Address of the President of the Republic of Macedonia

Ladies and Gentlemen, distinguished guests and dear friends,

The topic that you have chosen as a focus for this conference – democratisation and the security challenges in SEE (South East Europe) – embraces the two most significant issues which are in tight correlation with the future of this region. The crucial question is: will SEE manage to join the modern European and world democratic and security processes and institutions, or it will stay on the margins of the modern developments, still preoccupied with the old inherited problems, which have already caused so many human traumas and backwardness?

Despite the choice being more than clear, nevertheless, one should explicitly stress the readiness of the countries in the region to adjust to the new realities and demands of the new era. We should all ask ourselves if we are indeed prepared to overcome our mutual misunderstandings, the old mental patterns and habits, and of course, the old methods of 'conflict resolution'.

We welcome the twenty-first century with lot of hopes and expectations for the prosperity of mankind but we also should not neglect the numerous challenges we still face day by day and that still cause a lot of problems for our move forward. Some of these challenges are deep-rooted in our troublesome history: poverty, conflicts, dictatorship and various diseases have always been among the most often and most serious problems for the peoples in the region. At the same time, there are many other challenges that are more recent, such as globalisation, environment protection, etc. that also call for more attention.

Undoubtedly, all our efforts should be directed towards creation of a concept that will provide equal access to the benefits of globalisation process to all nations and individuals. The appropriate access and distribution of one's own resources, the usage of the knowledge and modern technology is supposed to facilitate smoother and easier facing with the demands of modernity to all nations. At the same time, like never before in history, we bear mutual responsibility in regard to environment protection. We have to do that right now and right here. History will make records of our deeds and they will be either condemned or praised by the future generations. Let's face our responsibility and do our best on behalf of our future generations.

Globalisation rapidly brings closer the countries and nations of the world, and thus in the new millennium we expect the United Nations to bear responsibility for promotion of more efficient world integration and strengthening of the interdependence of its member countries' behaviour. In order to make the UN being efficient and carry on its continuous path towards the future in the twenty-first century, all member countries should respect the valid norms of international law and ethics. They are also expected to respond to new challenges, including the forthcoming reform of the world organisation.

The Republic of Macedonia is rightly proud of its role and contribution to the successful realisation and promotion of the main mission of the UN.

The history of our region, that is today called Southeast Europe, has been marked with so many peculiarities, which cannot be found in some other regions of the world. The main problems in this regard should be identified in the way we comprehend the history and the historical processes, the lack of communication and shortage of effective methods of conflict

resolution, which is of utmost importance in the current era of wide integration processes that dominate in Europe and the world as a whole. Therefore, today more than ever, the countries of this region need courage to support a different perspective on the historical legacies, complexes and prejudices. In this context, civilisational human values should be posed as the main and the only valid criteria for dealing with the old and new problems. The best example of how to achieve that is already available – it is the paradigm of united and democratic Europe, and first of all, the commitment to make Europe our common home, in which the Balkans undeniably belong.

The current priority of our politics should be the transformation of SEE into a stable, secure and prosperous part of Europe, which can be achieved only through entire and permanent integration of the countries from the region in the European processes. That should be our common goal and commitment.

The Republic of Macedonia is firmly devoted to take active part in the processes aimed towards stabilisation and democratisation of the region, and is also ready to give contribution to their successful realisation as much as it is within its own possibilities.

The Republic of Macedonia is committed to go on with its policy of protection and promotion of human rights and freedoms. We have already proved our sincere devotion to this noble cause during the Kosovo refugee crisis when we provided shelter for more than 390,000 refugees. Only truly democratic states know and can make the members of the national minorities feel the state as their own, embrace them all as equal citizens through their full integration in society and state structures. Macedonia has constantly been engaged in the fight against organised crime, which is an evil that gets momentum in many states in the world. Our state is committed to realise the economic reforms that will promote market economy, but also takes great measures for promotion of the living standards of its citizens as well as the improvement of the quality of life. Our main approach is based on security and the free flow of goods and capital, of technology and knowledge.

In regard to our international position, the main contribution of Macedonia has been its permanent support of the endeavours of conflict prevention since 1993, when for the first time UN preventive forces were deployed on our territory, as well as later on through our active co-operation with the international community during the Kosovo crisis. Throughout the past decade Macedonia has been implementing the UN resolutions even at times when they had negative effect on our own economy and stability.

Let me now say a few words on the Summit that was held in Skopje few days ago, which brought together the political leaders from all SEE countries. The Skopje Meeting has shown the readiness of the region to start talking with the language of cooperation finally. It has expressed our common wish for stabilisation, democratisation and integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. In the best possible manner, the countries and the peoples of this region, which have so far been recognisable as a source of instability, decided to take the fate in their own hands and to start dealing with their problems themselves.

The Stability Pact and the Process of Co-operation in Southeast Europe offer a wide framework for practical realisation of our commitments and policies. I deeply hope that we are not going to miss this big opportunity. Otherwise we will bear huge responsibility for any failure before future generations of our children.

The Skopje Summit had special significance, and even offered one more reason for optimism. Namely, after a decade-long absence and excommunication from the international and regional

scene, the FR of Yugoslavia has got back again among the countries of the region, among its neighbours. We are deeply convinced that it has come back with a sincere wish to become one of the generators and promoters of peace, stability and democratic transformations of the region as a whole. The inclusion within the Stability Pact involves a lot of responsibilities for this country, too. At the same time, with the admission of Yugoslavia, the Stability Pact gets a new impulse that will enable faster implementation of the new principles and positive tendencies. Because of all of this, we dare say that the general situation in the region has been visibly improved.

Democratic changes in the FR of Yugoslavia were greeted by all participants of the Skopje Summit with sincere hope that they would contribute to general stabilisation of the region.

The Republic of Macedonia is going to strengthen its efforts for democracy building. We will not allow any autocratic leaders to threaten democratic changes by heating up nationalist passions and by making obstacles for the political and economic reforms we have already opened. The concept based on citizen democracy is one of our main priorities and a precondition for our prosperity.

At this occasion we would like to recall the statement of the first UN Secretary General, Dag Hamarskjold, according to which "There is no life that can bring more satisfaction than the one devoted to the benefits of one's own country and mankind. That calls for sacrifice of one's personal interests but also courage to defend these principles".

The issue of democratisation and the security challenges in SEE are a complex topic that includes a lot of questions related to our present state of affairs, to our past and our future. I am deeply convinced that your suggestions and opinions will be a significant contribution towards more successful continuation and realisation of the current positive developments in Southeast Europe.

I wish you fruitful discussions and successful completion of this significant scholar event, organised with joint efforts of the Macedonian partner (Institute of Defence) and the PfP Consortium of Military Academies and Security Studies Institutes.

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Boris Trajkovski
President of the Republic of Macedonia
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Introduction

Time and space dimensions have different meaning in the Balkans. During just one year (May 2000 to May 2001) this statement has been proven in the case of the main activity organised by the PfP Consortium Working Group on Crisis Management in SEE. At the last Working Group's meeting in Reichenau the idea on organising an international conference was born. The idea was fully supported at the PfP Consortium meeting in Tallinn and eventually realised in Ohrid, Macedonia. The scholar conference under the title "Ten Years After: Democratisation and Security Challenges in SEE" (27-29 October, 2000) without false modesty can be seen as one of the best events organised under the auspices of the PfP Consortium between two annual meetings.

The conference was co-organised by the Working Group on Crisis Management and Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Skopje (Macedonia), which Institute of Defence was celebrating its 25th anniversary. It brought together around 100 participants, out of whose around 50 scholars had a role of paper presenters and panel moderators. Prior to the conference there had been some sceptical views on the effect of participation of such a big number of participants, but since the very beginning of the event all doubts vanished. The reasons were manifold: first, there had been obvious (and probably, a decade-long) need to get together scholars from the region; second, the dramatic developments in the past decade called for comprehensive re-consideration and evaluation; third, in the eve of the conference another historical event with long-term consequences happened (i.e. fall of Slobodan Milosevic and his regime in FR Yugoslavia). One of the main qualities of the Ohrid conference was its success in bringing on the same table many distinguished scholars from the US, Western Europe, Russia (and CIS) and, what is most important – from all the countries in SEE. Maybe not visible on the surface, but the conference also consisted of representatives of different 'schools', from the security and peace academic communities, as well as scholars, professors, public persons, NGO representatives and journalists. Not surprisingly, the debates were often not only interesting and lively but also dissonant. As a result, all presentations were highly sincere, deep and with high quality of arguments. The conference turned out to be more than a nice time; our conference became a challenging and creative meeting place, even more so than the organisers had hoped.

From today's perspective the Ohrid conference deserves another careful retrospection. The collection of presented papers is the best proof of the seriousness and the big efforts invested in this event. Nevertheless, the developments that have marked the period of one year since the decision to organise such a conference was made – call for one more analysis of the real meaning of time and space in the region considered. Namely, at the time when the decision on undertaking such an ambitious activity was made, nobody could predict the dramatic events in Yugoslavia. The conference was, therefore, held under a visible excitement among the scholars and analysts for the expected positive developments in the region. Thus, the paradigm 'ten years after' changed into 'SEE after Milošević'. The optimistic atmosphere was additionally strengthened because of the Skopje Summit of the heads of states of SEE countries that had happened just a day before the opening of the Ohrid conference.

Indeed a dialogue turned out to be what we badly needed because of a decade of turmoil, ruined bridges, and ceased personal, institutional and academic communication and co-operation in the Balkans. However, this meeting should also be seen as an extraordinary opportunity for

promotion of another dimension of the dialogue – between the SEE and the Western academic communities. For almost a decade there has been no dialogue but only one-way communication coming from the Western academic and political community to the Balkan's. Democratic and security models and, especially human rights concepts were 'exported' from the West, the SEE scholars and politicians seemed to welcome these ideas – but the real achievements were lacking.

The lack of a critical thinking about the process of democratisation, conflict resolution and human rights implementation was equally present in the West and in the Balkans. The failure of the West to democratise the Balkans and the obvious conflict mismanagement in the region call for an explanation. On the other hand, in the last horrible decade the Balkans have learnt many difficult and painful lessons and seems to be ready to open the process of recovery and reconciliation. Only joint efforts of two equal partners (i.e. the Western and the Balkan institutions/academic communities that are embraced by the PfP Consortium) seem to be the right approach in giving the right impetus to the new prospects in the troublesome region.

The starting point of the Ohrid conference was that the issues of democratisation, human rights and regional security in SEE go right into the heart of the problem but, at the same time, are some of the most explored and often most oversimplified topics of the academic and political discourse. The so-called democratic transition in the Yugoslav successor states started in the most unusual way – by misuse of democratic rhetoric and principles for most retrograde purposes. 'Democracy' helped the hard-liners and worse nationalists all over former Yugoslavia to get in power in a legal way and even by mass popular support in 1990. The deep-rooted and long-lasting Yugoslav crisis culminated into an inevitable loss of legitimacy of the communist elites (both federal and republican ones). The vacuum was de facto fulfilled by nationalist ideology and practice although nationalist elites took advantage of the newly declared democratic postulates (such as multi-party system, free elections, etc.).

The worst abuse was made on expense of human rights, which in the political agendas were defined as collective rights (i.e. rights of by then 'deprived and discriminated' nations). Newly established regimes were not so much anti-democratic as "a-democratic". New rulers came to power with two slogans emblazoned on the banners. One read "Democracy," while the other demanded "Justice for the People". Undoubtedly, nationalists had no democratic credentials, and no plans to deepen democracy once they came to power. Instead, their emphasis was on the claims of nationhood. Political opposition as well as ordinary citizens who dared to question the regime and its actions were labelled traitors, international spies, foes of their country and its independence.

The scene for forthcoming wars/conflicts was set up with almost no resistance. Long time ago, Alexis de Tocqueville warned that the most dangerous period for a bad government is the moment it gets better. The moment when the ancient regime is not being dismantled completely but the control mechanisms are being made so loose and ineffective is perfect for setting the stage for various kinds of societal, political and economic deviations.

The relationship between nascent democracy and ethnic conflict is not a straightforward one. Truly, democratisation has a potential to help mitigate ethnic conflict. But, the potential can hardly be activated as the transition towards democracy produces a fertile ground for ethnic hatred, animosity and political demands of the internal and external power-thirsty political forces and leaders. Especially in the case of former Yugoslavia, ethnic mobilisation was made in the name of multi-party democracy.

War by definition is a negation of the very essence of human rights and individualism. Former Yugoslavia's dissolution was made in the name of collective rights i.e. belonging to one's own nation and self-determination. False patriotism and self-sacrifice were promoted as the most appreciated values. In the concept of the *people-victim* is the basis for the belief that individualistic values have no meaning because the individual life is completely subordinated to the community and its mission. Collective martyrdom to the cause of the preservation of the state/nation is the highest value, while self-sacrifice becomes a behavioural stereotype. Ethno-nationalism produces intolerance and animosity towards the other nations, but also leads toward deprivation of human rights and freedoms even for the members of one's own nation.

The records are not more favourable even in the countries that did not suffer from these conflicts. The poor results of the democratisation process and a long list of violations of human rights are also typical for the 'peaceful' states, such as Macedonia and/or Albania. All reports and findings of the international and domestic monitoring missions and organisations indicate continuous electoral manipulations (and even violence), police forces abuses, politically dependent judiciary, etc. Although the roots of the problems and obstacles for democratisation are of mainly internal character (i.e. are deeply embedded in the respective societies) partly these infamous records are a consequence of the regional interdependence and spilling over effects of the general crisis in the Balkans.

Having proved unable to cope with the conflict situations in a peaceful manner, the Yugoslav successor states (which is also true for Albania) became a scene of a decade-long presence and interference of the international community. In that sense the external influence (both positive and negative) has become a very important determinant of all significant developments and processes in the region. The effects of this unique external policies regarding the former Yugoslav republics can be seen through two main dimensions i.e. conflict resolution endeavours and political/economic impetus. Both efforts have been ambiguous, unprincipled, changeable and even in some cases hypocritical. The international actors (such as OSCE, EU, NATO, and USA) have not defined it yet what is the goal and what are the means how to achieve it. The dilemma security vs. stability is still hanging over the Balkans due to the disagreement and misconception among the international agents as well as among the regional ones regarding the most crucial point – what is the precondition and what is the final goal. The conflict managers who have been able just to 'fix' things in the short run, never addressed the roots of the conflicts and finally – a decade later - the only result is what can be called conflict mismanagement. None of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia has been resolved and many other potential flesh points have emerged. Nevertheless, there is lot of 'peace business' for all kinds of international, governmental and NGO missions in the region. That is a guarantee that they will stay there for years to come but there is no guarantee for the prospects of the region.

'West' and 'democracy' have been the most often mentioned paradigms in the Balkans throughout the 90s, although the reality was negation of all promoted ideas. The democratic West is perceived like the 'Promised Land' – the place where all misfortunes end and the bright future begins. The irresistible attractiveness of this illusion has served as a strong stimulus – until certain degree. The countries and people from the 'grey zone' have lost all hopes to re-build the region and their own home yards but instead have turned towards the unreachable West. Life has become a hyper real – full of expectations, false self-perception and unrealistic hopes, at least, for the unhappy citizens. The elites could only benefit from such a self-deception.

Given the disastrous results of human rights and democratic reforms in the SEE countries, regional stabilisation is usually defined as a big challenge both for the domestic actors and the

international community. Obviously even the bare definition of the goal is made in a problematic way. It is very questionable whether the priority in the region is its stability or its security. What comes first? Stabilisation of the region is perceived as a minimal goal, or better a situation in which the conflicts will cease and the reconstruction of the region will start. Even this minimal expectation does not necessarily mean that people will feel more secure and the human rights and freedoms will be better promoted and realised. Stabilisation without (human) security may be preservation of the tragic *status quo*.

Stabilisation in the Balkans can mean only security for the state(s) but does not include human security i.e. security of the individual citizen. The right to life and liberty together with the right to security of persons are defined as fundamental human rights according to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is believed that human security can be achieved only through a global political culture based on genuinely shared values, particularly those of human dignity and human rights. The citizens of the majority of the SEE countries are victims of their own political immaturity i.e. of the governments they (very often) freely elect. At the same time, due to the unprincipled behaviour of the 'international community' which uses double standards in defining human rights values and 'global' culture, their feeling of insecurity often comes from the very advocates of human rights and 'exporters' of democracy.

After a decade of intra-state (and/or inter-state) conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia, these societies need economic re-construction, institution-building, but also a change in the mental state of affairs. At the moment, the shortage of fresh financial investments and the loud silence over the conflict reconciliation issues do not give much hope that human rights and democratisation endeavours will give positive and fast results. On this territory there have been deployed and engaged the biggest number of peace support missions, peace-workers, NGOs and governmental organisations *'per capita'*. Yet in some regions (Kosovo) the mass violations of human rights, forced migrations and executions are happening in front of the eyes of the entire 'international community'.

As temples of knowledge, human dignity and prosperity, academic institutions and research institutes are expected to give expertise and even to warn politicians on their activities. The Western academia has built a lot of analyses, studies, projects and degrees over the tragic experience of the former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, so far, the advice coming from the West has been one-sided in terms of disrespect for the local expertise and knowledge and in terms of picturing 'black&white' situations and solutions. The possible conclusion may be that each academia (in the West and in the region) have lot of things to do in its own 'yards' i.e. the promotion of (both negative and positive) peace begins in one's own society and only then - on a basis of equal co-operation - it can be re-directed outward. The SEE institutions still need support and expertise from abroad, but first of all they all have to finish their own homework in terms of defining their independence and relationship with the current regimes.

The memories from the conference were still vivid when the new wave of Balkan crisis occurred exactly in the country that had been the host. The question that can be rightly posed is: was the Macedonian conflict difficult to predict? From a point of view of the future activities of the Working Group on Crisis Management (and the PfP Consortium itself), there is even more important issue: what is the purpose of the meetings of the experts and scholars at such gatherings, and what should and could be done in order to promote peaceful conflict resolution?

Many issues are open and even more are pending, but one thing is clear: the existence and active engagement of this very Consortium Working Group is of utmost importance. The focus

of its activities and more importantly its purpose are not (and must not be) purely academic. Scholarship has far more important mission in this case – it is expected to deal with real human destinies, sufferings, fears and hopes. Occasionally, scholars and experts should meet and exchange their findings, but in the rest of their engagement they must be involved in field research, must be present there where they are needed, and must offer concrete assistance. Finally, looking forward to the future activities of our Working Group, let's recall wise Gandhi's messages about some of the most renounced human sins:

- Knowledge without character

- Science without humanity

- Worship without sacrifice

- Politics without principles.

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Critical Security Points of Serbia/FR Yugoslavia[1]

Developments in the country confirm that what transpired in Serbia on 5 October 2000 was not a revolution after all. By discarding Milošević the citizens of Serbia have created only the initial assumptions for an irreversible journey out of communism and war. Thus, they have avoided an internal conflict at the last moment and found hope in themselves.

It should be noted that the initial change occurred despite Milošević readiness to defend his power by force. It has also happened despite the Euro-American striving to end Milošević regime with sanctions and bombs.

The long exposure to cross fire brought the citizens of Serbia to a point of almost giving up on themselves. They saw a chance for liberation, only after Milošević had revealed his own political impotence by defrauding the elections. This also proved that the sources for the preservation and renewal of his absolutist power have run dry. That is why his regime clashing with the positive will of the citizens inevitably collapsed. The citizens' action benefited from the readiness of the West to spare them its (military) assistance in critical moments.

The fact that the citizens of Serbia, even under unfavourable circumstances, managed to remove Milošević may perhaps, in a literary trance, be proclaimed a revolution. The gloomy reality, however, shows that they are today faced with the same tasks as ten years ago. Only now they have to find the solutions under incomparably more difficult circumstances.

In October 2000, the citizens of Serbia in fact went back to point "1990", when they first had to break up with socialism and then embark upon an arduous task of modernisation. The key jobs awaiting the new regime and the citizens testify to that. They need to reconstruct the existing state and define the one they will be living in, as soon as possible. They must simultaneously initiate a general and profound recovery of the devastated society. At the same time they need to find a new place for Serbia in the region, as well as the Euro-Atlantic and the world communities.

(1) What are the initial security consequences of the changes?

It may still be too early for a serious assessment of security consequences the changes conceived in Serbia will produce. The positive effects, for the time being, can only be measured in Serbia and Montenegro. Salvation found in the elections diminished rather than eliminated the threat of the violent ending of the crisis. A sensitive period of power transfer and state reconstitution lies ahead, and may be susceptible to conflicts incited from numerous directions.

The direct and calculable security benefits brought about by the change of power in Serbia/FRY may be defined as follows:

- drastically reduced threat of an internal (civil) war in Serbia, substantially diminished prospects for the abuse of the Yugoslav Army in Montenegro or for the outbreak of a tribal war in it, largely limited possibility to export the Serbian crisis to neighbouring countries and the region, and elimination of the reason for NATO air-support to the democratisation of Serbia and the Balkans.

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[1] The paper submitted at the Conference has been extended to cover the post-October period of change in Serbia and the FRY.

In this context a number of other collateral benefits are also mentioned, although the long-term effects of some of them may appear damaging to a number of internal or external actors. Many in the region have thus been deprived of the possibility to affirm their democratic legitimacy on an anti-Milošević basis. This has also blocked the road for the creation of new independent states through war. That is why the Montenegrin authorities will now have to offer their citizens, as well as the international public, plausible reasons for redrawing the borders anew.

Milošević demise resulted in diverse gains as well as losses for the West. In the first place, the West was given the chance to join the victors in the general celebration. Therefore, attempts to cover up the fact that the change in Serbia transpired despite the efforts of the Euro-Atlantic community to topple the country's authoritarian regime by bombs and sanctions come as no surprise.

The initial damage the Alliance is bound to experience will be due to the loss of grounds to manage the Yugoslav crisis. The fiasco of NATO- management was, let us recall, the inevitable outcome of its desire to compensate for the lack of a valid strategy with reactive action; namely, its decision to use air-strikes against the consequences in order to avoid the toilsome removal of fundamental causes behind the Yugoslav wars. To make things more difficult for NATO, the (guided?) proclamation of the "Balkan syndrome" started a new cycie to re-examine the justifiability and scope of its intervention in Kosovo.

In all truth, Milošević already in October 1998, passed the "hot potato" on to the U.S.A. and NATO. After that, he defended the bomb showered Kosovo only to the point of his survival in power. The U.S.A used destructive ways to liberate Kosovo and Albanians in it also up to the point of Milošević survival in power.

In any case, the Alliance's taking of Kosovo gave it an opportunity to prove the validity of its principle of "humanitarian interventionism". Nominal attachment of the West to the principle of unchangeability of borders will once again be tested in Kosovo. That is where the scope of the thus far discriminatory Alliance's attachment to democracy will also be tested. Simultaneously, the seriousness and efficiency of the Stability Pact shall be verified.

The West will therefore have to promptly define and apply an efficient strategy, including the involvement of local actors, to finally do away with the causes of the Yugoslav wars. This would help eliminate the key security risks in South Eastern Europe and this course of action gains in urgency since the expected consolidation of Serbia is bound to change the inherited array of security factors and parameters in the region.

(2) Initial inventory of critical points

The cross section of the new situation allows us to assume that Serbia is no longer the source of security risks in the region. To this extent, the external threats to its security have also been reduced. This certainly does not remove every danger for the security of Serbia and the region, but rather points to their changed arrangement, requiring a different approach to the Serbian and regional security complex.

To start with, an inventory of the points critical for the security of Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia should be made. The new map of risks has, ultimately, been drawn by the interaction of two basic groups of factors:

- first, the concentration of the fundamental causes for the violent disintegration of the second Yugoslavia in its eastern part, and

- second, the surfacing of all the consequences of an abortive attempt of the Serbian citizens to escape from the need to abandon socialism and undergo a democratic modernisation, by plunging into a war.

That is why attention should be focused on the internal factors of (the lack of) security in Serbia, to assess the directions and scope of change. However, the fact that we are talking about a controversial and incomplete process impairs the validity of any such findings at the very outset.

The period between the October toppling of Milošević and the DOS power take-over in Serbia is marked by dual rule and lawlessness. The incomplete break with the former regime aggravated the tackling of the following urgent problems:

- restitution of the basic functions of the federal state pending the final agreement between Serbia and Montenegro concerning its future make up;

- employment of the remaining domestic and potential foreign resources for the economic and social survival of the population;

- start up of society's pacification;

- checking the further criminalization of society;

- establishment of full co-operation with the KFOR and TJNMIK (NATO and UN) to increase the safety of non Albanian population in Kosovo as weh as to prevent one-sided solution of its future status.

This means that the primary task of the new authorities is to stop the state and society from deteriorating any further. This should be followed by remedial action leading to gradual recovery and development but would necessitate prompt improvement of the internal security of society and safety of its citizens.

The entire period was marked by the legal change of main actors of the federal and municipal governments, but under conditions of an uncontrolled decomposition of the inherited system. The fact is that the October charge of the citizens and the DOS did result in the demise of the central potentate, but it failed to give them sufficient power to do away with the system he relied on. Furthermore, the disintegration of the system deprived them of the instruments for the fast change they wanted.

The tactical ambivalence of the DOS protracted the formative stage for too long a time. Apparently fearing a civil war, the DOS refrained from accelerating the (revolutionary turn of) post-election developments. Entering the legal channels, instead, the DOS allowed the old regime - otherwise based on constitutional and legal abuse - to obstruct the change even before it became effective. The opposition, too, was caught unawares by the speed of collapse of the former regime. Moreover, it seems that it did not even have an operational plan for the fast establishment and consolidation of its government. Thus, the DOS failed to rapidly dismantle and depose the elites of the former regime. As a result, the remnants of these elites, after a rite of mimicry, hurried to fit into the existing order.

A prolonged interregnum favoured the survival of the old and the emerging of the new security risks in Serbia and the FRY, making the complex of security issues the main source of threats.

Slow establishment of the supreme civil command over the Yugoslav Army prevented a thorough test of loyalty of the military top brass and gave the first generals a chance to attach their allegiance to the personality of the new FRY president. This interfered with the personnel change in the Army top ranks, indispensable for its radical transformation. The delayed formation of the federal cabinet and the malfunctioning of the parliament prevented

an effective reintegration of the Army into the system leaving it beyond any democratic control. Instead, the army and its generals continued to parade the public and political scene, although now clad in a democratic attire.

The October divisions in the Serbian police soon grew into a hidden disintegration of the police system, leaving substantial parts of it outside public control, most importantly the special Operations units. The fact that the consolidation of the police was, at least nominally, in the hands of Milošević's associates gave rise to numerous uncertainties in the Serbian political arena. These uncertainties were heightened by the prolonged political games concerning the creation of a caretaker (transitory) government, dissolution of the parliament and the republic elections. In view of all that, the core of the police remained in the grey zone, and it is not inconceivable that it might be arbitrarily abused by unknown actors in case the situation aggravated.

As could be expected - in view of the experience of the transition countries - the state security services have undergone the smallest change. For reasons unknown to the public the DOS and its leaders failed to undertake even cosmetic personnel changes in these branches until February 2001.

An important reason for the protracted lawlessness and dual rule is in the fact that the new authorities have found themselves in the "Montenegrin scissors" The lack of readiness of the current Montenegrin rulers to, at least temporarily, give up the numerous advantages of the acquired sovereignty is quite obvious. At the same time, the Montenegrin epigones of Milošević (The Socialist Popular Party) took the opportunity to compensate for the lack of legitimacy and power in their own republic by installing themselves at the federal level through the DOS. It is, therefore, not inconceivable that the third Yugoslavia may disintegrate even before it is given the chance to be democratically rearranged. This all the more since the "Montenegrin scissors" have activated the international ones built into the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, transferring Kosovo from Serbia into Yugoslavia.

The refusal of the Montenegrin elites to support the consolidation of the federal authorities, the only ones available to the DOS before the Serbian election, politically revived the idea on the secession of Serbia from the FRY. Although in that case Montenegro would also immediately formalise its sovereignty, this would affect the political map of the region and cause a domino effect. This would also remove the obstacles for granting Kosovo the status of a state, and create problems for the preservation of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania.

Tactical ambivalence and strategic deficiencies of the DOS cannot be properly understood without a brief political examination of this political conglomerate made out of necessity and at the last moment. This is all the more important in view of the gradual surfacing of the inherent, reform and administrative limits of the DOS.

Although most of the DOS parties emerged out of resistance to the former regime in the early 90s, they have never acquired a convincing social, political program identity. Their differences, in addition to those reflected in their respective names, were mostly based on the "icons" of their leaders. They were also distinguished by the changeable inconsistency in relations towards Milošević regime. That is why the easy switch of the key oppositionist of the time from a position of conflict into one of secret or overt co-operation with the authorities, ruined the idea of party pluralism and democracy in Serbia.

Having conceded to Milošević plan of national and state unification of all Serbs by force, the Opposition leaders, long ago, became political prisoners of his opportunistic moves. The public or tacit adoption of (un)known war objectives spared them the difficulty of developing alternative strategies. That is why the loss of initiative placed them into a reactive position,

which allowed them only to criticise the inferior (war) tactics of the regime and the wrong choice of means.

By creating an interest-based and political alliance during the Yugoslav wars, the leading Opposition parties and the regime became mutually dependent - one indispensable for the survival of the other. That is why the Opposition in all critical moments granted political legitimacy to the regime which tolerated it in return. This enabled the regime to gradually corrupt the top ranks of key Opposition parties by letting them have a controlled share in the spoils of war and positions of power. And as the greed of the Opposition party bureaucracies increased so did the blackmailing power the regime had over them.

That is why Milošević power in Serbia and the FRY was not seriously threatened by the autonomous pressure of the Opposition over the past ten years, and it was only the lost battles and/or accompanying internal mistakes that pressed him against the wall. Namely, whenever the regime was in trouble, the Opposition could not (or did not want to) take political advantage of the situation and possibly work out a change of power.

Political sterility of central Opposition parties in Serbia was, among other things, due to their inherent controversy. Although products of anti-communism and old-fashioned nationalism, they obtained an additional public legitimacy invoking the principles of freedom and democracy. However, they have never overcome the conflict between the collectivistic and individualistic (civic) approach to the Serbian state and national problem. Their belated pacifism therefore presented no obstacle to support the regime in all the wars throughout the former Yugoslavia and to keep silent about the disparate real and alleged Serbian objectives and the means used to attain them.

The essential impotence of the Opposition as well as its calculating nature were additionally laid bare in Kosovo. The final state and national defeat of the regime caught the Opposition by surprise. Despite the fact that, together with the regime, the opposition, at least verbally, linked the survival of the Serbian nation with the preservation of Kosovo, the loss of the "national cradle" failed to stir it out of lethargy. True, the Opposition managed to disengage its political destiny from that of Kosovo and came out of this defeat unscathed.

When in July-August 1999 it seemed that a joint effort of the Opposition and citizens would easily end the regime, internal self blocking mechanism were activated. The absence of a common approach was once again justified by the thesis about the conflict of the leaders' vanities – the bad lot of the Serbian Opposition. However, this thesis was merely an easily accepted and/or deliberately devised screen to hide the real conflict of opposition-party bureaucracies concerning the future division of power. That is why the Opposition leaders were more concerned with preventing the success of their rivals than with the toppling of Milošević. This situation actually concealed their early fears of losing the impending and desired share in the new government. This accounts for the fact that the opposition parties in all previous election campaigns invested greater efforts in fighting each other than in deposing the regime.

Although in power, the DOS members were not rid of their own inhibitions. The lack of operational programs to reform the neglected society added to their overt as well as secret discord concerning the pace and scope of the initiated change. The central line of political conflicts and a potential split reflected their attitudes towards the Yugoslav wars and their consequences. It is therefore hardly surprising that the Serbian public stage is now dominated by the discussion about co-operation with The Hague Tribunal and the degree of sanctioning Milošević and his regime. The same line forms the axis of political regrouping within the DOS which may soon end in its disintegration. Therefore, we cannot disregard the fact that the key DOS parties – the Democratic Party of Serbia and the Democratic Party – are already

more concerned with the grab for power as a security for their future than with an efficient reaction to the challenges of social crises.

The new authorities are now in a political stalemate, compelling them to scale the initial reform by the criteria of minimum risk for themselves. This necessarily leads to the prolonged coexistence of the emerging authorities and the inherited institutions of power which may sprout attempts to restore the former regime if the internal crisis intensified.

Therefore, the only assumptions we could make now without some degree of certainty are as follows:

- Milošević's demise is only the first step to be followed by a period of toilsome transfer of government and power, brimming with security risks;

- second, the longer the interregnum the lesser the readiness of the West would be to provide efficient support and the more numerous its conditions for the announced help would grow;

- third, the degree of devastation of the Serbian and Yugoslav society and state exclude the possibility of fast and visible change and the citizens will not be able to measure or realize their gains soon. One should therefore expect a gradual decrease in their reform zeal, i.e. an increase in their dissatisfaction which may be channelled towards the new authorities.

On balance, these elements warn that Serbia and the FRY shall for a long time yet remain an unstable society and a security risk, primarily for the citizens. It would therefore be necessary to urgently establish democratic control over the armed forces — including, in addition to the police and the army, both para-police and paramilitary forces.

(3) Exclusion of armed forces from democratic control

On 5 and 6 October, the generals' elites of the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian police, submitted themselves to the new authorities. A number of facts seriously indicate that they were forced to make that move, since the majority of soldiers and policemen, exposed to the pressure of the public, refused to maintain Slobodan Milošević rule by force. After that, the army generals set out to make political profit out of their new loyalty. Their remarkable attachment to the new authorities seeks to cover their former role of the Praetorian Guard. The generals of the police, on the other hand, withdrew from the public scene. There are reasonable grounds to suspect that most of them applied themselves to destroying the evidence of the previous abuse on the part of the police and the scope of its criminalisation.

The analysts have not sufficiently addressed the benefits deriving for the citizens from the restraint manifested by the Army and the police in critical moments. That removed the risk of the regime's use of the paramilitary and para-police formations, which, if involved in a possible internal conflict, would have necessarily turned it into a bloodshed and street terror.

Partial installation of the new government marked the beginning of pacification of the society and political space in Serbia/FRY. But the DOS could not have really established efficient control over the armed forces until it verified its victory on the Serbian elections. Its declared reform orientation allows for the assumption that the Serbian/FRY armed forces would be subjected to democratic control.

However, a degree of moderation in assessments is required in view of the lack of public evidence substantiating the proclaimed commitment of the DOS or its individual members to the concept of democratic control. The absence of a valid program for the change of civil-military and civil-police relations may still be a sign of their lack of knowledge on the model.

But the DOS can compensate for this handicap relatively easily and fast. It will be much more difficult to change the nature of the inherited armed forces and create the necessary preconditions for democratic control.

The first-line barriers are the central elements of the newly created environment. Economic and social capacity of Serbia and the FRY for pro-European modernisation have been reduced to the minimum. Simultaneous abolishment of Yugoslavia in Montenegro and in Kosovo, rendered its democratic reconstitution almost impossible and/or redundant. The incursion of the KLA Presevo flank into the Serbian south amounts to a war challenge to the new authorities, which may require their response with the use of armed force. To make things worse, this parallelogram of the diverse forces incorporates all the civilisation deficiencies of the three Yugoslav states, resulting in bestial consequences in the never-contained Yugoslav wars.

To this extent the current restraint of the new DOS government towards the Yugoslav Army and the police can no longer be explained by the enforced coalition with Milošević's Montenegrin allies or its lack of power in Serbia. One should sooner say that the DOS wavering, which may take quite a while, is the result of the awareness that the important factors determining the survival and security of the federal state are beyond its reach.

For example, the new government dares not to make an autonomous response to the KLA activities without risking a new conflict with the Euro-Atlantic community. On the other hand, it is incapable of cajoling this community into observing the Resolution 1244 and the Kumanovo Agreement. This impairs its prospects for influencing the solution concerning the future status of Kosovo still further. The likelihood that the DOS may find a mutually acceptable solution to preserve a state bond, of whatever kind, between Serbia and Montenegro are also small. The DOS obviously postponed this as well as many other problems for after the Serbian elections. This increases the probability that it will be faced with a "take it or leave it" offer of the Montenegrin authorities. The Euro-Atlantic ambivalence towards the future independence of Montenegro as well as the latent dispersion of Montenegrin voters will not lessen the problem for the DOS one least bit.

It could be expected that under the prevailing circumstances the DOS may easily postpone the submission of the armed forces to democratic control. Namely, for this purpose it would first have to adopt new constitutions of both the FRY and Serbia. And, at that, fully aware that the federal statute will not be recognised in Montenegro and cannot be applied in Kosovo. However, if it rushed into adjusting the Serbian with the federal constitution it would be taking the risk of leaving Serbia without sufficient attributes of a state in case of the sudden dismantling of Yugoslavia. On top of that, the DOS would have to engage in a parallel and radical transformation of the armed forces. At this moment it has neither the time nor funds, nor for that matter, a valid program for this purpose. Its reformist will may be further reduced by the fear of a conflict with the inherited generals' elites as well as the fear of resistance to change of a part of the officer corps.

We will therefore briefly list the dangers the DOS is bound to face in the reform of the armed forces. Its readiness to take the risk and its ability to neutralise these dangers will determine the pace of establishing democratic control over these forces. For methodological reasons my initial views will be grouped according to the structure of the armed forces, in the ascending order of the risk involved.

(a) Para-military and para-police forces

Serbia and Yugoslavia cannot become democratic countries until their party and para-police groups, are dissolved and disarmed. In order to achieve that the new government must

first have reliable knowledge on their origin, numbers, disposition, force, chain of command and mutual connections.

The way to find that out leads into the "grey Zone" of the Yugoslav wars. And in this zone, one will inevitably find the links between the para-forces, secret police and the underground. This will also require the uncovering of the lines of war mongering and the ways used to usher the citizens of the former Yugoslavia into an ail-out war. This would impair the validity of official interpretations of the real causes and objectives behind the Yugoslav wars. This would be followed by an obligation to establish the responsibility of public political actors for waging the wars. The same package would include the need to measure the share of the para-forces as well as that of the hidden masterminds of their war crimes, and so on.

The magnitude of the risk involved in intervening into the "grey zone" is directly proportionate to the assumed share of the para-forces in causing and spreading the Yugoslav wars. Furthermore, the risks would rapidly increase with an attempt to sanction any such crimes of these forces. This would also reinforce their resolve to defend themselves using all possible means. This defence would be vertically structured with the political and state warlords in the first line. Their backs would be guarded by the military and police top ranks, protected by the operators of secret services, known as well as unknown. In this context one should not exclude the possibility of hidden trans-boundary co operation and mutual assistance of those who joined forces in the violent destruction of the former Yugoslavia.

It does not take much effort to prove that Serbia/FRY and thereby also the DOS, lack almost all conditions to do this job. The new government may therefore be expected to at least block, or place under police control, the paramilitary and para-police groups for the sake of stabilising the security situation.

(b) Serbian Police

The entry of the sphere of civilian-police relations reduces the magnitude of the risk and increases the DOS interest to rearrange this sphere. The DOS has only become able to establish real power over the police, i.e. its command structure, after the elections in Serbia. An element which works in its favour is the reform orientation of most public security officers, as manifested during the critical moments of the power take-over. The restraint displayed by the special police units at that time is also encouraging. However, it is still impossible to tell the price the DOS will have to pay. Another fact which remains unknown, since the bill was drawn internally, is the "currency" of payment. It would not be illogical to assume that the price of loyalty would include partial protection of individuals and groups against responsibility for their previous (evil) doings.

The true nature of the affiliation of this part of the police to the reforms will not be revealed until the new authorities embark upon changing the concept and the structure of the entire service. Although the DOS has not yet announced the complete plan, it is only reasonable to expect that the strategic objectives include the numerical reduction and demilitarisation of the police. However, this job cannot be done without a systemic effort to decriminalise the police. In proportion to the depth of the reform individual and group resistance to change will increase. This all the more since the reform implies an internal redistribution of power as well as disciplinary and criminal responsibility of individuals, and all that in a situation marked by an increased existential and employment uncertainty of a large number of policemen.

The critical point of the future reform will be the DOS entry into the grounds of the state security. This is where the real readiness of the DOS for democratic change will be measured. On the other hand, it can only prove it by installing the parliamentary instruments to settle the

accounts with the State Security and establish future control over it. An additional guarantor in this job has to be the country's public.

It would be difficult to anticipate just how strong a resistance to change will be offered by the state security staff, but there is no doubt that there will be some. It will be still more difficult to anticipate the means some of them will use for defence since the available arsenal is boundless. This all the more because the service, emulating its communist precursor, operated primarily as political police. On top of that, it has, over the past few years, been turned into a private service of the ruling couple and thereby necessarily involved in political terror, financial and other abuse.

In this business the DOS is bound to face the dilemma concerning the depth of its reform. A radical one demands a cut at the base which is located in the war production abilities of the Milošević regime. That is why it is more likely that the DOS will yield to political opportunity and scale the change in the Serbian police pursuant to its projected (power) needs.

A new Set of problems emerges once we start considering the future status and role of the police in Montenegro. This police is, just like its Serbian counterpart, highly militarised. Both forces have been developed as alternatives to the internal army and have long gone far beyond the frameworks of a police force. It is unlikely that the Montenegrin authorities would easily give up their para-police and the power it guarantees, and still less believable that the federal authorities would be able to substantially influence the reform of the republic police forces.

(c) Yugoslav Army

The Yugoslav Army takes the last place on the scale of reform risks. But that is why it is clearly the first on the scale of complexity and the costs involved. The available evidence warns that the army reform ranges fairly low at the DOS scale of priorities. Possible change in civilian-military relations and the military-political entity of the Yugoslav army may be additionally deferred under the pressure of the Presevo KLA wing. The intention of the current authorities in Montenegro – to make their state sovereignty complete as soon as possible – works in the same direction.

However, the pace of change will be decisively influenced by the fact that the DOS has not, thus far, done more than declared its principled resolve to create a modern professional and numerically fewer army. As to the plan, the means and price of attaining these objectives, they still remain unknown. Be what they may, the DOS has to take the management of the army transformation from the hands of the generals as soon as possible and transfer it to the parliament and the government.

The key problem of the new authorities will also be to define the starting point. In order to place the Yugoslav Army under democratic control they would first have to prepare efficient constitutional instruments and procedures. This implies the knowledge of the state to which the army structure and size will be adjusted. Only on the basis of clear state (defence and security) parameters can the planning of transformation, reduction and modernisation of the inherited army be undertaken.

This also creates difficulties in anticipating the scope and magnitude of the risk emerging out of the civilian and military spheres. The one thing that is certain is that, in the initial stage, the resistance to change within the military will match the inherent resistance of a bureaucratic mastodon. The experience of transition countries reveals that the first obstacle may be overcome by shortening the time of compulsory military service. That is because this may cause a chain effect on the restructuring and reduction of the army and curb the costs of maintaining it.

Bearing in mind that the DOS may not take an independent decision concerning the destiny or the shape of Yugoslavia, it will be forced to accept the co-existence with the inherited army pending the final decision. After the Serbian elections the DOS may start dosed personnel changes in the military top ranks and the change will probably be done in the manner which will bypass the hot topics of political or war responsibility of the military leadership and individuals in it, although this will also apply to their political masters and supporters.

The initial assessments allow a general assumption that the DOS, having conquered the power in Serbia, focused on the institutional reinforcement of its political control over the armed forces. The pace of social and economic reform of the society and the creation of a democratic infrastructure will directly determine the prospects for irrevocable subjecting of the armed forces to democratic control. This, however, will not be possible unless the Serbian and Yugoslav war knots are unravelled. And when it comes to that, the DOS and its members will have to weight their own share in the Yugoslav wars.

(4) Prospects for integration of Serbia/FRY into Euro-Atlantic security structures

In order to establish whether it could join the "Western security structures" and to what extent, Serbia has to identify them first. And that certainly is not an easy task.

At this moment there are at least three security systems wherein the West plays a dominant or leading role. The offer open to Serbia/FRY includes first the United Nations and then also NATO and its branches. Next come the emerging European Union security structures. Each one of these systems is in a different state of readiness and efficiency.

After the collapse of the bloc structure the United Nations lost what little delegated power they had. Lingering on the margin for so long they are approaching the crossroads which may take them into historical archives or revival. But to all appearances the decision about the path to be taken will not be made on East River.

As for NATO, it found the reason for its existence in the Yugoslav wars and was thereafter promoted to the role of the world peace enforcer of dubious legitimacy. The Alliance reached its zenith in Kosovo.

However, ever since Kumanovo the dilemmas as to its purpose and reach suppressed by the Yugoslav episode are surfacing once again. It seems that NATO and its regulators will finally have to concern themselves with their own destiny.

The continental move of the EU is being made under the guise of taking its share of responsibility for Europe. Although the West European search for their own security identity currently relies on NATO, it seems to suggest a duality which cannot go on for ever.

The security offer is certainly interspersed with the OSCE, numerous regional initiatives and ad hoc groups.

Before deciding on that Serbia will have to take a stand on the Euro- American concept of the security integration applied to formerly socialist countries. The concept, on its part, proved deficient on two counts:

- first, it reduced the security complex, as interpreted by the Copenhagen school, to the military component of overall security,

- second, it limits the security integration to the military political link with NATO and/or its branches.

Therefore, from the point of country's entry into the "western structure" the correlation between military security of an individual country and its actual integration into the Euro-

Atlantic community keeps dropping. Once they join the ranks they are confronted with countless interfering factors unknown in advance. All at once, the nominally precise criteria, e.g. into the EU, are relativized and subjected to the free will of decision-makers.

Immediately following October 5, the readiness of the FRY and Serbia to return to the UN, and the OSCE was publicly declared. The strategic Option of the DOS is to integrate Serbia/FRY into Europe. This implies its activation into the Stability Pact, i.e. stabilisation of the region. To general satisfaction the FRY was admitted to almost all main institutions of the international community in a summary procedure.

The DOS has, for quite transparent reasons, avoided to declare its position on NATO and the Partnership for Peace. These reasons may easily be classified into three groups. The following reasons, taken together, act against the prompt consideration of the possible entry of Serbia into the Alliance:

- first, the collective and individual trauma due to the NATO aggression on the FRY. Although the opinion polis on the eve of the elections indicated a drop in xenophobia and isolationism, or rather an increase in the European orientation of the respondents, NATO still stands for the metaphor of the undesired American hegemony;

- second, NATO is a hot and slippery political topic, used in internal political conflicts as a disqualifier. In addition, the attitude towards NATO is not on the agenda at all, and the general dodging of the subject should come as no surprise, and

- third, even if it wanted to join NATO, assuming it survives until then, Serbia cannot fulfil the admission conditions or sustain the costs involved.

To all this we should add a democratic reason: serious talks may ensue only after NATO itself has been placed under democratic civilian control.

In order for Serbia and the FRY to be able to engage in security co Operation with "western structures" the new authorities must apply themselves to establishing internal security. In this job, they may be assisted by the EU and the U.S.A. in two ways:

- first, by not attaching any conditions to their economic and political support, and

- second, by offering effective assistance in consolidating the state.

For this purpose they could, e.g. within the Third Table of the Pact, form a special fund to encourage the transformation of civilian-military relations in the countries of the region. In the case of Serbia this would mean first of all, the provision of professional assistance in developing procedures for democratic civil control over the Yugoslav Army accompanied, in parallel, by the financial support to army transformation and employment of the demobbed army staff.

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Albania's search for security
1992 to date

In this paper we will look at how the Albanian foreign policy has evolved, since 1992 in light of its security concerns. To achieve this we will focus at Albania's foreign policy toward the question of Kosova, Macedonia and Greece. We will be looking at both Democratic and Socialist Party policies.

The Foreign Policy of the Democratic-led Government toward Kosova

In stark contrast with the up to then attitude of the Communist authorities toward the national question, in post-communist Albania the national question became a foreign policy priority. What factors accounted for this dramatic change in Albanian stance? Due to the collapse of communism and democratic transformation that was occurring throughout the former communist block, Albania found itself better placed to support the cause of the ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the outbreak of Yugoslav wars had a two-fold effect on Tirana. On the one hand, the isolation of Serbia, and its relegation to a pariah status provided a greater diplomatic space for Albania to assist Albanians in Kosova, on the other, it presented an ominous threat from Serbia. If the war spread to Kosova, then Albania would have, ultimately, been dragged into it as well. Such a development would have been catastrophic for Albania whose "armed forces were grossly inadequate for the country's defense"[1] and in addition, was going through one of the most difficult periods in its history. A general situation of turmoil prevailed as the communist system was collapsing and the country was moving toward pluralism. The internal security had been broken and the country was experiencing a severe economic and social dislocation that had reduced Albania to total dependence on foreign assistance.[2] The avoidance of war became the overriding foreign policy objective. The cautious policy adopted by Tirana cannot be primarily attributed to Western and US pressure but to domestic and regional constraints that drastically limited its options.[3] Actually, what provided the US and the Albanian governments with the opportunity to develop a strategy that would prevent the spread of the war southward was the decision of the Albanians in Kosova to organise a non-violent movement.

What we notice from these developments is the convergence of interests between the Albanian state and the Albanians in Kosova. In the past Albania had tried to enhance its security by not focusing on the national question and avoiding any action that would have been perceived as threatening by its neighbours, however, under the new circumstances this foreign policy line could no longer provide security.

The new national security strategy adopted by Albania had become more assertive. While stating that Albania recognised the inviolability of borders thus rejecting the idea of national unification and supporting a peaceful resolution of the problem, it also declared that if Serbia started its ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosova, Albanians would react as one nation which

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[1]   Biberaj, Albania in Transition, Westview Press, 1998, p. 251

[2]   Louis Zanga, "Albania Reduced total Dependence on Foreign Food", RFE/RL Research Reports, Vol. 1, No. 8, 21 February 1992.

[3]   Louis Zanga, "Albania Afraid of the War over Kosova", RFE/RL Research Reports, Vol. 1, No.46, 20November, 1992.

could lead to a larger Balkan war.[4] This foreign policy stance was meant to serve two goals: to work as a deterrent against the Serbian threat and to urge the US to become more involved in the region.

The Christmas warning announced by President *Bush* in December 1992 and later confirmed by *Clinton* which threatened Serbia with military action if it provoked a war in Kosova was an indication of the shared interests between the US and Albania in preventing the southward spread of the war. In this contexts, Albania and the Albanians provided the US and NATO with an important factor to maintain stability. For Albania, the dose association with the US and Western countries provided the government with the necessary security to focus on the question of the economic transformation. In addition, Albania pursued an active policy at the regional level with the aim of building an anti-Milošević coalition.[5] In these attempts it also tried to differentiate between Montenegro and Serbia. In all these endeavours, Albanian state closely co-ordinated its activities with the Kosova shadow government. This dose co-operation at the institutional level strengthened the firmness of Albanians in Kosova to carry on their resistance in a peaceful way.[6]

Despite the great progress that was made in the inter-Albanian co operation, problems did exist. The relationship between Albania and Kosova, though conducted through institutional channels, had remained confined to two political forces, Democratic Party (DP) and the Democratic League of Kosova (DLK), or even in between two individuals, *Berisha* and *Rugova*, as some would say.[7] DP and DLK did not try to reach out to other political forces in Albania and Kosova in order to establish a wider and open dialogue on the national question.[8] This lack of consensus on the national question proved to be very costly for the Albanians when the crisis broke out. *Rugova* publicly supported *Berisha* and PD policies during national elections and the referendum on the constitution. This attitude undoubtedly increased the already existing gap between *Rugova* and the Socialist Party. Whereas *Berisha*, by strongly supporting *Rugova* and his peaceful policies, and by maintaining contacts only with hirn, contributed to the marginalisation of the other political figures in Kosova.[9]

Strong co-operation that developed between Albania and Kosova notwithstanding, Tirana was in no position to assist the Albanians in Kosova to achieve their independence. By supporting the *Ghandian* policies of *Rugova*, Albania had clearly indicated that its principle concern was the prevention of conflict. The endorsement of Kosova statehood would have exacerbated regional tensions and threatened the Albania's security. Therefore, Albania declared that it would accept a solution that provided not less than the rights Albanians enjoyed under 1974 constitution. This stande of the Albanian government was adopted immediately after coming to power of *Berisha* in March 1992.[10]

Until late 1996, Albanian foreign policy remained unchanged. It continued to support *Rugova's* peaceful policy and it urged the US and Western countries to exercise pressure on Belgrade to initiate negotiation with Prishtina and restore autonomy so as to defuse tensions in the region. However, the political realities that had shaped Albania's foreign policy in the

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4   Biberaj, Albania in Transition, p. 251

5   EE/1588/BBC World Summary, 12 January, 1993

6   Baze, Shqiperia dhe Lufta ne Kosova, p. 28

7   Fabian Schmidt, "Balancing the Power Triangle", Transition, 26 May, 1995, p.39, Louis Zanga, "The Question of Kosovar Sovereignty", RFE/RL Research Reports, Vol. 1, No.43, 30 October, 1992.

8   Socialist Party Calls for a Round Table of Albanian and Kosovo Parties on Kosova, "Koha Jone" Lezhe, 8 June 1994, pp. 3-4. BBC Monitoring Service, 21 June 1994.

9   Baze, Shqiperia dhe Lufta ne Kosove, p.39

10 Hamilton, "Albania: Restore Autonomy to Kosova Albanian Leader Urges, Reuters, 31 August, 1992.

early 1990s bad changed significantly; exclusion of Kosova from the peace negotiations in Dayton marked a serious setback to the efforts of *Rugova* and *Berisha* to bring about a settlement. In the wake of the Dayton Agreement the importance of Albania's regional role decreased as the fighting in Bosnia ended and the threat of a spill over to the neighbouring countries subsided,[11] while the position of Belgrade was strengthened since its support was deemed crucial for the peace accord in Bosnia.

In addition, the international image of Albania was tarnished after the controversial elections of May 1996. Albanian government carne under international pressure and the relations with the US, which had been remarkable until then, deteriorated significantly.[12] During all this period, Tirana's policy toward Kosova continued to remain unchanged. It was only after the start of the opposition protests in Belgrade that we noticed a change. Berisha called on the Albanians of Kosova to stage peaceful protests in support of the Serbian Opposition arguing that the democratisation of Serbia was important for the resolution of the Kosova question.[13] The novelty of this stand consisted of two things. In contrast to the previous cautious policy of Albania this was a bold move. Secondly, for the first time *Berisha* was openly challenging *Rugova's* position, which maintained that the protests were an internal Serbian affair, and that there was no difference between *Milosevic* and the opposition. The ritt between *Berisha* and *Rugova* became clear as the press in Kosova started attacking *Berisha*.[14] Whether the move of *Berisha* marked the beginning of a more assertive policy by Albania is difficult to say due to the outbreak of the crisis in Albania.

Albania's Foreign Policy toward Macedonia

Although the disintegration of Yugoslavia further fragmented the Albanians in the Balkans, the establishment of an independent Macedonian state was in the interest of Albania and the Albanians in general. The decision of Macedonia not to remain in rump Yugoslavia weakened Serb regional standing and separated Greece and Serbia. In addition, both countries shared similar interests. They were being squeezed by the Greek-Serb axis and could offset some of the pressure by developing dose economic and political ties.[15] Due to these considerations Tirana strongly supported Macedonia's stability and independence, and urged the Albanians of Macedonia to work toward this end. While Albania showed interest in the welfare of the ethnic Albanians the issue was not the main factor shaping bilateral relations. As we trace the development of Albanian-Macedonian relations, we notice that the overriding security concern – stability of Macedonia – prevailed over other concerns.[16] Tirana (and the Kosovar leadership) did not support the move of the Albanians in Macedonia for territorial autonomy afraid that this would trigger Serbian intervention.

During *Gligorov's* visit to Albania in June 1992 *Berisha* supported the Albanians' demand for constituent nation's status in Macedonia, and linked the recognition of Macedonia with the latter's respect for Albanians rights there. Following the meeting, the economic relations between the two countries intensified. The transportation of oil through Albania was made possible and in December *Berisha* and *Gligorov* met again on the occasion of the opening of

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[11] Baze, Shqiperia dhe Lufta ne Kosove, p.29

[12] Biberaj, Albania in Transition, p.315

[13] Albania: Foreign Minister says Kosovo issue... ATA news agency, Tirane, 28 December 1996

[14] Baze, Shqzperia dhe Lufta ne Kosove, p.51

[15] Vasil Turpovski, "The Balkan Crisis and the Republic of Macedonia", in Danopolous and Messas (eds.), Crises in the Balkans, Boulder Colo: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 141-43.

[16] Biberaj, Albania in Transition, p.239-40.

new border points. These contacts indicated that Albania had de facto recognised Macedonia.[17] De jure recognition was extended immediately after the UN recognition of Macedonia in April 1993, notwithstanding Macedonian authorities failure to address any of the Albanian grievances. Albania's position was reversed because Tirana thought that the recognition of Macedonia would improve the relations between the two countries thus creating the necessary conditions for solving the Status of Albanians in Macedonia.[18] A similar change in policy occurred on the issue of Macedonia's membership in OSCE that had been vetoed by Albania and Greece.

At the end of 1993 the relations between the two countries experienced, for a brief period, deterioration due to the occurrence of two events. Macedonian authorities announced that they had discovered a paramilitary organisation that had connections with Tirana. Considering the Albanian policy toward Kosova and Macedonia, such allegations sounded very absurd. In its policy toward the Kosova question, primary concern of Albania was to avoid a conflict with Serbia. The same thing held true for Macedonia which was illustrated by the continuous call on the Albanians in Macedonia to become a stabilising factor in Macedonia. Moreover, according to this allegations, Albania had decided to create trouble in Macedonia at the end of 1993, after Macedonia had been admitted to the TJN, and also after the US troops had been stationed there, and a number of European countries had established diplomatic relations with Macedonia. Following the incident Albanian Defence Minister and his Macedonian counterpart tried to minimise the importance of the event.

The second event, which was seen as hardening of the Albanian stance toward Macedonia, was Tirana's involvement in the split of the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP).[19] The PDP had been suffering from internal dissent over the strategy to be employed in order to achieve the party's goals. A faction composed of the cabinet and parliament members supported participation in the government as the best way to achieve the Albanians' goals. Whereas the other group, led by *Menduh Thaci* and *Arben Xhaferi*, maintained that participation in government without any progress toward meeting Albanian grievances had weakened the bargaining position of the Albanians. In December 1993 the PDP leadership resigned. Tirana had openly supported *Xhaferi* and *Thaci* section. In the national congress in February 1994 the party split into two. The move by Albania brought about a strong reaction from Skopje. Careful observation of the event and subsequent developments should raise a few questions in one's mind.

The differentiation of political forces in Macedonia by analysts between moderate and radical had been in vogue until the elections of 1998, though such political categories did not always reflect the reality. After the split of PDP, both groups kept the Party's program and statutes.[20] The use of labels, such as nationalist and moderate, benefited the ruling forces in government. Secondly, the event gives the impression as if the key to understanding and controlling developments concerning Albanians outside Albania resides in Tirana. This image has also been reinforced by the way in which Western diplomacy in the region has been conducted. It has focused on Albania and *Berisha* instead of turning their attention to the local Albanian leaders in Macedonia and their grievances.[21] Lastly, was there really a shift in Albania's policy toward Macedonia? In February Greece imposed an embargo on Macedonia.

[17]   Biberaj, "Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg", p.18.

[18]   Robert Austin, "Albania-Macedonian Relations, Confrontation or Co-operation?" RFE/RL Research Reports, p. 4.

[19]   Fabian Schmidt, "From National Consensus to Pluralism", p. 27

[20]   Schmidt, "From National Consensus to Pluralism" p.27

[21]   Isa Blunmi, "The Question of Identity, Diplomacy and Albanians in Macedonia"

That, combined with the UN embargo on Yugoslavia, proved disastrous for the Macedonian economy. At this difficult situation Albania (and Bulgaria) provided Macedonia with alternative trade routes[22] without trying to capitalise on Macedonia's weakness. This clearly illustrated that the overriding security concern of Albania — stability of Macedonia — remained the same.

In May *Berisha* met with *Gligorov* for informal talks. The meeting focused primarily on how to increase economic co-operation between the two countries, and extend communication and transportation links. Berisha praised *Gligorov* for the steps taken to enlarge the middle school system, Albanian language media and the decision to hold the population census. The attitude of Albania toward Macedonia did not change even after the incident following the establishment of the Albanian University in Tetova. While Tirana recognised and supported the university, its reaction toward Skopje was restrained.[23]

Although the relations between Macedonian authorities and the Albanians in Macedonia provided considerable room for intervention, Tirana did not exploit it.[24] The stability of Macedonia, not the ethnic ties, was and still is the main factor that has shaped Albanian-Macedonian relations. Fully aware of this[25] and the constraints under which Albanian foreign policy operated due to the Kosovo question and the problematic relationship with Greece, Macedonian authorities did not have to make concessions to Albanians at home in order to maintain relations with Tirana at a satisfactory level. Apart from geostrategic considerations, the attitude of Tirana toward Skopje has also been influenced by the way Tirana perceives the problem of Albanians of Macedonia. For the Albanian political class it is Kosova that constitutes what we know as the Albanian national question, whereas the case of Macedonia is seen as "one of equal rights within the existing state."[26]

The policy of the Democratic Government toward Greece

Relations between Tirana and Athens constitute a very important and complex dimension that has always demanded the special attention and energies of the Albanian government. The Albanian public opinion too, as a result of the large number of Albanian emigrant workers in Greece, has been much more interested in this dimension over other foreign policy issues. The relations between the two have also necessitated the intervention of international actors to reduce the tensions.

The Democratic government that emerged after the 1992 elections was very much interested in having good relations with its southern neighbour. Albania was going through a very difficult transition; the economy was in ruins and the country faced serious security threats due to the outbreak of the conflict in Yugoslavia. The immigration of hundreds of thousands of Albanians to Greece relieved some of the transition pains by reducing unemployment and helping the economic recovery through their annual remittances. As the only Balkan country being member of EU and NATO, Greek political support was also important for Albania's integration into the Western institutions. In addition, the danger of the Yugoslav conflict

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[22] Albania: Berisha offers facilities to Macedonia to overcome Blockade, BBC Monitoring Service, 23 February, 1994

[23] Biberaj, Albania in Transition, p.242

[24] Blazevska and Mehmeti, "Steering Through the Regional Troubles", in The New Accommodation

[25] Macedonia: Premier Interviewed on Economic Crisis, Albania. 'Koha Jone' Tirana, 3 June 1995, BBC Monitoring Service, 8 June 1995, Quoting Macedonian PM: "Common sense says that it is in Albania's interest for her neighbour to be stable".

[26] Rubin Barnett, (ed.) Toward Comprehensive Peace in the Southeastern Europe, p.76-79

moving to Albanian inhabited territories required that that Tirana maintained good relations with neighbouring countries. However, despite this positive disposition of Albania, relations between the two remained problematic until the middle of 1995. The reasons accounting for this state of affairs can be found in the aims of the Greek government toward Albania and the region as well as in the means employed to achieve these goals.

Greek policy in the early 1990s was affected by strong forces of nationalism. Greece tried to establish itself as a leading regional power that could impose its terms on others. To this end it pursued an aggressive foreign policy as illustrated by the measures that it adopted against Macedonia and Albania. Another factor that had a negative impact on bilateral relations and increased Tirana's suspicions was the development of the Greek-Serb axis. The very strong and constant pro Serb stance of Athens was indicative of different and opposing national interests between Albania and Greece.

The policy of Greece toward Albania is embodied in the phrase:

"Albania's road to Europe goes via Athens". However, Greece lacked the resources to play this special role. In 1994 trade with Greece composed only 14% of the overall trade relations, while Greek investments only 15% of the total foreign investments in Albania. Italy was ahead of Greece in both of these indicators. Even in terms of the economic aid, Greece was behind Italy, United States and Germany.[27] Although the remittances of the Albanian refugees constitute a significant contribution to the GNP, which enhances Athens' importance, Greece too, benefits a lot from Albania emigrant workers. They provide a cheap labour force and their Greek employers save money by not paying their social security benefits. In addition, the Albanians' savings in Greek banks provide capital for investments in the Greek economy. The economic growth that is witnessed in Northern Greece in the last decade can be attributed, to a large extent, to the cheap Albanian labour force and trade relations between Northern Greek regions and Albania. In addition to economic benefits, Greece has turned the Albanian refugees into a powerful foreign policy instrument, which is used whenever Greece is not pleased with the attitude of the Albanian Government. The deportation of Albanians constitutes the most effective instrument that Greece possesses toward Albania. By returning the refugees Greece not only put pressure on the Albanian economy but also created new cleavages in the Albanian political system. The left-wing Opposition adopted a more conciliatory attitude toward Greece, hoping that it would attract the vote of those families that were directly affected by the deportation policies and tensions between Tirana and Athens. Yet at the same time, such Greek policies have also increased anti-Greek feelings among the Albanian population. Turning again to the issue of Athens' goal that Tirana accepts its positions. Because of different national interests and the general situation of turmoil that existed in the Balkans, Tirana could not fall into the Greek foreign policy line. Contrary to the policies of Athens, Albania recognised Macedonia in early 1993 and during the Greek imposed embargo provided Macedonia with alternative trade routes. Greece was also distressed by the deepening political and military relationship of Albania with United States and Turkey, which narrowed its room to manoeuvre.[28]

The safeguarding of the Greek minority rights constitutes another objective of Greece in Albania. As a mother country, Greece has naturally an interest in the well being of the minority. Greek officials have declared time after time that the improvement of bilateral relations depends on respect for the minority rights. The bilateral disputes between Greece

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[27]   Mero Baze, Kthim Grek, Eurolindja, Tirane, 1995, p.76

[28]   Elez Biberaj, Albania in Transition, p. 242

and Albania have always had, at least as officially stated reason, the maltreatment of the Greek minority. A brief look at the Albanian history shows that, unlike other Balkan countries, minorities in Albania have not experienced periods of repression, forced assimilation or ethnic cleansing. Two main factors account for this positive legacy. As a result of the small size of the minorities, even the Greek minority that is more visible is estimated at around 100.000[29] constituting dose to 3% of the population, minorities are not perceived by the Albanians as a threat to their control over the state. Second, inter-ethnic tolerance in Albania is directly connected to inter-religious tolerance of which Albania provides a unique example not only in the Balkans but even beyond. Greek minority is fully integrated in the Albanian political, economic and social life, as it is confirmed also in the communication between the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Albanian government.[30] Considering Albania's weak position vis-à-vis Greece; its quest for integration in the Western Institutions; and its efforts to internationalise the Kosova issue, Albania could not afford, even if it wanted, to pursue policies other than those that further integrated the Greek minority. Hence the concern for Greek minority in Albania has turned into a foreign policy instrument that Greece uses to bring pressure on the Albanian government similar to the one that we mentioned above: the deportation of Albanian refugees. The Albanians' concern with the Greek demands on behalf of the Greek minority is that they have in the past - but also certain statements in the 1990s raised similar concerns - been associated with irredentist aims of Greece toward southern Albania or Northern Epirus as Greeks call it. Greece has always considered the acquisition of South Albania as part of the fulfilment of the Megali Idea. During the Balkan Wars, First and Second World War Greece has tried to capture South Albania. However, in each case the post-war settlement did not change the Albanian-Greek border that was decided in the Protocol of Firence in December 1913. Since 1940 Greece has been in a State of War with Albania following Italy's attack against Greece from Albania, though Albania then was no longer a sovereign country. Paradoxically the state of war between Albania and Greece continues to exist. International law experts say that the decision of Mr. *Papandreou's* Socialist government in 1987 to lift the state of war against Albania is not juridical enough to invalidate the state of war because Greek parliament has never approved the act.[31] The border issue between Greece and Albania should have been covered by the Helsinki Final Act on the inviolability of borders in Europe. Nevertheless, the lack of border pyramid between Greece and Albania testifies to the fact that Greece does not

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[29] There exists a huge discrepancy between the official Albanian estimates around 60,000 – 70,000 and the Greek ones ranging from 300,000 to 400,000. Albanians, but also many regional analysts, assert that the inflated Greek mimbers result from the fact that Greeks equate religion with ethnicity, thus countiug as Greeks also those that arc (3reek Orthodox by religion. The US CIA estimates in its World Fact Books for the Greek minority in Albania is at 100,000. Calculations on the size of the Greek minority arc also done based on the number of votes cast for the party Union for Human Rights (The Greek Minority Party). In the parliarnentary elections of March 1992 it received 48,923 votes or 2.9 percent of the total votes. Voter turnout was 90 percent. The estimates for the size of Greek minority, which arc calculated from two different sources provide the following results: around 120,000 (Robert Austin, Kjell Engelbrekt, Duncan Perry, "Albania's Greek Minority", RFE/RL Research Reports, Vol. 3, No. 11, 18 March 1994, p.20) and between 100,000 – 140,000 persons (Greek Helsinki Monitor, "Greeks of Albania and Albanians in Greece", September 1994, p.19). Although there arc problems associated with the above caiculation (not all the voters of Union for Human Rights are Greek and ethnic Greeks do vote for other parties), one thing becomes clear that the numbers claimed by Greeks 300,000 – 400,000 people are not real. According to some independent sources in Tirana the numbers range from 80,000 to 100,000 Greeks. The 100,000 figure is taken with a wide margin. Thus if we take the 100,000 as an approximate estiinate for the Greek minority, then it should compose dose to 3 percent ofthe total population.

[30] CSCE HCNM — Albania letters at http://www.riga.lv/minelres/albania

[31] Remzi Lani, "Albania-Greece: Intrigue and Love", SouthEast European Information Network, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 1 February 2000.

officially recognise the border with Albania. Greek policy toward Albania in the 1990s further increased Albanians fears regarding the ultimate aims of its southern neighbour. Athens has allowed the fierce anti-Albanian propaganda that is aired from the radio stations in Northern Greece by the Panhellenic Union of Northern Epirus Struggle, which calls for autonomy and secession of Northern Epirus (Southern Albania). Greece has tried, and succeeded to some extent, to bring the Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church under the control of the Greek Orthodox Church. The Greek Orthodox Exarch *Anastasios Yanullatos* has been declared as the new Archbishop by the Patriarch in Istanbul, though this is against the statuses of the Autocephalous Albanian church. The Greek Orthodox Church is known for its ultra nationalist attitudes toward the Greek minority and Southern Albania.

The first serious incident in the Albanian-Greek relations brings together almost all the elements that we mentioned above. In 1993 Albanian authorities deported a Greek clergyman who had been caught disseminating maps that showed half of the Albanian territory within the Greek borders. Athens immediately hit back by expelling tens of thousand of illegal Albanian migrant workers. As the relations deteriorated, in a statement by the Greek Prime Minister *Mitsotakis*, among other demands, drew the parallel between Albanians in Kosova and the Greek minority in Albania. Whatever status Albanians demanded for Albanians in Kosova should be granted also to the Greek minority.[32] Such a statement could only be seen as a manifestation of the Greek Serbian axis, aiming at keeping Albania off balance, thus being unable to pressurise Serbia over the Kosova issue. As a result of this, Albania further increased its political and military co-operation with Turkey. Tirana also pointed to the lack of reciprocity in the bilateral relations. While the Greek minority was fully integrated in the political and social life of Albania, Athens would not agree to address the issue of the Albanian *Cham* minority that had been expelled from Greece by the Greek armed forces at the end of the Second World War. Tirana also demanded the legalisation of the Albanian migrant workers in Greece. Relations with Greece further deteriorated and reached their lowest point in April 1994, after an attack on a conscript training center in which two Albanian soldiers were killed. The Albanian government blamed the attack on Greece and called for the UN Security Council to condemn Greece for state terrorism. While Greece denied the attacks, it did not take any measures to curb the actions of the extremist organization.[33] The Albanian government responded by arresting several members of the Greek organisation *Omonia,* on charges of espionage and illegal possession of weapons. As counter measures Greece not only initiated a massive deportation of Albanian immigrants but also vetoed EU aid to Albania and was able to influence US decision regarding 30 million USD funding, which was put on hold. Release of prisoners and improvement in the status of the Greek minority were put as conditions by Greece to normalise relations with Albania. The Albanian public opinion was divided between those that advocated a strong stance on one hand and the left-wing Opposition that criticised the government for overreacting and damaging bilateral relations. At this point, the US and EU became involved trying to defuse tensions. Following the release of the ethnic Greeks, relations improved considerably. A meeting between Albanian and Greek officials in March 1995 called on mutual assistance aimed at easing polemics and on joint action in rooting out the Organisation that had carried the action (MAVI). In 1996, during the visit of the Greek President, Greece and Albania signed the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, Goodneighborliness and Security. Albanian government was aware of the importance of having good relations with Greece due to economic and political considerations. The improvement of bilateral relations reflected also a different Greek foreign policy toward the Balkans that had initiated with Prime Minister *Costas Simitis*.

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[32] Elez Biberaj, Albania in Transitionop. cit., p. 242

[33] ElezBiberaj, p.244

Misperceptions of each other's intentions might have played a role in the escalating feud – Albanians' suspicions that behind Greek demands for minority protection lied irredentist goals – however, unless Greece addresses the *Cham* problem Albanians will not be assured that Athens is genuinely interested in having good relations.

Albania's Foreign Policy toward Kosova during the Socialist-led Government

Three main factors shaped Albanian foreign policy and account for its shift after Socialist took power. The need of Socialist-led coalition government to strengthen their position domestically. As a result of 1997, crisis the legitimacy of state institutions had been severely damaged, the political scene was characterised by strong polarisation and the economy was in ruins. Against this background, no political force could have maintained power without the support of the West. It is in this context that we should understand *Nano's* policy shift toward Kosovo.

In order to win the West's support, *Nano* presented himself as a moderate force that was charting a new course that was in contrast to the nationalistic policies of *Berisha*.[34] As *Nano* put it in a report to the Parliament "our unwavering will to introduce into Albania Western political ethics and do away one by one with the concepts and the mentalities of the old and savage Balkans and Albanian policy."[35] However, as we have seen, *Berisha* had not pursued nationalist policies; he had maintained good relations with Macedonia even though the later had not addressed any of the Albanian grievances. In the case of Kosovo his primary concern had been to avoid the conflict. Although *Berisha* became a strong advocate of the Kosovo Albanians, he did call for the restoration of autonomy and urged them to make compromises. Thus in order to differentiate his policy from the previous one, *Nano* had to engage in spectacular acts like meeting *Milošević* and abandoning all the principles on which Tirana-Prishtina co-operation was based.[36]

The second factor that shaped Albanian foreign policy was the dose relationship that Tirana developed with Athens at the expense of other regional allies. According to many observers, *Nano* was under strong Greek influence.[37] Lastly, what made easier *Nano's* policy shift was the lack of consensus that had existed on the national question. As we noted earlier, the co-operation between Albania and Kosova had developed exclusively between two political forces: DP and DLK. The other political forces were not consulted on the policy that Tirana pursued on the national question. As a result, *Nano* could abandon the previous policy by identifying it with *Berisha*. In addition the continuous support that *Rugova* had given *Berisha* had resulted in estrangement between him and the Socialist Party in Albania. As the events unfolded, it became clear that a kind of alliance had developed between *Nano* and those opposing *Rugova* in Prishtina.

The meeting between *Nano* and *Milošević* during the Crete summit of the Balkan countries very well illustrates the new Albanian foreign policy. In a total policy reversal, Tirana had carried talks with Belgrade on Kosova when only the legitimate leaders of the Kosova Albanians were entitled to carry those talks. Similar to the meeting between Albanian and Yugoslav Foreign Ministers at the UN a month earlier, this meeting had taken place without consultations with the Kosovar Albanian leadership. Since Albania cannot play the role of the

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[34] Baze, Shqiperia dhe Lufta ne Kosove, p.55-56

[35] Albania: Prernier says solving die Kosova Crisis..., 'Zeri 1 Popullit', Reuters, 1 April, 1998.

[36] Baze, Shqiperia dhe Lufta ne Kosove, p. 56.

[37] Biberaj, Albania in Transition, p. 341.

mother state, Tirana cannot represent Kosovar Albanians and decide about their fate. For *Nano* the full observation of the human rights in Kosova and the application of democracy were seen as sufficient conditions to initiate a dialogue with Belgrade.[38] *Nano* also called for direct contacts between Prishtina and Belgrade without the presence of a third party. The new policy had obviously changed from being a factor of support for Kosova Albanians to one of pressure. In line with this policy, *Nano* criticised Kosovar parallel institutions saying that they were not a solution; on the contrary, they radicalised the societies that had created them.[39]

The new policy of Tirana was strongly criticised by the Kosovar Albanians which asked the "government in Tirana to give the same support as its predecessor" and reminded it that the "relations between Albania and Kosova is not one of a mother-daughter country."[40] The contacts between Tirana and Prishtina had almost broken down.

Despite criticisms at home *Nano* had won praise abroad. The Crete meeting had taken place with Athens's blessing which wanted to rehabilitate *Milošević*.[41] The Western countries, too, had endorsed the meeting and gave their support to *Nano*.[42]

Even after the outbreak of war in Kosova, in March 1998, the government's attitude remained restrained and ambivalent.[43] While all the political forces in Albania, including the Socialists, joined a massive rally in Tirana in support of Kosova under the motto "one nation, one stand", the government failed to adopt these as the main building block of its policy. Tirana's demand for NATO troops to be deployed in the north-eastern border to prevent a spillover into Albania clearly pointed to the lack of this principle. Tirana was trying to insulate itself from the crisis in Kosova. The government failed to formulate a policy of its own to present the Albanian view on Kosova. Rather it played the role of the obedient partner of the West.[44]

As fighting escalated in Kosova, during the May-June period, and the West refused to intervene, *Nano* toughened his rhetoric, as illustrated by one of his declarations that Albania was "on the eve of war" with Yugoslavia and called for NATO intervention.[45] However, the main driving force behind his policy had not changed. In Crans Montana *Nano* openly opposed independence for Kosova as not being the best way to end the fighting and suggested that the "right solution would be the creation of a democratic framework, be it a local parliament or administration". His demand did not even match that of the international community that had asked for substantial autonomy. But what was more important than his pronouncement on the future status of Kosova was bis attempt to establish himself as the only reliable and indispensable partner of the West. In Crans Montana *Nano* declared that *Rugova* had become a man without any authority, while adding that he had "information that the KLA has the capacity and the authority to be included into a negotiation process", and that Tirana

[38] Dena Kyrakiou, Greece: Tirana Belgrade agree to renew ties. Reuters, 4 November, 1997

[39] ENTER news agency, Tirana ,7 February, 1998

[40] Leading ethnic Albanian Party criticises die Albanian premier. 'Kosova Daily Report', Prishtina, 3 November, 1997, BBC Monitoring Service, 05/11/97

[41] Dina Krykidou, Greece: Albania, Belgrade agree to renew ties.

[42] Germany: Albania – Kinkel supports Albania's policy of dialogue with Belgrade, ATA news agency, Tirane, 15 November, 1997, BBC Monitoring Service, 18/11/97, British Foreign Secretary promises Premier continuous support, ATA, 15 December, 1997

[43] IC Group Report: The View From Tirana: The Albanian dimension of die Kosova crisis 10/07/98

[44] Mero Baze, "War in Kosova and Albanian Paralyses", Gazeta Albania, 3 June, 1998

[45] Austria: Albania says on the eve of war with Yugoslavia, Reuters 22 June, 1998

was "trying to contact every one possible on the ground with due influence to moderate KLA factions".[46]

The need to win West's support in order to shore up his position at home is the main driving force behind *Nano's* foreign policy. Despite widespread corruption and marginalisation of the opposition the West continued to support the Socialist-led government.[47] Following the violence that was sparked as a result of the assassination of *Azem Hajdari*, a leading Democratic Party figure, *Nano* was forced to resign and was succeeded by *Pandeli Majko.*

The foreign policy pursued by *Majko* changed substantially from his predecessor's. It became more assertive and increased considerably his support for the Albanians in Kosova.[48] The hardening of his stance has been described as a "return to the Balkan nation's traditional line on Kosova". *Majko* clearly stated that "Albania should not embark on the road of giving recipes" and that his government was formulating his policy according to this line.[49] A week from the start of the bombing campaign and as the Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing was underway, *Majko* went as far as saying that "independence is an Option that can be discussed very clearly now".[50] This was a bold statement considering the fact that NATO members were opposed to independence. The present official policy of the Socialist-led government is that it supports Kosovar Albanians will. In other words the independence of Kosova.

The Foreign Policy of the Socialist-led Government toward Macedonia

The policy of the Socialist-led government toward Macedonia, similar to the Democratic party's policy, continued to subordinate the ethnic ties to the security concerns and maintenance of good relations. However, while the main contours of foreign policy remained the same the co Operation between the two countries received a boost, as was indicated by the visit of *Nano* to Skopje and signing of eight agreements in the fields of justice, transportation, economy and finance. Following the outbreak of the war in Kosova in March 1998, the countries increased their co-operation in the security area as well in preventing arms and drug trafficking and illegal border crossings.[51]

The same policy was followed by *Majko*, too, and did not change with the coming to power of a new coalition in Macedonia. The co Operation between Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro increased during the Kosova crisis, as these countries were trying to avoid the destabilising effects of *Milošević's* policies, and cope with the refugee crisis.

The Policy of the Socialist led Government toward Greece

The crisis of 1997 changed dramatically Albania's position and the nature of relationship with Greece. Tirana has accepted in a way the special role that Greece should play in the region. During the 1993-6 period Socialist party's had been critical of Democratic Party's

[46] Elif Koban, Switzerland: Interview – Albania PM urges Balances view on Kosova, Reuters, 26 June, 1998

[47] Daniel McAdams, "Don't Look Now: Another Albanian Nightmare", Human Events, 10/16/98, vol.54, issue 39, p.6

[48] Benet Koleka, Albania: Analysis — Albania seen as hardening Kosova stance, Reuters, 22 January, 1999

[49] Albania — Interview. Albanian PM backs Kosova Albanian line, Reuters, 25 October, 1998

[50] Richard Murphy, Albania — Interview. Kosova Independence an option. Reuters 1 April 1999

[51] Co-operation with Macedonia necessary in die context of Kosovo crisis. ATA news agency, Tirane 17 March, 1998

policies toward Greece. In addition there existed contacts between PASOK and Socialist Party since 1993. This closeness was indicated by the permission that was given to *Fatos Nano*, the leader of Socialist Party, in 1997 to hold election rallies in several Greek cities where there are Albanian emigrants. The Greek government had clearly taken sides in Albanian election and as the course of events showed, a deep cleavage had been created in its relations with the Democratic Party. After the Socialist took power, the contacts between the two increased substantially and intensified in all areas. There were frequent visits of Greek officials in Tirana which were reciprocated by Albanian counterparts. Not only in the domestic scene, but also in the foreign one, Greece started to play a much more important role. Greece was asked to play the role of the third party between Kosova and Belgrade. As we mentioned earlier, in the Crete Summit Athens aimed at rehabilitating *Milošević* and including Serbia in the regional initiatives, and succeeded in arranging a meeting between *Milošević* and *Nano*. The meeting was strongly criticised by Kosovar leadership and the Albanian opposition.

Improvement of relations with Athens happened at the expense of those with Italy and Turkey. The Opposition strongly opposed this and accused the government for selling the interests of the country. As examples were given the presence of a Greek military contingent in Albania without any clear mission whose mandate continued to be extended, the grip of Greece on the Albanian economy, and the sluggish progress on the Corridor VIII that was seen as vital for Albania's development. During this period Greece has used the instrument of deportation of Albanian citizens very rarely.

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Kosovo Crisis: Lessons Learnt in Crisis Management

Challenges and dangers that the modern international community encounters have smaller specific weight regarding to cataclysmic scenarios from the period of the Cold War. However, given in such scale, they represent an alternative for insecurity. Ethnic conflicts, radical nationalism and internal conflicts represent the scenario of the modern international scene, staged by the new relations and the old suffocated contents.[1] Apart from this, modern international relations have acquired new attributes which emerged as a result of the unequal economic development, demographic expansion, and so on.[2] Namely, the new challenges and temptations only confirm the fact that international relations are vitally changing and the international community has to bare that in mind. Complex crises do not recognise national borders and unless they are managed properly they could influence the security and stability on macro and micro level. In that course precisely is focused the question on how to explain in such conditions the division of "stability zone" and "crisis zones"?[3] Perhaps as a substitute for the division "East – West"? Although we cannot perceive them as equal generators of instability, there is still a strong prerequisite that the "crisis zones" will represent a challenge. This emphasises the fact that endangering the peace and the security has modified the itinerary or its priority. That means that within the relation peace-conflict-crises-war little serious interference has occurred. That is why the crisis concept established within a wider context of the cycle depends on the strategy determination when handling crises, which on the other hand is accepted as an assumption that the contingency concept, which is an adequate for a conflict phase, is a rational approach.

In that sense, it is necessary to make a distinction in the crisis management strategies in sense of avoiding the crisis, its prevention, crisis management, when solving the crisis and according to which crisis management is consisted of effort for situation maintenance on high tensions and confrontations. In that manner we are making distinction between conflict prevention based on the prevention techniques from management, that is crisis management.

The distinction is significant because of the fact that the crises have their own developing cycle which reach on an appropriate techniques. That is why the crisis management should be understood as a part of a process, that is an activity which is established as a complex approach for a certain conflict. The crisis by itself, cannot and should not be observed isolated from the conflict cycle as a whole, but the potentials for crisis management are part of the complexity of approaches and the mechanisms for peace and security maintenance.[4]

In that sense, we can initially start from a triple dimension of a conflict that is: prevention of conflicts in order to prevent forcible elements to occur, crisis management for prevention of escalation of crisis and peace establishment.[5]

The triple format of a conflict or its structural components can be observed partially, but they are connected and the interaction is very complex.[6]

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[1] Vukadinovic R., Medunarodni odnosi, (Zagreb: Fakultet politickih znanosti, 1995): 89.

[2] McNamara R.S., The Changing Nature of Global Security and its Impact on South Asia, (Washington DC: Washington Council on Non Proliferation, 1992): 3-4.

[3] Singer M. and Widawsky A., The Real World Order: Zones of Peace Zones of Turmoil, (New York & New Jersey, 1993): 3.

[4] Gocevski T., Ortakovski V., Georgieva L., Transformacya na sovremenite konflikti, (Kumanovo: Makedonska riznica, 1999): 364.

[5] Gocevski T., Mitrevska M., Krizen Menadzment, (Kumanovo: Makedonska riznica, 2001, forthcoming): 150.

Each state has to have at its disposal mechanisms and procedures for conflict management and proper organisation, procedures and agreements for crisis management and conflict prevention. In that sense, the crisis management should assist in the creation of pre-conditions for prevention of crisis on macro and micro level. In this case a political analysis of the possibility for crisis prevention is executed in connection with the relation of the super powers and military-political alliances, military confrontation within Europe as a priority. Nowadays, regarding the new political situation, all those elements have lost that meaning. According to that, the modified nature of the conflicts and the crises facing Europe (e.g. Kosovo crisis) leads to the importance of creating more subtle approach in connection to crisis management versus the current ones which are less efficient.[7] This emphasises the fact that when a crisis is overcome nobody pays any attention to analyse the results, for when other crises in future occur, to be managed and solved with more efficiency and flexible mechanisms.

All that leads to the conclusion that the international community should pay more attention in the creation of a situation which will require establishment and development of a new approach in crisis management.

Thus, "the New World order" should be comprehended as a dynamic state where different actors play their role, state where the contradictions are clearly expressed and the divisions could bring to escalation of new crises and disorders.[8] As a support to this view we could name the example of the warfare in Yugoslavia, that is a war which supposed to settle down the lasting crisis in Kosovo, or the example of Macedonia which was directly under the impact of flow of refugees, and its role as a host in reply to the Kosovo refugee crisis. Namely, The Republic of Macedonia became a significant factor in all the stages of the crisis. Why? Because during the Kosovo refugee crisis Macedonia hosted approximately three hundred and eighty thousand refugees (379,523); out of who approximately two hundred and ninety thousand refugees (287,423) resided in Macedonia throughout the crisis. Using an established air bridge ninety-two thousand and one hundred were transported to third countries (Chart 1):

Refugees Situation on 15 June, 1999	
Refugees in Macedonia	**379,523**
Refugees in camps	**112,434**
Refugees in Host Families	**154,989**
Rest	**20,000**
Departed abroad by July,5	**92,100**

[6]   Hill C., The EU/WEU System of Conflict Prevention: (Rome, Paper presented at the Conference "Preventing Violent Conflict in Europe",1997).

[7]   Mitchell C.R., The structure of International Conflict, (London):97.

[8]   Podatoci od Ministerstvo za odbrana na Republika Makedonija, Aktivnosti na medunarodnite humanitarni organizacii vo Republika Makedonija, 2000.

From these 92,100:

Albania	7.050	*Malta*	105
Australia	1.781	*Netherlands*	3.828
Austria	4.795	*New Zealand*	45
Belgium	1.200	*Norway*	5.810
Canada	5.046	*Poland*	1.047
Croatia	370	*Portugal*	1.283
Czech Rep.	854	*Romania*	41
Denmark	2.789	*Slovakia*	91
Finland	961	*Slovenia*	627
France	5.556	*Spain*	916
Germany	14.104	*Sweden*	3.232
Greece	432	*Switzerland*	1.653
Iceland	73	*Turkey*	8.045
Israel	212	*United Kingdom*	4.902
Italy	6.501	*United States*	8.650
Luxembourg	101		
Total			92.100

Accordingly, the number of population in Macedonia has increased by fourteen point seventy-seven percents (14,77%) (Chart 2):

Comparison according to situation on 15 June, 1999			
Country	**Current Population**	**Estimated Population Increase by 14,77%**	**Almost as the population in**
Macedonia	1.945.932	287.423	**Iceland**
USA	253.250.000	37.406.175	**Canada**
Germany	81.591.000	12.051.361	**Belgium**
France	57.981.000	8.564.057	**Guinea**

The demographic structure at that moment was disturbed. Not to talk about the national and social, because at that very moment that issue was the most significant. Simply, there was a need for accepting refugees. The Kosovo crisis has caused great deal of loss for the Macedonian economy, the agriculture, industrial production, construction, etc. According to some existing analyses, the total drainages that were done to the Republic of Macedonia are around US$ 660 mil. Beside the above mentioned loss, other additional material expenses are estimated to the end of the year (1999), and they are enormous, which caused discrepancy in the budget (Chart 3):

Additional Expenditures from the Budgets of the Government Ministries for the Refugees	
Ministries	**Total expenditures in € for 1999**
Ministry of Urbanism and Civil Eng.	14.294.105
Ministry of Health Care	11.227.907
Ministry of Labour and Social Policy	10.594.438
Ministry of Defence	25.766.294
Ministry of Transportation	3.061.091
Ministry of Interior	28.755.342
Ministry of Education	7.971
Total:	**101.669.800**

Republic of Macedonia has received international assistance from UN, which cannot cover the expenses that occurred, and those are around 100 mil. € for 1999.

If the number of population in the United States had increased by fourteen point seventy-seven percents, it would mean to add it the population from entire Canada. Or for Germany it would mean to add it the population from entire Belgium.

All the data presented here show that the demographic structure in a physical sense would be deranged. Thus, in a condition like this every country would encounter the same or similar problems as the Republic of Macedonia did. Bearing that in mind, one could accept the lessons learnt in crisis management in Macedonia during the refugee crisis. In that sense, Macedonia offers basic recommendations as groundwork for new settlements and for better global co-operation in further crisis situations. Here are some of the most important:

♦ ensuring a united strategic approach towards planning of resources and co-operation with the international organisations such as NATO, United Nations, European Union, and so on;

♦ creating conditions for regional co-operation in crisis management;

♦ ensuring, in the shortest period of time, an agreed package of procedures grounded on verified international directions for co ordination and management of a certain event. That is to say, all the measures to be in co-ordination with and pemiission of the hosting country;

♦   undertaking responsibilities that will not exceed social resources and capacities of the country, or directly endanger its social, economic and national security

♦   concluding an agreement between the hosting country and the international organisations about the kind and the scope of co-operation as well as working in co-ordination with the agreed procedures and directions established for the crisis;

♦   consulting the hosting country about every activity that a foreign agency or organisation plan to undertake;

♦   providing the necessary resources and capacities for support of development of the procedures and project established by the international agencies and organisations as a response to the crisis;

♦   creating timely fortification of the necessary elements and resources for adequate dealing with the crisis;

♦   the responsible participants on domestic and international level must be interactive and have proper experience in the procedures before a crisis de facto occurs;

♦   the agreements and procedures determined by international organisations and agencies between countries in jeopardy and host countries for similar or same events are not compulsory for the countries that did not signed those agreements;

♦   unilateral modification should not be executed in order to respond to a crisis if there is sufficient time for consultations and co ordination. If there is not sufficient time for reaching consensus, the side which has taken up the measure should inform and than involve the other actors in the decision analyses;

♦   the crisis requirements cannot be anticipated as a whole, which is why the agencies for civil protection should be involved in the resource planning;

♦   in order to achieve proper planning, the required elements and resources should be identified,

Identification of the projected approaches should be timely, and it should be a priority in determination of the support procedures and also assistance for the host country and the international agencies.

♦   The procuring procedures in crisis should exploit domestic sources.

♦   Global approach towards co-ordination and financial assistance should be established and implemented before, during and after a crisis occurs.

♦   The legislative and the obligation should be learnt in advance in order to provide proper documentation, health care, proper accommodation and security for the refugees. All that has an important role when the type of the refugees is determined.

♦   The historical heritage of the host country, antiques, monuments and archaeological findings must be respected and properly protected.

♦   The media (press) should always be informed.

♦   The relevant bodies responsible for procedure identification and those which can be used as a response of a complex national crisis to provide highest level of interoperability with the procedures of other agencies and sector must be co-ordinated.

Thus, the imperative of appropriate explanation of these recommendations which emerged from the lessons learnt in crisis management consist of the need to be in co-ordination with the capabilities and the needs of the hosting country and of course with the international agreements.

At the end I will quote the Counsellor for National Security of the President of the United States, Mister Samuel Berger, whose answer to the question "What have we achieved in Kosovo?" was "More of what many people think, but less of what was needed". Here, 1 would add, for the Kosovo refugee crisis the Republic of Macedonia has done much more of what many people think, the lessons are learnt, and the message is for them to be used or not to have crises and never to be used.

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BETWEEN OLD TIES AND NEW CHALLENGES: SLOVENIAN POLICY TOWARDS CRISIS SITUATION IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

1.   INTRODUCTION

The end of the twentieth century in the South-Eastern Europe is marked by presence of multinational peace-keeping forces, partly situated in Kosovo (UNM]K, KFOR), partly in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH, SFOR), as also at the border between Croatia and Montenegro, *Prevlaka* horn. Ten years ago, the multinational (intra Yugoslav) police units came to the end of the stabilisation mission at Kosovo. In between, in past ten years, there was a war on the territories of nearly the whole former Yugoslavia: in Slovenia (1991), in Croatia (1991-1995), in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995), Kosovo (1998-1999), in Serbia and Montenegro (1999). The sole exception was Macedonia, although it was also affected by the turmoil at its borders (with Serbia and Albania) and in its neighbourhood. Some experts would argue if these events constituted one war? The situation in practice would support the notion of different wars having been stopped by different peace accords. All mentioned events constituted the disintegration of second Yugoslavia, the state that was formed during Second World War (1943) as the partisan movement answer to the occupation from fascist and Nazis troops.

In Western countries, more in the USA than in Western Europe, these events were usually defined as a *Balkan War*. *Todorova* is asking, why does the war need to be Balkan, if the Spanish civil war was Spanish, not Iberian, and the Greek civil war was never Balkan (*Todorova*, 1997: 186). In past ten years, the crisis began "in former Yugoslavia", during the war in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina it was determined as Balkan crisis, and finished as crisis in South-Eastern Europe. This is the way in which international community generalised the most dangerous and bloody regional European conflicts in past ten years.

Slovenia, a republic that formed second Yugoslavia together with 5 other socialist republics, followed the same pattern of describing the situation in the region. When Slovenia was attacked by troops of Yugoslav Peoples Army (on 25-26 June, 1991), the Slovenes would call it as *"Yugoslav army occupation"*. When the clashes have moved on to Croatia in autumn 1991, there was "the Balkan War". The NATO's air campaign against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 happened to "Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro".

The analysis of media and political leaders' messages in Slovenia would show how reluctant they are towards two notions: Yugoslavia and the Balkans. Yugoslavia is the term, reserved for the historical states of which Slovenia was an important constitutional part. The Balkans is a geopolitical metaphor[1], in Slovenia understood as the region on the edge of Europe, territorially within Europe, but not part of its civilisation. The turmoil of the Balkans is contrasted with the European zone of peace. The Balkans security identity card in twentieth century, as described by *Aćimović* (1997:128:129), would serve as approval that the unanimous decision of Slovenian population to declare independence in 1991 was correct.

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[1]   It is an abstract symbol of violence, instability, corruption, aggression, militarisation, negative nationalism and brutality (Jelušić in Ma1ešič 2000: 88).

The Kosovo phase of the Balkan war brought about a new category – South-Eastern Europe. South-Eastern Europe became a geographic alternative to the Balkans, which helped Slovenia to become increasingly more engaged in the region than in past ten years.

The main objective of this paper is to depict where and how Slovenia is approaching the problems of the Yugoslavia's successor states. As the word "Yugoslavia" is connected with the common past and with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the term the "Balkans" is still burdened with negative connotation, the only widely accepted term that rests at dispose of the media and t politicians is "South-Eastern Europe". The media coverage of recent visits of Slovenian economic delegations to Serbia (end of 2000, be of 2001) would like to instil the notion of "markets of former Yugoslavia" in the Slovenian public, which might show some softening of the clear distinction between us (the Europe) and them (the Balkans) from the past ten years. The mentioned distinction was the result of Slovenian basic foreign policy orientation to fulfil the security and economic interests of the Republic of Slovenia as a Central European and Mediterranean country within Euro-Atlantic structures. Full member-ship of the Republic of Slovenia in the EU and NATO is, therefore, its basic strategic goal, thus Slovenian politicians would like to show how Slovenia has successfully got rid of the Balkan heritage.

II.   RETURN TO THE BALKANS (SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE)

Appearance of Slovenian diplomats, politicians and even scholars in other countries in South-Eastern Europe has been often accompanied by many unpleasant questions and critical judgements related to retained attitude of Republic of Slovenia to South-European region. Even in January 2001, there are some journalists of right wing oriented newspapers who would like to impose the intentions of restoring the old Yugoslavia to the politicians and economic that claimed for better political and economic relations with Belgrade[2].

Except for the relations with Croatia, which was treated as westward oriented neighbouring state, only a few Politicians have tried to establish some kind of official relationships with Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), Macedonia, Montenegro, let alone Serbia. According to the results of the Slovenian media coverage of the South-Eastern European region problems, we would conclude that the main turn-around was achieved during the Slovenian non-permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the period between January 1998 and December 1999. Why we should point out this period as the most important impetus for Slovenian diplomacy to become more engaged in the South East Europe?

First of all, Slovenian diplomats in New York felt responsible for the ongoing crisis in the Balkans, especially when it became clear that Serbian aggressive policy incarnated in the regime of *Slobodan Milošević* towards the neighbouring countries focused more on the Kosovo as part of Serbia, and on Montenegro as constitutional part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. During the first Slovenian presidency of the UNSC (August 1998) the Resolution on Kosovo, sponsored by Slovenia, was proposed. At the same time, Slovenia became a kind of tutor and a role model to the Montenegrin aspirations for independence. During the NATO air campaign against FRY, Montenegro received extremely positive outlook in the Slovenian media. It was due to the Montenegrin wide opening of the borders to large number of Kosovar refugees and due to its generosity towards the homeless people.

Second reason, why Slovenia should be more actively oriented towards the South Eastern European region, lies in national security of Slovenia. National security and economic

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[2]   Why we left Yugoslavia after all, comments somebody in Demokracija (18 January 2001, p.4).

development of Slovenia depends on security, democratic development and economic stability of the countries in the area of South Eastern Europe. Slovenia is still linked to the majority of these countries through some unsolved property issues and issues of succession to the dissolved SFRY. At the same time, this area offers Slovenia new opportunities for economic co-operation. Slovene exports to the countries of South Eastern Europe account for approximately 16% of the total exports, and the imports for about 7% of total imports. The value of annual trade with the countries of South Eastern Europe is approximately USD 2 billion, whereby Slovenia's surplus amounts to around USD 500 million (*Drobnič* 2000). At the end of 2000, it became very clear that the economic relations with the region will grow very fast in near future.

In terms of international status, Slovenia has proved to be a country with stabile and peaceful oriented democracy (being very serious candidate for EU and NATO membership), as also a country with very elaborated feeling for the needs and troubles of the area left behind on the way to "European civilisation". Slovenia is very active donor state in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Within the Stability Pact, Slovenia has so far proposed (or carried out) over 80 economic, scientific and technical, educational, cultural, and other projects. The international community expressed its greatest recognition for Slovenia by appointing it as the leading country and co-ordinator in the field of human rights and minorities (Drobnič 2000).

III. SLOVENIA IN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS AT THE BALKANS

Slovenia has its police and military troops deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. Three contingents of military police (platoon size) were part of Italian battalion in Multinational Special Unit (MSU) in SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The costs of military police deployment in SFOR are covered by Slovenian military budget. The units of medical support and helicopter transport are also available for SFOR needs. There were also three contingents of military officers deployed in multinational units of KFOR in Kosovo (altogether 18 officers). Fifteen members of civilian police began the one-year term of work in Kosovo as part of UNMIK in November 2000. There are also teachers at the police academy *Vučitrn* coming from Slovenia.

Around 150 members of the Slovenian Army and Slovenian Police have been already experienced in the peace and stability-keeping units at the Balkans. They participated in the peace endeavours of the international community, but as members of the country that historically was a part of common homeland, and because they arc able to understand all involved parties, they arc well accepted among the local population and respected by other members of peacekeeping units in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. They are appropriately equipped, much better than the units in Slovenia. As Slovenian government has guaranteed to allocate more finances for peacekeeping operations in this part of the world in the following years, the Slovenian presence in the region would show the sincere interest of the country to help by conflict resolution, as also it would serve as the main source of military and police experiences in operations out of area.

Slovenian experts were also members in OSCE missions in this region. At the present time they are working on very important and delicate topic – democratisation of the media. With the co-operation and help offered by OSCE and other international organisations, Slovenia plays an active role in the procedure of education and preparation for bureaucracy, public administration and police.

IV. INTERNATIONAL TRUST FUND – THE BEST SLOVENIAN "EXPORT PRODUCT"

On the field of the defence co-operation Slovenia was a founding country of the Mine clearing foundation, named *International Trust Fund* (ITF). This project started in 1998 when mine clearing activities began on the territory of Croatia. Afterwards the objectives of the ITF moved to BiH and in recent time to Kosovo. ITF collected in only two years more than USD 56.000.000,00. The fund raising for ITF has special condition, connected with the Government of USA. US Government doubles the sum that leaders of the ITF put together from different donor states and institutions. With the help of this money more than 10 millions of sq. metres (7 millions of sq. metres in BiH) of the territory of Croatia, BiH, Kosovo and Albania were cleared and over 5000 mines were destroyed. At the same time, people who were severely injured by different types of mines are offered a possibility for special rehabilitation treatment. 350 mine victims (*Nedeljski Dnevnik,* 3 December 2000) were rehabilitated in the Slovene Institute for Rehabilitation of Mine Victims and 56 victims in rehabilitation centres in BiH. Help to injured people is offered without religious, national or other prejudice. Special attention is offered to the children who were many times innocent casualties of mines lying around. ITF provide all necessary equipment for mine clearing and organise special educational program for local peoples how to use the equipment safely. Slovenia that is alone also a great contributor to the ITF, runs the whole program of mine clearing.

V.   THE POLITICS TOWARDS REFUGEES

Republic of Slovenia accepted more than 100,000 refugees from all republics that were part of former Yugoslavia. The greatest flow came from BiH with around 70,000 people in 1992. Over a half of them later moved on, to the West. About 45,000 stayed in Slovenia for several years — with their relatives and friends living in Slovenia from the times before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, as well as in refugee centres throughout the country, operated by Slovenian government. The refugees were offered the level of standard that Slovenia could give at that time; there was a lot of help coming from NGOs, especially Red Cross and Caritas, as also coming from foreign countries. At the beginning, children were sent to the schools established inside the refugee centres, because there were a lot of teachers among refugees able to teach young people. Later on, when many of these people moved to other countries or back to Croatia or BiH, Slovenian government decided to incorporate the refugee children in Slovenian education system. Many of them are now students at the University of Ljubljana and University of Maribor. Some of them became integrated and probably permanently settled in Slovenia. The NGO's, like Red Cross and Caritas, are constantly collecting money, used clothes, food. Each September, when new school terms begin, Slovenian primary and secondary schools are sending school necessaries to BiH (books, notebooks, pencils).

In 1999, Red Cross and Slovenian media started humanitarian action called *Hand to refugees – Slovenian village.* The initial idea was to build up a village in the Macedonian area with many refugees. After the NATO air strike on FRY, which forced Serb troops to leave Kosovo, many refugees went back to Kosovo, and Slovenian humanitarian action finished with a small village built near *Djakovica*.

Each summer, active members of Caritas and pupils from Ljubljana's Theological Gymnasium go voluntarily to BiH and help local people in everyday life. They are working on restoration of ecclesiastic buildings, which were destructed during the war.

VI. ACADEMIC CO-OPERATION

Academic community of former Yugoslavia was devastated at the beginning of the armed conflict in Slovenia. Slovenian scientists that were engaged in common Yugoslav projects turned to the western scientific community and entered the networks of European Commission or other scientific associations. For some years, the territory of former Yugoslavia was no more the attractive research matter. The scientists from the region moved westward in huge numbers, those who stayed lagged behind because of war devastation and poor budget of their war-occupied countries.

Some defence and military analysts, like *Anton Bebler* and *Anton Žabkar* (both from University of Ljubljana), worked continuously on the analysis of the Balkan conflicts. They published numerous articles and kept the presence of the Balkan war alive in the Slovenian and world social sciences. Slovenian Faculty of Social Sciences (Defence Studies Division) focused upon the analysis of media warfare (*Marjan Malešič* and international security aspect (*Anton Grizold*) of the Balkan war. Despite the officially broken bonds of former Yugoslavia, it continued to cooperate with some experts on defence matters from Zagreb Faculty of Political Sciences, among whom *Radovan Vukadinović* and *Siniša Tatalović* influenced significantly the polemological overview of the war in Croatia.

There was also a link established between Slovenian Defence Studies Division and Institute of Defence, University of Skopje, Faculty of Philosophy, through which the Macedonian defence analysts as *Biljana Vankovska, Zoran Nacev* and *Anastas Lakoski* presented Macedonian understanding of the Balkan crisis. Looking at this newly established scientific community in which scientists from Skopje, Zagreb and Ljubljana have put together the efforts to explain the roots and consequences of the Balkan war, we should notice that all of them belong to defence studies departments. These education branches were established 25 years ago at five different university centers in former Yugoslavia (Ljubljana, Zagreb, Sarajevo, Belgrade, Skopje) in order to educate civilian experts for defence system. Although their initial focus was on the national security systems of theirs respected republics, the common scientific network showed the elaborated expertise in military, polemological and defence analyses of the contemporary world conflicts. The network might serve to re-establish or further develop the conflict resolution and peace management studies in the South Eastern Europe.

VII. CONCLUSION

The process of co-operation inside the region of former Yugoslav republics, if not the whole Balkan region or even the region of South Eastern Europe would foster the sincere wish of the Yugoslav successor states to contribute to stability in the region and in Europe as a whole. There is a hope that they would gradually enter the European Union, the goal that was a leading star of the former Yugoslavia's government just before the war broke out. It will need a lot of years, much more than it would if Yugoslavia would democratise itself when the Cold War was over, if its nations would be able to stop the aggressiveness of the Serb nationalists under *Slobodan Milošević* if it would be able to reorganise its Armed Forces before they became a threat to itself. Unfortunately, all mentioned preconditions needed the period of ten years and a war with thousands of death and millions of displaced persons in order to be fulfilled.

Looking back to the beginning of the nineties there was no actor inside the former Yugoslavia able to force such reorganisation. Except international community! As many times in the history of the Balkans, the evil and good were initiated and brought in from outside the region. This is again an indicator of highly deficient cultural, economic and

political cohesion of the Balkans. The Balkans has proved the well earned reputation of troublemaker. After World War Two, the Yugoslav state, within the Balkan region and generally perceived as being in eastern Europe, sought to overcome the historical legacy of the Balkans by constructing a supranational civil identity – non-aligned Yugoslavia. Yugoslav identity collapsed in 1991 and *balkanisation* returned. The war that followed was fought in "the Balkans" and was a historical repetition of the Balkan wars from the beginning of the century. Cohen once stated: "The twentieth century began, and seems destined to end, with the major South Slav ethnic groups divided among separate Balkan states. Whether such division is a tragedy or a blessing depends on one's vantage point." (Cohen, 1995: xvii)

Slovenia projects stability and prosperity into the conflict region. Its diplomatic, economic, military, police and academic ties with countries in the region, its presence in multilateral efforts to stabilise the region, and its preparedness to act as a part of international community when bringing the initiatives for co-operation to South-Eastern Europe, would help to generate the positive experiences and desirable arrangements. Comparable efforts of all Yugoslav successor states would maybe avoid the danger of a vicious circle of dependency on the presence of foreign peace-keepers. We hope that South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans will overcome its centuries old distinction as the most volatile and troublesome part of the European continent in 21st century, and generations that are coming would face the durable and prospectus peace.

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1. Demokracija, 18.January 2001, N.3, Vol.6. p.4.

2. Nedeljski Dnevnik, 3 December 2000. ps.6,8. Tik pod površš prežijo plodovi smrti... Slovenski sklad za razminiranje in pomoč žrtvam min v BIH je postal najuspešnejši slovenski "izvozni produkt"

Other:

Presentation: International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance. 6. International Explosive Ordnance Disposal Conference.

Bulgaria's Experience in Peace Support Operations

This paper is trying to examine rather the Bulgarian initial inexperience and step-by-step involvement in Peace Support Operations during the first decade after the end of the Cold War. It is based mainly on some new archival material and official analyses as well as on the latest political, sociological and military research in the country. A study of the oral testimonies of the participants in the described events and more thorough critical examination of our modest experience in the matter have just started.

Under the conditions of the bi-polar post-war confrontation Bulgaria strictly follows the political line of the Soviet Bloc determined by Kremlin. This position is observed in regard of the UN peacekeeping operations, too. In the Cold War years no Bulgarian military units or observers directly participate in any armed conflict nor are they included in any UN missions. During the Korean War in March 1952 a group of Bulgarian army physicians (26 people) is sent to the province of Northern Pyongyang. Even the members of the group management themselves are not quite aware whether it should be treated as a military unit or a humanitarian mission under the Bulgarian Red Cross[1].

A Bulgarian participation in UN military forces is more seriously discussed for a first time by the Bulgarian authorities immediately after the flare-up of the Cyprus Crisis (December 1963 - March 1964). In March 1964 Canada and some Scandinavian countries put forward for discussion the creation of permanent UN armed forces. The Bulgarian position is strictly defined by the Soviets' negative reaction to the proposal, which is treated by them as a sequence of the US idea to form "international police forces"[2]. The matter is discussed at a special session of the Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo in December 1964, chaired by *Todor Zhivkov*.[3] Within the boundaries of the intelligence information exchange among the Warsaw Pact Secret Services in 1965 strictly confidential information is received in Sofia by the State Security Council of Rumania regarding "the behind the scenes Western countries' preparation of UN peacekeeping forces"[4]. In the beginning of 1967 Bulgaria officially supports a Soviet Memorandum which keeps on maintaining die Kremlin's previous attitude in regard of die UN peacekeeping operations[5].

A radical change in die Bulgarian Government's attitude toward this problem is only observed after die 1967 Middle East War. In July 1970 an expert report regarding the possibility to get Bulgarian contingents ready "for UN needs" is made out by die Ministry of Foreign Affairs[6]. At die culmination of the next Israeli-Arab war on October 26 1973 Egypt addresses die UN Security Council with an urgent appeal for support. As early as die next day at an extraordinary session die Bulgarian political leadership for die first time in die country's post-war history adopts a principal resolution that a positive answer is to be given to "a possible proposal for Bulgarian participation with armed forces in die UN contingent for securing control of cease-fire in die Middle East"[7]. An invitation of such kind for Bulgarian

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[1]   Central State Archive /CDA/, Sofia, Fond 1b, Record 24, File 134, p. 1-5.

[2]   Kronlund Jan, Proposal by Canada on a Permanent UN Stand-By Force and Finnish Reaction to it - Peacekeeping 1815 to Today [1995], p. 393-402.

[3]   CDA, Fond 1b, Record 6, File 5708, p. 1-25.

[4]   Archive of the Ministry of the Interior /AMVRJ, Sofia, Fond 1, Record 10, File 338, p. 64-67

[5]   CDA, Fond 1b, Record 6, File 6626, p. 1-14.

[6]   Diplomatic Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs /DAMVNR/, Sofia, Record 21p, File 453, p. 1-3.

[7]   CDA, Fond 1b, Record 35, File 4426, p. 1.

participation in the UN mission in die Middle East/UNEF II/ is not subsequently made. At die end of its rule, in September 1988, die *Zhivkov* regime replies in positive as well to an application of SWAPO for including Bulgarian representatives in die UN mission in support to die realisation of Namibia's period transition toward full independence/UNTAG/[8] A special proposal on die issue is made out in April 1989 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, *Petar Mladenov*[9] but the drastic strain of die political situation at home in consequence of die protest actions of die Bulgarian Turks and die simultaneous actions of anti-governmental dissident groups in the course of die following month obviously make this topic dropped from die agenda.

Immediately after die first more serious international crisis after die end of die Cold War die new Bulgarian government declares its willingness to join die world's organisation's actions directed toward die settling of armed conflicts. During die military operations preparatory period of the multinational forces under the UN aegis in the Persian Gulf for the first time the idea of Bulgarian participation with an armed contingent is officially set forward. The Suggestion to send a Bulgarian Engineers' battalion in the Persian Gulf made by President Zhelyu Zhelev brings about animated debates in the National Assembly but a timely decision is not reached owing to the speedy conclusion of "Desert Storm" operation. Among the arguments opposing an extempore and hasty decision on this matter is the one claiming that differently from some other East-European countries, Bulgaria has no experience in such operations[10] Thus, for instance, in the period 1948-1992 Poland, with its personnel or military observers, has taken part in seven out of the total fifteen UN peacekeeping operations, while Czechoslovakia has participated in five[11].

A year later, Resolution No.49 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria of February 7 1992 suggests that the National Assembly should endorse a "participation of a Bulgarian armed contingent (one infantry battalion) in UN peace-keeping operations". On April 15th 1992 the National Assembly nearly unanimously votes in favour of sending one Bulgarian infantry battalion to Cambodia. This unanimity shows the concern of the highest political ruling body in the Republic of Bulgaria with the flare-up of multiple fires of tension, one of which (that in Bosnia) is a close-by Bulgarian border. There are also a number of critical remarks in the analysis of the first Bulgarian armed participation in a UN peacekeeping Operation (UNTAC). The main conclusion is that the preparation period of the Bulgarian participants (who numbered nearly 900 people[12]) was extremely short, considering the complicated circumstances in the region of operation[13]. A careful consideration of the experience gained through this participation of a Bulgarian armed contingent makes possible to improve the selection, preparation and organisation of a future Bulgarian inclusion in peacekeeping operations. In the course of the next months Bulgarian military and police observers are sent in different crisis areas, i.e. with the UN mission in Angola UNAVEM II and the mission in Tadjikistan UNMOT, where more than sixty Bulgarian officers have passed through in the course of the last five years.

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[8]   See: Crocker, Chester, Peacemaking in Southern Africa: The Namibia-Angola Settlement of 1988 - Herding Cats. Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World [Peace Institute, Washington, 1999], p. 207-244.

[9]   CDA, Fond 1b, Record 35, File 150-88; Record 36, File 181-89.

[10] Bechar, Nansen, Possibilities for a Bulgarian Participation in Peacekeeping: New Experience and New Dilemmas - International Relations, Sofia, 1994, No. 5, p. 18.

[11] The Military Balance. 1992/1993, [IISS, London, 1992], p. 247-250.

[12] An infantry battalion of 850 persons, 4 staff officers, 16 officers as military observers and 11 as rnilitary police.

[13] Yankov, Yanko, The Cambodia Diary; Naydenov, V., The Cambodia Mission: Lessons Learned - *Military History Journal*, Sofia, 1994, No. 2, p. 2-6, 86-93.

Further to the bilateral agreements in the defence field concluded with the neighbouring NATO member countries - Greece and Turkey in 199 1- 1992 and a more intensive participation in the NATO military structures' activities in 1993[14], the achievement of operational compatibility/interoperability/ with the NATO' principles of command, standards and normative regulations during joint military exercises, seminars and other military-political and military-technical initiatives is put forward as a target of predominant importance. Even immediately after the dissolution of the Organisation of the Warsaw Pact on July 1st 1991 the Bulgarian State and military leadership shows an increased interest in the widening of professional contacts and co-operation with NATO. During his talks with *Manfred Wörner*, Secretary-General of the Pact, in the NATO Headquarters in Brussels in November 1991, Bulgarian President *Zhelyu Zhelev* puts forward several topics related to the bilateral and multilateral co-operation: opening a dialogue "on the possibilities to undertake ad hoc initiatives and procedures for prevention and settlement of crisis situations and conflicts; of widening the contacts in the military field through sending Bulgarian officers in NATO military schools as well as through co-operation in the sphere of military planning, civil-military relations, the control of the air space, etc. The President *Zhelev* explicitly states: "We are prepared to take part in the joint planning of combined Operations in cases of natural disasters and flows of refugees as well as in cases of other non-conventional security threats in Europe"[15].

In the end of April 1993, Gen. *Lyuben Petrov*, Chief of General Staff of the Bulgarian Armed Forces on the invitation of the NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe Gen. *John Shalikashvili*, participates in a conference of the NATO Military Committee and in the 'SHAPEX-93' exercise, dedicated to the issue of "Crisis Management - a Role for NATO". At the NATO Military Committee's conference on April 28th 1993 Gen. *Petrov* reminds of Bulgaria's principle position that "none of the Balkan and neighbouring states should be involved in military actions in the former Yugoslavia", at the same time expressing a high appreciation of NATO's efforts and actions "for the implementation of the peace plan to resolve the conflict". He informs his colleagues of the idea to set up in Bulgaria a training center for peacekeeping force personnel and addresses the NATO member countries with an appeal for any methodological or material assistance on their part. In his speech on the report "Crisis Management - a Role for NATO", the Bulgarian Chief of Staff stresses again: "We share the appraisal that for the time being apart of NATO there is no other institution which has at its disposal the necessary political and military structures and which can be used under the UN auspices in the interest of collective security and in support of the international efforts for peaceful settlement of regional conflicts. We believe that the military exercises related to the application of the procedures for crisis control can prove to be an exceptionally useful form of testing the political and military decision-forming techniques under circumstances of similar character. We highly appreciate every possibility to learn from NATO's experience in this respect"[16] In the spirit of the Bulgarian Government's active aspirations for its incorporation into the international peace-keeping efforts in 1994, the first national Concept for the Participation of the Republic of Bulgaria in the Peace-Support Operations (PSO) is made out.

In the course of the next years an important form of co-operation aimed at securing interoperability during the preparation for participation in peace support and humanitarian operations is to make sure the Bulgarian participation in joint military exercises under the

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[14] See: Military Cooperation 1991/1993. A Survey - *Bulgarian Military Review*, Sofia, 1993, No. 2, p. 79-92.

[15] Diplomatic Archive, Sofia, Record 48-10.

[16] Here and later on there is used as new source an available data from General Staff, Bulgarian Armed Forces Documentation.

"Partnership for Peace" (PfP) on the Balkans and the interaction with the specialised military structures of NATO. At the first conference of the national armament directors (CNAD) with the PfP partners held in Brussels in November 1995, the Bulgarian Delegation is handed a Memorandum which permits submitting of over 500 standards of NATO. Another more than 58 codification documents and classificators of NATO are permitted for use, too.

After joining the Partnership for Peace initiative in February 1994 the Bulgarian government declares its readiness to organise "Breeze-94" - an operational and tactic military exercise in the spirit of this initiative with the participation of the naval forces of eight countries. This military naval exercise is a first one of this kind on the Black Sea. In it 9 warships and 10 auxiliary ships of the Bulgarian Naval Forces with crews of 1060 people and 8 foreign ships with crews of 1088 people take part[17]. The successful execution of this military exercise confirms the common belief that such exercises can play a more and more significant part in the preventive diplomacy and crisis management within the boundaries of the major international security structures. Bulgaria hosts as well the first NATO naval military exercise under PfP "Cooperative Partner-95" and the first major land forces military exercise in the Balkans region "Cooperative Determination-96".

Regardless of the internal political changes in Bulgaria, in the period following its joining "Partnership for Peace"(1994-2000) all Bulgarian governments make efforts to provide an active participation in joined military exercises and conferences for the achievement of a better interoperability with the NATO armed forces at their carrying-out peace support operations. The main problems to be faced arc related predominantly with the necessity to accept a normative basis in compliance with the contemporary doctrinal concepts as well as the obsolescence of the material and technical equipment and gear of the Bulgarian armed forces. The discussions regarding the contents of the future National Security Doctrine and the Military Doctrine, going on for quite a few years, arc no doubt with a negative effect, regardless of the fact that the legal ground for the country's participation in PSO is defined in Art. 84 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria as well as in the Law of the Defence and Armed Forces adopted by the National Assembly in December 1995. Another unfavourable factor proves to be the progressive deterioration of the gear and equipment of the individual branches of the armed forces. Thus, for instance, at the live air exercises "Olympia-97" in Greece and "Hezarfen-97" in Turkey Bulgaria sends only military observers since in both cases it has been found that "the condition and the availability of aviation equipment in good working order does not permit our participation in the exercise with flying machines."

When such multinational military exercises arc carried out, the main objective is to achieve interoperability in the preparation for peace support and humanitarian operations. During the multinational operative and tactical military exercise "Cooperative Partner-97" in Bulgaria, for instance, convoy, humanitarian and embargo Operations are carried out under the command of the Headquarters of the NATO Allied Forces in Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). In 1997 the Bulgarian Army participates with military observers, staff officers or military units in 23 military exercises[18] under or in the spirit of "Partnership for Peace", nine of them in the Balkans. In the next 1998 year there is a Bulgarian participation in 28 PfP exercises or seminars. The increased participation in military exercises in the Balkans – 11, is distinctively characteristic, in nine of them the participation is with military units and weaponry. When the NATO program under "Partnership for Peace" for 1999 is made out, a Bulgarian participation

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[17] *Military History Journal*, Sofia, 1994, No. 6, p. 198-204.

[18] According to a General Staff Information. In other source it is noted participation in exercises during 1997 (http://www.md.government.bg).

in 33 military exercises and working seminars is planned, the bigger part of those are aimed at increasing the interoperability and fighting skills in carrying-out peace-support and humanitarian operations. According to an official Report, in 1999 Bulgaria took part in more than 470 activities "in the spirit" of the Partnership for Peace, including 21 exercises, 130 seminars and workshops (22 of them hosted by Bulgaria)[19]. Bulgarian officers take part also in the biggest NATO military exercise on the Balkans for the year 2000 - "Cooperative Dragon 2000" held in July in Albania. During the participation in the "Partnership for Peace" initiative (1994-2000) Bulgaria has participated in 108 PfP exercises and in 2 NATO exercises ("Strong Resolve 98" and "Linked Sea 2000") with approx. 700 officers and 4 800 soldiers in total[20].

On April 16th 1998 the Bulgarian Parliament (National Assembly) adopted at last the country's National Security Concept. As predominating factor for the maintaining of national security is stated the pursuing of an "active foreign policy for pacifying the Balkans. This policy is the most important element of the Bulgarian interests preventive defence strategy". In this way Bulgaria might turn into "a generator of security" in the region[21]

The main priority specified in the Military Doctrine, adopted with a Resolution of the National Assembly of April 8th 1999, is the country's integration into the new all-European security and defence architecture while as main sources of military threat and risk are stated "the actual and potential conflicts in different parts of the region". Therefore, the document assigns an important place to the matters related to the armed forces' participation "in peace support operations and any other Operations different from war". Among the most significant suggestions are those for the establishing of a Situation Center for the carrying-out of such Operations and the creation of Multinational Peace Forces in South East Europe. According to the Action Plan for Membership in NATO adopted on April 23-25 1999 at the Washington Summit, the Bulgarian government is to work out its own national Program in which the following five main lines are to be formulated, i.e. political and economic; defence; resource; legal and security matters. Among the specific purposes are the "creating of a crisis control System - modern and compatible with the NATO member-countries" and accordingly the "building-up of operational possibilities" for taking part in multinational Operations "for establishing peace under the leadership of NATO, WEU or a coalition of states". In late 2000 the General Staff of Bulgarian Armed Forces adopted some doctrinal and concept documents, among them a Doctrine for the Operations different from war[22].

On September 26th 1998 in Skopje during the Third Meeting of the Ministers of Defence of the South-East European Countries an agreement - a "Memorandum for the Creation of Multinational Peace Forces in South-East Europe" (MPFSEE) is signed. This agreement provides for the establishment of a multinational brigade which should be used for humanitarian assistance, conflict-prevention, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement with a UN or OSCE mandate under the leadership of NATO or WEU. The seat of the MPFSEE is in the town of *Plovdiv* while a Turkish general is head of the brigade. Each participant's share in the common budget is in proportion to the participating military units, i.e.: Albania - 11,76%; Bulgaria - 23,53%; Greece - 17,65%; Italy - 2,94%; Macedonia - 8,82%; Romania - 11,76% and Turkey - 23,53%. The commanding & staff military exercises of MPFSEE are planned to take place in Bulgaria in the period 1999-2001 and in Romania in the period 2002-2003.

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[19]   White Book of Defense and Armed Forces of Republic of Bulgaria, Sofia, Ministry of Defense, 2001.

[20]   A Guide for the Participants in Peacekeeping Missions. Psychological Aspects, Sofia 2000, p. 9.

[21]   Darzhaven Vestnik [State Gazette], Sofia, No. 46, 22 April 1998.

[22]   A Doctrine for operations different from war. General Staff of Bulgarian Army, 29 November 2000, 42 pages.

According to the approved preliminary program, in December 1999 "SEEBRIG-99", first command staff exercise of the multinational brigade was held, and in September 2000 – the second one, "SEVEN STAR – 2000", with the participation of troops.

A new initiative is in a progress – the formation of an operative group for naval co-operation in Black Sea area (BLACKSEAFOR). This multinational group should be used in relief, humanitarian, ecological and other naval operations. Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine are intending to participate with own vessels in the project.

The Bulgarian participation in international peacekeeping and conflict-preventing initiatives in the recent years is concentrated in the region of South-East Europe. Units of the Bulgarian Army take part in SFOR in Bosnia and in KFOR in Kosovo, also humanitarian aid as well as a non-combatant and medical assistance party (108 people) are sent to the "Radusha" refugee camp in the Republic of Macedonia[23]. Bulgaria takes part in SFOR since 1997 with an engineering platoon (30 people) included in the Dutch contingent, and since 1998 – with an automobile platoon (26 people) in the "BELUGA" group under Greek command. According to a representative sociological research in regard of the Bulgarian military contingent in Bosnia (June 1998 - January 1999) the Bulgarian participants in SFOR demonstrate "a knowledge of and a readiness to follow the main principles of the peace-keeping" (observing non-partiality toward any one of the hostile parties, a minimal use of force and arms). A successful accomplishment of such a mission is dependent on the character of the mutual relations with other nations' representatives and the local population. Significant is the fact that after the conclusion of the mission, the bigger part of the investigated members of the armed forces (90,5%) state that their relations with their colleagues (Dutch and Greeks) were "friendly", more than a half of them (53,7%) assess their contacts with the local population in Bosnia and Herzegovina as "friendly". At the same time, there is a certain discrepancy between the expectations and the reality in regard of the preliminary training as well as a fall of trust in the commanding staff after the conclusion of the mission. The researchers draw the following general conclusion: "We learn very little from our mistakes and our previous experience. A bigger part of the problems faced during Bulgaria's first participation in PSO in Cambodia (1992-1993) are also repeated in Bosnia …"[24]. Some of the lessons learnt during the previous participation in the PSO are never the less taken into consideration in the training of military contingents for future missions. In the process of selection and training of Bulgarian military units for participation in KFOR all the participants are first of all sent to short-term courses at specialised military educational and training centers in Holland and Germany.

From February 9th 2000 a Bulgarian engineering section (40 people) takes part in the NATO controlled operation in Kosovo (KFOR) as a unit of the 43rd Armoured Engineering Company of the 1st Restoration Battalion of the Multinational Brigade South[25]. Apart from that, members of the Bulgarian military forces are sent to the commanding outpost of KFOR in Thessaloniki as well as in the chief commanding post in Pristina. In Kosovo there arc also Bulgarian medical officers sent to help with the overcoming of the humanitarian crisis as well as police units to take part in the restoring of the public order and security in the area. In consequence of the increased participation of Bulgarian contingents and military observers[26]

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[23] *Military History Journal*, Sofia, 1999, No. 5, p. 159-169.

[24] Yanakiev, Yantzislav; Georgi Petkov, Bulgarian Army in Peace Support Operations - *Military Journal*, Sofia, 1999, No. 4, p. 94-106.

[25] In the first four months period Bulgarian unit is under the Netherlands' command and from June 2000 - under the command of a German contingent staff.

[26] Bulgarian military observers are included in an OSCE Mission in Albania, too.

in PSO in the Balkan region additional problems related to a more effective control, co-ordination of actions and summarising of the accumulated information arise. Military experts suggest a discussion of the idea, in the future, together with the Situation Center functioning at the Ministry of Defence "to have in the region of the mission... formed a national commandment, following the NATO countries' experience"[27] The progress of the regional integration process in the field of defence training and the achievement of interoperability makes imperative a search for new approaches and initiatives for the realisation of the bilateral and multilateral military co operation in South East Europe.

New perspectives for more active and broader Bulgarian participation in peace support Operations appear in early 2001. In response to a UN DPSO invitation in February 2001, Bulgarian government approved a decision for sending 15 officers as military observers in Ethiopia and Eritrea[28]. In a process of preparation for a peace support mission in Cyprus is another battalion of approx. 400 recruiters.

The past decade clearly indicated the determinative tendencies in the international relations sphere, characterising the world's global and regional processes in the beginning of the new century. There is no doubt that the redefining and giving of a new meaning to the concepts and methods for the prevention and resolution of international and social crises and armed conflicts have been among the priority tendencies of the international community's activity. The modest initial experience of Bulgaria in peace support Operations ifl last ten years gradually outlined a number of essential conclusions. Their implementation requires a well planned, purposeful and long-term strategy for integrating the country in the international and regional security structures and the forthcoming more and more active participation of Bulgarian military and police units and civil organisations in peace support and humanitarian Operations meant to establish security and stability in the region of South East Europe.

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[27] Uzunov, Slavcho, Armed Forces Participation in Crisis Management – *Military Journal*, Sofia, 2000, No. 1, p. 58.

[28] Bulgarian Army Daily, Sofia, No. 15 029, 9 February 2001, p.92

Name of Discord, Aim of Co-Operation.
Changing Perceptions of Security between Neighbouring Countries.

State relations are signified by major events in history. Alliances and wars, occupations and conquests are moments or periods of history that follow states in their relations many years or generations after the time they occurred. In the same way peoples and ethnic groups keep glorious or tragic memories and their aspirations or fears go beyond state politics or international balances. However, there are moments when the silent river-wise current of popular feelings joins the international conjecture. Time then comes for conflict where rationality inclines to history and fatal past precludes humanity from change.

In modern times the citizen model is dominant and the other is not a threat but a prerequisite of individual identity. Nations divide the world in states but the ethnic state is predominantly a state based on citizenship rather than on ethnic homogeneity. Powerful states are determined by their multiethnic composition. New developments marked the 20 century and the eruption of a globalising society inserted new concepts of analysis compatible to the emergent unified world, the new powers and possibilities offered. Soft borders, regional and global economic integration schemes, policies of non state actors etc. However, since states remain the principal components of international society, we have to analyse their interaction equally through the traditional key concepts of power politics.

Security as a balance between interest and power.

Security is principally viewed as protection against an external threat. Evaluation and perception of an external danger is dependant of the way a State fixes its policy priorities. In the international society the absence of a compulsory jurisdiction brings power considerations to the front. Thus, interaction between policy definition and the context in which it has to be applied influences the security perspectives. In simple, even simplistic terms, we can argue that if the definition of national interest and correspondingly the foreign policy exceeds the estimation of one's own power then disillusion, retreat or defeat are the possible outcomes. On the contrary, if national interest is defined in underestimating the power factor, it will create the will to exploit this vacuum and claims will emerge. Since power appreciations are not stable, a constant game of negotiations, pressures, unilateral acts, claims and counter claims are always in play. As long as a status quo is not achieved, the balance of power is constantly under play. Stabilisation is thus important.

In the traditional realist theory, "interest" is defined as power. The two concepts are described not only in interconnection with each other but also as a single concept. My interest is to increase or impose my power. Although change is introduced, it is considered that it concerns the evolution of a single concept. Both are considered as perennial concerns of the state.

"Realism assumes that its key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but it does not endow that concept with a meaning that is fixed once and for all." And although "the idea of interest is indeed the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and place", it is recognised that "the kind of interest determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which the foreign policy is formulated" (Morgentau p.10,11).

In our approach it is not the specific goal presented as "interest" that matters rather than the variability of the interest in terms of its adjustment in a moving power configuration. So the

two concepts are distinguished, intimately interconnected, but defined separately. Interest defined as power and power defined as interest is a tautology not without substance but reductive to the concept of the will of power that is always true but not a sufficient tool of analysis. Thus, one has to meaningfully rephrase the relation of the two concepts and conceive the setting of national interest and consequently the goals of foreign policy (of a nation, state or other political grouping) and then evaluate the implementation of these goals in terms of the general balance of power.

Foreign policy positions are determined by two criteria. The first is institutional, the second is conjectural. Institutional criteria means that the foreign policy position is dependant upon the quality of the person who expresses it, e.g. state representative or academic. A state representative puts his position in a negotiation process and logic so it has to take into account not only the ultimate goals that he wants to achieve, but also the way the interaction of his position will end up with a desirable outcome. He has to calculate internal political reactions and, equally, the other party's reaction. An academic, on the contrary, can act more freely and his position may refer directly to the desirable solution. It can be extremely useful to the state representatives by procuring alternative scenarios even in the negotiation process where a reflexive maximisation of claims seems inevitable.

The conjectural criteria means that foreign policy positions have to be shaped in terms of time and place taking into account the geo-strategic environment in which the state foreign policy would be implemented.

In our analysis we will try to give an account of Greek foreign policy in connection with the denomination dispute between Greece and the new Macedonian State.

The definition of national interest.

Three sectoral levels of analysis lead to the definition of national interest:

- State considerations in its interaction with the international system.

- Internal Political interactions.
  Dominant political discourse and opposition. Variability of public opinion, possibility of change (maturity of electoral body, state of education, quality of leadership, etc.).

- Historical legacies.

Additionally, national interest is

1. materially defined

2. symbolically defined (identity-prestige)

3. institutionally determined (state unity, elite or leaders specific interests.)

In terms of theory we apply the general pi that the definition of national interest is an interpretation characterised by its relativity towards facts or previous definitions. This is the reason for using the phrase "perception of national interest" and by this 1 mean no stability of interest, neither in time nor place, and therefore, neither to be pursued or defended come what may (wider any circumstances). The case of the two neighbouring countries, Greece and FYRoM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), is relevant for showing how damaging the perception of interest can be when it succumbs to short sighted Vision aiming only at personal or party consideration's and supported by a disoriented public. Greece and FYRoM were entangled in a conflict over the name that impeded the former in exploiting the serious advantages in the area at that period and the second in establishing relations with the EU and securing the political and ethnic unity of the newly established state.

Let us remember the facts of the issue.

The creation of the new Macedonian state succeeded the Macedonian federal state of Yugoslavia in 1991. The new state had to promote a unifying identity whilst its multiethnic composition was in fact endangering its state unity. One could support the view that Macedonians, trying to counter or negate the Bulgarian or Albanian claims over the new state, turned to the South (Greece) in a mixed portion of defensive victimisation and expansive heroism.

On the other hand, Greece had to formulate its position to counter the Macedonian claims and to assert its own identity. The denial of the particular name as official denomination of state was the official position of Greece until 1995. We can distinguish three periods concerning the denomination dispute.

The first covers die period until 1994. During that stage Greek diplomacy did not accept any concession and contested any use of die term "Macedonia" even in a hyphenated or compound form. Nevertheless, that period was the most turbulent in terms of Greek internal politics. It comprised die genesis of an ethnic movement rejecting die right for die new state of Macedonia to be recognised as such, the support of die EU and finally die "dissensions" in die ruling party, especially between P.M. and Minister of F.A.

In 1994 die sanctions adopted by die Greek Government against Macedonia hardened die odds of the game.

Finally, die adoption of die 'Interim agreement' directed die relation of the two countries to a completely different path.

In the first phase we have to consider die Greek thesis - official and unofficial, between people and government and amongst government members, as well.

Feeling a threat to their national and territorial integrity Greeks tried to defend their country against this "unusual" enemy which neither had military, political nor economic superiority. The slogan that was projected from both, die streets and some "engaged" intellectuals, was that "Macedonia is Greek". This slogan revealed all die misjudgements, bad reasoning and panic reaction of that period. The slogan miscalculated how it could be exploited by die adverse party and created a false image of die dispute to die Greeks. It was one of these situations where logic is trapped in die obvious (validity) tautology of one's own rights, without considering die opposing side's angle. The real issue was missing. Both sides were not taking into account that Macedonia geographically and historically did not represent a single ethnic image. Since 1945 there has been gradual recognition that there are Macedonian Slavs and Macedonian Greeks. Perceiving Macedonia as a single entity leads inevitably to die point that die claims of northern Macedonians and those of die South (Greeks) were mutually exclusive.

Thus this position, expressed by a slogan of double meaning, did not clarify the real dispute. If one refers to the Greek part then the assertion that "Macedonia is Greek" is a pleonasm and it appears as a defensive reaction but considered from the opposer's angle it could be interpreted as all Macedonia being Greek, thus is registering this as an aggressive reaction.

The Macedonian Question has been settled within the context of the Greek national aspiration (in the 19th century) to free the territories conquested by the Ottoman Empire. This project called "The Great Idea" was materialised in a world where the territorial and border fluidity was immediately connected with the solution of the Eastern Question and the expected shrinking of the Ottoman Empire.

The contemporary national upheaval has not been accompanied by a general reshaping of the frontiers in the Balkan area. The principle of the frontiers inviolability was implemented within the context of the already existing federal states or regions. Nevertheless, the geopolitical map was altered and new independent states were recognised. Therefore, any reference to national claims by one state would be affecting the national integrity of another state, or its external defence. The Greek state has fought for its national integration from Crete to Macedonia since its foundation. After the disaster of 1922, however, it was evident that a century of wars for the unification of its national territories was over and the nation was concentrating on in the problems of democracy and domestic development. The Cyprus question has confirmed this course, since it has shown how harmful the idea of its union to Greece has been.

The revival of the Macedonian question, through the appropriation of the name, led Greece back to the logic of national integration (expansive) or protection of its integrity (defensive). The exclusive appropriation of the name was endowed by a sense of mutilation, especially at the symbolic level. Besides, the denial of any compromise (i.e. a compound name) illustrated the extent of the fear. The victim was the identity itself and any compromise was being experienced as a threat against it. Therefore, defending the name cannot be limited to the logic of defending the nation and its territories, as the latter had been expressed in 1940 when the Greeks resisted successfully to Italian Fascism. Greek reaction represented, therefore, a movement trying to recompose and strengthen its national identity. The place selected as the battlefield (denomination dispute) created the opposite effect, since identity sensibilities concerning origins, ethnic purity and historic rights over territories can be solved only as political questions rather than scientific ones.

The Macedonian question played a crucial role in Greek internal politics due to the position of the communist party in 1924 and 1949 for an independent Macedonia incorporating the corresponding Greek territories. Its position until 1956 had divided the communist party itself and created profound fears that concluded to designate and try communists as traitors. The Macedonian question also put Serbs and Bulgarians in constant rivalry. Tito was trying to promote a Macedonian state that would be included in its Balkan union, creating a constellation of small states under its hegemony. Bulgaria tried to impose its rules on the area especially after the dominant position it had acquired during the Second World War but after the war Tito had been in a better position to negotiate with the allies.

The two states, Greece and the new Macedonian state, clashed in different stages of their development. The new-founded state was trying to confirm its political existence, while Greece was going through a period of relative affluence and decadent stability, disturbed by the international and Balkan changes.

The existential uncertainty of the new-founded state was, to a considerable degree, due to the differentiation process from its historical contenders, basically Bulgarians and Serbs, and aggravated by its extremely fragile internal unity. The Macedonian origin of the new founded state played the role of a powerful stabiliser of its identity hut could not function as a warrant of its internal unity. It represented the continuity of the immediate Yugoslavian past, the collective appropriation of a glorious, ancient and recent history, giving, at the same time, the sense of perspective only to the ethnic majority.

The irredentist claims of the new state that had been expressed in the official texts pointed out that the state in question should go beyond the suffocating territorial limits and find expression in a cultural integrative perspective, which, in this case, could only be nationalistic. The example of the newly-founded state confirms, as we believe, the analysis that the building of national identity follows a course in three stages, i.e. from its ethnic emergence to its state formation and finally to the ethnic integration perspective (being, one

and whole). In this course the reality principle (general balance of power in relation to the identity dynamics and the capacity of the state) will determine the final outcome of this process.

The insertion of the Macedonian character in the imaginary of the new state's identity illustrated the violence by which the assertion of the name was invested. The aggressive attitude of the newly founded state was not due to the real elements of its power, but to the way it associated its Macedonian trait with its existential insecurity. Paradoxically enough, the perceived adversaries, historically presenting contending claims, bad "a reason to exist" for the new Macedonian state.

The overreaction pervading the Greek attitude draws its strength from its popular origin. When the problem first emerged, the official policy was much more tolerant. So, beyond the parties' policies or any carefully planned motivation, it is important to realise and understand whether the national reaction expressed a general sense of weakness rather than an effort to protect its identity and territorial integrity.

The Greek attitude may be presented as a reflexive reaction to the adversary claim which deprived the Greek side of the advantages it possessed in the area by that time and the prevention of any other initiatives in the European or international fora. It is accompanied by the crisis of adjustment in the international and, more specifically, European system through which a permanent dependence was being confirmed.

Therefore, the relative affluence has led the internal crisis of the public economic and political life of its international integration, to a situation of decaying stability. This contradictory situation is due to the inability of the state to forge an independent national policy on the one hand, and to the necessity of defending the national singularity on the other, as far as the conditions of life, work and entertainment are concerned.

Dependence was confirmed; by the way its policy was ultimately defined not by its own initiatives but in reaction to what others were claiming or giving. The popular reaction in Greece against the appropriation of the name appeared as having the character of a national awakening.

Reinterpretation of national interest in terms of the new configuration of power

- International configuration of power.
  Principal actors involved.
  New patterns of power relations.
- Regional and bilateral balance of power.

In the cold war period Greek national interest was perceived as an intrinsic part of NATO politics. A clear distinction between external and internal politics was pursued. In internal politics the existence of a Slavo-Macedonian community was considered as a threat. Assimilation or rejection of any claim of the Slavo-Macedonians characterised the state practice. On the contrary, Greece had never opposed the legitimacy of the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia as a federal state entity. Yugoslavia played at that moment an important role in the East-West relations. NATO was in favour of Tito's policies as a buffer state to the soviet influence in the Balkans, acting as a stabiliser between Albania, Bulgaria and the other communist countries. Concerning international politics, Yugoslavia represented the non-aligned movement and the sensitive frontier to the soviet bloc. For the first time in history, a country, due to the cold war antagonism, could function as an axis of stability, keep enemies apart, avoid taking sides and stay out of any sphere of influence.

Integrated in the alliance System Greece had to follow and not oppose any objection. Its national interest was defined in connection to the threat coming from the North, consequently nothing that would deviate from the policy, that aimed to preserve Yugoslavia from any claims, was acceptable.

In the post-cold war period Yugoslavia's role changed dramatically. Neither Europe nor the U.S. were willing to face a strong state in this part of the world. Especially a country with ethnic affinities with the defeated Russians. The break up of the country was favoured by the conflicting policies of the European countries. The new international environment undermined the Franco-German axis because Germany was seeking to re-establish a strong central European zone of influence, integrating the Near East, while France was trying to keep the advantages of its nuclear preponderance.

By this time Greece's national interest was defined by the threat from the east, that is to say the Greek-Turkish relations. Turkey strengthened its geopolitical position in the post cold war period. In the moving Balkan environment new threats to Greece's security were presented.

Albania's internal instability provoked a real security threat, focused basically on the migration movement to Greece. This created violent border incidents concerning illegal immigrants. The creation of Macedonia was geopolitically a rather favourable situation buffering any Albanian or Bulgarian claims for territorial unity. In fact, the break up of Yugoslavia gave Greece a weaker neighbour.

Greece had to choose from which side it was willing to act. In the first phase of the conflict Greece acted as a part of the problem and not as a part of the solution. Intra-European dissension and Greece's incapacity to perceive itself as a full member of EMU created a substratum of a defensive option. Greece was insecure about its European commitment and was going through an identity crisis (identity redefinition in relation to its European status). In this period national interest was defined in connection with the perceived threats, to our way of life (Europe), our identity (irredentist claims - Macedonia) and borders (Turkey).

In the first phase Greece tried to take advantage of its European membership and succeeded in imposing hard limitations upon the new Macedonian state. The European Council decision in 1992 was in favour of the Greek position of rejecting any use of the term Macedonia by Skopje. In fact, I consider that the maximisation of the claim was favoured by an erroneous perception of the new European balances. Germany and the U.S. were in favour of the creation of new states in the area and were trying to design the new environment. In addition, the quality of the new claim was not sustainable because it implied a denial of the identity of the other. Since partition of the new Macedonian state was not desirable, one had to envisage a consensus. Greece used its favourable power conjecture to impose an enviable position. It turned out that Greece's allies were not in favour of its claim, at least in the way in which it was defended, and independently of the favourable decisions of the European Council, their actual support was very weak.

When Greece became aware of this, it realised that it had two options. Either to negotiate or to harden its position. This evolution led to the imposition of sanctions by Greece in 1994. The unilateral character of the sanctions was viewed negatively by the Greek allies. Greece's position was actually leading to a dead end but it was responding to the refusal of consensus from the other side. Although institutionally complying with Greece's demands, actual interests of European partners as great powers in the region diverged. They tried to condemn the sanctions as a unilateral act but this created a popular reaction in Greece and transferred the problem to the European institutional level. The popular reaction regressed Greece to the position of victim in which Europeans were perceived as enemies, thus creating major difficulties in Greece's integration to the European community. FYRoM diplomacy, realising

that European politics were moving at two levels, institutional and bilateral, exploited this situation having understood that the great powers wanted a stable new Macedonian state as a part of their strategy in the region. In this context, the Macedonian government was not willing to make any concessions as to a compound character of the name. It was considered that time was working in favour of the establishment of the dc facto use of the constitutional name by delaying the negotiation process.

Nevertheless, the persistence of the Greek side, the institutional blockade in the EU and other international institutions and ultimately the economic sanctions, were creating serious damage to the new country. On the other side the anti-European reaction of the Greek people was equally damaging Greece's interests. Awareness of this negative situation for both countries created a need to reach an interim consensus that would lead to a workable but not definite solution.

The interim agreement of 1995 was thus based on concessions by the two sides of the dispute: FYRoM accepting to withdraw from using the ancient Macedonian flag (*Star of Vergina* discovered by *Andronikos* in 1977 in ancient Pella) and changes in the constitutional irredentist claims of article of the constitution and Greece accepting to redraw the sanctions and unofficially accepting a solution of a compound name.

The evolution of the Greek position was based on two factors. Internal and external. The first is connected to the *Papandreou* era and the coming to power of a definitely European orientated prime minister. From that point, Greece's national interest was identified as the integration in the European Union through its accession to the EMU and the adoption of the new European currency. Foreign policy had then to be adequately reshaped. The fact that Greece had realised that economically and socially it had the possibility to meet the conditions (macroeconomic indicators achieved, infrastructure built, etc.) for accession to the EMU gave to the Greek public a sense of a prestigious goal that counterbalanced its fears. Now, not so insecure about its options and its capacity to achieve them, Greece could take into account other European partners' interests and their neighbours' demands.

We recognise here three factors that contributed to the general configuration of power in which the foreign policy of the two neighbour countries interacted. Three factors are constantly present in the Balkan affairs in the post cold war era, namely Euro-Atlantic relations, intra-European relations and inter-Balkan policies. (In this dispute Russian politics didn't play a decisive role.)

At this stage, FYRoM was perceived by the West as a possible example of a multicultural experiment, as far as its internal unity was at stake and geopolitically as a buffer state and stabiliser of the neighbouring ethnic claims. In addition the state that was favourable to western influence which was proved by the UN American led force and stationing of the NATO military forces during the Kosovo crisis. After the Bosnian unworkable solution and the main clash of regional nationalism in Kosovo, the importance of the new Macedonian state acquired an utmost importance.

This was equally valid for Greece. Redefinition of its national interest was then inevitable for three reasons. The first was that by adjusting its policy to the European and American interests it could fully play the role of the privileged mediator and participate as a member of the powerful block of nations (as member of the EU and NATO). The second was the material benefits that a small but modernising market could procure, especially for Greek Macedonia business and industry, and the third being that the strengthening of the new Macedonian state would preserve the country from the possible new neighbouring ethnic claims in the region and therefore establishing a stable and secure environment at its borders.

The only remaining conflict would be the symbolic one concerning the official and final denomination of the new republic. In my personal opinion, the Option of a compound name would be the solution that would better assure the new Macedonian republic of its state unity and integrity as a citizen modelled multicultural state. This solution presents major advantages because it:

- Will not create any exclusive use of Macedonia but it will be considered as a region and not as a historical apple of discord, as a region whose name could be shared for the common good rather than be one of exclusive possession.

- Will enable to institute an important constitutional principle that will permit integration of the Albanian-Muslim element in terms of equality.

- Will favour exchanges with the other parts of the Macedonian region. It is important to understand that disappearance of friction and the new economic reality that intensifies cross border relations, softening their obstructive character, can unify Macedonia and the Balkan region through trade and culture.

We now conclude to the principal aim of our thesis being that the regional approach, the local culture and the trade are not consistent neither with the state affinities and identity susceptibilities, nor with the globalisation process and soft borders theory. Greek-Macedonian relations in their common Macedonian area can function as the pilot scheme of economic and cultural relations in South East Europe. Cultural exclusiveness leads to isolationism and propriety rights are overwhelmed by mergers and co-operation schemes in the actual globalising pattern. As far as an object is perceived as common but not exclusive, it is no longer a source of friction but a reason of co-operation. The Franco-German relationship concerning Alsace Lorain is the great example in modern history in which a region, after being the theatre of two world wars, is today a region of co-operation and the place that hosts the legislative capital of Europe.

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NATO WAR IN KOSOVO AND THE CIS:
SHORT- AND LONG-TERM EFFECTS

While the implications of the NATO war against Yugoslavia for European security, international law, relations between Russia and the West have been widely debated since the moment the air strikes began, its impact on intra-CIS developments and policies of CIS member states, including Russia, on the post-Soviet space remained largely outside the focus of analysis. Such an approach appears to be erroneous, for some visible or latent processes, triggered by NATO actions, in future may well become an issue on the European security agenda.

Although, generally speaking, the CIS was affected by the Kosovo crisis in a many-fold and contradictory way, one critically important result does not raise doubts. After the 1999 war practically all the CIS states explicitly or implicitly realised that use of military force in order to achieve political goals became openly possible, not to say - required, in present-day Europe. Many of them started to shape their security and defence policies correspondingly. Concrete steps naturally varied from country to country, but the common process of creating, or strengthening, or allying oneself with somebody else's, power capabilities, was activated.

This paper intends to draw a general picture of how the post-Soviet space responded to the challenge of the war in Kosovo.

The war in Kosovo revealed further the lack of whatever homogeneity among the CIS states and increased centrifugal trends within the Commonwealth.

The need to take an official stand on the issue of NATO bombings of Yugoslavia puts all the member states and, consequently, the CIS as a whole, into a situation of a hard choice. Factors that were to be taken into account contradicted each other while goals of the Operation could be – and were – interpreted as beneficial for interests of some states, but totally detrimental for the others.

On the one hand, the newly-independent states of the CIS have found, or have been looking for, their own role and place in the international relations within the framework of the world order of the 1990s, where leading role of the UN and OSCE in crisis management was an axiom and where state sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders etc. were recognised as a supreme value. The practical revision of these principles, started by NATO actions, threatened to undermine many achievements of the state-building in the NES. On the other hand, by March 1999 a number of NIS, GUAM group in particular (Georgia Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova) has already chosen a pro-Western security orientation and in some of their capitals even thoughts of eventually joining Western security alliances have strengthened. This orientation demanded from them to show understanding, let alone - support, of NATO steps. Furthermore, the consent of these states to approve military intervention was apparently connected with expectations to receive political, or, maybe, economic dividends. At the same time a collision was going deeper between this group and those states, led by Russia, which either had their own conflict agenda with NATO (Belarus) or had no chance to see NATO coming to their security assistance in the foreseeable future (Tajikistan).

Another dividing line separated CIS states depending on whether and how they were involved into numerous ethno-political conflicts on the post-Soviet space. NATO de facto acted as a military ally of secessionist forces and, later on, carried out an operation of

separation of Kosovo from Yugoslavia[1] Of course, this was highly sensitive for Georgia,. Azerbaijan and Moldova as long as expressing political support to NATO would under the circumstances contradict the imperative to preserve their own territorial integrity (in Armenia the events in Kosovo would by definition be received differently). However, paradoxically enough, the very precedent of using force against one of the sides in conflict provided grounds – for the Georgian leadership for example – to hope for the similar solution in Abkhazia. Assistance to the central government looked quite within reach, if the formal criteria that had determined the use of force, would have coincided, i.e. if the opposite side could be portrayed as having demonstrated behaviour, unacceptable for the West (ethnic cleansing etc.)[2] Biased character of the Western decision, denial to universally apply the "liberal values" – Serbia is not the only country in Europe where minority rights are not fully guaranteed – could only strengthen this viewpoint and so did hopes for personal connections with Western leaders or a "democratic" image.

Religious factor was a point of special concern. Although the conflict between Serbs and Albanians was predominantly ethnic, rather than religious, it was widely seen as a confrontation between the Orthodox Church and Islam which was relevant to the CIS with its division into "Muslim" and "Christian" countries.

No wonder that in this situation the CIS could not arrive to a common approach towards the war in Yugoslavia. Belarus blamed NATO most radically and expressed readiness to provide Belgrade with military technical, not only humanitarian assistance, which was the view of Russia. Azerbaijan found itself on the other extreme; Baku not only from the very beginning demanded withdrawal of Yugoslav troops from Kosovo, but offered its soldiers to be sent there to serve in the Turkish peace-keeping battalion. All other states were between these two poles. The CIS summit on April 2, 1999 found a very amorphous formula. On a closed session, according to president *Yeltsin*, it urged "to stop the bloodshed"[3] and demonstrated an intention to contribute to "just peaceful solution".

Russia's failure to consolidate the CIS on the Kosovo issue once again demonstrated its falling influence inside the Commonwealth. Furthermore, the value of Russia's security guarantees and its very ability to act were challenged. Famous *Yeltsin's* "we will not let them touch Kosovo" was openly ignored by NATO. In the course of domestic political debate the government recognised that it had no plan how to prevent Kosovo model being applied to the post-Soviet space.[4]

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[1] In this context, it would be very interesting to analyse the reaction of non recognized states on the territory of the CIS (Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh, South Osetia, Transdniestria) and political movements, potentially able to launch separatist struggle. However, available materials are insufficient.

[2] This is why in summer 1999 Georgia wanted to have the UN Security Council include into its resolution on Abkhazia a formula on facts of ethnic cleansing of Georgians. The attempt, however, was not successful.

[3] Quoted in *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik*, n. 5, 1999, p.55. Obviously, this differs strikingly from Russia's own position which condemned the aggression and even froze its relations with the Alliance.

[4] On March 27, 1999, Foreign Minister *Ivanov* during the extraordinary session of the parliament was asked a question what Russia would do, if NATO started bombing *Tiraspol, Sukhumi* or *Stepanakert* (capitals of non-recognized breakaway republics). Minister answered: "We will do everything to prevent it" which sounded totally inadequate to the atmosphere in the Duma and to the situation in general. *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 1 April, 1999.

The CIS military-political space was irreversibly divided into two parts.

In April 1999 Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan formally withdrew from the Collective Security system, based upon the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty of 1992. The intention of the three states to make this step was known beforehand but their final decision not to prolong participation in the treaty symbolically coincided with the bombing campaign. The number of treaty members fell to 6 (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan).

Russia-centred system is based upon Russian armed forces and their capabilities as a central element, Russia' s bilateral defence co-operation with armies of several CIS countries, co-operation in defence procurement and, last, collective mechanisms of the Tashkent treaty. The crucial role of Russian forces can be seen everywhere – from nuclear guarantees to unassisted peace-keeping in Abkhazia to protection and defence of the Tajik-Afghan border, let alone military-technical assistance provided to allies. Bilateral defence co-operation develops unevenly: it reached a culminating point in case of Belarus (see below) where a coalition is clearly emerging, while initiatives, engaging other countries, largely remained on a declaratory level. Co-operation in arms production is deeply rooted in the inertia of the post-Soviet integration and its cementing role will be, therefore, gradually eroding parallel to general decrease of intensity of post-Soviet co-operation ties.

The Tashkent treaty, a very amorphous body, which failed not only to create integrated structures of a defence alliance, but even to rise into a working coalition, still faces fundamental problems in defining its mission. It does not have a unifying security agenda, not to say a threat which would be a common priority for all. While Belarus and to a considerable extent Russia, especially after Kosovo, are concerned with developments westward of their borders, Asian members of the Tashkent Treaty (as well as Uzbekistan, for this matter, its withdrawal from the treaty notwithstanding) - and also Russia, arc already involved into hostilities with Islamic extremists. Resources of Russia are insufficient to finance and fulfil both missions. It is likely in this connection that the future of the treaty is to be a "paper" organisation or to become formally replaced by the System of bilateral or multilateral coalitions with Russia (following the Russian-Belorussian model) or under its patronage which could increase the cohesion inside each of the "mini-blocs", constituting the new security arrangement.

The future of the Russia-centric security arrangement in the CIS looks as follows. The System can ensure certain security interests of its members (air defence, partial protection against the "southern challenge", guarantee against a large-scale aggression by means of nuclear umbrella), but its general effectiveness will be limited. Intrusions into Central Asia will continue to take place. Much will depend on the potential adversary. The interaction between the CIS collective security System and Western structures will at best be possible through individual efforts of member states. At worst, it will not take place at all: for the West, it seems more attractive to engage the CIS countries into bilateral or NATO-sponsored programs individually, while the value of the CIS collective security System as an institutional partner is very low.

The GUUAM "five" (Uzbekistan joined the group in April 1999) already now appear to be a bit more cohesive in planning its mission, although neutral status of Moldova on the one hand and complicated security agenda of Uzbekistan place certain constraints. GUUAM's dynamics arc linked with the need to ensure common interests in the sphere of "new" energy transit, threats to territorial integrity of the four founding members which are interested in having at least limited power potential for their neutralisation, accentuated differences

concerning national security interests from those of Russia and, last but not least, Ukraine's ability to play a limited leading role in dealing with particular military or military-technical questions (if outside financial back up is provided).

All these factors pre-determine GUUAM's pro-Western security orientation. In 1998 Ukraine even tried to institutionalise relations with NATO and reach an agreement on regular consultations in "16 + 4" format (the initiative failed due to hesitance of NATO and the approach of formally neutral Moldova). In April 1999 GUUAM declared intentions to develop co-operation with NATO within the PfP and EAPC. Remindworthy, the declaration was made at the NATO Washington summit which as whole could not be taken out of the context of the war in Yugoslavia and deterioration of the Russia-NATO relations.

Practical military-political activity of GUUAM is mostly connected with co-operation between Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine which, besides regular consultations of the military, arc creating a joint peace keeping battalion whose function will be to protect the transit of oil through the territories of Azerbaijan and Georgia. In addition, these countries actively promote individual relations with NATO or its member countries. Georgia revealed its plans to apply for fall NATO membership in 2005 and started to shape its defence policy correspondingly. In 1999 Georgia took part in 165 PfP events, including 9 multinational exercises.[5] Azerbaijani Foreign Minister *Guliev* was reported to say that *Baku* planned to form a military-political alliance with Ankara and *Tbilisi* and confirmed the possibility to deploy a NATO base in his country.[6] In March 2000 *Kiev* hosted an unprecedented session of the North Atlantic Council, while Ukraine's parliament adopted a legislation allowing to use the site in *Yavoriv* as a NATO training centre (although these actions, as well as some others, were partly intended to repair the damage to NATO-Ukraine relations, done by the bombing campaign, see below).

GUUAM's security co-operation, contrary to economic dimension, can bring sustainable results. First, the bloc can mobilise resources to solve concrete tasks. Second, it is a convenient vehicle for the Western security structures to strengthen their presence on the post-Soviet space without failing into an open confrontation with Russia (as it would be in case of plans, for example, to enlarge NATO to include any CIS states). At the same time, if the West for any reason decides not to stimulate GUUAM, its goals are to remain mostly declarations.

Revitalising the United Air Defence System of the CIS

The United Air Defence system of the CIS was Set U in February 1995 and initially included 10 member states. Before the war in Kosovo, developments within the system mostly reflected the drift towards the division of participating countries into two groups. While Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and some other members of the Tashkent Treaty gradually proceeded towards higher interoperability and were jointly on combat duty, others (Ukraine, for instance) were nearly lethargic.

The war in Yugoslavia exposed the need of all states to have a reliable air defence System in the situation when none of them could run one independently. As a result, if annual exercises on a Russian test site in Astrakhan in August 1999 secured participation of only 5 member countries, in August 2000 there were already 7 countries coming, including Ukraine (in addition, Azerbaijan was among the observers).

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[5] *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 27 April 2000.

[6] *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 16 February 2000.

This form of co-operation remains attractive as long as it is very flexible (national forces stay under control of respective national authorities, unless they wish to join the efforts and structures) and allows the countries to define forms of their participation (from exchange of information to joint duty).

At the same time even the United Air Defence has no guarantees of its progressive development. It is too strongly connected with the CIS tradition, with its low-effective decision-making, let alone implementation. For years, it has not been properly financed. Finally, as soon as the immediate impact of the Kosovo factor is overcome, the difference in basic foreign policy and security orientations of the member countries will increase once again and the impact of centrifugal forces may prevail.

A clear anti-NATO accent (re)appeared in the Russian defence policy

Time coincidence between NATO enlargement to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic and the aggression against Yugoslavia gave a lot of credit to the voice of those forces in Russia that had been for years alarming the public opinion about the expansionist nature of the Alliance and demanding the country should protect itself from NATO threat first and foremost. Since March 1999 the influence of this viewpoint has grown considerably.

Even in spring 2000, one year after the strikes, according to an opinion poll, conducted by the Russian Public Opinion and Market Research Institute, there are no people in Russia who totally trust NATO. Only 5,7% of those polled trust NATO "to a certain degree" while 59,7% do not trust it at all.[7] In August 2000, a survey of highly-authoritative All-Russia Centre for Public Opinion Studies (VTsIOM) demonstrated that 54% of respondents agreed (definitely "Yes" and rather "Yes") that Russia had grounds to be afraid of Western countries that were members of NATO, while only 32% disagreed (definitely "No" and rather "No").[8]

In June 1999 large-scale command and staff exercises *"Zapad (West) 99"* were held to train Air Defence troops and the Baltic Sea Fleet to defend the *Kaliningrad* special area and objects on the Kola Peninsula against massive air strikes. Russian strategic bombers were sent with a training mission to areas near Iceland and the Norwegian Sea.

More importantly, conceptual changes in Russian threat assessment, brought about or re-affirmed as a result of the war in Kosovo, were codified in the new Russian military doctrine, adopted in April 2000. Several provisions of this document are so directly linked with the events in Yugoslavia in 1999 and NATO enlargement that they deserve to be quoted in full. "Attempts to weaken (ignore) existing mechanisms of ensuring international security (UN and ISCE first of all)" and "use of military and power actions that circumvent universally recognised principles and norms of international law, as a means of "humanitarian intervention" without the authorisation of the UN Security Council "are named first and second in a row among the factors that destabilise the existing military-political situation (point I.3). Among the military threats to Russia there are "creating (building up) troops (forces) that leads to breaking the existing balance of forces near the border of the Russian Federation and borders of its allies, or in the adjacent seas", "enlargement of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of military security of the Russian Federation", "entry of foreign troops in violation of the UN Charter into territories of states, neighbouring and friendly to Russia" (point I.5)[9]

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[7] http://www.russiatoday.comffeatures.php3?id=1 51143, visited on 14 April, 2000

[8] http://www.polit.ru/documents/309976.html, visited on 8 September, 2000

[9] Full text of the doctrine quoted in *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 22 April 2000

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Under this circumstances, particularly taking into account the mood of the public opinion, it will be very difficult to restore Russia-NATO co-operation to pre-Kosovo level, let alone to move it forward.

A strong impulse was given to Russian-Belorussian defence integration

This aspect cannot be taken out of the context of the Russia-NATO relations, touched upon in the previous thesis, however, it has somewhat autonomous dynamics due to specifics of international situation of Belarus and of its own problematic relationship with the West.

In 1999 Russia and Belarus planned to hold more than 60 joint command and staff exercises besides the coalition manoeuvres *"Boevoe Sodruzhestvo-99"*. In the beginning of 2000 Moscow and Minsk agreed to have a joint defence procurement order for 2000 and established a joint inter-state financial-industrial group "Defence systems". An intrigue emerged when in April 2000 Belorussian president *Lukashenko* hinted that the joint grouping of forces would consist of 300 thousand men. Probably, what is meant here is not military build-up – Russian experts put together Belarus's army (80,000), internal and border troops (60,000), troops of Moscow Military District together with internal and border units (150,000-170,000) and arrive to the same 300,000 - but growing interoperability and effectiveness.[10]

Apparently, after Kosovo Russia and Belarus should be particularly interested in strengthening air and missile defences. Two countries have a joint air defence system since mid-1990s. But in August 2000, for the first time, air defence troops of both countries, in contact with ships and units of the Baltic Sea Fleet, held exercises in *Kaliningrad* oblast to learn the Baltic theatre and the Western direction in general (before similar exercises used to take place on a Russian test site in Astrakhan). In addition, Russia builds an early warning station in *Gantsevichi* which should become operational this year (as agreed, Belarus will not charge Russia any rent at least for 25 years of lease).

A project of a trilateral Russian-Belorussian-Yugoslav Union was put onto political agenda

Although practical implementation of this idea at the moment looks totally unrealistic and impossible, it does not exclude political demonstrations of different kind which will, again, add to influencing the public opinion in an anti-Western tone.

In April 1999 Russian political class produced a mixed reaction on the application of Yugoslavia to join the Union of Russia and Belarus. On the one hand, the Russian Duma by a large margin of 293 votes against 54 endorsed the decision of FRY parliament on joining the Union and recommended to the Russian government to consider practical questions related to implementation of this decision. On the other hand, criticism, voiced primarily by the Russian governors who were at that time also members of the upper chamber of the Russian legislature, proved to be sufficient to influence president *Yeltsin* to speak against "quick" actions on founding the trilateral Union. Opponents mostly emphasised two points: first, that Union might drag Russia into the warfare on the Yugoslav side and, second, that supporting the "orthodox" side in the conflict would threaten to undermine ethnic and inter-confessional peace inside Russia.

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[10] See *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 19 April 2000

Moscow also has to take into account that at the moment allying itself with the Belgrade regime would strongly worsen the prospects of Russia's economic co-operation with the Western countries, would lead to deterioration of relations with the leadership of Montenegro, contacts with which are upheld, and would make it harder the task of transition towards a single Russian-Belorussian state, which constitutes an important foreign policy imperative of itself.

Ukraine-NATO relations were damaged

Ukraine's reaction to the NATO bombing campaign is most interesting not only for among the CIS states Ukraine is geographically closest to the Balkans, but also because its co-operation ties with NATO were most-advanced. Nevertheless, these ties were considerably damaged. Although since the spring of 1999 the official Kiev has successfully done a lot to camouflage the negative impact and, furthermore, much has been achieved by both sides to further develop the interaction, it is likely that it will take long before Ukraine's political elites and its public opinion will once again start seeing NATO as a European security "provider and guarantor"only.

The events demonstrated that, contrary to Ukraine's expectations, NATO in the course of its decision-making was not inclined to take into account the position or interests of Ukraine, whether or not Kiev wished to admit this. First, the bilateral Charter on Distinctive Partnership of 1997 was openly violated. The Charter contains provisions according to which the sides agreed not to use force or threat of force against any state in any way which would not be compatible with the principles of the UN Charter or Helsinki Final Act, to recognize rights of all states to choose and use their own means of ensuring security, to respect sovereignty, territorial integrity of all states and inviolability of borders, to prevent conflicts and settle disputes by peaceful means according to principles of UN and OSCE (article 2).[11] Later, Ukraine's attempts to mediate in the conflict (visit of defence and foreign ministers *Alexander Kuz'muk* and *Boris Tarasyuk* to Belgrade on March 27, president *Kuchma's* message to the Contact Group and the EU Troika, special settlement plan of April 1999) failed. This happened not only because *Kiev* with its open pro-NATO sympathies was an unacceptable mediator for Yugoslavia, but even more so, as experts point out, because from the Western point of view, to "return Russia on board" was more important compared to "keeping Ukraine on board".[12]

Second, a precedent of KLA's political victory, which was made possible due to NATO intervention, may, especially if Kosovo eventually *de jure* secedes from Yugoslavia, encourage those forces in Crimea that may start struggle to achieve separation of the peninsula from Ukraine. Such a scenario should not be excluded, particularly in a broader context of rising Islamic extremism. Indeed, in May 1999 massive violent protests of the Crimean Tartars against the policy of the central authorities took place. Factor of Turkey, ethnically close to Tartars and member in NATO, in the post-Kosovo world would draw a particular attention of radicals.

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[11] There is an analogy with violating the Russia-NATO Founding Act. However, in Russia this document was always treated sceptically and, therefore, its violation did not come as a surprise. In Ukraine where, on the contrary, words about country's key role in Eastern European security were taken for NATO's real views, many were disappointed to see the difference between the words and deeds.

[12] J.Sherr, St.Main. Russian and Ukrainian perceptions of events in Yugoslavia. Paper F64, Conflict Studies Research Centre, RMA Sandhurst, May 1999, p. 19.

Third, NATO actions exposed Ukraine to a real military risk, related to the Russian naval base in Sevastopol. In case of Russia-NATO armed confrontation NATO would have to take military measures to prevent Moscow using the ships of the Black Sea Fleet in the Adriatic Sea or elsewhere, but that would mean to attack simultaneously objects on Ukrainian territory. Another scenario was connected with Russia violating Ukraine's air space to carry out Operations on the Balkan theatre.

Fourth, the war in Yugoslavia negatively affected interests of Ukraine as a Danube state and directly damaged environmental security of the country.

The results of NATO's neglect towards Ukraine's interests did not take long to reveal themselves. Popular sympathies to the alliance, never unambiguously high enough,[13] plunged. According to a poll, conducted in April 1999 by the Institute of Social and Political Psychology, only 10% of the population thought NATO's actions were justified while 62% considered them to be an open aggression against a sovereign state.[14] On March 24, the parliament by 231 votes against 43 passed a resolution, in which NATO bombings were blamed as aggression on the ground that Yugoslavia did not threaten any member of the Alliance, and called on the government to review Ukraine's relations with NATO. Speaker *Alexander Tkachenko* even put forward a proposal to provide Yugoslavia with technical (though not military-technical) assistance.[15] Furthermore, the parliament called on the government to prepare a bill on denouncing the non-nuclear status of Ukraine.

A number of steps was taken to promote defence co-operation with Russia. On March 24, under a direct impression of NATO bombings, Ukrainian parliament ratified the basic agreements on the Black Sea Fleet leasing in Sevastopol, which had been awaiting ratification for almost three years and whose ratification was not guaranteed, although at that point already likely for reasons, other than Kosovo. In July 1999 Russia and Ukraine reached an agreement on the use of Ukraine's air space by the Black Sea Fleet. In March 2000, several additional documents concerning daily activities of the Fleet in Crimea were signed. Also, in summer 1999, Ukraine and Russia agreed to count the expenses of the former on repairs of the missile cruiser "*Moskva*" as a debt payment; as a result the cruiser returned to Sevastopol from *Mykolaiv* shipyards. In fall an analogous scheme was applied to Ukraine's strategic bombers Tu-95 and Tu-160, which Russia had been willing to purchase since long time, but the two sides could not have agreed about the price. In September-October 1999, and then in April 2000, several joint exercises were held. Although all this measures were unable to overcome a general pro-NATO focus in the defence policy of. *Kuchma's* administration, they nevertheless made it look more balanced.

Conclusions

NATO war against Yugoslavia produced false expectations and false apprehensions. The former include, on the one hand, hopes of separatists of all kinds that one day they will be able to use KLA experience on drawing the Western public opinion on their side. On the other hand, some governments of Eurasia lost a good deal of realism and ceased to see the distinction between spheres of interest or influence and direct and immediate responsibility

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[13] See O. Potekhin. The NATO-Ukraine Partnership: Problems, Achievements and Perspectives. In: Between Russia and the West: Foreign and Security Policy of Independent Ukraine. Ed. by K. Spillmann, A. Wenger and D. Mueller. Peter Lang, Bern, 1999, pp. 158-161.

[14] *Nezavisimaia Gazeta,* 27 April 1999.

[15] *Nezavisimaia Gazeta,* 26 March, 24 April 1999.

for their security, which is highly unlikely to be fully taken upon themselves by their rational Western security partners.

As for the false apprehensions, Russia's return towards inertial patterns of post-Cold War threat assessment, which had been slowly but gradually eroding before Kosovo wider the impact of an imperative to deal with security problems in its south, rather gives rise to scepticism than optimism, regarding the future of European security.

False expectations can be a short-term phenomenon, provided there is a sufficient effort to prove them so. But impeded partnership between Russia and the West is something regrettable for both sides in the situation when both are facing security challenges of the new century.

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