions for 1997 (21), however, was nearly double that for 1993 (12). For both 1993 and 1997, the majority of the open-ended questions dealt with the wars in former Yugoslavia. Again, this paper is the initial report of analyses of responses to the open-ended questions.

[15] In this connection, see the comments by OSCE Secretary General Giancarlo Aragona in OSCE Review (1998).

[16] One possible hint of this, in February 1999, was President Clinton's statement that: U.S. ground troops should participate in a NATO peacekeeping mission in Kosovo to give the warring sides "the confidence to lay down their arms." "Bosnia taught us a lesson," Clinton said in his weekly radio address, referring to the estimated quarter-million people killed in [Bosnia] before NATO peacekeepers intervened. "If we wait until casualties mount and war spreads, any effort to stop it will come at a higher price under more dangerous conditions" (emphasis added) (Priest, 1999, p. A1).

European Peace And Security: A Different Perspective

Jan Oberg

1. European Union militarisation: Humpty-Dumpty as peace-maker

Some Reflections on Conflict Management in the 1990s

What we can learn from the conflict mismanagement in the Balkans the last ten years is that the EU must first of all improve its capacity to diagnose and understand complex conflicts, conduct early warning, early listening and early action and intervene with civilian capacity to create talks, dialogues, brainstorms and negotiations in close co-operation with all conflicting parties. I would suggest that it attempts to reduce national interests and intervene as impartially as it can and attack problems rather than actors. It is essential to understand that the earlier we intervene and the less violent a conflict is, the easier it is to help solve it without politicising the situation and the easier it is to control prestige, national interests and other – for conflict-resolution disturbing – considerations.

It is also clear that most governments and Ministries of Foreign Affairs need professionals to deal with conflict issues, like they need military professionals to deal with military matters. It is also quite obvious that many NGOs with professional staff in conflict-management have done more good and less harm than many governments. They must be given a place in the EU conflict-management structure.

We can certainly also learn that it leads nowhere when single countries try to play many roles at the same time - mediators, judges, peace-keepers, peace-enforcers, arms traders, sanction-makers, humanists, etc. It leads nowhere when they have national(ist) interests while professing to help bring about peace with the local parties. If Germany's real interest in the Balkans is obtaining influence and spreading the DM, do not call it "peace." If the Americans want the Bondsteel base on Yugoslav territory, the largest they've built since the Vietnam War, then tell people and the media honestly that the U.S. is engaged for more reasons than concern for human rights.

We can learn that peace plans must be developed from above but also from the bottom up and that all conflicting parties must have a stake. For instance, various peace plans could be presented prior to referendums and people given an opportunity to democratically vote for the peace plan they believe best serves their interests for the future – for one single reason: they are to live with them. And from the present situation in Kosovo we could learn that it is not that easy to occupy a trouble spot and socially engineer it into a democracy with tolerance and recon-ciliation.

Beyond any other lesson I would emphasise one: that at the end of the day peace and peace-making is about putting human beings first. We have to deal with people's perceptions of the issue that split them from fellow human beings, with how they perceive themselves, the conflict issue and the "others." We have to deal with fear (much more important than 'evil' when explaining why people do harm to each other), with hatred, intolerance, despair – in short with the root causes behind violence, rather than merely putting lids on the fire and ignoring the root causes. And I believe we have to develop criteria for best practices and that decision-makers ought to be both more humble and self-critical about the work they have done in the name of peace.

The lessons I am advocating here admittedly belong to a new paradigm. Judging from EU documents and plans, the EU wants none of it. Some reasons seem to be that they are incompatible with traditional concepts of power (power is power over someone else, not over ourselves), they do not have "sex appeal" for careerists, they won't make the EU a new world super power or satisfy the military-industrial complex. They are also quite incompatible with male thinking in general and male elite thinking in particular.

The EU Crisis Management Organisation

Little is available about it, but the EU crisis management structure is taking shape. Crisis management will be conducted under the auspices of the General Affairs Council (GAC). The Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) - ambassadors to the EU make many of the decisions after issues have been prepared in working groups. The focal point of the crisis management structure will be the (Interim) Political and Security Committee (iPSC). Representatives of the EU Commission and the Council Secretariat, the Early Warning and Planning Unit (PU) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) take part in its meetings. Not participating but advising the PSC is the Committee of Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. Then there is the interim Military Body, later to become the EU Military Committee (EUMC) which is composed of member state chiefs of defence and will advise Mr. Solana, the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/Secretary-General (HR/SG). The PU, set up prior to the Helsinki Summit in 1999, is attached to Mr. Solana's office which also hosts the Situation Centre (SITCEN) which pools civilian and military expertise in the assessment of intelligence information.

The Civilian Dimension is Clearly Underdeveloped

In terms of manpower, the EUMS for instance, with military and civilian experts, will reach about 100, twice the size of the old WEU and half the size of NATO's international military staff. There will be around 100 military experts to assess intelligence. It is worth quoting at length from the October issue of the excellent European Security Review published by the Centre for European Security and Disarmament (CESD) and the International Security Information Service, Europe (ISIS Europe) from which the above rundown of the structure is taken:

"In comparison with the preparation for the military assessment of information relating to crisis management, the new civilian structures within the Council look relatively impoverished. The Policy Unit has a total of 20 staff who will be hard-pressed to meet the challenge of processing information from member states, open sources (including reports from NGOs) and the other EU institutions."

It is pretty obvious that the civilian dimension is not given priority. Sweden has been a major advocate of this civilian dimension and Swedish together with other EU politicians maintain that the civilian committee is fundamentally important while the military will serve 'only' as the last resort. But as it stands now, this is not credible. It is obvious that it does not have the manpower and other resources to effectively monitor and analyse developments in conflict areas around the world. And that is relevant since the EU has not defined any limits to where it can intervene.

Why no Co-ordination with the OSCE and the UN?

It is also evident that there is no body for the systematic co-ordination and co-operation with civil society organisations, conflict-resolution NGOs or peace research institutes. As long as the

EU is called a peace project and its military force is justified with reference to peace-making, the above mentioned body is of great relevance.

In addition, whereas there are four working groups for EU-NATO co-ordination in crisis management and the central EU figure in all this is Mr. Javier Solana, former S-G of NATO, there seems to be no parallel bodies for co-ordination between the EU on the one hand and organisations like the UN, OSCE, OAU and other regional governmental bodies and potential conflict-managers on the other.

EU-NATO co-operation was pushed through in Nice, with no similar function vis-à-vis the mentioned organisations. Indeed, if the EU's endeavour were mainly civilian, it would be natural to discuss its fundamental relation to and co-operation with the OSCE, the existing civilian European security organisation. The OSCE is still grossly under-staffed with only a handful of civilians at its Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna; with the sharp reduction in that organisation's influence, one might have thought that the EU would draw some conclusion from that when building a similar unit.

On the basis of this there seems to be extremely little evidence that the EU crisis management as it stands today is strong on civilian measures and will only use military force as the last resort. So far, it looks organisationally as if it were the other way around.

And it is likely that the EU Rapid Reaction Force and military build-up will make the European security 'architecture' even more chaotic and non-transparent. Indeed it could be a creator of conflicts inside Europe and with the United States.

Future EU's Dependence on the United States and NATO

It is no secret that the EU is militarily much smaller and less effective than the U.S. Figures speak for themselves: while U.S. military expenditures are roughly US $ 300 bn (3.2 per cent of its GDP), those of the EU combined are US $165 bn (2,1 per cent of their combined GDP) – and while U.S. spending is increasing, that of the EU has fallen steadily. The U.S. spends 39 per cent of its military expenditures on personnel, the EU 61 per cent, which is indicative of how much more technology- and capital-intensive America's defence is. The U.S. spends 24 per cent of its defence budget on new equipment, the EU average being only 14. And, perhaps most important of all for the future: the U.S. spent US $ 36,5 bn on military research and development (R&D) in 1999 while the European NATO members combined spent only US $ 8,9 bn. European NATO and EU members' military industries are also the story of duplication and much less integration and fusion than U.S. military industry.

One can find experts who argue that the (American) Revolution in Military Affairs, RAM, widens the gap between Europe and the US to such an extent that European militaries will soon be unable to operate alongside the Americans because of their technological backwardness!

For the foreseeable future, EU military action will be heavily dependent on access to NATO and American resources, be it various types of intelligence, satellite surveillance, lift aircraft capacity, coded communication systems etc. Remember, the U.S. conducted about 70 per cent of all the bombing sorties over Yugoslavia; and in spite of the fact that the EU allies had some 2 million man under arms on paper, it took them a long time to get some 30.000 (about 2 per cent of them) on the ground in Kosovo.

To perform as a military power in war-fighting and/or peace-making, the EU will have to overcome this historical and structural inferiority. It will only be possible if the EU (and non-EU

NATO allies in Europe) rationalise and co-ordinate all military functions much more effectively in the future and boost their military investments considerably.

In addition, it is my contention that the EU – by choosing the military power scale – will bring itself into increasingly fierce competition with the U.S. and remain dependent upon it for decades. What it should do to become more autonomous is to develop a niche for itself that will strike the world around it as much more attractive and compatible with professional conflict-management of the future.

Formal Membership is Irrelevant and so are the Words "European Army"

Two hypothesis can be advanced here: The first one is that except for the symbolic importance to some East Europeans, it no longer matters at all what organisation a country is formally accepted into as a member. The fluid 'architecture' makes this irrelevant. Sweden can participate in all this and not be a member of NATO and non EU member Norway intends to make the largest per capita contribution to the EU forces. EU will co-operate with non-EU countries including the U.S. and Canada; and non-EU countries are encouraged to participate in the EU force – overlapping with activities and exercises with non-NATO countries which participate in a series of NATO activities.

The second is that it is nothing but a fig leaf argument when we are told that the EU Rapid Reaction Force is not and will not become a European "Army." You may add: not yet, at least. If one day the EU becomes a federation this must become an EU Army. But the point is that what we traditionally associate with a national standing, conscript, territorial army is no longer relevant. The current model operates with contingents of troops that will be trained and assembled on short notice and put under a central command. German Lt. General Klaus Schuwirth, commander of the German Army's 4th Corps in Potsdam, is already appointed head of the EU Military Staff in Brussels, with British major-general Graham Messervy Whiting who heads the EU military committee as second in command.

This fig-leaf discussion was summarised wonderfully by Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission: "If you don't want to call it a European Army, don't call it a European Army. You can call it Margaret. You can call it Mary-Ann." (Daily Telegraph, November 17, 2000). On February 10 this year, Romano Prodi also declared before a Latvian audience that "any attack or aggression against an EU member nation would be an attack or aggression against the whole EU, this is the highest guarantee." If implemented as stated this statement marks a quantum shift of EU from an socio-economic union into a military defence alliance. Such a development might risk to promote the development of a renewed cold war in Europe.

All you've got to do is to consult Lewis Carroll's "Alice in Wonderland" in which Humpty Dumpty says: "When I use a word it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less." And Alice responds: "The question is whether you can make words mean so many different things." And Humpty Dumpty answers "The question is: Which is to be Master - that's all." He then offers an example of how much one word can mean ("impenetrability") and summarises: "When I make a word do a lot of work like that, I always pay it well." Indeed, Alice has come to Euro land.

2. The Militarisation of the European Union: A Civilisational Mistake

It was quite predictable that the EU would militarise itself. In fact, one of the world's leading peace researchers, Johan Galtung, predicted that in his book about the EU from 1972, "A Superpower in the Making." It is not in the nature of big powers to see greatness in non-violence, dialogue, tolerance or in playing the role of one among many. The EU – whose main players are former colonial powers and present nuclear powers and/or culturally violent – began their militarisation some ten years ago with the French-German military co-operation, and it got another boost with the French-British agreement in 1998 in Saint Malo. And the recent EU Nice Summit has put the militarisation of EU on an irreversible path, most likely to a new Cold War.

Today it is the so-called Eurocorps which is formally in charge of NATO/KFOR in Kosovo. Internally, the EU struggles with ever deeper vertical integration, i.e. more and more standardisation and harmonisation of ever more areas, and with horizontal integration of more and more countries. Externally, it decided a year ago at its summit in Finland to become a world player by setting up a sizeable military Rapid Reaction Force by the year 2003.

There are various proposals in the direction of a "United States of Europe" (USE), there is a common currency, a common foreign and security policy, common or harmonised laws, a structure with functions that look increasingly like a super-state with a President. There is a stepped up civilian and military industrial integration and rationalisation. And at its summit in Nice in southern France, beginning December 6, 2000 a European Charter is on the table.

Rhetoric and Reality

We are told that a European "Army" is not in the offing. But can the EU really move on with integration in virtually all other regards and not end up having something that looks surprisingly much like an integrated military? If so, it will be unique in history. Isn't it in the nature of defence and military matters that they require more centralisation, central control, harmonisation, interoperability, standardisation and integration than most civilian spheres?

The Headline Goals for the force in the year 2003 was planned a year ago at 60.000 troops. Already committed, however, are almost 70.000. With reservists this will add up to 225.000 under arms. And not exactly traditional peace-keeping arms. Among other resources, Sweden for instance has assigned AJS 37 Viggen fighters, a submarine, corvettes and a mechanised battalion. Britain has pledged 18 warships and up to 72 combat aircraft.

Ministers tell the citizens that it is for disaster relief, humanitarian aid, natural catastrophes, mine clearing and peacekeeping. It will serve as a back-up for diplomacy and it will only be used as a last resort when everything else has been tried to avert conflicts from erupting into violent struggle. But if it is modelled upon the case of Kosovo, that is the example par excellence of the failure of preventive diplomacy, of diplomacy backing up force.

The Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

We are also told that the EU's most important part is civilian and that civilian crisis management, coupled with early analysis, early warning and violence-preventive diplomacy is the main thing; however, the present structure and balance of resources does not bear out that point.

Earlier, the Commission has developed an inventory of 25 categories (encompassing 300 specific actions) for civilian crisis management. Among them we find virtually anything such as

counter-terrorism operations, support to free media, training of intelligence and judicial staff as well as conflict resolution training centres. So, some priorities had to be set up.

According to the documents from the EU Feira European Council summit in June this year, an Interim Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management had its first meeting only three days before the Summit (June 16) and could hardly have developed much of an identity.

Appendix 3 of the Feira document approaches the civilian aspect in this manner: "The reinforcement of the Union's capabilities in civilian aspects of crisis management should above all, provide it with adequate means to face complex political crises by:

- acting to prevent the eruption or escalation of conflicts;
- consolidating peace and internal stability in periods of transition
- ensuring complementarity between the military and civilian aspects of crisis management covering the full range of Petersberg tasks."

How is that operationalised? The priority areas outlined next to this goal formulation is:

I. Police — co-operation during crisis and in relation to:
II. Strengthening the rule of law — e.g. assist in the re-establishment of a judicial and penal system in societies in transition and/or conflict/post-war reconstruction.
III. Strengthening civilian administration — training experts for duties in the re-establishment of collapsed administrative systems;
IV. Civil protection — such as search and rescue in disaster relief.

It should be clear for everyone to see: every reference to civilian conflict management - conflict analysis, early warning, attention to the human dimensions of conflict, training of mediators, peace workers, social workers, psychologists, conflict-resolution experts, negotiators and activities to empower civil society, reconciliation and forgiveness - is conspicuously lacking.

The EU versus the UN and OSCE

The Feira summit decided that the EU force should be deployed "both in response to request of a lead agency like the UN and the OSCE, or, where appropriate, in autonomous EU action." It also decided to "propose to NATO the creation of four 'ad hoc working groups' between the EU and NATO on the issues which have been identified in that context: security issues, capabilities goal, modalities enabling EU access to NATO assets and capabilities and the definition of permanent arrangements for EU-NATO consultation."

At the peak point of its history as a peacekeeping organisation, the UN deployed some 70.000 Blue Helmets. By the end of October 2000, it was down to 37.000, a figure which include observers, civilian police and troops. Britain which will deploy 12.500 troops to the EU force has 312 UN peacekeepers. Sweden will contribute 1500 to the EU force and has 192 UN peacekeepers of whom 46 are soldiers.

If Europe's strongest nations wanted the UN to be the leading peacekeeper it is strange that that organisation has been systematically drained in terms of funds, manpower and legitimacy – while the EU seeks to build an operative force twice as big in just three years. It's the same countries that could never deliver enough well-trained UN Blue Helmets (e.g. to Srebrenica in time) with lighter and less sophisticated military equipment to the world's most important peace-making organisation. They are also the ones which, during last year's bombing, violated the

Charter of the UN's basic value of creating 'peace by peaceful means' and ignored the provision of having a UN mandate.

The Swedish prime minister maintains that the EU force will be a contribution to the UN too. But that immediately raises the question: why did the US and the EU not decide to finally make the UN what it ought to be and had a chance to become after the end of the old Cold War?

From Kosovo to EU Turbo-Militarisation

The single most important event in creating the political atmosphere with which the turbo-militarisation of the EU now takes place is the experience in Kosovo last year. European leaders assess that the Americans took over the show, took the diplomatic lead and backed it up with overwhelming military power which almost cast the European NATO partners in the role of onlookers. Leading EU/NATO partners recognised the structural weakness and the inability to shoulder the burden and back up their diplomatic efforts by force.

In passing one may notice that Kosovo is the best singular illustration of the inability to a) diagnose the conflict, b) conduct early warning, c) apply early listening and d) come up with a set of reasonably creative and acceptable series of conflict-mitigation and mediation initiatives. It is also the case of clandestine arms trade and military training, intelligence infiltration of peace missions, double games and Western alliance-making with hard-line secessionist nationalists and ignoring moderate, non-violent political factors.

The simple facts remain, whether or not covered in the mainstream Western press: we are further from a solution to the real issues than ever before. It has been recognised that some Western leaders told their citizens quite a few things last year to justify the 78-days bombing which turned out to be either not the whole truth or blatant lies. None of the deep and complex conflicts have been settled in the region – five years after Dayton and 18 months after the bombing.

The present international missions are strapped for funds and have not been able to prevent ethnic cleansing, lawlessness and authoritarianism in Kosovo, in spite of having more troops and civilians than Belgrade ever had to maintain law and order. Kosovo has become a strongly divisive issue, if not a turning point, in Euro-Atlantic relations; it left the EU grumbling aloud in response to what the Americans are de facto saying: we fixed the bombing and got our base there, we paid by far the most - now it is your turn to fix the peace. Circles close to George W. Bush more than hint that the United States is not going to stay for much longer. So the European may be stuck with an extremely expensive cul-de-sac protectorate-like situation for the next few decades.

So, first there was Kosovo, then Kosova and for the foreseeable future there will be "Kaosovo." A diplomatic, moral and peace-making fiasco is now being turned into a recipe. By the EU.

Finally, history's non-violent irony deserves mention. The Kosovo-Albanians started out on a non-violent path and got nothing but lip service by the West. They ended up with an extremely violent political force with Western backing. In contrast, the nationalities that make up Serbia were imprisoned for a decade or more in Milosevic' internal cage and the outer cage of the West – in short major violence. However, they avoided what we all feared, namely civil war and other terrible internal violence and broke out of that cage by means of non-violence. Officially, they are supported by the West. But for how long if they do not comply with Western demands? (If

Mr. Kostunica remains the Vojeslav Kostunica I know – and I think he will – he is not the man the West will see as a long-term partner).

And Kosovo was about 10 other Things

It is not difficult to see that Kosovo was not only, perhaps not even predominantly, about Kosovo. It was

1. one element in the build-up of a common foreign and security policy within the EU on its way "up";
2. a stepping stone to and in NATO expansion,
3. a chance to contain the very much weakened Russia, and
4. a chance to improve the access to the oil in the Caucasus. Further,
5. it could be used as a focal point for changing the three inter-related conflict formations and strategic theatres: the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus. It antagonised Russia, quite a few neighbours in the region, India and China and could well be described by future historians as the beginning of a new Cold War formation between the West and these formidable powers.

The Serbia-Kosovo conflict could also be used

6. to promote market economy; it was written into the Rambouillet text that Kosovo should operate a market economy – like it had been in the Dayton Accords. The West could get a foothold once and for all, spreading Western values and institutions – and boots – all over Kosovo; in short
7. non-violence had lost, the military won. In addition,
8. the whole affair could be used as evidence that the US and NATO, not the EU and certainly not the UN (which was never considered for a Kosovo mission before the war) or the OSCE was the peacekeeper, the peace enforcer and the peacemaker. The UN was forced to leave Macedonia where it had had one of its most successful missions only a few weeks before the bombing started. So, the UN (the only organisation which could be synonymous with the much-used term 'international community') was defeated as the world's new peacekeeper. Next,
9. with the CIA's infiltration of OSCE's KVM mission that was also the end of that organisation as an important and strong regional organisation. And, finally,
10. the US could use the opportunity, like it had in Bosnia and Croatia, to show that the Europeans could not get their act together and that it had to fix a few problems in Europe's backyard; in short, the EU as EU was humiliated. The rapid militarisation of it now signals a "never again."

So, if the West's operation in the Balkans was about peace, it was a very special peace brought about in a special way. One must hope that this is not what the EU plans to repeat in various conflict spots up to 2.500 miles or 4.000 kilometres - or in any hotspot around the globe. The Swedish defence minister Bjorn von Sydow recently confirmed that no geographical limits have been defined beyond which the EU force should not intervene.

The U.S. attempt at World Domination

In short, the Balkans and Kosovo in particular was a gift to those who wanted to promote NATO and undermine the UN and other more civilian organisations. It was a springboard for

those who want the United States to move forward, not as a force for civilisation and creative new conflict-management, but in the role of world police, world judge and world dominator.

Is it far fetched to hypothesise that the United States aims at world dominance in this period of history between a very weakened Russia and an ascending Asia?

Consider the simultaneous attempts by the U.S. to control modern computer-related technologies and bio-technology, the world market and world trade, the world's peace keeping, world space, world oceans, the world's resources and world environment. (The latter is being done not by agreeing with global norms in Kyoto and the Hague but by environmental modification techniques for war purposes such as HAARP). The U.S. is also the only state that plans to be able to fight a nuclear war even for political purposes and not only in response to an attack; while such a war means potential world destruction, the U.S. intends to survive it by means of the planned self-protective BMD, Ballistic Missile Defence.

Furthermore, no other country in human history has fought as many wars, intervened in so many places, used its intelligence agency so widely and sold so many weapons. Finally, add to all this the strength with which American culture, media and news bureaus are the strongest world-wide in shaping people's perception of the world and listening in on their views clandestinely (through e.g. Echelon and other listening devices around the world) – and you have some, not exactly negligible, indicators for that hypothesis.

The EU should make another Contribution to Peace

So, the EU sees its chance now. It also wants to guard itself against excessive US dominance in the future. The most recent example of the rapidly widening disagreement, if not worse, between the EU and the US came with Secretary of Defence, Richard Cohen's warning to European defence ministers in Brussels on December 5 in effect saying "don't even try to compete with NATO, co-ordinate with it and let us – US – control force planning and interventions."

The EU's chosen means to play a world role is economic first and from now on, military. While the former may succeed, the latter won't in the foreseeable future. If a small power wants to fight a bigger one, the first rule of thumb is: don't choose the field in which the opponent is much stronger. So, if the EU chooses to militarise itself it will remain a European sub-division of NATO.

If on the contrary it does things differently, draws some other lessons from Kosovo and decides to deal with conflicts around the world in a new way, it may become much stronger and even a moral force - and stronger than the US on most power scales. It may become a power of the future rather than a replica of its colonial past and of the present NATO. It would probably also create less suspicion among people and governments within a radius of 4000 kilometres, and beyond, who would have less reason to ask: what on earth is the EU up to for the future?

We may indeed ask whether the EU leaders have the required creativity and a vision of Europe in the future world to see some new 'mission civilisatrice" like that?

3. Peaceful Europe – Something different[1]

Peace is promoted by constructive Proposals and Dialogue

We openly express our concern over – and criticised – the ongoing, militarisation of the EU. Some will say: but there are no alternatives. We believe that there are always alternatives, that democracies are characterised by alternatives and choice, and that openly discussed alternatives will improve the quality and legitimacy of society's decision-making.

In addition, it is an intellectual and moral challenge to not only criticise but also be constructive. If we only tell people that we think they are wrong, they are not likely to listen. However, if we say: what are your views on this set of ideas and steps? – we may sometimes engage them in dialogue and sow a seed. Most people in power circles live their daily lives in a time frame and a social space where certain ideas, viewpoints and concepts are just not supposed to be brought up.

TFF is one small and constructive voice with proposals that reduce, wherever possible, the use of structural and direct violence. When it comes to the EU, it leads nowhere to be "anti" about the project or sceptical of some of its manifestations – such as its militarisation and conflict-management role. What is needed is a systematic, world-wide dialogue about the meaning of peace and how various meanings will compete in influencing the future of the EU and its day-to-day policies. A first precondition is that we liberate ourselves from the belief that the things which happen are the only things than can or should happen. Democracy is not about voting 'yes' or 'no' to one presented option, it is about engaging people in the dialogue about many alternatives and then have a vote to get to the one that suits most with a stake in the issue.

Peace is promoted by constructive proposals and dialogue. Authoritarianism and violence by its negation.

A Catalogue for further Brainstorming and Dialogue

To make the EU and broader Europe a factor for world peace, here follow 32 proposals, big and small, for everyone to discuss, grouped in a few categories. The list is not indicative of priorities and a EU peace policy would have to be pieced together by many elements, ideas and steps in different combinations depending on circumstances:

A) Towards an Economically Peaceful Europe

New Economy – could mean Something different

- If the EU developed a new economics and a set of relations with the disadvantaged countries and peoples all over the world and provided less and less exploitative trade and investment conditions, it would – over time – make a visible contribution to poverty-reduction and also reduce the risk of war and environmental catastrophe. For the EU to not only define itself as a peace project but actually be one, it must not only help reduce direct violence but also reduce its present contribution to structural violence.
- In its concrete day-to-day operations with the world, it must put people first, place basic human need satisfaction among the poorest as its absolute, inescapable top priority.

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1 The following part is co-authored by Jan Oberg, TFF Director and Christian Hårleman, TFF Associate.

- Its leaders must even have the courage to say to European citizens: "we in Europe are so many times more wealthy and secure than those at the bottom of the world society. We need your understanding and assistance to solve the largest problem of all and solve it as quickly as we can: we must forever abolish those mechanisms which force 1,2 billion of humanity to live on less than $ 1 per day and 2,4 million to lack adequate sanitation. We in Europe must hold back our luxury consumption for a while until those lives are saved." (Figures from UNDP's Human Development Report).

A historic Contribution to Global Violence Reduction

- And they would not talk about it. They would do it. And when they had done it, they would have made a larger contribution to world peace than any other organisation in modern history. They would have given the words "humanitarian intervention" a relevant content. They would have globalised humanism, and not just financial transactions and profit-making. They would have shown that the EU is something new and entirely different from the United States. And they would have shown that all this can be done for a fraction of the world's military expenditures today. And when it was done, there would be less need for military expenditures, because wars also (not only, for sure) grow out of unequal relations, hopelessness and injustices at many levels.
- - To do things like that require more civil courage and vision than letting the military-industrial complexes and interventionism, consumerism and environmental decay, the market and profit motives continue unabated and label repairs of their consequences "peace-making" and "conflict-management."

B) Human Security and Alternative Defence

Reducing Violence against Women and Children

Around the world on average, about one in every three women has experience violence in an intimate relationship. World-wide, about 1,2 million women and girls under 18 are trafficked for prostitution each year. There are 100 million children living on the streets, there are 300,000 child soldiers and 6 million injured in armed conflict. We have seen how soldiers behave in this respect, not only in wars but also in so-called peace missions such as Bosnia and Kosovo. Those who want the EU to become a militarised actor can not also act with credibility on reducing violence against gender and children. In short, the EU cannot develop in whichever way its adult male leaders feel like and simultaneously call it a peace project.

Alternative Defence and Common Security

What a marvellous opportunity in human history: no countries in the EU feel threatened by any other EU country and many do not see a military threat from anybody else. This means that all they need is a defensive military, a civilian component and then protection of citizens against embargoes, environmental catastrophes and the like. Of course it cannot be excluded that some kind of threatening situation may develop in the future. Thus, the EU does not need any long-range offensive weapons anymore to deter any enemies as it did in the past. This means conversion to purely alternative defence methods, predominantly civilian but perhaps also military (defensive, only for defence on one's own territory but non-threatening to others) since it is as much a democratic right to be in favour of military defence as it is to be in favour of non-violence only.

Common security was a concept developed during the end of the Cold War and cannot be applied today. But in a broader perspective the Palme Commission was essentially making a very wise point: we can't build security and trust with anybody if at the same time we threaten them or have the capability to threaten and kill them should we one day decide to.

Isn't it time to develop some kind of security doctrine for common defence in Europe &endash; before we continue with weapons technologies, strategies and doctrines that were comme il faut during the Cold War - and before the EU venture into peace, security and stability actions on the ground up to 6000 kilometres from Brussels?

Such a new thinking would also reduce arms trade and other profiteering from warfare by European companies. They would produce only what their own countries need.

Strengthen and expand the OSCE

No other governmental organisation has been so useful to confidence-building and tension-reduction in contemporary Europe. It has a machinery for conflict analysis, early warning and on-the-ground missions which, given its small size and resources, have done very impressive things. With all its members in the former Soviet Union and its basically civilian approach, it would be much more relevant to build peace with than the EU.

Strengthening the OSCE would also be EU's real gift to the UN, its peace-making capability and the norms of the Charter, whereas EU integration with NATO will not.

Nuclear Weapons Freedom and Nuclear Weapons-free Zones

As long as European states either possess nuclear weapons or participate in nuclear-based strategies and policies, there is no substance to the assertion that Europe is a peace project. Neither is it democratic. If government dared, they would let Europe's citizens participate in a referendum with a question such as: would you like your country to be defended by the use of nuclear weapons? It would hardly yield a 10 per cent in favour. As long as EU countries conduct nuclear policies, they also provide an excuse for nuclear threshold countries. Possession means proliferation; the solution is abolition.

Conflict – or Violence Risk Assessment

In the same way environmental assessment studies focus on the probable consequences for the environment of certain economic, technological and other policies, the EU could spearhead a similar development in the field of peace: to assess the risk for heightened tension, conflict behaviour and direct violence of EU policies and their likely effects within and outside the EU.

Reconciliation Institutes, East-West and North-South

It would be natural for Europe, a centre of humanism and Enlightenment, to focus more strongly on the human dimensions of conflict, war and peace. What would be more natural than setting up reconciliation research and action centres in places of conflict, inside the EU – say, in Serbia or Croatia, the Basque province, Kosovo, somewhere on the line that once made up the Iron Curtain?

What about an African-European effort to deal with the hurt and harm throughout history and how to make use of that in a constructive manner to help the African continent to finally rise to the position of an equal to Europe in cultural, economic, religious and many other ways.

What about a similar effort to bring peace-loving Palestinians and Israelis together in a long-term effort to focus on the human, socio-psychological, cultural and societal factors in that conflict? With a view to the future, it might be useful for Europeans to learn more about Islam, Arab culture and the ways of living throughout the Middle East and the Caucasian region.

C) Citizen's Peace Education, Tolerance and Reconciliation

People-to-People: EU and the World

One very good argument for the EU is that it helps bringing young people together and study abroad and thus promote international understanding. This is true, well and good. But intra-European understanding is already much better and easier than broader inter-cultural encounters. It is not enough to improve European-European understanding. In a globalising world it is actually provincialism. Better global understanding (and thus peace), requires many more programs that make it possible for young Europeans to meet, work with and do projects together with people from Africa, the Middle East, Arab, South America, the former Soviet Union, India, Asia etc. – and exchanging places to live for extended periods, mutual aid and not one-way.

Education in Peace, Conflict Analysis, Conflict – Resolution and non-violent Policies

If EU diplomats are increasingly to serve as conflict-managers, they will need education and training in the concepts and skills, just as they would for any other profession such as law, medicine or economics. The Peace Academy mentioned below may be one place, but EU universities could focus much more on these subjects and NGOs could also provide some of the training when they have practical as well as theoretical competence.

Let's assume that European youth and other citizens would be interested in general peace education and learning about other cultures, ways of thinking and the cultures of peace in order to navigate more smoothly in an internationalising, globalising world. The EU could set up a foundation with funds to enable international, national public and private schools and new experimenting peace schools and NGO universities to undertake a systematic peace education of the citizens.

The idea is not to have a special peace subject, it is to develop a peace perspective in all subjects, be it history, literature, culture, engineering or physics.

European media could be encouraged to report peace news, positive events, do reporting from the fields of peace. Radios stations could begin with a peace story in the morning, call-in programs with peace proposals to various big and small conflicts and we could watch peace competitions in the evening. TV could broadcast peace documentaries and have studio discussions about peace and development issues - all serving to heighten the awareness about world problems and sharpen the creativity toward solutions. And every free media would function as a blow-torch asking EU public figures what the EU does for peace and how peace is built into EU policies and programs.

A European Peace Academy

Perhaps to be seen as an umbrella institution for peace academies in various countries. A place where students, NGOs, officers and diplomats would come and work together and study peace, conflict-resolution, cultures of peace and non-violent theories and policies; a place where

academic publications would also be converted into popular writings and Internet dialogues with citizens anywhere.

Internet and other electronic resources could be utilised to create all-European and European-Third World mutual teaching programs, seminars, debates and skills training in everything related to violence-prevention and peace-making. It goes without saying also that new types of peace research institutes could mushroom, both in conflict-ridden regions and elsewhere, something like the New Nordic Peace Research Institute (actual as well as in virtual versions).

D) International Conflict-Management

A European Civilian Peace Corps, ECPC

The idea and a concrete proposal already exist in the EU Parliament. Apart from emphasising political, intellectual and civilian early warning and civilian conflict-management this proposal is an important evidence that alternatives do exist. The first priority of an ECPC will be conflict transformation of human-made crises, e.g., the prevention of violent conflict escalation and contribution towards conflict de-escalation. The ECPC's tasks will be exclusively civilian in nature. Special emphasis will be given to conflict prevention, because it is more humane and less costly in comparison with post-conflict reconstruction. The Corps might also take up humanitarian tasks following natural disasters. ECPC involvement should not be confined to a certain area (i.e. Europe).

It would be time to utilise the expertise and the human resources invested in most countries Civil Defence organisation and employ them in peacekeeping missions abroad. It is easy to imagine a EU Volunteer Service modelled upon that of the UN or something like the White Helmets proposed some years ago by Mexico. The International Peace Brigades already conduct important mission including accompaniment of, say, refugees to return to their homes.

NATO in a New Role

So, what about NATO, some would legitimately ask? Imagine it was stripped of everything but defence weapons and the extremely professional civilian and military staff were trained in civil defence, conflict-management and non-violence. Imagine NATO's sophisticated intelligence systems were put to serve early warning and monitoring of peace plans and cease-fires. Imagine its transport capacity was oriented towards bringing in humanitarian aid, conduct rescue operations in areas where natural catastrophes happen and assisting in bringing in all it takes to rebuild war-torn societies? It could even fight drugs and criminality.

If you can bring soldiers to anywhere in the world with heavy equipment and sustain them in battle for months, you can do almost anything you want to also protect people, to go between conflict parties and help them restore normality if war has anyhow happened. In short, NATO as a defensive alliance, able to do humanitarian work better and faster than any other and a peacekeeper alongside with the UN: not such a bad option for proud and competent NATO officers. I guess they would rather do that than plan nuclear weapons and local wars if they were given a choice by decision-makers in their democratic countries.

An increasingly important dimension is to look at latent conflicts which are far from violent at the moment and therefore more easy to handle. It may be social groups, language communities, minorities in potential conflict with central governments, increasing racism and xenophobia - which are increasingly manifest phenomena throughout Europe causing violent incidents.

Positive Examples – Conflict Consortiums – Local Expertise

Yet another would be to disseminate information about examples/cases of viable conflict-resolution, big and small – such as the Trento Province, the Åland Islands, and Schleswig-Holstein.

- Establish conflict consortiums in EU countries - small organisations where area experts, former humanitarian and other field workers, NGOs and diplomats come together and asses the risk of violence and conflicts in selected areas and give advise to their governments and the international community as to what can be done to prevent violence.
- Europe is full of people from conflict regions, e.g. people from the Balkans or Somalia. They could offer important input to the question: how shall we understand conflicts in their countries and what is wise and not wise to do, given the local culture: how will various attempts to help solve a conflict be viewed with the eyes of the others?

In short, there are no limits to what could be done to create a more peaceful EU on the road to a non-killing Europe.

Towards A Non-Killing Europe?

Europe has fought enough wars for decades and centuries. In a historical perspective, Europe has created colonial and economic violence historically elsewhere. European countries still exploit, marginalize and profit on the misery of others. The epoch in which we live is a golden opportunity to draw the only relevant conclusion: violence must be reduced and wars abolished. We must finally find new, more intelligent ways to deal with our conflicts. Europe could lead the way in this global, civilisational change process. It is nothing but the highest goal stated as the United Nations Charter. Europe must become a non-war zone.

One of the world's leading scholars on non-violence, Glenn Paige, uses the term nonkilling to describe the norms and policies of a new development for peace. If we apply Paige's nonkilling concept to Europe, it would have the following characteristics:

- First, there is no killing of European by European, and no threats to kill;
- Second, there is no killing of Europeans by foreigners – and no threats to kill;
- Third, there is no killing or threats to kill by Europeans of foreigners;
- Fourth, there are no weapons for killing targeted by Europeans against each other, by foreigners against Europeans or by Europeans against foreigners;
- Fifth, there are no ideological doctrines – political, religious, military, economic, legal, customary, or academic – that provide permissions for Europeans to kill Europeans, for foreigners to kill Europeans or for Europeans to kill foreigners;
- Sixth, there are no conditions of European society(ies) – political, economic, social and cultural &endash; or relationships between Europeans and foreigners that can only be maintained or changed by threat or use of killing force.

The EU is not Europe, it's one actor in Europe. Choose the largest definition of Europe in your discussions and ask: is a nonkilling Europe possible? If not, why not? If yes, why - and how? And then ask: how can the EU lead the way and become a nonkilling EU? What must we do if the EU turns out to promote a killing rather than a nonkilling Europe in years and decades to

come? In short, what is the nonkilling and killing capacity of the EU now and in the future? And what is the nonkilling and killing capacity of all that Europe which is not the EU?

We need thousands of informed dialogues all over Europe, broad scope and many levels. But I do not think we need a new (peace) movement that states only what it is against or lobbying NGOs whose N stands for Near-Governmental since all they seek are minor changes within the government agenda without presenting independent alternatives to it.

In a contrasting play on words, we need NPOs: government which are Near-Peoples Organisations (NPOs) but not governments which are Non-Peoples Organisations. The dialogues about security, conflict-resolution, peace and development must be tuned to the needs of the 21st century and not the 20th which was the most violent in human history.

So, 32 proposals for a peaceful, nonkilling Europe. Scrap some, elaborate on others, produce many more yourself – and ask decision-makers why such things are not on their agenda. For the sake of democracy and peace!

Jan Oberg
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Stable Peace or Secure Peace?

Daniel N. Nelson

What Peace Is Not

We had a bad decade. The 1990s, and well into 2000, were bloody awful. Post-Cold War wars, savage mass killing rampages, rape as an instrument of war, and the diffusion of technologies for weapons of mass destruction were just a few of the global epitaphs of this fin d'siecle.

However, would we have known peace if it were at hand? Like the blind men and the elephant, we often erroneously identify peace from transient and partial encounters with some vague form of quiescence or stability. Many times, we infer that conditions should be labelled as "peace" from incomplete observation when, in fact, we're dealing with something quite different.

We can be sure, however, that peace is not many things. Indeed, peace is not what we too often think it ought to be.

Peace is not the aftermath of war. Policing the battlefield and cleaning up carnage - these are activities to which the world community assigns UN blue helmets or, by default, non-governmental organisations with charitable or humanitarian identity. Everywhere combatants have fought in the late 20th century, multilateral institutions and private voluntary organisations rushed in when guns fell silent and, sometimes, even while fighting continued. Hundreds of these deployments have now occurred, involving huge financial and personnel commitments.

Unfortunately, such roles do not evoke settlement or quiescence, but suggest the melancholy prelude to later retribution. IFOR and KFOR do not implement "peace", but rather create a cessation of hostilities between combatants while mass graves are located, infrastructure rebuilt, and critical services restored. Unless accompanied by a vigorous enforcement of justice and assiduous efforts to distribute equitably the resources for reconstruction, war's aftermath is nothing more than a time when humiliation and resentment build into a yearning for retribution and revenge.[1]

Peacekeepers almost never keep the peace; they often arrive following hostilities, or the cessation of war. They count the dead and assess the destruction, having prevented neither. Peacekeepers maintain stalemate; they do not generate or ensure peace.[2] Peacekeeping fails, in one sense, because we have no real peacekeepers – and, by the time we act, there is no longer any peace to keep. Further, absent dedicated forces for peacekeeping, we send in troops trained for war to define, demarcate, and enforce peace. At individual and small unit levels, they often acquit themselves well and strive for the best outcomes. Still, the mismatch between means and ends are palpable. Tanks intimidate but make bad diplomats and lousy peacekeeping instruments; they make deep ruts in the roads, but have superficial and temporary effects on efforts to ensure peace. When military peacekeepers withdraw, the status quo ante quickly reasserts itself.

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[1] A synthesis of literature evoking such a motif is Robert E. Harkavy's "Defeat, National Humiliation and the Revenge Motif in International Politics", International Politics, Vol. 37, No. 3 (September 2000).

[2] See Laura Neack and Roger M. Knudson, "The Multiple Meanings and Purposes of Peacekeeping in Cyprus", International Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December 1999).

Once the parades are over and the floats have been stored away, the making of peace is quite separate from winning battles. Peace is not post-"victory". Defeating the Germans and Japanese in World War II still required a lengthy "cold war" of global competition. Although defeated militarily, neither Saddam Hussein nor Slobodan Milošević lost politically in the near-term. Formal or de facto, states of war persist long after military victories seem to have been won. High levels of military tension, coupled with intense political confrontation, follow indecisive wars - in the Korean peninsula, in Kashmir and around the world.

Peace is surely not stasis, since that might mean confusing peace with lengthy and stultifying regimes — a Zhivkov's Bulgaria, Ceaucescu's Romania, Duvalier's Haiti, Stroessner's Paraguay, and the Shah in Iran. Amid such stasis, violent death may be rare, but public suffering can be endemic. In Ceaucescu's twenty-five year dictatorship, he may have ordered few killings – but he certainly made millions of Romanians so miserable that they wanted to die.[3]

Stagnation is no worthy peace, although it may have distinct advantages for those who are most powerful. The benefits of such pseudo-peace for a narrow stratum can be gauged; as stasis continues, inequalities grow, and sinecures of power become filled more and more by familial loyalists or ideological sycophants.

Regime and policy stagnation, however, typically will not ensure complete or endless domestic tranquillity. Communist regimes or other authoritarian systems are not immune from the emergence of trade union movements coupled with intellectual dissent (e.g. Solidarity in Poland) which are an outgrowth of social and economic strife. Once unleashed, such domestic conflict within and beneath a superstructure of "stagno-stability" can lead to fundamental political change.[4] Stasis qua stagnation is inherently superficial, and always impermanent.

Peace is, likewise, not stability. Again, the immobilisme or pseudo change designed to ensure that no shift is radical, no innovation is severe, and no revolution is revolutionary could presage an end to peace, not its assurance. Many systems that appear to establish long-term stability exhibit repeated and episodic reforms, restructuring and retooling. New constitutions, new cabinets, and new elections revamp institutions, rewrite laws, and recycle political personalities, all without changing much more than cosmetics. No violence, minimal upheaval, sans turmoil- – if it walks like peace and sounds like peace, must it be peace? But, rather like Potemkin villages, it is a stability façade … with the sights and sounds of quiescence and gradualism concealing a backstage of festering, unattended turmoil.

Anyone who has lived through personal relationships in which tensions, consciously or unconsciously, are contained or suppressed knows that the catharsis of conflict can be a route to lasting peace. As long as it is not mutually destructive, conflict is not a danger to be forever avoided. Peace ought not be seen solely or primarily as the absence of conflict. Genuine peace may require running the gauntlet of conflict. Emerging on the other side of cathartic conflict, obstacles towards democracy, market and security may have been eliminated or pushed out of the way. Risky, perhaps – but probably far better than waiting and assuming that leaders and regimes such as in Serbia will moderate, behave and respond to positive inducement.

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[3] Regarding the Romanian case of destructive stagnation, see Daniel N. Nelson, "The Romanian Disaster", in Zoltan Barany and Ivan Volgyes, Legacies of Communism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 198-226.

[4] I was reminded of this conflictual undercurrent within the superstructure of stagno-stability by my colleague, Dr. Andrzej Karkoszka, former deputy defense minister of Poland.

Indeed, containment of conflict is never peace because it implies acceptance of low-level, geographically or temporally limited disputes. Unresolved and unreconciled, contained conflicts are the raw material for a later infectious spread of a far more lethal turmoil.

Managing crises should likewise not be confused with peaceful conditions. Whether entirely national or political, or complex and international, the intensity and peril of crises evoke the potential for catastrophe. When authorities fail during crises, internal violence may arise out of desperation, while external violence is invited against a demonstrably weak state. But, even "successful" crisis managers do not resolve, fix or make crises permanently go away.

When states are not at war, they may not be at peace. The absence of inter-state war, so often coded as "peace" in data sets of so-called "liberal peace" research, may contain fulsome attempts to harm other states. Such attempts include covert means, embargoes, denial of credits and investments, or other steps to weaken, subvert or foment internal conflict. Proxy war also belies the dyad focus of liberal peace literature; the USSR and US did not go to war against each other, but fought (via proxies) in Angola, Afghanistan, Nicaragua and in many other locales. Soviet and American policy was often and clearly directed towards harming the welfare of each other.

Confusing Stability and Security

Our definitions of peace, then, are wanting. For regions plagued by incessant conflict in recent years – areas of the former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, Central Africa, and other locales – these mistaken notions of what might be peace sustainable over time lead us to pursue false hopes and distant horizons.

At the core of these conceptual failings lies a confusion of stability with security.

Donors' have, as of spring 2000, committed almost $2.3 billion for projects collected under the rubric of the "Balkan Stability Pact" – the German-developed idea, endorsed at the Sarajevo Summit in July 1999. While most of these monies are not new, and the amount is paltry given the needs after a decade of conflict, the Pact and its donations evince Western guilty and fearful reaction to wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, plus state failure in Albania and precarious existence in Macedonia.

The Balkan Stability Pact is a typical shell game introduced by the casualty-adverse, deployment-exhausted countries of NATO. It is an effort to buy stability cheaply and to substitute stasis or quiescence for balancing threats and capacities.

The problem with this approach is clear: trying to create stability when there is no security is a formula for unsustainable peace. Peace that accompanies mere stability is unlikely to outlast that which precludes movement, motion, or change. Realistically, when troops like IFOR and KFOR leave, the lid will blow because a secure peace does not exist.

Real security, where a dynamic balance between threats and capacities exists, may first require substantial instability. The old may need to be uprooted, and the catharsis of social upheaval may be necessary to excise threats. In a region such as Southeast Europe, the elimination of an aggressive nationalism and the removal of leaders that utilise such ideologies to reinforce their own hold on power cannot be accomplished if "stability" is one's principal criterion.

Sustainable peace has been illusive; we obtain cease-fires, separate combatants, occupy and distribute humanitarian aid – but we nurture few of the sinews needed with which to hold, consolidate or institutionalise peace. Besides poor definitions, what is wrong?

Obtaining "sustainable" peace, in the first instance, is a low, low standard. That we may be able to reach conditions absent overt violence in regions where war has been waged, and may be able to continue such non-conflictual conditions for an extended period, is a weak substitute for a secure peace. Sustainability connotes tending and managing. More and more management. More "stability".

And, this is the problem. By setting low standards and wrong standards, we seek a kind of peace in the Balkans and in other volatile regions that is little more than a myth.

A Secure Peace?

A truly **secure peace** vis-à-vis stable or sustainable peace acknowledges, first, the nature of security – a dynamic balance between threats and capacities. Building armies, joining alliances, or expanding economies are capacity-focused and only part of the story.

Peace grounded in a capacity-focused strategy is unsustainable. An ample, and longstanding literature exists on the "security dilemma" – whereby one's own efforts to gain more capacities to ensure security generates others' efforts to protect themselves from your strengths with their own heightened capacities. We can be confident that peace qua capacities to protect, enforce and deter is a non-peace.

But, a **secure peace** must be sought differently. The same balance inevitably requires attention to abating threats – reducing external peril through negotiation, arbitration, disarmament, confidence building measures while vigorous internal efforts are made to provide justice, employment, and health. Where ambient threat is reduced, fewer capacities are needed, a balance more easily obtained, and opportunities for democratic development enhanced.

We have neglected or avoided creating mechanisms for threat abatement. Aspects of the Organisation for Security and Cupertino in Europe (OSCE), such as the High Commissioner for National Minorities, provide a small (but welcome) contribution to the notion of early warning of impending conflicts, and a low-overhead effort to defusing tensions among ethnic groups. In combination with an army of non-governmental organisations, and the norms established by the Council of Europe, OSCE and other organisations, an emerging regime of minority protections may be, slowly, reducing the incidence and severity of "ethnic conflict".[5]

Still, these are ad hoc, jerry-rigged efforts - not permanent, well-oiled mechanisms. Dependent on the forbearance of great powers, and the finances of benevolent or guilt-ridden governments, such threat-abatement enterprises cannot stem the tide alone.

That security requires a dynamic balance between threats and capacities is the first and foremost step in obtaining lasting peace. To assume that peace can be obtained via greater strength alone, or through Munich-like capitulation to potential peace-breakers, ignores the quality of dynamic balance. Raising capacities generates the same response from others, while a Chamberlainesque declaration of "peace in our time" will be effective only until the ink dries.

Recognising that peace is best gained through security, and security held only via a balance between threats and capacities, are logical constructs in the framework that must guide our approach to crises from the Baltic to Balkans and Central Europe to Central Asia.

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[5] See Ted Robert Gurr, "Ethnic Conflict", Foreign Affairs (May-June, 2000).

Another Bad Decade?

These are the lessons of post-Yugoslav wars, and especially the 1999 warfare in and around Kosovo. With insistent repetition, and horrendous consequences, we thought capacities would deter heinous behaviour, and then waited for capacities to end conflicts, and for capacities to generate renewed “peace”. We warned of dire consequences, bombed, and then occupied. Nevertheless, raw materials for conflict remained and, perhaps, were made worse. That such an approach was desperately wrong is now, hundreds of thousands of deaths later, evident.

We should have learned that minimalist approaches are the worst. **Secure peace,** which is the only sustainable peace, can be obtained solely by transiting rough waters - by going through the unstable and perilous times in order to eradicate the root cause of aggression, inhumanity, and threat. Such a **secure peace** is not likely to be the product of waiting until political winds rationalise intervention, and then only in a limited fashion. Further, nothing that is sustainable will be found with a capacity-driven approach alone. Separating combatants, keeping the "lid on", and minimising casualties usually ignore that post-conflict reconstruction will just be bricks and mortar unless guns are collected, crimes prevented, health care and other services begun anew, and war criminals apprehended.

Peace, in other words, follows from security - not stability. Security, in turn, comes from a combination of threat abatement and a timely use of capacities. Where there is no effort to reduce long-term threats, and a reluctance vigorously to commit capacities when available, no **secure peace** will ever be found. Unfortunately, that is precisely where we stand in regions such as the Balkans. It may be another very bad decade.

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Human Security in Southeast Europe: Just a Vanguard Rhetoric or a Genuine Ride for Security for All

Minna Nikolova

This essay is an attempt to explore uncertainties and convictions about long and widely manipulated Southeast European security issues which many unconsciously share. The paper is an initial observation which will hopefully put the beginning of a more comprehensive study on issues related to possibilities for enhancing human security in SEE. The main assertion of this work is that security can only be attained and grasped if the well-being of the humans is put in its centre. Modern and not so modern security concepts and ideas with sole state-cantered roundabouts are incomplete, misleading and overly perilous.

I. The Human Security definitions passageway

In May 2000, an exhibition "War or Peace" was opened in the ancient castle in Stadt-schlaining, Austria (also known as "the town of peace" - Friedensstadt). This exhibition had an exceptional task to display not only war and conflict but peace as well. Soon, however, the curators of the exhibition realised that the existence of peace is so natural and intelligible that they were short of artistic means to depict and show what it really is. Peace indeed, seemed to be a dynamic "harmony of tensions" which the creative human impulses could not delimit to a museum hall.

One of the sections in the exhibition was the so called Red Couch room. It was not fancily decorated – few huge pictures on the walls, a computer with some questions and a red couch which has travelled around the globe since 1975 and has hosted for interviews more than 16 000 people. Among those interviewed were homeless people, Chechen warriors, Peter Gabriel, Gorbachev, a Roma musicians family and many others (the project is ongoing). All of them were asked 16 standardised questions (What makes you feel (un)happy? What is the worst thing you have done, what is the worst thing that has happened to you, etc.) and their answers recorded and analysed.

The faster and further the project was developing, the more the Belgian photographer who started it as an arty eccentricity was convinced that behind the photo lenses, the Gallery of Mankind was in its making as a prove that at the launch of the 21st century geographical distance, cultural particularities, educational background and life experiences cannot impede all humans share some commonalties. Those common features were mainly expressed in terms of shared basic needs of food, shelter, safety and the fruitful milieu for the accomplishment of everyone's human potential; in other words, the thread underpinning the human security concept.

The human security idea emerged in the environs of a gigantic and disastrous human insecurity for many people around the globe whose simple desires voiced were to bring to a halt the main sources of haphazard violence and enduring scarcity of life basics. And indeed, the accumulated insecurity and fear have driven the willingness to change the rhetoric, the focus and the way the security issues are addressed. The human being acquired the focal standing in the security discourse to transform the sterile state security-cantered discussions to a more humanised and all-encompassing dialogue on human security.

In the Millennium Report of the UN, Secretary General Kofi Annan, human security concerns found expression in two phrases: freedom from fear and freedom from want for all human beings which encapsulate the merit of the started anew security discourse by focusing on the human dimension. Consequently, this mainly diplomatic change of rhetoric has brought about a change in the numerous interpretations of the meaning of security or rather a novel approach to broadening the concept to include as its primary concern the human well being what should have naturally found its place in the security discourse long ago. The

spotlight on the human being as well as the comprehensiveness of the human security approach is opening new facets for a security-related discussion.

In the Human Development Report of 1994, the ideas of human development and human security as well as the link between them were articulated for the first time even though the underlying sagacity has been implied for a long time. These two concepts were defined and related to bring a circle of ideas together and urge new rhetoric and verbal manifestations for changing the discussion itinerary which has been followed through military-invented solid and unyielding security doctrines. The 1994 Human Development Report stated that "human development is a broader concept - a process of widening the range of people's choices. Human security means that people can exercise those choices safely and freely – and that they can be fairly confident that the opportunities they have today will not be lost tomorrow." (p. 23)

The broadening of choices and the generation of more alternatives is certainly craved for by millions of humans locked into the impasse of dehumanising poverty, unmanageable conflicts, seemingly unbreakable criminalized societal weaves, insufficient and inequitably distributed resources, environment degradation as well as the overall incapacitation of realising one's human potential. The accent on expansion of human choices and their sustainability over time reveals unmistakably a strive for empowerment and enhanced human security. Moreover, the multi-faceted nature of human life and needs has also been reflected in the concept of human security which accommodates a variety of different aspects.

The broad approach which human security discourse endorses moves along two major tenets: "Safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression and the protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life - whether in homes, in jobs or communities." All that makes us feel safe and secure as human beings and what gives us the feeling of being protected and not in danger is the pivotal core of the human security idea. All which supports a human living in dignity and safety, non-violent conflict transformation and conflict prevention, protection of the children's well being and empowering environment for equitable human progress is complementing the defining of human security.

The Human Development Report of 1999 went a step further and classified the threats to human security in seven major categories: economic insecurity, food insecurity, health insecurity, personal insecurity, environmental insecurity, community and cultural insecurity, political insecurity. All these threats to human security are recognised as intertwined and interdependent. They form the realm of the negative definition of human security as the absence of all those threats while the positive way of defining human security is as presence, respect and fulfilment of the whole pallet of human rights as elaborated in the Bill of Rights. The categories of threats listed in the 1999 Human Development Report also show that arguments in terms of state security vs. human security which are the most widely spread misunderstanding of the concept lack cogency and validity since a genuine state security can only be achieved by means of successfully addressing human security concerns.

Human security should be seen as an indispensable element of complementarity to state security within the traditional security discourse, for state security's utmost goal should not be protecting the state's citizens against external aggression or military attack but rather catering for an intra and inter-state environment of comfort and safety for all. Probably, the comprehensive term, the Commission on Global Governance put three sets of security issues together: people's security, state security, and the security of the planet. Whichever of the terms is employed however, the bearer of the right to existence which immediately implies a guarantee to safety and security is the human being. A state cannot denote itself a secure state with insecure and unsafe individuals inhabiting it. Providing for the security of borders and relying on security notions based on territoriality and sovereignty only is not and cannot be a sound security compound due to the rising non-traditional threats to security today.

The addressing of those non-conventional threats to security will bring about the human state in which choices can really be exercised freely and safely and a state in which a human can enjoy his/her human existence in dignity and equality. If the rights elaborated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are lived through by humans, not excluding the human obligations they generate, some human wrongs in SEE could have been avoided.

II. The Human (In)Security in SEE

Split and artificially bordered, misunderstood and entangled, the Balkan states are coming into fashion these days. War and peace, conflict and reconciliation in black and white are being explained and lightened by people who never ever put their feet in Southeast Europe. Interestingly enough, the claimed "Balkan expertise" from the outside develops with such a velocity that both Balkan audio-visual and literary markets sections are flourishing.

Ethnicity, cultural and religious differences are frequently being exploited to shed light on the complexities the Balkans face; however, rarely an intellectual sharpness and cognition is the accompaniment of the discussion about SEE actualities. Balkan stereotypes and self-fulfilling prophecies are easily sold through the global media market to the world audience. Only the similarities and commonalties extracted from the Balkan context, which fit well the Western tradition and ways are emphasised as an "island of civility" and hope for betterment of "this misconstrued region". The change is, however, predicated on the interaction of the different elements manufacturing or manipulating the region's cultural specificities and conflict-prevention aptitudes both within and outside a distinct cultural context as well as the inherent capacities of every cultural milieu to transform (mostly its periphery) but further develop and enrich its core.

Within the confines of the Balkan nation-states, one can encounter a variegated heritage of cultural diversity due to its tremendous concentration in a relatively small territory. The distribution of apparently similar characteristics is nothing more than a dispersion of identical culturally-bound or driven communities within the borders of different states. Modern history of the region and particularly the traits left over by the Ottoman Empire have shaped quite a level of commonalties which are fervently rejected by the nation-states due to the threats they might pose to their security, i.e. their existence and wholeness. Being neglected though, those common features have devitalised and the systematically manifested differences reinforced by the ideology of over-emphasising them as factors of division and separatist spins gained precedence.

Those imagined pre-fabricated divisions and splits have been quickly exploited and turned into a background for escalating conflicts, highly creeping hatred and unbearability easily transferred into fanatic inter-cultural repulsion. The markers for division, especially during the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, most often referred to were religion, ethnic affiliation, gender, and incompatibility of values deriving from those fundamental differences. There has been no anthropologically-driven, or behavioural patterns-driven, open public discourse on what has kept all these "different people" together for such a long period of time and how those so tremendously differing cultures were coexisting peacefully. When ideas aiming at discovering the broader context of similarities and differences and what purported their violent expression were endeavoured upon, there was a scientific blockage and inability to reach reconciliation of competing claims.

One of the major challenges when Balkan security is being discussed is the misrepresentation of the dynamics of the processes which weave the region's culture-fabrics. At any point of time, when analysis is attempted, the process is being reduced for the purpose of analysis to its outcomes which can be measured. The tendency to visualise the lack of security, to turn its detrimental consequences as needed and capitalise on them was widely taken advantage of during the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. The neighbours were watching

the horror stories fearful and kept on wondering as to where the conception of antagonism and repugnance is born and emerges from and how humans mutilated so much as to bring about the violence and the destruction which tortured for a decade the peninsula. The Balkan security-insecurity melange was always underlined by the West as a the lack of ripeness and competence of local and regional structures (implied-local uncivilised cultures) to resolve their inherent and inherited conflicts but it is much deeper indeed.

The demonstrations and the illustrations of rising human insecurity in every SEE country abound today. The sources of this insecurity differ from state to state and they are not only to be ascribed to Milošević or other authoritarian regimes, inter-ethnic clashes and incompatibility of cultures. The sense of insecurity more intensely derives from quite non-conventional threats to security like organised crime, terrorism, drug trafficking and abuse, environmental degradation and pollution, social and economic insecurity as well as a chronic inability to handle intra-societal conflicts in a non-violent way. The lack of trust between different communities locked within the borders of the same state as well as the lack of will and perspectives those communities see for mutual co-existence turn these days to be the biggest challenges.

Rising social insecurity, suffocating unemployment rates and poverty delimiting the choices of many people in the region, combined with a future amputated by mines in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo are forming a new collage of unpredictable tension clusters.

Another extremely strong indicator of growing human insecurity in SEE is the constant outflow of people from the region, especially young people. In a recently convened meeting between representatives of all Austrian Universities with representatives of the universities in Serbia and Montenegro, the newly appointed acting Rector of the Belgrade University said that more than 400 000 young people have left the FRY for the last 10 years. The situation is not any better in Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and is particularly frightful in BiH.

The brain drain issue is closely related to transition and reform processes in the region whose main goals are reinstating political, social and economic stability at the SEE societies at large. The outflow of people is a consequence to a high degree of social and economic insecurities as well as the discernible lack of choices and perspectives those people see at home. In ten to fifteen years the region will be short of quite a few of its human resources and the social fabrics will be detrimentally affected unless in the meantime the anchors are found to bring back those people by enhancing their human security.

III. Viable strategies for enhancing human security

Let me name a few strategies but core ones: education, better use of the new information and communication technologies, and regional functional integration.

Education is presumably an instrument of popular democratic empowerment and a strategy for enhancing human development and hence human security. However, when addressing issues with strategic, long-term implications, education is rarely given the priority which it deserves. The record for investment in the field of education as compared to defence and arms production is meagre. Nothing new but recording this as statistics from year to year does not bring about real changes. Obviously, a more pro-active approach to stronger lobbying for larger investments for education has to be embarked upon. The SEE regional education networks have to be more actively supported; there should be a serious passageway built between education and employment in the region and the younger generation accepted to the labour market more willingly and vigorously. Through various policy mechanisms, these much needed links can be assured and put into force. This is not short-term planning but a long-run strategy whose implementation will bring about genuine transformations at a later stage.

Inter-cultural education with no tendencies of selective memories and glorious reminiscences of the past has to finally find its way in the formal educational curricula in the region. The type of learning most needed today is anticipatory and not learning from disasters and catastrophes. Learning combined with better usage of the new information and communication technologies for promoting tolerance and understanding should also be accelerated and the infrastructure and technical development in the region supported more actively. Also, matters of connectivity and accessibility of the new technological advances cannot be taken for granted in SEE but their availability needs to be mindfully upheld.

Last but not least, cross-border functional integration which increases the vested interest in co-operative activities rather than hostilities has to be urged. Functional integration is an old mechanism for enhancing security in different clusters of activities. The Stability Pact is a good illustration of such an attempt to put regional focus and functional, area-specific integration ahead by creating value networks capable of addressing and resolving conflicts at their genesis. However, the Stability Pact is still a disperse series of activities in key areas but the links between these areas are hardly established. The lack of viable overall funding strategy turns the Stability Pact into scattered attempts of addressing issues of importance in SEE. Hopefully, this initiative will soon start bearing the sustainability mark.

The multi-dimensionality of the human security concept which goes far beyond the traditional state security notion is a good face-saving strategy to talk about many things. The human security idea puts in the centre of the security debate the HUMAN being and is thus closely linked to the ideals and aspirations for full-fledged human rights protection as expressed and endorsed through all international and regional human rights instruments.

Discussing the security, peace and stability in Southeast Europe has to take a due consideration of the possibilities for enhancing the prevention of violence against persons, organised crime, terrorism, pollution, trafficking in human beings, corruption and the detrimental cross border effects of them. Those non-conventional threats to security have to constitute the core of the discussion of a new European and more particularly Southeast European security agenda for the years to come. The achievement of freedom from fear and freedom from want as the strategic agenda for the further development of mankind is a move closer to the juncture of providing for "the basic infrastructure for human survival" (Ambassador Walter Lichem).

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The Last Best Hope: Stabilisation Prospects for Macedonia

P. H. Liotta

> The Macedonian question has been the cause of every great European war for the last fifty years, and until that is settled there will be no more peace either in the Balkans or out of them. Macedonia is the most frightful mix-up of races ever imagined. Turks, Albanians, Greeks and Bulgarians live there side by side without mingling – and have lived so since the days of St. Paul.
> John Reed,
>
> The War in Eastern Europe, 1916
> In this part of the world it is difficult to find the true path between reason and emotion, myth and reality. This is the burden of the Balkans, which prevents us from becoming truly European.
> Kiro Gligorov

In 1996, the first U.S. ambassador to Macedonia toured a household appliance factory soon after his arrival in country. Five years after the nation's independence from the former Yugoslavia, the factory's director asked the ambassador, "Do you think we will make it?" The factory, located in the poorest of the former Yugoslav republics, was a decrepit monstrosity designed to service the now lost Yugoslav market and was one of at least a dozen in Macedonia that the World Bank had insisted be either closed permanently or sold. As the ambassador stepped into the courtyard, he responded gently, "Well, if you get that electrical motor contract in Turkey... ." The factory director interrupted to correct the misunderstanding: "No," he said, "I mean the country. Do you think Macedonia will make it?"

In some ways, the more perverse response would still have been, however, "Well, if you get that electrical motor contract in Turkey... ." Indeed, Macedonia's precarious existence ever since its declaration of independence in 1991 has largely been based on conditions – political, ethnic, social, economic – that extend from outside borders as much as internal dynamics within the nation. And, while Macedonia is seemingly well understood as a precarious example of potential Balkan instability, the tiniest nation in Southeast Europe is also a poorly understood success. In the broadest terms, Macedonia is characterised in the "Western" as a nation where the nationalist party, VMRO, sometimes ruthlessly suppresses the Albanian minority and aggravates tensions between ethnic Albanians and Slavic Macedonians. Nothing, in reality, could be further than the truth – but the perception of the "West" is, unfortunately, far more important than reality. The task to challenge and to reverse this perception may well come to represent the major security issue for Macedonia in the future. The perception embedded in the John Reed epigraph for this brief presentation is, in truth, a distortion; sadly, many analysts and even some policy makers believe it to be true.

I am constantly reminded, for example, of how largely ignorant Americans and Europeans (from outside the Balkans) are of Macedonia. A perhaps frivolous example from "pop" history illustrates this ignorance. A popular television game show in the U.S. recently posed as its prize – winning question the following: "Boris Trajkovski was recently elected as president of what Southeast European nation?" It seems notable that none of the game contestants answered the question correctly; none of them, in truth, even bothered to hazard a guess.

Yet Macedonia seems, in many ways, the most shining and positive example to rise from the ashes of former Yugoslavia. And, despite the obvious evidence to the contrary, reports of Macedonia's death have been greatly exaggerated. The challenges to accentuate the positive, and deal with the negative, will remain over the next decade.

One may thus realise, with some irony, both how blessed and how cursed the Republic of Macedonia remained throughout the 1990s. On the one hand, this tiny nation-state escaped, narrowly perhaps, the vicious cycles of destruction that consumed Croatia in 1991, Bosnia in 1992, Kosovo in 1999, and to some extent never relented in the continuing self-destruction of Serbs and Serbia throughout the last decade of the twentieth century. On the other hand, Macedonia has had to suffer through benign and intentional neglect from both Balkan neighbours and the so-called international community ever since its 1991 declaration of independence.

Slighted with the label of the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" from the earliest days of its existence, this state has managed to achieve small measures of political, social, economic, and even inter-ethnic integration. In the Balkans – or in the wider and more euphemistic context of "Southeast Europe" by which the Balkans is commonly known – this seems a near impossibility. Unlike Bosnia, Macedonia has received little infrastructure support or massive international assistance. Equally, bloodshed in the form of conflict outbreak and ethnic cleansing on a large scale has not, to date, occurred in the region.

Predictions in the Balkans, even more so than elsewhere, are a foolish enterprise. But given the limited time for this presentation and the more pressing need within this conference to engender a wide discussion, I would offer the following observations masked as recommendations for future direction:

Macedonia Will Always be Defined by "The Other."

Distasteful as the truth may be, Macedonia owes perhaps a debt of gratitude to Slobodan Milosevic. If not for his ruthless machinations and manoeuvrings, Macedonia may well have lacked the drive and the passion to seek independence. If not for the clumsy manoeuvrings and often ruthless machinations of the former Serbian leader, the amount of international support for Macedonia's independence and continued success would have been even smaller than it was. Thus, Macedonia's identity will likely continue to be defined by relations with other states that surround her. Whether we speak of Kosovo or Serbia at large, Greece, Bulgaria, or Albania, Macedonia – a land-locked country – must gracefully manoeuvre a path through difficult waters.

The Need to Establish Milestones for Determining Economic Progress and Promoting Achievements.

The sad truth, of course, is that it took war in Kosovo before renewed assistance would be offered in any significant amount to Macedonia. As with Bosnia, the tragedy of a neighbour’s agony provided another form of salvation both for the Macedonian people and for the viability of her continued existence as a state. Until 1999, again unlike Bosnia, the presence of UN forces in the area paled in comparison to the wide latitude of authority and responsiveness that NATO and SFOR (Stabilisation Force) exercised in post-Dayton Bosnia. The Balkan Stability Pact – known more formally as the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe – signed by Macedonia in June 1999, provided the opportunity for both economic and significant material assistance to this struggling nation. The pact thus provides provide a measure of hope, albeit however small, for the future republic of Macedonia. Yet no effective milestones exist, as part of a formal process, to demonstrate how the Stability Pact itself falls farther and farther behind in implementing the change it was originally intended to stimulate.

The Necessity to Create an Effective Public Relations Program, a long-term Vision, and a Definitive Strategy.

Macedonia must establish effective communication links to promote her identity, interests, and strategy for the future. To date, most especially in relation to recent crises, Macedonia continues to be "defined by the other" player in the political dynamic. Perhaps just as crucial as establishing a sound economic base, the need for promoting Macedonia's political identity is critical for competing interests in the expanding and transforming Europe. If Macedonia has serious intention to eventually become part of the European Union – and it should be clear that this is a long-term goal – then an effective and clear communication of the nation's intent to become included, rather than continually excluded, must be part of the long-term vision.

A Pragmatic Policy that Seeks Wider Support for Contributions Already Made and Yet to Come.

Macedonia received obvious neglect from the "West" during the years of her early independence. Treated largely as a staging area for NATO operations both prior to, during, and after the Kosovo engagement of 1999, it remained unclear how firm the "West's" security, economic, and even political commitments to Macedonia's future success were. Such ambiguity, while providing the "West" with a means to escape culpability, also invoked an inevitable bitterness in the Macedonians themselves. Saso Ordanoski, former editor of the Macedonian Forum magazine and normally an optimistic Balkan observer, remarked grimly in 1999 that Macedonia was forced to end up paying the bill for Serbia's injustice against Kosovo's Albanians. In the end, he added, if NATO countries had used only a small proportion of what they had spent on bombs to modernise Macedonia and other Balkan countries, the region would have had a far chance not only for integration but for survival as well. (The Economist 1999, 52).

Resist Accommodation Based on Ethnic Differences.

Macedonia is the last genuinely multi-ethnic state in the Balkans. For some, this suggests the impossibility of her continued existence. Cynics, often with no Balkan experience or knowledge, can be quite brutal in their ideas and so-called resolutions. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Van Evera, for example, suggest that:

If the Slavs refuse to share more equally with the Albanians, violence is inevitable. To forestall this, NATO should consider calling for a plebiscite to determine whether the Albanians want to remain in Macedonia. If not, Macedonia should also be partitioned. This is feasible because the Albanians of Macedonia are concentrated in western Macedonia, next to Kosovo and Albania. (New York Times, 19 April 1999)

Such a "solution" is flawed by internal contradictions. Why NATO should violate its own standard of avowed post-conflict neutrality and take on the role of mandating plebiscites, normally the role of institutions such as the OSCE, is unclear. Why Albanians of western Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania itself should be aligned with (read, "partitioned") into a community that would represent the poorest ethnic community in Europe, and yet be separated – physically, psychologically, economically – from the very ethnic communities and trading blocs they would depend on (such as the "Slavs" of Macedonia) and be somehow expected to remain viable is doubtful. Why Mearsheimer and Van Evera cannot recognise that the partition they advocate is yet another barbaric form of ethnic cleansing, and more than just an "ugly formula for ending wars," is incredible.

Promote Europeanisation.

If Europe has learned anything in the post-Cold War environment, surely one lesson was that European economic integration actually fuelled disintegration in Southeast Europe.

Outsiders push Balkan integration... but such efforts are doomed to fail in the face of local insecurity and political resistance. The Balkans need the leverage that can be achieved only by satisfying the region's single common aspiration: "Europeanisation"... In practice, Europeanisation means extending the cross-border monetary, trade, and investment arrangements that already operate within the EU across Europe's Southeast periphery... What the region is not achieving politically on an intraregional basis can therefore be achieved within a few years under the aegis of Europeanisation. This "New Deal" should apply to all states in the region – Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia – with no state's existing EU affiliations jeopardised or set back through participation... Early staged entry into liberal European economic regimes will encourage private-sector development, reduce the state's economic role, underpin the rule of law, and increase the benefits of forswearing violent conflict over resources and national boundaries. (Steil and Woodward 1999, 97–98)

One need only look at how the attraction of EU membership has furthered compliance with expected standards of civil society, to include the rights of ethnic minorities, in the Baltics and in Central and Southeast Europe. And one need not look much beyond how the incentive for nearer-term NATO and EU membership for Bulgaria and Romania, and even far-distant-future possibilities for Macedonia and Albania, provided cohesion and unity in the extraordinary intervention against Yugoslavia in 1999, even at great economic, social, and civil distress and expense within these nations.

In Lieu of Closure

Macedonia, over the last decade, has come perilously close to internal collapse on more than one occasion. Aside from a failure to complete secure resolution with Greece over various disputes, her internal commitments to economic reform were never fully committed to during the 1990s. Further, geographical isolation, obvious lack of technological sophistication as well as lack of access to technology, and evident and continuing political instability – severely aggravated by the Kosovo crisis of 1999 – failed to encourage foreign investment over the long run. That said, such investment along with the successful implementation of economic reforms are the only means to secure stability or ensure Macedonia's long-term success.

If one were to take a retrospective look at the Balkans in general over the last decade of the twentieth century, it might indeed seem miraculous that Macedonia had not suffered a fate similar to that of her neighbours. Yet the future for Macedonia seems laced with promise as much as peril. One evident conclusion is that the tensions between Slavic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians would continue at either an aggravated level of contest or at a manageable means to achieve workable consensus. The solution, nonetheless, could only be achieved by the peoples of the region itself. Such evidence should become a viable marker for other troubled nations of the region.

What are the strategic implications for American policy? First, policy makers must realise that the ambiguity that professed neutrality between contending parties and served apparently well enough during the 1990s, cannot be maintained indefinitely. Secondly, and in the effort to move beyond former Yugoslavia's internal haemorrhaging, there s a pressing need to link Macedonian identity with other European identities and organisations. Membership in NATO, for example, seemed a cultural marker of inclusion as much as a security guarantee. Finally,

the United States would have to recognise that difficult choices remain in the future. While many have consistently emphasised – perhaps overemphasised – the power of the Greek lobby in influencing foreign policy, this was not an all encompassing explanation for the lack of increased commitment. Civil societies, both creating and sustaining them, require difficult choice.

In retrospect, it seems odd to realise how little credit or acknowledgement Macedonia has received for her success since independence. No matter how difficult the choices for the people and for the region itself, it is no accident that the Macedonian question of the nineteenth century has been resurrected in a new form in the late twentieth century, one which requires a frank assessment of this nation's necessity and probability for survival. Perhaps the most complete irony is that Macedonia's fate could have been determined, and may well be, by specific and strategic policy choices rather than by a fatalistic coin toss left to the indiscriminate and often brutal gods of chance.

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