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I Foreword

Workshop Purposes, Procedures and Goals

Welcome in the Castle of Reichenau, a training Facility of the Austrian Armed Forces, to the Workshop “Information Management in the Field of Security Policy in the Southeast European Region“

As the Director of the “*Institut für internationale Friedenssicherung (IIFS)*“, a research institute of the Austrian National Defence Academy and as the chairman of the PfP Consortium Working Group “*Crisis Management in the Southeast European Region*“, I am very glad to welcome you here at this workshop. The main focus of the IIFS has changed in the 18-month- period of its existence. Although we started as pure research institute, the emphasis now lies in first line on providing Political Guidance and information Management, both naturally in the field of Security Policy.

This Workshop is part of the activities we are conducting in our PfP Working Group. We consider it one of the main objectives of the Consortium to create networks where questions related to Security Policy will be discussed in a transparent way. This meeting should be understood as an attempt to start one of these networks. It should not be considered as a typical research conference, but as the launch of the project Workshop “*Information Management in the Field of Security Policy in the Southeast European Region*”.

The final results of this workshop will contribute in gaining an objective view to the different ideas of the parties involved in the crisis scenarios throughout Southeast Europe. We will attempt to reach this goal through an open and honest discussion between experts from the region and interested persons from abroad. The main question in this context will be the one concerning the possible contribution of the academic community to a lasting stabilisation of the whole region. It is obvious that within the Stabilisation Pact the main efforts to calm down the tensions and to stabilise the area are carried out in the field of politics, economy and military. But it may also be noticed that there are only few structured attempts to assist in this stabilisation process on the conceptive and academic level. Naturally we are able to recognise a lot of activities such as seminars and conferences concerning the Southeast European region, but sometimes there are no clear structures discernible behind these efforts.

We will attempt to start a continuous discussion process v should last for a longer period of time and should finally create an academic community which includes experts from the whole region. The results of these meetings should be used also as an input to the educational efforts of our different institutions. In my opinion, the individual procedures which will lead to these results will be:

The identification of the main questions and an assessment of their relevance for the academic community. In order to get the answer to these questions we have to: Identify the questions which the academics will be able to solve, identify the responsible and capable group of persons to work on these questions, identify the way to deal with these questions and finally work out possible inputs towards society, politics and the economy.

The participants of the workshop are invited to provide support to the improvement of the network in the field of Security Policy and consequently to help in creating a Strategic Community within the Southeast European Region. All this should not end with the last day of any event of the Working Group, but should become a self-supporting process.

It will be my main objective as chairman of the Working-Group – and in my opinion it also should be one of the main purposes of the PfP-Consortium – to initiate and to support this process to the most possible extent.

Vienna, October 2000
Col Gustav E. GUSTENAU

III Presentations and Papers

1. If You Want Peace in the Balkans, Should You Give War a Chance? or: Current Security Problems in Southeast Europe

I Introduction

Secessionist conflicts have become a major feature of the European political landscape in the 1990s. International response to them has varied from full-scale military intervention to half-hearted mediation, generally providing for freezing of most active hostilities and for addressing most urgent humanitarian needs. Europe in the 1990s saw more “peace” operations on its soil than any other region in the world, but still was not able to find satisfactory answers. Kosovo is a tragic illustration of that and the deployment of NATO troops after a massive use of airpower still lacks the framework of a political plan and appears very tentative and opportunistic. Several specifically European factors define the perspective of a possible new wave of secessionist conflicts in the region.¹

The central pillar of peace, security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region is the NATO - the strongest and most successful political and military alliance in history. At the end of the century and of the millennium, ten years since the disappearance of bipolarity in Europe, the NATO has made good steps forward on the road of coming to terms with the heritage of Cold War and making significant contributions to some key areas:

- To European Integration, by taking new members – Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary – into the alliance.
- To a co-operative relationship with Russia, by creating a permanent NATO-Russia Council.
- To the transatlantic link, by enhancing its position as the key forum for the European-American dialogue.
- To joint crisis management Operations beyond NATO territory, by participating, for instance, in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and by managing its Kosovo Operation last year.

According to *Javier Solana*, former Secretary-General of the NATO and now the European Union High Representative for Foreign and Security Affairs² especially the Kosovo Operation was an undeniable success for NATO. He suggests that for the first time an alliance of sovereign nations fought not to conquer or preserve territory but to protect the values on which the alliance was founded. Or was this (as others believe³) a punishment in the Balkans, where NATO, dissatisfied with UN ineffectiveness, was taking the law into its own hands?

Was there a real success? In fact there were numerous differences over NATO’s mission and procedures in Kosovo - and a kind of unity demonstrated at North Atlantic Alliance’s 50th

¹ Pavel K. Baev: External Interventions in Secessionist Conflicts in Europe in the 1990s. in: European Security No. 2/1999. pp. 22-51

² Javier Solana: NATO’s Success in Kosovo. in: Foreign Affairs Nov/Dec. 1999. p. 114-120

³ Michael McGwire: Why did we bomb Belgrad?. in: International Affairs Nr. 112000.pp. 1-23

anniversary celebration in Washington April last year. And anything less than success in the Kosovo crisis will undermine this unity - an outcome that now seems likely if not inevitable.⁴

II The Global Players

The allies began the war with high expectations. The allied countries in their majority under centre-left governments, stressed the moral imperatives of reversing ethnic cleansing and saving the Albanian people of Kosovo. The political leaders have defended their solidarity with NATO through moral arguments - the war must “prevent a humanitarian catastrophe“, German Chancellor *Schröder* said. The alliance has shown an impressive solidarity, the transatlantic mood was good, NATO was demonstrating its relevance and effectiveness by combating ethnic violence in Europe, a success in Kosovo would guarantee the primacy of NATO in Europe’s future. There would be no doubt that NATO was the indispensable security institution on this continent - even the Americans still seemed Eurocentric, at least in understanding Europe’s geopolitical importance.

The transatlantic partnership, the European integration process, and the broader, inclusive security co-operation was spanning the entire Euro Atlantic area. No European would seriously question the fact that the United States is, and should remain, “a European power“. At the same time, no one wants to create security or stability against Russia, or through closed institutions. NATO has committed itself very strongly to a strategy of security co-operation. Through the Partnership for Peace programme and, most recently, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Alliance has created a framework for military co-operation across the entire Euro-Atlantic space. This approach will remain unchanged even after NATO enlargement. Like the Alliance, the EU is committed to its enlargement and has broadened its relationship with the United States through a joint action plan agreed in 1995. The European Union now has a transatlantic dimension as well. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also is broadening its agenda, and above all, the OSCE remains without an alternative as a framework for Euro-Atlantic arms control or for addressing the countless minority issues in Europe, because it is the sole organisation capable of setting standards of security behaviour, and of legitimising peacekeeping missions. In short, the quality of European security will be determined less by the Operations of the institutional clockwork, but rather by the deepening of political processes - the “invisible“ side of the new European security architecture.⁵

But what was the “visible“ effect last year, the outcome of NATO’s mission in Kosovo?⁶ What effect did the mission have on the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe? How will they interpret NATO’s zero-risk strategy of bombing from enormous heights which put Serb and Kosovar Albanian civilians on the ground at greater risk than would have been otherwise necessary?. Has the NATO mission strengthened or weakened the case for armed intervention in the name of human rights? All the short-, middle- and long-term consequences of the West’s intervention in Yugoslavia remain obscure.⁷ The “humanitarian intervention“ in Kosovo has resulted in flagrant violations of international law and the UN Charter by NATO countries it has produced the first massive bombings of a European country since World

⁴ Peter W. Rodman: Fallout from Kosovo. In: Foreign Affairs July/ August 1999. I 45-51

⁵ Michael Rühle, Nick Williams: “Better Than it Sounds“: Europe’s Invisible Security Architecture. in: Comparative Strategy Nr. 2/1998. pp. 12 1-123

⁶ MccGwire. Why did we bomb... op. cit.

⁷ Stephen Holmes: Introduction. In: East European Constitutional Review Nr. 3/1999. p. 41

War II. NATO has transformed itself from a defensive alliance into the first aggressor in Europe since Soviet Union's invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.⁸

In the light of the NATO objectives, consider political and military options facing the alliance. Political options include reconciliation, containment, and regime change military options consist of air strikes or a combination of air war and ground combat.⁹ The reluctance of NATO to use force against Serbia gave rise to charges of a credibility gap. Threats not backed up with force lead to a diminution of the credibility of NATO threats for future situations. The alliance set a number of deadlines that did not produce compliance. Rather than using force, however, the allies extended the deadlines.¹⁰

NATO political leaders seemed to have blinded themselves to how the Serbs would react to the threat and actuality of a bombing campaign, NATO was generally misreading how seriously Serbia saw the threat to its survival. NATO was guilty of using the *Dayton* approach of tight deadlines and dictate (rather than concentrating on finding a way, other than the use of force. of persuading *Milošević* to accept an effective international force), guilty of wishful thinking about the Serbs response to air attack., guilty of the tendency to define complex conflicts in oversimplified and moralistic terms (and thereby misshaping policy and public expectations), guilty of insisting that the enemy was *Milošević* of ignoring the complexities of Belgrade and Balkan politics¹¹, of cheating itself and the rest of the world by insisting that the military action "was not a war", of weakening the fragile political and economical Situation of neighbouring states like Macedonia, of giving a precedent to Russia and her military campaign in Chechnya - with other words: guilty of a senseless and unprofessional action of showing off NATO political muscle undertaken with best intentions, but resulting in worst consequences for Southeast Europe and entire Europe. The quality and the stability of the international order is at stake, because the Alliance was undermining the foundations of this order established since 1945, by disregarding the Security Council, which is primarily responsible for international peace and security under United Nations Charter.¹²

III Bombing Belgrade

Why did the NATO bomb Belgrade?¹³ The political objective was to avert a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo and/or to prevent a crisis from becoming a catastrophe. This was to be achieved by strategic and precision bombing of military targets in Serbia in order to reduce the capability of Serb forces to

- continue with their violence
- repress the Kosovar Albanians
- order ethnic cleansing.

Bombing Belgrade made sense only if one believed that this demonstration of NATO resolve would cause *Slobodan Milošević* to halt the process himself. That did not happen.

⁸ Robert M. Hayden: Humanitarian Hypocrisy. in: East European Constitutional Review No. 3/1999. pp. 9 1-96

⁹ Raymond Tanter, John Psarouthakis: Balancing in the Balkans. New York 1999. p. 14

¹⁰ Tanter. Psarouthakis. Balancing... op. Cit. p. 83

¹¹ Robert Thomas: Serbia - Still Europe's Pariah?. European Security Study No. 24. London 1996

¹² Arthur Paecht: "Kosovo as a Precedent: Towards a Reform of the Security Council International Law and Humanitarian Intervention. NATO Parliamentary Assembly - Civilian Affairs Committee. Amsterdam November 1999

¹³ MccGwire. Why did we bomb... op. cit.

Why? Later on we were told that no one could have foreseen that *Milošević* could have been so wicked. So the bombing continued and was justified by using exaggerated and emotive language and demonising *Milošević*. But *Milošević* did not create the Kosovo problem - he exploited it. First, the Serbs had historically framed Kosovo as a domain of loss situation. *Milošević* took advantage of this perceived loss for his domestic gain. Second, ancient memories over Kosovo increased its value. Third, the high price of battles fought caused the Serbs to overvalue Kosovo's worth.¹⁴

Let us try to understand why it all was possible: After nearly half a century of dormant nationalism, all the East European states were suddenly racked by ethnic, regionalist, and autonomist movements demanding some degree of autonomy or self-determination. Both majority and minority populations have been affected by this rebirth of ethnicity, and in some cases the programs and goals of different national communities have clashed, resulting in manifestations of conflict.¹⁵ Does a new fault line separate Western Christians from Orthodox Christians and Muslims? Are The Balkans again "Balkanised along religious lines"¹⁶ Not at all! It has nearly nothing to do with the nature of the Balkan people or with the image of the Balkans as a cauldron of ethnic hatred¹⁷ and it has not so much to do with the devilish power holders (how ever devilish they may be), but it is the consequence of something which is the background.¹⁸

IV Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia¹⁹ was - like the other countries - a para-state order which means that it was constituted upon a totally different principle of power, not through the institutionalised set of principles. There was a set of constitutional institutions which was more a kind of constitutional facade: You did have a constitutional framework but from the decision making point of view it was not a constitutional system, not a state order due to the fact that every decision was taken within the Party nomenclature, i.e. within the group of highest ranking leaders and later on the constitutional facade was added to this decision in a constitutional procedure in all Federal republics, but the fundamental decisions were not taken there.

The second factor is the role and the understanding of nation in the meaning of ethnicity - the Balkan's obsession of nation in a pre-political concept of ethnicity. It is the ethnicity which genders the constitution, it is the ethnicity which make the political community and so on. That has a lot to do with the historical background: The Balkan peoples lived for centuries in Empires, the Ottoman and the Austrian, where this feeling of ethnicity was developed in a counter position to the state in which they lived. Something of this remained as a part of political perception - ethnicity as something having the potentiality of elaboration.²⁰ So in former times the party leaders found themselves in a dilemma of how to control the potentialities of interethnic conflict in a multiethnic society like Yugoslavia was. And on the other hand, the question for the leaders was how to instrumentalise this multi-ethnicity for their own purposes. So the ethnic issue was manipulated as an additionally legitimating

¹⁴ Tanter, Psarouthakis. *Balancing...* op. Cit.. p. 76

¹⁵ Janusz Bugajski: *The Contours of Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe.* in: *Balkan Forum* No. 3/1993. p. 19-34

¹⁶ Tanter, Psarouthakis. *Balancing...* op. Cit.. p. viii

¹⁷ William W. Hagen: *The Balkan's Lethal Nationalisms.* in: *Foreign Affairs* Juli/August 1999. p.52-64

¹⁸ Following here a lecture given by the Serbian sociologist Lidija Basta-Posavec in Bern (Switzerland) on February 2. 1995

¹⁹ For a historical overview see Svein Mønnesland: *Land ohne Wiederkehr – Ex-Jugoslawien: Die Wurzeln des Krieges.* Klagenfurt 1997

²⁰ Ljubomir Mažar: *The Roots of Nationalism.* in: *Balkan Forum* No. 2/1994, pp. 81-109

ground for their para-state order. In the course of a development full of crises and fading away of instruments like workers' self-government etc. the ethnic issue became more and more relevant as a factor additionally legitimising the power holders. Which means, that the authoritarian balancing of interethnic tensions and conflicts was already in the logic of such a system.

It was by no means a coincidence that the three ex-communist multiethnic federations - Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia - dissolved. Communist power holders perceived every constitution only as an instrument of power and not a limit of power, and so the Yugoslav constitution of 1974 was a complete revision of the federal para-state order - not as a constituted, but as a permanently constituting state. That means that the state's question remained permanently open. The bearers of sovereignty, the constitutive parties of the federal order were nations in their republics and provinces - nations in the meaning of ethnicity. The constitution introduced only this aspect of a federal order - in contrast to every "normal" federal order and its democratic nature and principles. The consequences were fatal ones: There was a massive transfer of political loyalty to republics because only the republics (and autonomous provinces like Kosovo) were perceived as a nation's state in the sense of an ethnic state.²¹ As a consequence the society gradually becomes blocked as regards progress and national elites are given the opportunity to exploit their co-nationals in the name of the "national interest", which, conceived as the interest of the whole ethnic nation (including the "Diaspora"), has been an obsession in Serbian, as well as Croatian and Slovenian, politics.²²

Here we have configurations determining the political situation in the newly emerged states of former Yugoslavia, how ever democratic their facade is: Ethnic states can only exist as such in a defending meaning, in trying to protect themselves against others. Actors of an autocratic nature often dominate ethnic conflicts. Interethnic conflict served the function of reinforcing intra-ethnic political strength.²³ The majority nation as ethnicity is the founder of the statehood and will protect itself against all these who can not due to their birth participate in this ethnicity. This potentiality for conflict was caused by the constitution of 1974 and realised by the constitutions of all successor states defining themselves as "national states" of the given nation. How can you have a democratic consensus based on ethnicity if you have a multiethnic state which is not a Switzerland in the South East, but ruled that way? All you get is an escalation of interethnic conflicts. This fatal potentiality of ethnicity was rooted in 1974 because in every single case the question of state itself seemed to be opened and ethnic republics were unable and unwilling to define and to follow a "common interest" of the common federation. The "socialist" federation could never legitimise themselves in a liberal, democratic sense of the word because they were established by nations (ethnicities) as primarily guaranteeing the quality of nations in the federation. So the federation had to legitimise itself by saying: forget about individuals - the nations are equal in their rights. In communist way of dealing with politics only collectively was inherent, and ethnicity was the new form of collectivity as an instrument of authoritarian balancing of power. Forget about political equality, individual rights, political pluralism and witness the image of pluralism created by confronting ethnic interests through representing their mother republics. And this was a potentiality for disaster because these mother republics were not ethnically

²¹ For details see Miranda Vickers: *The Status of Kosovo in Socialist Yugoslavia*. Bradford Studies on South Eastern Europe No. 1. Bradford 1994

²² Vojin Dimitrijevic: *Democracy versus Nation: The Post-Communist Hypernational State and the position of its "Ethnical Different" Citizens*. in: Helsinki Monitor No. 5/1994 (Special Issue). pp. 13-24

²³ Tanter, Psarouthakis. *Balancing...* op. Cit.. pp. 96 ff.

homogenous, so that every political, constitutional, economic etc. question due to the inherent logic of the political System became an interethnic and tension.²⁴

V The Minority Question

Another problem of the ex-Yugoslav crux is the minority question. How is it possible to have a refreshed Kosovo²⁵ problem when Yugoslavia on the legal level could really have been boasted of having introduced the international standards of minority protection: Yugoslavia was taken as an example of someone who did give minority rights especially such ones of legal and constitutional relevance. But, viewed in the background above mentioned, Kosovo is not a problem of minority question. Not only the nations, but also the minorities - especially the most numerous in Vojvodina (Hungarians) and Kosovo (Albanians) - was given a constitutional Status which enabled them not to protect their cultural identity, but to act politically as an ethnic collectivity. The minority got a para-state position, too, and perceived it as a guarantee for own liberty which has to be on federal and republic levels. So the logic for these two provinces inside Serbia was that them was given a dual status by directly participating on the federal level (with the possibility of a constitutional, legal and executive veto) and so being provided with a state function of their own. The minority issue has been permanently posed and articulated as para-state issue also. That means, if you have a System which has no positive legitimisation at all - as the system in East Europe and in Yugoslavia were - all political elites within their collectivities, ethnic groups, had to push the differences as a part of their identity. To be different and to have problems with others - this is what makes the respective power holders long living in power! That means your "right" is based on your tactics to remain different and stay away from the others, because the others are always these ones who are potentially endangering your "rights". That is why the Albanian people in Kosovo perceive their "rights", but not only the Albanians: Every people in South East Europe is feeling himself as deeply discriminated, but in fact they all are victims of a manipulation which is a systematic one, perpetuating up to nowadays as a negative legitimacy causing a never ending disastrous outcome.

VI The Balkan Nationalism

The other Balkan nationalisms in play in the lands of former Yugoslavia are not morally superior to Serbian nationalism.²⁶ The Slovenians, who in the past were locked in bitter nationalist conflicts with both the Italians and the Austrian Germans, today have a state that has neither irredentist claims against its neighbours (except some smaller conflicts with Croatia about the common borderline at the Dragunja river) nor conflicts with internal minorities (but sometimes playing with the idea of a referendum in order to deprive "foreigners" of Slovenian citizenship). Croatian, Albanian²⁷ and Bosnian Muslim nationalism are no less free to the temptations of violence and authoritarianism than is Serbian nationalism. Especially Croatia under the dictatorship of general *Tudjman*²⁸ for nearly ten

²⁴ Stipe Šušvar: Svi naši nacionaliznii. Valjevo 1986

²⁵ Srdja Popovic et al.: Kosovoski evor - dre ili seci?. Belgrad 1990

²⁶ Hagen. The Balkan's... op. cit. pp. 60 ff.

²⁷ For details see The Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Albania (Ed.): The Truth on Kosova. Tirana 1993

²⁸ Gordana Uzelak: Franjo Tudjman's Nationalist Ideology. in: East European Quarterly No. 4/1998. pp. 449-472; Drago Hedi: Living in the Past: Franjo Tudjman's Croatia. in: Current Histor March 2000. pp. 104-109

years had the obsession to regain its “historical borders“, i.e. the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia.²⁹

Croatia has proven its nationalism most bloodily by expelling 200.000 or more *Krajina* Serbs in 1995, but also in Bosnia with the participation of its regular Army in the war and by financing Croatian separatists in the Herzegovina over years with 1 - 3 million *Deutschmarks* per day. Had NATO acceptance of Croatian secession in 1991 been conditioned on firm guarantees for the Serb minority there, a better outcome might have occurred not only in Croatia, but also in Bosnia. This would have presented an opportunity to pressure *Milošević* for a quid pro quo guarantee of the minority rights of the Kosovo Albanians, including self-government. In this way, the present tragedy in Kosovo might have been averted.

VII The Kosovo Liberation Army

UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which provided the basic guideline for the cessation of hostilities in Kosovo, encourages “the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self government for Kosovo, taking full account of the *Rambouillet* accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia“, and that means that, sooner or later, Kosovo must be reintegrated into the FRY:³⁰

With regard to the present situation in Kosovo, nothing could be further from the truth. If the FRY sought to regain control of its territory, this would probably lead to a renewal of internal conflict between it and some form of organised ethnic Albanian resistance. NATO’s presence in Kosovo is the presence of an occupying power and that puts a burden on international work in rebuilding Kosovar political institutions. The international community is facing a new set of challenges - it must restore and maintain law and order so that some form of normality can return to everyday life; disarm former KLA and put their weapons under control; rebuild functioning administrative, justice, and police systems; establish the basis of a liberal and non-corrupt economy; and above all, find ways of eliciting a critical mass of goodwill among Kosovo’s ethnic communities to begin a reconciliation process. These tasks are difficult and extremely urgent, but nearly all efforts to address challenges remain obviously insufficient.³¹

Why so insufficient? According to Greek analysts the Kosovo was becoming a “grey area“ and increasingly “ungovernable“ due to a lack of infrastructure, political corruption, the ineffectiveness of the civil government and the collapse of both legitimacy and control over territories after 1989. In addition to this, the anarchy in Albania since July 1997 has led up to one million of light weapons and 1.5 billion rounds of ammunition being available on the black market in Central and Eastern Europe, with obvious security implications.³² The Kosovo became the main destination for Albanian weapons, significant portions came to Macedonia and Greece. This situation was producing “Grey area terrorism“ exercising local violence. In such a way also the KLA operated consisting in the beginning of groups of local population financed and armed from Albanian criminal organisations. For long years it was almost impossible to make a clear distinction between criminal and political activities, but

²⁹ Ljubo Boban: *Hrvatske granice od 1918. do 1991 godine*. Zagreb 1992

³⁰ Volker Kröning: *Kosovo and International Humanitarian Law*. NATO Parliamentary Assembly - Civilian Affairs Committee. Amsterdam November 1999

³¹ Guy-Michel Chauveau: *Securing Peace in Kosovo: The Challenges ahead*. NATO Parliamentary Assembly - Civilian Affairs Committee. Amsterdam. November 1999

³² Chris Smith. *Domitilla Sagramoso: Small arms trafficking may export Albania’s anarchy*. in: *Jane’s Intelligence Review* January 1999. pp. 24-28

Serbian propaganda against KLA and the Albanian movement contributed most in bringing the KLA out of deep cover, and even to its development into a public political and popular factor. not only in Kosovo.³³ After NATO's Kosovo mission it is not necessary to make such a distinction - the United States had aligned itself with the KLA. *Rambouillet* and the NATO mission bestowed a legitimacy on the KLA. which emerged from the war with an enhanced military capability, a greatly improved organisational structure, and leaders who saw themselves (and were seen by many) as Kosovos government-in-waiting. Concessions made to the KLA despite their terrorist behaviour and aim of a Greater Albania³⁴ - consisting of Albania, Southeast-Montenegro, Kosovo and parts of southern Serbia, two thirds of Macedonia and the North of Greece and must be gained against the will of Russia and Italy who are more than others "not pleased with the idea of Albanian national unification"³⁵ -. further enhanced the KLA's Status and its military capability, storing up trouble for the future.³⁶ Greater Albanian nationalism is intending such troubles:

While the independence of Kosovo is considered impossible and undesirable by Serbian and international diplomacy and by certain political circles in Tirana, the Albanian people and the KLA are waging a heroic armed struggle which is of utmost historical importance for the Albanian nation, despite its cost and the outcome in the near future. (...) the independence of Kosovo is not only possible, but unavoidable and a basic requirement to the final solution of the Albanian national question through the unification of the Albanian ethnic Lands. This just and final solution is what Albanians are fighting for, they cannot be satisfied with any solution easy to reach and accepted by Serbia or international community.³⁷

VIII Troubles in Present Times

And there are troubles in present times, too. According to an UNHCR/OSCE-Overview of the "Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo"³⁸ the overall situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo remains precarious. While the crime statistics released by UNMIK indicate a decline in the overall number of violent incidents, this may be due to the fact that there has been a significant decrease in the overall non-Albanian population. Otherwise there is still a climate of violence and impunity, as well as widespread discrimination directed against non-Albanians.

Nowadays Kosovo is a field of ethnically-motivated crime, violence and terrorism which are increasing every month instigated by groups based in and outside of Kosovo. The remaining Serb population is a major concern: the Serbs, with the exception of some regions, are isolated in small communities and feel extremely vulnerable. Their exodus from Kosovo is continuing, and they have become more and more distrustful of the ability of the international community to guarantee their survival and the protection of their cultural and

³³ N.D.A. Arvanites: Organized Crime and Geopolitics. in: Eurobalkans Autumn 1998. pp. 4-7: to the involvement of Kosovo Albanians into international crime see Miroslav Nožna: Ěeská republika na križovatkách mezinárodního zločinu. in: Mezinárodní politika Nr. 3/1999. pp. 4-7: (round table) Rossija - Jugoslavskij krizis - Zapad. in: Otkrytaja politika Nr. 5-6/1999. pp. 29-35

³⁴ Dritan Peka: Les droits collectifs et le status de la population albanaise dans les etats voisins. in: The Balkan Analyst No. 4/1997. pp.53-88

³⁵ Abdi Baleta: Kosova - Albanian Nation in war with the Serbian Nation. in: The Balkan Analyst No. 2/1998. pp. 63-136. cit. pp. 72

³⁶ MccGwire. Why did we bomb... op. cit. p. 17

³⁷ Baleta Kosova - Albanian Nation in war... op. cit.. p. 88

³⁸ 3 November 1999. <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/reports/minorities>

spiritual heritage, and thereby it is more and more difficult for international agencies to obtain their co-operation.

The Serbs have become collective targets for revenge, and the few Albanian voices who dare denounce Albanian reactions are heavily criticised and even threatened for it. Thus the Albanian journalist *Veton Surroi* came under heavy criticism for publishing an article last August expressing his shame at the violence committed by the Albanians. The most immediate question for the international community is to know to what extent *Hashim Thaci* - the former leader of the KLA who considers himself as the "Prime Minister" of Kosovo - still has control over the former KLA combatants who are demonstrably involved in the ongoing violent acts against Serbs and other minorities. *Thaci* has condemned all crimes but in meetings with foreign guests he plays down the importance of ethnically-motivated violence. Observers doubt that he is doing much to prevent it. The creation of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) last September - commanded by *Agim Ceku* (*1960), the former KLA-commander - seems to be the continuation of the KLA with another name. In a recent interview *Ceku* said: "Today's situation corresponds to our expectations. We do not think about *Milošević*. Kosovo is free, and the international community is responsible for its security and development. Kosovo's independence is our main aim, but we do not press the international community to grant us independence now. Under today's circumstances independence is a logical consequence, and I am sure it will come soon. The KLA is not disarmed, but demilitarised, we put our weapons under joint control of KPC and KFOR. KFOR is responsible for Kosovos security, and in co-operation with KFOR we are developing and strengthening KPC as an own system of defence."³⁹

Does the situation correspond to international expectations? The establishment of a functioning local administration is still a hopeless task and justice is another huge challenge - because people would rather carry out their own justice and judges themselves are afraid of reaching decisions that could make them targets to retribution. Even the legal basis is a problem: *Bernard Kouchner's* - the head of UNMIK - decision to use the Yugoslav legal code as a basis was perceived very critically by the Albanians, although many experts agree that the code is actually fair in many areas.

UN Resolution 1244 reaffirmed "the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" and reminded "the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo". Meanwhile, some of the Allies, especially the United States, are beginning to say more and more openly that both objectives are not compatible and that the aspirations of Kosovo Albanians to independence should be looked at favourably. This prospect worries most Europeans who fear its destabilising consequences and who respond cautiously to the Serb plan for the creation of Serb "cantons" in Kosovo.⁴⁰

With other words: The international security and civil presence in Kosovo does not work, the final status of Kosovo is not clear, but an accumulation in the sense of developing an increasing technical, economic and legal autonomy of Kosovo vis-à-vis Serbia would definitely influence the final outcome. Do the Albanians want autonomy or secession? Is that the way to make Kosovo "work" and to gain the confidence of its inhabitants? But these are less important questions - compared with others: Any strategy aimed at ending the Balkan crisis will fall if it does not include the region's centre: Serbia. Western governments face a serious political dilemma as long as Yugoslavia is ruled by leaders indicted for war crimes. Time matters, and the continuing isolation of Serbia makes the process of political change and

³⁹ Globus (Zagreb) 24.3.2000. pp. 34-36

⁴⁰ Chauveau.. Securing Peace in Kosovo... op. cit.

economic reform far more difficult and prolonged. How long? The political will in Europe and North America to act in Kosovo will not last. The two or three years remaining before Western attention turns elsewhere give little time to provide a framework for reform.⁴¹ NATO insisted that the enemy was *Milošević* it demonised one man, ignored the complexities of Belgrade politics and absolved the Serbian people of any blame for the policy in Kosovo - and transformed the whole mission from the very beginning into a punishment of Serbia and all the Serbs. One must raise the question of whether the Allies always respected the principles of proportionality between civilian damage and military advantage. The military value of destroying the Serbian Television building appears quite questionable.⁴²

IX The Results

During the past five years, two international protectorates have come into being on the territory of former Yugoslavia - first Bosnia and Herzegovina, and now Kosovo. In addition, two other Balkan countries, Macedonia and Albania, are vitally dependent on foreign aid, both military and economic. Other states in the region face the threat that in the event of further conflicts or social upheavals, they could slip into a situation similar to that in which Albania found itself in 1997. The countries in question are Bulgaria, Romania, and to a large extent even Croatia. The only post-communist country in Southeast Europe not affected by the instability of the region is Slovenia.⁴³

The result of the events in and around the Kosovo has been a political, humanitarian and potential Balkan-wide security disaster. Direct war-related damage is largely restricted to Yugoslavia, estimated at up to 30 billions USD. Yugoslavia neighbours suffered damage indirectly linked to the war, above all a slump in the sectors of trade, transport and tourism, as well as a loss of confidence on the part of foreign investors. The political damage resulting from the deepening of ethnic animosities is also substantial.⁴⁴

A variety of factors suggest that traditional tactics for achieving a peaceful resolution to the current crisis have been exhausted and are no longer effective. The West has reacted to the Kosovo crisis with a fundamental challenge to the values and security of the democratic world. The crisis dramatically affected all the states in the region, albeit in different ways: through the influx of refugees (Macedonia, Albania), NATO membership (Hungary), support for the allied operations, and economic losses. Never before has the international community come so close to a consensus on the need for a comprehensive strategy based on a vision for the region as a whole.⁴⁵ With its initiative on the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, the EU has taken the lead in efforts aimed at stabilising the region. This will require a durable commitment on the part of the EU and its member states. However, many of the expectations that have been raised are unrealistic as regards both the EU and Southeast Europe. The EU has two options of how to influence stabilisation in Southeast Europe: 1. by giving an institutional shape to relations between the EU and the region, and 2. thru direct economic, political and social co-operation. In the meantime, the EU has made it clear that its proposed

⁴¹ Benn Steil, Susan L. Woodward: A European "New Deal" for the Balkans. in: Foreign Affairs No. 6/1999. pp. 95-105

⁴² McGwire. Why did we bomb... op. cit. p. 19; Volker Kröning: Kosovo and International Humanit. op. cit.

⁴³ Ladislav Cabada, Martin Ehl: The Kosovo Crisis and the Prospects for the Balkans. in: Perspectives No. 13/1999-2000. pp. 21-30

⁴⁴ Andreas Witkowski: Southeast Europe and the European Union - promo stability through integration?. in: South East Europe Review No. 1/2000. pp. 79-96

⁴⁵ Ivan Krastev et al.: 2010: The Balkans after Kosovo. in: East European Constitutional Review No. 3/1999. pp. 82-90

initiatives on integration will continue to be conditional on the countries' success in meeting the established criteria. The initiative concerning the new "Stability and Association Agreements" with Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Macedonia is conditional on the fulfilment of a certain minimum of social and economic requirements. One key problem here is the stability dilemma, i.e. it is precisely those countries that are burdened with the greatest stability deficits which fall to qualify for the EU's initiatives.⁴⁶

Over the past decade, political processes in the Balkans have been shaped by two parallel events: the simultaneous disintegration of the communist System and Titoist Yugoslavia. The post-Yugoslav republics have all become presidential or semi-presidential republics, with a sluggish turnover of political elites, restricted media freedom, and insensitivity to minority rights.⁴⁷

Macedonia is an exception in this respect. Macedonia escaped the fighting that accompanied the independence of the other Yugoslav republics.⁴⁸ Macedonia made an agreement with rump Yugoslavia under which the Yugoslav Army left the country in 1992.⁴⁹ Its own military force can do little to protect Macedonia from outside aggression. It is for this reason that the UN, in an unprecedented decision, chose to station a 1,000-strong observer force in Macedonia along the border with Serbia in 1993. Skopje's foreign policy is quite simple: ensure secure borders, guarantee independence, and promote economic stability. These can best be achieved through the integration into the European structures of the EU and the Atlantic alliance. Macedonia has become an important NATO base of operations, with the alliance opening training centres in the country. Skopje's good-neighbour policy - achieved after conflicts unilaterally provoked by Serbia (about borderlines), Bulgaria (about Macedonian language and nation), and Greece (about the state's name and symbols) - has paid off with other countries and has received encouragement with the launching of the Balkan Security Pact in July 1999. Although the peoples of this multiethnic central Balkan country have been confronted with many social and economic problems, they have generally managed to avoid violence, have succeeded in establishing a democratic society, and promoted stability through permanent co-operation with the Albanian minority in all fields and on all levels. Macedonia shows promise of creating a Balkan success story.⁵⁰

The Kosovo crisis did not drastically upset the political status quo in Bulgaria and Romania. The two governments have confirmed their pro-Western orientation. Brussels gave Sofia and Bucharest national-security guarantees in exchange for their support of Operation Allied Force. In Bulgaria, the left-wing opposition has taken an overt anti-Western stand, abandoning the pro-European consensus previously shared by all political parties.⁵¹ Bulgarian policy seems designed to: 1. avoid being squeezed between its neighbours, Greece, Turkey and Serbia 2. develop a stable internal system politically and economically in a quieter external environment, and 3. make a good case for earlier rather than later access to NATO and EU. This is all very rational. One wonders why the West does not reciprocate by making better use of Bulgaria as a regional moderator.⁵²

⁴⁶ Witkowski: Southeast Europe... op. cit. p.94

⁴⁷ Krastev et al. 2010: The Balkans ... op. cit. p. 83

⁴⁸ To Macedonian history in former Yugoslavia see John Parker: The Macedonian Problem Solved?. in: The South Slavic Journal No. 6/1983. pp. 12-21

⁴⁹ For details see Mitre Arsovski: Hronika na eden neminoven raspad. Skopje 1995

⁵⁰ Duncan Perry: Macedonia's Quest for Security and Stability. in: Current History March 2000. 129-136

⁵¹ Krastev et al. 2010: The Balkans op. cit. p. 85

⁵² Victoria Gray: The Albanian Diaspora and Security in the Balkans. in: European Security No. 3/1999, pp. 133-148

In Montenegro the war presented a tremendous, even existential challenge to the reformist government. Three developments seem more or less possible at the moment: 1. *Milošević* may stage a coup attempt, 2. President *Milo Đukanović* may preserve the delicate balance and wait for better times to come; and 3. *Đukanović* may attempt a radical move towards independence.⁵³

In the third case the West was reluctant, but helped Montenegro to gain economic independence from Serbia through the introduction of the *Deutschmark* as a parallel currency. In the most extreme scenario, the FRY could break into three independent states, avoiding co-operation despite the close interconnection of the infrastructure.⁵⁴ The issue cannot be resolved simply through a decision to hold a referendum by the ruling coalition. Apart from the Situation within the country, Montenegro's Status will depend largely on international arrangements made for the stabilisation of the Balkans and Southeast Europe, as well as on the future developments in Serbia.⁵⁵

Albania seems to be an opposite to Macedonia. Despite its intentions to establish a democratic society, the historical social, political, cultural and economic conditions in Albania present a lot of obstacles on the way to true democracy. The legacy of the past,⁵⁶ the extreme poverty of the country, the lack of democratic traditions make Albania's transition to democracy the most difficult of any East European nation.⁵⁷ Albania's recent experiences justify concern about the future democracy in this country, in early 1997, Albania collapsed into anarchy and civil war. Foreign troops arrived, new elections were held, a new government was formed, and international assistance started to help rebuild the country. However, lawlessness and violence are continuing, significant problems remain, and the stability is quite fragile. Albania's most serious internal problems are political intolerance, polarisation and a lack of will for reconciliation on all sides.⁵⁸

Another question remains whether the interplay of the Albanian Diaspora - the Kosovars and their KLA, the Albanian minority in Macedonia numbering 430.000, the Albanian community in the USA numbering hundreds of thousands, the large Albanian community in Turkey and others, all linked with local criminals and/or radical Muslim "freedom fighters" - will push Albania into new conflicts with its neighbours.⁵⁹ Certainly Albania is in no condition to fight with anyone, but the high birth rate of Albanians could be seen as a threat by their Slav and Greek neighbours.⁶⁰

The post-war period of Kosovo is characterised by an institutional and security vacuum. The near future of Kosovo is one of an international protectorate, but in the longer run the Albanians of Kosovo appear determined to pursue their state-building and Greater Albania dreams.⁶¹ At issue is whether there is a solution that would satisfy the ethnic Albanian desire

⁵³ Krastev et al.. 2010: The Balkans... op. cit. p. 85

⁵⁴ Filip Tesar: What has NATO achieved in Kosovo? In: Perspectives No. 13/1999-2000. . 51-58

⁵⁵ Srdjan Darmanovic: Montenegro Survives the War. in: East European Constitutional Review No. 3/1999. pp. 66-67

⁵⁶ For details see Gjergj Fishta: Introduction into the Canon. in: The Balkan Analyst No. 1/1998. pp. 57-85

⁵⁷ Fatos Tarifa: Albania's Post-Cominunist Transition: Can Democracy Thrive? in: Balkan Forum No. 5/1993. pp. 123-133

⁵⁸ Paul Kubicek: Another Balkan Humpty-Dumpty: Putting Albania Back Together. in: European Security No. 2/1998. pp. 78-91

⁵⁹ Gray. The Albanian Diaspora... op. cit.. p. 145

⁶⁰ For details see the polish report Artur Górski. Witold Pawlowski: Ile Albanii? in: Polityka No. 16/1999. pp. 3-8

⁶¹ Lenard J. Cohen: Kosovo: "Nobody's Country"; in: Current History March 200. pp. 117-123

for independence as well as Belgrade's requirement of maintaining the territorial integrity of Serbia by retaining one of its medieval homelands. Although informal partition may not satisfy either side, it might be the only compromise that even begins to resolve the conflict over Kosovo.⁶² Ethnic Albanians would rename their area Kosova. The Serbs would occupy the partitioned entity of the Northeast and Northwest, which would retain the name of Kosovo. With respect to the ethnic Albanian population, Serbia and Macedonia fear that Kosovo might unite with Albania to create Greater Albania. This potential unity is a threat to current states in the region because it attracts ethnic Albanians from other parts of the Balkans.⁶³

The *Rambouillet* proposal⁶⁴ includes substantial autonomy for ethnic Albanians, withdrawal of most Serb forces, disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army, and a referendum within three years for ethnic Albanians to vote on independence.⁶⁵ According to the German journalist *Rudolf Augstein*, Editor of the famous magazine "*Der Spiegel*", especially this referendum was unacceptable for everybody, not only for the Serbs.⁶⁶ The *Dayton* accord's aim was an unified state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, composed of two multiethnic entities. Today's Bosnia consists of three de facto monoethnic entities, controlled by Croats (Herceg-Bosna), Serbs (Republika Srpska) and Bosnians. It also has three separate armies, three separate police forces, and a federal government that exists mostly only on paper. Local authorities continue to demand donor aid in return for partial co-operation, or threaten to maintain open obstruction to Dayton's implementation. The constitution (Dayton Annex 4) requires revision. but if the international community permits the revision of *Dayton*, it will open Pandora's box of competing claims. Bosnia and Herzegovina could be "cantonized" and governed by a reduced central government presiding over relatively strong cantons. This option could allow a more rapid return of refugees, it could permit more responsible local politics, and reduce the possibility of Croat and Serb secession. On paper Bosnia is and remains a protectorate, and the complaints of most Bosnians are not that a protectorate exists, but that it is a dysfunctional one and does not protect them.⁶⁷

X Conclusion

Some observers argue that the Balkan crisis makes it more urgent for NATO to take in new members like Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria in order to expand the zone of stability in the region. On the other hand, NATO's most recent new members, especially Hungary, were hesitant in participating in the Kosovo war. This was hardly a great advertisement for further enlargement. As for Southeast Europe, sceptics will ask whether allied parliaments will be eager to extend solemn new defence commitments to countries from an explosive region whose problems we do not handle very well.⁶⁸

What does it mean to handle problems in an explosive region? NATO's intervention in the Kosovo crisis followed the pattern that since the establishment of the United Nations, wars have rarely been allowed to follow their natural course. It is an unpleasant truth that war can

⁶² Tanter. Psarouthakis, *Balancing...* op. cit. p. 112

⁶³ Tanter. Psarouthakis, *Balancing...* op. cit. p. xv

⁶⁴ For details see Wolfgang Petritsch et al.: *Kosovo Kosova - Mythen. Daten. Fakten. Klagenfurt! Wien/ Ljubljana/ Tuzla/Sarajevo 1999*

⁶⁵ Tanter. Psarouthakis, *Balancing...* op. cit. p. xvi

⁶⁶ Petritsch. *Kosovo...* op. cit.

⁶⁷ Jan M.B. Lyon: *Will Bosnia survive Dayton?*. in *Current History* March 2000, p. 110-116

⁶⁸ Rodman. *The Fallout...* op. cit. p. 48

resolve political conflicts and lead to peace. War brings peace only after passing a culminating phase of violence - imposed cease-fires interrupt the fighting, and each time, the opponents use the pause to recruit, train, and equip additional forces for further combat. Imposed armistices artificially freeze the conflict and perpetuate the state of war indefinitely. Interventions often fail to protect civilians, because multinational military commands tend to avoid any risk of combat, thereby limiting their own effectiveness. Too many wars nowadays become endemic conflicts that never end because the transformative effects are blocked by outside intervention. Policy elites should actively resist the emotional impulse to human suffering. Give war a chance, and appreciate war's paradoxical logic to serve its sole useful function: to bring peace.⁶⁹

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⁶⁹ Edward N. Luttwak: Give War a Chance. in: Foreign Affairs No. 4/1999. pp. 36-44

2. Security Issues of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Light of the Dayton Peace Accords

I The Geopolitical Role of BIN

At the moment, it may sound quite ironical to suggest to this distinguished academic audience that a gathering similar to that of Vienna 1815 (Vienna Congress) should be organised in the near future, with the aim of declaring and then constituting a new Switzerland-like state position of Bosnia. What I want to say is simple. Although the fact that (I)SFOR, notably NATO countries with the inclusion of a number of non-members from Europe and non-European states, achieved a great deal of the aims for which was authorised — basically to establish peace via the implementation of the military aspects of Dayton agreement, and some other tasks - there are many questions to be solved before the proper achievement of the restoration of peace and order in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Above all, overseeing and ensuring the separation of forces and their withdrawal into clearly defined areas is valuable but far from being sufficient. Unless (I)SFOR undertakes more aggressive steps in bringing war criminals like S. Milošević R. Karadžić General R. Mladić and quite a few others (V. Maksimović V. Ostojić etc.) to Den Hague, the peace cannot be saved for the future. These persons simply represent a political concept that excludes others from political life in the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, leaving the right to that land only to people belonging to the Orthodox faith.

Greater Croatian aspirations which were exposed by the F. Tuđman regime in Croatia towards Bosnia were also an obstacle for faster implementation of the peace, reconstruction and reconciliation process between the Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs. It now seems that these intentions belong to the past as the new Croatian ruling elite show much more understanding for the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina in their public appearances. Some rightwing Bosniac politicians - mainly from the Party of Democratic Action - can also cause some delay in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, simply because they believe they can be in and out of the power in the country in a fluid state of movements.

This is short-sighted from the very “political” point of view of the Representatives of Bosniacs-SDA members. Returning to my proposal of new “Vienna Conference“ - like the one of 1815, when the Swiss confederation was given the right of neutrality - for new neutral country of Bosnia and Herzegovina I believe that this is the only good long-term solution for the Balkan peninsula as the implementation of the military issues of the said Accords it is definitely not sufficient.

According to J. Solana it is evident, however, that long-term peace requires a long-term programme of economic and civil reconstruction. Without civil reconstruction the Dayton Peace Accords, according to Solana “will amount to little more than the most expensive cease-fire in history“. Construction of the new bridges and road accesses are the only long-term achievements so far — they have to be followed by interchange of their people: citizen from all constitutive nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, from Europe and from the rest of the world. In order to achieve this, a lot remains to be done.

Bosnia and Herzegovina stands at a cross-road in a very real way. It combines territory which is at the same time deep inside Europe and still very close to most important regions of economic development of the world: the Middle East and the Caucasus region.

At the same time it is a country of multi-cultural and multi-ethnic existence of almost 10 centuries. The Bosniacs (by faith Muslim), the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats have lived there together. It is a fact which should always be kept into mind that in different times and under different foreign rulers or external interference the atmosphere between these three was not always as harmonic as they wanted or as they could consider suitable. But the ordinary people of all three national groups could always live together without interference and - to a quite high degree - rely on each other.

After such horrible happenings as in the recent past, it is of course difficult to predict if the mutual understanding can be regained within a short period of time. This depends on the domestic politicians of all groups, on their intentions, on their readiness to co-operate for the better benefits of all: Their own people, all of the Bosnians and for the sake of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Everybody now - if not in the near past - knows whose responsibilities for what had happened are biggest. With the believe that the international community has the clear-cut intention to sanction them, there would be in a medium-term and long-term perspective a great chance to proceed with the reconciliation of the peoples.

In that regard, faster economic reconstruction, more jobs for everybody without any kind of discrimination, pragmatic education curricula in the schooling system, better health-care and all together social security for each citizen in every part of the state are of great importance. As mentioned above, Bosnia is inside Europe. It means that the European investors should be encouraged and not be hesitant to "attack that small but still important market". In the era of globalisation the only matters of importance are the size of a market and its competitive presence. That will be the best way for them to show what they really want with Bosnia. By constructing high-ways across the country according to model of B.O.T. arrangement, by investing in the productive sector of the industry, and by investing and promoting agriculture and tourism of the country they will make the entire situation more friendly and more reconciled and gain confidence between each other.

But what is a most urgent question? It is a final and ultimate implementation of the Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace Accords, the annex dealing with refugees and displaced persons. Unless they are allowed to return to their homes safely, together with the implementation of the rest of the basic Human rights - free movement, free access to any place in the country without discrimination, free right to return to their previous work places - there will be no substantial improvements in the country at all.

But how can refugees be expected the return in a country where three armies, three police forces, two (in fact three) entities exist with different political standards, aspirations etc.? In these entities different legal system have been established, such as in the Republika Srpska., where the legal system of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is valid. On the other side the cantons where the Bosnian Croats have the majority use the legal rules and procedures of their neighbour country, the Republic of Croatia.

The refugees are not safe and protected unless the armed forces as well as the police become a unified institution with the equal representation of all three entities. Furthermore, the refugee return is not realistic unless the educational system is being harmonised with the contemporary curricula in Europe. The situation at the moment is still far away from that goal. Under such a situation it is not possible to expect the parents to be happy to let their children be educated with some topics not agreed upon as a national standard of the education all over the country. In this regard it is urgent to establish basic rules for the education system at state level. How can someone falling ill (but of different nationhood) be expected to be hospitalised without discrimination? The basis for all this should be the implementation of the European Convention of Human rights as a minimum.

The rest of what should be achieved very soon are the harmonisation of the legal system, the starting of a relevant and transparent privatisation process, legal security, above all a professional and independent court system, proper prosecutors, correct behaviour of the police and administration, etc. With the relevant harmonisation of the laws and regulations as requested by the Council of Europe in order to become a member there would be some positive movements towards improved investment climate and the creation of an environment desired for the necessary inflow of foreign direct investment.

II The Dayton Peace Accords and the Beginning of Redefining Balkan Security

The Dayton Peace Accords laid down not only the principles, rules and regulation which are important for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also for the shaping of the political, military, economic, cultural and any other side of the life of the whole region of Southeast Europe. This implies that this region - according to the historical events — is being considered as very unstable, vulnerable and a part of the world, where many not only positive, but mainly negative influences have prevailed and caused big trouble of which most dangerous and tragic one was the Bosnian example. The message of Dayton to other players in region is that the only proper way to solve the numerous problems and disputes of the past is to do it in a peaceful way by ways of conciliation and other non-violent steps. This implies that the use of international conventions should be a base on which they can rely. Using these means, they can speed up their intention of becoming members of the Euro-Atlantic institutions, which would bring integration in civil, economic and military institutions (NATO, Partnership for Peace), inclusion in the European military forces, which are now in stage of establishment and in their first deployment in the Kosovo etc.

Here once again the bulk of the problems are left to be settled by the direct (domestic) players with good services of the international community. Realisation is possible on the one hand through intensive co-operation between the countries on a bilateral level, or on the other hand, on the multilateral stage of the Pact for Stability for Southeast Europe. Within this pact, the matters of economic co-operation are by far the most urgent and applicable topics. The experience of each participating country and all others through co-operating in meeting the terms and conditions for the membership are of some value for integration. Besides, a country like Bosnia and Herzegovina needs very close co-operation as prerequisite to any integration — above all with its neighbours countries (including, once the democracy becomes reality, with the FR of Yugoslavia) as well as with Turkey, Austria, and particularly with the United States, which were the moving force for the final making of the peace in Bosnia. Turkey and Austria also have big impact on Bosnia and Herzegovina, as in former times our country was part of them.

Without the active involvement of the United States in European security affairs it is difficult to believe that the peace in the region of Balkan will be a lasting matter. Indeed, the SFOR operation is a resounding confirmation of the transatlantic link and of NATO as the most stable international and regional force.

III Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Security through Possible Integration in the NATO Structure

In its own way, NATO is world-wide success in many ways. Although the Washington Treaty of 1949 by which this most gigantic international military-political organisation is established proposed its existence for a short-period of time, as just to inject self-confidence

into a weak and fragmented post-war Europe, it developed in fact of far more and long lasting nature. The last 50 years of its existence proved this fact in a very clear way, if not for any other example and experience but for the establishment of lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for preventing another disaster in the Kosovo issue.

The tasks of NATO for this new century should be wider and deeper: long-term peace and dose and mutual co-operation in both the civil and military field in the Balkans must be established, for which the role and importance of NATO is not to be questioned.

The next role for which NATO is indispensable is that of further acceleration of the process of globalisation. That means that the whole world will become more transparent, more open and creative, as J. Solana., the former Secretary General of NATO, has pointed out quite often over the past years. But globalisation is not just a direct road to success: on the way there, specially for small countries (one of which BiH definitely is), there will be many casualties and pains. This, however, is the price which has to be paid if someone want to go in the direction of globalisation. At least it is seems like that for quite period of time ahead.

To adapt it self to globalisation, BiH needs more and more efforts – first from inside and then from the outside world.

On that way Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with the countries of directly bordering it – the SR of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia – and with them the other countries of the region of Southeast Europe will have to keep in mind that improving security inside and outside would also result in disarmament of the entire region (and not just BiH) and preventing any cause for a future regional conflict. It is true that with the end of the Cold War, regional conflicts have not stopped, especially in countries which have been living for a long period under the experience of a totalitarian regime of one or the other model – Yugoslav or Soviet. Under the circumstances of not giving the same quality of life and of human rights to all the people of the country, without equal rights in sharing the results of the development and with the large number of privileges and benefits for mainly just one or two nations (and not even for majority of them but for a small elite), the conflicts could become reality as happened in a most disastrous way in BiH.

These regional conflicts are closely followed by forced and unforced migration of the most capable inhabitants of a nation, something which is especially difficult for a small state. NATO is the last station on the way towards integration of BiH into the Euro-Atlantic institutions. To get there, BiH has to improve the internal conditions of the state and to gain attraction through applying for membership in the Partnership for Peace group first. In order to manage these issues, political stability as well as full implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords are the first tasks to be achieved. But with the help of international community it can be achieved - for the benefit of BiH. of the region and also for a prosperous and unified Europe from the Atlantic ocean to the Ural, as was predicted by the late president of France, General de Gaulle, a long time ago.

IV The Pact of Stability for Southeast Europe and its Impact on Speeding up the Process of Integration of BiH in EU and NATO

At least three groups of questions deserve to be taken into deep consideration when analysing this topic. They are:

1) Political Issues

These questions comprise:

The application of human rights, the implementation of a democratic multi-party system with free and transparent elections, an independent judicial system, a well organised administration and the police. One of the most significant characteristics of the Dayton Peace Accords is the acceptance by all relevant political players of the highest international standards regarding human rights, freedom liberty and other rights. 15 most important conventions and international covenants, including the European Human Rights Convention, the Covenant on the Social, Political and Economic Rights and the like, as indicated in Annex 1 to the Constitution of BiH constitute the legal system of BiH. The European Convention for human rights and basic freedom has the priority over all other laws and regulations of the country and is to be implemented directly. The BiH Constitution also contains the provision of preventing anybody to restrict the use of these rights. In that regard the Constitution of BiH serves to provide the foundation for the Court for human rights, consisting of distinguished domestic and foreign lawyers, as well as the institution of ombudsmen. It is also anticipated the application of different international mechanism as specified in those conventions and/or covenants.

But in practice this informative and institutional frame is considered as not sufficient and not effective for the protection of human rights. The main reasons for this are: BiH is a country undergoing a transition process. This will cause painful effects at first because of the huge devastation done by the aggression and war in Bosnia. Moreover, this will also mean that be heavy discrimination out of reasons of national status or religious faith. It is already the case in many examples when refugees and displaced people intend to go back to their homes, property, or apartments. This situation is increasing tensions and may cause severe social conflicts, unless both the national politicians of all the nations and the international community prevent it.

Concerning the other basic human rights and freedom like free multi-party elections, the fresh experience with the municipality election (April 2000) shows some sign of moves towards non- national parties, which means bringing together of all the national groupings. This is just a first sign. One has to be very careful in analysing its real effects. For more serious conclusions one is bound to wait for this year's coming general election when that or some other feeling could be of more value. Suggestions to organise an election for presidency at the same time should also be analysed seriously.

2) Military Issues

When Bosnia is concerned it is not any longer enough to consider only good co-operation of the high representatives of the military forces prevailing during their meetings, mainly in the presence of an SFOR representative. If there is any serious sign of real implementation of Annex 7 one must consider that it can only be really done under the condition of one joint military and police force. Without that it is hard to believe in a very positive impact of the Peace Accords.

The Dayton Peace Accords have defined the existence of three military formations and during the cease-fire they were considered as three enemy parties. But the Accord has also moved in the direction and the establishment of some specific institutions and the relationship between them on new concept and for whole country. This process was started in the Federation of BiH earlier including the foundation of the Armed forces of the Federation.

According to the Constitution of the Federation of BiH, and more specifically according to the document well known as Blair House, there is a developed procedure and defined plan of integration of the Army of BiH and the Croatian Council of Defence into united armed forces of BiH. In creating the unified defence and security system of BiH, the Constitution of BiH has established some basic principles. They are defined as follows:

1. All military forces in BiH will function in accordance with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH.
2. No entity will be under the threatened use of force or by the actual use of it from any the other entity,
3. The armed forces of one entity must be under no circumstances on the territory of any other entity without permission, not only from its government but also from the Presidency of BiH,
4. Every member of the Presidency, according to his official authorisation, is functioning as the civil supreme commander of the armed forces.
5. A permanent military committee is to be established with the task to co-ordinate the functioning of military forces of BiH. Members of presidency are the members of the permanent military committee. The Presidency is the body which has the right to nominate all other members of this committee. The members are the Ministers of Defence of the Entities and the Chiefs of General Staff of the entity armed forces.

This is the current situation. But although Bosnia and Herzegovina, or to be more specific, most of the main political players in the Federation and at a smaller number politicians in the Republika Srpska are willing to be included in the Euro-Atlantic military institutions, full integration is still far away. For an integration in the Partnership for Peace programme and NATO Bosnia has too many military forces. The international institutions are - among many other conditions - certain to insist on joint military forces with a joint command.

It is important to say that the activities of the OSCE, as far as regional security and the steps towards the implementation of the Pact for Stability in Southeast Europe are concerned are important steps into this direction, but will definitely have to progress further before an application for closer inclusion in the European institutions can be submitted.

3) Economic Issues and the Pact for Stability

The situation concerning the economic integration of the Southeast European region in the Euro-Atlantic economic group in near or more distant future is far from being clear. There are two groups of suggestions or proposals of how that might take place:

As to the countries of former Yugoslavia, the first group predicts that a new structure of the former country should be established in the form of a new community, flexible in its organisation and decentralised in its structure. Bearing this in mind, some of the sovereignty of the newly established states will have to be delegated to that new community, including: foreign policy, security, defence policy, monetary policy and joint supreme and constitutional court.

Second group proposes a so called Balkan Federation based on the principle that the passage to Europe goes via the Balkan countries.

Both of these hypotheses are not realistic. The suggestion of founding of a new joint country is almost ironic after what was done above all to Bosnia and Herzegovina, to some smaller extent to the Republic of Croatia, and most recently to the Kosovo. Under the aspects of the genocide, often committed in combination with rape (mainly) on the Bosniac population, the high number of refugees and displaced persons and their hurt feelings, in combination with hardly any of the indicted war criminals arrested and a lack of strictly democratic opposition to the regime in the SR of Yugoslavia, this proposal must be considered a humiliation and disgrace by the ordinary man. One should add that all the former country (mainly consisting of Serbs and Montenegrinians) wanted was to continue with their huge amount of privileges and incentives for their obedience to their superiors. With a few exceptions (in the last couple

years of the former country only the companies from BiH had a positive account in doing the business with foreign partners), the economy was able to compete on the world market for the simple reasons of heavy tax burdens, levies, etc being imposed on companies when establishing the production costs.

What is more unrealistic about this proposal is that it will have to integrate countries who have already made some steps on their approach to membership in European institutions: Slovenia, Croatia and recently Bosnia and Herzegovina through a specific arrangement with the European Union on non-tariff barriers for Bosnian products without time limitation. On the other side you have the economy of the SR of Yugoslavia which is still institutionalised within an outdated system, showing no aspiration for transition into the market economy system at all.

The second initiative of forming a Balkan Federation bears similar contra productive consequences, which in fact will make the national, cultural and religious differences more acute and lead to a higher level of animosity among the states.

It is a fact all those different state economies are caught in varying stages of transition and privatisation and are unable to meet the requirements which the EU has already laid down for potential new members from Central Europe (Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic). The EU will not change these conditions in near future, however, they may only become more complex for new potential members.

Concerning BiH, first and foremost harmonisation and implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords will be a long way to go. Some international representatives, with whom I fully agree, consider that the most suitable way for BiH when considering membership in EU is to accept it without delay and apply all the laws and regulation as all the other members have done right away. The other way can only be a very elongated approach.

V Instead of a Conclusion: What are the Prospects of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Future?

Bosnia and Herzegovina is small state if one counts the number of people. Recent estimates consider that today, just about 3.5 million people live in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Before the war, this figure stood at 4.4 million. The GDP per capita is about less than 1000 \$ in mid-2000. Moreover, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a small state in geographic terms with just about 51.000 sq. km. In all other respects, it must be considered a small country, too.

In addition, there is a huge devastation of about more than of 60 billion USD. Some analyst would not consider it correct as to count the inflow of the direct foreign investment as most active driving force for faster reconstruction and development. When observing the de facto political situation - which could be evaluated as not yet up to the standards of today's Europe — all this conveys a very depressive picture of the country.

But I do not think that this is the right impression. Not if the country — looking towards the future, but starting right at this moment - is prepared to do quite a few things: first and foremost, it will be necessary to persuade domestic politicians of all national groups to stick to more co-operation between each other and accept the help of Office of High Representative whose task is nothing but that.

If this is going to happen, everybody can expect the coming general election (November, 2000) will bring more light to Bosnia and Herzegovina, under which new political driving forces together with a more realistic approach of the national parties can run the country on the path to transition.

This will mean more democracy, full implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, specially of the Annex 7, and the readiness to establish joint armed and police forces. This can be starting point concerning internal security, including the right of each individual to move wherever he or she intends and to be, allow for full execution of the full spectrum of human rights but at least to those specified in the European Convention on basic human rights.

Besides, the Parliament should become more capable of promulgating quite a number of the laws and regulations, on the level of the state as well as on entity level, especially concerning a more transparent approach to the implementation of the privatisation process. These should also include more strict considerations of all possible ways to prevent corruption of the relevant bodies and institutions in the country and at all levels.

In this regard a very fresh decision by the OHR-Representative to promulgate a new law concerning the judiciary institutions, such as the election of the judges, their replacement, their salaries and the like will help to let things move in the right direction.

Other laws like those on foreign direct investments, specially those which are under the umbrella of the authorities of entities, have to be brought into the line with the laws of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Today there is paradoxical situation that on the one hand, the laws on the state level have been implemented in updated versions. On the other hand, the laws of the same content on the level of the entities do not comply at all with the corresponding state legislation. Everybody in the judicial profession knows that lower level laws must always comply with those of the higher level.

Other laws like those on custom duties are impossible to apply, no matter how good they are, unless the borders of the state are protected by appropriate police forces, as is the case all over the civilised world. Today, with no borders to the SR of Yugoslavia and with no well organised border controls to the Republic of Croatia, law and order in these regards are a very weak point. There is a high level of expectation that these nuisances will be removed soon as something which does not correspond to a well organised state.

With the above mentioned serving as examples for into which directions the further activities of the institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina should be moving, there is some real hope that we will be able to meet the requirements of what expected by the international community in the medium term. It is not true as mentioned in some quotes inside and outside BiH that in order to achieve these and many other objectives as soon as possible, the state should be placed under protectorate. This does certainly bear not truth for one reason: given a referendum asking whether the voters liked to see Bosnia and Herzegovina as a protectorate or not, only the Bosniacs would vote in favour. It is my believe that the majority of the Bosnian Serbs and quite a number of the Bosnian Croats would vote against any protectorate. These parts of the population still dream of being included in Serbia or Croatia.

Quite to the contrary, it is my strong believe that BiH should be taken in and treated as a member of the Euro-Atlantic institutions without delay. The rest of the issues to be dealt with could then be managed much faster from the position of a member of those institutions and organisations.

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3. Greek Views Concerning the Balkan Crisis

I Active Involvement

Generally, developments in the Balkans have major implications on Greece's national interests, and Greece has an obligation, as an active member of the EU, NATO and as a Balkan country that knows and understands the region better than other partners in the EU, to contribute multi-dimensionally to the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive European Union Policy. In recent EU meetings Greece presented various ideas and plans for a more active involvement of the EU in the Balkan Peninsula, in order to facilitate the positive developments for ending the crisis and the stalemate in one of the most war-torn corners of our planet. Athens has dynamically and credibly supported the stability, democracy, security and the respecting of human rights in the entire region.

Nowadays, the EU has the excellent and historic opportunity to increase its leverage in the Balkans and become a very stable and strong force, aiming at promoting a unified strategy that could include all disparate initiatives, presented at various times by specific governments as well regional institutions.

Three of the most crucial issues of strategic importance for long-term Balkan stability as well as for Greece's security are:

First: The future of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (predominantly the constitutional one). Even if one accepts that the current federal character of Yugoslavia has completed its post-war cycle, no one can deny the uncontrollable dissolution of FRY into independent states. The continuous fragmentation of FRY into weak state entities will be a permanent source of insecurity and instability. The EU and the broader international community should take a clear stand on this issue. The constitutional future of the FRY is predominantly a problem for the parties involved and should not result from unilateral actions of secessionism.

Second: The future status of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). According to various reports and statistical data, in few years, the composition of the population of FYROM will be dramatically altered. The demographic changes and the dynamic tendencies within the Albanian communities in the entire Balkan region (especially after the Kosovo crisis), in connection to the increasing number of irredentist tendencies could create further problems for the fragile mosaic of FYROM; FYROM's territorial integrity is of high importance for the national security of Greece. No one can be sure that the land-locked country will survive in the coming years. The EU and NATO should closely follow the developments there and act in a stabilising role.

Third: Developments in the Balkans, especially since the start of the Yugoslav break-up, insecurity, the lack of democratic norms and traditions and economic recession have all contributed to the rise of extreme nationalism, irredentism and secessionism as magic solutions and answers for solving these problems. Secessionism among various population groups is being directed by ultra-nationalist circles. The Balkan region should be an active sub-space of a European one, and therefore should not be acceptable in the form of ethnically "pure" states. On the contrary, the Balkan future should be based on democratic principles and promotion of multicultural societies.

The European Union, but also the Atlantic Alliance, should undertake a number of initiatives in three different directions:

- Formulating a (comprehensive) policy to strengthen the European orientation of the Balkans. The prospect of membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions is an extremely important issue and incentive. Athens can and should support the future entry of its neighbouring states to the EU and NATO.
- Enlarging and strengthening specific mechanisms for regional and sub regional co-operation, supporting democratic institutions and a comprehensive Balk vision and eliminating the economic crises, social underdevelopment and extended poverty.
- Guaranteeing the inviolability of the intra-Balkan borders and proposing an international conference to be held in Geneva or New York under the auspices of the UN (topics to be included such as fighting organised crime and Mafia introducing CSBMs, halting the proliferation of light weapons, supporting regional co-operative initiatives and environmental proposals. etc.). The European Union, through the Stability Pact (in which Greece is one of the most active and energetic member), and the Atlantic Alliance, through the Partnership for Peace programme, have the potential and power to contribute to the construction of a new “politico-economic and security environment“. Contemporary Greek economic and business activities in the Balkans could prove mutually profitable, while Greek investments in the region are “financial injections in stability, security and economic well-being of the regional populations“.

II Proposals

- There is an urgent need for the full implementation of UN Security Council Draft Resolution 1244, without delay and without “holes“, if we wish to create a multiethnic Kosovo, with respect for human rights and for safeguarding the rights of the Serbs and other communities. Albanian Kosovars should learn to respect the internationally - accepted human rights, guarantee the return of all refugees to their homes and ensure the participation of all citizens in the local elections and institutions.
- The European countries should support the moderate forces among Serbs and Albanians in the Kosovo (e.g. the Serbs of *Gracanica* and others). They should offer them real responsibilities within the democratic functioning of local-regional authorities. In the light of democratic developments in Serbia, and by taking into consideration certain aspects of the so-called *Rambouillet* agreements, the future regime of Kosovo might be decided at least in the mid-term through negotiations. Unilateral actions by whatever circles must be avoided. A change in the Serbian regime will hopefully end the isolation of the FRY from the rest of the world. Then the existing sanctions should be lifted as soon as possible. The European Union should start immediately to reinforce ailing Serbia with massive package of economic and humanitarian aid.
- Channels of further communication in accordance with the Stability Pact should be set up, such as contacts among young people, churches, NGOs, universities, municipalities, military-to-military contacts etc. The European Union has an historic opportunity through the Stability Pact to fully contribute to democratic developments in Yugoslavia and to stability, peace and growth in the Balkans. Security and peace will be the normal state of affairs and relations in Southeast Europe and Greece has a major and key-role to play in the Balkans and the Adriatic-Mediterranean.

Greece has played a prominent role in the Balkans during the last years, by:

- Supporting the deployment of KFOR troops through operation *Joint Guardian* from *Thessaloniki* via FYROM to Kosovo.

- Promoting a lot of trilateral meetings with Bulgaria and Turkey at the *Evros* area and with Albania and FYROM at the *Prespes Lake* at various levels.
- Participating actively and multi-dimensionally in the peacekeeping and humanitarian operations SFOR (Bosnia), ALBA (Albania) and AFOR (Albania, during the Kosovo crisis).
- Involving itself in the Southeast Multinational Brigade Act PSO HUMOPs.
- Establishing a considerable number of bilateral military and support agreements with its neighbours and fully supporting various European and NATO initiatives in the Balkans. Together with the Russian Federation, Switzerland and the Czech Republic contributed a lot to the relief of Kosovar refugees.
- Engaging itself in an active and positive Defence Diplomacy in the entire region (at MoD and General Staff level).

Greece remained and remains wholeheartedly committed to the Atlantic and European ideas and policies. As a country with a long history and involvement in the region, Greece is a factor of stability, security and prosperity as well a promoter of economic and sustainable development throughout the entire region. Democratic Greece is an active participant in and member of the EU and NATO and undoubtedly needs the support of all countries to succeed in the long way to peace and security in the Balkans and Southeast Europe.

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4. Balancing Security and Region-Building Information about Southeast Europe

I Introduction

The aim of this short paper is to reach a broad range of “information masters and servants“, producing or utilising information on Southeast European (SEE) affairs — official decision-makers, including, defence analysts, intelligence sources, diplomats and politicians; media and NGO representatives; internet information users and providers; and last but not least — the academic community of researchers, lecturers and students dealing with this region.

The reason of targeting such a broad audience stems from the understanding of how important the particular Balkan situation is today for different decision-making processes, and from the need of improving the cognitional element of the perceptions about Southeast Europe on which longer-term psychological inclinations are based. Both reasons have a direct impact on the knowledge formation of the region of Southeast Europe.

Addressing these issues to the Working Group on Crisis Management in SEE is motivated furthermore by the need to improve the structure of the information management in the field of security in the Balkans. On several occasions during the last century, including the last decade, there was a tendency to shape the notion of the invariant nature of the conflicts and crises in the Balkans or Southeast Europe. It is hard to disagree that crisis management in Southeast Europe is and will continue to be a viable academic and practical undertaking for many people, because it is needed for coping with dramatic and tragic social events in this region. However, the longer-term political and strategic objective of the majority of the interested countries in and out of the region of SEE is the reduction of the causes, leading to the application of the crisis-management tools. This prospect is directly linked to the transformation of the Balkans into a normal and compatible European region. For years to come the security information of the Balkans will remain an inevitable part of our life. But the future, whose prerequisites are shaped today, is linked with the social practices of region building. That is why the definition of the appropriate balance of information on security and region-building in SEE in each particular situation is a significant component of the general information management process in the field of security policy in this region.

II Basic Presumptions of the Research Report

The improvement of the information management structure in the field of security policy in SEE may be carried out along three lines that also determine the logic of this paper:

First, both information and perception influence the knowledge, the decisions and the activities based upon them.¹ That is why perceptions of the Balkans should assume a more sophisticated contents, that would reflect the richness of factors determining the regional social, political and security developments. This is crucial in preventing information delivery or perception attacks transformed into miscalculations about strategy, concrete decision or into an incorrect cognition. Situational awareness, experienced by the people engaged with the Balkans necessitates a comprehensive and encompassing picture rather than certain

¹ See more in: Henrik Friman. Perception Warfare: a Concept for the Future. in: J. M. J. Bosch, H. A. M. Luijff and A. R. Mollema (eds.). “Information Operations”, NLARMS 1999. Breda. p. 13-19.

outlines. And what has happened with the SEE region in the last decade was that it was identified with former Yugoslavia. The term “Western Balkans” correctly differentiates the zone with predominantly security-flowing information from the rest of the region, dominated by region-building information. The challenge for the observer and for the “doer“ is to sense the post-conflict reconstruction developments in the Western zone and the security risks in the non-western part of the Balkan peninsula while reflecting Southeast Europe in its thoroughness.

Second, the information management in the field of security policy in SEE may be facilitated through a better balance of security and region-building information, a mid-to-longer term breaking of the mental and practical vicious cycle of conflict-hostile perception-threatening behaviour traditional for the Balkans and a more intense conflict.²

The “region-building” ingredient of the information and the perception of Southeast Europe may be a practical instrument of introducing a different perspective of the security developments in the Balkans. Drawing the vicious cycle in greater details may look like this: conflict => hostile perception => threatening behaviour => more hatred => acts of cruelty => acts of revenge => a more intense, even violent conflict. The key question is how to switch from a threatening to a more conciliatory behaviour. A recent step in the right direction in Kosovo, for example, has been the adoption of new rules by the Interim Administrative Council (IAC), governing hateful speech on Kosovo’s broadcast media, though no corresponding rules exist for print media. A similar, but much broader and with multiple follow-ups was the beginning of the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations. Our concept is that the change of behaviour from a threatening type to a conciliatory one (including the so much needed historical reconciliations and rapprochements in the Balkans) is linked to presenting and proving there are more options for all – not in the field of conflicting attitudes, but in the area of constructive efforts. This holds true both for the bottom-up regional developments and for the top-down ones, i.e. for the relations inside the Southeast European region and for the relations of external for the region countries with the Balkan peoples. The concept is valid both from the perspective of improving the negotiation-management tools for Southeast European cases and from the sociological perspective of exerting an effort towards coping with the retarded modernisation of the region in comparison to other European regions in terms of economy, technology, infrastructure, social and human standards, political culture. The first perspective would mean introducing a broader range of positive incentives in handling the various and complicated conflict situations. The second one shows the way of making a breakthrough in the historical evolution of the region towards a compatible and needed part of the rest of Europe.

Third, the balance of the information on security and region-building issues of Southeast Europe is a significant aspect of the improvement of information management in the field of security policy in the region because it reflects the two dominating historical developments of the Balkans today: a) coping with its various hot and potential conflicts and, b) overcoming the region’s belated modernisation.³

² See also about this issue in: P. Terrence Hopmann, *The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts*. University of South Carolina Press. Columbia. 1996. p. 120-132

³ See: Pl. Pantev, *Legitimizing Sub-regionalism: Envolving Perception, Initiative and Approaches to Subregional Relations in Southeast Europe*. in: R Dwan (ed.). “Building Security in Europe’s New Borderlands: Subregional Cooperation in the Wider Europe“. M. E. Sharpe. Armonk. New York. London. England. .1999. p. 95-116; *Southeast Europe: Ideas for Overcoming the Belated Modernization of the Region*. in: *International Relations*. 1/1999. p. 109-114

As already underlined, crisis management remains an indispensable political and strategic instrument. The knowledge and information about the two tendencies, discussed in this paper can be importantly utilised in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction activities. Both conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction are meaningful factors of preventing crises and crises-management losses.

III Practical Issues of the Interaction of the Security and the Region-Building Information about Southeast Europe

First, the interaction and the eventual balancing of the security and the region-building information about Southeast Europe reflects the general tendencies of the respective government's information policy and the broader political objectives of the state. This is easily illustrated by the information policy of the *Milošević* regime. One aspect of this policy is the tendency to underestimate the bottom-up regional efforts of the Balkan governments but the Serbian one to take the initiative in improving the Balkan co-operation and the historical fate of the region on the basis of the standards of democracy and Human rights. A recent meeting of the Prime-Ministers of the countries in Bucharest in February 2000, participating in the so called "Sofia Process of Stability and Co-operation" definitely showed the Balkan countries do not want to do business with the regime of *Milošević*: due to the situation in FRY the Romanian hosts did not invite a Yugoslav representation. The reaction of Belgrade was of playing down the importance of the meeting. But the meeting was important because it added to the legitimising of regional co-operation and of the solidarity of the Yugoslav neighbours against the repressive regime.

Example number two: the Russian information policy about the Balkans. The region badly needs big economic projects and investments. Russia has been primarily engaged in conflict management participation – in SFOR, KFOR, trading armaments with Cyprus, etc. What has been missing was engagement with longer-term constructive projects of support for the economic prosperity of the Balkans. In an interview to a Yugoslav official journal Deputy Foreign-Minister of Russia, Alexander Avdeev announced Russia intends to stimulate economic co-operation in the Balkans within 10-15 years, with Yugoslavia as the focus of that cooperation.⁴ No word is mentioned about the character of the regime Russia is ready to support. But clearly the Russian economic plans are opposed to the Stability Pact for SEE that leaves Yugoslavia, according to him in isolation.

Where is the point? In the fact that Russia, a great power and an old player in the Balkans is entering the region-building field in a conflicting pattern, opposed to the parties of the Pact of Stability for SEE of which Moscow is also a member. The worst of the recipes for the Balkans is to have the great powers of Europe and the world involved with the region in a conflicting manner. The past experience has shown the result is the "Balkanisation" of the region, i. e. the fragmentation of the region and local wars. Mr. Avdeev promises that Yugoslavia could become the gas distributor for all other Balkan countries: A similar promise, stemming from his Ministry when he was Ambassador of Russia to Sofia in the mid 90s, was given to the Bulgarians. After Bulgaria disagreed with the terms of the project and later demanded a NATO membership the same promise was shifted to another eventual key-partner in the Balkans. Russia is a great state needed in the Balkans, but not for the sake of building sophisticated balances of power that have traditionally led to disasters and to the

⁴ See: Russia - Reliable Friends of Yugoslavia. Interview & Alexander Avdeev First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, in: Review of International Affairs. Vol L-LI No 1087-88. December 1999-January 2000, p.24-25

absence of a regional economic space in the end of the 20th century. Any great power and centre of economic might is welcome in Southeast Europe, but only as a contributor to the gradually accumulating integration potential for membership in the EU and NATO. The Balkans need these anchors of stability and guarantors of prosperity and any external to the region power should assimilate this necessity. Unless the respective great power elects to be hated and discarded by the people of the region. Hence, an effective information policy should be adapted to these regional needs.

Second, the dilemmas of the long-term engagement of NATO and the EU in Southeast Europe. This issue has a key role both for the security and the region-building information about the Balkans. Though it is logically linked to the previous issue – of the general political objectives of the governments of the respective countries that have engaged with the Balkans, it bears the risk of turning into a de-motivating factor for the stability and progress of the region.

The overcoming of the economic, technological, infrastructure, social and political retardation of the region is invariably linked by the Balkan governments with a lasting benign engagement with Southeast Europe. It is a legitimate and sovereign right, for example, of the US Administration and Congress to withdraw from the Balkans after the presidential elections. The unclear part of this scenario is who will fill the vacuum on security and, to some extent, on region-building issues the Americans will create, if they withdraw. The people in SEE are not sure if this is an internal American problem or an issue between the USA and the EU. The pledge of NATO that KFOR will stay as long as needed for the stability of the Balkans is perceived seriously, in earnest by many Balkan people and analysts. Any demonstration of dubiousness on future attitude to the Balkans by US politicians or EU member-state representatives tends to ruin what has been already done. The least of the negative results is the prolongation of the *Milošević* regime. What matters more is the political credibility of the political and social forces in all the other Balkan countries that have undertaken the long-term effort of homogenising the societies of Southeast Europe and slowly, but purposefully are trying to turn the region into a security community, compatible with the rest of Europe. The information management of security policy in SEE faces a real problem in that area.

Third and last, the success of the Pact of Stability for SEE has a key role in promoting both conflict-prevention efforts and post-conflict rehabilitation in the region.

The international community agreed to provide financial and technical help and the leaders of the countries of the region agreed to initiate reforms to create conditions conducive to development. The Pact of Stability for SEE is a catalyst for co-operation, bringing the states and societies of the region closer together, facilitating the learning of the difficult lesson that thinking and acting in the Balkans as a team would turn into an individual success for each of the countries. Furthermore, the Stability Pact is the catalysing factor that gives the upper hand to the future prospects for the people in the region while narrowing the meaning of past grievances. By tradition in the Balkans the latter have obscured the importance of the former.

An effective Information management on Southeast European issues in the area of security and region-building should become the needed catalyst for the success of the Stability Pact. It would turn into the practical contribution to preventing crisis-management situations and eventual losses, stemming from such contingencies.

IV Conclusions

Part of the efforts on information management in the field of security policy in the Southeast European region should be devoted to preventing crisis-management situations and the losses with which they are usually linked. Conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation are significant tools in that aspect. The latter are dependent on the ways security is guaranteed and region-building is carried out. A balanced approach to informing on these two aspects of the crisis-prevention activity has the potential to become part of a longer-term information and perception formation strategy about the region of Southeast Europe for EU, NATO and PfP countries.

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5. The Disintegration Process in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

I Introduction

The disintegration process in the FRY is a continuing process since Kosovo Albanians have started to fight for independence. It is difficult to set a starting point because the origins of the ethnic rivalry and demands for independence are a continuous issue. The FRY was established on 27. April 1992 and on its birthday the disintegration process had already started. It started in Kosovo and later spread to Montenegro. The main reason was *Milošević* nationalistic, unitaristic and aggressive, non-democratic policy toward Kosovo Albanians. The main occasion was the abolition of the autonomous status of Kosovo in 1989 even before the FRY had been established.

II Kosovo

Kosovo became a Serbian colony where ethnic Albanians who represent 90 percent of the Kosovo population were ruled by Serbs. Albanians created parallel state institutions and tried to establish local authorities on a short term and a sovereign national state on a long-term. Their peaceful resistance and political fight for their rights and independence under the leadership of *Ibrahim Rugova* caused only more Serbian repression. Such violent political and security environment stimulated the appearance of KLA in 1998 and change in Kosovo Albanians policy - from political fight to armed confrontation with Serbian police and military forces. Serbian response can be described more like ethnic cleansing supported by military and police forces than an adequate response to KLA activities.

The situation in Kosovo and in the FRY as a whole suggests that the disintegration process will continue. It is just a question how, when and to which extent the process will continue and what implications it will have on the security and stability of the Southeast European region.

III Montenegro

The situation in Montenegro is very much different from the situation in Kosovo. Montenegrins don't have ethnic or territorial disputes with Serbs but rather political and economic ones. The new Montenegro government under the leadership of Mr. Milo Đukanović and the Montenegrin people are feeling trapped in *Milošević's* unitaristic policy in which they can not see any future for the prosperity of the nation. So the reasons for planning independence are different from those of Kosovo Albanians. These facts can fill US U with optimism that the separation of Montenegro from the FRY can still be stopped and the disintegration process limited on Kosovo. The preconditions for such limited disintegration process are democratic changes in Serbia and the removal of *Milošević* regime. These changes could shape a political atmosphere of dialogue between Serbia and Montenegro to create federation or confederation of two sovereign nations on a completely new democratic basis.

IV Rambouillet and Dayton

However, the past conflict and the political situation in Kosovo give us no reason for optimism. All political parties in the Kosovo are in favour of an independent Kosovo and the majority of the population supports them. The political leaders don't have any space for political manoeuvring. The return of Serbian police and military forces even just for guarding the borders (according to Chapter 2, Article VI of the so-called *Rambouillet Accords* dating from February 23, 1999) seems to be impossible. It would lead to new conflicts between Serbs and Albanians. Serbian presence in the region would cause a new crisis in Kosovo and a destabilisation of the region. The fact is that Serbs and Kosovo Albanians couldn't reach an agreement of how to live together in a common state for a century. It is most likely that they will not be able to reach an agreement in the future, especially after the last war. Because all these facts we can assess that Kosovo as an integral part of the FRY is more wish of international community and Serbian obsession than reality. It is also impossible to make any serious comparison to the situation in BiH. Moreover, the solutions (the *Dayton Peace Accords*) used in BiH can not be used for Kosovo. The *Rambouillet Accords* which were based on the constitutional rights of Kosovo (autonomy) referring to the 1974 constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is out of date and is not a proper solution of a future status of Kosovo. Kosovo as an autonomous republic in the FRY would be a republic just on paper, which will function as an independent state. Such a situation would make Kosovo a time bomb triggering a new crisis in the region. I am convinced that these accords would no longer be acceptable for Kosovo Albanians. They are simply not enough. They do not give enough guarantees for a certain secession in the future.

In the end the international community will have to face this fact and the new reality even if it may have some negative impacts on the region and will change the geopolitical map of Southeast Europe. The most important task of the international community is to give assistance to both sides to reach some kind of solution for peaceful disintegration. Such a plan should be a step by step process that will guarantee that nobody is a winner or loser. That means that the Serbian minority will have all rights according to international standards and that the FRY will have free access to their historical important sites. Also a fair agreement regarding natural resources and transportation routes must be achieved. Security guarantees are also very important, not just for Serbia and Kosovo, but for the entire region.

V Answers

If we take in consideration the prediction that FRY will disintegrate to a certain extent, we must find answers what are the implications of this future reality to the security of the region.

First: There should be no doubt that the Kosovo Albanians will re-establish close ties with neighbouring Albania with very little or even no border control. This could cause a threat of importation of organised crime of all kinds from neighbouring Albania and through Kosovo into western and central European countries. Open borders would also mean a threat of illegal or uncontrolled migration. Such threats would have a negative impact on the fragile democracy in the Kosovo, economic and security situation and could cause major instability in the country.

Second: Such a situation will have possible negative impacts on neighbouring Macedonia. It is a question how the Albanian minority in Macedonia will react. It is well known that the Macedonian Albanians also cherish a hope to integrate parts of territories where they are the majority with territories where other Albanians are living today. The least possible demands will be close ties with Kosovo what means loose border control and threat of illegal migrations from Albania and Kosovo. Such migration waves could easily change the demographic

picture in Macedonia and cause further ethnic tensions between Macedonians and the Albanian minority. In such a Situation Macedonia could be easily destabilised and become a new potential security risk for the region. The Kosovo crisis could easily move to Macedonia.

VI Future Perspectives

The shapers of political long-term solutions of Kosovo Question must take all these negative impacts into consideration. They must find proper solutions to minimise the risks. Long-term solutions are still far in the future.

However, there is no doubt that a further disintegration of the FRY without presence of international peacekeeping forces in Kosovo and without NATO military deterrence against Serbian military forces will lead to the use of force. The consequences would be horrible not just for the people in FRY but for the whole region. The current situation must be used for finding peaceful and democratic solutions for the Kosovo question and for the future stability of the FRY and the whole region. This is the main and the only sense for international military presence in the region and all other humanitarian and other post conflict assistance.

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6. Security Issues of Yugoslavia with the Changes in South-East Europe

I Introduction

There are a number of reasons why it could be reasonably stated that the tectonic geopolitical changes that have occurred in the last decade are unique in the political history of Europe and the world so far. To this it shall be added that, for a scientific study of the case, a certain historic distance is required to allow the researcher to distinguish more reliably between those aspects of events being “occurrences of longer duration” within a dense “dust of events” on the one hand and the chronological history, so rapidly taking place in front of our eyes, on the other.

Still, within the decade following downfall of the so-called bipolarism having already passed, certain specifics have become already very much evident: globality in spatial scope, whereby changes in any area of this time truly a world system, have effect upon the system as a whole can be understood and, even more important, intentions exist by those who are decisively shaping the distribution of power and mainframe of the overall system to impose primarily their vested interests, targets and values to each part of the System.

Such attempts, when the concept of international system is concerned, to “chain link“ parts of the system into its whole until the distinctions of such parts become unrecognisable, logically viewed, lead to complete amorphousness of the system’s structure. Viewed through any of its part, thus its whole becomes “visible” - *pars pro toto*.

II The International Order has Changed

Bearing the above stated in mind, when the subjects of the international system are concerned, another specific of the changes in the last decade becomes apparent: the changes that are taking place are not only in building a new order of states in the world system’s hierarchy ladder, but a new, all encompassing civilisation model is being established which does not provide for sovereign states as the main subjects of international relations any more. The previous international order of about two hundred sovereign states is being “ironed out” by a technologically unrestrained globalisation process. This conflict of the old, but not “obsolete”, system of states and the peculiar “global consumer society” in the final form, objectives and consequences of which are difficult to predict at present, is exposed in particular by the controversial role of the United Nations, the leading world organisation, that had epitomised the world order of sovereign states as its main factors until the end of the “cold war“.

This brief, apparently redundant, “excursion“ through the “icy deserts of abstractions” (*Adorno*) of international relations is an unavoidable introduction and sets the framework for any valid analysis and understanding of security issues facing the FR of Yugoslavia and the countries of Southeast Europe in the post-bipolar era. Involved here, *inter alia*, are the deadly issues not only of theory and philosophy, but, even more, of the “actual truth of the cause” (*verita effeualle delle cose*) of the current international relations.

There are reasons, therefore, in the claim that the NATO military intervention against the FR of Yugoslavia without a mandate from the UN Security Council represents the final blow (*coup de grace*) to the international order of sovereign states, institutionally and legally

supported by the United Nations. It can be clearly seen that much bigger cards are “on the table” than the simple security of one particular state.

The bombing intervention that, in the words of leaders of this currently mightiest military-political alliance, was launched “for humanitarian causes” had surfaced numerous new and important issues which, when the FR of Yugoslavia, Southeast and the entire Europe are concerned, expose major uncertainties to us. The newly created state of the matter, in respect of the FR of Yugoslavia’s security, is much more complex and contains realistic hazards that, according to the “domino theory“, threaten the peace and stability within the region and far outside it. These are the matters that are being studied in detail at the Institute of Geopolitical Studies in Belgrade within a number of its research projects.

III What is the crux of the matter?

Even if we accept, in the final analysis that humanitarian reasons as the cause of military intervention had preponderance over the respect of the UN international and legal order and that these reasons existed as such, the situation created in the Southern Serbian province testifies that none of the alleged causes for intervention had not been real. To this date, the multinational forces under the UN flag, the civil administration and the so called protective forces, have failed to meet their obligations assumed under the Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council.

After all, Kosovo and Metohija have failed to become, even symbolically, a multiethnic, multicultural and multi-religious community. Violence, murders, kidnapping, abductions and harassment of the non-Albanian population are the order of the day which, unfortunately, international forces are unable to put a stop to. The monuments of Serbian material and spiritual culture are being erased with the intent to completely obliterate the traces of eight centuries of the presence of the Serb nation in Kosovo and Metohija. A contribution to that drive, among other things, is the renaming of the UÇK into a quasi-protective force - in contravention of the UNSC Resolution 1244 and the *Kumanovo* military-technical accord.

Should the most responsible international factors, by their doing or failing to do, allow the process of ethnic cleansing of non-Albanian population in Kosovo and Metohija to be completed, that will, whether we like it or not, widely open the gates for “Greater Albania“. Such a development of events that means the possible breakdown of the FR of Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity will have tragic effects on the peace and security of the entire region. Any revision of the “bloody borders” (Huntington) in the Balkans will inevitably lead to a war of unforeseeable dimensions. For its prevention the major responsibility rests with multinational forces stationed in this Serbian province. Already now, we are witnessing - due to the inefficiency of KFOR and UNMIK — a major spill-over of crime, drugs, arms and white slavery trading, as well as an unchecked movement of people between the FR of Yugoslavia (Kosovo & Metohija), Albania and Macedonia. Albania proper represents a particular threat to the stability and security of all countries in the region, being a country in a chronic state of disorder and a traditional and current trouble-maker in the Balkans.

The necessary precondition to overcome this state of affairs is the strict observation of the UNSC Resolution 1244 and the creation of conditions for the return of all non-Albanian exiles, regardless of their national and religious affiliation and a guarantee of the basic human rights to all inhabitants of the province. To that effect, the return of Yugoslav border troops and police, pursuant to the Resolution 1244, would have a favourable effect on the stabilisation of the province, with simultaneous support by international factors to moderate political forces and their representatives within the Albanian community in Kosovo and Metohija.

IV Conclusion

Unavoidable roles of the USA and the Russian Federation, a prominent place in management of the crisis in that part of the FR of Yugoslavia should be played by the OSCE, the EU and particularly by interested European states. Without proper involvement of all factors mentioned above, Yugoslav, European and global, it will not be possible to stabilise the situation within and without the region. The specifics of the post-cold war international order and management of this and similar crises, as discussed at the outset of this paper, clearly test us to interdependence, not yet known elsewhere, of local, regional and world stability and security.

Therefore, when the stabilisation of the situation created by the NATO intervention against the FR of Yugoslavia is concerned, it is imperative that local (FR of Yugoslavia) and regional factors (European states, institutions and organisations) should confirm their political and strategic identities in this part of the world.

Specifically, co-ordination of the three interdependent levels of international system is *conditio sine qua non* of the stability and security of the world as a whole and of any of its parts. This means, for instance, that the administrative border between Kosovo and Metohija and central Serbia - five kilometres on either side - can be effectively guarded from terrorist acts and conflict spill-overs outside the province by co-operation between the Yugoslav army and the multinational forces.

Accordingly, if we honestly wish for peace and co-operation in Europe, the obvious dead end faced by international military, civil and police forces that seriously threatens the stability and security of the entire region, can and must be overcome by strict adherence to the UNSC Resolution 1244 and relevant agreements, by all factors of the three levels stated. By the same token, this is the only way not to jeopardise the created ratio of power in Europe and the existing institutional, legal and security frameworks. With respect to this issue, the FR of Yugoslavia has fulfilled all its undertaken obligations and rightly expects support of the fact by all European factors, seeking peace and co-operation.

Resolving of the above enumerated security and political issues, among other things, is a precondition for the successful implementation of the Southeast European Security Pact, for sincere striving for co-operation among the nations of this region and for their inclusion in the community of European nations which should not exclude any country within the region, but must not encourage separatisms and meddle in the sovereign political will of any nation.

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7. The Harmonisation Tendency towards NATO in Southeast Europe - the Bulgarian Point of View

I Introduction

I will draw the attention to the fact that Southeast Europe needs a comprehensive approach in order to overcome the problems and to achieve long-lasting stability to ensure peace, security, prosperity and development of the region as an indivisible part of the European continent.

The promotion of security and stability and the improvement of its crisis management capabilities are the main goals of the countries in Southeast Europe. Facing the new requirements to operate and co-operate effectively and to be better prepared for the future security challenges, the countries from this region have set new patterns of partnership fostering the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. An effective stimulating and practical tool to achieve regional stability and closer co-operation could become the development of readiness and capability to prevent crises and co-operate in regional crisis management.

A common Partnership Goal, with the support and expertise of NATO, is to be established and an adequate network to “warn” in due time, co ordinate and in case of emergency Pool and focus the needed forces and resources has to be built.

II Euro-Atlantic Values

The Southeast European Co-operation Process (accepted at the last NATO Summit in Washington as contributing to the Alliance’s effort to enhance regional security) can be viewed as one of the main existing high level regional crisis management forums. It proves and gives the backbone to implement in practice the determination of the leaders in the SEECP to further consolidate the co-operation so that the Euro-Atlantic values of peace, democracy, prosperity and respect for Human rights take root in Southeast Europe.

In that respect NATO deserves high appreciation in providing the general security framework for peace and stability-building activities in the region. Particular importance should be attached to the increased co-operation with NATO on security matters in the region, by participating in its specific mechanisms such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Partnership for Peace Program and the Consultative Forum on Security Matters launched by the Alliance following its Washington Summit.

I would like to underline the importance of the dialogue on the ways and means to improve co-ordination and synergy of activities and resources dedicated to regional defence and security co-operation with a view to enhancing the contribution of participating states to security and stability in Southeast Europe.

New opportunities for the region have emerged with the important and timely NATO SEE Initiative and the development of the Stability Pact process. Without doubt, implementation of the Pact’s objectives will rely on already existing frameworks for co-operation avoiding unnecessary duplication of efforts. Valuable and highly commended is the role of the Southeast European Defence Ministerial for the security dimension of our countries’ co-operation.

Taking into consideration the commonality of the security challenges in our region, the necessity of finding flexible common mechanisms for their neutralisation has emerged as a leading priority. The establishment of the Multinational Peace Force in South Eastern Europe (MPFSEE) is a bench mark in this respect. The political grounds, incentives and goals of the States-Parties to the Agreement on the MPFSEE are clearly stated by themselves in the preamble of the Agreement. It is explicitly declared that political-military co-operation is a key element in strengthening the European capabilities in the fields of security and defence. It is important to bear in mind that the states as well as the parties have declared their commitment to enhance interoperability based on NATO standards and to the regional security and stability, and commitment to foster good neighbourly relations among the countries of Southeast Europe in the context of the Southeast Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM) process and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in the spirit of Partnership for Peace (PfP). The role and the significance of the MPFSEE in the political decision making process in Southeast Europe is probably most clearly revealed by the mechanism for political and military consultations, exchange information and decision making, provided for in the Agreement itself.

III Priority Interest

An important area of priority interest which should be pointed out is the regional co-operation in the field of civil-military emergency planning and disaster relief. The development of an integrated approach to crisis management and the improvement of awareness of potential problems are key issues of crisis prevention.

We need more harmonised efforts to:

- Develop a maximum degree of publicity and public knowledge on civil military activities related to crisis management.
- Institutionalise information exchange within Southeast Europe on military reform issues.
- Harmonise education - prepare the required manpower to accomplish both Alliance's new missions and collective defence, as well as be able to operate in multinational staffs following NATO procedures. Special emphasis should be given to professional and language training for the needs of the Services, and for working a multinational environment.
- Establish a crisis management information network system and develop mechanisms and procedures for action in possible crises situations.
- An important and essential area for the co-operating countries could be meeting NATO standards in the field of security through legislative adaptation and institutional development of mechanisms for the protection of classified information.

Some of the key considerations in weighing these options are their burden-sharing implications. And burden-sharing should be understood broadly to comprise not only direct costs but also benefits.

A major contribution to the stability is to identify together the risks and challenges, streamline the assessments, create the necessary regional and partnership objective awareness of problems, ensure common understanding, use and implement unified doctrines and terms, promote and back up co Operation efforts and foster a co-operative attitude by the International organisations and NGOs.

IV Conclusion

For Bulgaria membership in NATO is a strategic priority and a definite choice. In regional terms the priorities of Bulgaria's policy focus on enhancing relations with all countries in Southeast Europe with a view to further security and confidence building, and envisage active involvement in the processes of SEE integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

To conclude my remarks, I would like to stress and underline that the new European security architecture cannot be successfully established without laying proper grounds in the Southeast part of the continent.

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8. The Impact of the Kosovo Conflict on Macedonia: Between the Hammer and the Anvil

I International responses to the Kosovo crisis and the position of Macedonia

Since the beginning of the Yugoslav drama, numerous security organisations have proven incapable both in early warning and action, conflict- and violence-prevention and conflict management. Having lacked a global and strategic view on the Yugoslav conflicts the so-called international community most often behaved as a fireman putting out one fire after another. The general impression is that what has been going in the region may be named conflict mismanagement. The Macedonian and the Kosovo cases may illustrate two contrasting approaches toward prevention of immediate break out of a violent conflict. The Macedonian case is usually considered a clear success on the ground, even though there are no established, agreed-upon criteria on how to measure the success of preventive missions. Of course, one can argue that the very absence of violent conflict is the main criterion - but then, what is the time perspective? But a success must also include guarantees that peace is likely to prevail long time after the termination of a mission.

The analysis of the character and de facto changing mandate of the UN preventive deployment in Macedonia (UNPREDEP) might prove that this unique mission was stationed for totally wrong reasons, based on a deficient diagnosis of the conflict: it was established to prevent external aggression from the north when this was a highly unlikely scenario - and thus turned its back to conflict potentials inside Macedonia. As time passed, fortunately the mandate was transformed and focused on internal conflict mitigation, but officially this has been admitted neither by UN officials nor by the Macedonian government. So the much-praised political will among all the relevant factors in Macedonia was based on a blurred conception of the real mandate of the mission. Undoubtedly, UNPREDEP's overall achievements were positive; but it did not succeed in really alleviating the internal conflict potential or to address the root causes of the conflicts. Basic problems are still immediate, and there is no conflict transformation or conflict-resolution on the horizon. The greatest achievement of this early action was the avoidance of use of pressure or threats toward the parties in the dispute and on different segments in the Macedonian society. Interestingly, it contained elements of real preventive diplomacy on the ground and - more important - it was diplomacy not backed by force.

From a wider point of view, the main limitation of this mission of preventive peacekeeping was that it was tied to one state's territory but having to deal with a problem that connects with several territories. With the 1999 developments in Kosovo - which were very predictable and warned against by many for years - there is a need for re-evaluating the achievements and results of the UN mission in Macedonia. It is crystal clear that Macedonia needs some sort of mechanism for conflict-mitigation and conflict-transformation within its own society. In addition, Macedonia itself and the region as a whole would benefit greatly if this mission had been extended in time to cover also Kosovo. The fatal delay of numerous and possible types of conflict-prevention in Kosovo jeopardised the situation in Macedonia. Without some corresponding or integrated mission on the other side of the border, UNPREDEP was not able to fulfil its mandate, as much as one would have wished.

The outbreak of open and a large-scale violence in the Serbian province of Kosovo in early 1998 was the final evidence that international responses to this conflict had been unsuitable and/or tardy. With his non-violent politics, the leader of the Kosovo Albanians, *Ibrahim*

Rugova “bought” sometime for the international community in a very critical moment of escalation of the war in Croatia and Bosnia. The outbreak of violence in Kosovo was among the most predictable events in the world. Despite loud early warnings about this conflict, there was no early action. The period of several years gave enough time to the international players to implement some form of conflict prevention, but the opportunity was missed. Both the Yugoslav (Serbian) regime and the international community looked satisfied with the situation on the ground, relying all the time on common sense of the confronted peoples and parties. Indeed, for several years there existed a unique model of hostile coexistence, i.e. a low degree of friction and apparent stability of the Serbian-Albanian dualism in Kosovo.

After NATO intervention over Yugoslavia, it is reasonable to ask whether miscalculations of the so-called international community were result of its short-sighted and very often divergent policies toward Kosovo crisis, or there was something more in the background, something more deliberate in terms of a long-term strategy. The attitude towards the Serbian regime has been inconsistent and unprincipled since the beginning of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia. From one side, the West has treated *Milošević* as “a butcher in the Balkans” and the Serbs have been demonised as the only guilty ones in the highly complex conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia.

At the same time, the so-called international community accepted *Milošević*'s signature on the Dayton Peace Accords, considering that he was the main guarantor that the agreement would be implemented. During this period, the international community was deeply aware of the situation in Kosovo, but intentionally turned its blind eye to it. Actually, it tolerated the Serbian state repression in the province, while loudly demanding that the Human rights of the Kosovo Albanians' be greatly improved. It seems that the international so-called community had intentionally waited until the situation in Kosovo had heightened so much that coercive international measures appeared to be “indispensable” and NATO could be sold as “*there is nothing else to do now*”. Western global media indeed helped rallying public opinion behind the *we-must-do-something* policy. At that stage of the violent conflict, the international ‘help’ inevitably has a character of involvement in the conflict, especially regarding the imposition of the final solution.

From a Macedonian perspective the subsequent motions of the international community were extremely contradictory and even dangerous. Reportedly, the real motivation for the Americans and Europeans in undertaking all ‘necessary’ measures including the military intervention over Yugoslavia was prevention of the conflict spreading to Macedonia. With this stated purpose and with the rapid escalation of the conflict, due to NATO and the US transformed themselves from ‘mediators’ into active, side taking parties to the conflict, strange missions were established both in Kosovo and –Macedonia.

The first one was so-called OSCE verification mission (KVM) in Kosovo, which was followed by the NATO-led 4000-troop “extraction” force stationed on Macedonia's northern border. Some observers believe that the real role of the OSCE mission was, in fact, to serve as a prelude for the NATO-led mission in Macedonia and subsequent bombing of Yugoslavia. Both Macedonian and international representatives were repeatedly stating that the ‘extraction mission’ in Macedonia was of an essentially humanitarian nature and that its main task would have been to protect and evacuate unarmed OSCE verifiers if and when necessary.

However, suspicion about its real mandate increased when speculations about sending additional military force in the form of ‘extractors of the extractors’ were revealed by the media. The absurdity of the mandate of this mission became very apparent when in fact OSCE verifiers withdrew from Kosovo without any incident, in a very short time, and just before the beginning of the NATO military campaign over Yugoslavia.

Since 1991 the Republic of Macedonia has been trying to deserve the epithet of the only peaceful actor in the Yugoslav drama. Peace in the country has been a result of many endeavours undertaken both by the Macedonian government and citizens and the international assistance of various kinds. Suddenly, just before the military intervention, the mild Macedonian landscape was dramatically changed by the presence of the NATO forces. One cannot avoid the impression that Macedonia was put in a very ambiguous and undesirable position, at the same time hosting UN and NATO forces with essentially different mandates and different impacts on its security. As a result, Macedonia was transformed in a place d'arme.

If it is true that the UN preventive peacekeeping mission was initiated by the Macedonian government, but in this second case the situation was radically different. Brussels (and Washington) resolutely demanded the installation of NATO troops in a very critical moment of Macedonia's internal political life. Macedonia was caught in an interregnum period, when the new Macedonian parliament and government were not constituted after the latest elections. The NATO leadership presented it as a test for Macedonia's co-operativeness and willingness to join NATO. It was de facto blackmail and the Macedonian government had no choice. Both president *Gligorov* and the young Prime Minister *Georgievski* were faced with a difficult dilemma. They were aware that it was not in the country's best interest to participate in something that was bound to antagonise Serbia and looked like a support to Albanian separatism through violence. Heavily dependent upon foreign military assistance and tending toward NATO membership and EU integration, the Macedonian government accepted increasing foreign military presence. One of the leaders of the coalition government, a professor of international law, *Dr. Vasil Tupurkovski* wrote in 1997 that, Macedonia must not seek to exploit existing differences among the Balkan states, nor must it seek to improve its international position to the expense of its neighbours." However, being now in the ruling position, he obviously changed his mind.

At the beginning of 1999 the situation in Macedonia as well as in the region could have been described as a stage for a collision between preventive diplomacy versus preventing diplomacy. Previously, there was a widespread consideration that UNPREDEP had provided a stable security environment in Macedonia in which democracy could have established its roots in society, the moves of so-called international community endangered all positive achievements of preventive diplomacy, and brought Macedonia to the edge of catastrophe. The Macedonian case became famous in the world as a paradigmatic precedent of UN preventive deployment, which gave the UN prominence in the field of conflict-prevention that is supposed to be an essential part of its mandate.

In February 1999, on the eve of the Kosovo war, this unique mission was terminated, and very soon the role of the UN in the Balkan conflicts was definitively marginalized by the non-authorized NATO military intervention in the FR of Yugoslavia. The violent conflict in Kosovo was a failure of the whole international community, but the military intervention and the way it was undertaken by NATO was a failure of conflict prevention in general. Conflict-management by extensive use of force in and over Yugoslavia endangered and worsened the prospects of successful conflict-prevention endeavours in neighbouring Macedonia and the entire region. It has been one more proof that the international so-called community has not built a long term strategy of preventing intrastate conflicts, especially not in the Balkans.

II “Collateral damages” of the NATO’s intervention in Macedonia

The term ‘collateral damages’, which has been cynically invented by strategists, applies perfectly to the war in Yugoslavia and the situation in Macedonia. The Macedonian euphoria that followed words of moral support and praise from NATO Secretary-General Solana vanished during the first weeks of the war. The government was soon in a state of shock. When the Prime Minister *Georgievski* accused NATO that its military campaign was about to make Macedonia an innocent victim of the war in Yugoslavia, it was too late, because the country had already been badly hurt. Regardless of whether Macedonia was an “innocent victim” or a “naive collaborator” in the military campaign, it is abundantly clear today that the consequences of the war are visible in every sphere and that their reparation will be a difficult challenge for the long-term future.

By 24 March 1999, when the NATO air-campaign began over Yugoslavia, Macedonia’s government was viewed with ambiguity by its citizens. Even before the outbreak of war, the public evaluation of the first “100 days in office” showed great disillusionment with regard to the promises made during the parliamentary elections. The new government that had come to power under the motto “Changes“ had been anything but successful in bringing about real and positive changes, especially in the social and economic spheres of society. However, foreign observers highly appreciated the very experiment of getting the two most nation parties together in the coalition. Some of them hastened to say that the biggest trials in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations had been overcome and that the country proved its maturity in the search for ethnic *modus vivendi*.

So, the situation was far from stable — as manifested very soon by the de facto disfunctioning of the major political institutions and procedures. The maintenance of the ruling coalition between VMRO and DPA resulted partly from a compromise between their two leaders and partly from exercising the famous “ostrich tactics” that Macedonian politicians have developed to perfection. Whenever the problems were to be resolved through the legitimate institutions, tremendous obstacles appeared. The exit of such blockade of the political system was seen in turning a blind eye and deaf ear to the actions undertaken by the coalition partner. The survival of the government was paid for by sacrificing democratic principles and legal procedures. Macedonia’s government stayed in office, but the nascent democratic achievements and rule of law suffered unrecoverable damages.

In the first days of the military intervention in Yugoslavia when upset Macedonian citizens expected some official explanation by their government, the political institutions pretended that nothing was going on. The parliamentary debate on an insignificant law on communal taxes was underway without any disturbances before the eyes of the confused citizens.

The coalition partners, more specifically the minister of interior (from DA) and vice-prime minister (from DPA) were arguing over the legal status of the people from Kosovo that were arriving in the thousands by the day and night. DPA party activists were already active in the fields helping their km. They organised efficient transportation and private accommodation for the refugees from Kosovo in the towns and villages in western Macedonia. Media announced that KLA fighters were given medical treatment in the *Tetovo* hospital, but the Macedonian authorities simply disregarded the information, indeed seems to have lost contact with the rapidly unfolding crisis.

During the 78-day military campaign, Macedonian police undertook several actions in the villages close to the borders to Yugoslavia and Albania and found huge amounts of ammunition and military equipment in what looked like secret KLA stores or headquarters. These actions were presented as a major success of Macedonian police, but at the same time

nothing was done when there was a public Albanian mobilisation and youngsters were sent from Macedonia into Kosovo to fight. In the same period, in an interview to the Italian radio, *Arben Xhaferi* said that Albanians in Macedonia would not respond to an official mobilisation call should the Macedonian authorities issue one.

The Macedonian government was crying for international help and particularly insisted on Europe to open its doors too — appealing that the number of refugees had become alarming and that it was an unbearable burden for the weak and collapsed Macedonian economy. On the other hand and simultaneously, the representatives of the Albanian parties and community were proving the opposite: that all the country's resources and capacities had not been used yet and that all the refugees had to stay in Macedonia. Their main arguments were that Kosovars were 'at home' in Macedonia, and Albanian members of the parliament claimed that they were legal representatives of the people in the refugee camps.

The general conclusion is that during the war in Yugoslavia and refugee exodus of the Kosovo Albanians, the feeling of internal cohesion increased rapidly, not only within the Albanian community in Macedonia, but also between Macedonian and Kosovo Albanians. The Albanian ethnic community has been perceived as one unifying whole both by ordinary people and politicians, and the question of citizenship to two different states has been unheeded.

Albanians in Macedonia showed unprecedented empathy, solidarity and hospitality to their Kosovo brethren, while the Macedonians feeling and attitudes were rather mixed and ambiguous. One part of the public manifested sincere compassion with the unhappy people, remembering that Macedonian people have gone through the same horrible experience several times during its history. On the other hand, there was increasing fear and even anti-Albanian feelings which were often intermixed with anti-NATO and pro-Serb sentiments. Different political structures were manipulating those expressions, interpreting them once as anti-NATO and sometimes as anti-Albanian and/or pro-Serbian attitudes. In general, the Kosovo war was a highly politicising issue in Macedonia as it was in many countries in the region. Political parties tried to mobilise public opinion over this sensitive issue in order to win some significant points in regard to their opponents.

Actually, the attitudes in certain segments of the Macedonian society can be explained on a non-political basis. As for the Albanian side, the situation is quite unambiguous. War and sufferings of so many innocent people with the same ethnic affiliation inevitably represent a good basis for creation of sense of belonging and solidarity. The attitudes of Macedonians are more difficult to explain, because there were so many mixed feelings. Undoubtedly, Macedonians having experienced horrors of exodus several times in their history manifested their compassion with suffering people.

However, their attitude was more complex, because they also felt a fear from exactly the suffering people who came in. The sympathies found among the Serbian people cannot be explained by a similar ethnic and/or religious affiliation, but rather by the image of having a "common enemy" in the face of Albanian population. The level of ethnic identification and homogenisation of the two most numerous groups in Macedonia has reached its peak since independence in 1991. Albanians accused Macedonians of lack of empathy for the refugees, while many Macedonians started looking at members of the Albanian minority and refugees as if they were all potential KLA fighters.

The seriousness of the situation could have manifested itself when violent incidents were imminent, especially in the ethnically mixed areas (*Tetovo*, *Kumanovo*, villages around the capital, *Skopje*, etc.) and between the refugees and the local population near the refugee camps. One of the reasons behind the sceptical attitudes of the Macedonians was that they had several doubts about the NATO military campaign it took place without any legal

authorisation, with lots of “collateral damages” and it created a frightening pre-war atmosphere in Macedonia during the Kosovo war itself. Furthermore, there was the humiliating and arrogant behaviour of NATO and its troops and representatives in Macedonia throughout the crisis.

Nevertheless, the deeper source of animosity among Macedonians will be found in the extremely severe social and economic situation. Even before the war, Macedonia had more than 300,000 unemployed people, and half of the employees had not received their salaries for several months; the number of socially endangered people was constantly increasing. Instead of an expected economic growth in 1999, it dropped by more than 10 per cent.

These economic hardships mainly affected the Macedonian part of the population, because the Albanians are mostly employed in the private sector, in small agriculture units or are immigrant workers in Western European countries. Macedonian firms were closed in a big number, and their workers sent home on a “forced vacation” either because of the lack of raw materials or because of inability to export the goods out of the country. The main roads to Europe’s markets lead exactly through war-ravaged Yugoslavia.

Furthermore, during many decades the biggest trade partner of Macedonian economy has been Yugoslavia (Serbia and Kosovo). Understandably, devastation of the civilian and infrastructure targets in neighbouring Yugoslavia amounted to a de facto strike on Macedonia, too: on its economy, citizens’ security and future. Therefore, Macedonians spontaneously took a side in the conflict opposite to the one chosen by their government which was still trying, rather, to position itself by bowing to foreign masters in the competition race to join NATO.

Thus, while citizens engaged in public protests and anti-war concerts, the foreign minister was touring European capitals demanding a full NATO membership for Macedonia. His hopes were definitively ruined after the Washington Summit in mid April-1999. The chance of quick entry turned out to have been an illusion.

At the peak of the refugee crisis Macedonia hosted over 350,000 people (according to unreliable official estimations) which amounts to almost 18 per cent out of the total population. It was a burden that even developed countries could hardly have borne – and knew how to avoid. Macedonian citizens were watching humanitarian convoys for the refugees, while the international community was not even thinking about the damages that the host country suffered. The West saw Macedonia not as a sovereign state faced with a humanitarian catastrophe that greatly alleviated the pressure on Europe, but rather as a kind of nameless area settled by refugees in “tent cities” combined with thousands of heavily armed foreign soldiers in barracks and bases. Western journalists that were not able to pronounce correctly the name of the capital of Macedonia knew the strangest names of the refugee camps.

Cynicism and hypocrisy of the leaders in the Western countries only deepened the existing gap between the ethnic groups in the country. Humanitarian aid arrived much slower than the military troops, while the Macedonian state and Army were facing bankruptcy. In the face of complaints from the Macedonian side that KLA had moved its headquarters and onto Macedonia’s territory and that the country might become the next involved party in the conflict, the assurance came from *Gen. Wesley Clark* and German Foreign Minister *Fischer* who said that they were personally going to appeal to KLA leadership not to destabilise Macedonia.

The feeling of insecurity among the citizens grew along with the increased number of NATO troops. At one point NATO had three times more soldiers there than the regular Macedonian army! – and kept on stating that its mission was purely humanitarian and that

they were not going to transform NATO's presence into ground troops for an invasion of Kosovo.

The terrifying "sound of protection" over the Macedonian sky and the frequently heard detonations caused by some "mistakes" by NATO jets, were additional factor contributing to something of a war psychosis. After the first biggest protests before the embassies of the Western countries in *Skopje*, Macedonia's police corps engaged in protecting the alleged "protectors of Macedonia" – NATO country embassies – which only worsened the gap of mistrust between Macedonian citizens and their state.

The war is over and the Macedonian government has survived. The country has gone through the heaviest challenge since 1991. However, the story does not end here and now. Macedonia has been left degraded in political, economic, social and environmental terms. The country's inter ethnic relations have never been worse despite persistent denial of that fact by officials. The gap of distrust and animosity is deeper than ever. In Albanian-populated villages one can see graffiti such as "UÇK- NATO". The Albanian community in Macedonia has not identified only with the Kosovars, but also with what was seen as a common mighty protector – NATO and the US.

III Macedonia after the NATO intervention: Before or After the Rain?

The appearance of Macedonia as a sovereign state on the international scene followed many dare predictions as well as hopes and amazement. Since 1991 it has been seen as "oasis of peace" and/or "bacon of hope" on the turbulent Balkans. The Macedonian citizens have become satisfied with the fact that there has not been war in their country – yet. The metaphor of the film "Before the Rain" has become reality, but nobody has been sure whether the rain will bring relief or sorrow. One year after the NATO intervention over Yugoslavia and the transformation of Macedonia into "refugee heaven"– the question is still open. Actually, Macedonia does not know whether the current situation can be described as before or after the rain. The memories of the horrible scenes of human sufferings and the cold breath of death are still fresh, but the Macedonian citizens ask themselves – is it all over or might it happen again?

For a decade the Macedonian citizens have been told both by their government(s) and the so-called international community that the political and security situation in their country is the ultimate happiness. They should have been happy with the situation where the human sufferings were some other people sufferings not their own. State of peace and stability, which is not happiness but a normal state of affairs and a pre-condition for development in any normal state in the world, for the Macedonians citizens, should have been a source of extraordinary satisfaction. The government announced negative peace as its achievement, while the so-called international community got opportunity to show, at least, one successful and even paradigmatic case of preventive diplomacy (or preventive peacekeeping) undertaken on its behalf

Summing up the consequences of NATO intervention is a very difficult and ambiguous task. Difficulties arise from the fact that the humanitarian catastrophe from spring 1999 has left extremely deep but not always visible scars on Macedonia and its people. Ambiguity is, however, a result of the "ostrich tactic" practised by the Macedonian government(s) that is not willing to allow an open debate on the issue – what was the price that Macedonia had to pay during the Kosovo crisis in spring 1999? It looks far more concerned with defence of the so-called Euro-Atlantic values and New World Order than with the situation in the country.

For the parties directly involved in the Kosovo conflict, particularly during the NATO intervention as well as in its aftermath, the need to claim victory is quite understandable. But the behaviour of the Macedonian government in the aftermath of the intervention was nothing less than bizarre. The Prime Minister *Georgievski* hurried up to congratulate *Gen. Clark* for the “shining victory“ and publicly declared that during the crisis NATO troops had been so welcome in Macedonia that they were “not guests but hosts in our country“. Since then nobody has ever tried to make an analysis of the costs of the “victory” that Macedonia had to pay in terms of economic, political, human, and ecological damages. Most of these issues have been seen as not desirable for opening debate. NATO intervention over Yugoslavia is still one of the most politicised issues in Macedonia. Any attempt to pose delicate questions that might condemn “our allies” is seen as a betrayal of Macedonia’s strategic interests to join the Alliance or a direct attack of the coalition government.

Not surprisingly, the one-year jubilee is also seen as a memory of the ‘great victory’. From the government’s perspective, staying in office under the tremendous conditions that have been prevailing during the last year is a great success indeed. The real question is – what this jubilee means for the Macedonian society and its citizens? The leading political elite tries to link the survival of the state with the survival of the ruling coalition. In this interpretation these two different matters are presented as synonyms. Truly, the last year brought many challenges for the fragile Macedonian state and society, and some moments will be remembered in the future as a nightmare. Nevertheless, explanation of the public stand on the Kosovo crisis is a very difficult task because there is not one Macedonian perspective but several ones.

The Macedonian governing elite claims to be a saviour of the country, since its wise policy contributed to peaceful overcoming of the Kosovo crisis and avoiding violent conflict in Macedonia itself it also claims that Macedonia’s Position and respect within the international community has been improved thanks to its co-operative behaviour during the climax of the crisis. The Macedonian government has a misperception on the country’s geo-political and geo-strategic significance and is convinced that the “international community” ultimately guarantees its security. It is fascinated by power in the international arena in the same way it is fascinated by power in the domestic framework. Exercising authoritative patterns of rule on the internal political scene, it knows how to respect more powerful actors in the so-called international community.

The Kosovo crisis was the first contact of the small Macedonian state with world (geo)politics and it appeared to be a knock down. Despite many disappointments, the Macedonian leadership has not figured out yet that international relations are not based on altruism, but on bare interests. During the Kosovo crisis EU/NATO “invented” new admission criteria for Macedonia – providing a shelter for the enormous refugee influx that on the peak reached 18 per cent of the total population in the country. Macedonia (together with Albania) saved Western Europe from a security threat that was seen as a nightmare for all security advisers. Macedonia’s “good behaviour” was forgotten very soon and even the compensation for the damages has not been paid yet. The only “award” was situating Macedonia in the “Western Balkans” i.e. a sanitary corridor for failed or (potentially) collapsed states. The country infamous for its tent-cities and refugee hell has transformed into a transit zone – to Kosovo.

Having failed to provide any concrete proofs of the benefits from the “co-operatives” with EU/NATO structures, the Macedonian government emphasises more abstract and value-based aspects of “globalisation”. It has been trying to keep the public into a state of hyper-real existence in international relations. They all have been promising that Macedonia’s admission into NATO and/or EU is a matter of days. In the years that followed Macedonia has been everything but an economically attractive country for foreign investments. The internal

conflicts potential along with the violent conflicts in the neighbourhood divert foreign business. Macedonia cannot catch up with new developments in the economic sphere, and most usually has been an object of humanitarian/economic assistance provided by the international institutions.

The “carrot and stick” methods practised by the “international community” did not make Macedonia learn anything, but rather helped built a servile mentality. The new-born state has not been thought how to walk on two legs but rather how to crawl on the knees to please the powerful “allies” and get NATO/EU membership and economic assistance from the World Bank/International Monetary Fond. Consequently, instead of experiencing state independence for the first time in her history, Macedonia has been transformed into an immature client state and pawn in the game of the powerful actors on the international scene.

The worst and potentially the most dangerous consequence of the NATO intervention are shaken identities (or better of intra-ethnic identification and homogenisation), especially on the micro level. While the Macedonian government is speaking about “positive energy” and “relaxed inter-ethnic relations”, according to many indications the feeling of internal cohesion in each of the major ethnic groups has increased rapidly. It is the case not only within the Albanian community in Macedonia, but also between the Albanians in Macedonia and those in Kosovo. The Albanian community in Macedonia has not identified only with the Kosovars, but also with what was seen as a common mighty protector – NATO and the US. The Albanian ethnic community has been perceived as one unifying whole both by ordinary people and politicians, and the question of citizenship to two different states has been unheeded. In short, the NATO intervention over Yugoslavia has directly strengthened fragmentation processes in Macedonia. The consequences are still serious. The gap of distrust and animosity is deeper than ever. To make things worse, after UNPREDEP mission’s termination, there has not been any systematic endeavour for conflict prevention in Macedonia. While the eyes of the international community are focused on Kosovo, Macedonia’s problems seem to be definitively neglected.

Inter-ethnic confidence building on micro- and macro-levels in the Macedonian society has been a priority and seen as a precondition for survival of the state and maintenance of peace in the country and wider. The task is difficult, obstacles abound. But there were positive moves since 1991, permanent and visible. By autumn 1999, after this unprecedented violent upheaval, we seem back to “Year Zero”, a year when everything must start all over again. Traumas are now much deeper and numerous than they were before March 24, 1999. Regardless of the whole cynicism of this “B-52 humanitarianism,” one must say that NATO has turned the hands of the historical watch back and pushed Macedonia backwards in history. To start going in the right direction again, this must be acknowledged in a deep sense.

Its fantastic aurora of an “oasis of peace” or a “miracle” in the Balkans has been destroyed. Macedonia was handed back its old historical epithet of a “powder keg”. This rather local prism in the evaluation of the developments from spring 1999 only confirms the general opinion that peace and progress in the Balkans has never been so unachievable. Loud optimistic promises and expectations connected with the utterly empty Stability Pact discussions won’t change that a bit.

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IV Abbreviations

Bosnia and Herzegovina	BiH
Board of Trade	BOT
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	EAPC
European Union	EU
Former Republic of Yugoslavia	FRY
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	FYROM
Implementation Force	IFOR
Interim Administrative Council	IAC
Institute for International Peace Support	IIPS
Kosovo Force	KFOR
Kosovo Liberation Army	KLA / UÇK
Kosovo Protection Corps	KPC
Kosovo Verification Mission	KVM
Ministry of Defence	MOD
Multinational Peace Force in South Eastern Europe	MPFSEE
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation	NATO
National Defence Academy	NDA
Non-Governmental Organisation	NGO
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe	OSCE
Partnership for Peace	PfP
Peace Support - Humanitarian Operations	PSO-HUMOPs
Stranka demokratske akcije - Party of Democratic Action	SDA
Southeast Europe	SEE
Southeast European Co-operation Process	SEECp
Southeast Europe Defence Ministerial	SEDM
Stabilisation Force	SFOR
United Nations Preventive Deployment in Macedonia	UNPREDEP
United Nation Security Council	UNSC
United States Dollar	USD
Vnatrešna makedonska revolutionema organizacija — Interior Macedonian Revolutionary Organization	VMRO