

Partnership for Peace Consortium
of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Working Group on Crisis Management in South-East Europe

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE

**A SURVEY OF THE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
AND OF THE ADAPTATION PROCESS TO THE
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE STANDARDS**

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I Foreword

The PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes finds its roots in a proposal by US Secretary of Defence Cohen at the meeting of the Ministers of Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council on 12 June 1998. The Consortium aims primarily at strengthening the institutional co-operation between the 44 Euro-Atlantic Partner Countries. In this way, a higher level of professionalism and efficiency can be reached in the fields of training and education of both soldiers and civil servants.

Within the framework of the "Washington Summit" in April 1999, the PfP Education and Training Programme was welcomed by the governments of NATO and EAPC countries. It is based upon three initiatives, namely the "PfP-Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes", the "PfP Simulation Network" and the "Co-operative Network of PfP Training Centres". Their main efforts centre on joint civilian and military training and education on the national security-political and strategic levels of planning with an aim of strengthening multinationality. In this network between professionals, scientists and experts, substantial exchange of information can take place on various levels.

Next to the six Working Groups (*Curriculum Development, Publications, Information Technology, Research, Simulations, Advanced Distributed Learning*) and the Secretariat Working Group, six new Working Groups were founded at this meeting (*Military History, Digital Library, Lessons Learned, European Security and Defence Identity, Crisis Management in South-East Europe, PfP Training Centres*). The Working Group "Crisis Management in South-East Europe" is headed by the Institut für Internationale Friedenssicherung of the Austrian National Defence Academy (IIF/LVAk).

As head of the Institute, I would like to stress the enormous security-political relevance of the publication: Austria understands her role within the Working Group as providing a firm basis for dialogue on matters that have been a pivot of European politics during the last

decade. "Civil-Military Relations in South-East Europe. A Survey of the National Perspectives and of the Adaptation Process to the PfP Standards" combines papers by distinguished research fellows and experts from the region, above all from Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Within the publication, an overview over the common interests and differences within the civil-military structures in the South-East European region will provide ample space for further academic discourse.

The unique character of the Consortium Working Group on South-East Europe finds its aim in bringing together military and civilian research institutions and academies concerned with security politics from the region. Through the improved access to information, academies and institutions will be able to improve the efficiency of their training. Security-political institutions are being offered the chance of channelling the results of their research directly into the educational system. This publication might help to provide all participants of Consortium Working Group as well as institutions and experts not directly participating in the PfP process with access to the same spectrum of information from - sometimes - diverging national viewpoints.

In accordance with this basic concept the Working Group aims at furthering the unique academic dialogue that has been created between its participants and the workshops in Reichenau in 2000 and 2001 with a perspective of improving the coherence within the Euro-Atlantic strategic community.

Finally I want to thank all authors for their efforts to complete a unique study that will be both informative for all interested in this issues and helpful for the co-operative relations of the countries from the region. Special thanks should go to Prof. Dr. Plamen Pantev who did a tremendous work as the editor.

The support of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the PfP-Consortium in this endeavour has been decisive.

II Introduction

The last decade of the Twentieth century brought the issue of civil-military relations to the centre of political, national security, legal and broader social studies in the countries of South-East Europe or the Balkans. There is no surprise, because the need of more and efficient civilian democratic control over the security sector has been in the focus of the political and social debate of the countries that were undergoing fundamental systemic changes.

There are *five major specific aspects* of the issue of civil-military relations in South-East Europe that comprise the analytical framework's accents of this study, carried out by the Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS), Sofia with the fundamental support of the Institut für Internationale Friedessicherung (IIF) at the National Defence Academy, Vienna and in co-operation with the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Consortium of the Defence Academies and the Security Studies Institutes of the PfP countries.

First, the issue of civil-military relations is a basic transitional problem, i.e., part of the very substance of the changes from the societies of "real", Yugoslav or Albanian socialism to democratic societies, from centrally planned to market-regulated economies.

Second, civil-military relations in South-East Europe in the period 1990-2000 experienced the impact of the post-Yugoslav conflicts and wars. The consequences of these conflicts and wars and their reflection on civil-military relations were different in the individual countries of the region.

Third, the changing civil-military relations are an element of the nascent and gradually evolving Balkan security community and of the region's build-up as a prospective compatible component of the Euro-Atlantic security and civic zone.

Fourth, civil-military relations in South-East Europe are undergoing the influence of the transforming security and defence agenda of the

post-Cold War Europe and the world. The new threats to security in the end of the Twentieth and the beginning of Twenty First centuries require deep national security sector reforms in terms of policy, instruments of dealing with the risks, challenges or imminent dangers. A significant component of the needed changes is the adaptation to participation in multilateral peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, humanitarian and rescue missions and operations. All these new developments inevitably have repercussions on the civil-military relations, on the role society plays in shaping new and effective organisation and instruments of coping with the threats for the nations, the regions and the world.

Fifth, civil-military relations in South-East Europe and the various changes they have undergone and continue to experience are closely linked with the roles and influences of some international organisations and institutions. Both the stage of mature transformations for some countries in the Balkans and the start in the very end of the Twentieth century of changes in the civil-military relations sector for others are invariably linked to the activities of NATO, its PfP programme and the enlargement and co-operation policy of the European Union (EU). Other institutions and forums as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Pact of Stability for South-East Europe also contribute to the improvement of the civil-military relations in the region, their approximation to the best standards in this area for democratic civilian control of the armed forces and the security institutions in general.

1. As an issue of **the transition** of the societies of South-East European civil-military relations were both a subject of social-political debate and of research interest throughout the nineties of the previous century for some of the countries of the region, and for other Balkan states the complexity of the problem just started to be realised in the last year of the decade. The differences in the transition of the different countries of South-East Europe were clearly reflected on the civil-military relationship of the respective societies. With a different rate of ripening of the problem and with a different level of realisation of its essence by the broader social groups, however, for one decade most of the Balkan countries' elites understood that democratic civilian control of the armed forces guarantees

accountability and preserves legitimacy for the maintenance and the eventual application of the force of the state. In a differentiated pattern the culture of disengaging and non-involving the military in domestic politics was gaining grounds in the troubled for long region. The values of securing civilian democratic control on the defence policy-making and of limiting the role of the military in foreign-policy issues, including on the deployment of national forces out of the country were gradually understood and are already utilised in the practical activities of some of the countries from the region. This gradually evolving process is additionally motivated by the similarly gradual realisation that democracies cannot or will not be able to go to war against each other.

2. The experience of **the Balkan conflicts and wars** by the different countries from the region was differently reflected on the respective civil-military relations. The post-Yugoslav states that emerged after the end of the federation received a specific mark on their civil-military relations, depending on the particular cases. The establishment of statehood for all these new states was a problem itself. However, it has been specifically worsened by the dominating militarily Serbia for each one of them. At the same time, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Bosnia and Herzegovina – due to the policy for a decade by Belgrade, were left with the worst of problems in terms of establishing in a clear-cut fashion of civil-military relations: in the case of FRY the existence of several armed forces, belonging to Serbia inside and outside the country did not allow the definition of civil-military relations within a state. The presence of international forces added to the complexity of this particular case. In the case of Bosnia, the persistence of several contending projects for hosting the sovereign state complicated the issue of civil-military relations because of the contradicting nature of the respective state projects. In the Albanian case the Balkan war that involved Kosovo negatively influenced the fragile economy and state, though the state survived a really harsh experience. In the cases of Romania and Bulgaria, the wars greatly diminished the rate of the two countries' integration efforts in the EU. The dramatic experience, however, accelerated their military reform processes, leading the two countries closer to NATO membership.

3. The building-up of a **regional security community** and of the region as a normal European region requires re-assessment of the role of the armed forces, of the defence and national security concepts, of the real value of the principles and norms of democracy in a nascent Balkan regional civil society. The state of civil-military relations in the individual countries of South-East Europe and of the region in general is both an indicator of the level of evolution of the security community and an opportunity to name the obstacles on the way of this developing process. Reaching a higher level of homogeneity in the area of civil-military relations is a stable step-stone on the way of building a regional security community in South-East Europe.

4. The Balkan conflicts and wars throughout the last decade of the Twentieth century clearly demonstrated to the states and societies of the region the emergence of a new, post-Cold War **security and defence agenda**. Most importantly - the new security threats require new responses, which are not necessarily military. Political accentuation and economic investment in police forces, border guards, customs forces and crisis management facilities are the right response to many new security threats¹. In the cases when a military response is required for meeting the new security threats not only new military capabilities would be needed in terms of equipment, logistics, command, control and communication structures, but also new skills by the military, including of operating outside their home countries. Civil-military relations in such circumstances would require a new and higher reliance on the skills of civilians and not always depend on the soldiers. The adaptation to these new, post-Cold War security and defence requirements are conceived by the states in the region as a necessary pre-condition to join the cooperative and partnership arrangements of the Euro-Atlantic zone of stability and prosperity. However, the different countries of South-East Europe have different capacity and rate of adaptation to these needs. The overcoming of this deficiency is stimulated by developing the partner and co-operative relations, alongside with the

¹ Chris Donnelly, Shaping soldiers for the 21st century, in: *NATO review*, Summer/Autumn 2000, p. 28-31.

internal, domestic economic, social, political, financial and defence reform progress.

5. **International, especially Western support** has become a crucial factor in both conceptualising the transformations in civil-military relations in South-East Europe and in finding the practical ways of establishing new types of relationships between democratising with different velocity Balkan societies and their respective military establishments. NATO and its PfP programme have played a central and a leading role in the international efforts of supporting the adaptation to democratic control over the security and defence institutions, especially over the armed forces. Apart from a solidarity approach in reconstructing on the basis of democracy the former authoritarian and totalitarian societies, NATO and the PfP programme were instrumental in finding practical ways of involving the individual Balkan nations in peacekeeping missions. The main direction of achieving this goal has been improving the interoperability of the equipment, standardising the operating procedures and the command, control and communications of the partnering military units. The gradual formation of a common security and strategic culture through the PfP Consortium of the Defence Academies and the Security Studies Institutes is certainly one of the most ambitious projects of the Partnership for Peace Programme. It is also a most appropriate means of clarifying and eventually – homogenising the understanding of the fundamental meaning of civilian democratic control over the military – a task that has been set by the Study on NATO Enlargement in 1995. The Pact of Stability for South-East Europe acknowledges the important contribution of NATO to stability in the region by its PfP and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The Pact underscores that “the Alliance has an important role to play in achieving the objectives of the Pact, noting in particular NATO’s recent decisions to reach out to countries of the region”². Memberships, the Membership Action Plans and the prospects for membership facilitate the establishment of standards the applicant countries are

² Stability Pact for South-East Europe, adopted on 30 July 1999 in Sarajevo, Art. 27.

supposed to meet, including in the area of the democratic control over the military. Throughout the 1990s the EU, the WEU, the Council of Europe (CE) and the OSCE have also substantially contributed to the establishment of new, democratically based civil-military relations in the Balkans. The Phare and the Tacis programmes of the Union have significantly added to the international efforts of the internalisation of democratic norms, to facilitating the activities of the non-governmental organisations (NGOs), monitoring from a nascent civil society the development of civil-military relations. The adoption of Chapter VII of the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Relations, constituting an important part of the Budapest Summit Declaration of 6 December 1994 is a daring effort to set new standards in the civil-military relations by introducing more transparency in national laws that regulate the relationship between society and the armed forces³. It is a very actual document after FRY was re-integrated in the OSCE, because the Code of Conduct clearly defines in its paragraph 20 that “the participating states consider the democratic control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces as well as intelligence services and the police to be an indispensable element of stability and security. They will further the integration of their armed forces with civil society as an important expression of democracy”⁴. The role of the bilateral government-to-government and military-to-military contacts of Western (NATO, EU, PfP, OSCE, CE) and individual Balkan countries is significant in the process of transformation of civil-military relations in South-East Europe towards democratic control of their armed forces and greater transparency in their defence planning and budgeting processes. However, the major effect of these bilateral efforts has consistently depended on the national abilities to utilise the support.

³ In more details: Rienk Terpstra, *The OSCE Code of Conduct: Setting new standards in the politico-military field?*, in: *Helsinki Monitor*, Volume 7 – 1996 – Number 1, p. 27-41; Gert de Nooy (ed.), *Cooperative Security, the OSCE and its Code of Conduct*, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, London, Boston, 1996, 158 pp.

⁴ *Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security*, par. 20.

The objectives of this study are to find how civil-military relations in South-East Europe are influenced and influence the transitional societies of the region, the conflicts and wars that marred the Balkans, the evolution of the regional security community, the new, post-Cold War security and defence agenda and the Western support. The initial ambitions were to carry out a comparative research on how civil-military relations are reflected on domestic, defence and foreign policy and on five factors that shape the civilian democratic control of the armed forces of the individual countries of South-East Europe: the external environment, the historical legacies, the domestic political, social and economic context, the institutional factors and the military culture and professionalism.

The study on civil-military relations in South-East Europe has borrowed in this endeavour from a broader project of the British Economic and Social Research Council's 'One Europe or Several?' Programme – 'The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in a Comparative Context' under the guidance of Dr. Andrew Cottey, University College Cork and University of Bradford, Dr. Tim Edmunds, Defence Studies Department/Joint Services Command and Staff College, King's College London and Dr. Anthony Forster, Defence Studies Department/Joint Services Command and Staff College, King's College London. However, at this stage of development of civil-military relations and the studies on these issues in South-East Europe this could become possible only in the Bulgarian and the Slovenian national cases. This is why the part of the study, dealing with the individual national cases bears more the features of a survey. It registers dominating national perceptions of the peculiar and troubling, according to the authors, aspects of the civil-military relations in their own countries. This survey also produces a very useful record of information about major legal and institutional arrangements in the respective countries on the democratic control of the military. The survey highlights also important historical events and political attitudes that influence the state of the civil-military relations in the individual countries. All the national studies outline existing deficiencies in the civil-military relations in the particular countries. Concrete proposals how to deal with the problems of the democratic civilian control of the armed forces are made by each of the national-case writers.

The analytic and prescriptive part of the study treats the national cases in the context of the five aspects of the research framework. It would be premature to expect the breakthrough of civil-military relations in Hungary or the changed nature of these relations in Bulgaria to be the feature of the thorough region. However, the culture of critically and freely assessing developments in the security and defence establishments in the countries of South-East region has been shaped and bears the potential to go deeper into the roots of the issues, whose improvement is indispensable for both the evolution of the region and of its integration in the EU and NATO.

III National Perspectives on Civil-Military Relations

1. Civil-Military Relations in Albania: Phases of Evolution


The change of the social-economic system that led to the end of totalitarian socialism and the transition to the pluralist system was accompanied by profound changes in the political, economic and social fields.

The transition process proved that the more rigid, conservative and fanatic a system is, the more acute, powerful and deep the changes in that country will be. And Albania is one such an example.

Certainly those changes were mirrored even in the national security policy. From the beginning of those changes in Albania, the western orientation of the national policy, as a synthesised expression of the all-nation willingness and the return to the previous tradition of the Albanian state, was manifested. Albania has transferred itself from isolation to a country, open for co-operation. Membership in NATO and in other international organisations and institutions was defined as the priority of the country's foreign policy.

The army constituted one of the most powerful and conservative ideological structures of the communist system. Henceforth, it has to undergo radical changes during the transformation of the system, serving at the same time as a mirror, and to some extent - as a guarantee for future changes. New relations had to be established in full understanding between the political class, the state and the people. The state as one of the most important organisms of society can exist only in the conditions of an equilibrium between the democratic institutions (one of the pillars of which is the army), the political class and the people. In the case when one of these three components may threaten the pact of understanding, the equilibrium may be shaken and the existence of the state could face a serious risk.

Following is the figure of this equilibrium:



Fortunately whenever this equilibrium has been shaken in Albania because of the degeneration of the politics, the spiritual ties between the army and the people have never been severed. This has helped to avoid the tragedy of confrontation between them. But regardless of this the damage has been considerable.

The most significant and critical proof of this statement has been the events of March 1997, during which the confrontation between the army and the people was avoided. While the refusal by the army to get confronted with the people saved the army's dignity, its incapability to protect itself from the destruction in March 1997 will remain an object of a deeper study. Civil-military relations during the transition period have undergone such a test several times and always under some pressure, but never have the military forces been a provocative factor of the complicated situations.

Even in the cases when they made a mistake, this has happened mostly because of the influence of the policy to them. A clear example of this is the destruction of the army within 24 hours in the year 1997.

The transition processes in the civil-military relations in Albania are characterised by several peculiarities and the most important one seems to be the destruction of the army seven years after the beginning of its reformation. The gravest situation within the military establishment that demonstrated the most serious damage in the army and in the relations between the army and the people (society) took place in 1997. This happened when the change of the social-economic system was not yet completed, and when the revolt of the people had to be careful to preserve the democratic process in the country and not to affect the pluralist character and the market economy of the state. This took place when the army was formally depoliticised since 1991, and pretended to have occupied its legal position in the framework of a democratic state, when the country's forces were part of the PfP and normally they were considered to be in a much better state than in 1991-1992.

Why did this tragedy in the Albanian army not happen when it was more expected and possible - in 1991-1992? At that period the transition of the social-economic system from centralised to market economy was taking place alongside with the transition from a one-party to a multi-party system, and the army was part of the communist party ideology and organisation, which were closely connected with the Party-state structures. We shall try to analyse this almost unique phenomenon in the context of civil-military relations during the transition period of the Albanian army.

The civil-military relations in Albania have passed the following stages from the start of the democratic process in this country:

First phase

It encompasses the period from the beginning of the de-politicisation of the army till the completion of the big structural changes, the establishment of regular relations with NATO and its member countries and joining the PfP (1992-1996).

It was clear to everyone that the system was undergoing changes, that new political, economic and social relations were being established in

the Albanian society. The Party of Labour (Communist) was a failure and the armed forces were subjected to profound structural and doctrinal changes.

In spite of the imbalances in the relations of the government, the people (society) and the Albanian military, the latter got orientated well. From the very beginning they supported the democratic processes, protected the military property, avoided the confrontation with the people and guaranteed combat readiness, regardless of the difficulties. They abandoned the Party which they belonged to (more than 80% of them belonged to the Communist Party) with maturity, farsightedness and as real patriots, and welcomed the reformation processes. It is generally accepted that the military are conservative towards political and social issues. However, this was not noticed with the military in the years of the great changes. At that period the Albanian case challenged the suppositions of some theoreticians on the symbiosis Party-state as the model of the armies of the countries of Eastern Europe. The Albanian army did not make any effort to prevent the Marxist-Leninist regime from toppling down in the period of the crisis.

An important and critical moment was the realisation of one of the demands of the reform - the reduction of the army. The way, criteria, seriousness and principles, through which this element of the reform was to be performed, were important factors for the future of the army and Albanian society.

The basic criterion to be followed for the selection of military was professionalism. The respect of this demand can establish an optimal equilibrium in the civil-military relations. It is a well-known fact that it is more difficult to manipulate the professional military by politics or for him to interfere in politics.

A main condition to maintain the civil-military relations is the civilians with political functions must not encourage or lead the military towards political-party activity. It is vital for the existence of the army to avoid political commitment and militant political spirit among the military. Otherwise, this may cause damage not only to the army, but also to the political system and to the whole society and state.

Though there is a law in Albania, which prohibits the involvement of the military in party and political activities, the politicians themselves were the first to disrespect this law – a fact, which influenced badly the army.

Unfortunately, the selection of the military that were kept in the army was made on the basis of personal sympathies and party and political convictions. The National Information Service also played its role in those selections and appointments.

A prey to the behaviour of serving politics fell mostly the military without background, who were ambitious and career-seekers and for whom it was impossible to realise their ambitions with skills and in conformity with the degrees of rising in the career. The terms of the experience, professional skill, seniority and education, which are the fundamentals of hierarchy, were ignored. Those who were the first to be removed from the leading positions of the army were the experienced military that, as Samuel Huntington says, are transformed into “sterile servants of the state”. However, this contingent was replaced with the “servile servants of the policy”.

To justify the personnel policy the Ministry of Defence (MoD) undertook the so-called tests, which were not considered in future promotions.


In contrast, "generals of the party" were promoted and received new stars, no matter their professionalism and their personality. The young captains and those about thirty years of age became brigade and division commanders. After three to six months they were promoted as Lieutenant Colonels. In the beginning of 1995 the majority of them became brigadiers, generals ...

This group of military, who artificially were preferred by politicians, enjoyed also economic privileges, which separated them from the rest of the military. So first this elite was corrupted and then it was put to the service of politics.

The political power elite, generally with low culture, that was being created in the Albanian society artificially and urgently, tried to create a military elite to be put at its service. In this way the necessary equilibrium between the ideology of society, power and professionalism of the military was shaken. It appeared that the more professional a military was - the less he had to be involved in the army. Those relations can be presented through the diagram below:

The diagram of the varied values between ideology – professionalism – power:

Ideology and culture of society



Professionalism reduces at the same time the ideological factor and the curve of the power of the military in political life. Otherwise, the involvement of the military in the political and party life leads them towards professional incompetence and raises excessively the power of the military in the political-social life.

As can be seen in the graph, the power is a variable gradient of professionalism and ideology (gradient = sine/cosine). This function clearly shows that professionalism is in a contrary position with the ideology and vice-versa. Becoming aware about the mathematical functioning of this mechanism, it becomes easier to define the low level of the military power as compared to the other parts of society. It becomes clear that the main negative factor in those relations is the ideology, the commitment and militancy of the military in the party political activities.

The engagement of the military in the political activities of the parties in power has a largely negative effect. The participation of the military in power is detrimental to the professional values, which consequently lead to the degrading of power itself.

Furthermore, there was not a personnel board to sign for middle and low ranks. After a large group of military officers was dismissed without taking into consideration their professionalism and career, unacceptable differentiation was created in the treatment, appointment, promotion and payment, thus undermining the necessary cohesion for an army and destroying the internal relations of the armed forces.

The officers of the army core could never play their role. The all-out denigration and material deprivation of the army core created a gap between them and the elite. The loss of the contacts between the military elite and the army units and sub-units (the base or core of the army) harmed the vertical direction, so necessary for the functioning of the army. The detachment of the leadership from the base led to the loss of direction and to falling into chaos.

Objective civil control, according to Samuel Huntington, not only reduces the power of the army into the lowest possible level, but also raises to the maximum the possibility for the social security of the military.

What does social security for the military mean and how can we achieve it? It is the duty of the civil authorities to guarantee by law security conditions for the personnel and a reasonable welfare, payment, pension and shelter. Thus, by having guaranteed living conditions they will be always motivated in their duty. Otherwise, they will concentrate on their daily existential problems and neglect their duty and military prestige. The overwhelming majority of the military live in similar conditions as common people in the transition period, daily confronted by many difficulties.

The assessment of the military by society defines substantially the prestige of the former. For many years now, starting from the communist regime, the prestige and the authority of the military have been seriously

undermined as a result of the changes in the grading system, punishment of main army officers and the planned killing of some of them. This has seriously hit the functioning of the hierarchy and the prestige of the army. This led in the 1990s to moral and psychological deterioration of the Albanian army.

The years of the transition further worsened the situation. One part of society thought in a naïve way that the army was no more necessary and that there will no more be threat of any war. No ideas of any other roles of the armed forces existed for this part of society. Albania experienced the mistake that had occurred in other countries of Eastern Europe, in which was spread the thinking that "*the more democratic a country is, the less respect there is for the army*". The military profession got denigrated; indifference towards the military further lowered their prestige. The slogan "In democratic societies civilian institutions exert the control over the military" was misused in nominating civilians to military assignments, or in putting them in uniform without military education. Many of them were sent to receive education in foreign countries and after carrying out short-term courses were appointed to positions in the MoD.

In general, the lack of civilian competence on the issues of the armed forces harmed the institution and compromised the control civilians exercised over the military.

The civil-military relations developed naturally, first on the basis of the respective expertise of civilian and military leaders, second, thanks to their personal and non-official relations, and third, with the confidence created between them in their common work.

The treatment of civilians and military was different: the absolute trust towards civilians was only because of the fact that they used to come from the party structures in power. The distrust of the majority of the officers threatened the personal relations and obstructed the creation or confidence between them. In many cases the military were unjustly accused of belonging to the pro-Communist political spectrum. Civilian authoritarianism was often replacing civilian democratic control.

In the framework of the reform of the armed forces a document of the policy of security and defence was compiled for the first time. The duties and competences of different power-holders in the field of defence and their relations were defined.

On one side the adoption of the document was a success. It legally divided the questions of security and defence of the country between the president, parliament and the government (Prime Minister and Defence Minister). On the other side, however, by using the authority of the President the parliament was almost completely subjugated and the government was ignored. The deterioration of the relations between them was even more worsened because the Presidential power was beginning to resemble the power, enjoyed by the ex-first Secretary of the Party of Labour of Albania during the communist regime. Such a similarity could be witnessed also in the MoD, in which democratic civil control has been replaced by civil authoritarianism, while the functions of the General Staff have been turned into secretarial ones.

The laws, sub-legal acts and instructions approved in the framework of the juridical reform were not in conformity with one another and ran counter to one another, causing a juridical disorder and discordances. The status of the military as a guarantee of his rights could not be applied as a result of contradictions with other legal acts. This caused the loss of confidence of the military towards the political elite and negatively influenced the attitude of the military towards their duty.

The law on the use of arms also did not give an adequate legal protection to the military, diminishing their safety. As a result of that, when some military units have been attacked, they preferred to abandon the weapons than to defend by using them.

These deficiencies of the legal regulation of the activity of the armed forces led to the inefficiency of the laws from the very beginning of their introduction. Henceforth, some sectors of the military deviated from their normal activity.

The assessment and control of the budget of the army by the Parliament assumed a superficial, formal and irresponsible character.

A very restricted budget for a period of 5-6 years and a full underestimation of the military caused a serious damage to the training and discipline of the army. The result was further discouraging of the military and lowering the effectiveness of the army.

At the beginning, the military reform appeared to be a success for the democratic regime. However, due to the lack of adequate leadership and of wrongly perceiving the national mission of the armed forces, the military reform was presented with two faces: one for the foreigners, and another – for the military personnel.

The official propaganda introduced the military reform as a success. In reality, however, there were some achievements, related to the openness and contacts of the Albanian army with the military of the countries of our neighbours and with the NATO members. This led to many military agreements and to joint military exercise with the USA and other NATO members during 1994-1996.

As a consequence the country's national security was improved. Albania has never been so close with its western allies before, never the people of this country felt more confident of their security.

The participation in the PfP programme was another achievement, which allowed Albania not only to tighten ties with the USA and with the West European countries, but also to increase the level of training in the army as well as its readiness, logistic support and its interoperability and standard performance, compatible with NATO members.

The dominant idea, introduced by the political leadership was becoming full member of NATO. The large majority of the military personnel as well as the Albanian people were inspired by the idea of becoming a full member of NATO. However, this action was undertaken as a party affair, not as a national task. The main requirements for membership were to be provided by the armed forces. It has been often forgotten, however, that the primary condition for participation in NATO as a full member was having a functioning democratic society and state.

These issues were not deeply considered and studied, which hindered the creation of clear-cut concepts of the military reform, the realisation of doctrinal and structural changes, including on the leading command structures and the dislocation of the army.

The commitment of NATO and of the armed forces of the PfP countries in those years have been extremely important, particularly in the technical consultancy, education and qualification of the staff. But the effect has not been sufficient, since those processes included only a limited number of military of the MoD and of any other central institution who “were qualified” in a repeated manner in different countries, and leaving aside the military officers of the other operative units, thus creating a monopoly in the right for qualification.

Second Phase

The situation of the Albanian army on the brink of the events of March 1997 was very grave. The system of civil-military relations was one of the influential factors on this situation.

The moral and psychological state of the army did not motivate the servicemen for their role and duties. The dignity of the military officers was offended and provoked by the attitude of the political power holders. The military were also affected by the degradation of professionalism in their field of activity, by the removal of good professionals from their positions and the upgrading to higher positions of less professional officers. The latter could not guarantee an adequate security, because there was lack of 80% of the officers on the level of platoons and companies. The troops for securing the protection of the military sites were also insufficient.

The army, actually, could not trust its military leadership and the government of the country, because of the politically and economically compromised elite. The army was itself in a grave economic situation. It did not have the necessary internal cohesion and the motivation for its duties. It did not trust the political power and did not believe in the future of its country. In this situation the army was very weak and it

could not resist the troubles that took place in 1997 and cope with the problems, created by the political and military leaders.

In this situation the people became aware that they had lost not only their "freedom" - after the loathing process of ballots during the general elections in June 1996 by the officials, elections which were never recognised by any international structure. Six months later the Albanians felt another loss – the "pyramid schemes" failed and the majority of the people not only did not “get rich fast”, but also lost their family savings.

In this stage, each careful analyst may have thought that the moment of breaking the “Clausewitz paradoxical trinity” was close. Now not only the people, but also the military were detached from the government. The threat was not addressed directly against the army. It was an internal threat, focused on the government and its structures. The involvement of the military elite in the policy of the party made the military organisation more vulnerable. Though the army suffered serious consequences, this one was not of any conflict between the people and the armed forces.

A decision was taken to use military forces in operations for restoring order in the Southern urban areas, whose population was accused of holding communist riots against democracy. However, nobody accepted to fight against their brothers and sisters only because they were demanding the government to resign.

Although the government used state media in misinforming the people for a possible aggression by Serbia and Greece nobody accepted such false propaganda. The majority of the military leadership did not obey blindly the orders of the President to conduct military operations against the population of the southern provinces.

Hardly understanding can be reached when the politicians do not accept the professional and moral expertise of the military. In such cases the military has nothing to do but to resign on the basis of the principle of the military honour. In Albania many officers, including the chief of general staff, left the army.

In the conditions when the majority of the military did not obey the political leadership, the chairman of the National Information Service was appointed to lead the Armed Forces. After being promoted to a four-stars general, he directly took over the command of the army. Then the selection of the military that had passed the test of loyalty towards the party took place. They have been then appointed to command the mixed troops, consisting of paramilitary units and armed forces. These newly founded fighting formations were used against the people.

The military had to choose between two options - either to implement the order of the politicians and of the degenerated elite of the army and attack their own people with tanks, artillery and chemical weapons, taken for the first time out of the stores, or abandon the military units and join the ranks of the protesting people. Being part of the people and closely related with them the military abandoned the military units and did not take action against them. Huntington correctly points out that the anti-government fights encourage the civil-military relations in a different manner from those, incited by conflicts between the states. The internal conflicts interfere in the objective factor.

The deformation of the reform in the armed forces, interferences in politics by the military and the serious damage of civil-military relations in a society with serious problems in its democratic development, followed by the destruction of the army, constitute a specific and, perhaps, unique experience.

Third Phase: Rebuilding of the Albanian Army, Re-establishment of Civil-Military Relations

After the considerable drama of the destruction of the Albanian Army, the society and the military were really shocked.

The rebuilding of the army began immediately. The forces that got powerfully mobilised in it were:

1. The army
2. The people
3. NATO and partner countries

Suffice it to mention that this considerable damage encouraged and realised powerful ties between them.

Good relations were immediately established between the society and military. The lack of the army in those situations made the Albanian society aware about the damage it had suffered and about the fact that there could not build the state without the rebuilding of the army.

The willingness and the commitment for re-constructing the armed forces reflected a general positivism of civil-military relations in Albania. Officers and subordinates used to protect together the military sites and work together as constructing workers or carpenters after the working day was over for re-building the military barracks. The families of the newly recruited soldiers used to provide voluntarily different necessary equipment for their barracks. The contrast was complete. A few months ago crowds of people attacked and destroyed the abandoned military units and now the people, together with the military were re-building voluntarily and free of charge.

In such a situation good civil-military relations were developed. The political parties also tried to be careful in their attitudes to the armed forces, despite the various conflicts in other social areas.

The re-construction of the army was orientated to finding new conceptual and legal solutions that would create a new direction of leadership, of relations among the military themselves and of a smoother functioning of the military hierarchy.

The new situation for the civil-military relations enabled the realisation of large-scale consultancies with the state, politicians, diplomats, historians, etc., concerning major issues of the policy of security and defence, of improving the civil democratic control.

The assistance by NATO and its partner countries was immediate and systematic. Just for six months twelve teams of NATO experts of different fields came to Albania. In the Ministry of Defence, apart from the NATO mission, there are other permanent missions of some Alliance member countries.

In the framework of the PfP Albania acquired a special status. Apart from the various aid programmes many possibilities for education and specialisation in NATO member countries were offered to the Albanian military and civilian experts.

Documents of the National Security and Defence and the Law on the Army, were drafted. The new structure of the army was also approved.

The rebuilding and regeneration of the army was intensified. One year after its destruction the Albanian army was confronted with the grave situation, caused by the military conflict in Kosovo. The threat for the security of the country during the conflict in Kosovo definitely improved the civil-military relations. It is widely known that a growing external threat improves the civil control. Another phenomenon was experienced here like in other countries at different times: the civil institutions can turn more cohesive because of the "rally around the flag" as a result of the outside threat.

Actually, Albania is a very active, supportive and enthusiastic partner of PfP. Particular focus on military interoperability in certain appropriate fields is reflected in its Individual Partnership Programme (IPP), Planning and Review Process (PARP). The implementation of Albania's IPP of 1999 was successful, despite the Kosovo crisis. But nevertheless, more remains to be done regarding Albanian self-sufficiency in IPP. More can and should be done in improving the democratic control over the military in Albania too.

2. Civil-Military Relations in Bulgaria: Aspects, Factors, Problems

I Introduction

In spite of the progress made in the last ten years, the development of effective management of democratically legitimated relations between the society and Armed Forces continue to be one of the top priorities in the Bulgarian political agenda. After years of difficult and frequently painful decisions, the country's general political transition to democracy was successfully completed. Along with basic issues, such as the introduction of democratic political and market economy rules, considerable efforts were dedicated to implement the principle of democratic civil control over the military.

The Bulgarian Armed Forces¹ already operate under new judicial and procedural regulations leading to strict political and public control. Nevertheless, they still remain an important factor in the domestic democratic process. It is so not because they represent any kind of threat to society, but because they consume a significant part of the limited state budget and have indisputable social role. The reorganisation of the Armed Forces, from the typical totalitarian status of "a state within the state" to the size, structure and functions, acceptable from internal and international point of view, is a process of extremely high political and strategic importance. The defence reform in Bulgaria is a factor for strengthening the civil society, ensuring sustainable socio-economic development and effective integration into the European Union (EU) and NATO. It needs special public (including international) attention, monitoring by the mass media, and political-military co-operation for the

¹ According to the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Armed Forces comprise the General Staff, Land Forces, Air Force, Navy formations and centrally subordinated units which functionally are divided into Rapid Reaction Forces, Defence Forces, Territorial Defence Troops and Reserves. See: MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA, APPROVED BY THE XXXVIII NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA ON 8 APRIL 1999. Available on-line at <http://www.md.government.bg>

successful development of effective standards, norms and procedures, which would guarantee both the capability of the Armed Forces and the rigorous democratic control.

II Internal Political Aspect of the Civil-Military Relations and the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces

Eleven years after the beginning of the democratic reforms the civil-military relations in Bulgaria are associated with reliable, manageable and evolving civilian and democratic control over the armed forces. Without overestimating the achievements in the field, one can say that a definite introduction and a practical record of this major principle in any modern functioning democracy continues to be high on the political agenda of the country.

Even the slightest residual temptation, at the start of the democratisation of the armed forces, in domestic politics has been thoroughly overcome. It has become both a legal and an ethical norm that the military is the apolitical servant of the democratically elected institutions, according to the Constitution and the laws, and yet remaining the symbol of national pride.

The establishment of the democratic oversight faces a few major problems. While it is a basic element of the official policy of the Bulgarian Government, the civilian democratic control of the armed forces has not yet gained an effective social support. Furthermore, the principle has not yet attracted irreversibly its potential staunchest guardian – society itself. While the social instincts are definitely on the side of the democratic principle, the public is not capable of organising, channelling and expressing these instincts within the potential of the democratic control of the armed forces and, ultimately, to defend themselves from the guards they have appointed.

This intricate incapability is not insurmountable, but requires the overcoming of particular deficiencies in the areas of domestic politics, defence policy and foreign policy.

Traditionally, the Bulgarian military have perceived themselves as one of the fundamental national pillars. They have a lot of arguments to self-portrait themselves like that. They bear stability and impartiality in their behaviour and logically have had a normalising impact on the social and political processes. Intellectually, however, the hypothetical conversion of the military into a threat to society has never been considered. Ways of preventing such a negative development were never sought or practically formulated before the beginning of the democratic transition in post-totalitarian Bulgaria.

Becoming the apolitical servant of the democratically elected institutions was not a job the Bulgarian military and their civilian masters did easily overnight. It took at least 4-5 years to overcome residual temptations to involve the armed forces in domestic politics on the opposing sides of the competing political forces. Bulgarian history of the last ten years will keep the names of certain generals and many officers, dreaming of personal careers through a “right” political affiliation. But the ultimate objective of the pluralistic Bulgarian political parties and organisations has never been to utilise the power of the armed forces for the direct imposition of their political will and gaining the upper hand in the domestic political struggle. Rather it has been the indirect impact on society by the leading political forces to have members of the armed forces, a highly respected institution by the Bulgarians, on their side.

This vicious practice was both discarded and intellectually outlived by the end of 1997. The Bulgarian politicians assimilated the restrained and responsible behaviour of the large majority of the Bulgarian officers not to be dragged into the political combinations and schemes of various parties and to remain true to their professional credit as patriots and guardians of their people. In post-Communist Bulgaria, the acceptance of the transition to democracy by the military took place earlier than the agreement of the leading political forces to structure the civil-military relations in accordance with the rules of the democratic society. By the way, getting rid of various residual temptations to exert power on the quite vulnerable society, not necessarily using the resources of the armed forces, the police or the secret services, but using other levers of economic or administrative nature, which a ruling party or a coalition

have a dominant ‘say’, remains a difficult problem for post-Communist Bulgaria. People do not fear the monopolistic might of the armed forces, but the monopolistic taxes imposed by the state energy company.

From 1989 to 1991 the Bulgarian armed forces were attacked by the democratic opposition (at that point) as an instrument of the power of the Socialist Party, the heir of the Communist Party. After the adoption of the new democratic Constitution this reproach easily withered away. Any residual ties or loyalty to a political party or an ideology on the side of the military in the years that followed were in an environment that definitely and clearly required just the opposite – subordination to the objectives of the National Security Concept, loyalty to the democratically elected Parliament, Government and President independent on their political affiliation.

One of the notable achievements of the Bulgarian democratic transition after decades of socialist totalitarianism, including deviations towards a more aggressive nationalism in the period 1984-1989, was the mature and wise discarding of this option for the country’s political relations. Neither of the major political parties, including the former Communists reformed into Socialists, utilised the nationalism for domestic or foreign political purposes. The Armed Forces - a traditional symbol of patriotism - were purposefully not dragged into such a dangerous political game. The military themselves chose to be pragmatic and effectively useful for their people rather than to become the “glorious heroes” at the turn of the Twentieth century.

This particular component of the newly constructed civil-military relations – how to stay patriotic without resorting to nationalistic or chauvinistic attitudes, was crucial not only to the definition of the contents of these relations but also to the civilian democratic control of the armed forces in Bulgaria. This crucial aspect of the transition from Communism to democracy served as a role model in the midst of similar transitions and on-going post-Yugoslav conflicts in South-East Europe in general. The Bulgarian civil-military relations of the post-Communist transformation period turned into a specific generator of stability in the warring Balkans. The central position of Bulgaria vis-à-vis almost all major conflicts influenced the regional developments by showing it is

able to overcome a traditional burden of the Balkan past – the aggressive nationalistic attitudes of the military from all Balkan countries. Indeed, Bulgaria's success in neutralising the poison of the traditional Balkan destructive nationalism, adopting new roles for its military in terms of domestic politics, and generating trust, stability and confidence in the defence establishments of the neighbouring countries, are among the most positive features of the Bulgarian transition to new civil-military relations.

III The Democratic-Civilian Control Over the Armed Forces: the Defence-Political Aspect

The answer to the question 'who has the control over the defence policy' is a major criterion and an indicator of the level of maturity of the democratic-civilian control over the military. Both, who devises the defence strategy and forces' structure, and who masters spending and procurement –are issues that the Bulgarian defence establishment had to cope with during its adaptation to the functioning of the principle of the democratic oversight of the armed forces. It had to turn all these questions into an immanent part of the contents of that principle.

The Bulgarian military, the country's political leadership and society in general accepted the meaning and the consequences of the principle of civilian democratic control over the armed forces. The period from 1989 to 1991 marked an initial legislative and institutional approximation of the requirements of the democratic principle. The new democratic Constitution of 1991, followed by the new laws on defence, armed forces, internal security and intelligence services defined the functions and responsibilities of the Parliament, the President, the Government and the General Staff according to the requirements of the democratic civilian control.

The National Assembly (Parliament) is the main institution for political direction and control over the armed forces and the rest of the security structures. It carries out these functions through its legislative activity, resource allocation through the budget, adoption of decisions

and other acts and parliamentary control. In the security sphere, its National Security Committee assists the Parliament.

The legislative acts, adopted by the National Assembly that concern the national security include: the National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine (as political-military document on strategic level), the Defence and Armed Forces Act, other basic laws, such as the Special Intelligence Means Act and the Consultative Council for National Security Act .

The National Assembly decides on the declaration of war and concludes peace, approves the deployment and the use of Bulgarian Armed Forces (BAF) outside the country, and the deployment, crossing and use of foreign troops on Bulgarian territory. On a motion from the President or the Council of Ministers it introduces martial law or a state of emergency on the whole or on part of the country's territory; ratifies or rejects through law all international agreements, which have a political and military nature or envisage corrections to the national borders. The National Assembly ratifies international treaties, both bilateral (e.g., for international co-operation) and multilateral (e.g. the Treaty on the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), the "Open Sky" Treaty, etc.), conventions, as well as laws regulating particular issues of defence, internal order, security, the defence-industrial complex. Example is the "Law of Control over Foreign Trade Activities with Armaments, Goods and Technologies with Dual Purpose Application.

The *Defence and Armed Forces Act of the Republic of Bulgaria* (DAFA), enacted in 1995, added the following powers to the National Assembly: to adopt by decision the National Security Concept (as a "Grand strategy" document) and the Military Doctrine on proposal by the Council of Ministers; to adopt long-term programmes for the development of the armed forces; to determine the size of the armed forces; to ensure the necessary legislative norms for the establishment of units for civil protection and for carrying out humanitarian tasks in the case of natural and industrial disasters; to establish, restructure and close military educational institutions.

The National Assembly carries out parliamentary control over the activities of all security related institutions: the Ministry of Defence,

Bulgarian AF, Military Intelligence, Military Counter-Intelligence; Ministry of Internal Affairs, Border Troops, Gendarmerie, National Security Service (the counterintelligence), National Intelligence Service and National Guard Service. The National Security Committee and the Foreign and Integration Policy Committee of the Parliament assist its activities and carry out parliamentary control on its behalf.

The President of the Republic is Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria. He appoints and dismisses the higher command of the Armed Forces and bestows all higher military ranks, acting on a motion from the Council of Ministers. The President presides over the Consultative Council for National Security, the status of which is regulated by law. The National Intelligence Service and the National Guard Service are under presidential authority. On a motion by the Government, he declares general or partial mobilisation for war. Whenever the National Assembly is not in session and cannot be convened, he proclaims *a state of war* in case of armed attack against Bulgaria or whenever urgent action is required by virtue of an international commitment. He proclaims martial law or any other state of emergency. The National Assembly is convened forthwith to endorse the President's decision.

The Defence and Armed Forces Act specifies that the President, acting on a proposal by the Council of Ministers, approves the strategic plans for activities of the Armed Forces and alerts the Armed Forces or part thereof to an advanced alert; during a military conflict or war he coordinates the foreign policy efforts for participation in international organisations and security structures with the aim of terminating the military conflict or war. Furthermore, the President is in charge of the Supreme Command, issues acts for preparing the country and Armed Forces for war; implements wartime plans; introduces a restrictive regime for the dissemination of information concerning the defence of the country; introduces to the National Assembly proposals for making peace.

With the introduction of martial law, the declaring of war or with the actual start of military activities, the President forms the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, e.g. the Supreme Headquarters (SHQ). The

SHQ assists the Supreme Commander in leading the defence and Armed Forces and includes the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Regional Development and Public Works, the Minister of Transportation and Communications, the Chief of the General Staff and other individuals, designated by the Supreme Commander.

The structure of *The Council of Ministers (The Government)* dealing with national security issues comprises the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the Civil Protection Agency, the Inter-Agency Committee on Issues of the defence-industrial complex and the mobilisation readiness of the Country, the Directorate of Confessional Issues, the General Directorate “State Reserves and Wartime Supplies”, the National Council for Struggle Against Narcotics Abuse and Narcotics Traffic, the National Bureau for Territorial Asylum and Refugees, etc.

The amendments to the Defence and Armed Forces Act in 1995, 1997 and 2000 added to the authority of the Council of Ministers to:

- politically control the Armed Forces and general leadership
- to co-ordinate the overall defence planning;
- to formulate and perform the state defence and military policy;
- to maintain combat and mobilisation readiness of the Armed Forces;
- to approve mobilisation plans, a Regulation for the Military Service, the General Wartime Plan of the state and the wartime draft budget;
- to regulate the production of and trade with defence items;
- to determine the standards and the order for accumulation, preservation and use of raw and wartime materials;
- to command and control the mobilisation of the Armed Forces and the transition of the country from peace to war;
- to open, transform and close military facilities, branches, institutes and colleges;
- to approve requirements to the transportation, energy, communications systems, storage systems & settlements, production and economic sites in compliance with the needs of the defence;

- to make proposals to the President of the Republic for assigning and discharging the higher command of the Armed Forces and for bestowing all higher military ranks etc.

Additionally to these, based on the experience of the crises management in Bosnia and of the expanded co-operation with NATO, the 1997 amendments added to the authority of the Council of Ministers to approve the deployment and use of Bulgarian military units outside the country for execution of humanitarian, ecological, educational, sports and other tasks of a non-military nature; to approve the deployment and use of individual unarmed military personnel outside the country's borders for the execution of official or representative tasks by virtue of international commitments; to approve the deployment and use of military equipment outside the country's borders; to approve the deployment of foreign troops in Bulgaria or their crossing of Bulgarian territory for the execution of tasks of a peaceful nature.

The Minister of Defence is responsible for the conduct of the state's policy in the Ministry of Defence. The ministers in all governments since 1991 were civilian (though in one case a retired Flag Officer).

The Minister of Defence implements political and civil control over the Bulgarian Armed Forces by participating in the development and updating of the National Security Concept; compiling the draft of the State's budget in the part concerning the Ministry of Defence; allocating the budget and managing financial resources and procurement for the Bulgarian AF; formulating and managing personnel policy including recruitment of Bulgarian AF personnel and officer training; organising cultural, educational and patriotic activities; implementing general oversight on the military educational system, military scientific and research institutes; implementing international co-operation in the field of defence; issuing regulations, ordinances, instructions and orders and other legal acts at the level of the Ministry of Defence; organising activities for the support and care for citizens, injured in the defence of the country; being responsible for the management and maintenance of the state military property, sports activities and development of sports infrastructure; organising the inspection activities of the Ministry of

Defence; submitting to the Council of Ministers a proposal for appointment of a high ranking general to the post of Chief of the General Staff; approving the staff of the central administration of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff; directing the information, publication and public relations activities of the Ministry of Defence, the Military Police and Military Counter-Intelligence and others.

The Minister of Defence submits to the Council of Ministers a draft of the Military Doctrine of the country (a political-military document); a proposal of the number and organisation of BAF; a draft for a General state wartime plan; a proposal for the assigning and discharging of the higher command staff and for awarding higher military ranks; a proposal for announcing a general or partial mobilisation. Acting on a proposal by the Chief of the General Staff, the Minister of Defence commissions officers for regular service; promotes to a higher rank, demotes to a lower rank and discharges from military service officers of the Bulgarian AF. Furthermore, he or she appoints and recalls the Bulgarian defence and military attaches abroad and the representatives of the Ministry of Defence to international organisations.

In respect to civil control, two important amendments were introduced with the changes in the DAFA in the year 2000. First, the Minister of Defence was tasked with leading the defence planning in the Ministry and the Bulgarian AF. Secondly, he became responsible for activities providing information for the purposes of defence and national security. The latter means that the Military Information Agency (the military intelligence) was directly subordinated to the civilian minister.

Deputy Ministers and the Chief of the Political Cabinet who are civilians assist the Minister of Defence. In the performance of his controlling functions an Inspectorate in which civilian and military staff are included supports the Minister of Defence. The Inspectorate controls the effective implementation of the budget and procurement policy; observation of the human rights; personnel and recruitment policy; social policy and environment protection; information for corruption, squandering and misuse of material and financial resources, military discipline; management of military property; observation of international agreements etc.

The problems arising while meeting the formal requirements for civilian democratic control concern most of all its effectiveness. Although not a unique Bulgarian problem, it has certain features that are and will continue to be treated for further improvement. First of all, there is still a lack of realism and coherence between budgets and defence plans. To be more precise, once plans are endorsed they are regularly found to be unaffordable within the allocated budgets. The result is that MoD has to adopt a significantly different force posture from that agreed by Parliament in order to meet affordability constraints.²

There was an unrealistic belief in many of the Bulgarian political and military leaders that once the formal requirements of the civilian democratic control are met the control itself will be guaranteed. The reason of this wrong perception is the lack of understanding that effective civilian control is attainable only if there is clarity about the relation among the resources, forces and goals of the defence policy.”³

The establishment and effective functioning of a rigorous defence planning system was one of the accents in MoD activity since the autumn of 1998. It was an effort to overcome this issue. At that time the existing system had four major deficiencies:

- a) lack of certain functions (broken links between national security objectives and existing force structures; missing organisations to which important components of the defence planning were designated);
- b) no holistic but rather a piecemeal approach to defence planning (the

² See in greater detail: PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF THE BULGARIAN ARMED FORCES AND MOD, FINAL REPORT, STUDY No 3/98, DIRECTORATE OF CONSULTANCY AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES, UK MOD, 5 OCTOBER 1998. Available on-line at <http://www.md.government.bg>

³ Todor Tagarev and Velizar Shalamanov carried out an extensive study on this particular issue within the ISIS research program in 1998. See: VELIZAR M. SHALAMANOV, TODOR D. TAGAREV, REENGINEERING THE DEFENCE PLANNING IN BULGARIA, INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (ISIS), SOFIA, DECEMBER 1998, RESEARCH REPORTS 9. Available at the website of the Institute: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isis>

- ‘down-up’ planning was not backed by a rational mechanism for adaptation of resource requirements to force structure. Lowering combat potential and degrading morale were logical consequences);
- c) Short-term thinking. The short-term planning horizon had economic, financial and cognitive justification. The planning process had to be changed towards a more prospective thinking and synchronising the goals with realistic resource estimates;
 - d) Cultural, perceptual and educational deficiency. The traditional understanding of planning among the Bulgarian military was an ‘operational planning’ – a highly classified activity carried out by few, highly expert military officers of the General Staff of the country’s armed forces. So, there is still some way to go before integrating long-term strategic planning through programming and operational planning in a comprehensive system. Failure to carry out this task will inevitably mean hampering the interaction between the civilian and military leadership.

The latter conclusion, however, would be true only if we were facing capable civilians and military that are both experts on defence issues. Still too many of the present civilian MoD staff are retired military officers at various ranks and age. The inflow of civilians in the MoD is still moderate, especially in terms of defence expertise, military, command of modern information technologies and their impact on defence and security. The ongoing reform of the military education system, defence and security issues is expected to lead to major improvements with time.

A fundamental problem remains – the inadequate parliamentary expertise on military, defence and security issues. It is so even for the National Security Committee. The inertia of the old thinking that “military issues are the domains of military experts” is characteristic for some Members of Parliament who have special responsibilities in implementing civilian democratic control over the armed forces and other security institutions.

IV The Foreign Political Aspect of the Democratic Control Over the Armed Forces

Certainly one of the country's assets during the long and hard transition to democracy and functioning market economy is its foreign, especially regional policy in the Balkans. Unless all factors, having impact on the formation, formulation and implementation of Bulgaria's foreign policy, were positively affecting the decisions and their implementation, Bulgaria as well as South-East Europe would have faced difficult times. One of those positive factors affecting the country's foreign policy was the approach of the Bulgarian armed forces.

The analysis of the continental (European) and the regional (Balkan) security situation led the forward-minded Bulgarian security experts, as early as the very beginning of the 90's, to the conclusion that Bulgarian military diplomacy assumes a special role for the national security of the country, especially after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. An active Bulgarian military diplomacy succeeded in creating a positive regional atmosphere of greater mutual trust. The confidence-building measures (CBMs) that were negotiated with Greece, Turkey and Romania had lower ceilings, compared to similar CBMs within the CFE Treaty.

A curious dialectics evolved in the armed forces-foreign policy interrelationship. While on the civilian side of the civil-military relations some nationalistic political tendencies and parties required a less sophisticated and even assertive Bulgarian foreign policy, the Bulgarian military and armed forces suggested and insisted on a sober, peaceful and good-neighbourly regional policy. This largely coincided with the platforms of the leading political forces in the country – ruling and opposition, despite the struggle between them, often compared to an internal “civil Cold War”.

In such a generally harmonious environment, concerning the regional policy of Bulgaria, it was not difficult to reach an agreement on the issues of deployment and use of force. The following stages could be summarised:

1. Staying neutral in the initial phases of the post-Yugoslav wars;

2. Joining the SFOR peace-keepers with modest engineering units;
3. Joining NATO in the political-military efforts during the “Allied Force” operation against FRY, and later – the KFOR peace-keepers in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis.

The decision for the deployment of Bulgarian peace-keepers in FRY, Cambodia, Angola and military observers in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia as part of OSCE or UN missions, was made by civilians that mastered the procedures and had the final say for the country’s involvement in military operations abroad.

So, yes, there has been an influence by the military on the country’s foreign policy. However, they influenced the expertise and efficiency by raising them and not the contents or the direction of the foreign-political decisions that were taken. One particular manifestation is the way the military influenced the country’s strategic orientation to NATO membership. From the beginning of Bulgaria’s participation in the NATO’s PfP Initiative, the Bulgarian military proved to be active and efficient. Meanwhile, the Government for the period from 1995 to 1997 was not working for the objective of becoming a NATO member. Notwithstanding, a pro-NATO momentum was gathering in the Bulgarian society thanks to the involvement of its armed forces in joint exercises with NATO partners.

When in February 1997 the new Bulgarian Government formally declared it is willing to join NATO, the country’s armed forces were again among the engines that pulled the process forward. Much of the intellectual work has been carried out within the MoD or through collaboration of the MoD and pro-NATO NGOs and think tanks to motivate both society and armed forces in general for the new goals and fundamental reform. This process was accelerated especially after the autumn of 1998 when new leaders headed the defence policy sector of the MoD. They are still doing their best in providing assistance and promoting joint projects with Bulgarian partner think tanks to bring the issue of Bulgaria’s integration in NATO to broader social circles in this country.

V Factors That Influence Civil-Military Relations

The Civil-military relations and democratic control of the Armed Forces were rightly perceived by the Bulgarian politicians, analysts and military as a most significant, key element of the strategic change, aimed at successfully adapting the country to the security and defence realities in the existing international and domestic environment. The introduction of basic democratic principles and creation of a stable and productive *mode* of civil-military relations was done in complicated circumstances.

The historical tradition of the Armed Forces as a factor for the country's stability opened a space for effective close collaboration with experienced in democratic interactions partners which together made the positive atmosphere for significant changes in the national political and military strategic culture.

In the same time the combination of communist legacy with issues such as ineffective political leadership of the country's transformation process towards a functional democracy and market economy, the legal and institutional inconsistencies on the execution of the national chain of command of the Armed Forces together with the lack of professionalism and expertise of both civilian authorities and military leadership caused the delay of the implementation of effective civilian direction and democratic oversight of the defence system.

a) The international factor

It was already mentioned that the international context was between the most influential factor in understanding and shaping the national pattern of civil-military relations. More precisely, it has been the combination of international factors that led to the specific state of Bulgaria's civil-military relations. The ten years old external conflicts on the country's Western border raised the issue of the roles of various national security and defence institutions in those particular circumstances. Generally, Bulgaria's attitude to the post-Yugoslav conflicts called for a comprehensive answer to the level of involvement

of the Bulgarian armed forces while meeting the challenges of these conflicts.

Logically rose the question what kind of adaptation, enforcement and reform of the armed forces would generate an efficient reaction to the on-going wars next door. There were two schools of thought in regard to these questions.

The first was that during an evolving crisis sane leaders do not reshuffle their armed forces, but prepare to counter an eventual direct threat with what is available and eventually reinforce it. The second was that the transitional policy of the country, based on reforming all sectors of national life, must not omit the defence one despite the wars that Serbia was waging on its former Federative republican brethren. Implementing all aspects of this reform meant a new definition and construction of the civil-military relations along the principles of a democratic society.

The second school of thought prevailed after bearing in mind that there was no direct and imminent threat from any of the neighbouring countries in short to mid-term. The conflicts in the neighbouring disrupting federation could not generate, politicise and legitimise a higher role for the military, but rather accelerated the adaptation, the conception and education of what democratic civilian control over the armed forces is and how this could be translated into a more efficient armed force that guards its nation.

Another international factor acted as a catalyst in adopting the above-mentioned approach: the diminishing political and military influence of Russia. The Soviet-type model of civil-military relations was no longer valid after the end of the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organisations. Russia's pulling out from its former allies freed the terrain for new models and policies. Obviously, in a period of change in the Bulgarian society the vacuum left by the dominant power in the former alliance meant a radical departure not only from the pattern of civil-military relations in the ex-totalitarian society of Russia, but also from the military establishment that Russia has developed in the last three centuries. Together with the ideological legacy by which Russia dominated over its

former allies, the latter parted also with much of the geopolitical, social and military influence of the great power. The exploitation by the Bulgarian armed forces of the Russia-dominated military equipment and armaments could no longer mean preservation of the social model of civil-military relations.

Hence, the influence of the West was very strong in this specific environment of mixed factors: social transition to democracy and market economy; active conflicts on the Western border, and pulling out of the Russian factor. The model of civil-military relations of the developed Western democracies was perceived as an inherent to a broader “security community” of nations in the terms and concepts of Karl Deutsch. Democratic control of the armed forces was not perceived as the simple result of some pressure from the West, but first of all as a priority national security task in a democratising society, need for urgent change of the defence establishment to counter a pending security threat while coping with two other fundamental problems: filling the great power vacuum left by Russia and winning the sympathy and entering into alliance with the countries from the EU and NATO.

This is why NATO’s PfP and EU’s Phare Programme and the individual country-to-country support for defence reform practically influenced the reshaping of the civil-military relations in Bulgaria. The greatest effect was educating how national security and democratic society’s needs can be matched and guaranteed. The learning process on the issue is far from over. Since 1997, however, it became clearer to both civilians and military that a major objective such as joining EU and NATO necessitates stable, undoubted and effective democratic control of civilians over the military.

It has been very much within the context of this learning process with Western support that two important psychological barriers with the military have been overcome – professional pride and professional assurance that the country’s national security will not be harmed. Only in theory, was it learnt that a developed civil-military relationship requires a higher professional culture for the civilian counterparts of the military, including the civilian political masters. This aspect of the Western support is still not very effective. Two studies about the reform

of the Bulgarian armed forces and the civil-military relations, carried out by an American Defence Department and a British MoD team, apart from the concrete practical results showed that the best way of implementing an efficient civilian democratic control over the military is by using civilians displaying expertise that is respected by the military because of its own merits and not just because it is the dictum of the democratic principle.

Apart from its relations with the USA and the UK, the Bulgarians have profited much from the experience on the issues of civil-military relations from Germany, The Netherlands, Italy, France, Spain and Switzerland. The maturity of the knowledge and its implementation in shaping the new civil-military relations has risen between 1998 and 2000. Both the international programs that help the country's adaptation to NATO membership requirements and the national education process are in better positions to shape the thinking of those, who are or will be actively engaged in civil-military interaction and in carrying out the civilian democratic control over the military.

b) Historical tradition and legacies

Civil-military relations in Bulgaria today do not profit from models and experience from the Communist or the pre-Communist past of the country.⁴

Soon after the national liberation of Bulgaria in 1878 the armed forces of the young Third Kingdom turned into the most dynamic state institution, enjoying high respect and strong popular support. At that time, the unjust Berlin Treaty of 1878 sliced Bulgarian population and territory into pieces and the mission of the Bulgarian military was identified with the ideals of the national liberation fighters of the previous decades and centuries. The Bulgarian military were loved by the people: all hopes for uniting with the rest of the Bulgarians and

⁴ See also about this in: PLAMEN PANTEV, VALERI RATCHEV, TODOR TAGAREV, SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF THE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN BULGARIA DURING THE TRANSITIONAL POLITICAL PERIOD, ISIS, SOFIA, 1996, pp. 25-29.

territories, once defined formally by the Ottoman Empire as belonging to the Bulgarian Christians and their Orthodox Church were linked with the might and courage of the armed forces. So it was easy to socialise the military towards foreign political intervention and deployment of Bulgarian force. Society was also easily socialised towards accepting and supporting the missions of the army in defence of the national ideals for unification. However, Bulgaria and its army were perceived as “a war-mongering machine” in the centre of the Balkans.

After an initial success in 1885 and 1912 the military victories that followed could not be politically and diplomatically finalised with success. The unattainability of the national ideals turned into national frustration, demanding revenge. The fascist regimes that were established from the 20's till the end of the World War II naturally allied with the Nazi power of Germany and fascist Italy. Because of the anti-fascist resistance both army's socialisation to political intervention and society's socialisation to acceptance of such an intervention were either frustrated or diluted. The country and its armed forces were not any longer effective in achieving the previous national ideals, which generally remained unfulfilled and historically incomplete. In the period 1923-44 there could hardly be found traces of civilian democratic control over the military in a totalitarian society of a fascist type.

The legacy of the totalitarian Socialist regime after 1944 was a Soviet model of civil-military relations, especially on the issues of procurement, tactics and strategy. The total Soviet military control over the Warsaw Pact Treaty armed forces left blank space on the issues of defence policy and its civilian democratic control in post-Cold War Bulgaria. Though the military of Socialist Bulgaria were under the civilian political control of the Communist Party it was far from the standards of democracy. The dependence on Soviet defence policy further worsened the situation for the post-Communist leaders of democratic Bulgaria and its armed forces. The ‘motivation vacuum’ for change and activity was dialectically filled by the need to protect the country from the ex-Yugoslav conflicts. The historical instincts of the Bulgarian officers and soldiers to defend their fatherland led them to the acceptance of the model of civil-military relations of the democratic

nations of Europe and North America, whose societies turned into a targeted model of Bulgaria's national development.

So the Communist history, including the 'perestroika' phase, and the pre-Communist past were not suggesting anything workable in the new conditions of the post-Cold War world. Apart from a patriotic motivation it was the example of others and the hope for the future that turned Bulgaria and its armed forces into major factors of stability and democratic development in the Balkans.

c) Internal political, economic and social factors

The Bulgarian state can hardly be qualified as 'strong' internally during the transition period to functioning democracy and market economy. However, it never assumed the features of a 'weak' one. The few temptations of military intervention in politics can be linked to a few generals who volunteered to be drawn into policy-making, but as individuals, without pulling the responsibility of the institution of the armed forces. Their ambition was their personal career in the times of change.

A negative domestic background was the intense, very often highly, though artificially polarised political relations. This political situation de-motivated many talented young officers from military service. The pending danger of in-proportionate civilian political intervention threatened to cause de-professionalisation of the armed forces.

Another specific feature of this complex factor, influencing civil-military relations is the freedom of the press and the media in general. There was virtually no significant problem in the military or the civil-military domain that was not illuminated and brought to the diverse reasoning and assessment of the public. Thus, the task of making more effective the civilian democratic control over the military was becoming easier.

The clarity and inevitability of social transition from totalitarian socialism to capitalism, constitutionally sanctioned in 1991, was further

strengthened by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The next two to three years finally clarified the need to join NATO – a need that stemmed from the new democratic and market oriented society and from the national security environment of Bulgaria.

Thus it was not the overcoming of the ‘penetrative’ Communist model of civil-military relations, but the social repercussions of the armed forces cuts that turned to be the central destabilising factor of the Bulgarian civil-military relations. The Bulgarian military, especially the officer corps, have historically entertained a relatively decent social status. Several efforts to launch armed forces cuts always took place in an immature economic environment. The poverty of the mismanaged state, the high foreign debt, the slow and inefficient economic reform were the main factors of the economic conditions that could hardly back-up a deep and consistent military reform.

The last, most ambitious and rather successfully targeting the NATO standards armed forces cuts did start in 1998-99 in not much different economic conditions. Many cases of dismissed colonels or lieutenant-colonels, working as security guards for privates, but presently businessmen, and until recently servicemen to these same officers in the military units they commanded illustrate the drama of the situation. It is only shadowed by the cases of officers and sergeants who commit suicides after receiving the orders to leave the armed forces with no personal alternatives or chances for their families.

The President and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the Ministry of Defence and NGOs are doing a lot to manage in a least painful way the process of armed forces cuts. The Government has negotiated the support of international financial institutions, of individual NATO and EU countries in implementing a comprehensive compensating and adaptation program for those who have to go – officers, sergeants, soldiers, civilians. The popularity of the adaptation courses, which provide new qualification, is high.

Some job opportunities have been provided for officers with economic and law education by the Ministry of Finance. The private

sector also reacted positively, though in modest proportions to the call of the President to employ former officers of the armed forces.

Financial compensation and an interim period before leaving the armed forces have also been provided to those who were separated.

The further creation of jobs with an active governmental support will be the best guarantee of preserving the effectiveness of the civilian democratic control. The pledges of the country's state leaders on this issue are solemn. The hopes for carrying out successfully "Plan 2004" are great. The MoD, the Minister and his Deputies, representatives of think-tanks and NGOs, the media are carefully explaining to the public the aims of the military reform.

The civilian public has received a very significant message, re-transmitted to the military who leave the armed forces: in relative terms the officers and people in uniform in general who have to leave the armed forces are given better chances by the Government to make a new start than most of the civilians in similar situations outside the military establishment. A comparison between the opportunities, provided by the state for the research staff of a closed institute of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and for the military and civilian researchers of closed institutes within the framework of the armed forces shows a much better starting point for those who worked in the military system. Providing the men and women who are separated from the MoD with offices, laboratories, buildings, initial capital, contracts for particular projects, etc. is compared to nothing for the civilian academicians.

Though the economic and social situation in Bulgaria during the period of military reform is hard, there are very promising chances of raising the respect to the principle of the civilian democratic control over the military.

An issue, which has been for years neglected and was contradicting the principles of democracy, was finally placed on the right track: Turks, Roma and all other smaller ethnic minorities are already 'welcome' to the officer corps of the armed forces. A greater part of the problem in the past – the inadequate political management of the issue, has been

overcome. The internal ethnic situation, the parliamentary balancing of the ethnic issue and the regional stability, the good-neighbourly relations provides a positive environment for normalising this issue in the armed forces too. In the last ten years, although a symbol of national pride and patriotism, the armed forces never became the institution of ethnic division and conflict. Another part of the problem – the proper education of the representatives of the ethnic minorities has also been re-confirmed as an equal opportunity for all.

d) The changing nature of the strategic culture: the military doctrine and defence reform

The new legal framework, adopted in the 90's, influenced in an important way the shaping of the new military culture. The principle of "legality", if not exactly the rule of law, has always had a significant role throughout the new history of Bulgaria – after 1878. This factor, in combination with the natural generation changes throughout the decade of the 90's, especially with the determination to implement fully "Plan 2004", expected to draw the armed forces to the standards of NATO, led to a major shift in the Bulgarian military culture in the direction of full acceptance of the civilian democratic control over the military.

There still remain certain impediments to the realisation of this new military culture:

First, the level of knowledge and political culture in the formulation and administration of national security, defence and military issues by the civilian leadership is not high, though, with much effort, the level of adequacy is reached in most cases. A continuing practice of the civilian leadership is the too high reliance on the technical advice of military officers.

Second, a modest national security and defence expert community that has proved throughout the 90's its adequacy to the evolving issues and national interests of Bulgaria is not involved enough and its expertise is not yet fully utilised. This diminishes the potential of the civilian leadership to formulate alternative solutions in the area of

national security and defence. Though this state of affairs is better in comparison to the similar activity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, more needs to be done to keep to the high level of requirements of the democratic policy-making and implementation process.

Third, the officers and the generals do not always perceive the specific repercussions of the principle of separation of powers on the military leadership adequately. However, with the improvements of the education process in the military system this obstacle is of a diminishing significance.

The National Security Concept defines the principles and landmarks, which are the basis of the *new Military Doctrine* adopted by the Parliament on 8 April 1999. The document closed the circle of regulated responsibilities for national security and defence. It complements the set of missions and functions of the Bulgarian Armed Forces, as defined in the Constitution, the National Security Concept and the Defence and the Armed Forces Act (1995, amended 1997, 2000). It emphasises their role for guaranteeing national security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. With the Military Doctrine for the first time a Parliamentary decision determined the peacetime and wartime size of the Armed Forces as well as the directions and landmarks for their development.

The philosophy of the new Military Doctrine consists of putting the accent on the thesis that involvement of the country in a military conflict should be avoided by strengthening international security and stability. At the same time the sovereignty, security and independence of Bulgaria should be guaranteed through interaction and integration in European and Euro-Atlantic security structures and through a national defence policy that is adequate to the potential threats.

The Military Doctrine enlarges the spectrum of functions being carried out by the Armed Forces. The deterrence and defence functions are complemented by peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue functions, by functions for assistance and by the acceleration of Bulgaria's integration in NATO, as well as by social functions for creating in the

citizens of a feeling of security, for the education of youth in the spirit of patriotism and strengthening the ethnic cohesion of the nation.

The main goals of the new Bulgarian military policy which determine the character of the Armed Forces' main roles are:

- To support the efforts of the international community for guaranteeing peace and security;
- To prevent the country's involvement in armed conflicts;
- To guarantee the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.

The Bulgarian AF possesses important potential for implementing its *social mission*. The Armed Forces perform it by contributing to the integration of the social and ethnic groups in society; educating youth in a "European" spirit; generating in citizens feelings of security and safety, of reliability in case of natural and other disasters; contributing to the development of education, science and higher technologies; clarifying the goals and strategy for the integration of Bulgaria in NATO and EU.

Discussions about the necessity of *defence reform*⁵ began in Bulgaria during the first non-communist government in 1992 – the Government of the Union of Democratic Forces with Prime Minister Mr. Philip Dimitrov and Minister of Defence Mr. Dimitar Ludzhev). Since then all the efforts to transfer the Armed Forces into a new type and institution were symbolic, slowly achieved and limited in effect. For the first time the reengineering of the Armed Forces was placed among the major tasks and priorities in the program "*Bulgaria 2001*" of Mr. Ivan Kostov's Government. The declared goal is to structurally reform the defence establishment and to optimise the personnel in view of the efficient realisation of tasks defined by the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine. The reorganisation is related to transforming the structure and personnel of the Army in compliance with the conditions of the military-strategic environment, financial-economic and

⁵ See in greater detail: Velizar Shalamanov, CHANGING THE STRATEGIC CULTURE: POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF DEFENCE REFORM IN POST COMMUNIST BULGARIA, University of Glasgow, 1999.

demographic capacities of the country and with the enhanced achievement of the high level of interoperability with NATO forces.

Certain difficulties have resulted from the inheritance from the Cold War characteristics of the Armed Forces - level of combat and mobilisation readiness, numerical and combat strength, the disposition which were not sustainable and, as far as the military and political situation is concerned, its maintenance was debatable and even groundless.

The reform of the Bulgarian Armed Forces is being determined by the changed military and political and strategic situation in Europe and particularly on the Balkans, as well as by the economic state of the country and related problems of a financial, material and technical character. Additionally, during the last few years, the demographic factor, which consists of the progressive decrease of human resources that are fit for service in the AF, is having a negative effect.

In previous years, because of the insufficient funding of the BAF, its combat training and provision of the troops with modern armaments and equipment were extremely limited. The field, flight and naval training of the commanders, staffs and troops have been decreased to a considerable extent.

The defence reform plan (known as *Plan 2004*⁶), the execution of which started in 2000, has four main goals: to make the Armed Forces adequate to the strategic environment and in condition to face the challenges of new types of conflicts and crises, to have a high level of interoperability with NATO no later than 2001-2002, to have potential for an effective contribution in crises response operations and to have a realistic size in accordance with the level of resources the country can provide for defence. To meet these goals, the designers of the plan followed several basic principles and approaches stemming from the

⁶ PLAN FOR THE ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE BY THE YEAR 2004, in: "Bulgaria's Way: A Book for the Partners", MoD, 1999, p. 40-47. Also available on-line at <http://www.md.government.bg>

new strategic culture: Ensuring that the Armed Forces have the resources to develop military strategic reasoning, the transition to this model should lead to a gradual and constant increase in the capabilities of the Armed Forces; the organisational structure should be based on units and formations interoperable with the respective formations of NATO forces; the command and control system in peacetime should be developed on three levels - strategic, operational and tactical; the Rapid Reaction Forces should be a priority when recruiting career soldiers and procuring armament and equipment, and will have priority in providing resources; the development of the reserve formations and units for peacetime implies forming a unit fully recruited with personnel, armament, and equipment and reduced to a minimum staff and support elements, the restructuring of the units and formations should be accompanied by a reduction of the number of garrisons and barracks and the development of the system for training of troops, the command staff and the HQs should be done via the resources for preparation of fully combat ready and trained units and formations.

The principles and approaches to achieve the new model of the BAF are realised by managing organs with a new profile under the comprehensive leadership of the General Staff. The latter was reformed and became adequate to the central administration of the Ministry of Defence and presently consists of six departments of NATO's type – personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, force planning, and communications.

The new strategic culture also reflects the *organisational* formula of the perspective Armed Forces. The idea is that until 2004 the Armed Forces should be radically reorganised in structural and functional aspects.

Structurally, the Armed Forces are planned to have a defensive character, to be capable of defending the territory of the country without being directed against a specific adversary, and to achieve a high degree of interoperability with NATO forces as early as the preparation for accession. The Bulgarian Armed Forces comprise Army, Air Force, Navy and supporting elements. Functionally, the forces are organised in

Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) with Immediate Reaction element, Defence Forces and Territorial Defence Troops.

The redesign of the *defence planning process* in Bulgaria was a priority task from both civilian control and effective management point of view. As in any reengineering effort, it has to overcome organisational inertia, perception roadblocks and, in some cases, overt or covert resistance. The Defence Planning Directorate was established in MoD as a new instrument of the civilian political leadership for strategic planning and guidance of defence activities. Led by a civilian expert the Directorate is designed in a way to allow the performance of the following main functions of the civilian Minister of Defence:

- Formulation of defence policy, the policy on development of strategies, concepts, and doctrines and oversight of the process of their implementation into field manuals and other regulative documents of the Bulgarian Armed Forces;
- Co-ordination of the force development activities;
- Formulation of the policy on the development of weapon systems, armaments and equipment, the defence information infrastructure and the system for command and control;
- Co-ordination and oversight of the execution of plans and programs for force development, technological development, development of the command and control systems to guarantee interoperability with NATO and compatibility with the national information infrastructure;
- Co-ordination of scientific studies, R&D in the interest of defence planning, defence and force development, and building integration potential.

The process of defence planning is supported by a new established *Institute for Advanced Defence Research* (IADR) that will unite practically all scientific, research and development activities conducted at the Ministry of Defence. The design of IADR is a straightforward consequence of reengineering and may be examined as an example of streamlining, consolidation of activities, and flattening of the organisation. It supports the concept of outsourcing scientific studies,

R&D and the introduction of competition in meeting the needs of the defence establishment.

Plan 2004 is the first attempt for such a radical defence reform. The deep structural qualitative and quantitative changes in the defence system and especially in the Bulgarian Armed Forces were based for the first time on politically determined factors, expert models and adequate resource forecasts. Further development of the defence system, the MoD and Bulgarian armed forces and programmes of EU and NATO membership are the key tasks of country's defence policy. Bulgaria's consistent policy in this aspect is in full agreement with its national interests.

VI Conclusion

The democratic oversight on Armed Forces and the other national security structures may be applied only if all the elements of the separated powers function perfectly in the framework of their competence and if they co-operate efficiently on the basis of set principles.

It cannot be denied that certain problems exist in the functioning of the institutional system of the national security precisely in relation to democratic control over the Armed Forces and some of the security services. The provisions of the Constitution and the law do not sufficiently clarify the conditions necessary for constructing an efficient mechanism that would allow the state institutions to fully implement their constitutional obligations towards the Armed Forces. In this respect, some issues need to be further improved:

- How further to be clarified the power and responsibilities of the National Assembly, the President, the Council of Ministers, the Minister of Defence and the Chief of General Staff in order to improve the effectiveness of the defence policy formulation and implementation?
- What should be the model of the General Staff - of a "classical" or "joint" type?

- How much political control to exercise over the General Staff and in which way to improve and use professional military expertise, etc.?

There is, however, a list of measures that are still in the process of developing before a productive political civilian direction and democratic oversight to be effectively implemented:

- *“Civilising” the Ministry of Defence.* It is not possible for the Minister of Defence to execute civilian control when his staff consists mainly of military who prepare his decisions, like the experience prior to 1997. Civilians have been appointed on most of the key posts of the MoD directorates that were formerly occupied by military. This is a necessary prerequisite for strengthening civilian control and needs to continue in the future. In accordance with present policy, there is a trend the optimisation of the central administration structure to continue, including the reduction of personnel, reshuffling of sections based on functional homogeneity and economic efficiency of work in the conditions of market economy.
- *Adopting a managerial style of “guidance-management-feedback” of the Minister of Defence.* The authorisation of a person to carry out a determined activity and to bear responsibility for it is made by his/her appointment to the job, and not by re-signing his orders or collecting opinions on elementary questions. The control has to be exercised at certain stages and on the results, and not by constant feeling that something is “hanging over his/her head”.
- *Adopting a programming method of resources management* the base of which is unconditionally the Minister of Defence’s staff and not mainly General Staff offices. In this sphere of management, the professional military should be used exclusively as experts, and not as financial specialists and clerks.
- *Placing the Public Relations Office* among the priorities of the civilian minister’s activities. The time will come when the Minister of Defence will start a “fight” for the budget that will be doomed without support of the public.
- *Expanding the military education and training* of the civil employees, Members of Parliament, journalists who work in the defence field, as well as the military who work in joint civil-military teams.

- *Optimising the administration scheme* in the defence field. It is not admissible that the institution that elaborates the tasks is not able to manage the resources needed for their implementation.
- *Adapting the military to modern society*:
 - In the social aspect - maintaining the families of the military, regulating the civil-military relations at a local level, improving the veterans' status, expanding women's role in the Armed Forces (Women may serve in the Bulgarian AF both on civilian and military positions. The military positions that may be occupied by women will be determined by the Minister of Defence, acting on a proposal by the Chief of the General Staff);
 - From a moral point of view - psychological support of the personnel in the combat units, ethics in the management and administrating of the service processes;
 - From a legal point of view - improving the legislation concerning military service, adapting the internal norms, regulations and mechanisms to the new needs of international relations of the Armed Forces etc.

What still has to be done is to solve the problems at national level in accordance with the *basic democratic requirements*:

- Clear and unequivocal separation of the obligations and responsibilities of each institution that takes part in the democratic control of the Armed Forces in accordance with the fundamental objective needs of the command and management of security and defence in peace time, in conditions of military-political crisis and in armed conflict
- Possibilities for objective, profound and detailed parliamentary control over the Armed Forces and all services, related to security and defence
- Clear differentiation of the functions of the General Staff and military professionals
- Ensuring adequate roles and place of the Armed Forces and the resources allotted to them.

In relative terms Bulgaria has passed the longer part of its way to a working democratic control of the armed forces, reaching a level close to the requirements for NATO membership.

In absolute terms, however, a more detailed learning process and analytical framework should allow a more careful and precise assessment. The understanding of the authors is that – for one reason or another – all democracies need to continue their efforts to keep and improve the state of their own national civil-military relations. In that respect, Bulgaria has the will and the experience to share with its partners. One recent confirmation is the invitation to be co-founder of the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control over the Armed Forces. Another is the joint Bulgarian-UK initiative within the Stability Pact Working Table III of “Transparency of Defence Budgeting” that contributes not only to the efficiency of democratic control within a single country, but also to dissemination of ‘good governance’ practices in the countries of South-East Europe, increased confidence among them and the stability in the region.

DISCLAIMER. This publication was produced in the interest of academic freedom, the advancement of national security concepts, and development of the integration preparedness of Bulgaria. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors as researchers of the Institute for Security and International Studies and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence or the Bulgarian Government as a whole.

3. Development of Civil-Military Relations in Croatia

I Introduction

The changes that Croatia is facing in the new millennium can already be defined as tremendously significant. The departure of the authoritarian leader, cessation of “single-party democracy”, as well as the strengthening sense of the necessity to adopt the European standards of life and behaviour, may be seen as principal landmarks of the new development – which will not be achieved neither easily nor quickly – but which is, nevertheless, the only alternative to national confinement and international isolation. A comprehensive process of changes will inevitably have to encompass political, economic, social, cultural and scientific and military spheres, and will represent the beginning of the true evaluation of the recent Croatian achievements in its transformation from single-party, socialist system into the world of democracy.

What are the Croatian specifics?

Differing from other European socialist states that have recognised in the Great Spring of 1989 their chance for transition from socialism to democratic European societies by relatively simple replacement of state attributes, Croatia, within its fight for independence, has introduced several specifics which are characterising it even today:

- Impossibility of a peaceful secession from federal Yugoslavia, uprising of Serb population in Croatia and imposed military conflict that followed, represent the first such characteristic that has strongly marked the beginning of Croatian path towards independence. All other events and developments on that path: creation and build-up of its military forces; withdrawal of the Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA) from Croatia; creation of the, so called, Krajina; and finally, the fight for liberation of all Croatian territories and their reintegration under the sovereignty of the Croatian state, were observed by disoriented and unprepared international community. Unprepared for the break-apart of Yugoslavia, the international community was unable to act in a more resolute manner even in times of fierce attacks on

Vukovar, on Dubrovnik, or in times when some 30% of Croatian territory was occupied by Serb rebels.

- Croatia, which was along with Slovenia by the level of economic development and structure undoubtedly the most advanced of all former socialist countries, was, instead of accessing Europe, thrown into the whirlpool of war which resulted in large number of victims, huge material destruction and enormous expenditures for creation and strengthening of the military, followed by the process of rebuilding the country and return of refugees after the liberation.
- Spread of the conflict into Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Croatian population felt threatened by the new relations, has also entangled Croatia in the conflict with Muslims, which was actually the third military conflict that Croatian military was forced to fight. In the first conflict Croats were defending their homes against Serb rebels and YPA forces, in the second it was liberating Croatian territories, and in the third it was engaged in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with the Croatian military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina (HVO). And it was this, third war, that has led Croatian policy into a very specific situation, since the international community, which has by the time already accepted Croatia as a stabilising factor in the region, was suddenly faced with the new situation, difficult to understand, and especially difficult to justify. The Washington Agreement on the relations between Croats and Muslims, from 1995 has opened the possibility for new mutual relations, but in spite of all international warnings, the Croatian side remained engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely in parts populated by Croats, supporting and assisting all those forces that were openly or covertly advocating for the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina and for inclusion of the Croatian parts into Croatia proper.
- Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) as a structure that was by vast majority winning on all elections, and that held a considerable majority in the Croatian Sabor (Parliament), became a principal actor in the creation of the Croatian state. Besides a relatively short period of coalition government, CDU was governing Croatia and has had a final word in all activities of political, economic and social character. By that the so called multi-party system was to a large extent curtailed, and the level of democracy depended mostly on the

willingness of the CDU to accept or not accept a particular solution, having the major mass-media firmly in its hands.

- Croatian foreign policy was not only exclusively the policy of the leading political party, but was strongly influenced by a single person – the President of the Republic of Croatia. All other factors that are in a normal democracy participating in the creation of foreign policy were transformed into a sheer transmission of political solutions created in the President’s Cabinet by the leading actor.
- Such specific internal and external developments were preventing Croatia to catch pace with other countries in transition. Even more so, it is possible to argue that only now, after the recent changes in the direction of stronger democracy, the doors for Croatian transition have been fully opened. In this way Croatia has lost valuable time in comparison to other former socialist states, and its model of internal transition and its present distance from Europe represent a heavy burden for the new policy. Although it might be said that the transition has not been achieved to a full satisfaction in none of the former socialist countries, the results in Croatia are probably among the worst ones. The number of the employed was cut in half, huge unemployment (over 20 per cent), rise of foreign debt (some 9,3 bill. USD), decrease in the production and exports, and distancing from sources of investment capital have all resulted in a difficult economic situation and have at the same time created a negative climate for any serious foreign investment.
- The relations with the international community were also under the influence of a strong nationalistic policy led by the CDU. Following the criticism of the “Storm” military operation, the international community continued to criticise Croatia for violating human rights, for limiting the freedom of media, for insufficient independence of judiciary, for lack of control over the activities of security and intelligence institutions, for “wild” privatisation and development of the economy, lack of transparency in military structures and for constant support to Croatian factors in Bosnia and Herzegovina that were advocating the creation of a third entity, or secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina. By all this the Croatian policy, which was the favourite of the West in the early days, and for which the Croatian president was stating that represents the “US regional strategic partner”, became isolated and distanced from the European

processes. Along with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, Croatia is the most distanced country from any European and trans-Atlantic integration, which is to a large extent the result of activities of the formerly ruling political establishment. Self-content with its achievements, the political elite was absorbed with the creation of a national myth of self-sufficiency and of the need to preserve the national and state interests, of avoiding any links with eventual new Balkan associations, as well as on highlighting the dilemmas regarding the need and the costs of closer approach to Europe. The ideology of national self-sufficiency has led Croatia into isolation, at the same time giving the national policy the opportunity to use the attacks on international community in order to defend and preserve its positions at home and to justify the existing situation.

II Objective Circumstances and Subjective Weaknesses in the Development of the Croatian Military Forces

The Croatian state did not inherit any of its armed forces from the previous regime, but was rather created and developed them within very detrimental conditions, created by the transition and war. The Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) came to power after the first elections in May 1990, and on October 8, 1991, Croatia declared its secession from the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). It also gained international recognition. But through the internal armed rebellion by part of the Serb population, as well as by external Serbian aggression a quasi-state called the Republic of Serbian Krajina was formed on almost 1/3 of the centrally located Croatian territory. With the support from the international community Croatia managed to liberate the largest part of the country by military operations in the spring (“Lightning”) and summer (“Storm”) of 1995. The occupied Danube region (Podunavlje) was peacefully re-integrated by Croatia, again with international assistance, in January 1998.

Under the pretext of assistance and support to Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia was in various ways participating in war, fought in that neighbouring country. It helped forming quasi-state political institutions of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croatian Republic of

Herzeg-Bosnia), as well as in forming Croat's military forces (Croatian Defence Council – HVO). Croatian forces were assisting Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Croatian-Bosniak “war within the war” during 1993-1994.

1. Transition

The war in Croatia and its neighbourhood was reflected on the transitional processes in Croatia too. The transition of the Croatian political system began after the first multi-party elections (parliamentarian, presidential and local). In the period August 1991 to August 1992 a joint government of Democratic Unity was formed, with participation of opposition parties as well. Throughout the remaining time of war the CDU was continuously in power, and due to a very favourable election law and notorious “Diaspora list”, was winning all subsequent elections. The main feature of the Croatian political system of that time was a quite unclear limit between the authorities of the legislative, executive and judicial powers. Bluntly, the main power was concentrated in the hands of president Franjo Tudjman.

The media were formally free and independent, but the HDZ (CDU) managed to obtain a firm control over the main daily newspaper and TV, defined as “state television”. During the war days it was the television that was the principal source of information for the majority of citizens.

The war has further strengthened the crisis in the economy, typical of all transitional countries. But one of the fundamental problems of the Croatian economic transition is in the fact that the representatives of the ruling party came into possession of the best companies, obtained the most influential media, the telecommunications, etc. The ruling party guaranteed to itself favourable loans, low prices of shares and/or equity of privatised companies as well as other ill-founded privileges. Through such schemes the HDZ had practically gained control over everything that survived and possessed some worth in the Croatian economy.

The unemployment was partially amortised through inclusion of a part of the active population into police and military forces needed for

the defence of the country¹ and by employment in other ministries and newly founded institutions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Office of the President). Some important parts of the national economy, like tourism, transit traffic, shipbuilding and others, came to a standstill due to the war. Furthermore crimes, drugs and a rising moral and material crisis were felt all over the devastated country.

The international community was mostly critical of the Croatian transition processes. Main objections were aimed at the lack of media freedom, the electoral law, the Croatian policy regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina and the problem of the Serb refugees. Based on this, the doors to main European economic and security integration processes were closed for Croatia, although Croatia has declared its interest to join the EU and NATO. During the CDU and president Tudjman Croatia was accepted into the UN, OSCE, the World Bank, IMF, the Council of Europe and to a regional organisation – the Central European Initiative (CEI). But the exclusion from major organisations like NATO, EU, WEU, Partnership for Peace, and their activities have disabled Croatia to strengthen its concrete political, economic and military forms of co-operation with the developed Western European countries. Furthermore, Croatia was firmly rejecting all attempts by the international community to take part in the regional forms of co-operation, stating that these are all attempts to bring Croatia into some “new Yugoslavia”, “Balkanoslavia”, and to link Croatia firmly again with the “backward Balkans”.

2. The War

The war has additionally exhausted Croatia’s economy. Direct war damages are being estimated to USD 27 billion. The price of war was huge. During the war, military expenditures were as high as 15% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

¹ Estimates state that during the whole time of the war some 350,000 people, or 7.3% of the overall population, were connected with the army. Croatian Army 2000 – National security, armed forces, democracy, Zagreb, 1999, p. 50.

The war has intensified nationalistic feelings, and the ethnic and religious communities that were living in Croatia before (especially Croatian and Serbian) found themselves separated by a deep ditch. Both in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina numerous war crimes over civilians of other nationalities were committed. People were murdered, looted and expelled. This has caused significant demographic changes, as well as changes in the structure of the population. Croatian atrocities were often justified by the aggression on Croatia, which culminated by the extreme statement given by the President of the Supreme Court – that no crime can be committed in a war of defence war of our territory.²

War has also caused a strong national cohesion of all three sides (Croatian, Serbian, Bosnian). The Croatian government was underlining the “statehood” as a paramount value that was expected to engage all existing resources, energies and emotions of the population and direct them to the creation and the defence of the national state. In those days a very influential president’s adviser marked the police, army and the Church as “institutions that are forming an axis of Croatian state and society”. President Tudjman was also often accenting on the significance of the development of the Croatian armed forces. On several occasions president Tudjman described Croatian armed forces as something, “on which the Croatian state politics and the Croatian people may found their overall policy”.

After the military successes in 1995, in which vast majority of the occupied Croatian territories were liberated, as well as large parts of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (in co-operation with Croatian Defence Council and the Croatian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as with the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina), the leadership declared Croatia as a “regional power”.³ The proclaimed “strategic US-Croatian alliance” was meant to underline the Croatian military contribution to the overall policies of the international community on the territories of former Yugoslavia. But, notwithstanding the military contribution, the relations with military-political and other Western

² Ibid., p. 50.

³ Official domestic and foreign sources were, as a rule, using the term “regional power” only for the Croatian military, not for Croatia as a state.

institutions that Croatia was willing to join - NATO, WEU, and EU – are based on acceptance of a system of values, promoted by those very institutions. The Croatian authorities made a wrong assessment, believing that it will be based only on the strength of the Croatian military and on the readiness to use it that Croatia will be accepted as an equal partner of the new international community. Ever since the “Zagreb crisis” 1995-1996, when the President of the Republic refused to recognise and accept the results of the local elections in Zagreb, won by the opposition – the systematic criticism by the international community was rising. In the overall post-Cold-War security system the so called “hard-security” was being gradually enlarged with “soft-security”, through the introduction of democratic standards, respect of human rights, extended democratic civil control of the armed forces, application of non-military dispute resolution mechanisms and so on. Advocates of this new concept (especially among the former army commanders) were labelled by the Croatian leadership as national traitors, dilettantes, devils, “sheep”, “goose” and so on.

It may be concluded that the Croatian system of national security and Croatian armed forces were being created and developed in an extremely unfavourable initial conditions characterised by transition and war, with no existing tradition of democratic institutions in that segment of society. The situation on the battlefields and the unclear competences of the various institutions of the political system has resulted in a full convergence of the military and the political decision-making. Both the security-defence system and the Croatian armed forces of that time were certainly not meeting the criteria and the standards, expected in a democratic society.

III Organisation and Legal Structure of the System of National Security and Armed Forces

The system of national security and defence in Croatia consists of several institutions, differing in functions, authorities and relations among them.

1. Structure

According to the Constitution, the President of the Republic is a Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and according to the Law on Service in the Armed Forces his title is “Vrhovnik” (“Supreme Commander”). The Law on the Defence further regulates his authorities and responsibilities, regarding the armed forces as well. The President of the Republic issues directions, orders, decisions, rulings and other acts governing the foundations of the structure and preparation of the armed forces, as well as their training, armament and equipment. Following the proposal made by the Minister of Defence, the President of the Republic issues acts determining the overall volume, number and mobilisation development of the armed forces, as well as the organisation of units, services, headquarters and commands. The Military Cabinet is at President’s disposal, as counselling and preparatory body, as well as the Military Adviser.

Croatian Sabor (Parliament) is the highest legislative power of the country. It consists of the House of Representatives and the House of Counties. In the field of national security the House of Representatives issues legislation governing the obligations that the national defence imposes on the citizens, their property and determines the basic principles of the organisation of defence. Deliberations on the draft Law on Military Budget, adopted every year, should enable all interested Members of Parliament (MPs) to get to know the defence situation and to determine their position regarding the further development of the defence and the military policy. Prior to the deliberation on certain issues in the House of Representatives, these issues are being discussed at the Sabor’s Committee for internal policy and national security. The scope of responsibilities of this Committee is very wide and issues like national security and defence represent only a narrow segment. The State Auditing Office is directly accountable to the House of Representatives. This is the only body through which Sabor may control the activities of the Ministry of Defence and the Croatian Army, namely through the control of finances. Until 1998 the State Auditing Office was not auditing the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior and was not submitting at least those findings to the House of Representatives.

The **Cabinet of Ministers**, within the scope of its authorities, proposes the legislation to Sabor, including the legislation governing the military, and if presided over by the President of the Republic, it may issue certain decisions regarding the defence policy.

National Security Office (UNS) is a state executive body entrusted with co-ordination and supervision of the work of other administrative bodies, especially of ministries dealing with matters relevant to national security. A Chairman, who is appointed and released by the President of the Republic, runs the Office. The UNS is a mixed civilian-military body, encompassing also following services: Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS), Headquarters for National Security (SONS), Security Headquarters and Intelligence Academy. During the mandate of president Tudjman a military unit – the I. Croatian Guard Regiment – assigned for president's security, was also a part of the Security Headquarters.

The Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia (MORH) is one of the, so called, state ministries, and performs administrative and expert tasks in the area of the defence, as regulated by the Law on Defence, Law on Service in the Armed Forces, Law on State Administration, as well as by the decisions of the President of the Republic.

The Ministry of Defence has undergone several transformations since its creation in 1990. The present structure of the Ministry of Defence is regulated by an unpublished Decision on Basic Structure of the MORH of December 1997. The Decision should have been applied as of August 1998, but, allegedly, is being applied only partially as of October 1998. This structure was to transform the wartime structure into a peacetime structure of the Ministry. Basic purposes of this transformation are the creation of the organisation adjusted to the peaceful development of the country and reaching the Euro-Atlantic standards.

The chain of command runs from the President of the Republic, as the Commander-in-Chief, to the Minister of Defence, down to the Chief of Staff and then to organisational units within their command.

The Minister of Defence is heading the Ministry and has one deputy and eight assistant ministers. The State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence conducts legal, property-related and protocol tasks at the MORH. The Minister of Defence is a civilian, while the deputy, assistants and state secretary are commissioned officers.

General Staff, Defence Inspectorate, Institute for Defence Studies, Research and Development and Administrations and Offices of the Defence are all part of the Ministry of Defence. The Military Council, as an advisory body, is also formed within the Ministry of Defence. Apart from the Minister and the Chief of the General Staff, a certain number of experts also participate in this body, appointed by the President of the Republic upon proposals by the Minister and the Chief of the General Staff.

General Staff of the Republic of Croatia (GSOSRH) structured within the Ministry of Defence for performing professional tasks for the President of the Republic. According to the Law on Defence, the Chief of the General Staff is directly responsible to the President of the Republic in all questions connected with commanding and use of armed forces both in war and peace. The Chief of General Staff is, after the Supreme Commander, the highest in rank military officer in Croatia and is superior to all commands and units, except those directly subordinated to the President of the Republic through the UNS and its Security department. The organisation of the GSOSRH is regulated by the act signed by the Joint Chief of Staff, who appoints the chiefs of certain units within it as well. A new structure of the GSOSRH is defined in a non-published Decision on Basic Structure of the GSORSR of the president of 5 December 1997.

The Ministry of Defence and the GSORSR have somewhat similar structure, but while in the Ministry the accent is put on preparation of the defence, the main task of the GSORSR is operational conducting of defence and military operations. In case of the war a war Cabinet is being formed, members of which are being appointed by the Supreme Commander.

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia are defined by the law as a form of organisation and preparation of Croatian citizen for armed defence and a main pillar of armed resistance. According to the Constitution and the Law on Defence, the Armed Forces are prepared during peace-time as a principal defence force capable of timely resisting and blocking of a sudden enemy strike, or to remove other threats. In peace-time, the Armed Forces are preparing human and other resources for defending the country in the case of war.

Since Croatia did not inherit any armed forces from the previous state, the Armed Forces had different organisational forms after the country's independence.

During the period that ended by the adoption of the Croatian Law on Defence (July 1991), they consisted of police forces (professional, reserve and drafted cadre). By the decision of the President of the Republic of April 20, 1991 the National Guard was formed (ZNG) as the first military formation of the new state. The National Guard as the first professional, uniformed and armed formation of a military organisation was a part of the Ministry of Interior, but under the command of the Minister of Defence. In 1991 members of the former Territorial Defence have joined the defence of the country within the newly formed brigades under the command of the Minister of Defence. By adoption of the Law for Defence the Armed Forces and the National Guard formed unique armed forces, subordinated to the Supreme Commander. Units of the former Territorial Defence became the reserve of the ZNG. By the presidential decision of 24 December 1991 Domobran forces were formed as a territorial component of the reserve, filled in accordance to the territorial principle. Therefore, the armed forces are formed of the Croatian Army, which consists of National Guard (ZNG) and Domobran units.

The Law on Changes and Amendments to the Law for Defence from 1996, removes the term Croatian Army from legislative terminology, so thereupon only the term 'armed forces' is being used. As of 1996 the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia have the following components: Croatian Infantry (HkoV), Croatian Military Maritime Forces (HRM) and Croatian Military Air Force.

The armed forces have peacetime and wartime regime. During the peacetime regime armed forces are filled with professional cadre (officers and sentries) and recruits who are serving obligatory 10 months service.

Peacetime composition of the armed forces is organised in six military areas of the Infantry. Seven professional guardian brigades – infantry and motorised - form an axis of this composition.

The Ministry of Defence provides a logistic support to the armed forces.

Catholic military ordinance headed by a bishop is also active in the Croatian armed forces. The ordinance has 16 chapels. There are no military priests of other religions in the Croatian armed forces.

After the war both military courts and military prosecutions have been terminated, leaving the regular courts to deal with all cases. The armed forces have kept only the internal disciplinary proceedings.

2. Legislation

Apart from the constitutional and legislative provisions regulating the general issues in structuring the national system of security and the armed forces, their primary tasks and responsibilities, the Croatian public has no knowledge of any other documents, which would regulate the policy of national security and defence, and organisation and use of armed forces.

National interests and goals of the security policy, coherent strategy, methods and resources for its implementation are all noted in a very general and abstract way in few programme documents. There are no legally accepted documents on concepts and strategies of national security and defence, nor on military strategy.

This lack of adequate documentation and discussion is especially notable when speaking of armed forces, their volume, methods of service, procurement, civil supervision, management, military budget

etc. Parliamentary discussions on budget present a rare opportunity to open these questions. But due to the absence of information these discussions usually lack expertise and quality.⁴

Except by the Constitution, management and basic relations within the armed forces are regulated by the provisions of the Law for Defence, changed several times since the beginning of the war, the Law on Service in Armed Forces (from March 1995), and a number of other regulations and internal acts.

A wider framework of regulation of the security and defence system was repeatedly changed through laws such as the Law on Organisation and Authorities of the Ministries and Administrations, Law on Internal Affairs, Law on the National Security Office, Law on Procedures in the Croatian Sabor, and a number of rulings, acts, decisions issued both by the President of the Republic and the Cabinet of Ministers.

3. Governance and control

The problems of the Croatian security and defence system, of the armed forces after the parliamentary and presidential elections⁵ of 3 January 2000 are still big. Competitions of different institutions and organisations are overlapping and partly they are not regulated by legislation. Even existing laws are not fully utilised. The Ministry of Defence is not sending yearly reports, which is the normal practice in democratic states (The White Papers). It is not known if the Office for National Security (UNS) was sending the report to the parliament, which

⁴ The Cabinet has proposed approximately USD 1 billion for the 1999 military budget, without specifying any developmental programmes that could justify this sum. The opposition parties were challenging the budget from similar abstract positions by calling it a “militaristic” one, while the advocates of the proposed budget were protesting against “insufficient means for defence”. Current statements that the Croatian military budget should be reduced to NATO standards have also been offered without any concrete argumentation of such reductions.

⁵ It should be noted that the Croatian military had recognised the results of the elections and they continued normal work with the new High Commander, President Stjepan Mesic who came from the Croatian National Party and with the new Prime Minister, Ivica Racan (Social democratic Party).

is also required by law. In the Parliament there is no specialised body, overseeing the armed forces, their development, supply of arms and technique. The question of national security and defence is mixed with other very wide questions of international and foreign policy.

There is not also an adequate control by the public. Due to the recent full closeness of the Croatian security and defence forces, and the rather negative feeling among some civilians and scholars, Croatia is now having very few educated civilians who are able to discuss and plan policy together with the military.

Former Study of Defence which was created at Zagreb's Department for Political Sciences in 1975., was abandoned in 1994. It was one of the first measures of the new Croatian Ministry for Education, which was also ideologically motivated as a continuation of elimination of the subject self-defence, which in the days of former Yugoslavia was taught in every school. Instead of this subject nothing new was offered.

Co-operation between civilians and military people, which is the basis for democratic control and compromise on political and military interests of the country, does not exist in Croatia yet.

From 1992 in the frames of the Office for strategic research, created in the Ministry of Defence, some research activities were started in different fields: anthropology, psychology, sociology. In the same year the work was started on some other projects: Experiences from the Patriotic War, geostrategic elements of Croatia, Armed forces of Croatia, Global and regional strategies, Logistic of Croatian Army, Command and Information System. In these projects co-operation of civilian experts and military people was reached. One of the projects was elaborating the Strategic defence of Croatia. It was partly published, but was classified as a whole. After the war work on the projects was abandoned, the teams of experts were not meeting any more, and the finished studies were not offered for public discussion.

Research activities, connected with the Patriotic War were also politicised. In the days of President Tudjman no one dared to touch the issue of a "sacred war". But the new regime, under the influence of the

international community, has started now to draw new light on the war crimes. Conditions were created for co-operation with The Hague Tribunal, the return of Serbs and the re-compensation for all refugees. But radical elements from former military and civilian structures are strongly criticising this policy, stating that with such new policy the government is betraying the Patriotic War, the sacrifices of the people, and the position of all patriotic fighters.

The new Minister of War Veterans is sharply attacked as a person who started the process of revision of the privileges, which were lavishly given to the veterans (pensions, invalidities, privileges in getting apartments, cars, schooling). The strongest attack of these factors was a letter of 12 generals, in which they asked the President to change the policy towards the international community. The main point of criticism is the Croatian co-operation with The Hague Tribunal. But the next day after the letter was published a Presidential act dismissed all 12 generals.

At the same time the Croatian Parliament after bitter discussion promulgated a Declaration on Patriotic War, which is stating that Croatia was leading only a defensive war. It was a political attempt to cool the pressure. But it is quite sure that many issues connected with the war will be on agenda in the future: veterans' privileges, war crimes, Croatian military participation in the war in Bosnia. They will represent a cause for potential political troubles.

Recently accepted changes in the Croatian Constitution,⁶ connected with the position of the President, could clear the relations within the military and the security services and they could improve the democratic control over the armed forces and civil-military relations. A main precondition of this is the change in the present armed forces.

⁶ By accepting constitutional changes on 9.November 2000 Croatia has changed the semi-presidential system with the system of parliamentary democracy.

4. Cadre policy

Having no clear basic documents, national goals, concepts, strategies and doctrine and the pointed responsibility of their shaping, it was hard to talk on concrete structuring of military forces. All political actors in Croatia are in agreement that this is needed and this restructuring has to be on the level of NATO standards.

The peaceful structure of the armed forces includes 62,450. 38,450 of them are professional soldiers and officers and 24,000 conscripts. 9,500 civilians serve in the Ministry of Defence.

Critics are saying that even such peace projection number is too high, considering the territory of Croatia and the number of its inhabitants. Also it is not in the frames of the new European security architecture and particularly it is not proportionate to the magnitude of the security challenges. Members of NATO and transitional countries which are invited to NATO, are having less forces compared to number of inhabitants (Poland - 0.62%, The Czech Republic - 0.57%, Hungary - 0.43%) With its 1.34% Croatia would be second in Europe, immediately after Greece (1.59%)⁷.

It is hard to say what is the real number of the military in Croatia. The former Minister of Defence claimed on 29 January 1999 that the armed forces have in service only 66 per cent of the number, which is projected with the new structure. The Ministry of Defence in December 1998, according to the obligations with the OSCE, was informing the Organisation that in the services of the Croat armed forces there are 61,506 men and women.

The number of 45,000 professional soldiers and officers is used in the end of 2000. In the period of the last three years the tendency is to cut this amount by 16,000 and another cut should be made in the next ten years when 6,000 will leave the forces. This number does not include the people who would for different reasons leave the ranks voluntarily.⁸

⁷ Vecernji list, 2 January, 2000.

⁸ Normal fluctuation from the military is 3-5% yearly.

On the other side, the reduction of the armed forces of Croatia cannot be made easily, due to the harsh economic situation (more than 360,000 unemployed, which makes 22% of the population). The problem is that the whole Croat economy is in crisis, there are no foreign investments and the domestic resources are not adequate to start the production. All cuts in the military sphere should be made with maximum sensitivity, and try not to deepen the economic and political crisis. A set of measures should be created like loans for employment and stimulation of employers. Beside those unfavourable economic and social conditions the big problem is in the lack of formal training of military people.

5. Training

The creation of the Croat military forces in the conditions of war and transition from one regime to another has led to the heterogeneous composition of the Croat military.

In the beginning of the Patriotic War a small group of officers of the former Yugoslav Peoples Army (YPA), mostly Croats, had joined the ranks of the Croatian fighters. In the ranks of the fighters were people coming as volunteers and they were bearing strong animosity against the YPA. Former officers were also confronted with these sentiments, but they were needed as professionals. Still the majority of the people who were in commanding positions were without professional training and they were getting their formal ranks due to their courage, party affiliation (mostly members of the Croatian Democratic Union) and family connections. This system for long time was the main source of recruiting new officers.⁹

During the Patriotic War fighters were unable to get a formal civilian education. For the objectives of military education a special school was opened to offer courses for the officers at the different levels of command. Special short courses for officers were organised and for the highest in rank officers the Military School was created. The future military attaches are educated in the Military Diplomatic Academy. All

⁹ Minister Susak was stating that “war experience is much more important than some diplomas”, *Hrvatska vojska...* pp. 179.

these programs are for people who already are in the military services and are not open for civilians.

Unity and compatibility of military and civilian education systems were not created during the war and there is no sign that it could happen now.¹⁰

As professional training is more and more becoming a product of peaceful evolution and of the new Croatian ties with NATO, many officers are applying for the Graduate Programme in International Relations at Zagreb's University.

6. Military Expenses

The real figures of the military budget are not very precise. Official statistics are just one part of the picture. During the Patriotic War part of the military expenditures were not registered anywhere. President Tudjman was claiming that during the war years the military forces were getting around 15 per cent of the GDP. At the same time official statistics were not giving more than 10 per cent.

The claims that the military budgets of 1997, 1998 and 1999 have been reduced should be met with doubts. Part of the budget was re-distributed to other institutions. The so-called transfers to the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina were taken away from the military budget and were channelled to the Croatian part of the Federation via the Ministry of Finance.¹¹ The sum of money, which Croatia was sending to Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina: pensions for veterans, support for invalids, medical care, rehabilitation, was representing in 1999 680 million Kuna or 109 million USD. After the change of regime these

¹⁰ All efforts to create a Centre for Strategic Studies had no impact and the Centre was not organised.

¹¹ Croatian Prime Minister Ivica Racan stated that Croatia "will fulfil all its obligations toward Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina: military pensions, invalidities but on transparent way through legal institutions". I. Racan, "Making up for lost time", NATO review-Building Stability in the Balkan, summer-autumn 2000, pp. 8-10.

costs were transferred to the newly created Ministry of Croatian Defenders.

All these changes towards transparency in the military budget were made under the strong pressure of the international community, which was clearly saying that only democracy would open the door for Croatian membership in Partnership for Peace.

This structure of the military budget is still not favourable on many issues. More than 90 of per cent of the whole budget is for salaries,¹² logistic and supply. Less than 10 percent of budget is provided for technical equipment and modernisation.

For all these reasons it could be said that the predicted 3% military spending from the budget would not be reached soon or easy.

IV Politicisation of the Military and Civil-Military Relations

The Law for Defence of 1991 forbids in its paragraph 42. any political activity, the creation of parties, organising political meetings and manifestations in the armed forces. However, in the Rules of the armed forces from 1992 membership of military in the political parties was allowed. Later it was confirmed by the changes of the Law for Defence from 1993. During the Patriotic War and the years in which Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) was in power, the majority of the highly ranking officers were members of the CDU. The former Minister of Defence, Miljavac, who was claiming that the majority of the officers were active in the CDU, also confirmed this.

In the days of war political affiliation to the CDU was very often substitute for the lack of formal training or military experience. Beside President Tudjman, who was charismatic leader of the Party and the Supreme commander of the military, Minister of Defence, Gojko Šušak

¹² There are important differences in the salaries. Members of guards' brigades (professionals) are having much higher salaries in comparison to professionals, employed by other services.

was practically the second ranking person in the Central Board of the CDU. Generals and high in rank officers were regularly on the party election lists. In the House of Representatives of the Croatian Parliament (1991-1995) there were three representatives of CDU who were also on the highest military positions (chief of staff, commander of the Osijek military area and the leader of the Office for political activities. In 1995 the political activities of the military in legislature and courts were eliminated.

The Croatian political opposition started to fight for de-politicisation of the police and the army in 1993. But the CDU was strongly rejecting these proposals, claiming that it would diminish the human rights of the military people. The next attempt of the political opposition had also failed in 1995, but was having only one concrete impact on the abolishing of the Political Office in the Ministry. Soon, it became clear this was only a cosmetic change and that its tasks were transferred to the Office for Public Relations, whose slow reactions, apologetic writing, the mythology created around the military, and politically inspired speeches were becoming a normal way of communication.¹³

The politicisation of the military forces, the political, social and financial powers of the Ministry were extremely strong when Gojko Šušak was the Minister of Defence. A lot of special links were created with the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Ministry made lucrative contracts with the members of CDU, and on the other side 120,000 lawsuits were started against the Ministry, which was not paying its bills.

After Šušak's death Dr. Andrija Hebrang was appointed as the new Minister. He was the former Minister of Health. Immediately after taking office he announced radical changes in the Ministry and in its

¹³ When some Croatian journals were publishing materials, connected with poor behaviour of the security services, protecting President Tudjman on the island of Brijuni, Ministry of Defence issued a statement in which all journalists and citizens, witnessing such behaviour of the military, were called "citizens with no Croatian origin, Serbs, and children of officers and generals, of former YPA who are still having strong hate for everything that is Croatian", Hrvatska vojska.... pp. 175.

financial activities, the creation of a new peaceful structure, control by the civilian sector and the new model of training the military. Confronted with very strong internal opposition in the military, Minister Hebrang after two months of crisis resigned. Pavao Miljavac was appointed as a new Minister. Since he was the actual chief of staff during the same day he retired and immediately received the ministerial position.

The first Minister who was a proper civilian was Jozo Radoš. He was a representative of the ruling coalition of six parties. Many transitional problems in the Ministry are not solved and there are also not easy relations between the Ministry and the Chief of General Staff. Some functions, which in democratic states belong to the Chief of General Staff are not yet given back and also many scandals connected with the past (sale of arms, drugs, war crimes) are influencing the work of the Ministry.

V Integration in the international security organisations and international co-operation

The new Croatian regime and some retired military people are stating that Croatia is Mediterranean, Panonian and Danube country and for that reasons her place in Europe must be unquestionable.¹⁴

In the PpP Croatia was invited only after the change of the political regime in the 2000. But even before that many areas of co-operation had existed and international links were cultivated.

The Croatian army with its engineering staff was accepted in the OSCE mission in Nagorny Karabakh. The co-operation was developed with missions of EU, observers of OSCE, UN forces in Croatia, NATO forces in Croatia and with the forces, which are stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia was supporting activities of NATO and WEU in the peace operations in the area. During all this time air corridors were

¹⁴ Antun Tus: "Obrambeni i sigurnosni aspekti integracije u europske i transatlanske strukture", in Hrvatska i Europa, Zagreb, 1997. pp. 125-139.

open and flight controls in Zagreb and Split were also co-operating with NATO.

The biggest results of the military co-operation were in the training.

USA was the first NATO country, which organised in 1995 joint Croatian-American civil-military programmes for professional training of the Croatian military, development of democratic institutions and civil control over the military. Soon after the American offer other European countries started also co-operation.¹⁵

From 1999 the Croatian military are trained in the Marshall Centre in Garmisch. There are also training programmes organised for medical staff and special seminars in German language. The value of the German support to the Croatian military is around two million US dollars.

Croatian and British forces are intensifying their co-operation after 1997. Britain is organising special language seminars for Croatian officers and also few seminars are organised on the Civil-Military relations.

A similar co-operation does exist with France, Turkey, Italy, Norway, Spain, Hungary and Poland. The Croatian Ministry for Defence has planned to spend two million US dollars¹⁶ for the training of military people abroad in the year 2000.

¹⁵ Direct US military training assistance to Croatia grew from 65.000 in 1995. to 500.000 US dollars in 2000. This money was provided to Croatia through the congressionally authorised International Military Education and Training (IMET) fund. During this period the USA trained nearly 200 Croatian military and civilian personnel in the USA and several hundred more at one or two week seminars held in Croatia. Kristian J. Wheaton: "Cultivating Croatia's Military", NATO review- Building Stability in the Balkans, summer-autumn 2000, pp. 10-12.

¹⁶ More than 90% of the candidates are going for training in the NATO countries.

It is hoped that all these Croatian candidates will help to foster the transformation of the Croatian armed forces in parallel with the democratic development of Croatia.

It was obvious that in Tudjman's time Croatia was not included in the European security structures not because of the military, but primarily for political reasons.

The acceptance of Croatia in the PfP during the first half of 2000 was a concrete award for the democratic changes, promoted after 3 January. The whole process of democratisation of society includes also civilian control over the military and stronger civil-military co-operation. Unfortunately, these transformations, which were announced by the coalition government now in power are going very slowly and this has an impact on the organisation, concept and direction of the Croatian security and defence system.

VI Conclusion

The security and defence system of Croatia should be based on the basic national interests and has to be part of the general democratic values, principles and norms of a new European order. The vital and unchangeable national interests of Croatia are: defence of the country, her integrity, independence, and national identity with permanent economic and cultural development.¹⁷

The threats to Croatian security are nowadays more connected with the domestic situation than with the international one. Despite the unsolved problems in the relations with Croatian neighbours (Piran's bay, savings in the Ljubljanska banka, Prevlaka, return of refugees, compensation for the war damages, succession of the property from former Yugoslavia)¹⁸ Croatian relations in the region are gradually stabilised.

¹⁷ Antun Tus: "Sigurnost i obrana", Hrvatska Agenda 2000, Zagreb, pp. 35.

¹⁸ See: R. Vukadinovic: "La Croatie de L'après Dayton", in Relations Internationales & Strategiques, Paris, No 28, Hiver, 1997. pp. 63-71., and

The international forces, stationed in the Balkans are very instrumental for stability, eliminating any thought of a serious military threat. Their presence helps stability in the area and gives an impetus to democracy in the Western Balkans.

The political, economic and social problems of the Croatian society and the consequences, which are stemming from them, could hamper the democratic reforms of the armed forces and of Civil-Military relations.

Respect for universal human rights, democratisation of society, transparency of military spending, strengthening of Civil-Military relations are crucial not only for the integration links that Croatia wants to create with the EU and NATO, but they also represent important elements of the new European security architecture. As a small country Croatia has to do all in its power not to miss this opportunity and to build its Euro-Atlantic democratic links.

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4. From Civilian-Military to Civil-Military Relations in FRY

I Introduction

Today there are several new important theoretical and practical reasons, which call for a reconsideration of civilian-military relations. This problem should be simultaneously approached through examples provided by individual states and, perhaps even more, from the level of the international system as a whole and of its individual segments. Previously it should be noted here that the issue of relations between high military commanders and the leading political management, if a sharp separation of the military and the political is at all purposeful, has attracted attention and been a subject of research by contemporaries from ancient times. Perhaps the main reason for this interest of contemporaries in the confrontation of the military and the political lies in the practical consequences of that relationship – consequences, which significantly determine constitutional forms, the character of the political establishment, as well as the position of the individual society. For the theory of politics and political philosophy this is also a fundamental question of relationship between two kinds of power: the *political*, which personifies the society in its entirety, and the *military*, understood as the strong arm of the only legally allowed form of violence. In its considerations of the matters of safety and security in a given society, or, to put it more narrowly and specifically, a given state, the history of military doctrines gives the military factor priority in importance. Incidentally, most examples from political history demonstrate the tendency to identify the issues of security of the state in question with the military factor, as well as the *priority* of military power over the political, and, accordingly, the tendency to concentrate the functions of supreme command of the military and management of the state in the hands of one person – the chief of state.

No matter which power enjoyed priority at a given time and place, the relationship of the political and the military always contained in its core a constant tension with high probability of conflict, the balance which was sometimes achieved being as a rule extremely delicate. The

sociological differentiation of the main factors in the political–military relationship distinguishes, widely speaking, the society as the total of all its citizens (the so-called civil society), the state, defined in relation to the society as a narrower organisation of institutionally supported coercion, and, finally, the military as a markedly non-democratic institution whose efficiency depends, among other things, on discipline, strict hierarchy, and obedience. As we can see, the three factors range from the “disperse” forms of relatively spontaneous interest- and value-motivated groupings of the civil society to the stiff, hierarchic military structure. These characteristics of the different forms of organisation are alone sufficient to cause constant tension in every individual society as a whole. But the complexity of the relationship is made more difficult by the tension within the military factor itself. Namely, the desired harmony and balance between the military's functional requirements (that is, its capability to deal with external and internal threats to national security) and the social factors influencing it (tradition, interests, culture, values, goals, dominant ideology, and institutions which support all these) has proven difficult to attain. Theory has already thoroughly explained, and practice has on many occasions confirmed, that the tipping of the scales in civilian-military relations to the advantage of either side can have disastrous consequences for the security and/or the democracy of a society.

Although individual theorists of international relations claim that the total power of a state is decisively determined by the so-called new sources and dimensions of power, the military factor is still *ultimo ratio* in the so-called Western democracies when it comes to security and realisation of national interests. However, there have been some important changes.

Due to many causes, but primarily to the almost simultaneous reduction of security threats and strengthening of the so-called civil society in most Western countries, the military has been beset by a crisis of legitimacy and the social influence of the military factor has diminished. In conditions of a reduced interest for the military profession and of relative material prosperity of the widest social circles, the civilian structures have established an effective control over the military factor. However, it seems that the balance between the two

factors has been disturbed in favour of the civilian. In fact, this is one of the most important characteristics of Western democracy, closely interdependent with the concepts of rule of law, respect of human and minority rights, and, at the same time, the most idealised and ideological value in liberal democratic societies of the West.

The need is felt to analyse the normative-institutional framework by which the *desirable* relationship between military and political power is regulated and, even more, to establish the “effective truth of the matter” - “behind” and “beyond” this framework. Moreover, this is the only way to avoid the idealisation of the relationship between the military and civilian factors – as Abrahamson rightly points out, there are also cases where military power can appropriate a significant part of economic and political power without violating the existing legal framework, that is, by acting within and through the existing institutions. In that regard, the state of affairs in the countries of South-East Europe which are in “transition” towards more stable democratic forms is different and a great deal more complex than in countries of the European Union (EU), the United States (US), and Canada.

II Phases of Defence and Security Development of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

When the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) is concerned, in the past “decade of change” our country has gone through two phases in its defence and security development. The first phase lasted from 1989 to the creation of the FRY (28 April 1992), and the second from May 1992 till the present day.

(1) The first phase was marked by the consequences of the breaking up of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) as multiethnic, multi-confessional, and multicultural constructs. The state and its army shared the same fate. As it is well known, in the period prior to the beginning of secessionist wars, the “second” Yugoslavia based its defence and security policy and doctrine on the experiences and tenets of the doctrine and strategy of so-called people's war. The YPA, as a pronouncedly ideological, party army

composed of the victors and the losers of the Second World War under the slogan of so-called brotherhood and unity, was under the jurisdiction of the federal state, or, more precisely, under the control of the Yugoslav communist party political leadership. The Territorial Defence, on the other hand, was in relative terms, independently directed by the political leaderships of the individual republics and even autonomous provinces. With time, the YPA and the Territorial Defence became rivals within the total defence and security system. Their mutual animosity increased, as chauvinism and separatism in certain republics grew stronger, preparing them for secession.

(2) The second phase coincides with the creation and subsequent development of the FRY. In the defence and security field, the most striking experience of these years was the effort to mitigate the destructive consequences of the breaking up of the second Yugoslavia, as well as to carry out the necessary supplementation and improvement of the defence and security system. However, a fundamental and all-encompassing reform of the army, defence, and the entire system of integral security, including establishment of effective control of the civilian over the military, still await Serbia and Montenegro after the democratic changes of October 2000.

It must once again be emphasised that the experience of the FRY, which is only now entering the so-called period of transition, is significantly different than that of the other countries of South-East Europe.

In short, due to well-known geopolitical and strategic changes Serbia and Montenegro found themselves in completely new and highly unfavourable surroundings. FRY is surrounded from all sides with members of Partnership for Peace (PfP), members of NATO, or impatient candidates for membership in the Alliance. Until the democratic revolution of last October, no realistic offer could be made to Serbia and Montenegro to join European and Balkan political, economic, and security integration processes.

III Changes in the Defence System of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

In the period since the creation of the FRY (1992) several normative documents were promulgated, regulating the constitutional position of the defence and security system, and especially of the armed forces. These documents are the Constitution of the FRY, the Defence Act, Army of Yugoslavia Act (AY), Transformation of the AY Act, and the Production and Trading in Armaments and Military Equipment Act.

The above-mentioned normative documents essentially altered the constitutional conception and position of the army and defence in comparison with former Yugoslavia. In the earlier state, matters of defence and security were under the jurisdiction of all subjects of society and all levels of state and political organisation, from the federal state down to the republics, regions, districts, municipalities, firms, and individuals – citizens and employees. In the current constitutional settlement, defence and national security are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal state. All organs and institutions engaged in defence and military affairs – civilian, as well as military – from the top (federal minister of defence) to the bottom of the state hierarchy are directly subordinate to federal organs. The new normative documents significantly strengthened *civilian control over the military and defence system*.

First, the ministry of defence itself became an organ of the federal government for managing the military and defence system. On the other hand the staff and professional functions of the Supreme Command dealing with preparation and employment of the armed forces were placed under the jurisdiction of the AY General Staff. This represented a break with the earlier solutions according to which these two roles were united by the position of the federal secretary for national defence who, as the highest in rank general, was practically beyond any civilian or parliamentary control and jurisdiction. All significant issues concerning the position of the military and defence system in the social and state constitutional system, were *de facto* resolved in the immediate circle of supreme command.

With these new solutions, the FRY came closer to European standards regarding civilian control of the military. The normative regulation of these matters was such that the tasks of managing the army and providing necessary conditions for its development and functioning in peacetime were completely entrusted to the civilian and parliamentary authorities, whereas supreme command in war and carrying out of combat preparations and training in accordance with the established doctrinal and strategic role were entrusted to the Supreme Defence Council as the Supreme Command of the armed forces.

No less important in terms of strengthening civilian control over the military and defence system was the *appointment of civilians to the position of federal minister of defence*. In the previous system the senior general from the ranks of the army filled this position. In this way, the army has been placed, both formally and actually, under the control of the civilian minister and his ministry. It was a move in the direction of solutions practised in the most developed democratic states of Europe.

Second, the system of parliamentary control over military and defence issues was strengthened by having all development plans and programs, including, of course, the budget, debated and accepted in the Federal Parliament, in accordance with strictly defined parliamentary procedure. As opposed to the earlier system, now there is no way to manoeuvre around or avoid parliamentary control over the army and defence. In order to establish that system even more firmly, the Parliament was given the right and the obligation to pass special laws and decisions on adopting any new program concerning the equipment of the AY. Finally, the Parliament establishes basic strategic priorities and decides on the shaping and defining of defence and national security policy. This primarily applies to issues concerning changes in strategic conception of defence and attitude towards existing European and regional security and military-political arrangements and integrations.

With its changed name, the AY explicitly classifies and qualifies itself as the army of a state, and not of a people, as was the case with the previous army. This change of name was undoubtedly a sure sign that efforts to build a *new social and functional type of military organisation*, tailored to new specific circumstances and to the altered social being and

system characteristics of the new Yugoslav federation, were soon to follow.

The AY was defined as an *operational type army*, whose only task and doctrinal role is to defend the FRY's freedom, independence, territorial integrity, and constitutional order from armed aggression. It is understood that this primarily means external armed aggression, but also to the internal, if its scope, intensity, and characteristics surpass the defensive and security capabilities and capacities at the disposal of the so-called internal security forces. Although it is not explicitly stated in the formulations of the above mentioned doctrinal document, this interpretation is implicitly contained in it, as is the case with all armies in the world.

The above-mentioned document is explicit in stating that the AY is the *army of the federal state*, and not of any individual political party, including the party in power. The army stands above and beyond all political ideologies; keeping an equal distance from all political forces and movements in the country, open towards the media and the civilian institutions that are supposed to exercise social control over it.

In the operational sense, the AY is a *highly professional military organisation*, although it is not, nor can it be in the existing circumstances, composed entirely of professionals. Its forces consist partly of conscripts serving their regular term of duty, and partly of volunteers serving “by contract”, that is, individuals who choose to take up performing of military duties as their profession. The military service system, the length of the term of service, the mobilisation system, and the system of training and preparation of the wartime army has all been tailored to this definition of the army's character and functional type.

In its organisational structuring, that is, by its branches and services and by its peacetime deployment of units, commands, and combat formations, the AY follows the basic conclusions drawn from analysis and military-geographic and operational assessment of the war theatre. Since our war theatre encompasses all three traditional combat environments – land, sea, and air – the AY must have all three branches of the armed forces: army, navy, and air force. Likewise, in accordance

with the assessment that the Yugoslav war theatre consists of three lands and one maritime battle area, the AY's organisational structure has allotted corresponding operational and strategic formations to each of these. At this moment these formations are three *armies*, subdivided into corps, and the Navy, as a separate grouping on the same level as the armies. However, other solutions are possible. One, which is being considered, is based on *army corps*, each of which would have one of the land battle areas as its zone of responsibility.

Numerically, the AY can be ranked among the smaller armed forces. Its peacetime strength is approximately 0.8-0.9% of the total population, rising to about 3-4% in wartime. These figures are just very close to world and European standards.

With regard to the number and level armament with the five kinds of weapons which are classified as so-called heavy weapons (tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery weapons of calibres larger than 76 mm, combat aircraft, and armed helicopters), the AY has undertaken the obligation to fully comply with the stipulations of the Agreement of Sub-Regional Arms Control, signed in Florence in June 1996. That agreement came about as a result of the Dayton peace arrangement and its intention is to prevent new military conflicts in this region using the method of balance of forces and encouragement of mutual confidence by way of mutual control of the level of armament.

The above-mentioned limitations exert significant influence on all aspects of the AY's organisational structuring: total manpower, basic types of units and joint tactical formations, types and quantity of heavy equipment, and so on. However, the agreement places no limitation regarding quality of weapons systems. This enables the signatories to disrupt the balance of military forces in the sub-region of the former Yugoslavia by improving the quality of their heavy weapons.

The FRY has fulfilled all stipulations of this agreement, reducing its level of armament to the specified degree. In accepting the stipulations of the agreement, the FRY demonstrated that it has neither territorial, nor any other political claims against any neighbouring country. The AY as it has been structured on the basis of the limitations contained in this

agreement is absolutely ineffective for large-scale offensive operations, which would be necessary for realisation of possible territorial claims against neighbouring states. That army is useful only for conducting a *strategic defence* in protection of its own territory, and it would require extreme efforts to take the war to the territory of the aggressor. But this is not *a priori* opposed to the fundamental strategic tenet, which calls for defence of Yugoslavia's own territorial integrity, because that kind of strategic defence can in part be conducted through offensive use of military resources.

The most obvious example of the modernisation of the strategic concept of defence and of the development of a military organisation corresponding to that concept was the formation of the Special Forces Corps. Its doctrinal and strategic role consists in carrying out special operations and all kinds of so-called unconventional actions, as they are defined in the military doctrines of Western states. This is nothing unusual since it is well known that all armies in the world, especially those of European and NATO countries, as well as the armies of our neighbours, have such formations and assign to them that identical role. The Corps is a highly mobile and professional operational formation capable of quick deployment on any part of the war theatre and at any given operational or tactical route. The introduction of this formation into the organisational structure of the AY has enhanced the function of deterrence from all forms of armed threats, and primarily from terrorist-sabotage and insurgent activities on a wider scale.

It must be noted that the other corps of the AY are organised, equipped, trained, and prepared to effectively counter the full spectrum of so-called unconventional actions in their own zones of responsibility. None of the corps is dependent on the Special Forces Corps in that respect. The Pristina Corps demonstrated exemplary effectiveness in the fighting against terrorist bands of Albanian separatists and against armed insurrection during the summer of 1998. This primarily refers to protection of the border strip from infiltration by armed terrorist bands from Albania.

IV European Security Arrangements and the Federal Republic Yugoslavia

Before saying anything concrete on PfP itself, we must examine other existing instruments and institutions that contribute to stability and security of the region and Europe as a whole.

WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (WEU) – one of the oldest European organisations. It comprises ten member states, five states in the status of observers, and ten states with the status of associate partner.

The WEU has been developing its own military component for almost ten years. The initiative to form these forces was launched by France and Germany. It started with the formation of the Franco-German brigade, later to develop into forces amounting to 60,000 troops. The basic components of these forces are Eurocorps, Multinational Division – Central, which is also a part of NATO's rapid reaction corps, and Anglo-Dutch amphibious forces, which also have a role in NATO operations. There are also standing naval forces of the Mediterranean, comprising 8-10 destroyers or frigates, which had their place and role in the Adriatic in conducting the blockade of our country. Those are the forces, which the European Union (EU) would employ in peace operations, peace enforcement operations, or humanitarian operations. An agreement has been reached with NATO enabling these forces to use NATO facilities and means (means of transport, means of communication, means of command, and intelligence service) in instances when WEU forces are being engaged as European forces, acting on decision and demand of the EU, while NATO forces are not being engaged or the US, as NATO's leading member, does not want to participate. These forces are intended to replace NATO forces in Kosovo and Metohija.

THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) – 15 member states – so far without armed forces of its own, so that in case of need it would use WEU forces. However, it plans to develop its own military capacities. At the meeting in Brussels (20 November 2000) EU ministers of defence and foreign affairs decided that the member states should provide 120,000 troops for European Rapid Reaction Forces. These forces are to become

operational by 2003 in the strength of 60,000 troops, while the rest will be kept as reserve in case of need. Germany will participate with 13,500, Britain and France with 12,000-12,500 each, Italy with 12,000, Spain with 6,500, Netherlands, Belgium, and Greece with 3,000 each, Finland and Sweden with 2,000 each, Ireland and Portugal with 1,000 each, and Luxembourg with 500 troops. Denmark decided not to participate with troops because of internal problems, while Austria asked for more time to “reconsider”. These forces will be intended for rapid actions in crisis areas with the aim of enforcing or keeping peace, as well as humanitarian actions in case of large-scale disasters.

The objective of the formation of these forces is that Europe strengthens its own defensive component, that it attains its own defensive identity, something that serves not only to promote Europe's independence and responsibility in matters of its own security, but also to strengthen its position in international relations. Namely, past events have demonstrated Europe's dependence on the US in this respect, especially regarding the solution of crises in the Balkan area.

This issue has caused some quite bitter exchanges, as was the case earlier with WEU forces, in the US, but also within Europe itself, since there are different opinions regarding the objective and the purpose of the formation of strong EU forces. Some critics regard this as unnecessary, and leading only to doubling of capacities, because there already exists a sufficiently strong NATO, while others are of the opinion that this is being done with the aim to gradually “abolish” NATO and to disturb transatlantic relations, that is, to “drive out” the US from Europe.

NATO – 19 member states – politico-defensive alliance whose task is to safeguard the values attained by member states in the fields of legislature, parliamentary democracy, market economy, and common cultural heritage. It can also be defined as a political association of countries, which contribute to promotion of common values and defence of common interests. The fundamental activity of the Alliance is collective defence, stemming from Article 5 of the Washington Agreement which, among other things, states that: “...attack on one or more countries of the Alliance in Europe or America is considered an

attack on all members...”. In the meantime the list of the Alliance's potential activities has been expanded, enabling it to become engaged wherever interests of its members are threatened – preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, anti-terrorist and anti-sabotage actions, collective engagement when regional security is threatened, etc.

BALKAN COUNTRIES’ PEACEKEEPING FORCES – up to 2,000 troops, to be engaged in peacekeeping operations as regional forces of the Balkans. Participating in them are all Balkan countries except the FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE is a programme of military co-operation between NATO and the participating countries. The origins of this program are closely connected to the events of the 1990s and the process of NATO's reform and transformation from a defensive into a political organisation. The wave of optimism in NATO countries following the collapse of socialism was soon replaced by scepticism. A solution had to be found for the existing situation. NATO did not have an enemy any more and many prophesied its dissolution and demise. The situation in eastern European countries, created by economic and political collapse, was not good, and there was danger of mass movement of the population towards Western Europe. There was also a danger of widespread ethnic conflicts. Therefore, in October 1993 the US gave the initiative to launch the PfP project, an initiative in which was to contain basic ideas on how NATO was to consolidate its future reforms (politico-ideological redefinition of the enemy, redefinition of NATO's operational space, and organisational restructuring). All this NATO successfully realised.

The US president, William Clinton proclaimed officially the PfP programme in January 1994. The general objective of the program is to increase the member states’ capability and readiness to keep the peace through joint planning, training and exercises with NATO forces. The realization of the partnership program helps partner countries to prepare their armed forces for conducting operations together with NATO forces in peace operations, peace enforcement operations and humanitarian operations. An individual or particular objective of the partnership is to

prepare those countries which wish to become members of the Alliance to realize that as painlessly as possible, whereas to countries which do not want membership or will not be given the chance to join NATO it offers establishment of co-operative relations with the Alliance and aid in planning, training and exercises. Joint planning, training and exercises are supposed to increase the capability of the member state so that it can successfully fulfil tasks in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and so on.

The procedure for entrance into the PfP programme is based on three documents: PfP Framework Document, Presentation Document, and the Individual Partnership Program. The signing of the Framework Document represents the first phase in the procedure of entry into the PfP. This is followed by the submission of the Presentation Document, which determines the scope and degree of integration into the process of co-operation with NATO with regard to common joint planning and training, joint military exercises, lists the means and infrastructure which can be allocated and which will be used to fulfil the requirements of the PfP programme and so on. The third phase, or the third document, is the individual program, which specifies the relations and obligations of the partner state to NATO. It must be emphasised that the partner state itself defines the contents and scope of co-operation, that is, how and to what extent it is to be integrated into the process of co-operation. Most countries, which have entered PfP signed the so-called General partnership program, while Russia and the Ukraine have special relations with NATO under this program. The implementation of the PfP program manifests itself through joint planning and exercises, education of officers in Western countries, participation in various seminars, giving military assistance to PfP member countries by NATO countries, joint participation in peace operations, and so on. Transparency in military planning, in the budget process, and in the establishment of democratic control over military forces is also being promoted. Finally, in the long run, the forces of the partner country develop the capabilities, which enable them to better conduct operations together with NATO countries in crisis situations. The forms of co-operation within this program (currently there are around 2,000 activities) are being expanded and deepened, and it can be safely said that the PfP has become a part of the European security architecture.

So far 29 countries have entered PfP, but since Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have become full members of NATO last year, the PfP currently comprises 26 countries. All countries of the Balkan area are members of this program, except FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina has not become a member yet because it has not yet been fully internally constituted as a state and does not have unified armed forces.

In addition to what has already been said, there is also the possibility of making bilateral military agreements and contracts of various types (military-technical co-operation, joint military exercises, assistance in arming or reorganisation of armed forces, and so on). Illustrative in this respect is the Equip and Train project, through which the armed forces of Croatia and later the Muslim forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were reorganised and armed. The US has direct bilateral military relations with Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Albania, and Bulgaria. Turkey has bilateral military co-operation contracts with Albania and Macedonia, Germany with Albania, and so on.

One form of bilateral co-operation was demonstrated by the recent joint exercise of the Croat and US air forces codenamed Secure Sky. It was held between 27 November and 1 December of this year with the participation of about 20 aircraft, the objective being to provide joint practice for American and Croat pilots.

V Entry of FR Yugoslavia into the PfP Program – Needs and Possibilities

Where could the FRY and the AY join, into which kind of integration, partnership or alliance? As far as bilateral relations and agreements are concerned, the answer is undoubtedly positive. Such relations and agreements already exist. They include military-technical co-operation, exchange of military delegations, co-operation of military health services, and so on. However, there are no bilateral agreements, which could be interpreted as pointed against any other country or countries or against the general security and stability of the region. This is undoubtedly a good thing and this practice must be continued.

Membership, that is, entry into or creation of “some kind” of alliance with the WEU or the future EU forces is not possible due to the simple fact that the FRY is not a member of these institutions. Alliance with NATO is also impossible for the same reason, and it has already been mentioned that the road to entry into NATO leads through the PfP. So, there are two solutions in play: entry into PfP and into Balkan Countries Peacekeeping Forces. It must be remembered that, unlike the FRY, all Balkan countries, which contribute forces to the Balkan Countries Peacekeeping Forces have already joined PfP. This points to the conclusion that at this moment it makes sense to talk only about the PfP. So, the question is whether the FRY should seek ways to enter PfP or not and which are the dominant factors influencing such a decision.

Factors which could influence such a decision can be provisionally placed into three groups or divided into three categories:

POLITICAL – in the sense of what is gained and lost on the political field and in the international position of the FRY if the initiative for entry into PfP is accepted or refused;

SECURITY – would membership in the PfP strengthen or weaken our security system and how it would influence the security situation in general;

GENERAL – certain factors of psychological nature among the general population due to last year’s events in connection with NATO aggression against our country must be taken into account. Also, there are certain problems which can be provisionally termed “technical” and, of course, the question whether the other side is willing to accept our application for membership in the PfP.

1. The current state leadership, primarily the representatives of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) at the federal level, in their everyday actions and statements emphasise that they will conduct a peaceful and good-neighbourly policy, leading to establishment of good relations in the region and Europe as a whole – a policy which will include the FRY into all international organisations and institutions. They accept the presence of the forces and

representatives of the international community in Kosovo-Metohija and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. They call for its respect and the solution (peaceful, constructive, through negotiations) of the situation in Kosovo-Metohija. There have been several indications that this policy and these statements are not mere talk, but that they are being realised through concrete actions.

The initiative for entry of the FRY into PfP cannot in any way be harmful to that policy. On the contrary it can only serve as confirmation of the government actions and its intention to make the FRY a full member of the international community as quickly as possible and to share in the solidification of collective security of the Balkans and Europe. Failure to launch such an initiative or refusal to enter PfP would have negative effect on the relationship of part, or perhaps even all, of the international community towards the FRY and would cast a shadow of uncertainty as to its long-term intentions and actions, and its foreign policy course.

2. Strengthening or weakening of the security system. There should be no dilemma in this regard. Collective security is always stronger, and the immediate threats would be reduced. One very significant element of the security system, the police force, has started opening up and co-operating with international organisations and institutions. We see no reason why the AY should not do the same. "Military secrets" and protection of the measures being undertaken to prepare the country for defence must not be used as an excuse. As a signatory of the OSCE Charter our country already has certain obligations regarding limitation and control of conventional weapons (sending of reports on numerical strength and allowing control of certain units), meaning that there is already a certain openness and that information which is classified as "military secret" are to a significant extent already open and known. In addition, it must be borne in mind that the country which enters into PfP determines on its own the scope of its participation, units and infrastructure which it will include into the PfP, so there is always the possibility to deny the general public access to vital information. On the positive side, AY personnel would have the chance to test its solutions and procedures in practice, through planning and training with others. The fear among part of the AY personnel that entry into PfP would

entail the obligation to procure worn out weaponry and military equipment from Western producers is unjustified. There is a significant number of countries which have joined the PfP but have so far not procured a single piece of such weaponry, and continue to rely on their previous weapons and military equipment suppliers. Partnership could in fact prove a positive incentive for our weapons and military equipment producers to enter more freely into partnerships and give themselves better access to the markets.

3. Instant application and speedy entry into PfP could result in some negative consequences for the DOS regarding support of part of the voters and the population to measures being undertaken by the DOS government. Consequences of last year's destruction, casualties among the population, loss of jobs due to destruction of factories, and so on, are still very painful and "fresh" in the minds of our people. Measures to boost confidence, and there is a great deal of suspicion towards NATO in a significant part of the population, must be gradually undertaken. It is necessary to explain to the wider public why we should now enter into partnership with NATO, what is gained and what is lost, to prepare the population, so that there will later be no negative consequences of any form.

Under the provisional designation of "technical problems" we understand the obligations, which await the AY, as well as the possibility that the AY could quickly prepare a certain number of its personnel for direct co-operation under the stipulations of the PfP. In the AY there were no changes at the highest level, or at lower levels for that matter, but they will certainly come. The AY is facing reorganisation and reduction, based on the political decision, which will be made when DOS comes to power in Serbia and settles relations with Montenegro. Naturally, one must take into consideration the economic capabilities of the country and the degree of immediate danger. So, it is a "new army" and new people who will be entering the PfP. Knowledge of foreign languages, primarily English and French, is on a very low level in the AY, and additional time and schooling would be required to provide the necessary personnel for participation in direct co-operation. The economic factor is not to be neglected either. PfP members bear the costs of their participation themselves, and the already meagre AY

budget would have difficulty in covering these expenses. These and similar problems indicate that gradual entry allowing for at least some time for preparation would best suit the AY, especially if reorganisation, which is a complex process and cannot be accomplished overnight, starts immediately.

Also, one must not forget the other side. PfP is partnership with NATO, so it would be good to examine their readiness to immediately accept the FRY as partner, regardless of the fact that there are certain indications that a Yugoslav initiative to enter into PfP would be welcome.

In closing, it is necessary to emphasise that there are different and divided opinions regarding this issue. Some see PfP and membership in that organisation as Fry's big chance to solve almost all our problems, including the question of Kosovo-Metohija. Others are not against entering into PfP, but see no great benefit in it. A third group consists of individuals who see PfP as a NATO branch office in its expansion towards the East and are *a priori* against it, while a fourth comprises those who maintain that we should apply for entry into PfP, but then we should not rush things, but begin stalling. We consider these views and approaches to the issue as unconstructive and, to put it mildly, their advocates do not fully understand the essence of the partnership. Entry into PfP means both giving and receiving, and the benefits are certainly mutual. As in international relations, there are only interests according to which one must act.

Launching of the initiative to enter PfP would doubtless have more positive than negative effects. It would be an additional incentive and support to our foreign policy, a step towards consolidating the much-desired confidence between us and the international community, and certainly a gateway to greater co-operation, establishment of peace, and creation of a better security environment in regional and wider dimensions.

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5. Breakthrough of Civil-Military Relations in Hungary

I Introduction

There are three forms of national security policy, on two levels. One of the forms is the military security policy, which contains all measures to act against external threats. The second form, the internal security policy is designed to minimise the possibilities of the internal attempts to weaken or demolish the state. The third form, the situational security policy, deals with the threat of deterioration as a consequence of long-term social, economic, and political changes, reducing the power of the state.

Each form of national security policy has an operating and an institutional level. The operating level deals with the direct means concerning that security threat. The institutional level deals with the formulation and execution methods of the operational policy.

Civil-military relations are the main institutional part of the military security policy. The direct operating issues of military policy, on the other hand, include the size and supply of the armed forces; the types of organisation, deployment, and armaments; the methods of application of military forces. These questions are usually in the focus of public debates.

The institutional issues include balancing the relationship between civilians and the military and maximising military security with minimum social consumption. Also, it is important to find the right pattern of civil-military relations to assure the country's security without risk.

The military institution is shaped by two imperative factors: functional and societal. The functional force originates from the threats to society's security; the societal force, on the other hand, comes from social ideologies and dominant institutions in the society. The mutual effect of these two forces is the root of civil-military relations. As Huntington notes: "The degree to which they conflict depends upon the

intensity of the security needs and the nature and strength of the value pattern of society. Adjustment and balance between the two forces are not inevitable: some societies may be inherently incapable of providing effectively for their own military security”¹.

In the history of the modern states, the relationship between civilians and military is a crucial element of politics. The civilians need the services of the military, but at the same time, they must be sure that the armed forces do not intervene in politics. It is a situation, where the armed forces has virtually the only physical power to press the politicians to perform their mandates, so the politicians are interested in maintaining a stable and good relationship with the military.

Ideal civil-military relations are based on an elaborated civilian control. In such a state, the powers of civilian and military groups in society are equal. There are two ways for civilians to minimise military power in society. One of them is subjective civilian control, where certain significant civilian groups maximise their power to control the armed forces. Subjective civilian control is usually connected to one or more groups’ interests, and it suggests certain relationships among civilian groups. The appearance of the military profession complicates further the question of civil-military relations. In the new situation, the dominant civilian groups have to confront not only other civilian groups but also new, independent, functional military groups. The rise of the military profession makes possible a new and more expressive definition of civilian control.

Objective civilian control, as opposed to subjective civilian control, maximises military professionalism. It is the allocation of political power among military and civilian groups, which is conducive to the appearance of professional behaviour and attitudes among the members of the officer corps. Samuel Huntington wrote that: “The antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in politics: civilian control decreases as the military become progressively involved in institutional, class, and constitutional politics. Subjective civilian control, on the other hand, presupposes this involvement. The essence

¹ Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 1.

of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism; the essence of subjective civilian control is the denial of an independent military sphere.”²

To achieve the basic requirement for any system of civilian control and to maximise military power, objective civilian control reduces the power of the military by professionalising the armed forces, and by keeping them far away from politics at the same time. It is the best way to decrease the influence of the military, while increasing the military security.

II Sovietised Military

There were two significant changes in civil-military relations during the last five decades in Hungary. The first one occurred right after World War II in the 1948-53 period. The second transformation started in 1989/90, and it is still going on. During the first period the main mission of the military was transformed from the defence of the nation state to the protection of the communist regime, while during the second period the political leaders tried to remedy what the predecessors had damaged.

The main difference between the task of the military in democratic and socialist societies is that in the socialist system the armed forces have not only external, but internal responsibilities as well. This internal function is to secure the power of the communist regime and to defend it from domestic opponents. During the socialist era in Hungary, the crucial tasks of the military stemmed from Marxist-Leninist ideology and the political structure of the one party state. The Hungarian Communist Party (HCP) militarised the entire society and built up a close and strong relationship with the armed forces. However, this connection was not always balanced. The military was a strictly controlled subordinate to the HCP, which was superior. The HCP needed loyal military to defend the communist regime from its external and internal enemies. At the same time the military needed the HCP support to ensure its relatively high material status and social prestige.

² Ibid., 83.

But, this relationship was not unclouded. The HCP penetrated the entire Hungarian military structure by means of political control to ensure the loyalty of the military. From the HCP's perspective, the Main Political Administration (MPA) was the principal organisation to maintain ideological and political notions. This hierarchy of political officers infiltrated the entire military structure from company level to the highest leadership. The Party also utilised the regular and military intelligence organisations to guarantee the trustworthiness of the military men, in addition to electing high-ranking officers into different positions of the Party's structure.

Additionally, among the six Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) states, the Hungarian Army was controlled by external powers. They were the Soviet armed forces, representing Soviet politics, and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO), an alliance system controlled by the Soviet political and military elite. Zoltan Barany stated in his book, "The Soviet Union subordinated the East European military establishments and attempted, less successfully, to integrate them not with each other but with the Soviet armed forces."³

From 1949, sovietisation gained speed, and both economic and political spheres came under Soviet control, following the Soviet model. As the HSP gained power, a significant transformation happened in the Hungarian military structure and control. During the period of 1945-53 the defence structure and the civil-military relations changed radically in Hungary.

Actually, the Communist Party was successful in dominating the Hungarian armed forces because it enjoyed Soviet support, and the HSP, which won the 1945 election and provided the Minister of Defence, did not pay enough attention to impede the politicisation of the armed forces. By the end of 1946, almost all key positions in the military were in the Communists' hand. By 1948, almost 100 percent of the career military officers were HCP members. The HCP clearly ruled the armed forces.

³ Zoltan D., Barany. *Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-90. The Case of Hungary.* p. 18.

During the coalition period the Communist Party held five National Military Conferences to give guidance to the armed forces on political, ideological, and organisational issues. At the first conference, in June 1945, speakers such as Central Committee secretary Janos Kadar examined the internal political situation, and emphasised the need for improved political education among the officers and soldiers. At the second conference, in June 1946, the Communist Party celebrated the fact that almost all important command positions in the armed forces were in communist hands. The third National Military Conference, in 1947, did not radically change the civil-military relationship in Hungary. At the fourth conference, in May 1948, the speakers emphasised the need for army modernisation.

Until that time, the coalition parties had the right to organise party groups in the barracks. At the fifth conference, in November 1948, Minister of Defence announced in his speech the reorganisation of the party's involvement in the military and criticised the performance of the educational officers.

On December 1, 1948, the Main Political Administration (MPA) was established to supervise political and ideological matters in the military. This organisation was the most important political organisation to ensure political control in the military. Barany writes, "With the creation of the MPA the already faint line between the state and the party was erased for it was responsible as a party organisation to the HCP command and as a military structure to the Ministry of Defence (MOD)."⁴

The establishment of the MPA changed the system of educational officers. The MPA formed a network of Marxism-Leninism evening courses to prepare the ideological orientation of military cadres. Also, the MPA published numerous books of Marxist historical and sociological analyses and it organised reading-writing proficiency courses for illiterate soldiers and several cultural events in the barracks. The educational officers were replaced with political officers whose missions were the same as the Red Army's commissars.

⁴ Ibid., 38.

In this new dual-command system the political officers did not limit their activities to controlling the socialist-type political education; rather, they influenced the military decision making process as well. It generated a kind of hate among the carrier officers against the political officers, and eroded military discipline and morale. The carrier officer seized every single opportunity to blame the political officers for the errors. The other significant means of party control over the armed forces was the HCP's Military Committee. It was formed in 1946, and all members were senior Communist offices chaired by the minister. The Military Committee was responsible for the direct control of political affairs in the armed forces until 1949.

In November 1950, the Defence Committee was established under Soviet pressure. It consisted of only three members: HCP's General Secretary, Matyas Rakosi, HCP's Deputy General Secretary, Erno Gero, and Defence Minister, Mihaly Farkas. This three-member Defence Committee operated in secret, and made all-important political, military, and even economic decision until the death of Stalin.

Parallel to these organisations, the personnel level was very important. Several military leaders were also party functionaries. From 1945, the HCP worked hard on removing officers who served in the army under governor Admiral Miklos Horthy. Special committees were formed to investigate the records of the officers on professional and political aspects. Beside the review of officers' records, thousands of officers were eliminated from the armed forces, and hundreds of them were executed or given prison sentences as war criminals.

The purge in the military was carried out by the Military –Political Department (MPD) empowered with the tasks of military counter-intelligence, the disclosure and prosecution of anti-regime activities, and the maintenance of high morale in the military. Barany's data show the following: Between 1949 and 1950 twelve generals and 1,100 high-ranking officers were removed from the armed forces as a consequence of the purges which affected lower-ranked military cadres as well.

Military courts sentenced approximately 10,000 individuals in 1951, 6,500 in 1952, and 4,600 in 1953.⁵

After 1945, the substitution of personnel, and the new educational system that concentrated on political-ideological re-education instead of professional military skills destroyed the prestige of military. Increasing the strength of the armed forces, more and more Communists were enlisted from the worker-peasant circle of society.

During this period Soviet influence was considerable not only in politics, but also in military affairs. Military advisors promoted the Soviet dominance. Their primary mission was to reorganise the armed forces' high command. The first group of military advisors gave friendly hand when the Hungarian leaders requested it. However, from 1949, the primary mission of the second group of advisors was to sovietise the entire Hungarian military and wipe out its national character. These advisors, controlled directly from Moscow, first reorganised the army commandership including the General Staff. Later, they initiated into service the Russian-style training system, uniforms, professional manuals, and military regulations.

Year by year, the number of Soviet military advisors increased, and Soviet advisors were appointed side-by-side to each high-and-midlevel Hungarian commander. With this system of advisors, actually, the Soviet High Command integrated the Hungarian army into the Red Army. Soviet dominance was assured by the training system of Hungarian officers as well. From the end of 1948, officers loyal to the HCP and to the Soviet Union were sent to the Soviet Union to study. The Soviets trained the future Hungarian military commanders for three-four years, forming them according to Soviet expectations.

After the World War II, during the transition period of 1945-53, the Communists struggled for a leading position in politics, expanding dominance over military. In this period, the Hungarian Communist Party, under Soviet supervision, gained significant control over the armed forces in Hungary. Even high-ranking military officers were in

⁵ Ibid., 39.

high political positions and took part in the political decision-making process. First, they were members of the Communist Party, and then only secondly, members of the career officer corps.

III “New Era?” 1953 – 1988

After the death of Stalin in 1953, the basic relationship between the military and the HWP did not change radically in Hungary. The HCP controlled the Army, and professional incompetence and ideological rigidity remained the main characteristic of the highest command in the Hungarian People’s Army (HPA). At the time of the Revolution in October 1956, 8085% of the officer corps was comprised of members of the Party, and 6070% of the conscripts belonged to the HWP’s youth organisation, the Communist Youth League (CYL).

Military prestige and morale declined from 1953. With the reduction of the HPA’s size, hundreds of career officers found themselves on the street from one day to the next in the period between 1953-56. Barany notes the following: “Since the Yugoslav threat no longer existed and Soviet demands for the expansion of the satellite militaries stopped after 1953, the government implemented a cut in the following fall. The [Ministry of Defence] MOD announced further troop reductions ranging between 15,000 and 20,000 in September 1955, July and August 1956. In the fall of 1956 the HPA’s size was approximately 120,000.”⁶

In the October revolution of 1956, the Hungarian military acted neither as an interest group, nor as a participant in policymaking process. Instead, the military elite simply waited for instructions from HCP headquarters, and when it did not receive clear directives, it was unable to stand on its own. Co-operation between the government, Party, and military leadership was accidental. In order to improve communication, the HWP Central Committee sent its own permanent committee to the MOD.

⁶ Ibid., 58.

The Revolution can be considered a consequence of the major factional conflict that arose within the political elite. The army did not play a significant political role in this conflict. Civil-military relations broke down during the first crisis situation the HPA faced. The reasons for this fact were manifold.

After the failed Revolution the HWP's most important military task was to reorganise the HPA. The first step was a draft of Officer's declaration in November 1956. Those who intended to remain in the HPA signed and pledged to serve the new government and to fight unflinchingly against the regime's external and internal enemies. Data show from Barany's sources that "about 80 percent of the officers (8,865) chose to sign the declaration, 2,435 elected not to. It is worth noting that with the 200,000 people who left the country went thousands of conscripted soldiers as well as 1,448 officers. Those officers who did not accept the conditions set out in the Declaration were dismissed."⁷

The other step for the HPA's reorganisation was the further strengthening of party control over the armed forces. The HWP Central Committee issued a new policy concerning the military, named Guiding Principles of Party and Political Organs within the Military. Although some aspects of civil-military relations changed in the 1953-88 period, the HWP maintained firm control over the military.

The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact influenced the HPA in many ways as well. After the 1956 Revolution, the Soviet troops remained "temporarily" stationed in Hungary for 35 years. As Barany notes: "Moscow made the same offer to Budapest in 1958 but Kadar flatly refused, saying 'there is absolutely no resentment in our country against the presence of your troops on our territory.' Thus, Kadar rejected the offers, referring to 'the danger of Western provocation,' which he maintained could well result in another counterrevolution."⁸

Also, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) had significant political and military influence among the socialist countries. Barany

⁷ Ibid., 67.

⁸ Ibid., 76.

writes that: “The WTO had a great deal of political significance in the bloc to the extent that it (1) provided a formal framework of binding the Communist states together; (2) limited the sovereignty of individual member states by forbidding their participation in other alliances; and (3) served as a useful forum for the expression of the bloc’s support of various Soviet foreign policy positions and initiatives.”⁹

Some Western analysts argued that the WTO’s main goal was to unite Soviet forces with their Eastern European counterparts in a military campaign. Additional goals were to maintain the Soviet capability for rapid military intervention in Eastern Europe, and to diminish the resistance of the Eastern European armies against the Soviet occupation forces, but not to maintain military preparedness in the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries.

In the 1970s the state of civil-military relations and the entire military reflected the actual political, economic, and social situation in the country. One of the most important missions of the armed forces was its internal function. The 1976 Defence Law defined the internal missions of the armed forces: “co-operation in the protection of national security and domestic order; participation in the national economy and in the education and training of youth; and rendering assistance at times of natural disasters.”¹⁰

The Soviet influence was still strong however, and the HCP’s control over the military was strengthened with the so-called lists of sensitive positions. Seven classified lists of positions were created between 1968 and 1985. The Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP) exercised all rights to appoint loyal cadres to these positions.

The lack of military professionalism, the lack of national character of the army, the frequent harassment and abuse of law, hard service-time for conscripts and officers and financial problems caused further decline in military prestige from the early 1970s to late 1980s.

⁹ Ibid., 77.

¹⁰ Defence Law, 1976.

The 1980s showed a limited democratisation of the military, and a little mellowing of its strict subordination to the Soviet Union and the WTO. More and more military delegations visited different Western countries and military organisations. By the end of 1980s not only Hungarian economic and political life, but also the military was ripe for radical changes and reforms as well.

IV Breakthrough

During the socialist-communist years the Hungarian armed forces was a typical Soviet-type military organisation. After the political changes in 1989, both civilian and military leaders were challenged to reform the entire military according to the new situations in Central Europe. The civilian-political reform was interwoven with military reform. From 1989, one of the most important questions was the command, the structure, and the size of the future Hungarian military. Furthermore, Hungary was one of the vanguards of the revolution in Central and Eastern Europe that started in the late 1980s. Communism collapsed, and the former countries of the Soviet Bloc threw off their yokes.

In Hungary, after four decades of socialist-communist dominance, the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (HSWP) lost its strength. In 1988, the Kádár's 32-year reign, known as "Goulash communism," collapsed, even though it had been a soft communist dictatorship, with Hungary being the most liberal country of the Eastern European communist regimes. The HSWP could no longer contain the internal opposition movement, although in some cases the party tried to repress it. With the external forces of *perestroika* and *glasnost* being led by the Soviet leader, Michail Gorbachev, the party removed Janos Kadar and his closest supporters party and country leadership, and named Karoly Grosz as the new party leader. This move was in essence a bloodless purge of the old guard in favour of a younger, less hard-line leadership.

The first large, threatening opposition movement was that of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), which emerged in September 1987. As developments continued, more and more anti-system parties

and groups were formed, such as the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD). In addition, in 1989, the communists split into two parties. The reformers left the HSWP and formed the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP). The traditional pre-communist-era parties also re-emerged: the Smallholder Party, the Christian Democratic Party, and the National Peasants Party.

From March 1989, the roundtable negotiations between the HSWP and the opposition parties started to set up the policy for the political transformation process. Also, Prime Minister Miklós Németh announced a significant military reform on 1 December 1989 to try to isolate the armed forces from politics.

The situation was troublesome and the military were strained. The first issue under Hungary's defence reform was to clarify the command and control structure over the defence ministry and Hungarian People's Army, and the authority lines between the president and government in peacetime and wartime. Also, it was important to arrange repatriation of the Soviet troops from Hungary, and remove the socialist party's influence on the military.

According to the 1949 Constitution, and its changes in October 1989, National Assembly representatives were elected for four-year terms, and the president was the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The Parliament had the right to make decisions concerning the use of the military, and the National Assembly was entitled to declare states of war and conclusion of peace. In wartime, it declared states of emergency and set up the Defence Council. The Constitution of 1949 provided the legal background of the constitutional changes in October 1989.

The defence reform of 1 December 1989 separated the Hungarian military into two parts: a defence ministry subordinate to the Prime Minister, and a Command of the Hungarian Army, subordinate to the President. The Németh government did this because it predicted that a new non-communist government would come to power after the 1990 election. It hoped to keep the presidential position together with the position of the commander-in-chief as well.

Yet these reforms could not resolve the tensions in civil-military relations. The first civilian defence minister Lajos Fűr was appointed in May 1990, but he and his staff mainly dealt with social and political matters, and the armed forces remained separate and beyond his purview. The struggle for control of the military continued among the president, the Prime Minister, and the defence minister.

A member of the Parliamentary Defence Committee argued that the president was clearly the commander-in-chief, but there were two restrictions on his command. First, the National Assembly was authorised to make decisions on deploying armed forces within Hungary or abroad. Second, each issue on national defence required the Prime Minister's countersignature as well. The Constitutional Court had the right to make a decision on this issue. The Court concluded that the president as commander-in-chief would issue only guidelines (not orders) to the military, and the Prime Minister and the defence minister had the authority to exercise executive power. In accordance with the Court's decision, the defence ministry began to re-organise the military structure at the end of 1991.¹¹

The new military reform of 1992 had two major goals. One was to subordinate the military command to the defence ministry; the other was to replace career military officers with civilians in order to establish control over the military by the ruling party (Hungarian Democratic Forum).

The 1992 reforms also solved many problems that the 1989 defence reform had caused. The Commander of Home Defence Forces was required to be subordinate to the president during crisis or war, but in peacetime, the defence minister would exercise the command and control of the armed forces.

In accordance with the formal military reform, the size of the armed forces was reduced from its 1989 size of 150,000 to 100,000 by the end

¹¹ Jeffrey Simon, *NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations* (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1996), 137-148.

of 1992. The structure of the armed forces was also reorganised. In accordance with the 7 December 1993 Defence Law, on January 1994, the government announced, that it would merge the defence ministry and the General Staff of the Army Command. This was scheduled to ensure civil control over the military in peacetime as well as in war.

In the May 1994 parliamentary elections the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) gained 209 seats in the 386seat Parliament. The socialist Prime Minister Gyula Horn appointed retired Colonel György Keleti as the new defence minister. He had been the press spokesman under the former defence minister, but had left the military to become a Member of Parliament.

First, Keleti reorganised the defence ministry, reducing its number by 10%. Then, he reorganised the General Staff, giving more authority in military planning, including intelligence. Keleti decided to separate the defence ministry and army headquarters, but later, influenced by a British study, he changed his mind, and at first suggested leaving unfilled the position of Commander of the Hungarian Home Defence Forces (HHDF), but later suggested eliminating the position.

He also realised that the existing structure of the military could not be financed from the budget. First, he planned to reduce the personnel by calling up fewer conscripts, then reducing the service time of the conscripts from 12 months to 9. Later, he added to the reduction of the armed forces by cutting the number of military districts from four to two.

Ultimately, the budget constraints determined the possibilities. From 1994, the Armed forces cancelled military exercises above the company level.

Civilians in Parliament complained about the low probability of re-establishing civil control of the military. Parliamentary Defence Committee Chairman Imre Mécs noted: “The executive should control military matters, but this is not done with the necessary effectiveness, so the National Assembly’s Defence Committee has to reinforce its

supervision in this domain.”¹² Therefore, Mécs asked for expansion of the authority of the Defence Committee, and he suggested increasing the numbers on the committee.

The other members of the Defence Committee complained that the defence ministry did not provide them with all required information. The defence minister and the members of the Defence Committee clashed when the minister failed to inform and discuss military procurement and, in another case military deployment abroad. Despite the limited capability of the Defence Committee, it was one of the most active parliamentary defence committees in Central Europe.

The reform of the Hungarian Home Defence Forces continued during 1995. Resolution 88/1995 (6 July) of the Parliament defined the direction of the medium-term and long-term transformation of the armed forces and their size. The medium-term reorganisation was expected to be completed by 1998 and the long-term one by 2005. In the future as a result of transformation, Hungary should have Defence Forces that are modern, of a smaller size than today without losing their deterrence capability and are suitable for integration into NATO, and based partly on voluntary service and partly on conscription. The transformation must cover every component of the structure of the Defence Forces (organisation, size of personnel, proportion of commissioned and non-commissioned staff, armament and other military equipment, operations, combat-readiness, training and supplies, etc.).¹³

In October 1995, the government began co-ordination talks on the status of professional soldiers. Finally, in May 1996, the parliament passed a new law, but the soldiers were unsatisfied. The service was difficult, the salary was low, and the future of military careers was vague. Consequently, many professional soldiers continued to leave the armed forces. A member of the Parliamentary Defence Committee described the situation in the military as tragic, because of the personnel matters and the technical conditions.

¹² Ibid., 164.

¹³ “Military Legal Background”. Honvedelmi Miniszterium. 1997.

Despite the financial problems and the budget constraints, Hungary continued force modernisation according to NATO accession. From 1995, Hungary enhanced the participation in different missions, including peacekeeping, Partnership for Peace (PfP), and NATO Implementation Forces (IFOR). Additionally, after the Dayton agreement, Hungary allowed the United States to set up a station of army-service-corps logistics units in Hungary. Hungary reacted positively to NATO's offer since the principles and the flexible character of PfP provided an opportunity for the further development of co-operation with NATO countries. From the start, Hungary has made it clear that it considers participation in Partnership for Peace as an extremely valuable, but not exclusive, element of its preparation for accession.

The bilateral and multilateral co-operation among the countries is also very important. Great importance is being attached to the Planning and Review Process (PARP), which was launched in the framework of PfP at the beginning of 1995. The co-operation pursued in the framework of the IFOR operation to bring about a settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia was an extremely important dimension of relations between Hungary and NATO.

The next important stage was the NATO's offer to the countries interested in accession to start a country-specific, individual and intensified dialogue with the Alliance on the elements of substance-of-preparation for accession, and on the expectations *vis-a-vis* future member states. Hungary was among the first to start the dialogue with the officials responsible on the NATO staff.

In November 1997 80% of Hungarians voted in a referendum in favour of NATO integration. After the referendum one of our most important challenges was to ensure effective and efficient democratic, civil control of the Hungarian Armed Forces. The key elements of this were actually established in the early 1990s, during the transition period from communism to our present system. Now, Hungarian security and defence issues are laid out in the Basic Principles of National Defence, in the act on National Defence and, most importantly, in the Constitution.

The keyword of the preparation of the Hungarian Home Defence Forces for accession is “interoperability.” The replacement and further development of military equipment, weapon systems, and installations according to NATO standards were not the only or primary dimensions of the preparation. The most urgent task has been rather, the development of what is called “interoperability of the minds” which includes the transformation of the structures, procedures, and training systems of the HHDF. One further requirement of NATO membership was the establishment and implementation of democratic and civilian control over the armed forces, and parliamentary supervision over the military and the defence budget.

Budgetary and interoperability in minds causes serious problems even now in the time of Hungarian NATO-membership. We still have not accomplished the fusion of MOD and General Staff which situation generates various problems in practical work. The General Staff, the supreme body of the HHDF, is responsible for the realisation of the HHDF’s development, combat and mobilisation. In the current system, the National Defence Ministry and the HHDF, in some cases, have the same responsibilities. Current reforms of the Armed Forces will see the integration of these two bodies by the end of this year, eliminating the current problems and duplications in the functioning of the military management.

It is a widely accepted idea in Central European countries such as Hungary, that it is impossible to find any one unified, coherent Western model. The integrated National Defence Headquarters plays an important role in democratic civil-military relations and provides effective oversight of the Armed Forces. The integrated defence structure relies on teamwork and a balanced mix of civil and military expertise. Once adopted in Hungary, this kind of organisation, structure and management would reduce duplication, would cost less, and ensure prompt decision-making and execution of orders. It would also ensure that objective advice was provided to the Minister and government on defence issues, ensure that governmental policy, regulations and guidelines were followed by the Armed Forces and, last but not least, establish a NATO-compatible defence structure in Hungary.

The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary is the basic institutional framework, which defines the position of the Armed Forces, the Defence Ministry and the Hungarian Home Defence Forces (HHDF) within Hungarian society. According to the Constitution, the President is the Supreme Commander of the Hungarian Armed Forces, with parliament exercising civil control over the Armed Forces through its National Defence Committee. It approves the principles and fundamental elements defining the security policy and basic principles of defence, consents to the sending of elements of the Armed Forces abroad, ensures the accountability of the Home Defence Minister to parliament, and oversees services, training, procurement and the position of the HHDF in the Hungarian security system.

The Defence Ministry is responsible for advising the Minister and State Secretaries; development of defence and legal policy; development of foreign policy (military issues) and management of NATO policy; professional military advice; laying basic principles of the HHDF; financial planning and management; procurement; management of civil and media issues; employment of personnel for the Ministry and other subordinated organisations, and supervision of military training and education.

V General Aims

The Republic of Hungary bases itself on the indivisibility of security, noting the fact that, today, no European State or organisation can guarantee security for itself alone or to the detriment of others. Security is a complex issue, which has economic, political, military, human rights, environmental and other aspects. Hungary can only preserve its security in co-operation with neighbouring countries and others in the European region. The European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Western European Union (WEU), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe (CE) all play an important role in the security of the continent. Hungary wishes to contribute to its own security and to the security and stability of Europe by carrying out the modernisation of the country and its military on the basis of co-operative membership with these institutions.

Euro-Atlantic integration figures as one of the most important objectives of Hungarian security policy. The defence policy of Hungary is built upon the unity of co-operation, deterrence and defence. The principle of co-operation is testament to the fact that Republic of Hungary sees Euro-Atlantic integration as the primary guarantee of security, wishing to attain it by enhancing bilateral and regional ties and strengthening the institutions of European security and co-operation. The principle of deterrence and defence demonstrates the intent of Hungary to maintain a defence capability in harmony with international treaties. The principle of deterrence also mandates that the Hungarian Defence Forces shall be kept at a level of combat training that should not allow for the risk of an armed aggression against the country, and that would help to prevent armed conflict from erupting by threatening the aggressors with serious losses or defeat.

The military factor continues to play an important role in guaranteeing security, but its missions, tasks and operations differ from those of previous eras. Among the peacetime missions of the military gaining importance are: to prepare for and to prevent armed conflicts and crises from erupting; to participate in peacekeeping and peace-support missions; and to prevent and handle national or manmade disasters and non-military threats affecting security. Naturally, the primary role of the armed forces continues to be the protection of state sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The most important task of Hungarian Defence Forces at this time is the armed defence of the country. One of the basic requirements facing the military nowadays is that it should be capable of preventing armed conflicts endangering the country, of managing emergency or crisis situations, and of conducting defensive operations. Establishing and continually enhancing these capabilities and improving the quality of preparation and equipment of the forces are high priority tasks. The principle of adequate defence, as well as the present geo-strategic situation of Hungary, its characteristics, material and human resources justifies an armed force that is comparable to those of similar-sized countries.

VI Conclusion

With respect to the civil-military relations in Hungary after World War II, two significant transformation periods can be observed. The first major transition happened right after the war, between 1945-53, when the communists gained power and reformed the military according to communist notions. The second significant transformation started in 1988-89, when democratic forces came to power in Hungary, and started to reform the military as well. From 1989, Hungary and its military have come a long way toward democratic consolidation. However, much still remains to be achieved in terms of a real democracy.

The 19-member Defence committee of the National Assembly is one of the bastions of democratic civil-military relations in Hungary. To ensure democratic civil control over the military, for instance, no Member of Parliament can be a member of the military. To achieve effective civilian oversight of the military, however, Hungary has to adopt a new constitution based on democratic principles. Hungary also still has to develop the already existing National Security Council, an interagency organisation subordinate to the Prime Minister, so that it can bring together the ministers to form national security policy, and give clear directions to the military.

There is much to improve in the Defence Ministry as well, in the terms of real civilian oversight of the military. First, the minister could achieve wider public support if this yearly report on defence policy and the state of the military is not confidential. Second, the duplication of functions between the General Staff and Defence Ministry should be abolished. Third, the number of military officers serving in the MOD should be decreased. Fourth, there should be a rotation system for the officers to serve in the MOD, then after a certain period, to go back to the General Staff and units. Finally, Hungary needs more civilian experts and specialists on military matters to ensure effective civil control over the armed forces. Clearly, the Hungarian goals concerning democratic civil-military relations has not been accomplished completely yet.

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6. Civil-Military Relations in Macedonia: Between Peace and War

The process of transition towards democracy in the Balkans has been dramatic and turbulent since its onset. Particularly civil-military reforms have been dependent on many external and internal factors, which differed from one country to another. However, the transitional civil-military relations in the Yugoslav-successor states have had a common determinant i.e. war/conflict. While the war/violent conflict has been the crucial determinant of all major developments in the other former Yugoslav republics, on the surface it looks as if Macedonia is an exception where all reforms take place in a peaceful environment. The other newly independent states as well as their militaries were born in the process of rise of nationalism and violent disintegration of Second Yugoslavia. The question is whether Macedonia has really been relieved from war threats and succeeded to take advantage of peace in terms of intensification of the democratisation process? How far has really the process of civil-military reforms gone, especially in comparison to the other former Yugoslav republics?

I Towards Statehood and New Defence System: Macedonian Peace Story – If Any?

Having been one of the smallest republics with less than two million inhabitants and within a hostile regional environment (as it was perceived), Macedonia was more a consumer than a provider of services to the Yugoslav Federation, especially in economic and security terms. In identity terms, Macedonian nationalism had a privileged position and even blessings from the top unlike the other Yugoslav nationalisms that were heavily suppressed. One may conclude that Macedonia had more benefits than costs in security terms in former Yugoslavia.

The explanation as to why it was possible for Macedonia to leave the federation in a peaceful manner can be found in a set of factors. First of all, from the point of view of Serbian nationalism it was not perceived as a threat. Macedonia was militarily helpless, and the Serbian minority hardly numerous, so it seemed that it could be regained without any

problem at some later point. In 1991–92 the focus of the Serbian policy was on the other Yugoslav fronts where military capacity and armament were badly needed.

The second happy circumstance was the tactics that the Macedonian leadership used. It relied on the fact that Macedonians had never been perceived as secessionists and inimical towards Serbia. There had not been any military preparations or paramilitary groups, and the government favoured the negotiation table as a form of conflict resolution. In the eventual worst-case scenario President Gligorov opted for non-violent resistance and appeals to the international community. No matter how risky and unsound it looked at the time, the leadership thought that independence could not be defended at any cost.¹ An additional, though not a crucial circumstance was the fact that in the negotiation team of the Yugoslav people's Army (YPA) there were officers with long years of service in Macedonia and with Macedonian wives. Yet military reasons prevailed in the decision to withdraw peacefully from Macedonia.

In terms of the dominant public stand regarding the Yugoslav wars that had already started there was nothing heroic or belligerent. The Macedonians were in a state of shock from the very beginning because of the coincidence – the first death casualty of the pending conflicts was a Macedonian private killed during the unrest in Split (Croatia) in spring 1991. The developments that followed persuaded the public that there was nothing for Macedonia in the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. Macedonia continued sending the annual quota of conscripts in the YPA and issued the appeal to the officers of Macedonian origin to return to Macedonia only in early 1992 (i.e. when the final agreement with the YPA was reached), which made her partly involved in the wars in Slovenia and Croatia.

¹ In one occasion President Gligorov stated that at the time of negotiations on the YPA withdrawal from Macedonia he had already prepared a video-type with his address to the nation. In case of failure of the negotiations and his arrest the type was supposed to be broadcasted. The message was a call for non-violent civil resistance and an appeal to the international community. (Interview of the author with the President Gligorov, Ohrid, October 1997).

Following the referendum on independence from 8 September and the new Constitution of 17 November 1991, the first organic law to be adopted in the Assembly was the Defence Law in February 1992. Actually, *de facto* and *de jure* the new Macedonian defence system in a period coexisted with the old federal one. Avoidance of any hostilities was of utmost importance for the new state, even at high material costs. The YPA took along all movable armament and equipment (and what was not possible to remove was destroyed). Macedonia was left totally militarily helpless and even more – there was no material for heroic stories about the courageous behaviour regarding the mighty military opponent. The price was paid in material terms, but the reward was peace. Macedonia did not fight for peace, it was granted freedom and independence. More importantly, the newly born Macedonian army had no internal opponents in a form of paramilitary forces out of any state control.

Unlike Slovenia that had built up its military force on the foundations of the Republican Territorial Defence (TD) long before the war occurred, the delayed process in Macedonia took a different course. Along with the YPA withdrawal from the borders the units of the Macedonian TD took over control, but it was never given the status of a nucleus of the new army. Since early 1992 Macedonian officers were coming back and were immediately included in the Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM). A few months' vacuum period caused a slight competition atmosphere among the members of the TD and the professional military staff from YPA. The former insisted on their more prominent position in the new military hierarchy, claiming that the ARM was established thanks to the TD's efforts. There was even a formal request to the President of the Republic for transformation of the Republican Staff of TD into a new General Staff of ARM.² Once established ARM included without any discrimination all available cadres from TD and the former YPA.

² Trajan Gocevski, *Kolektivnata bezbednost i odbranata na Makedonija (Collective Security and Macedonian Defence)* (Kumanovo: Prosveta, 1990): 255–6.

Despite calls from some political parties and intellectuals, the government undertook practical steps toward formation of the ARM only after the establishment of the entire political and legal framework. There was no euphoria or national sentiment accompanying the creation of the first military force of independent Macedonia. Even the nationalist party (MAAK) that had called for secession since 1990, in September 1991 proposed a radical solution in the form of a *Manifesto for Demilitarisation of the Macedonian Republic*. Some domestic authors are uncritically euphoric about the meaning of this document and the peaceful behaviour of Macedonia in 1991-92: “The process of gaining independence from the ex-Yugoslav federation peacefully has cast light on the Republic of Macedonia as a civilised state and the small Macedonian population as a great civilised people striving for establishing eternal peace in Kant’s sense of the word: “Vom ewigen Frieden. The essence of the Macedonian peace model on the Balkans has been pointed out in the Manifesto for Demilitarisation of the Macedonian Republic’ in September 1991.”³

Actually, the Manifesto was a symbolic cry of a group of intellectuals concerned about Macedonia’s future in the hostile Balkans. It was not a product of a mature civil society movement or a sound theoretical consideration, and thus it did not echo strongly in the society. Unlike Slovenia in 1990, the demilitarisation idea was not backed by any critical evaluation of the deficiencies of the previous military establishment. It was more a product of Macedonia’s passivity and self-pity than a concept led by a proactive and democratic attitude towards national security issues. Macedonia’s peacefulness was more a coincidence than a result of some political decision. Very soon it was apparent that the young state possessed a deep internal conflict potential and lacked the democratic culture for a peaceful conflict resolution. Therefore, it is incorrect to conclude that demilitarisation and making an ‘oasis of peace’ out of Macedonia were the leading ideas in government policymaking in 1991–92.⁴ The idea of a neutral Macedonia promoted

³ Olga Murdzeva-Skarik and Svetomir Skarik, ‘Peace and UNPREDEP in Macedonia’, paper presented at XVI IPRA General Conference, *Creating Nonviolent Futures*, Brisbane, Australia, 8–12 July 1996, p 11.

⁴ Olga Murdzeva-Skarik and Svetomir Skarik, ‘Peace and UNPREDEP in Macedonia’.

by the creator of the new defence system, professor of defence studies Trajan Gocevski, did not create any public attention and was treated only as a nice but unrealistic idea.⁵

In early 1992 Macedonia was *de facto* a demilitarised country since the YPA did not leave any armament or equipment behind. *De jure* the new defence system was built up in that period. The most urgent need for the time being was making a precise account of the human and particularly professional potential and the material resources. These efforts seemed hopeless in the context of the series of disadvantages from that period, such as: the double embargo from the north (by enforcement of the UN sanctions against FR Yugoslavia) and from the south (by the Greek government because of the name dispute); the UN embargo on the import of arms and military equipment for all Yugoslav successor states indiscriminately; decreased level of economic development emphasised by the disintegration of the former Yugoslav market etc.

The military by definition is an institution whose legitimacy depends on its functional efficiency and capability to perform its mission. The data from public polls showed that the citizens were not convinced that the new military was capable and efficient enough to preserve peace.⁶ The government efforts could not cover the truth that the army-building process faced enormous difficulties. Furthermore, the country was under a dual pressure of accomplishing both functional and societal imperative (in Huntington terms). This was almost an impossible task to accomplish under conditions of trauma, transition and initial democratisation.

In this critical period when it was totally disarmed the country was not directly militarily threatened. The possibility of spillover effects

⁵ Trajan Gocevski, *Neutralna Makedonija: od vizija do stvarnost* (Neutral Macedonia: From Vision to Reality) (Kumanovo: Makedonska riznica, 1995).

⁶ Agency for Public Opinion Survey (NIP Nova Makedonija, DATA Press) realised two surveys during March–May 1996 on a sample of 2,800 respondents. The survey titled *peace in Macedonia* showed interesting results regarding ARM. Only a small minority of citizens (2.29 per cent) was convinced that ARM had contributed to preserving peace in the country. Only 14.71 per cent thought that the realisation of a lasting peace depended on the military.

from the other war zones in former Yugoslavia was immense, but the traditional rivals over Macedonia (i.e. neighbouring countries) were not showing any serious aggressive intentions. The difficulties and insecurities were more related to the Macedonian identity in terms of statehood and nationhood. The struggle for international recognition was more than difficult, but the obstacles contributed to strengthening Macedonian nationalism. The Macedonians still cannot forget the very critical political moments when they were 'left in the lurch' by the Albanians on the most substantial issue – the international recognition of the Macedonian state.

The internal threat of violent interethnic conflict was becoming more and more pertinent. Since 1991, on the Albanian side there have been several important indications concerning the attitude towards the Macedonian state: Albanians boycotted the referendum on independence in 1991 as well as the census; the Albanian parliamentary group boycotted adoption of the new Constitution in the same year; in 1992 Albanians held illegal referendum which demonstrated that 90 per cent supported independence; in 1994 they declared an autonomous 'Republic Illiryda' in the western part of the Republic. In early November 1993 the police arrested a group of Albanians (including a deputy minister of defence in the government of Macedonia) and accused them of attempting to establish paramilitary forces. Their next steps ostensibly would have been to separate 'Illiryda' by force, and then to unify it with Albania and independent Kosovo.

The ARM was supposed to find solid foundations of its legitimacy in the state, whose complete identity was highly contested (the name, borders, membership in the international organisations etc.). The Defence Law defined it as 'armed force of all citizens of the Republic of Macedonia', which should have been accompanied by a number of actions that would have promoted the integrative social role of the military. Like once before the YPA, the ARM was supposed to contribute to the general national integration. In reality the implementation of this policy faced big difficulties. In the first several years the young Albanian conscripts boycotted compulsory military service. The government and the judicial system deliberately ignored these phenomena, while in the public it was a taboo.

Regarding the professional officer corps the Albanians have always been highly underrepresented (since the Second Yugoslavia period). Because the ARM had to rely on the old cadres from the former parent-institution, it inherited a complicated situation regarding ethnic representation in the officer corps. Unofficially, the so-called ‘national-key’ was seen as the best solution, at least, regarding the high-ranking officers. Although the ‘national key’ principle might sometimes be the simplest way to achieve ethnic balance, as a criteria for recruitment it is in direct opposition to the *ethos*, or at least, the myth of the military as an institution.⁷ It is, or should be, an institution where the principles of professionalism and capability are primarily respected. It does not release the civilian and military authorities from taking measures aimed at stimulation of interest in the military profession among the members of the ethnic groups that are poorly represented in the military hierarchy. The data from the first five generations of cadets enrolled in the Military academy indicate that the problem continues to be important.

In the background of the problem there is the so-called ‘question of loyalty’, which is typical not only for multiethnic and fledgling democracies in South-East Europe.⁸ In Macedonian society there is a widespread opinion that when stability and national security are at issue one does not pose the question: ‘Will Macedonians attack Albanians, or *vice versa*?’ but ‘Will they defend and protect each other in case Macedonia is attacked by a third party?’⁹

The ethnic concerns have been present in all debates on the profile of the Macedonian army. The proposals for introduction of all-volunteer armed forces have most often been directed towards the creation of a

⁷ The consistent and sometimes even stubborn implementation of the ‘national key’ principle, as both the Yugoslav and Soviet case proved, is not a guarantee for satisfactory results. (Cynthia Enloe, *Policija, vojska i etnicitet: fundamenti drzavne vlasti (Police, Military and Ethnicity: Foundations of State Power)* (Zagreb: Globus, 1990): 177.

⁸ Alon Peled, *A Question of Loyalty: Military Manpower Policy in Multiethnic States* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998).

⁹ Ferid Muhic, ‘Kulturnata integracija i socijalniot pluralizam: makedonskiot model’ (Cultural integration and social pluralism: the Macedonian model), *Socioloska revija*, vol. 1, no 1, 1996, p 26.

military organisation that would easily be tailored according to pure ethnic criteria. In March 1998 certain circles (so-called Council of Intellectuals) around then opposition party the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) advocated the concept of a 'Macedonian National Army'. According to the retired Gen. Mitre Arsovski (the first Chief of Staff in independent Macedonia) the idea of ARM as a military of all citizens was supposed to serve the state (i.e. regime and consequently it was politicised). The National Army, in opposite, would serve the (Macedonian) people. Another member of the Council put it more explicitly: 'One cannot expect loyalty from a military consisting, among others, of Albanians and Kosovars.'¹⁰

The Constitution clearly determines the external military mission of the armed forces, which is usually seen as a guarantee that they will be kept away from the internal political scene. The interaction of societal and external (regional and international) factors not only determines the concept of security, but also the role of the military and the police. The data on the social and material status of the police and army staff clearly indicate that the police forces are much better off than the Army's ones. In other words, internal security threats are seen as more serious than the external ones. Thus police represent a serious functional rival to the military as well as a competitor in regard to the scarce social and economic resources. Self-conscious regarding its inferiority in guaranteeing the external security and gravity of the internal (ethnic) conflicts, the ARM could easily turn more attention to the internal plight.

During the first months of independence, and later on as well, there were incidents on the Macedonian borders (with Greece), which were not challenging but certainly provocative. The spontaneous reactions of the top brass 'ready to respond in a decisive manner' manifested their inability to adjust to the new environment. For the time being the loudest advocate of such an approach was the Chief of Staff, Gen. Arsovski. Only several years after, he proposed an internal security doctrine that

¹⁰ Budo Vukobrat, 'Mitre would like to go to NATO!', *AIM Press Skopje* (www.aimpress.org), 5 March 1998.

would allow the military to intervene in domestic riots and conflicts when the police were not sufficient to cope with them.

The government's call for an international presence in 1992 manifested a far more reasonable and critical attitude to the security capabilities of the state. The first initiative for deployment of UN peace forces on the Macedonian territory came from President Gligorov in November 1992. The UN Security Council authorised the establishment of UNPROFOR's presence in Macedonia by its resolution 795(1992) of 11 December 1992 as 'UNPROFOR's Macedonia Command'. Its mandate was originally defined as follows: 'to monitor the border areas with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; to strengthen, by its presence, the country's security and stability; and report on any developments that could threaten the country'.¹¹

The conclusion about the first several years of independence is that civil–military relations were in the shadow of a more important issue – society–military, or better, ethnic–military relations. Soon it became clear that the issue would deeply affect the profile of civil–military relations in the long run.

II Impediments of Macedonian civil–military relations

The revival of the pre-communist military traditions and symbols in the other Yugoslav successor states had begun before the final dissolution took place. Macedonia does not fit into that pattern since 'the national emancipation in the military sphere' came as a sort of surprise. When it became clear that state independence became the inevitable option, creation of the legal foundations of the independent state was the priority. Adoption of the new Constitution (17 November 1991) and several organic laws (including the Defence Law) were sine qua non as legitimacy before the international community. The whole proceeding was done in a rush with no time for a wider public debate on the state (and defence) policy. The fragile balance of the actors on the political

¹¹ 'UNPREDEP – United Nations Preventive Deployment Force: Mission Backgrounder', *Department of Public Information, United Nations*, Webedition, updated 12 June 1997.

scene (of which none had enough power to determine the basic directions) mirrored the many compromise solutions included in the legal system.

The political system was supposed to be created in accordance with the basic premises of parliamentary democracy, but it was done in an inconsistent way with lots of improvisations. The democratic deficit was to be compensated for by imitation of the institutions and principles from Western democracies. The tailoring of the legal system was tasked to provide democratic legitimisation with special emphasis on fundamental human rights and freedoms. Again the solution was easy to find – the list was copied from the basic international documents on human rights and pasted into the Constitution. There was nothing much in Macedonian society to ‘constitutionalise’ in autumn 1991, so the Constitution was more a list of good intentions than a product of the social reality.

Having lacked any pre-communist (democratic) traditions, Macedonian constitutionalists had a rare opportunity to draft a political system ‘out of nothing’. The situation that could be described as ‘*tabula rasa*’ allowed them to choose among the available models, ignoring the fact that they have all been established in a long process and in accordance with the national conditions. The situation regarding the model of civil–military relations was even more bizarre. Having lacked any experience and expertise, the issue was not given any special attention. The existing model is more a by-product of the accepted democratic pattern of the political system than a result of some idea about the necessity of democratic control of the military. After all, in 1991 Macedonia did not have its own armed forces and one could not guess when these would be created. The (normative) model of democratic control preceded the establishment of what should have been controlled. The whole issue was virtually *terra incognita*. Even nine years after, the issue is still a kind of novelty both for the academic community and the public. At the same time, the problems are growing, while the gap between the normative and the real is getting deeper. Furthermore, the normative model of separation of powers has its own deficiencies.

The Assembly, which is supposed to be the focal political institution in the parliamentary democracy, has been playing a secondary role in the overall political process. From a constitutional point of view, it not only holds the most important competencies typical of a legislative branch, but its position is strengthened even beyond what is usual. Namely, no other branch of power can dissolve the parliament and call for new elections. Hypothetically, only the parliament itself is authorised to do that, which is highly unlikely to happen. In reality, however, the parliament has been on the margins of political developments. Under the clear supremacy of the executive power (government and/or the President) most often it has been in the role of a voting machine for decisions made elsewhere. The structure of the Assembly so far has been in favour of one party or a ruling coalition with a weak opposition. This situation created a kind of disdainful attitude towards the proposals and critiques coming from the other side of the political spectrum. Thus the politically very important control function towards the executive branch has been discredited. The activities of the parliamentary commission for internal policy and defence have been more focused on giving support to the government's proposals than toward their critique.

The most unusual feature of the Macedonian parliamentary system is in the structure and position of the executive branch. It is two-headed and consists of Government and the President of the Republic. The relationship legislative-executive power as well as the relationships within the executive domain has been dependent more on the current power-holders than on the constitutional model. The inconsistency of the constitutional model consists of two basic premises. First, there is the inability of the government to dissolve the parliament under any circumstances. Secondly, the president is elected directly from the citizens and is thus not responsible to parliament. An additional problem arises from the non-existing legally defined relationship between the Government and the President, especially in the realm of security and defence policy. The Constitution defined the boundaries of the institutions' competencies in a vague way, relinquishing to the Defence Law the task of developing a network of institutional relations. However, the Law also failed to eliminate the ambiguity in terms of competencies and responsibilities on several lines, such as: the President of the Republic (as designated Commander in Chief of the Armed

Forces) and the Government; the Government – Ministry of Defence; and the President of the Republic – Ministry of the Defence – General Staff.

Many political analysts agree that Macedonia does not have a pure model of parliamentary system, because of the strong elements of the presidential system. The debate usually runs around the legal aspects while neglecting the more substantial dimension. The presidential system in Macedonia, particularly linked with the personality of the first president Gligorov (1991–99), was more existent in essence than based in the constitution. The new President Trajkovski made a good contrast with the situation created by his predecessor. Unlike his counterparts in Croatia and Yugoslavia, Gligorov has been remembered as a wise and reasonable politician and a ‘father’ of the ‘oasis of peace’.

However, his methods used in domestic affairs, although rather ‘soft’, showed a cunning politician. He used his influence in a rather informal way, which is indirectly proved by the fact that there are few acts with his signature applied to them (except in the case of promulgation declaring laws). He wanted to see himself as a president of all citizens, but the opposition saw him as a number one member of the ruling Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDUM).¹² In regard to the military Gligorov had unquestionable authority and very often even bypassing regular channels of communication.¹³ For the opposition it was a clear

¹² Many of these allegations appeared to be true during the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1994 when Gligorov’s campaign was conducted together with the SDSM and the other two parties united in the coalition ‘Alliance for Macedonia’.

¹³ For example, President Gligorov promoted the former defence minister, retired Col. Risto Damjanovski, into a general in an unprecedented way. Damjanovski had been removed from office because of his loyalty towards the YPA orders during the period of gaining independence. It had been believed that he had been responsible for withdrawal of the draft Defence Law in 1991 under the explanation that ‘we already have a federal defence law that is still valid’. His promotion was made exclusively by Gligorov who skipped the regular procedure of taking proposals from the General Staff of the Army. The other peculiarity was that Damjanovski had been retired for three years, when he was promoted into a general. Obviously Gligorov introduced a practice valid in the former Yugoslavia, although the retired officers are usually promoted only in

sign of building an alliance between the pro-Serb oriented President and the former YPA officers, all called 'old guard'. According to foreign analysts the civilian control of the military and the national security system was 'personal' and depended more on Gligorov's role than on constitutional mechanisms.¹⁴ The change in office from 1999 showed that the function of the President was heavily dependent on who is in office. Gligorov's successor lacks his experience and charisma, but also knowledge in defence matters. However, his main deficiency is lack of legitimacy. He came into power in a way that many see as fraudulent elections.¹⁵

It is believed that the invisible coalition between Gligorov and the Government of Branko Crvenkovski (SDUM) was an alliance in which Gligorov dominated the young and inexperienced Prime Minister. The situation changed a bit after the assassination attempt on Gligorov's life in 1995, when gradually his influence in political developments was partly diminished by the 'gamins from our own rows', i.e. the young ambitious SDUM elite. After the 1998 parliamentary elections for the first time the Government and the President belonged to opposite political positions. The problem was named 'cohabitation' and was explained as a normal political phenomenon in any democracy, but the serious collisions occurred at several very important points with a clear significance for the foreign and security policy of the country. The election of Trajkovski promised far better understanding between the President and the Government but it soon appeared that the Prime Minister, as a leader of the ruling IMRO, has been a far most dominant political figure.

exceptional situations like wartime when it is necessary. ('Gligorov napravi general od ministerot Damjanovski smenet poradi projugoslovenstvo' (Gligorov promoted into a general the minister Damjanovski, who was replaced because of pro-Yugoslavness), *Dnevnik*, 1 September 1997).

¹⁴ Zlatko Isakovic and Constantine P. Danopoulos, 'In search of identity: civil-military relations and nationhood in the Former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia (FYROM)' in Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker (eds), *Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).

¹⁵ OSCE monitoring mission reported serious violations of the procedure in Western Macedonia, but only after the new president came into office.

The 1991 Constitution introduced a new institution in the national security system – the Security Council of the Republic of Macedonia. It gathers together the leading political figures, such as the President of the Republic (who acts as its chair), the Prime Minister, the president of the Assembly, the ministers of foreign affairs, interior and defence and three members appointed by the President of the Republic. Although it is not established as a body attached to the President's office, so far it has been under its decisive influence. Formally it is supposed to consider matters of significance for the national security system and to give advice and recommendations to the Assembly. In practice, it has been a rather 'shadowy institution' functioning *ad hoc* and in a highly non-transparent manner. Actually the public has perceived the sessions of the Council as an alarming signal. The feeling of confusion and insecurity usually increased, especially after opposing statements on the security situation, given to the media by its different members.

At the beginning of the 1999 NATO intervention in Yugoslavia after the meeting of the Security Council, President Gligorov said to the media that he had proposed the introduction of a state of emergency, but he had been outvoted. However, the Government's representative stated that the situation was under control and that Gligorov only wanted to effect a 'coup d'état' in order to prolong his mandate and postpone the presidential elections. The weakest point in the public quarrel was that according to the constitution the state of emergency might have been declared only 'when major natural disasters or epidemics take place' and not because of a refugee influx, no matter how big it was. The second similar situation happened in spring 1999 after several serious armed incidents on the border with Kosovo, when the President proclaimed it a serious situation and ordered combat readiness of part of the ARM and deployment of twice as many soldiers in the border area, while Prime Minister Georgievski calmed down the public by saying that the situation was perfectly stable and secure. His coalition partner Arben Xhaferi, the leader of the Albanian party (PDPA, Party of Democratic Prosperity of Albanians) backed his statement saying that Macedonia had never been more secure.¹⁶

¹⁶ Quoted by Iso Rusi, 'Incidents on the Macedonian-Kosovo Border', *AIM Press-Skopje* (www.aimpress.org), 23 June 2000.

The Government's competencies in defence matters in practice mostly depend on the current relationship between the President and the Prime Minister, although every day more operative activities are left to the Defence Ministry. The existing legal lacuna regarding the position and responsibility of the Defence Minister in practice produces many deviations. The most important issue is whether the Minister is responsible to the Government or to the President of the Republic. The Defence Law's inconsistencies imply a closer relation with the President, but it is not necessarily always the case. During Gligorov's term, it was believed that his consent regarding the choice of the defence minister was, although informal, decisive. However, the new President Trajkovski is usually not consulted about the most important issues of national security, which puts him in a rather farcical situation as far as the public is concerned.¹⁷

One of the main novelties of the 1991 Constitution has been the demand that only a civilian can be appointed a defence minister. The idea strengthened the civilian control of the military. However, from the very beginning the ambiguity of the relationships between the President, the Government and the Defence Ministry was noticed by the General Staff. Then Chief of Staff, Gen. Arsovski and a group of high-ranking officers came up with a proposal for tighter linking of the General Staff with the Commander-in-Chief (the President). Moreover, in their view the appointment of the civilian defence minister was a sign of politicisation of the Defence Ministry and the ARM. Soon after this letter Gen. Arsovski was dismissed from office and retired early. However, he reappeared again as an under-secretary in the Defence Ministry in the IMRO government.

The act of appointing a civilian at the top of the Defence Ministry is often an insufficient step in terms of civilian control. It cannot guarantee civilian surveillance in defence matters in the long run, unless other competent civil experts surround the minister. Regardless of who has

¹⁷ For example, in spring 2000 a public scandal occurred when the media revealed a report of the head of the Military Security Service on activities of Albanian paramilitary units in Macedonia. It appeared that the report had been submitted to the Prime Minister, while the President had not been informed at all.

been in office, the general pattern in the Macedonian defence Ministry is that the ministers do not call for external civilian expertise. As for the internal one available in the administration the civilianisation process is being implemented in a bizarre way. The elite comprehends civilianisation as an open opportunity for endless purges and nepotism. Purges among civil servants and experts are made on a strange political criterion, which is centred on the 'question of loyalty'. On the surface this loyalty is attached to the SDUM or IMRO (the two dominant political parties), but in the background there is the old division on Serbomane and Bulgaromane respectively. During the previous SDUM rule two under-secretary offices were vacant for quite some time after the spectacular removal of civilian officials with the assistance of the military police. Under the current government people who were in office for an extremely short term and then replaced have occupied the positions. For some time, for example, the under-secretary for defence policy was a military officer (afterwards appointed assistant to the Chief of Staff of ARM) as well as the undersecretary for procurement and legal affairs. Asked at a press conference about this solution, Minister Kljusev replied that Gen. Janev (the under-secretary for defence policy) had been wearing a civil suit during work hours and had been very obedient, so there was no danger of violation of the principle of civilian control.

Civil-military relations in Macedonia have been shaped in an atmosphere of sharp fragmentation and antagonism on the political scene. The party system is divided along ethnic lines, but there are also traditional divisions among the Macedonians themselves. A political opponent is usually seen as an enemy who should be discredited as a 'traitor to the Macedonian cause'. Some years ago the SDUM government was accused for its 'soft' policy towards Albanians' demands. From the beginning of the multiparty system IMRO has declared itself as the only genuine Macedonian party, and introduced the division of 'patriots' and 'traitors', i.e. 'real Macedonians' and 'the others'. Today being in power, the situation is the opposite: IMRO is in a coalition with the radical Albanian party (PDPA) and is blamed for 'selling and dividing' Macedonia between Albania and Bulgaria. Over the course of years the nationalistic zeal has grown in a relatively less nationalistic Macedonia. Fermentation of the relationship between the

politics and the military has not reached its zenith yet, since the political system and the military still go through serious mutations with uncertain outcome on both sides.

III Macedonian officer corps: old faces in new uniforms

According to the official (and even some scholarly) interpretations the Macedonian Army is a new institution not only due to the time of its creation, but also given its new political, legal, social and cultural foundations. Most often it is totally ignored that it still bears certain (visible) scars of its parent institution. Namely, the YPA took all armaments but left the officers to withdraw to their home republic and to join the ARM.

Macedonia did not have big problems in terms of recruitment of commissioned and non-commissioned officers thanks to the attractiveness of the military profession among the youth in former Yugoslavia. Most of the officers of Macedonian (and few of Albanian) origin moved to the republic after the appeal of the government in 1992. However, the gathered cadres gave an odd profile of the military institution. Some of the ten generals and 2,400 officers specialised as navy or air forces officers. In one period the peculiarity of the landlocked country was the vice-admiral on the post of the Chief of Staff (Dragoljub Bocinov).

Macedonian officers left the YPA with inferiority complex and, even with a belief that they were discriminated against in terms of career mobility on the upper ranks of the military hierarchy. They also suffered frustration because of the collapse of the state and the military they used to loyally serve until the last moment. Overnight they found themselves in a radically different political and military environment. Two opposite driving forces – Yugo-nostalgia and pro-Macedonianism – have shaped the institutional identity of the Macedonian military. Both inclinations, however, appear to be harmful either for them personally or for the democratic prospects of the country. For many of the older-generation officers the memories of the ‘good old times’, when they served the fourth best military in Europe, are still fresh. It had nothing to do with

their political loyalty to Yugoslavia (or Serbia), but rather with their inability to adjust to the unfavourable environment. At the same time, some of them have finally found a favourable basis for their professional affirmation, but also for reawakening of national pride and patriotism. For the officers raised in the spirit of communism, abolishing the ideology created a vacuum that called for some other substance. Nationalism was seen as the best choice thanks to its potential to mobilise the young state against external and internal threats. Loyalty was attached more to their nation than to the (multiethnic) state.

Constitutionally, it seemed that the ARM was granted only the external military mission, i.e. protection of independence and territorial integrity of the country against aggression. Compared with the former YPA it seemed like the abolition of the internal function and protection of the regime from domestic threats. The officers have to abandon the messianic self-image as the ultimate defenders of the constitutional order (and regime). Nevertheless, the total concentration on an external military mission has induced new frustrations for ill-armed and poorly trained army. In the first years after gaining independence there were often border provocations or the manifestation of force both in the south and the north. Although they were not serious security threats, they were sufficiently distressing for the military officers.

One of the most critical incidents happened on the northern border (the elevation 1703 known as Chupino Brdo) in 1994. Ten Yugoslav soldiers occupied the elevation on the undefined Yugoslav–Macedonian border, which was seen by many as a clear provocation and overture to a war between the two states. The Defence Minister Popovski reacted resolutely and set a deadline for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav troops and said that the Macedonian Army would take over the elevation by force if necessary.¹⁸ When the Yugoslav soldiers withdrew upon the order of the Yugoslav General Staff, no one believed that it was the Macedonian military power that had made them go peacefully. The incident happened on the eve of the presidential elections in Macedonia, so the opposition came forward with the speculation that the incident

¹⁸ Panta Dzambazoski, 'What caused the General Staff off?', *AIM Press – Skopje* (www.aimpress.org), 5 July 1994.

was faked and was the result of an agreement between Gligorov and Milosevic. Allegedly, both of them could score positive points – Milosevic internationally and Gligorov internally. The attempt of an armed forcing out of a foreign army from what was considered Macedonian territory should have shown the decisiveness of Gligorov, who had been accused for his pacifist and soft foreign policy by the opposition parties. However, the feeling that dominated in Macedonia after the peaceful settlement was not victorious. The resolution to fight back was rather seen as a possible dangerous venture, doubtlessly at a much greater cost than the strategic significance of the elevation 1703.

The other external challenge for the Macedonian army has been related to the 1997 events in neighbouring Albania. The collapse of the state was followed by the abandonment of the border posts by the Albanian soldiers. Different gangs were freely crossing the border and running arms smuggling from Albania in Macedonia, and mainly in Kosovo. For the time being Macedonian border troops together with UNPROFOR forces achieved some results, but the course of events showed that it was not sufficient.

Officially, the ARM is not permitted to exercise any internal missions (except disaster management under conditions prescribed by law). However, at least on one occasion there were rumours about its engagement in the context of internal political struggle. Having blamed the government for fraud in the first round of the 1994 elections, the opposition organised a big protest meeting in the capital, Skopje. Allegedly, the President of the Republic issued an order to certain Army units to raise their military readiness in case the peaceful protests turned into violent ones. At the beginning the rumours were categorically denied by the officials, but later on they admitted that ‘the Army units were engaged in a safeguard of the Commander in Chief’. The order was made by the Commander in Chief himself and realised through the Defence Ministry, but without the knowledge of Chief of Staff Bocinov.

The affair that had been left at a level of speculations, nevertheless showed several critical points. First, it showed that all possibilities for involvement of the military (or some units) in the domestic political confrontations had not been eliminated despite a relatively clear legal

regulation. Secondly, the special units that were supposed to be used were out of the regular chain of command, i.e. under a direct line of command that led from the President to the Defence Ministry (the Department for Military Security and Intelligence). Thirdly, bypassing of the General Staff might have been an indication of a lack of confidence that the military in general would be willing to act against the citizens. Several years after the event, then Chief of Staff¹⁹ energetically denied his involvement in the whole matter: “I find offensive the allegations about my responsibility for obeying the orders for mobilisation of the army and increase of the military readiness. I claim that such an order was not issued. If it had been issued – you can be sure that I would have rejected it. Since long ago I had said ‘no’ to such orders. I had no motivation and there is no power in the world that would enforce me to use weapons against my own people. I have proved that many times before, even in the times when one should have courage to do that and to persist as a Macedonian. [...] As a professional and orthodox soldier I have always honourably and with dignity defended the interests of the Macedonian people. One thought has always been leading me – the thought of the Macedonian cause. I am not a machine and a servant, but I am a patriot.”²⁰

In the background of this statement is the idea of the so-called ‘patriotic soldier’ as opposed to the modern concept of a ‘professional soldier’. The patriotic soldier is believed to be loyal to his nation rather than to the constitution. In this very case the dubiousness arises from the fact that the Macedonian nation does not match with (all) citizens. According to widespread opinion the sources of instability and conflict in Macedonia are predominantly internal ones, i.e. related to the fragile interethnic relations in the country. Constitutionally the military mission is strictly limited on its external dimension, but even some of the

¹⁹ Bocinov has been known as a ‘Macedonian hero’ from the Yugoslav wars because of his refusal to obey the order of his superior to fire on Split (Croatia). He was charged by the YPA military judicial authorities and put to jail where he was tortured. He was released only after long negotiations and pressures on the Belgrade regime.

²⁰ ‘General Bocinov: Nema sila sto ce me natera da pukam vo sopstveniot narod!’ (General Bocinov: ‘There is no such power that would enforce me to fire against my own people!’), *Nova Makedonija*, 17 February 1999, p. 7.

creators of the Constitution advocate rather flexible interpretation of the possible engagement of the military when territorial integrity has been threatened.²¹ According to this standpoint, there will be no need for declaration of a state of war or state of emergency if any secessionist movement tries to violate Macedonian territory. If the police and other security forces are insufficient to control the situation, then the ARM will be automatically called to intervene. Such interpretations leave a 'small door open' for military intervention in case of intrastate conflict in spite of the legal definitions of the military mission. Since the officers of Macedonian origin heavily dominate in the military ranks, the question of their loyalty in such a case is irrelevant.

From the point of view of the internal military regime within the ARM another bizarre situation has existed for several years. In 1993 the Constitutional Court repealed the statutory provision according to which military service was to be regulated by the act of the defence minister. The created legal vacuum has not been eliminated yet. This situation raises serious doubt about military discipline, especially the disciplinary accountability of the officers and the recruits.

De-politicisation of the ARM is formally proclaimed but only in the form of 'de-partisation' (banning party activity in the armed forces). The Defence Law prohibits organising and performing activities on behalf of the political parties and other civil associations within the Army. The *de facto* situation looks different. The overwhelming majority of the officers have a communist pedigree and until the 1998 parliamentary elections (and IMRO's victory) there were very often allegations that they were members of the 'old guard'. Under the IMRO government the de-politicisation process has been intensified but in a weird manner. The *IMRO-isation* of the armed forces, police and intelligence services is of enormous magnitude. Today's opposition (SDUM) blames the government for purges among the state administration, military and security forces on political criterion. Unofficially, many officers claim that the IMRO membership is the only way to get a career promotion.

²¹ Interview of the author with Dr Vlado Popovski, the member of the expert group who drafted the Constitution and the former Minister of Defence, Skopje, June 2000.

Personnel without adequate education and experience holds higher positions, while the removal of the old cadres is being explained by cleansing of the ARM of Gligorov's influence.

The biggest purges have been done among the elite ARM units, such as 'Scorpions' and 'Wolves'. The financial terms of the service in these, for now only, entirely professional units have contributed to mass abandonment of the young well-trained cadres. The bad working conditions, unlimited work hours and unpaid salaries are the main points of criticism among the professionals. Following the demands for professionalism of the Army, which is seen as a crucial feature of the 'Western model', the government claims certain achievements as well as ambitious plans for the future. The official data from 1996 showed that 30 per cent of the ARM military staff was professional, and it was expected to increase to 50 per cent in the next several years.²² The figures seem less important than the fact that the negative tendencies, such as nepotism, corruption and politicisation, have contributed to compromising the meaning of professionalism. From the perspective of the former YPA officers today's situation has less in common with military professionalism than the one in the former Yugoslavia.

The way professionalism is comprehended in Macedonia indicates that it is seen mainly as an important criterion for admission to NATO and less as a control mechanism in Huntington's terms. Aside from the prism in which professionalism is seen, a more crucial aspect is the financial ability of the state to achieve this goal. Macedonia had to build the army from scratch, so the priority was to provide some armament regardless of its source or the standard. Most of the current military arms and equipment are of different age, military purpose and country of origin, which in general creates huge problems in terms of achieving NATO standards. Bearing in mind that many of the donor states²³

²² *Nova Makedonija*, 2 September 1996, p 2.

²³ One of the biggest 'achievements of the VMRO government was the agreement with Bulgaria that provided 100 tanks for the Macedonian army. Both sides intended to score positive points in domestic and international terms. The Macedonian Government pictured the gift as ultimate proof of the friendly intentions from the Bulgarian side that should have definitively reassured Macedonians of their good will and non-aggressive politics towards Macedonia.

gifted Macedonia with weapons that were far from modern and of suspicious quality, many observers believe that the country has been turned into a depot for old and useless arms, that are expensive to maintain. The material situation in the ARM is so poor that it does not deserve even the attribute of a 'paper-tiger' since no one has ever taken it seriously. All these prove that the ARM has all the preconditions not to be released from its inferiority complex in the years to come.

On the other hand, it was presented as a significant improvement of Macedonia's military capabilities. In addition to the propagandists' points, the Sofia regime could show NATO/EU that it had Europeanised its policy towards the neighbours. Besides, it elegantly got rid of the extra tanks in accordance with the international agreement for reduction of arms in Central and Eastern Europe. Very soon it appeared that the gift did not consist of all one hundred tanks but less, and that the funds needed for their maintenance are an unbearable burden for Macedonia, let alone the fact that they are completely inadequate for Macedonia's defensive strategy.

7. Civil-Military Relations in Romania: Objectives and Priorities

I Introduction

The end of the Cold War objectively marked the end of an Old World and the beginning of a new one, yet things became somewhat more complicated from a subjective viewpoint. Many of us, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, got used to talking about overcoming the bipolarity of the Cold War. This we must overcome in our minds before we can tackle the new reality in a new way of thinking.

Naturally enough, the aspirations of many a Central and East European nation, suppressed for half a century, focused, from a very early stage, on the European Union and NATO, the Alliance being perceived as a guarantor of freedom, democracy and, ultimately, prosperity.

The beginning of NATO enlargement and the admission of the first three new members, apart from its political and military significance, stands as a concrete proof of the end of the Cold War mentality, but only on the condition that the enlargement process would continue and that the countries wishing to join and able to prove that, by so doing, would strengthen security and stability, have the actual possibility of becoming NATO members.

In the Madrid and the Washington Declaration the West has made a political pledge towards South-East Europe, being aware that, as the developments of recent years have proved, general stability in Europe is closely linked to the stability of this region.

Indissolubly linked to the Western political and economic system, Romania has constantly stated, and proved, before and after Madrid, that she sees no alternative to the integration into the Alliance. This objective, of major interest for her security and development, is confirmed by the public opinion polls, which rank Romania ahead of all the other Central and East European countries.

The Washington Declaration acknowledged the progress made by Romania towards consolidating democracy and the rule of law. This assessment was connected with the necessity to build stability, security and regional co-operation of the Southeast European countries and promote their integration into the Euro-Atlantic community.

Romania is ready to join NATO and, after Washington, has made considerable strides towards democracy, stability and military preparedness according to Alliance standards. The democratic solution of the national minorities' issues and the participation of representatives of the Magyar minority in the government have contributed to consolidating the Romanian-Hungarian partnership and set an example for interethnic relations.

Romania is a true supplier of regional security and stability by virtue of her good neighbour relations based on bilateral treaties and a network of bilateral and trilateral political partnerships in Central and Eastern Europe. We have a genuine potential for confidence building thanks to our active participation in PfP programmes, peacekeeping missions and the essential role she played in the multinational peace force in South-East Europe.

Romania can play a positive role in the political and military developments in the region. The necessity to ensure a safe and economically efficient transport of Caspian oil and gas to Western Europe is another area in which Romania can play a positive role. Together with the members of the Alliance, Romania could make a positive contribution to the Alliance's collective **defence** system and the increase of its capacity to react to the multiple threats originating in the potentially unstable adjoining areas, seeing that, among others, the reform of the **Romanian** military institution was carried out in compliance with NATO standards.

II Democratic Control over the Armed Forces

Setting up the legislative framework necessary for the smooth functioning of the military institution and strengthening its democratic and civilian control are basic elements of the military reform.

The 1990-1999 period saw the adoption of laws and governmental decisions that regulate the foundation, organisation and functioning of various military bodies, as well as Romania's international military relations and participation in PfP and peacekeeping missions.

According to the Constitution, the armed forces, as part of the executive power, are placed under the direct control of Parliament, the President, the Government, the **Defence** Minister and the Supreme Court of Justice.

The control exerted by these authorities primarily consists of the approval by the Parliament and the Government of the framework documents concerning **defence** activities (the National Security Strategy, the Military Strategy, the programmes of constitution, modernisation and preparation of forces), as well as the **defence** budget as part of the State budget. At the same time, the empowered public authorities watch over the way in which resources allocated to the army are used in compliance with the approved programmes. Apart from these public authorities that represent the classical power structures in the State, the armed forces are also subject to the direct control of the Supreme National **Defence** Council (SEND), the Constitutional Court and the Court of Audit.

Thanks to the transparency of the military activities and the efforts towards reform and Euro-Atlantic integration, the population holds the army in high esteem. Significant steps in the field of democratic and civilian control of the armed forces in the post-Madrid and post-Washington period are as follows:

- Setting up the conceptual and legislative framework for implementing a new **defence** system, similar to that of the NATO member countries;

- Elaboration of Romania's Strategy of National Security White Book of Defence and Military Strategy adopted by SEND and presented by the President.
- Increasing the share of the civilian staff working in the central structures of the Ministry, including leadership positions;
- Creating the civilian position of Secretary General of the Ministry of **Defence**, in charge of co-ordination the relations with the public authorities and non-governmental bodies;
- Increasing the volume of information supplied to Parliament (including documentary visits by MPs and participation in exercises);
- Improving the public relations services;
- Increasing the share of representatives of the political parties, media and civilian dignitaries among the students of the National **Defence College**.

According to the Constitution, **the President** of Romania represents the Romanian State, and is the safe guard of the national independence, unity and territorial integrity of the country. He supervises the proper functioning of the public authorities. Provisions defining the presidential institution are contained in article 80 of the Constitution (1), which indicate that the President of Romania is the Head of State, entrusted with the prerogatives in this political and administrative institution.

The relationship between the President and the Armed Forces are circumscribed to the sphere of Constitution and are divided between the presidential authority and the executive body.

Article 92 of the Constitution defines the President as Commander-in-Chief of the country's Armed Forces. The same provision is in the Article 3 of Law No 39/1990 concerning the presiding role of the President over the Supreme Council of Defence. The constitutional legislation has, however, excluded the possibility for the Head of State to have independent decision in exercising this attribution, making it mandatory that the declaration of the armed mobilisation has to be approved by the Parliament. A further safety measure against such types of decisions lies in the legal stipulation according to which the

declaration of the mobilisation has to be finally debated in the Supreme Council of National Defence. Thus the Prime Minister and other important decision-makers are involved in this type of decision.

Alongside the President, the Government represents the second structure at the national strategic level leadership. According to its constitutional role, the Government is entrusted with two functions: a) it ensures the implementation of the domestic and foreign policy of the country; b) it exercises the general management of public administration.

The Executive is enabled to negotiate international treaties on behalf of Romania and also agreements, conventions and other intergovernmental documents. Such international treaties, negotiated by the Government, are strongly related with the military co-operation between the Ministry of National Defence (MND) and foreign ministries of defence.

Concerning the general management of the Armed Forces the executive implements measures adopted in conformity with the law, for the general organisation and endowment of the armed forces and for the annual contingents of citizens called upon for the military service.

The role of the Supreme Council of National Defence is to organise and co-ordinate in a unitary manner two of the fundamental public services national defence and security.

The Council has a particularly important role in the exercise of control over the Army, deriving from the nature, number and importance of the attributions assigned to it by law, as well as from its composition. As far as the nature, number and importance of attributions is concerned, it has to be noted that all major issues coming within the ambit of national defence are taken up by the Council mandatory and prior to their examination by any other public authorities.

These issues are being debated by leading personalities of the political system, under the chairmanship of the Head of State. Debates are finalised either by the adoption of proposals addressed to Parliament

or to the President and aiming at the approval of solutions agreed upon during the reunions, or by the approval of the Army's proposals.

In accordance with the article 2 of the "Law no.63/2000 for the approval of Government Decision no.52/1998 on defence planning", the Romanian Defence Planning is based on political and strategic decisions and options of the Romanian Parliament, President and Government, as well as other public institutions that assume national security and defence responsibilities.

Romania's security policy is based on the prevention, deterrence and peaceful solving of crises and conflicts that could affect interests and values of the Romanian State.

According to the **Romania's National Security Strategy**, the main national interests are:

- Guaranteeing the fundamental rights, freedom and security of its citizens;
- Consolidation of a democratic political regime, based upon the respect of the Constitution and the supremacy of law;
- Ensuring the existence of Romania as a national, independent, sovereign, unitary and indivisible state;
- Supporting the relationship with the Romanian Diaspora with the view of maintaining their identity;
- Ensuring the status of Romania as a security and stability provider in Europe.

In order to promote and defend its fundamental interests, Romania will act by political, juridical, diplomatic, economic, social, military, public relations and intelligence means, as well as by the co-operation with other states and international organisations. Romania is not considering any state as potential enemy.

The defence policy objectives of Romania are the following:

- Optimisation of the defence capability;
- Integration into the North-Atlantic Alliance military structures;
- Enhancing the contribution to regional stability.

The defence policy directions of action are the following:

- Development of the capabilities of the fighting structures;
- Ensuring the necessary defence resources;
- Development of the human resources, intensifying the training of the military personnel;
- Modernisation of the military education;
- Improvement of the procurement system;
- Restructuring of the defence industry;
- Strengthening the relations with the civil society;
- Keeping tight relations with the armed forces of other states and international organisations.

III Romanian Defence Policy And The Planning System

The overall activity regarding defence planning is developed according to Law no.63/2000 for the approval of the Government Ordinance no 52/1998 regarding Romania's national defence planning. The defence planning is that activity by which the volume, structure and manner of allotting (natural, human, material and financial) resources are established accordingly to the fundamental objectives and interests of Romania's national security and defence. By this system are accomplished:

- The establishment of the public authorities' responsibilities in the security and national defence field;
- The correspondence between the objectives of national security and defence, the policy chosen for their achievement and the resources that can be provided for this purpose;
- The compatibility of the Romanian defence planning system with that of NATO member states.

The main steps of the defence planning process refer to:

- Identification of values and national interests, as well as of the risks and threats against them;
- Defining the objectives of national security, the policy for their achievement and counteracting the identified risks and threats;

- Establishing the responsibilities of the state bodies in the area of national defence and security;
- Settling the force missions, organisation, modernisation and training;
- Determining the required resources and their allocation for force establishment, modernisation and training.

The main documents issued in the framework of national defence planning system are the following:

- **Romania's National Security Strategy** – fundamental document that underlies the defence planning at the national level; it is put to Parliament by the Romanian President, within 3 months since he was mandated; its evaluation scope covers 4 years, with a long-term view. The Strategy establishes the national interests, risks and threats, the defence policy objectives, as well as the ways of acting in order to ensure national security.
- **The White Paper of the Government represents** an elaborated document meant to implement the provisions of the Romanian National Security Strategy. The White Paper establishes the main objectives and tasks of the institutions responsible for ensuring national security and defence, as well as the resources (human, material, financial etc.) that are to be allotted yearly; the White Paper is approved by the Parliament, within 3 months since the vote of confidence was granted and it covers the same validity period as the Romanian National Security Strategy.
- On the basis of the Romania's National Security Strategy and the White Paper, the Ministry of National Defence, as the authority in charge with the military defence of the country, issues the **Romanian Military Strategy**. This document contains the major military policy objectives and options of the Romanian State, for the period of time the Romanian National Security Strategy is valid. The document is to be approved by the Government in less than 45 days since the approval by the Parliament of the White Paper of The Government, and it establishes: forces structure, missions, organisation, procurement, level of training and readiness, logistic support and infrastructure necessary to the military system in order to achieve the national security objectives, as well as the concept of training and engagement in military operations. Also it comprises the

military actions required to fulfil the cooperation, partnership, alliance commitments assumed by Romania at international level.

- Based on the provisions of the Romania's Military Strategy, the Minister of National Defence issues the **Defence Planning Guidance** which is the main document used by MOD bodies, specialised in planning the structure and force capabilities, for: prioritising the allocation of resources, issuing policies and drawing up specific programmes;
- The chiefs of central structures in the Ministry of National Defence issue **Planning Orders** for the chiefs of the subordinated structures. These Planning Orders represent the basis for the subordinated structures in order to issue proposals and drafts of the Strategic and Operational Plans for forces employment;
- Based on **Programs for the Armed Forces Establishment, Modernisation and Training**, the Annual Plan for the Romanian Armed Forces Modernisation and Training is issued, simultaneously with the Defence Budget draft for the next fiscal year.

The Supreme Council of National Defence co-ordinates the unitary application of the measures taken by Government, ministries and other public institutions, responsible for defence, public order and national security.

According to the law on defence planning, a new resource management system (Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluating System–PPBES) is under implementation within the Ministry of National Defence.

PPBES has in view the development of the Romanian Armed Forces establishment, modernisation and training process in an integrated system, based on programmes. These programmes include: the building up, organisation, procurement, training and maintenance of forces designed to ensure national security and defence, according to the missions established by political leaders and to the financial resources.

The human resources management system is integrated into the overall system of military body management. The new “pyramid of the

functional structure” of the personnel is designed and based on new concepts and principles of the military careers.

The process of acquisitions is established as an integrated management in which three systems have the power of decision through their interaction:

- **Requirements Assessment System:** established by the 1001 Directive of the MoD; the responsibility belongs to the General Staff and to the Services Staffs; directed by the Requirements Surveillance Council.
- **Acquisition Management System:** established by the 1002 Directive of the MoD; Overseen by the Department for Military Acquisitions; Directed by the Acquisitions Council.
- **Planning, Programming and Budgeting System:** Subordinated directly to the Defence Minister; Directed by the Strategic Planning Council, which analyses through the Defence Planning Guidance the military objectives and the required resources to achieve these goals.

National Plans for 2001-2006

In order to design a new military capability and an adequate structure, according to the requirements of the National Security Strategy, “The Romanian Armed Forces Restructuring and Modernising Concept” and the “Action Plan for the Concept Implementation beginning with 2000” were issued. In accordance with the Multi-Annual Planning Cycle, the restructuring process will be developed in two stages.

The first stage (2000-2003) aims at restructuring and making operational the force structure at minimal required level, imposed by the necessity to ensure a credible defence capability and the interoperability level planned and assumed by Romania within the PfP Planning and Review Process.

The second stage (2004-2007) aims at modernising the armed forces procurement, fulfilling the operational capability of the established structures, at the planned level, as well as completing the major procurement programs. Taking into account the defence capability to be

achieved, The Supreme Council of National Defence approved the maximum number of the Armed Forces personnel to 140 000 of whom 112 000 military personnel.

In order to achieve this force structure, the defence budget is expected to be at least 710 millions USD in 2000 and to rise to a minimum of 1,190 millions USD in 2007. Moreover, it is necessary to add to the budget line funds for military courts, health, culture, sport etc. as well as for the payment of already engaged credits for procurement.

At the first stage, the establishment of the new force structure will determine a relevant number of redundant personnel, which will lead to an increase in the amount of expenditures, necessary for a real social protection for this personnel. At this stage, besides restructuring and making operational the armed forces, some of the major procurement programmes will be developed. No other new programmes will be started.

The resizing of the Armed Forces' personnel is solved by promoting the quantitative decrease of forces and equipment, simultaneously with the qualitative compensation of the acquisitions, to allow the application of the personnel training optimisation and the force employment concepts and procedures.

By 2010, 50% of the Armed Forces will be composed by professional personnel. The same structure of services is maintained: the Army, the Air Forces and the Navy, each one with its particular organisation, logistics and missions, but acting in a joint manner under the principles established by the Romanian Military Strategy.

According to the operational criteria, the Armed Forces will be structured as follows:

- Surveillance and Early Warning Forces;
- Crisis Reaction Forces;
 - a). Rapid Area Deployable Forces;
 - b). Rapid Reaction Forces;
- Main Forces;
- Reserve Forces.

At the second stage, the focus will be on the modernisation process and the acquisition of new equipment, as well as achieving the operational capability of force structure, at the planned level.

IV ARMED FORCES IN SOCIETY

1. The Legislative Framework

Newly adopted legislation on national defence contributed to the military system reform and organisation:

- **Law no. 45 / 1994** on Romanian national defence;
- **Law no. 73 / 1995** on national economy and territory preparedness for defence;
- **Law no. 80 / 1995** on military personnel status;
- **Law no. 46 / 1996** on population preparedness for defence;
- **Law no. 106 / 1996** on civil protection;
- **Law no. 132 / 1997** on goods and public services requisitions for public interest;
- **Government Decision no. 618 / 1997** on alternative military service;
- **Government Ordinance no. 7 / 1998** on certain measures for the civil protection of personnel during the MND units restructuring process;
- **Government Resolution no. 52 / 1998** on defence planning;
- **Government Resolution no. 121 / 1998** on material responsibility of the military personnel, approved by the Law no. 25 / 1999;
- **Government Resolution no. 1 / 1999** on the state of siege and emergency;
- **Government Resolution no. 385 / 1999** on MND organisation;

2. Military Justice System

Military justice system is organised on two distinct components subordinated to civil authorities (and at the administrative level to the Ministry of Defence): **Directorate–Ministry of Justice, and Military Prosecutor ‘s Section–Public Ministry.**

Legislative and Solicitor's Directorate located within the Ministry of National Defence, has as main attributions: MND interests support in military, civilian and special courts, endorsement of legislative projects elaborated by the MND, endorsement of military laws projects, participation in the elaboration of international military agreements.

3. Medical Assistance

The Directorate for Medical Assistance conducts the medical assistance of Romanian Armed Forces, being directly subordinated to the Secretary of State for the Relation with the Parliament.

This Directorate:

- Develops the unitary conception of organisation, logistic and functioning of the medical and veterinary assistance system in peace, crisis or war situation;
- Improves and modernises the medical activities to prevent illnesses, to maintain the necessary readiness of the troops

In order to fulfil its missions, the Directorate methodologically co-ordinates the activities of medical assistance units of the Armed Forces services and conducts directly the medical components of the military system. The pharmaceutical section ensures the logistic support.

4. Religious Assistance

The religious activity in the military:

- The restart of the religious service in the Romanian military took place after the 1989 events;
- The Religious Assistance Office was created within the Cultural Directorate of the Military on 1 January 1994. The office was developed into the Religious Assistance Section in May 1996, under the co-ordination of the Department for Defence Policy. This section is integrated in the Human Resources Management Directorate from June 1999.

The religious activity in the military is based on the art. 29 (5) of Romanian Constitution, on the laws of functioning of the military system and on the “Protocol concerning the organisation and functioning of the religious assistance in the military” completed in 1995 between the MND and the Romanian Patriarchy.

The religious assistance is promoted in all military structures, units and educational institutes. At this moment, 37 orthodox priests and 1 roman-catholic ensure this activity. Until 2005, the Romanian military will have around 100 priests and 50 priest’s assistants.

5. The Environment Protection in the Military System

The MOD `s Inspectorate for Environment Protection was created in 1994 to accomplish the following responsibilities:

- Identifying and evaluating the environmental impact of military activities;
- Developing the institutional framework for the environment protection within the military system;
- Complying with the NATO countries’ standards for the environment;
- Extending the national and international co-operation with similar civil and military organisations.

Principles of the environmental protection:

- Protecting and improving the life quality of the military personnel;
- Constant development, through the respect of ecological standards in the barracks, training units and fields;
- Avoiding the pollution through preventive measures for technological upgrading and Modernisation;
- Preserving the bio-diversity through the protection of valuable ecosystems;
- Assuming the principle of responsibility for any activity that affects the ecological quality;
- Increasing the ecological education of military personnel.

Specialised structures for environment protection:

- At departmental level, structures that cumulate different responsibilities, including the environment protection;
- Within the General Staff – the NBC and Environment Protection Section;
- Within the staff of the services – NBC and Environment Protection Office;
- Within the units – personnel with cumulative responsibilities, including environment protection.

6. The Military Relations With the Mass Media

The public opinion confidence in the armed forces determines not only the moral motivation of the military personnel activity, but also a budgetary guarantee, taking into account that the military body is completely sustained by the public finances. From the public relations perspective, obtaining and maintaining the civil society confidence and support represent a strategic objective. The public image of the military is an important element of its fight capability.

The level of public confidence in the military system continually goes around 80% entailing the beginning of the restructuring and Modernisation process.

The Public Relations Directorate, created in November 1993 is directly subordinated to the Minister of National Defence. The main attributions of this Directorate are:

- Permanent analysis of the information needs of the military and civilian public;
- Evaluating the communication quality and efficiency;
- Planning and accomplishing the public relations activities.

Principles guiding the communication with the media:

- The provisions of the Romanian Constitution referring to the right to information of all citizens will be respected.
- The information requested by mass media, different organisations or single citizens will be provided timely and completely, if this

information does not interfere with existing law provisions for the military information protection.

- Military personnel will benefit from a permanent flux of general military public information without any censorship or propaganda.
- The information will not be declared as classified for the purpose of protecting the military organisation from critics of unpleasant situations.
- The spread of information could be refused only if affecting negatively the security and national defence, the military or civilian personnel own security.
- The communication and public relations policy of the MND exclude formally any propaganda.

The modalities of public information include press communiqué, bulletins, conferences, and interviews with public personalities from the military system, military mass media, reviews, and movies, Internet. Currently, 40 journalists are officially endorsed to participate in all press conferences of the MND.

Presently, the Higher Military Study Academy organizes a post-academic course for public relations officers, accessible also to military and civilian journalists.

7. The Military Support for Public Administration Organisations in Emergency Situations

The military can ensure support to the public administration organisations, at their request in order to prevent, limit and eliminate the natural disaster effects and for other emergencies. The military units are able to intervene and the military system can provide material support.

Furthermore, the military system can provide paid or free services using the military equipment and personnel in emergency situations or for the activities promoting national history, values, in charitable works etc.

8. Civil Protection

Romania adhered to the Geneva Convention I and II additional protocols in 1990. The internal activity of civil protection is regulated through the Civil Protection Law no. 106/1996 and through the Law for defence against disaster no. 124/1995. The civil protection is an integral part of the national defence system, ensuring through specific means the population, its assets, national heritage and environment protection in emergency situations. The missions of the Civil Protection are:

- a. Training the personnel of inspectorates, commissions, units of civil protection and the population to apply the civil protection measures through institutional means;
- b. Monitoring the technological and natural sources of risk on Romanian territory;
- c. Ensuring the civil protection through:
 - Alert and Warning;
 - Evacuation;
 - Sheltering;
 - Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) protection;
 - Emergency medical care;
 - Clearing the unexploded ordnance.
- d. Contending and removing the consequences of military actions or natural and technological disasters.
- e. Participation in territory and economy preparation for defence.

V Conclusions

Romania's firm determination to assume the responsibilities associated with NATO's collective defence system is demonstrated by the orientation of the military restructuring towards interoperability with the Allied forces, her political and military capacity to contribute to crisis prevention and management and her active part in the subregional co-operation initiatives.

As far as the military reform is concerned, Romania is now in a stage of preparation for NATO integration more advanced than the 3 new members were at the moment invitations were extended. Apart from the

military capability to contribute to Alliance objectives and missions, a responsible and predictable behaviour in the international relations, the proven capacity to build consensus and the respect for the values promoted by the Alliance obviously qualify Romania for NATO membership as a direct contributor to strengthening the Southern flank and stimulating stability and integration in an area marked by uncertainty and insecurity.

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IV Analysis and Conclusions

Though the national case-studies on civil-military relations cannot provide, with the exception of the Bulgarian and the Slovenian perspectives, for a comparative view, the initial analytic framework is sufficient to assess the progress and the deficiencies of the individual countries in establishing civil democratic control over their military. One may dispute which of the factors, outlining the analytic framework – the problems of transition, the post-Yugoslav conflicts and wars, the evolving Balkan regional security community, the transforming security and defence agenda of post-Cold War Europe or the Western support, is more influential in shaping the civil-military relations of the individual countries in South-East Europe. However, the combined influence of these five factors has produced a differentiated picture of the state of the issues in the individual countries.

In terms of the development of the civil-military relations in the individual countries of South-East Europe, their establishment on a democratic basis and the way these five above mentioned factors are reflected on the national processes, the following temporary and for the purposes of analysis groupings of countries are possible:

Albania, as a specific individual case, needing the support of the PfP, being a member of the PfP itself.

The Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, as a specific case due to the difficult war past and the just started process of transition to democracy.

Croatia and Macedonia as former Yugoslav republics, making difficult steps on their way to building democratic societies and proving as reliable PfP partners.

Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia as countries that have passed successfully the ‘first generation of reforms’¹ and have the needed for their civil-military relations and the civilian democratic control over the armed forces the necessary legislative and institutional frameworks. They have covered also the larger part of the second generation reforms that makes them very much eligible for joining NATO from the point of view of this significant standard: the democratic control of the military.

Hungary, a member of the Alliance, though still having some similarities with the last group of countries has passed a longer journey and has made a breakthrough in the broader aspects of the security sector reform along the NATO requirements.

In the *Albanian case* one can witness the strong impact of the protracted democratic transition of the society on civil-military relations. A by-product of the slow evolution was personnel-selection, based on personal sympathies and political affiliations that actually were ruining army discipline and morale. The strong polarisation of the political forces in Albania, politicisation of the army and the involvement of the armed forces in political activities compromised the establishment of civil democratic control over the military. An over-concentration of prerogatives with the President further worsened the national civil-military attitudes. Diminishing confidence in the politicians has been a side-result of these developments. The interferences in politics by the military continued during the second phase of the reform of the Albanian defence establishment, which was a serious blow to the relations in a society with a significant deficit of democratic culture. The destruction

¹ Dr. Anthony Forster and Dr. Tim Edmunds of the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London at the UK Joint Services Command and Staff College write in their research project papers within *The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Context* of first and second generation reform issues in the area of the democratic control of the armed forces (DCAF) in Central and Eastern Europe. The first generation issues include the drafting and approval of new constitutions, the allocation of clear lines of responsibilities, having democratic structures in place. The second generation of reforms are connected with the effective operation of institutions and procedures, the acquisition of shared norms and values of civilians and military, i.e. the changes are more of an attitudinal character.

of the army was another feature of this phase. Despite the mobilisation of the Albanian society and armed forces during the Kosovo crisis there still remain fundamental questions of how to guard the civilians from their guardians in a democratic context. The continuing Western support through NATO, the PfP and EU are indispensable in sustaining the efforts of national definition of the solutions in the civil-military relations.

Immense problems face the *Yugoslav society, armed forces and state* in transforming the civil-military relations and developing them on a democratic basis. What really still awaits the reform in Yugoslavia is not just “civilianising” the control of the armed forces, but making it democratic. FRY is just entering the period of transition. The internal deficiency of democracy is a basic feature of this process in Yugoslavia.

The study of Dr. Simic is an attempt to set the issue of civil-military relations in the newly democratising Yugoslav society, though there are still problems of terminology. The civilian-military relations, of whom Dr. Simic writes, are missing the civil element. Democratic control of civilians over the armed forces and the security institutions of FRY in general, as well as democracy in this country would remain unattainable unless honest, clear and looking to the future answers of certain questions are not given to the Yugoslav society and to the international expert and non-expert community. Which are these questions and, very probably, other important ones?

First, what is the territorial scope of the Yugoslav armed forces? How do Belgrade and its military leadership for defence planning contingencies perceive the Serbian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, mainly in Republika Srpska? What happened to the armed forces of the republic of Serbian Krajina?

Second, what is the fate of the powerful paramilitary forces, active throughout the 1990s on the territory of former Yugoslavia?

Third, what is the fate of the Praetorian Guard that Milosevic brought up for his personal power?

Fourth, what was the technology of changing the multiethnic character of the Yugoslav People's Army or JNA into Vojska Jugoslavije or VJ, which became predominantly Serbian? What was the fate of the officers from the non-Serbian parts of former Yugoslavia and how was the dilemma of defecting to their new nation-states and loyalty to "Yugoslavianism" decided? Why did the former 'comrades of arms' from the JNA become enemies in wars? What was the role of the politicians and of the military in failing to produce a peaceful and democratic dissolution of the former federation and armed forces? What was the reason of the support that was given to the people's revolt in the autumn of 2000 in FRY by the armed forces, security service, the regular police and by powerful paramilitary police units? What was the difference with the situation in the beginning of the 1990s? Furthermore, what was the price of the contract of the leaders of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) with the war criminals for supporting the people's protests in October 2000?

Then comes the question – was really the toppling down of Milosevic the result of a 'purely popular revolt' and what setbacks may Yugoslav democracy suffer from the obviously negotiated endorsement of the new Yugoslav President by the army and the security forces? What will be the fundament of the newly evolving civil-military relations and on whom the 'democratic control' will be dependent?

A final question here is what will be the fate of the people and non-governmental organisations that will start rising in Yugoslavia as autonomous sources of knowledge and analytic assessments that will dare ask the unpleasant questions of the bargain of the democratic forces with war criminals?

These uneasy questions need to be faced and answered courageously before the initiative of FRY's application to the PfP, suggested by Dr. Simic, becomes feasible. The Yugoslav government and its foreign partners need to see FRY as soon as possible as a member of the international community of democratic nations. FRY is an important actor in strengthening stability in South-East Europe. The key to this role is Serbian society itself and the right steps it will take in

democratising and coming to terms with the past decade on a fair and democratic basis.

Croatia still bears bitterness, reflecting the way the Yugoslav federation broke apart and the perceptions to the Serbian neighbour. This is why for long Croatia stayed out of the regional initiatives and efforts to improve the stability of the broader region.

In the beginning of the process of reforming the Croat civil-military relations it was the existence of regular and paramilitary formations that prevented the establishment of democratic control over the military. It was not possible to clearly define the meaning of 'military'. This has been a deficiency of the Croat civil-military relations that barred for some time the country's acceptance by the other democratic states of Europe.

Many issues, connected with the war of independence remain on the agenda of civil-military relations. The veterans' privileges, the war crimes, Croatian military participation in the war in Bosnia are still causes of potential political disagreements and tensions. Another worrying fact of Croatia's civil-military relations is that it is hard to say what is the real number of the military in the country.

Problems of the transition in the Croatian MoD persist, which is the reason for a continuing tense relationship with the Chief of the General Staff. Other issues as past sales of arms, drugs and war crimes still influence the work of the Ministry.

On a broader scale, the security and defence system of Croatia needs to clarify which are the fundamental national interests it is based on. Respectively, the defence planning process needs to find the right link to these interests.

The stabilising role of the international military presence for Croatian society and state is not doubted. However, persisting economic and social problems hamper the reform of the armed forces and the evolution of civil-military relations towards greater democratic civilian control over the military.

Macedonia was the last to join the dissolution of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) and even participated in the wars against Slovenia and Croatia. On its side the YPA took along all movable armament and equipment from Macedonia, and what could not be moved – was destroyed, writes Prof. Vankovska.

The newly born Macedonian army had no internal contenders in terms of paramilitary forces. It was formed on the basis of the former Territorial Defence (TD) and the YPA.

Civil-military relations in Macedonia have been strongly dominated in the beginning of the 1990s by the 'ethnic composition of the military' issue. It appeared to be a long-term problem.

Having no armed forces of its own before, the Macedonian model of democratic control over the military was of a normative character, preceding the establishment of the very object of such a control. However, the initial deficiencies of the national model stem from the very normative model of separation of powers in Macedonia among the Parliament, the President and the Government. In addition, there still exists unclarity as to the Defence Minister's responsibilities.

Another deficiency of the existing civil-military relations in Macedonia is using the process of "civilianising" the MoD for purges by the authorities.

It is obvious from the study of the Macedonian national case by Prof. Biljana Vankovska that before coming to terms with itself it would be hard for Macedonia to come to terms with its neighbours Albania and Bulgaria. The latter is tacitly accused of rendering harm to the Macedonian armed forces by donating some 100 old tanks that are far from the best NATO standards. However, Bulgaria is not a NATO member and does not possess sophisticated new brands of tanks the Alliance has. Furthermore, Macedonia has accepted the donation without being forced to do it. Having some functional tanks, however, is better than having none. The Bulgarian side is trying to help the new armed forces of Macedonia to acquire also free NATO compatible radar communication system.

Prof. Vankovska writes that the fermentation of the relationship between the politics and the military has not yet reached its zenith since the political system and the military still go through serious mutations with an uncertain outcome on both sides. She adds that two contradicting factors have been shaping the mentality and the institutional identity of the Macedonian military for years: ‘Yugo-nostalgia’ and ‘pro-Macedonianism’. The new Macedonian military had to abandon a messianic vision of being ‘the ultimate defenders’ of the constitutional order. A real problem of the young Macedonian armed forces, writes Prof. Vankovska, is that they are badly armed and poorly trained. This would hardly allow them to be effective if they will have to fulfil their external function and mission.

The presence of international military units is perceived, according to Prof. Vankovska as definitely putting additional problems to the civil-military relations. The reason is the addition of a ‘non-national’ component to the ‘military’ side of the relationship. It is true that the non-national element complicates the issue, on the one side, but on the other – it is a fundamental reason for the stability of the country and the broader geo-strategic area around Macedonia.

At the present moment the Macedonian state lacks a clear concept of national security as well as a working model of democratic control of the military. A continued and active participation in the PfP is an appropriate format of gradually dealing away with most of the deficiencies in that aspect.

Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia is very advanced on their way to membership in the Alliance and to achieving high standards of democratic control over their military.

The critical assessments of the respective national case studies, however, display the existence of certain deficiencies of the legislative and institutional framework of the civil-military relations, though they are defined from the point of view of higher standards of efficiency. Definitely, the right place of the General Staff – not as a separate institution of the armed forces, but as part of the system of the respective MoDs, is such an issue. The issues of the civilian expertise; the

improvement of the planning, programming and budgeting system (PPBS) of resource management; improving public relations of the MoDs; the education and training of the military and the civilian employees; adapting the military to modern society in the social, moral and legal aspects; the issue of expenditure on the account of joining NATO – these and probably some others, are on the agenda of improving in a structured way the civil-military relations in these countries. In the Bulgarian case there is an understanding that there are better possibilities for a really objective, profound and detailed parliamentary control over the armed forces and all services, related to security and defence. In the Slovenian case still the normative approach continues to dominate the process of developing civil-military relations and an improvement of the co-ordination of all national security institutions and the defence authorities is needed. In the case of Romania there is a national perception that the country is more advanced in its preparation for NATO membership than were the three new members at the moment invitation was extended. However, even in this case certain improvements are possible, for example, by improving the independent civil society expertise on the issues of security and defence of Romania.

Though the *Hungarian case* shows a real breakthrough in the area of civil-military relations, the young NATO nation shows a high level of self-critical assessment of its problems. Major Tibor Babos writes that to achieve an effective civilian oversight of the military Hungary has to adopt a new Constitution, based on democratic principles. This is one of the peculiarities of the Hungarian democratic transition. Hungary also needs, according to Babos to develop the existing National Security Council, now subordinate to the Prime Minister, so that it can bring together the ministers to form the national security policy, and give clear directions to the military.

Much is expected to be improved by the MoD of Hungary too: more public support may be achieved if the annual defence policy report is declassified; the duplication of the functions between the General Staff and the Ministry of Defence should be finally abolished; the number of the military officers, serving in the MoD should be further decreased; a rotation system of service in the General Staff and the MoD for military

officers may be experienced. More civilian experts on military issues are needed in Hungary. They will ensure a more effective civil democratic control over the armed forces. Obviously this last need requires an answer by an improved system of education in that field for civilians.

Some **conclusions** can be drawn from this study:

First, the people and the security expert community of the countries of South-East Europe should finally understand that establishing democratic control over the armed forces is not a problem of a single act but rather a process of making the military more accountable in a democratic framework. The five specific factors that are influencing the process of establishing the democratic control have produced, logically, differentiated results. The latter are most reflective of the specific transition process the respective country has experienced, its connection with the conflicts and the wars in the region, of the individual contribution to regional stability, regional security community building-up and shaping of the region as a normal part of the extending European Union and Euro-Atlantic civic and geo-strategic zone. It would be unfair to judge the Western support as differentiated: it has produced differentiated results, depending on the different national social, political and economic processes. The PfP countries of the region, these that are approaching the PfP programme and the contenders for NATO membership from South-East Europe will find more and more that the developing process as well as membership in NATO are also financially consuming and yet more economic than any other form of building the national security and defence.

Second, the establishment of civil-military relations in South-East Europe on a democratic basis does not mean a repetition of existing Western models. The bilateral and multilateral Western activity of promoting democratic defence management, transparency, professionalism, efficiency, interoperability and professionalism require on the recipient countries' side the formulation of not just specific military reform agendas, but of establishing national models of civil-military relations. These models should be capable of arranging in a priority order the tasks of the reform process, of continuously receiving the

extended Western support and doing all that in the context of the norms and principles of the democratic society. The issue of establishing democratic civil-military relations is a matter of national interest and formulating the national features of this process is really a problem of the national societies and political elites. Expectations that the practical mechanisms of the democratic control of the armed forces can be imported and installed from Brussels or Washington, D. C. is an unrealistic vision of the development of the national societies to a functioning democracy. The foreign or international support may be tailored to the individual circumstances and needs of the recipient country from the Balkans, but it is through a nationally conceived interest of democratic build-up that the democratic control of the military and the whole security sector reform can be successfully implemented. Having a national motivation of doing it would produce really national tasks from the issues of Modernisation, international compatibility within the PfP standards of forces, logistics, equipment and communication, of politically, legally and operationally standardised procedures of making the partnership effective or membership in NATO – possible. It is the task of the national parliaments, national civil societies and their institutions to guarantee the implementation of the requirements of the democratic control of the military.

In other words, the establishment of democratic control of the armed forces within democratic civil-military relations should be psychologically internalised and turned into a national issue, never forgetting that democracy evolves and the process of democratic control over the military evolves too.

A final, third conclusion of the study is that further and more comparatively based research of the issues of civil-military relations in South-East Europe is needed as a necessary part of the PfP activity in the region.

V List of Abbreviations

Armed Forces	AF
Army of the Republic of Macedonia	ARM
Army of Yugoslavia	AY
Confidence-Building Measures	CBMs
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty	CFE
Council of Europe	CE
Croatian Democratic Union	CDU
Croatian Intelligence Service	HIS
Croatian Military Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina	HVO
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	EAPC
European Union	EU
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	FRY
General Staff of the Republic of Croatia	GSOSRH
Gross Domestic Product	GDP
Hungarian Democratic Forum	HDF
Hungarian Home Defence Forces	HHDF
Hungarian Socialist Party	HSP
Implementation Force	IFOR
Individual Partnership Programme	IPP
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation	IMRO
Kosovo Force	KFOR
Ministry of Defence	MoD
Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia	MORH
Ministry of National Defence of Romania	MND

National Security Office of Croatia	UNS
Non-Governmental Organisation	NGO
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation	NATO
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe	OSCE
Partnership for Peace	PfP
Party of Democratic Prosperity of Albanians	PDPA
Planning and Review Process	PARP
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System	PPBS
Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System	PPBES
Rapid Reaction Forces	RRF
Republic of Slovenia	RS
Slovene Army	SA
Social-Democratic Union of Macedonia	SDUM
Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia	SFRY
South-East European	SEE
Supreme National Defence Council of Romania	SNDC
Territorial Defence	TD
United Nations Preventive Deployment Force	UNPREDEP
United Nations Preventive Force	UNPROFOR
Warsaw Treaty Organisation	WTO
Western European Union	WEU
Yugoslav People's Army	YPA

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8. Civil-Military Relations in Slovenia: Aspects, Factors, Problems

I Introduction

Slovenia no doubt belongs among those countries of Central Europe, which have since the end of the Cold War faced numerous situations of instability, risks, and threats, military as well as non-military. These upheavals are reflected in the current practice of the country's civil-military relations.

The military in a democratic country should be under political control. The main principle of such control is dispersing the authority between various political entities (the National Assembly and its bodies established for control of the military, the President of the Republic, the Government, the ruling or leading political parties, dominant social groups). The purpose of political supremacy over the military in the Republic of Slovenia is to ensure loyalty, efficiency, and subordination of the military to institutions of the civil society.

II Internal Political Aspect of the Civil-Military Relations and the Democratic Civilian Control Over the Military

1. Transition from authoritarian communist-party dominated system of civil-military relations to parliamentary model of civil-military relations

Civil-military relations is a sphere of society which to a large extent reflects the system of social and political order, especially in circumstances of great social change as have occurred in the transition of the South-East European (SEE) countries from authoritarian one-party systems to systems based on parliamentary democracy, rule of law and market economy.

The area of civil-military relations is particularly important to Slovenia, because a state of war (a military conflict with the Yugoslav National Army in 1991) emerged in the country at the beginning of the transitional period. This happened in spite of the fact that there was a

very strong movement to demilitarise Slovenia just before the break of the war

Towards the end of the eighties there was an increased demand for de-politicisation (political neutralisation) of the military in Yugoslavia. There was a conflict between the Yugoslav army (YA) and the democratic public (the civil society) from the more politically advanced North Western parts of Yugoslavia.

At that time, Yugoslavia maintained an authoritarian communist-party dominated type of civil-military relations, which was established under the influence of the Marxist theory of the armed people, and drew from the experience of the national freedom fight during World War II. After the war the communist party exercised a form of civil-political control over the military. (Jelušič, 1997)

The conflict between the old communist-party dominated type of practice of civil-military relations and the parliamentary-democratic model proposed by Slovenia was essentially about political pluralism in a civilian political system.

By the end of the eighties in Yugoslavia there was already an explicit tendency towards dissolution of the federal state. Points of view regarding the future state regulation came to be openly and loudly declared. National programs for retribution of historical injustice appeared (Serbian Art and Science Academy memorandum), while Slovenia and Croatia declared their intentions of self-determination. The YA was losing its good name, its extra-national character and became increasingly less socially and nationally representative. These facts evoked strong negative feelings towards the YA with the young generation in the North Western republics of Yugoslavia.

In the post independence period Slovenia has implemented certain changes, which are important for an efficient transition from the authoritarian to a democratic socio-political system, market economy, and the establishment of the Slovene statehood.

The new Slovenian Constitution in 1991 included many fundamental changes, regarding the socio-political and legal framework of the state and its system of national security. Among the most important are: the introducing of constitutional parliamentary democracy; division of power between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches; increasing the governmental authority over the military budget and the military activities which regulate national security; reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence, which has assumed the full authority over the army management and logistics. (Grizold, 1998)


All this has provided the possibility for a quality change in the relations between the civilians and the army in Slovenia. The former symbiotic relationship between the state and the communist party was abandoned along with membership of political parties for military personnel. All political-party activities were banned and so were religious limitations and discrimination in the army. The Slovene army (SA) thus became more socially representative and more nationally and culturally homogenous. The military has passed under civilian control. The Defence Minister is a civilian, who is directly answerable to the National Assembly and the Government. The national security system has become more transparent and accessible to parliamentary scrutiny, to the media, empirical research, and public criticism. The overall co-operation between the military and the civil society has been subjected to the spirit of pluralist democratic values.

2. The Role of the Slovene Army in the Public

Since the war for independence, the Slovene army has enjoyed a high measure of trust among the population. Public opinion research¹ from August 2000 confirms this, showing that the Slovenian army (with 3.39 points on a one to five confidence scale) only trails the President of the republic (3.97), the National Bank and national currency (3.59 and 3.58).

¹ 'Politbarometer' is a public opinion research, carried out by the Centre for Public Opinion Research and Mass Communications, Faculty of Social Sciences in Ljubljana. It has studied the citizens' confidence in state institutions since 1991. The results of the current research show a decrease in trust in the institutions of the political system, i.e. it is getting stabilised at the level typical for the democratic countries.

Public confidence in the Slovenian army is ahead of the Government of the RS (2.49), the National Assembly (2.69), the courts (2.82), the police (3.23), the Constitutional Court (3.1), the Roman Catholic Church (2.51) and political parties (2.47).



Graph 1. Source: Politbarometer, Centre for Public Opinion Research, Faculty of Social sciences, University of Ljubljana: August 2000

The high measure of public trust in the SA reflects the population's confidence in strict civilian control over the army and Slovenian Army's benign and neutral political posture. (Bebler, 2000).

While the level of trust in the Slovenian army is high, the social prestige of military professions is rather low. This dichotomy can be explained by the fact that in the public the Slovene army represents an important symbol of national independence and national pride, while, on the other hand, the former social significance of the military profession has greatly diminished with the emergence of new non-military forms of insuring a country's national security and a shift in social values. A review of the phenomenon of trust in the Slovene Army shows that after

the foundation of the state and, especially following the independence war of 1991, the Slovene citizens had an exaggerated opinion of the state institutions, which was indicated by an increased trust. During the period between 1991 and 1999 the trust in state institutions declined. Trust in the army stabilised at the level comparable to that of some European countries.

3. The Process of a De-politicisation of the Military

The process of de-politicisation of the military is to be understood as the process of bringing to an end the communist party's control over the armed forces and ensuring (party-wise) political neutrality, and ideological plurality of the armed forces. The ruling communist party exercised the control of the armed forces in the former system. This was a communist-party dominated system of civilian supremacy over the army.

The process of de-politicisation of the Slovenian army began immediately after the establishment of independence and included the following measures: the dismantling of political structures in the military – all communist-party units were disbanded, and political management and the institutions of political officers in the military abolished. (Bebler, 1997). Thereby the first task in establishing a civilian democratic supremacy over the armed forces was completed. The central mechanism for insuring the communist party's control and political indoctrination of the military was removed.

While abolishing political officers, officers for motivation and informing (the so-called motivators) were introduced into the SA, who are in charge of warfare moral, public relations, informing soldiers, in co-operation with psychologists participate in solving conflicts and care for civil education.

Officers and non-commissioned officers have the right to form professional associations at the national and international levels. They, however, must not engage in politics while in uniform during the period of service, they must not publicly express their political views and judgement and must not enforce their views and judgement on others.

They must not be members of political parties. During their free time, they may participate in the activities of political parties as all other citizens, but they must not wear the uniform.

During the period of service, military personnel do not have the right to strike.

The provision of religious and spiritual care is by constitution and in practice guaranteed to all members of the SA. During the formation of the SA in 1993, an internal Act (an instruction) was passed that guaranteed the participation in religious ceremonies.

The MoD of Slovenia has recently worked with greater intensity on the project of introducing army chaplains, which is comparable to that in the countries of NATO.

The freedoms, rights and obligations of a citizen in the army relate to the personnel of the professional structure and the reserve formation. The Constitution and the Defence Act regulate these issues. Regarding the individual civilian control of the defence forces, the Ombudsman plays an important role being competent for the protection of rights in the army and Ministry of Defence.

III Democratic Civilian Control of the Armed Forces: Defence-Political Aspect

In the most general sense of the word civilian control of the army in Slovenia means the control of the civil society over the activities and conduct of the military as one of the institutions of the state. In Slovenia civilian control proceeds through the following areas of control: **legislative**, which is a foundation for the military's activity in the society; **financial**, which is an instrument for the regulation of the military's activity, and **personnel-managing**, which is essential for developing the national security system.

Democratic control of the military has been laid down and executed as a fundamental political determinant in the organisation of the defence system and the national security system of the Republic of Slovenia.

An important segment of civilian control is also civilianisation of the defence sector in particular the military, which is reflected in the educational structure of the officers. A significant portion of Slovene officers has completed secondary school civilian education, which is a specific to the transitional period in Slovenia.

Democratic civilian control over the Armed Forces in Slovenia is exercised through participation of the Parliament, the media, and the individual – the citizen as a member of the civil society. An important figure in exercising the individual control is the Ombudsman, who is responsible for monitoring and implementation of the human rights protection in the army and broadly in the defence sector.

The purpose of democratic civilian control over the institution of the military in Slovenia is to establish a balance between the civilian democratic institutions and the power of the military institution. The defence political aspect of control over defence forces in Slovenia reflects itself in the process of implementation of defence policy. Here it would be necessary to insure co-operation between the various Ministries, as well as between the National Assembly, the Government, the Defence and other Ministries, political parties and expert and scientific institutions in the civil society and the area of defence. An extremely important factor in the Slovene defence policy will be the degree of fragmentation or concentration of the political power in the area of defence. There will be various obstacles in the future implementation of the defence policy. Concerning Slovenia there may be certain economic and defence budget limitations, technological deficiency in the area of defence, problems in finding a suitable model of military organisation (professional or conscription army, or a combination of both). There may also be a problem with the capacity of mobilisation and efficiency of reserve forces, with the provision of military hardware and its dependence on the import (armament systems, logistics capacities). A particularly important element will be public

opinion as a factor influencing the defence system (interests of civilian groups, political parties, etc.).

Most countries in transition, which are establishing the system of national security, encounter the problem of paucity of expertise in the field of national security. Expert knowledge and science are those elements that can establish communication between individual institutions in the state, participating in forming the defence policy: the National Assembly, the Committee for Defence, and the President of the Republic, the Government, and the Ministry of Defence. The discord between the expertise on national security and the institutions shaping defence policy is too great. Defence institutions often seek quick solutions and tend to ignore results of expert studies. Links of positive influence and trust should be built in this area to provide a fair and expert co-operation.

IV The Foreign Political Aspect of the Democratic Civilian Control of the Armed Forces: Employing Armed Forces in International Relations

Institutional civil control of the armed forces in Slovenia is very strong and proceeds as an intertwining of the legislative authority, the executive authority, and the President of the Republic.

The authority over the management and command in the Slovene army is divided between democratic civilian institutions, thus providing conditions for implementing the democratic principle of balance of political power and control over the armed forces, which stipulates that the command of the armed forces in peace time does not lie exclusively within the authority of one individual. This means that neither the President, nor the Defence Minister, nor the National Assembly, nor any political party has the exclusive authority to command and manage the Armed Forces in the country; rather, the authority is evenly divided between all the various entities.

The Armed Forces in Slovenia are a constituent part of the state's legal order, and are by no means a state within a state. This means that

the SA is a dynamic and equal partner in the society, subordinated to democratic rules thereby achieving legitimacy and legal status in the civil society. The SA is not to be used for the purpose of political, and political party activities.

The government makes decisions about the Slovenian army's co-operation in performing the duties assumed within international organisations.

In addition to preparing the forces for its own defence and future tasks in NATO, Slovenia also provides forces and facilities for participation in international peace support operations and other crisis management operations.

V Factors Influencing the Civil-Military Relations in Slovenia

1. The legal and the institutional factor

The legislative and executive authorities, and the President of the Republic jointly perform institutional civilian control over the military in Slovenia. Political control proceeds through the legislative authority i.e. through the National Assembly and its competent working bodies (the Committee for Defence, the Committee for the Budget, Finances and Monetary Policy, The Committee for Control Over the Budget and Other Public Finances, the Committee for Monitoring the Implementation of the Resolution on the Starting Points for the Concept of National Security of the Republic of Slovenia, the Commission for Control Over the Work of Security and Intelligence Services, and Committee for International Relations). The main weakness of such control is in the insufficient training of those who implement it, and in a functional deficiency of the legislation, which does not stipulate the exact criteria and conditions of the control.

According to Samuel Huntington (1964), the problem of the modern state is not the army's revolt but in the relation of experts to politicians. The problem indicated by Huntington is how to accomplish objective

civilian control while acknowledging autonomy of military professionalism and independent military expertise. In the case of Slovenia the question would be: how to regulate the relations between the General Staff of the Slovene army and the Minister of Defence, the Chief of General Staff and the President of the Republic, and the Minister of Defence and the President of the Republic?

An essential element in civil-military relations is also the balance between the military and civilian factors in the decision-making process. To establish the balance in conditions with no clear legislative framework is extremely difficult, though not impossible. T. Skauge (1994:189) maintains that without determining the boundaries between the administrative and the political domains, civilian control is becoming a factor contradictory to professional autonomy.

A Canadian defence system expert Dr. Bland differentiates between various organisational models of defence systems, which differ among themselves with regard to the type of political system and the relations between the civilian and the military part of the Ministry of Defence. Dr. Bland believes that a typical characteristic of most Eastern-European defence systems is the so-called unified organisation, in which all mechanisms of control, management and command are joined under the authority of one leader.

The executive authority (the Government of RS) performs another part of the institutional control. It is legally binding that the Government participate in the control activities over defence in the following areas:

- Defence budget,
- Personnel policy,
- Management of military service relations by means of rules and regulations,
- Determination of rules for carrying out of tasks for particular authorised persons in the Armed Forces and in part of the defence structures.

The government co-ordinates activities of the defence and finance ministries and their bodies. Thus it tries to balance between the powers

in the adoption of the defence budget. A more visible role in this area in the future should be given to financial experts, specially trained in the field of defence (defence economists). Their task would be (by means of the professional argumentation) to advise and persuade the legislative authority of the necessity of long-term planning (for the period of 510 years) and securing financial resources in the area of defence.

In the future, the Slovene government should become more active in expert planning, control, leading and managing of personnel, and promotion policies in the Slovene military. The Government appoints the Minister of Defence who is a member of the Government in charge of defence matters and answerable to the legislative authority, i.e. the National Assembly. The Slovenian Minister of Defence is a civilian, which is one of the principles of the civil society in the development of democratic civil-military relations. The Civilian Minister of Defence executes the state's defence policy. The main task of the Minister of Defence in any democratic government including the Slovenian is to co-ordinate defence matters in co-operation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and, if necessary, with other ministers. The Minister of Defence proposes the Chief of General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces to the Government. The chief of General Staff will be responsible for combat readiness, the operation and employment of all commands, units and technical agencies in the Armed Forces. The Chief of General Staff is answerable to the Minister of Defence.

A critical survey of the previous and current relations between the Slovene (legislative and executive) authorities confirms our previous assertion that the accumulated problems are approached by means of ad hoc solutions, with much rhetoric offering a lot of promises, but giving little consideration to strategic aspects. In particular the Ministry of Defence emphasises the necessity of quick and pragmatic solutions that are supposed to be carried out within a few days, weeks or months. At the same time there's little consideration of the relevant fields of expertise: the military expertise, defence studies, sociology, psychology, organisational studies, technical fields, etc.

Since the political changes in 1990 the legislative civil control of the military has been secured through normative legislative Acts, which

have been very helpful in the development of Slovenian defence system since 1990, and have formed a legal basis for its functioning and the existence in the civil-military relations. In 1990 the first Law on Defence was passed. In 1991 the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia was adopted. In 1993 The National Assembly adopted the Resolution on the Starting Points of the Concept of National Security of the Republic of Slovenia. The document stipulates the tasks and functions of the bodies for control over the Armed Forces in Slovenia. In 1994 a new Law on Defence was passed. In the same year was adopted the Law on securing financial resources for the implementation of fundamental development programs of defence forces of the Republic of Slovenia between the years 1994 and 2003.

In the year 2000 the Slovenian Government adopted the Strategy of National Security and Strategy of Defence. The Strategy of National Security will be discussed in the Slovenian National Assembly, which will adopt a special resolution on this matter.

On the level of legislative and executive control over the Armed Forces (AF), an Instruction on fulfilling the obligations towards the President of the Republic in the field of defence (Official Gazette of RS, no. 64/95; pp. 49744976) was laid down. The instruction specifies the obligations of the Ministry of Defence towards the President as the supreme commander of the Slovenian AF. These include the conditions and procedures of informing the President, the orientations for the (annual) plans of deployment of the Slovene AF, the conditions and procedures of securing the appointment of the supreme commander of the Slovenian AF, protection of the supreme commander, protocol matters between the President and the Ministry of Defence, and details on the appointment and functioning of the defence advisor to the President.

On the level of government, the State Administration Law regulates competence and responsibilities. Article 140 in the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, regulates the competence of individual committees of the National Assembly authorised and responsible for the control over the AF. The article does not specifically mention individual committees, but refers to the working

body. One of the functions of the working body is to assess the appropriateness of the legislation relative to other countries and to test the efficiency of the regulations.

2. Military culture, professionalism and education

Here we wish to explain the influence of professionalism and military culture, and military training and education on the formation of the civilian democratic control in the period of social transition in Slovenia.

Military professionalism² is an important factor of political legitimacy and objective³ civilian control. The monitoring and study of military professionalism is very important for a better understanding of the relations between the military and the society. Particularly important is the officer elite, which holds the greatest power of decision making, and is also under continuous scrutiny in its relations and communication with the political system and the civil society in general.

With the establishment of sovereign state in 1991 Slovenia formed an autonomous military organisation. The Slovenian Armed Forces were formed on the basis of the organisational structure of the former 'Territorial Defence' (TD). The commanding personnel of the TD mostly came from schools for reserve officers of the former Yugoslav Army, while cadre occupied certain positions with civilian as well as exclusively military education.

When examining personnel structure in the Slovene army one finds that officers and non-commissioned officers came to work in the military from a variety of working and social environments, and with differing general and expert military education. This means that that they have been exposed to different socialisation processes and influences, and

² Military professionalism and professionalisation is to be understood as a specific form of military socialisation.

³ Huntington (1975) sees the solution in civilian control in the objective civil control with the aim of maximising military professionalism. The idea is a division of political power between the military and civilian groups, the consequence of which is expert behaviour and attitudes among the members of the officer corps.

reflects itself the great variety of professional identities, subcultures, ethics, and values. (Kotnik, 1999).

The Slovene Army personnel are categorised into five groups as follows:

- 1) Former active commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers with military training acquired at military schools in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY);
- 2) Former officers permanent formation of TD, which acquired military education at military schools in the former SFRY, or in a reserve officers school;
- 3) Reserve personnel of the former Yugoslav Armed Forces (with a rank acquired in the Reserve Officers School or in courses for military rank) with acquired various degrees in general education, and various civilian occupations;
- 4) Commissioned and non-commissioned officers with training acquired in the Military School Centre system; and
- 5) Defence Studies graduates who acquired a military rank during the course of instruction in the units of the former Yugoslav Army.

As a result of different (re)socialisation influences and processes one finds that, at least at the officer corps level, the Slovene army is a conglomerate of cadres. This kind of diversity on the one hand enriches the knowledge and experience of the SA, while it does not insure good functional connectedness⁴ and cohesiveness between army collectives and of the SA as a whole. (Kotnik, 1999).

The heterogeneous structure of the SA is a consequence of the emergence of the new Slovenian state and the formation of a new army. Thus, the 'concept of military profession'⁵ in the SA is still under

⁴ Functional harmony is a greater functional homogeneity and unification, unity of thought, common ethics.

⁵ Military profession is a group of technically and organisationally trained professionals for managing violence, linked by common training, common (corporative) practice and professional ethics (Abrahmsson, 1972). The Military profession exhibits three main characteristics: expertise, corporativity/common identity and responsibility (Huntington, 1957).

construction, since Slovenia is only just establishing the system of military education.


The overall education level of the SA personnel is rather low and acquired in the civil education system (with dominance in technical fields of expertise). Within the personnel structure there has not yet been established the necessary balance between the expert military, technical, and social science education.

After the independence in Slovenia we have not opted for a classical military academy, but for a civilian-based education system. The present military education system is based on general knowledge acquired by the officers through studying at civilian university programs, which is supplemented with the subsequent expert military and specialist training. This system is currently acceptable and rational from the point of view of providing non-career officer, to whom military service is only a stage on a diverse career path. However, it cannot provide sufficient career officers, who have chosen military occupation for life.

Career officers represent a firm professional core of a military organisation, from which the entire institution draws traditional military values and ethics and thus maintains cohesiveness, continuity and, in particular, organisational and functional efficiency.

The educational structure of the commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers is a legacy, especially of the post-war period. As a newly formed army, the SA was faced with a shortage of military intelligence, whereby heroic commanders with inadequate general and military expert education occupied the high command positions. The problem arose later when it emerged that their war practice had not been tested, supplemented or advanced with the necessary military expert and general knowledge. The problem was partly solved by additional training of the personnel "although there was normally no proper response among those who were already occupying important positions". Data from 1993 on the educational structure of the officer corps shows that only 41.6 % of the officers had university education (civilian faculty or military academy), 14.3% had finished high school, 19.5% had not

accomplished high school or university education while 18.2% had secondary school education.



Graph 2. Source: Kotnik, 1996, Educational structure of the Slovene officer corps from 1993

Military education in Slovenia in the near future will have to face two main tasks:

- It will have to homogenise the knowledge and skills that have already been acquired by the professional soldiers in the present formation of the Slovenian Armed Forces, and
- Design an educational program that will provide new trainees with sufficient general and specialist knowledge and skills for work in their profession, and shape them into officers who will be loyal to the Slovene state and nation. (Jelušič, 1997).

The Defence Ministry of the Republic of Slovenia as the main founder of the SA tries to consider modern trends in the area of military professionalism. Sociological research that was carried out in the military units (Garb, 1993), show a growth of military expertise,

responsibility and corporativity. The motivational factors are diverse and mutually connected. There are no excessive patriotic tendencies, nor does financial motivation stand out. There is also a very strong tendency towards civilianisation of the military as a result of the practise of employing civilian experts in the military. There is also a notable trend of fragmentation of fields of expertise within the Armed Forces (deprofessionalisation⁶ and superprofessionalisation⁷)

The social milieu from which the Slovene Army personnel come is quite even. No social milieu is predominant as indicated by the following almost even ratios of the Slovene Army personnel: rural areas 25.8, smaller towns 21.0, and bigger towns 24.2. The average age is 27, while the majority belong, with respect to social status of the parents, to the middleclass. (M. Garb, 1993)

Finally, we may conclude that military professionalism in the SA is still under construction and is not yet an entirely homogeneous phenomenon. Owing to the varied structure of the SA personnel, there is a presence of diverse cadre groups, and an absence of unified professional identity and ethics.

When talking about the process of professionalisation⁸ of SA we also think of enlarging the proportion of professional members of the Armed Forces on all levels, as well as a change in the system of providing soldiers in the military forces i.e. by increasing the number of professional soldiers at the expense of conscripts or by completely abolishing the conscription system.

There are two sets of factors, which suggest intensive professionalisation of the Slovene army. From the point of view of the state they could be labelled the external and the internal factors. The external factors come as a consequence of the changes in the

⁶ Increase in the number of civilians, civilian scientists, bureaucrats technocrats working in the fields linked with national security.


⁷ Internal specialisation within the frame of profession.

⁸ Professionalisation is a trend in modern armies of many European countries, which began changes into the way of providing soldiers for the Armed Forces.

international security environment after the end of the Cold War and the related changes in the nature of conflicts and tasks of the Armed Forces. Slovenia shall increasingly participate in the co-operative international peacekeeping operations. And the practice has shown that wholly professional armies are extremely suitable for multinational peacekeeping operations.

The internal factors influencing professionalisation of the Armed Forces include particularly social, political and demographic changes.


In Slovenia there is decline in the willingness to serve in the military service among the young population. Recently there has been an increase in the number of those physically and mentally unfit for service and the percentage of those temporarily unfit for military service is also on the increase. (In 1992 there were 14% of the unfit, and grew to 28,8 % in 1998.)



Graph 3. Source: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia, 1999

There has been a *growth in the number of objectors* who implement the right to conscientious objection, whereby the number of applications has grown from 105 citizens in 1993 to 2504 in 1999 (see Graph 2).

The growth in the number of cases of civilian national service indicates, in a broad sense, the changes in values among the youth in modern society. The values, norms, and lifestyles of the youth are in total contrast with the goals and lifestyles of the army. The Slovene youth⁹ also follow the general trend of the post-modern youth. A series of dominating values indicate a preference for basic "post-material" values such as: peace in the world, friendship among people, security of the family, personal freedom, a healthy environment, aesthetics and self realisation. The youth who are oriented in this way are characterised by little interest in national service and in defence and security issues.



Graph 4. Source: Defence Research Centre, Faculty of Social Sciences, public opinion research, N=1398 secondary school students, September 2000.

⁹ When talking about value orientations of the youth during the 1990s we must take into consideration the general shift in value system which occurred among the youth across the world during the 1980s, that is, the shift from global, ideological, and the wholly developed value systems, towards particular and concrete values among which increased sensitiveness to mutual relations and to the quality of daily life predominate. Researchers attribute this shift mainly to the modern urban youth, which is to be found in developed societies.

Defence Research Centre at the Faculty of Social Sciences has carried out a public opinion research with the aim to find out what the relationship of the Slovene youth towards the military profession is. In the opinion of 36.7 percent of the young the present, conscription system of providing soldiers for the SA is the most suitable one. 20.3 percent of the respondents maintain that professional army should replace conscription, while 13.2 percent support voluntary service.

Other research¹⁰ (carried out on the entire Slovene population) also shows that there is still considerable doubt in the Slovene public regarding the shift to a wholly professional army, namely, the proportion of those who support conscription is still relatively high. The people probably feel that it is not yet the right time to abandon this proven in the independence war and functioning institution of military conscription.

Intensive debates on professionalisation and the new way of providing soldiers for the SA are in progress in the political as well as the professional public.

The Slovene government has also adopted a document 'the Scope and Structure'¹¹ of the SA', proposing a plan of the development of the Slovene AF up to 2010. The document determines the direction for long-term development of the SA and among other things proposes increasing the proportion of professional soldiers in the army; however, it does not

¹⁰ In September 2000, Centre for Public Opinion Research at the Faculty of Defence Science carried out a telephone survey (Politbarometer) on 902 randomly chosen respondents. The aim was to obtain the public opinion on the preferred system of providing soldiers for the Slovene army. The results show that 28.4% percent of the respondents decided for an entirely professional army, 21.6% supported conscription army with a narrow professional core, 20.4% maintained the army should be mainly professional with a smaller degree of conscription, and 13,7% of the respondents expressed support to providing soldiers entirely by means of conscription.

¹¹ The Slovenian army has currently 62,000 soldiers in war time/combat formation, out of which 4,100 professional formation. By the year 2010 the number of professionals is supposed to increase to about 7,700. There is supposed to be from 4,000 to 4,500 conscription soldiers, and the overall human potential will have gradually diminished to about 47,000 members.

mention abolishing the conscription system. Increase in the number of professional soldiers is by all means a good foundation for a transition to entirely professional army system; however, the question remains whether in a small country like Slovenia professionalisation is the best way of ensuring military security.

Whether professional army system will be suitable for Slovenia in the future will become clear after a thorough analysis. For the time being, however, professional army in Slovenia is probably not yet the right solution. The political situation in Slovenia is still rather unbalanced, and the question is whether it will settle in ten years. In such circumstances professional military may become an instrument in the hands of politics.

3. Internal political, economic and social factors

One of the key internal political aspects of Civil-Military relations in the Republic of Slovenia is the strategy of regulating the military's relations with the public. The main principle and the goal of the strategy in peacetime are to obtain public support for the military's activities. Thus the military attempts to secure the legitimacy for its activity in the society. Public support is exhibited in trust in the Armed Forces and the national security system. In democratic political systems the Armed Forces are expected to act in accordance with the expectations of the public, and to submit to civilian political control. (Edmonds, 1988: 130) In this way the Army and the entire national security system shapes its public image and influences the public's perception. On the basis of these perceptions the public forms its attitude (of trust or distrust) towards the military institution, as well as certain demands from the system. The Military can lose the public support. The reason for this is that the military and other structures within the national defence system can create wrong impressions of the dangers in the public and thus appropriate a larger share of the Budget finances than necessary.

The significance and power of managing and planning of public relations both in peacetime and in wartime has been recognised by individual countries regardless of their political system.

Promotion policy within the professional military hierarchy and the administrative sector of the Ministry of Defence is an important factor influencing the image of the military in the public. Therefore it plays a significant role in the civil-military relations. The public follows personnel policy of the military more closely than the military professionals realise. This is particularly the case in the transitional countries where the military establishment is still forming its role in the society. The public in these countries often compares the social position of civilian officials with the position of the military elite, which is still being formed. The comparison is particularly at issue in promotion and salary policies. The inequitable position of civilians in the military in comparison with military professionals in the defence system is a common source of conflict in the military promotion policy in the countries of transition. The promotion policy in the military and the entire defence sector (and its appointing of managers and leaders) influences the public trust in the military and its public image a great deal more than the salary policy, since it also represents the decisive element in the formation personnel structure in the military institution.

The Slovene Minister of Defence proposes the Chief of General Staff of the Slovenian Armed forces to the Government. This is another fundamental principle of the civilian control of the army. The government of the Republic of Slovenia carries out the control over the personnel policy of the Ministry of Defence. The Government also gives its consent to the appointment of senior administrative personnel at the Ministry of Defence. A well-regulated personnel policy and promotion system is a basis for a development of democratic civil-military relations. Much of personnel policy in the Slovenian Ministry of Defence is still based on outdated legislation (State Administration Law). Likewise there is no specific regulation of the relations between the status of professional soldier and state administrator. In practice many Slovenian officers perform their duty as state administrators. This causes complications on the micro-level, in promotion and salary policies, and remuneration policy, which conflicts with the promotion system. Personnel policy in Slovenia will strongly depend on the type of Military School System that the country will establish. According to the experience from the Western democratic countries a modern and efficient army can be developed in a country only if the latter has its own

system of military education. An American theorist of civil-military relations in the fifties wrote that the nation, which does not respect its own army, would be forced to respect the enemy's army. Thus he made an important observation that no other institution in the modern state, including the police, can replace the military institution.

Most probably in the future Slovenia will encounter a problem that is currently concerning in the Canadian Ministry of Defence. The latter is facing paucity of management experts of different profiles in the administrative sector of the Ministry of Defence as a result of the 'brain drain' of good managers into the better-paid private sector. How can the problem be solved? For example: (a) by motivating state administrators in other ministries to seek employment in the defence sector (the most efficient means of motivation is a better salary), or (b) by motivating certain successful officers to take on the tasks in the civilian sector of the ministry.

The economic factor of the civil-military relations reflects itself in the tasks of civil defence economists. Their tasks should be directed towards rational defence expenditure and the distribution of financial means in accordance with the requirements of the government. The military in the democratic societies can spend only as much as it has been able to negotiate through its experts, and by means of argumentation supported by precisely worked out financial plans. Defence expenditure in Slovenia represents a considerable portion of the state budget and is a very sensitive issue in public opinion.

The issue of expenditure on the account of Slovenia's joining NATO is another economic factor in the current situation and future civil-military relations in Slovenia. Slovenia's integration in NATO will depend mainly on the organisation's assessment of whether Slovenia meets the necessary political and military expert standards.

Slovenia has made a commitment to spend on defence the percentage of the Slovene GDP, which will be equivalent to other members of the union.

Besides securing the appropriate Defence Budget, it is very important to insure a transparency i.e. civil control over the defence expenditure and the defence Budget.

4. The international factor

Defence and force planning is one of the conditions of the modern military professionalism and a base for the complex strategic decision-making process. The international factor is also important for the Slovenian civil-military relations. The Slovenian Minister of Defence is responsible for leading and managing the defence planning process. A crucial condition for establishing an effective national security system and national defence system is the revision and co-ordination of the basic documents in the area of national security. This is also a condition laid down by Membership Action Plan, and Annual National Program for implementation of the MAP. *National security strategy* was adopted by the Slovenian government on 24 August 2000, and is to be approved by the parliament in the first half of the year 2001. The Slovenian government adopted one week later the *Defence strategy*. Proposals of the doctrines of military defence, civil protection and disaster relief will be prepared for governmental procedure in the year 2001. The documents should also define the responsibilities of the Minister of Defence, and the Head of the General Staff concerning defence planning and force planning. So far, none of the Slovenian defence ministers was in power long enough to organise the system of leadership, management and the commanding process inside the MoD. The future role of the Slovenian State Secretary of Defence should be more dynamic with the focus on work in small groups.

5. Historical Tradition and Legacies

Civil-military relations in Slovenia have passed through various stages in the past ten years. The end of the eighties, which is called 'the time of the Slovenian spring', is characterised by the intensity of the relations between the institutions of the civil society, the military, and the state authorities (former Yugoslav and those of the Slovenian Republic). Institutions of civil society as *Mladina* magazine, Human

Rights Committee functioned as mechanisms of civilian control of the military and state authorities.

A decisive shift in the civil-military relations came with the ten days of war and the period that followed. With the formation of the new country the Territorial Defence was gradually transformed into the Slovenian army. The country began building the elements of the new defence system, which attained a new dimension with the passing of the Defence Law and Resolution on the Guidelines of the Concept of National Security of the Republic of Slovenia. Also, the Strategy of National Security and Defence Strategy were adopted this year. The following doctrines are currently in the governmental procedure: the Doctrine of Civil Defence, the Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Doctrine, and the Military Defence Doctrine.

The early 1990s were characterised by a marked normative (emphasis on the legal expertise) approach in the practice of civil-military relations. The emphasis was on civil-military relations in the narrow sense i.e. the relations between the state authorities and the military. The professional civilian institutions (for example, the non-governmental institutions and the University) did not actively participate in the shaping of the Slovene defence legislation.

In the development of the defence system so far little attention has been paid to the development of the system of National Security and to the complex development of civil-military relations. The normative approach continues to dominate in the creation of civil-military relations in Slovenia. However, the administrative transformation of the national security system (by means of a great number of restructuring of work posts) alone does not insure a successful functioning of the System of National Security.

VI Conclusion

This article outlined the situation in the civil-military relations of Slovenia in 1990 2000.

The internal political aspects of the civil-military relations is comprised of three parts: the transition from authoritarian to parliamentary system of civil-military relations, the role of the Slovenian Army in the Public, and in the process of a de-politicisation of the Military. In Slovenia civilian control proceeds through the following areas of control: legislative, which is a foundation for the military's activity in the society, financial, which is an instrument for the regulation of the military's activity, and personnel-managing, which is essential for the development of the national security system.

The Slovenian Army is present in international activities. The government makes decisions about the Slovenian army's co-operation in performing the duties assumed within international organisations. In addition to providing the forces for its own defence and for the future tasks arising from the country's full membership in NATO, Slovenia also provides forces and facilities for participation in international peace-support operations and other crisis management operations.

The following factors, influencing the Slovene civil-military relations, have been identified: the legal and the institutional factor; the internal political factor, the economic and social factors, and the international factor.

The legislative and executive authorities, and the President of the Republic jointly perform institutional civilian control over the military in Slovenia. One of the key internal political aspects of Civil-Military relations in Slovenia is the strategy of regulating the military's relations with the public.

Defence and force planning is one of the conditions of the modern military professionalism and a base for the complex strategic decision-making process. It is also an important international factor of the Slovenian Civil-Military relations.

Civil-military relations in Slovenia have passed through different stages in the past ten years. The end of the 1980s, which is also called 'the time of the Slovenian spring', is among other things characterised by the intensity of the relations between the institutions of the civil society,

the military, and the state authorities (former Yugoslav and those of the Slovenian Republic).

As a participant in the PfP, Slovenia meets most of the required standards in the area of Civil-Military-relations. In the future the country should pay more attention to the preparation, management and control over the defence budget. While the necessary institutions of civilian control have been established, the content of their work, and of defence policy has not yet been determined. The communication between the various authorities of defence policy in Slovenia and the institutions of national security is also quite rigid.

Nevertheless, Slovenia has managed to establish a solid defence system, which is the most transparent among the countries of transition from totalitarianism to democracy.

The army that is being formed is small but efficient. The military system is in progress towards attaining a high degree of professionalism of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the Slovene army.

Further progress will follow, if we manage to develop the professional soldiers' personal qualities and to provide quality training for the army recruits. The development of personal qualities, with the emphasis on leading and managing abilities, is a part of the process, which aims at establishing an efficient military system. Within the PfP Slovenia can demonstrate many advantages of small but well trained military units (e.g. the Alpine unit). The personal approach to training the leading and managing cadre in the defence system and control over it must become a basis for all other qualities in the system of national security.

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