

NATO's 2014 Summit Agenda

by Karl-Heinz Kamp¹

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New developments in the international security landscape require constant adjustments to be made by the Alliance, and NATO summits between heads of state and government have three very important functions: they indicate crucial developments and recognize important and occasionally historic events. They also allow NATO's political leadership to give forward-looking guidance to the Alliance's bureaucratic and military apparatus and to agree on particularly relevant issues. Lastly, summit meetings tend to speed up decision-making processes in NATO, since an imminent gathering of the "big chiefs" sets a deadline for compromise and consensus, both at headquarters and in capitals.

The next NATO summit is scheduled for mid-2014. Since the last summit in 2012 in Chicago, no ally has volunteered to host the follow-on meeting; the conference venue is still open. There are a number of important events to be recognized by NATO's heads of state and government: bidding farewell to NATO Secretary General Rasmussen (and agreeing on a successor), the 20th anniversary of NATO's Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) and the truly historic withdrawal of all combat forces from Afghanistan. These are not only occasions to be acknowledged, but highly political subjects on which consensus must be found: what will be the future of PfP – a programme that seems to have passed its peak – and how do we shape the post-2014 training mission in Afghanistan, called "Resolute Support"?

The implications of terminating NATO's ISAF mission (International Security and Assistance Force) can hardly be overestimated. The situation in Afghanistan has determined the strategic thinking, military planning, organization of force structures and procurement decisions of 50 allies and partners for more than a decade. Even a number of defence budgets were saved from public criticism and from further cuts, by underlining the relevance of the Afghan mission for the security of the Euro-Atlantic community. In addition, it was the long and daunting fight against the Taliban which helped many European countries expand their Euro-centric security policy horizon of the past, to encompass a global, 21st century perspective.



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However, even if Afghanistan is the eponym for the 2014 summit, it seems more an issue of the past and should not be the dominating subject in the deliberations of NATO's political leadership. If NATO summits are about political guidance, the forthcoming one needs to focus on those issues which are truly relevant for the further evolution of the Alliance in the post-Afghanistan world.

Discussions have already started in the capitals and there is an almost traditional tendency among Allies to try to squeeze all of their regional or individual concerns into the summit itinerary. This entails the danger of getting lost in subjects which may be relevant but where solutions are not readily available, so that frustration seems inevitable.

At first glance, two specific topics appear obvious agenda items for the summit: NATO's manifest problem of the "capabilities gap" between US and European military forces and the on-going crisis in Syria. On closer observation though, both topics carry more the danger of leading to transatlantic frustrations than to fostering NATO's cohesion. NATO has dealt with the capabilities gap for decades and has agreed upon myriads of initiatives like the Defence Capabilities Initiative in the late 1990s or the Prague Capabilities Commitment in 2002, to mention only two - most have remained without any consequences. Given the financial crisis in Europe, no quick fixes can be expected. Instead, improving NATO's military capabilities is a cumbersome and open-ended process of cumulating very small steps. Adding another ambitious declaration of intent where there is no perspective of it being realized, will lead NATO nowhere. The same holds true for the Syrian case. Notwithstanding the tragic situation in Syria and despite determination of some NATO members to react on the cruelties committed by the Assad regime, there is no military solution at hand which NATO could provide. Moreover, the Libyan case has shown that even a successful military intervention does not lead to political stability. The only imaginable NATO engagement could occur in a post-Assad situation whereby the new Syrian leadership would explicitly seek NATO support to build up efficient security forces. Given the current bloodshed, this moments seems far away.

Instead of focussing on capabilities, on Syria or on issues singled out by individual nations, the summit should concentrate on those topics which are of overarching importance for NATO's future in the post-2014 era and which, therefore, require direction from the highest political level. According to the current strategic environment, a number of agenda items fulfil these criteria and should be discussed by heads of state and government. Seven of them will be presented in an ascending order of relevance.

1. The NATO-Russia Relationship

On the lower end of the relevance list we find the "strategic partnership" with Russia which has been a constant subject at NATO's high-level meetings. However, if we compare the recent summit declarations in Riga (2006), Bucharest (2008), Strasbourg/Kehl (2009), Lisbon (2010) and Chicago (2012) the wording has become increasingly sceptical with regard to Russia's attitude vis-à-vis NATO. Whereas the Riga document seems overly positive and the Chicago summit declaration still lauds the "important progress in our cooperation", the same declaration states at great length that NATO and Russia "differ on specific issues" and urges Russia to defer from certain policies.

To "differ" on issues appears to be a window-dressed description of a fundamental change on both sides' perception of the relationship having turned sour. Missile Defence cooperation – once the showcase of perceived common security interests – is moribund. Moscow complains about the American missile defence plans almost by default, whereas Washington leaves no doubt that it will go on with the program regardless of Russian cooperation. The other long-looming issue, the revision of the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) is not taking a promising path either. According to Russian Deputy Defence Minister Anatoly Antonov, CFE Treaty "is dead".² The opposite positions on the Syria case do not help either to brighten the relationship.

In addition to these specific disputes, other developments contribute to a constant souring of the climate. Russia, again, has laid plans for its major military exercise Zapad (West) in the autumn of 2013. According

² See *Voice of Russia*, *CFE Treaty Mechanism is Dead – Russian Defence Ministry*, May 23, 2013, http://english.ruvr.ru/news/2013_05_23/CFE-Treaty-mechanism-is-dead-Russian-Defence-Ministry/



to press reports, it will have a similar setup to Zapad 2009 which culminated in a simulated Russian nuclear strike against Warsaw.³ In turn, certain NATO exercises in Central and Eastern Europe or NATO's Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya have been interpreted by Moscow as offensive or even aggressive. It appears that disappointment about mutual misperceptions and unfulfilled expectations is about to transform the entire partnership. NATO has to come to the painful recognition that there is hardly anything in common for effective cooperation. Even many of those NATO members who previously regarded fruitful relations with Russia as absolutely essential, openly and undiplomatically criticize the undemocratic behaviour of the Putin regime. On the other hand, Moscow is agonizingly aware of the fact that, in most instances, NATO will not give Russia any real voice in its decision-making processes but will follow its own course despite Russian scepticism.

In light of these developments, at least two closely interconnected questions will require guidance from NATO's political leadership:

- Shall NATO-Russia relations continue to be labelled a "strategic partnership" – a description indicating particularly intensive and privileged relations? What is "strategic" in the NATO-Russia liaison if NATO's cooperation with many other "ordinary" partners is much more intense and seems more mutually beneficial? Shouldn't the rhetoric be adapted to the real state of NATO-Russia relations to avoid false expectations and to allow cooperation on a realistic basis?
- Despite Russia's geographical size, its wealth in gas and oil or its power of veto in the United Nations: how relevant is Russia really for NATO's further evolution or for international security and stability? In which cases has Moscow really been supportive of NATO in recent years? Is Russia really the indispensable partner it was portrayed to be during the honeymoon period of the NATO-Russia relationship particularly in the 1990ies?

2. Missile Defence

Missile Defence (MD) has already been an agenda item at the two recent summits in Lisbon and Chicago – partly due to Russian criticism of NATO's MD plans and partly because of the Alliance's internal difficulties in finding consensus on the various aspects of the project. However, in spring 2013, MD underwent some fundamental changes, raising questions that need to be dealt with by NATO's heads of state.

NATO Missile Defence is primarily an American program, whereby the United States under a national contribution scheme, provides the brunt of missile platforms, interceptors and sensors for the defence of NATO territory. NATO Allies, in most cases, add the components (radars, sensors) already procured for air defence or theatre missile defence purposes. In March 2013, the Obama administration - mostly for financial reasons - modified its missile defence programme, the "European Phased Adapted Approach" (EPAA), by deleting the last step of the four-phased MD concept: it cancelled the development of new interceptor missiles which were supposed to protect United States' territory against intercontinental ballistic missiles from the Middle East and elsewhere.⁴

What initially appeared to be first and foremost a technical/financial issue, is increasingly becoming a political issue affecting the entire Alliance. Conceptually, in its first three phases, the EPAA primarily protects the territory of Europe's NATO members (and the US forces stationed there) from medium range missiles from the Middle East – simply because this is the threat NATO will be facing in coming years. Only the last phase of EPAA, from 2020 onwards, was supposed to counter the threat posed by intercontinental range missiles targeting the American homeland, assuming that potential aggressors, like Iran or North Korea, would still need time to develop missiles with such a long range. This basic reasoning was already heavily criticized by the Republicans in Washington, arguing that US taxpayers would be financing Europe's security for years (phases 1-3), whereas the protection of the American homeland could not be expected before 2020. After cancelling phase 4, this argumentation became even more salient and missile defence came un-

³ See Stephen Blank, *Moscow Pulls Back the Curtain on Zapad 2013*, Jamestown Foundation, June 21, 2013 <http://www.refworld.org/docid/51cd4d014.html>

⁴ While phase 1 of the EPAA started in 2011 with interceptors based on ships in the Mediterranean (Aegis Cruisers), phase 2 also foresees Aegis deployments ashore in Romania by 2015. In phase 3, from 2018 onwards, interceptor missiles would also be stationed in Poland. The now cancelled phase 4 intended to keep to the number of platforms and stationing countries (sea based and land based) but planned to replace the interceptors with completely new types having far greater technical capacities.



der even heavier attack in the US Congress, the reason being that Europe would be getting a defence shield for free, whereas the US homeland would not be protected at all. Thus, in June 2013, the House of Representatives brought in an amendment to the 2014 defence authorization bill, requesting NATO Allies to fund at least 50 % of EPAA costs.⁵

Even if such an amendment will have few chances to pass, it would still highlight the troubled waters NATO is heading for. At the historic Lisbon summit, NATO announced its ambitious plans for an Alliance missile defence system, knowing full well that the principal technical and financial burden would be borne by the United States. Today, however, with budgetary consolidation in full swing (automatic budgets cuts - called “sequestration”), a rebalancing of American attention from Europe to Asia and a re-emerging burden-sharing debate within the Alliance, US readiness to more or less fully fund a NATO missile defence system, is constantly decreasing.

With or without Congressional pressure, future US governments are likely to significantly cut their MD funds. Since European Allies, with their own rapidly shrinking defence budgets, are neither willing nor able to step in by procuring their own Aegis interceptors and radars, the future of the entire NATO MD project is at stake. NATO’s political leadership will have to take bold decisions to avoid the missile defence project from turning into a Potemkin’s village.

3. Cyber Threats

Of all non-traditional threats – in NATO parlance “emerging challenges” – risks in the area of cyberspace feature most prominently on the transatlantic agenda. The rapidly rising number of attacks against military and civilian computer networks keeps the issue in the limelight and raises public awareness for cyber related concerns. The downside of this skyrocketing attention, though, is that the topic tends to be hyped in many NATO member states, particularly with regard to its potential military implications. Comparing cyber-attacks to “the next Pearl Harbor” or to the collapse of the Twin Towers on September 11, as prominent voices

do, inflates the issue and blurs the fact that cyber-attacks can hardly be seen as a “war” in the strictest sense of the term. On closer inspection they do not even pose a fundamentally new danger. Instead, cyber-attacks are basically sophisticated versions of three very traditional activities: sabotage, espionage and subversion (different from cyber-crimes like hacking or fraudulent acts against the financial system).⁶ This does not diminish the problem per se, but at least, puts the protection of computer networks and potential military counter-measures into perspective. Using or threatening to use military force in one way or another, is arguably one of the last options to deal with the cyber problem.

NATO itself has been constantly improving its detection, assessment and prevention capabilities in order to better defend its communication facilities and computer networks against cyber-attack, as well as to recover in case of attack. At the Prague summit in 2002, the cyber issue was already on the agenda but it took the cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007 and the Russia-Georgia war in 2008, to speed up action. Still, so far, NATO measures are aimed at protecting the network, providing centralized expertise and awareness raising, not military action in the sense of deterrence or the use of force.

Given the tendency to militarize cyber threats, at least rhetorically, political leadership by NATO’s heads of state and government is required on at least two questions:

- To what degree does coping with cyber threats have a military dimension – besides protecting the command and control elements of computer networks? Are there specific measures a political-military Alliance can take to prevent or counter cyber aggression – beyond consultations and consensus building? Are NATO’s skills in deterrence and defence applicable to the cyber realm?
- Assuming NATO has a role as a political-military alliance, what level of intensity does a cyber-attack need to have to trigger a NATO (military) reaction? How much damage – and what kind of damage - has to occur before the cyber aggression is defined as an attack according to article 5 of the Washington Treaty?

⁵ Rachel Oswald, *U.S. Official Defends Spending on NATO Missile Shield, Under GOP Attack*, 25 June 2013, Global Security Newswire. Source: <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-official-defends-spending-nato-missile-shield-under-gop-attack/>

⁶ See James Andrew Lewis, *The Cyber War Has Not Begun*, CSIS, Washington DC, March 2010.



These highly political questions might not be easy to answer, not least because many NATO members still lack a national position on this. To kick off a debate on the military dimension of the fight against cyber threats, NATO heads of state could task NATO bodies to explore the issue and to report back at one of the forthcoming ministerial meetings.

4. NATO Enlargement

After the Chicago summit in May 2012, the question of which countries should become NATO members and when, was (again) a divisive issue among the Allies. US Foreign Secretary Hillary Clinton suggested that Chicago should be the last NATO summit not explicitly focusing on enlargement. Many European members concluded that from a US perspective, *all* forthcoming summits should deal with new members joining NATO. Since, at that time, many Allies had their doubts on the wisdom of further enlarging NATO, the Clinton statement was one of the reasons why the Alliance could not agree on a follow-up summit after Chicago – and a number of countries tried to postpone the issue.

Despite the fact that the Obama administration seems to have taken the heat off the enlargement issue and appears less pushy today than in May 2012, enlargement will be at the centre of the 2014 summit. Four countries have been defined by NATO as “aspirant countries”: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Georgia. With regards to the application of the first three, their case is hardly controversial. FYROM was ready to join NATO as early as 2009. As soon as the dispute with Greece over the name of the country has been resolved, accession can take place. Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina are relatively small countries and can be invited to join whenever they fulfill the necessary conditions.

The critical point of the enlargement question, however, is Georgia. In 2008 it was involved in a war with Russia over its renegade regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Hence, the considerable hesitation in NATO at inviting Georgia to join the Alliance, even though

NATO –mainly due to US pressure – made an explicit promise to Georgia (and to Ukraine)⁷ at the 2008 Bucharest summit, that they would be admitted. The result, since then, has been a stalemate on the membership front.

In the meantime, the battle order on the pros and cons of Georgian membership has changed significantly. The number of NATO members trying to put the Georgia issue on the back burner has become significantly smaller – Germany and a handful of others being the last. The argument according to which, Moscow would strongly disapprove such a step and that the entire NATO-Russia relationship could suffer, finds fewer and fewer supporters. Some NATO members appear to support Georgian membership in particular because it runs counter to Russian interests. Even the argument about Georgia’s unsolved territorial conflicts, which would prohibit Georgia’s accession to NATO, has lost validity. In the meantime, prominent voices in the Georgian government indicate more flexibility and pragmatism with regard to the relationship with Russia.⁸ Moreover, Georgia excelled itself vis-à-vis NATO, by providing military capabilities to all NATO missions without any caveats - Tbilisi even offered to contribute forces to the NATO Response Force (NRF).

Given these dynamics it is not unlikely that Georgia will be admitted to NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) – a program preparing candidate countries for membership. This would bring Georgia one step closer to accession without setting the date for admission – Albania remained in the MAP for a decade before it became a NATO member in 2009.

However, NATO heads of state need to take the membership issue beyond the Georgia question. Given the number and variety of applicant countries, NATO needs to recall the basics of enlargement in order to make the process run smoothly and to avoid past mistakes. This requires facing some blunt realities beyond the general narrative of enlargement being (by definition) a “win-win process” – as the reality has proved to be different. NATO documents have always stipulated that enlargement should not only be of benefit for the newly admitted countries but for NATO too. For some of the new members this was true, where-

⁷ Ukraine, in the meantime, withdrew its application for membership and is, therefore, no longer regarded as an applicant country.

⁸ See *Ivanishvili Criticizes Saakashvili, Wants West’s Help On Russia Ties*, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, April 29, 2013, <http://www.rferl.org/content/georgia-foreign-ivanishvili-saakashvili-russia-west/24971641.html>



as others swiftly neglected the obligations that came with membership and contribute appallingly little to NATO's overall capabilities – or even show worrisome levels of corruption and nepotism. Two questions have to be answered:

- How can NATO make sure that only countries who provide added value to NATO's capabilities and to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area are accepted as members, instead of remaining neutral at best and a liability at worst?
- What mechanisms can NATO agree to, to make sure that newly admitted countries fulfill their obligations after they have become members? How do we make sure that good aspirants become good members?

5. US Pivot to Asia

The announcement by the United States, early in 2012, indicating that stronger emphasis would be put on developments in the Asia-Pacific region, constitutes a major strategic shift for the Alliance. This "pivot" - later renamed as "rebalancing" - of resources and political attention to the Far East is arguably neither anti-European nor is it just a rearrangement of armed forces on the global strategic chessboard. Instead, it is as much a political and economic shift as a military one. It acknowledges the fact that there is less and less unfinished business in Europe - which is actually a positive occurrence. Furthermore, it is not a new development. US president George W. Bush opened up American perspectives towards Asia and established new ties with India, Indonesia and Vietnam. President Obama just went one step further in drawing the consequences of the growing importance of the entire Asia-Pacific region more explicitly.

The implications for NATO will be profound, not only because the Alliance cannot remain unaffected if its leading power redefines its strategic priorities, but also because developments in Asia are highly relevant for the European members of NATO as well. The Alliance has already adopted a global horizon, realizing that the security interests of its members are no longer limited to their geographical borders. Moreover, European economies with their on-time production lines are as dependent on stability in Asia and on free lines of communication, as the two North American ones, the US and Canada.

The importance of the issue notwithstanding, it appears as if NATO, as an institution, has not yet come to grips with the implications of this strategic game changer. Hence a number of issues need to be discussed by NATO's supreme political leadership:

- If NATO's leading power draws the consequences of international power shifts and therefore redefines its strategic priorities, does NATO need to put a stronger focus on the Asia-Pacific region as well – and if so, to what degree?
- From NATO's point of view: what is the meaning of "putting a stronger focus"? Does it primarily imply to take note of developments in the Asia-Pacific region and eventually to consult with partners in the area or does it mean to *act* individually or collectively in Asia?
- If NATO intends to *act*, who are the members with the capabilities to do so and what does "act" realistically mean? There are a number of steps imaginable depending on the capabilities and intentions of NATO nations. Politically, NATO representatives could participate (at the appropriate level) in the various regional fora in Asia – such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). They could also open liaison offices in certain countries to show the flag. Militarily, NATO naval forces could visit Asian ports to show interest in the region or could even take part in military exercises.
- If NATO intends to act militarily in distant regions it becomes evident that naval forces will become increasingly important – not only in Asia. If this is the case, NATO members need to ask themselves whether they are pursuing appropriate long term procurement strategies.

6. The Evolution of Partnerships

NATO partnerships, i.e. close and formalized relations with countries outside the Alliance, have been a true success story. Over more than two decades a dense network of regional partnership fora has been developed: the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and other bilateral arrangements with so called "Global Partners". All of these partnerships were mutually beneficial, providing NATO with influence in the regions and with military or political contributions to common projects from partner countries. In turn,



partners received NATO know-how in multinational operations, standardization or capacity building.

Overall success notwithstanding, NATO's partnership business is under heavy pressure to change in order to adapt to the requirements of the post-2014 era. Two current and forthcoming developments highlight the need for a far reaching evolution of partnerships. First, the growing number of partner countries (and institutions like EU, UN, Arab League, and African Union) raises the question of how to politically manage the large number of partners of different origins, intentions, interests and ambitions. Moreover, tensions among partners or problems between individual NATO members and partner countries tend to become an issue for the entire Alliance. For instance, tensions between Turkey and Israel have had severe repercussions on NATO in general.

Second, the redeployment from Afghanistan, and Washington's reorientation towards the Asia-Pacific region changes the relevance and leverage of individual partners. Politically problematic countries in Central Asia which currently might be regarded as indispensable for the withdrawal from Afghanistan could lose importance once all NATO combat forces are back home. In turn, countries in the Asia-Pacific area are likely to gain importance once key NATO Allies have focused their interest in that region.

Given the experiences with partnerships in the past and the challenges stemming from the requirements of the post-2014 world, three conclusions seem inescapable. First, partnerships cannot be free of hierarchies. Not all partners are equal and not all partners are equally important. For instance: Belarus and Turkmenistan, both PfP countries, are not on the same level of relevance as Sweden and Austria. Second, given that NATO is a community of values with all members abiding to the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law (even if some members still show shortcomings in that respect), politically likeminded partners should receive special attention. Third, partners which are full-fledged democracies (and are willing to contribute to NATO's missions) should receive a privileged status in the Alliance where they are included in NATO's consultation and decision shaping processes as far as possible – short of full membership.⁹ This does not exclude close and fruitful cooperation with other countries out-

side this privileged group of democracies – it is simply a different level of intensity and closeness.

The political questions to be discussed by NATO's political leadership are:

- How can NATO transform the current partnership system which is still characterized by regional groupings, into a mechanism that pays attention to the special requirement of forging closer ties with militarily capable and politically likeminded countries, regardless of their geographical location?
- Does NATO need to create a special forum to consult with these politically close countries – something that has already been mockingly characterized as the “Red Carpet Lounge” – and if so, who do you invite? Global partners like Australia or Japan would be natural members, the same holds true for Sweden or Finland. But what should be done with partners which are democratic but do not contribute at all to NATO missions, or those who do contribute but for which there are differing views within the Alliance on their democratic credentials?
- How can NATO convey the message that the creation of a privileged partnership forum for democracies is not directed “against” someone but instead, is fully in line with NATO's self-image as a value-based alliance of democracies?

7. NATO's Narrative for the Post-2014 Era

In addition to all these individual topics, one fundamental and arguably the most important issue will overarch the summit debates and will require political guidance from the highest level: how can NATO's existence in the post 2014 era be justified? With the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US pivoting to Asia-Pacific, sharply decreasing defence budgets everywhere in the Alliance, Russia's gradually decreasing relevance, less and less “unfinished business” in Europe, the core question will be: Can a political-military Alliance like NATO justify its existence in the post-Cold War era, without being engaged in a military operation which is key for the security of its members? Is it enough for the standard NATO parlance to state that the Alliance has to evolve from “deployed NATO to prepared NATO”, regardless of the question: prepared for what? To refer

⁹ See Karl-Heinz Kamp, Heidi Reisinger, *NATO's Partnerships After 2014: Go West!*, Research Paper n. 92, NATO Defense College, Rome, May 2013.



to the Strategic Concept of 2012 as the conceptual silver bullet against doubts on NATO's future roles and missions does not help either as some observers argue that in the meantime this document has been at least partly overtaken by events.¹⁰

If the Alliance fails to present a convincing rationale, the public perception could be that NATO is ready to accept its decreasing relevance and is prepared to put itself in standby mode to hibernate until it is reawakened by a new mission. Should such a hibernation-rational take hold, it will be even more difficult to allocate sufficient funds for security/defence related issues, particularly in austerity-struck European countries. Without sufficient funding though, NATO will not be able to preserve its major strengths: preparedness and interoperability through common planning, common standards and common exercises.

Hence, NATO leaders need to translate the three abstract core missions of the 2010 Strategic Concept (collective defence, crisis management, cooperative security) into a concrete narrative, which reflects the challenges of the post-Afghanistan era. Such a narrative could be that the Alliance will concentrate on the tasks

it was founded for: defending the security and the vital interests of its members. This might include contingencies far away from Europe – regardless of whether they are Article 5 missions or not, and whether they include expeditionary forces or territorial defence capabilities. A missile attack by North Korea on Alaska (given the waywardness of the regime in Pyongyang, this is hardly a far-fetched scenario) would be just as certain as a Syrian attack against Turkish territory, to trigger an Article 5 response. Even beyond questions of collective defence regulated by Article 5, immediate action to protect vital interests can become necessary. For instance, should a war in the Middle East prompt Iran to block the Straits of Hormuz, NATO could not remain passive simply because it did not suffer a direct attack. The same might hold true for devastating terrorist attacks, or violent disruptions of energy supplies. With the current proliferation of nuclear weapons, the spread of missile technology and the undoubted potential for devastating attacks on communication networks or for terrorist acts using state-of-the-art technology, formulating a narrative for NATO post-2014 should not be a mission impossible.

¹⁰ The NATO Secretary General is airing the idea of having, at the Summit, a sort of “report card” to assess which parts of the Strategic Concept have been successfully implemented.