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Counterinsurgency: the challenge for NATO strategy and operations

Edited by
Christopher M. Schnaubelt

Research Division • Rome, November 2009

NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE
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The Counterinsurgency Challenge for NATO

Christopher M. Schnaubelt

"Capturing the will of the people is a very clear and basic concept, yet one that is either misunderstood or ignored by political and military establishments around the world. The politician keeps applying force to attain a condition, assuming the military will both create and maintain it. And whilst for many years the military has understood the need to win the 'hearts and minds' of the local population, this is still seen as a supporting activity to the defeat of the insurgents rather than the overall objective, and it is often under-resourced and restricted to low-level acts to ameliorate local conditions and the lot of the people. This brings us back to the relationship between the trial and the clash of wills. Since the overall objective we seek by employing force is to win the clash of the wills, it follows that every trial of strength must be won in such a way that each success complements and supports the measures to win the clash of wills. Only then will the forces we send have utility and deliver the political result desired."

General Rupert Smith,
The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World[1]

Counterinsurgency has been a contentious topic for NATO; there appear to be wide differences among the members on how to approach it.

[11]New York: Vintage Books edition (2008), pp. 279-280.

United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates caused a stir in January 2008, when he appeared to criticize non-US members of NATO by saying: "I'm worried we're deploying [military advisors] that are not properly trained and I'm worried we have some military forces that don't know how to do counterinsurgency operations."[2]

According to the *Los Angeles Times*, "NATO officials bristled at suggestions that non-U.S. forces have been ineffective in implementing a counterinsurgency campaign. They argued that the south, home to Afghanistan's Pashtun tribal heartland that produced the Taliban movement, has long been the most militarily contested region of the country." The paper reported that an anonymous European NATO official "angrily denounced the American claims, saying much of the violence is a result of the small number of U.S. troops who had patrolled the region before NATO's takeover in mid-2006, a strategy that allowed the Taliban to reconstitute in the region."[3]

Yet Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has stated "We can do better" in Afghanistan. In a *Washington Post* Op-Ed, he wrote that NATO "needs a more cohesive approach."[4]

> Our operations are still too much of a patchwork, with individual countries assigned to specific geographic areas… Multiple approaches to military operations and development assistance within one mission reduce effectiveness and can strain solidarity. We should have more common approaches to our efforts, including fewer geographic restrictions on where forces can go in support of each other.[5]

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[2] "Gates says force unable to fight guerrillas", *Los Angeles Times*, January 16, 2008. Available at: http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/16/world/fg-usafghan16.

[3] Ibid.

[4] For a detailed analysis on NATO's problems in applying a comprehensive approach in such conditions, see NDC Forum Paper #9, *Operationalizing a comprehensive approach in semi-permissive environments*. It can be downloaded at: http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=79.

[5] January 18, 2009. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/16/AR2009011603717.html

This issue poses a strategic challenge for NATO, not only because the largest and longest duration combat operation in the history of the Alliance is ongoing and primarily consists of fighting insurgents in Afghanistan, but also because of the fissures that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has exposed among NATO members. These differences include related questions on how to characterize and approach the violence in Afghanistan (COIN or stability and reconstruction?) and the relative military contributions by member states to the first and thus far only operation conducted by NATO under Article V (in addition to the size of force contributions, caveats preclude some national troops from conducting full spectrum combat operations). The spectre of a "two-tier" alliance has been raised by allegations that some members have not been carrying their fair share of the burden.

While military and civilian defense leaders from the US, UK, and Canada clearly identify the mission in Afghanistan as a COIN effort, other NATO members are more reticent. For example, Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer (who also contribute chapters to this Forum Paper) have written that Germany, one of the largest NATO military partners, characterizes its efforts in Afghanistan as a "stability and reconstruction operation" rather than COIN. In addition to domestic politics, they posit that the reasons for this distinction include a different concept of the conflict within the German defense establishment: "…unlike many of its allies, the Federal Republic never engaged in a 'small war'. Germany lacks historical memory of such conflicts which could inform current debate."[6]

In an interview with the ISAF commander at the time, General David McKiernan, the German paper *Spiegel* argued that "Germans are prepared to support the government of Hamid Karzai and to push forward with reconstruction, but they clearly aren't interested in waging war. More and more civilians are falling into the line of fire in the fronts between the insurgents and ISAF, and ISAF soldiers are dying everyday."[7]

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[6] "Counter-what? Germany and Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan." RUSI February 2008, Vol 153 No. 1, p. 44.

[7] August 11, 2008. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,571345,00.html

When asked whether German and other national "so-called caveats" presented a problem for operations in Afghanistan, General McKiernan responded: "If there is something the German military cannot do that the American military can do, then the decision has been a legal and political decision back in Germany, and I accept that. But as a soldier, I don't understand it. I don't understand ever putting your men and women in harm's way without their having the full ability to protect themselves. That also means operating on actionable intelligence to defeat insurgents and protect your forces. That's how you keep your soldiers alive."[8]

Meanwhile, the deployment of additional US troops to Afghanistan initially considered by the Bush administration has been continued under the direction of President Barrack Obama. Obama has promised to switch the focus of US military efforts from Iraq to Afghanistan and to increase the US troop levels even further, approving an increase of 17,000 US soldiers and marines plus another 4,000 trainer/advisors while stating: "From our partners and NATO allies, we seek not simply troops, but rather clearly defined capabilities: supporting the Afghan elections, training Afghan Security Forces, and a greater civilian commitment to the Afghan people". However, cracks in resolve may already be appearing. Secretary of Defense Gates told a Congressional panel on January 27, 2009 that the new administration was getting ready to send more troops but lacked a clear plan for using them. Besides saying the US still required "a fully integrated civilian-military strategy", Gates hinted the bar for success might be lowered by saying the US also needed to establish "modest, realistic goals."[9]

Buried within rhetoric that the new White House is "elevating" the importance of the war in Afghanistan were hints the US would reduce its objectives while expecting allies to take up a heavier share of the burden

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[8] Ibid.

[9] David Wood, "Pentagon ready to beef up troops to Afghanistan without clear strategy." *Baltimore Sun* January 28, 2009 at: http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/nation/politics/bal-te.gates28jan28,0,7175932.story.

at least in respect to improving Afghan governance and economic growth. Gates told the *New York Times* in January 2009 that "If we set ourselves the objective of creating some sort of Central Asian Valhalla over there, we will lose" and said that goals under the Bush administration had been "too broad and too far into the future." According to the *Times*, other officials said the Obama administration "would leave economic development and nation-building increasingly to European allies, so that American forces could focus on the fight against insurgents."

From several different perspectives, this NATO Defense College Forum Paper explores the challenges that counterinsurgency operations pose for NATO. The next chapter provides an analysis of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy ("Af-Pak") announced by the White House in March 2009 and its implications for NATO and finds that the Obama administration's strategy is largely a continuation of the Bush administration's plans but with much greater resourcing. It implies that NATO will be called upon to extend its operations in Afghanistan and provide more troops and other resources to complement the increasing efforts by the Americans.

This is followed by Benjamin Schreer's chapter on the counterinsurgency lessons from Afghanistan for NATO. He argues that the effectiveness of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is hampered by a conceptual divide between NATO members regarding counterinsurgency strategy and operations, compounded by a failure to adequately resource ISAF. He concludes that "NATO's future existence will not depend on its ability to confront a sustained insurgency; its persistent weaknesses in this area might at the same time decrease the Atlantic Alliance's credibility as an international security actor."

After that, Chris Collett provides a description of "Hybrid Adversaries" and argues they are the most likely threat to NATO in both the near and foreseeable future. These are opponents that simultaneously and adaptively employ combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal means or activities. Rather than a single entity, these will typically be a combination of state and non-state actors. According to Collett,

a common view of this threat is needed and should result in NATO bolstering its ability to conduct counterinsurgency and stability operations.

In the fourth chapter, Christopher Jennings writes on the necessity of achieving the correct balance of civilian and military efforts during counterinsurgency operations as well as the need to identify and accept tradeoffs between short term security goals and long term development goals. Focusing on the importance of building key state institutions, he provides a framework that should be useful to both military and civilian leaders in designing more effective counterinsurgency plans.

Kirk Johnson next contributes an analysis of the need for, and problematic nature of, measures to indicate whether counterinsurgency operations are succeeding. He asserts that three topics are critical: population security, "hearts and minds," and measures of normalcy. His chapter also provides useful advice on selecting and interpreting data, including civilian casualties and polling.

Examining the experience of the United Kingdom during several counterinsurgency campaigns, Alexander Alderson's chapter addresses the time lag that results from the evolutionary process of military doctrine development in the face of the revolutionary pressures created by insurgents in the midst of war. He concludes that the British military has historically resolved this challenge by applying practical lessons in the field well before they are codified in doctrine. Given the need for whole-of-government approaches to counterinsurgency, however, the political/civilian aspects tend to lag because they lack concepts for evolutionary doctrine development and the capability for revolutionary adjustment on the ground.

Chapter seven scrutinizes the particular aspects of Germany's contributions to ISAF. As one of the largest force providers to ISAF specifically and to NATO in general, legal, political and conceptual restraints on German operations present a significant impact. Timo Noetzel and Martin Zapfe trace the development of German counterinsurgency policy and doctrine and argue that bottom-up pressure resulting from unit combat

engagements in Afghanistan is producing change in German military doctrine and politics in regards to counterinsurgency.

The subsequent chapter by Daniel Marston draws lessons from historical experience with irregular local security forces and recommends how they should be applied to Afghanistan. Marston notes that locally recruited security forces have been a key factor in successful COIN campaigns for at least the past 150 years. Critical considerations in raising such forces include flexible, adaptive, and culturally knowledgeable regular officers who can provide training, leadership, and tactical expertise. He observes that in modern campaigns, special operations forces have proven particularly well-suited for such tasks.

Kalev Sepp expands on the theme of NATO special operations forces, arguing that they are under-appreciated and under-utilized for contemporary counterinsurgency operations. When used, they are typically too focused on kinetic or direct action missions, while training and foreign internal defense missions are likely to have a greater long term impact at lower cost and political risk.

The penultimate chapter, written by Alex Crowther, argues that NATO should develop the necessary political will and take on police training as a major mission in support of counterinsurgency and stability operations. Unlike the United States, according to Crowther most other NATO members are well suited for conducting such missions given the prevalence of national Gendarmerie and Carabinieri police forces.

This Forum Paper concludes with a detailed study of American foreign assistance written by Terrence Kelly, Larry Crandall and Laurel Miller. They note that foreign assistance is an important component of COIN but current US legislation and policy is too restrictive and slow to meet the needs of officials responsible for implementing programs in countries where the US is carrying out COIN or stability operations, and recommend several specific changes to legislation, executive branch policy, and human resources practices.

CHAPTER ONE

The Obama Strategy for Afghanistan-Pakistan: Counterinsurgency Implications for NATO*

Christopher M. Schnaubelt

"We are in Afghanistan to confront a common enemy that threatens the United States, our friends and allies, and the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who have suffered the most at the hands of violent extremists. So I want the American people to nderstand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future."

President Barack Obama, March 27, 2009[1]

Introduction

This paper presents an analysis of the so-called "Af-Pak" strategy and what it means for the NATO and its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. Because the role of NATO in the Pakistan portion of the strategy is extremely limited, this paper focuses on the elements directed toward efforts in Afghanistan. It is based completely upon open-source

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* A revised version of this paper was published as "NATO and the new US "Af-Pak" strategy", NDC Research Paper 51, September 2009

[1] White House Press Office, "What's New in the Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan," http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Whats-New-in-the-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/ (accessed May 28, 2009)

materials. The primary sources are three key documents: the White House press release on what's new in the strategy, President Obama's remarks announcing the strategy, and an interagency white paper that was released simultaneously. These are complemented by published interviews with and newspaper quotes from key individuals such as General David Petraeus, the commanding general of US Central Command and head of the American combatant command responsible for US military efforts in Afghanistan.

Analyzing the strategy is complicated by fact that its development and implementation will be an interdependent and evolutionary process. Although the official description of the Af-Pak strategy and related statements by the White House will be unlikely to change—at least within the next year or two—the next logical step in the process of implementing the strategy is for the entities responsible for execution to write subordinate plans. Recent press reports indicate that US Secretary Defense Robert Gates has tasked the new Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF)/ISAF commander, General Stanley McChrystal, to write a new "60-day Assessment" of the situation in Afghanistan.[2]

This process may well result in significant changes to the Joint Campaign Plan developed by General Chrystal's predecessor, General David McKiernan.[3] However at the time this paper was written, no information was publicly available regarding the content of a new campaign plan to implement Af-Pak strategy.

Eight years of military and political intervention since the US initiated combat operations in October 2001 have obviously had a major influence on the operating environment in Afghanistan (as well as the neighboring situation in Pakistan). As should have been expected, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist groups have continually adjusted

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[2] Peter Spiegel, "Commander Maps New Course in Afghan War," *Wall Street Journal* June 12, 2009: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124476295460908195.html.

[3] Catherine Dale, "War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, January 23, 2009, p. 8.

their tactics in response to the actions of the US, NATO, and Afghanistan's elected government. And, US and other NATO forces in Afghanistan have experienced a long series of incremental changes in policy, strategy, and plans not only in response to the evolving situation in Afghanistan but also due to Alliance and domestic political considerations. It would be naïve, if not negligent, to believe that any new strategy will produce a quick success that would put an end to the action-reaction cycle and obviate the need for future adjustments.

The context

Understanding and appraising the Obama administration's strategy requires placing it in the context of the situation inherited from the Bush administration.[4] This approach is useful not only to provide an appreciation of how we arrived at the current juncture, but also in deriving lessons from what has been attempted in the past and proven effective or futile. The myopic thinking that has often characterized US strategy and planning for Afghanistan (and Iraq) has been counterproductive not only by inhibiting sufficient investment and long-range planning, but also because military officers and civilian officials on relatively short tours tend to look neither far into the future to establish long-range goals nor into the past to examine what their predecessors have done. It may be a cliché to say that the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results, but this truism is nonetheless a good one.

This is particularly worrisome given the tone of Obama administration pronouncements and media accounts that greatly exaggerate the newness and innovation displayed by the Obama Af-Pak strategy. For example, in the July/August 2009 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Fotini Christia

[4] For broader historical view, see Mark A. Burroughs, "A Historical Case Study of U.S. Strategy Towards Afghanistan," U.S. Army War College, April 2009. Available at: http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA499080.

and Michael Semple begin their article breathlessly with the assertion: "After seven years of the Bush administration's neglect and mismanagement of Afghanistan, President Barack Obama was prompt in ordering the deployment of 21,000 more U.S. troops."[5]

The frequent Bush administration strategy reviews, numerous evolutions in policy, and the creeping but multiple increases in troop strength and funding may say something about the level of foresight and quality of management but seem to belie the accusation of neglect. More importantly, Christia and Semple fail to mention that the troop increase implemented a recommendation developed by the Bush administration as part of a 2008 strategy review but had been put on hold in deference to the incoming president.[6] The Bush administration's strategy review and recommendations to send more troops meant the Obama team did not have to start from scratch and prompted Pentagon planners to begin preparations for the troop increase should it be approved. Yet if Bush made the formal decision to commit the additional forces as a lame duck, there surely would have been complaints about him handcuffing his successor.

As will be described in further detail below, the bulk of the "new" strategy is a continuation of Bush administration plans and policies. This should beg the question: if they didn't work for George W. Bush, why should they work for Barack H. Obama? Plausible explanations include: the Bush strategies were solid but their execution was poor, inadequate resources were devoted to carrying out otherwise sensible policies and plans, and/or necessary operational adjustments were made far too slowly

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[5] "Flipping the Taliban: How to Win in Afghanistan," pp. 34-45. Alternatively, in his blog on the *Foreign Policy* web site, David Rothkopf has written that a compliant media and Obama's star power "…has enabled the administration to take inherited policies and wrap them in Obama-paper with Obama-glitter all over it and all of a sudden, the old was repackaged into appearing new." See: http://rothkopf.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/08/the_problem_when_the_president_is_the_policy.)

[6] See Karen DeYoung, "Afghan Conflict Will Be Reviewed: Obama Sees Troops As Buying Time, Not Turning Tide," *The Washington Post* January 13, 2009, p. A-1. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/12/AR2009011203492.html (accessed July 7, 2009). Also, see Barbara Star, "Obama approves Afghanistan troop increase," CNN.com February 17, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/17/obama.troops/index.html (accessed July 7, 2009).

and thus ceded the initiative to the enemy. Nonetheless, analysts should not mislead themselves into believing that the inauguration of a new Commander-in-Chief who is far more articulate and popular than his predecessor will alone suffice as the change necessary turn the situation in Afghanistan around. Although it is now unpopular to quote former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the war in Afghanistan will continue to be a "long, hard slog" for quite some time to come.[7]

The Bush administration's legacy

One characteristic of the new administration's approach that is significantly different from its predecessor is that the Af-Pak strategy has been described in publicly released documents that present a largely coherent, integrated concept for US and allied efforts in Afghanistan (and Pakistan). Such was not the case for the Bush administration's efforts in the region. As Catherine Dale has written, "As of the start of 2009, the U.S. Government had not yet published a formal strategy for Afghanistan, along the lines of the November 2005 *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*."[8] Nonetheless, while they are not as comprehensive and complete as the 2005 strategy for Iraq discernible outlines of the Bush administration's approach to Afghanistan are indeed publicly available. An increasing amount of information was released by the Bush administration over time—probably coinciding with the administration's evolution in thinking about the problem combined with recognition of the declining security situation—and provided an increasing degree of lucidity.

Initial minimalism with a military focus

According to Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for

[7] See Dave Moniz and Tom Squitieri, "After grim Rumsfeld memo, White House supports him," *USA Today* October 22, 2003: http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-10-22-defense-memo-usat_x.htm.

[8] Dale, ibid, p.9.

Policy at the time, the Bush administration had determined that in 2001 its "task in Afghanistan was to overthrow the Taliban regime and deny al Qaida its safe haven."[9] Feith summarized the initial campaign strategy for Afghanistan as:

- Aiming to out the Taliban regime (not just to hit al Qaeda)
- Committing U.S. ground forces
- Using the indirect approach of supporting Afghan militias
- Relying on precision strikes
- Maintaining a small U.S. footprint to avoid problems that the Soviets (and British) had had in Afghanistan[10]

Feith also wrote that the strategy subsequently shifted: "In 2002, it was to help the Afghan interim administration establish its authority."[11]

Adding elements of economic development and building Afghan forces

Although the Bush administration had initially opposed the idea of nation building, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld continued to be skeptical,[12] on April 17, 2002 President Bush gave a speech that many interpreted as proposing a "Marshall Plan" for Afghanistan:

> Peace – peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistan develop its own stable government. Peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistan train and develop its own national army. And peace will be achieved through an education system for boys and girls, which works.

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[9] *War and Decision* (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), p. 139.
[10] Feith, ibid, pp. 88-89.
[11] Feith, ibid, p. 139.
[12] For example, in remarks at the Intrepid Sea-Air-Space Museum in New York City on February 14, 2003 he said: "Afghanistan belongs to the Afghans. The objective is not to engage in what some people call nationbuilding [sic]." ("Beyond Nation Building," transcript at: http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=337 (accessed July 7, 2009).

> We're working hard in Afghanistan. We're clearing minefields. We're rebuilding roads. We're improving medical care. And we will work to help Afghanistan to develop an economy that can feed its people without feeding the world's demand for drugs.[13]

Yet no detailed reconstruction plan was published by the White House and the rudimentary elements of a nascent strategy to help provide security, economic development, good governance, and build Afghanistan's army were substantially under-resourced. According to David Rohde and David E. Sanger: "Sixteen months after the president's 2002 speech, the United States Agency for International Development, the government's main foreign development arm, had seven full-time staffers and 35 full-time contract staff members in Afghanistan....Sixty-one agency positions were vacant."[14]

In a *New Yorker* magazine article extremely critical of the Bush administration's efforts in Afghanistan, Seymour Hersh depicts contemporary and former US government officials describing an action-reaction cycle as the Taliban adjusted tactics in response to the initial US approach of "reliance on massive firepower." According to then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Collins, the Taliban "began to realize at the end of 2003 that the key is not to fight our soldiers but U.N. officials and aid workers."[15]

Increased funding

Around the same time, according to Collins, "significant money began to flow" to support Afghan reconstruction and security efforts.

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[13] Speech at Virginia Military Institute. Transcript available at: http://www.usembassy.it/viewer/article.asp?article=/file2002_04/alia/A2041813.htm (accessed July 8, 2009).

[14] David Rohde and David E. Sanger, "How a "Good War' in Afghanistan Went Bad." *The New York Times*, August 12, 2007. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/12/world/asia/12afghan.html (accessed July 7, 2009).

[15] "The Other War: why Bush's Afghanistan problem won't go away," *The New Yorker* April 12, 2004. Available at: http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/04/12/040412fa_fact (accessed 7 July 2009).

Apparently, this was due to a shift in US strategy. Hersh writes that "In January of 2003, Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, made a fifteen-hour visit to Kabul and announced, 'We're clearly moving into a different phase, where our priority in Afghanistan is increasingly going to be stability and reconstruction.'" Hersh also reports that the Bush administration planned to devote additional efforts to "improving security and rebuilding the Afghan National Army."

In November 2003, Zalmay Khalilzad, an Afghan-American with strong political connections to the Bush administration, was appointed as the new US ambassador to Afghanistan. Besides direct access to the top levels of the US government, he was provided a budget ($2 billion) for reconstruction and other civilian efforts that was twice the size of the previous year's allocation. In partnership with the US military commander for Afghanistan, Lieutenant General David Barno, Khalilzad began implementing a new plan called "accelerating success" that included the expansion of Provincial Reconstruction Teams to "build schools, roads, and wells and to win the 'hearts and minds' of Afghans."[16]

Recognizing Pakistan's influence on the situation

The Bush administration also began linking conditions in Pakistan with success in Afghanistan. President Bush met with Pakistan's President General Pervez Musharraf in Islamabad in early March 2006 to confer about cooperation in the "war on terror" immediately after meeting with Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Kabul.[17] Bush met simultaneously with Musharraf and Karzai at the White House on September 26, 2006 to discuss common efforts to fight terrorism. At this occasion Bush praised the two leaders for "working hard together to defeat the Taliban and Al-Qaeda."[18]

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[16] Rohde and Sanger, ibid.

[17] MSNBC.com, "Bush praises Pakistan's help in terror fight," March 5, 2006. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11651039/ (accessed July 9, 2009).

[18] Andrew F. Tully, "Afghanistan: Bush, Karzai Agree on Strategy Against Terror." *RadioFreeEurope/Radio Liberty*, September 27, 2006; http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1071654.html (accessed July 9, 2009).

More troops, more money, more training

Following a trip to Afghanistan, on December 14, 2006 Anthony Cordesman wrote that "The Bush Administration is already considering major increases in military and economic aid and limited increases in US forces."[19] Cordesman reported that in order to produce the desired endstate of a "Moderate, stable, representative Afghanistan," a major part of US strategy was development of the Afghan National Army (ANA).[20] He described three "lines of operation" in this respect:

- Establish and Enhance ANA Training Command
- Professional/Self Sustaining Afghan National Army (Main Effort)
- Sustainment Operations for Afghan National Army

Cordesman's report included briefing slides illustrating that the above efforts were supporting four other lines of effort as part of a "Clear, Hold, Build, Engage" strategy:

- Security
  - Credible Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)
  - ANSF and Coalition Forces defeat elements of Al Qaeda, Taliban, and other Extremist Groups
  - Afghan led
  - Coherent Campaign Plan

- Governance and Justice (Main Effort)
  - Responsive, representative, and capable governments at all levels
  - Extend reach of Afghan government
  - Credible Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)

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[19] "Winning in Afghanistan: Afghan Force Development," Center for Strategic and International Studies Report, December 14, 2006, http://csis.org/publication/winning-afghanistan-2 (accessed July 8, 2009).

[20] Confirming the "main effort" identified by Anthony Cordesman in his December 2006 article, in a Congressional Research Service Report, Catherine Dale wrote that the primary goal of the October 2008 JCP for Afghanistan was "'transfer of lead security responsibility' to the Afghans, which includes planning as well as conducting operations" (Dale, ibid, p. 8).

- Economic Development
  - Viable Provincial/District level infrastructures
  - Determine Afghan needs at local level
  - Flexible approach to reconstruction

- Border Strategy
  - Develop cross border cooperation with Pakistan Military
  - Interdict Taliban network
  - Collaborative operations and planning
  - Effective, responsible tactical communications

Expanding to a more regional view

During a briefing to the press in Islamabad on January 12, 2007, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher said the Bush administration recognized extremist groups operating from Pakistan posed a threat to both Pakistan and Afghanistan. According to a US State Department report, he also said that:

> …military force alone is insufficient to secure the border region. The true challenge…is not only extending the government's authority to the border regions, but also the benefits of government, such as new roads, better schools, a sound justice system and business opportunities that would provide area residents alternatives to build better lives.
>
> The United States can support efforts with more reconstruction, more security, more opportunity for people on the Afghan side, and we can support Pakistan's efforts to provide more opportunities, more economic opportunity in better governance and more security for people on the Pakistani side.[21]

[21] David McKeeby, "Progress Seen in Security Pakistan-Afghanistan Border," *America.gov* January 17, 2009. www.america.gov/.../2007/January/20070117164543idybeekcm0.9265406.html (accessed 7 July 2009).

Finally, a clear statement of goals and implementing tasks

A month later, during a speech at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC, President Bush outlined the US strategy in Afghanistan. The message to Afghan, he said, was: "We will train you, we will help you, and we will stand with you as you defend your new democracy."[22] This speech was combined with a February 15, 2007 White House press release that reported "The Administration recently completed a top-to-bottom review of its Afghanistan strategy."[23] The highlights of the White House Fact Sheet included the following statements:

> America has a clear goal in Afghanistan. We will help the people of Afghanistan defeat the terrorists, and establish a stable, moderate, and democratic state that respects the rights of its citizens, governs its territory effectively, and is a reliable ally in the war on terror.
>
> The President is asking Congress for $11.8 billion over the next two years to help President Karzai defeat our common enemies and help the Afghan people build a free and successful nation. The President has also ordered an increase in U.S. forces in Afghanistan – by extending the stay of 3,200 troops now in the country by four months and by deploying a replacement force that will sustain that increase for the foreseeable future.

The White House Fact Sheet also declared that the US strategy was focused on "Several Key Goals," excerpted below:

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[22] David McKeeby, "Bush Announces New Plan for Afghanistan: President urges allies to join U.S. in helping democracy succeed, *America.gov* February 15, 2007, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/February/20070215155239idybeekcm0.8339807.html#ixzz0KZmCtrGM&D (accessed 7 July 2009)

[23] "White House Outlines U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: President seeking $11.8 billion over two years to assist Afghan government" *America.gov* February 15, 2007, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/February/20070215115104abretnuh0.7379267.html#ixzz0KZmShbFY&D (accessed 7 July 2009)

1. The United States And Our Allies Will Help President Karzai Increase The Size And Capabilities Of The Afghan Security Forces.

2. America Will Work With Our Allies To Strengthen The NATO Force In Afghanistan.

3. The United States And Our Allies Will Help President Karzai Improve Provincial Governance And Develop Afghanistan's Rural Economy.

4. The United States And Our Allies Will Help President Karzai Reverse The Increase In Poppy Cultivation That Is Aiding The Taliban

5. The United States And Our Allies Will Help President Karzai Fight Corruption — Particularly In Afghanistan's Judicial System.

6. The United States Will Help President Musharraf Defeat The Terrorists And Extremists Operating Inside Pakistan And Work With Afghanistan And Pakistan To Increase Cooperation In The Fight Against Terror.

Engage the "Reconcilables"

Perhaps inspired by the perceived success of similar efforts in Iraq, in what appears to be its final evolution the Bush administration also approved the concept of trying the split away "moderate" members of the Taliban from hard core extremists. According to MSNBC.com, in September 2007 an Afghanistan government spokesman said that President Karzai and President Bush had discussed initiating a Taliban reconciliation process and that Bush expressed support.[24] One year later, General David Petraeus confirmed to reporters that such an approach was "being examined as an option." *USA Today* reported that "Petraeus stressed it was premature to discuss strategy but suggested he will carry over lessons from his playbook in Iraq – including pos-

[24] Associated Press, "Taliban vows to 'never' negotiate," September 30, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21055255 (accessed July 7, 2009).

sible outreach to try to bring hostile players into the political process."[25]

Cross-border remote missile strikes

According to the *New York Times*, in July 2008 President Bush approved US ground raids into Pakistan in order to disrupt extremist infiltration into Afghanistan. This followed action by the CIA which had "for several years fired missiles at militants inside Pakistan from remotely piloted Predator aircraft."[26] (Consistent with a promise during his 2008 presidential campaign, within three days of his inauguration, President Obama continued the missile strikes in Pakistan and approximately one month later expanded the scope of such strikes. As reported by Mark Mazzetti and David E. Sanger, "The strikes are a sign that President Obama is continuing, and in some cases extending, Bush administration policy in using American spy agencies against terrorism suspects in Pakistan…."[27])

The campaign plan for Afghanistan

In November 2008, General McKiernan—the ISAF commander at the time—released the following unclassified summary to be posted on the *Small Wars Journal* website:[28]

MISSION

> ISAF conducts operations in partnership with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and in coordination with Operation Enduring Freedom, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the international community in order to assist

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[25] Kim Gamel, **"**Petraeus: more than troops needed in Afghanistan," September 14, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-09-14-3357186908_x.htm (accessed July 7, 2009).

[26] Eric Schmitt and Mark Mazzezet, "Bush Said to Give Orders Allowing Raids in Pakistan," September 11, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/washington/11policy.html (accessed July 9, 2009).

[27] CBS News/Associated Press, "Pakistan Strike First on Obama's Watch," January 23, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/01/23/terror/main4749317.shtml (accessed July 9, 2009); and Mark Mazzeetti and David E. Sanger, "Obama Expands Missile Strikes Inside Pakistan," *The New York Times* February 21, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/21/washington/21policy.html (accessed July 9, 2009).

[28] http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/isafcampaignplansummary.pdf (accessed 27 May 2008).

GIRoA to defeat the insurgency, establish a secure environment, extend viable governance, and promote development throughout Afghanistan.

LINES OF OPERATION

Security
Governance
Reconstruction and Development

COMPREHENSIVE AND INTEGRATED APPROACH

Comprehensive: Working concurrently across all three lines of operation.
Integrated: Operating in a coordinated manner with GIRoA and the international community.

KEY PLANNING FACTORS

Counterinsurgency campaign.
Shape, in order to clear in order to hold and build.
Prioritize the areas to clear and hold.
Establish and maintain freedom of movement.
Apply greater effort on the narcotics-insurgency nexus.
Identify and engage key Afghan community leaders.
Interdict and disrupt insurgent movement to and from sanctuaries in the border region.
Build Afghan capability, capacity, and credibility.

The Obama administration takes charge

The war in Afghanistan was a high profile topic on the campaign trail for Candidate Obama. During a visit to Kabul in July 2008, for example, he told CBS news: "For at least a year now, I have called for two additional brigades, perhaps three….I think it's very important that we unify command more effectively to coordinate our military activities. But military alone is not going to be enough."[29]

[29] "Obama calls situation in Afghanistan 'urgent'" *CNN.com*, July 21, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/07/20/obama.afghanistan/ (accessed July 13, 2009).

The new Obama administration announced February 10, 2009, that Bruce Riedel—described by the *Los Angeles Times* as "a former CIA official and harsh critic of former President Bush's handling of the conflict in Afghanistan—would chair a White House review of US policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan.[30] Part of Riedel's remit would be to tie together the other high level reviews being conducted by US Government agencies, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Central Command. However, it was reported that President Obama was likely to approve a significant increase in US forces, as previously requested by the Pentagon, prior to completion of the strategy review.[31]

On February 17, 2009, the Pentagon reported that President Obama had approved the deployment of 17,000 additional US soldiers and marines to Afghanistan. According to CNN, a military official said "the goal is to have enough troops to 'seize and hold' territory and maintain basic security, which hasn't been possible under current troop levels."[32] Slightly more than one month later on March 27, 2009, joined on the dais by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, President Obama said: "Today, I am announcing a comprehensive, new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. And this marks the conclusion of a careful policy review, led by Bruce [Riedel], that I ordered as soon as I took office."[33]

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[30] Julian E. Barnes, "Obama team works on overhaul of Afghanistan, Pakistan policy" February 11, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/feb/11/world/fg-us-afghan11 (accessed July 13, 2009).

[31] Karen DeYoung, "Afghan Conflict Will Be Reviewed: Obama Sees Troops As Buying Time, Not Turning Tide," *The Washington Post* January 13, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/12/AR2009011203492.html.

[32] Barbara Starr, *CNN.com*, February 17, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/17/obama.troops/index.html.

[33] The White House, "A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan," *The Blog*, March 27, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/03/27/A-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/ (accessed May 28, 2009.

Highlights of the Af-Pak Strategy

In his remarks announcing the new strategy, President Obama stated:

"We are in Afghanistan to confront a common enemy that threatens the United States, our friends and allies, and the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who have suffered the most at the hands of violent extremists. So I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future."[34]

He further said that:

- "The future of Afghanistan is inextricably linked to the future of its neighbor, Pakistan"
- The people of Pakistan want "an end to terror, access to basic services, the opportunity to live their dreams, and the security that can only come with the rule of law"
- "…we must isolate al Qaeda from the Pakistani people"
- The deployment of 17,000 additional troops "will take the fight to the Taliban in the south and the east, and give us a greater capacity to partner with Afghan security forces and to go after insurgents along the border….At the same time, we will shift the emphasis of our mission to training and increasing the size of Afghan security forces, so that they can eventually take the lead in securing their country"
- A goal of 134,000 ANA and 82,000 police would be met by 2011
- The military push must be joined by "a dramatic increase in our civilian effort….we need agricultural specialists and educators, engineers and lawyers"

[34] The White House, **"**Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan" March 27, 2009**,** http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/

- "We cannot turn a blind eye to the corruption that causes Afghans to lose faith in their own leaders. Instead, we will seek a new compact with the Afghanistan government that cracks down on corrupt behavior, and sets clear benchmarks, clear metrics for international assistance so that it is used to provide for the needs of the Afghan people"
- "…there will be no peace without reconciliation among former enemies"
- "And we will continue to support the basic human rights of all Afghans – including women and girls"
- "…we will set clear metrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable." These would include actions to:
  - Assess efforts to train ASF and progress in combating insurgents
  - Measure growth of Afghanistan's economy and illicit narcotics production
  - Confirm that the right tools and tactics are being used

The president's speech was accompanied by a White House press release, titled "What's New in the Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan."[35] It emphasized the following characteristics:

- An Attainable Objective
- A Regional Approach
- Building Capacity and More Training
- Using All Elements of National Power
- Bringing new international elements to the effort

Both the speech and the press release also reported that besides the 17,000 additional US troops that President Obama had approved in February 2009, another 4,000 would be deployed as trainers for the Afghan National Army and Police.

The White House press release identified the "core goal" of the

[35] White House Press Office, (ibid).

new strategy as "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens." As will be discussed further below, this is presented in a manner that gives the impression that it sets a lower bar for success compared to the goals of the previous administration, which explicitly included the promotion of democracy.

In addition to the president's speech and the White House press release, a policy white paper was also published.[36] It generally echoed the President's remarks, stating that the US "core goal" is to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan. It also laid out the following five objectives:

- Disrupting terrorist networks in Afghanistan and especially Pakistan to degrade any ability they have to plan and launch international terror attacks
- Promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan….
- Developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight….
- Assisting efforts to enhance civilian control and stable constitutional government in Pakistan and a vibrant economy….
- Involving the international community to actively assist…

On its second page, however, the white paper describes an "end state" which is far broader than the "core goal." It seeks to achieve "the removal of al Qaeda's sanctuary, effective democratic government control in Pakistan, and a self-reliant Afghanistan that will enable a withdrawal of combat forces while sustaining our commitment to political and economic development." Interestingly, the word "democracy" is not used in conjunction with Afghanistan yet supporting elections and improving governance are listed among the important tasks.

[36] "White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan" http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/afghanistan_pakistan_white_paper_final.pdf

So, what's new in the Obama administrations strategy?

Although different in geographic focus, the Obama administration's new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan is similar in many ways to both the Bush administration's pre-surge strategy for Iraq published in 2005 and the outline of the Bush strategy for Afghanistan that was released in 2007.[37] When asked by Margaret Warner during an interview on *The News Hour* what was different from the Bush plan, Obama's envoy to the region, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, could identify few specifics other than being "an integrated policy" with "far more resources."[38]

The Obama strategy for Afghanistan-Pakistan and the Bush pre-surge strategy for Iraq look especially similar. Each of them:

- Claimed to be "comprehensive" and stated that defeating terrorists is a vital interest of the United States;
- Recognized that some armed groups might be reconciled to the elected government but others, like al Qaeda, could not be brought into the peaceful political process and thus would require so-called "kinetic" operations to kill or capture terrorists;
- Recognized the problem of insurgent and terrorist infiltration from neighboring safe havens;
- Announced plans to enlarge and train the host nation's army and police so they could eventually take responsibility for securing their own country.

Bush in 2005 and Obama in 2009 both promised to assist, encourage, and cajole national leaders to develop their economy, improve gover-

[37] The Bush administration's *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,* dated November 30, 2005, can be downloaded at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/30/AR2005113000376.html
(accessed April 15, 2009)

[38] Interview transcript, "Obama Sets Plan to Boost Afghan Stability, Confront Taliban and Al-Qaida," March 27, 2009, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june09/afghanpak_03-27.html

nance, and reduce corruption. Each stated they would identify metrics to track their strategy's progress and said they would use benchmarks to press the respective host nation governments to implement the rule of law and be responsive to the needs of their populations.

However, in addition to providing more troops and funding the Af-Pak strategy seems to have two "Big Ideas" that present a clear change from the Bush strategy for Afghanistan as it had evolved by 2008. First, in the Obama strategy success in Afghanistan is strongly bound with the situation in Pakistan (thus, an Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy rather than another Afghanistan strategy). Although the Bush administration belatedly recognized the influence of the situation in Pakistan upon that in Afghanistan, and the problems generated when the Taliban and other extremists had a safe haven where they could escape from coalition operations in Afghanistan and regroup, it did not integrate consideration of the two states into a single broad strategy. This is an important, major new contribution to the US and allied strategy in the region.

Second, the new strategy gives the impression of an attempt to lower the bar by setting a more readily achievable goal. Rather than the broad goal announced by the Bush administration on February 15, 2008 to "help the people of Afghanistan defeat the terrorists, and establish a stable, moderate, and democratic state that respects the rights of its citizens, governs its territory effectively, and is a reliable ally in the War on Terror,"[39] the Obama administration distilled the purpose of operations in Afghanistan into the defeat of al Qaeda and elimination its safe havens.

Yet when reading the "fine print," it becomes clear that the Af-Pak strategy is consistent with US counterinsurgency doctrine and its execution will require the full range of efforts from providing population security, building Afghan security force capabilities, promoting economic

[39] "White House Outlines U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: President seeking $11.8 billion over two years to assist Afghan government", ibid.

development, improving governance, to reducing corruption. Interestingly, the word "democracy" is used only in the context of Pakistan's government. However as noted previously, the White Paper *implies* a democratic Afghanistan by including among its stated objectives "Promoting a more capable, accountable, and effective government in Afghanistan."[40] It also says that the strategy endeavors to "strengthen the relationship between the Afghan people and their government" and recommends "bolstering the legitimacy of the Afghan government." One of the specified tasks is to "do everything necessary to ensure the security and legitimacy of voter registration, elections, and vote counting."

The main substantive difference between the goals of the two strategies in this regard seems to be that the Bush administration stated that Afghanistan would be a "moderate" democratic state. Instead, the Obama Af-Pak strategy gives the desired nature of the Afghanistan government as being "legitimate" and "a capable, accountable, and effective government…that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function, especially regarding internal security, with limited international support." Furthermore, in the section regarding reconciliation with "non-ideologically committed insurgents" the Af-Pak strategy says that such efforts "must not become a mechanism for instituting medieval social policies that give up the quest for gender equality and human rights." These characteristics seem to *imply* a moderate government.

Perhaps the Af-Pak strategy is intentionally leaving open a theoretical possibility that some other form of Afghan government might be able to defeat al Qaeda, quiet the extremists, and adequately serve the people of Afghanistan. However, it is extremely difficult to imagine anything other than a moderate democracy being able to achieve the goals of the Af-Pak strategy while simultaneously being sufficiently consistent with NATO member state values to retain the necessary levels of military and economic development support.

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[40] Perhaps the Af-Pak strategy takes Afghan democracy as a given, so it is not necessary to mention it as a goal. If so, this further blurs any difference in the level of ambition between the Bush and Obama strategies.

Strategic and operational implications

The announcement of a "new" strategy may buy some time with domestic publics, but is unlikely to produce a rapid shift in the situation. By stating that the "core goal" is to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda," the Obama strategy gives the impression of lowering the bar from the previous goal of spreading democratic values and thus being easier to achieve. Yet as the preceding analysis shows, implementing the strategy will require a full-scale counterinsurgency effort that includes providing security for the Afghan population, increased economic development programs, and improving the quality and effectiveness of the Afghan government at the national, regional, and local levels. Especially considering the deterioration of the security situation during the past few years, the new strategy will very likely require greater levels of US and allied effort rather than less.

Coalition troop levels

In short, the Af-Pak strategy will probably increase demands upon—and tensions within—NATO instead of representing a solution that would reduce stress upon the alliance. Underlying tensions about decision-making and burden sharing remain unresolved, and possibly exacerbated. As was the case with his predecessor, it is likely that Obama will eventually have to recognize that he hasn't devoted enough resources to achieve his stated goals. Where will these come from?

The initial approval to send another 17,000 troops plus 4,000 trainer/advisors is probably only a down payment. The Associated Press reported that before being relieved, ISAF commander General David McKiernan told President Obama that another 10,000 troops would be needed but "the White House put off that decision until the end of the year." It also reported that on July 16, 2009, US Secretary of Defense Roberts Gates said "I think there will not be a significant increase in troop levels in Afghanistan beyond the 68,000, at least probably through the end of the year. Maybe some increase, but not a lot."[41]

[41] "Defense Secretary Says More Troops May Head to Afghanistan," July 16, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/07/16/defense-secretary-says-troops-head-afghanistan/

According to the Washington Post, while talking to US military leaders in Afghanistan during the last week of June 2009, US National Security Advisor James L. Jones implied that commanders should not request additional forces. Reporter Bob Woodward wrote that Jones had warned that "after all those additional troops, 17,000 plus 4,000 more, if there were new requests for force now, the president would quite likely have 'a Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment.'"[42] As Peter Feaver has pointed out, if Woodward's article is accurate this incident could be yet another similarity to the Bush administration's experience in Iraq: some reporters (including Woodward) have claimed that senior civilians discouraged senior military leaders from providing honest professional advice about troop levels by intimating that the president did not want to hear requests for more troops.[43]

Yet Woodward also wrote:

> The question of the force level for Afghanistan, however, is not settled and will probably be hotly debated over the next year. One senior military officer said privately that the United States would have to deploy a force of more than 100,000 to execute the counterinsurgency strategy of holding areas and towns after clearing out the Taliban insurgents. That is at least 32,000 more than the 68,000 currently authorized.

American and other coalition force levels are likely to remain problematic for quite some time. There is no consensus among counterinsurgency experts, yet a frequently cited rule of thumb suggests a ratio of 20 security force members per 1,000 in population is needed for success in counterinsurgency. (This figure, however, is hotly disputed.[44])

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[42] As Woodward explains, this is a well-known acronym in the US military meaning "What the [expletive]?" See "Key in Afghanistan: Economy, Not Military," *Washington Post* July 1, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/30/AR2009063002811_pf.html

[43] "The White House and Woodward," ForeignPolicy.com Shadow Government Blog, July 1, 2009, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/01/the_white_house_and_woodward.

[44] Although commonly prescribed, this is a disputed figure. See James T. Quinlivan, "Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations." *RAND Review*, Summer 2003 at: http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/burden.html

Using this rule of thumb, an Iraqi population of approximately 27.5 million would require roughly 550,000 security force members to quell a burgeoning insurgency. The "surge" in 2007 appeared to succeed with a far smaller ratio: approximately 169,000 troops from coalition forces.[45] However, the personnel available to conduct operations in Iraq also included a large portion of the 440,000 members of Iraqi Security Forces (soldiers and police) that had at that time been trained and equipped by Multi-National Force-Iraq. Furthermore, these Iraqi forces were complemented by approximately 92,000 "Sons of Iraq" irregular forces that have been described by the US Department of Defense as "a strategic asset that directly contributed to the 83% reduction in violence in the Baghdad Security Districts since August 2007."[46] Although there were questions about the capability and reliability of Iraqi regular and irregular security forces (as is the case with Afghanistan National Security Forces), the total number of security force members to population probably exceeded 20 per 1,000.

With an Afghan population of almost 32 million, following the 20 per 1,000 formula would require approximately 640,000 troops and police. Even if the planned increase of Afghan Security Forces to 216,000 (army and police) by 2011 is completed on schedule, this total plus approximately 68,000 US and 33,000 non-US coalition troops results in not quite half the ratio of total security force members to population that was used to turn the corner on violence in Iraq.

Following his participation in General McChrystal's "60-day Assessment," Anthony Cordesman argued that the US "must deploy a substantial number of additional brigade combat teams and 'enablers,'" and that the US should be ready to "deploy 3-6 more brigade combat teams during the coming year if required, but constantly monitor the overall

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[45] US Government Accountability Office, "Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight," March 2009, GAO-09-294SP, p. 42, http://gao.gov/new.items/d09294sp.pdf.

[46] US Department of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, December 2007, pp. 29 and 19, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/9010_Report_to_Congress_Dec_08.pdf. The number of Iraqi Security Forces actually performing duty may have been as little as one-half of the total reported as trained due to casualties, absent-without-leave, and other attrition.

progress in the war and Afghan government actions and cooperation and support." However, he also notes that:

> …*shape, clear, hold, and build* involve new forms of war fighting where force requirements cannot be predicted with precision. Past troop-to-task would require far higher levels of US forces [than] 3-6 more brigade combat teams, but such ratios ignore the impact of technology, new tactics, a civil-military approach to war and the role of civilian partners, and the ability to build up major new [Afghan National Security Forces] reinforcements over the [next] two years. At the same time, force requirements may be increased by new insurgent tactics and added foreign volunteers, instability in Pakistan, and the lack of adequate civilian partners and capability.[47]

While theoretically possible, it seems highly unlikely that current force levels will prove sufficient in the near term. The need for additional troops will place continuing pressure on NATO members to at a minimum maintain the size of their present deployments, if not to increase their contributions, to partially offset concerns about a "two tier alliance" and "Americanization of the war."[48]

A critical component of the Af-Pak strategy, as was the case with the Bush administration's approach, is helping to build capable and reliable Afghan National Security Forces. The creation of NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan could prove to be a significant contribution, but results remain to be seen. Even best case, the creation of sufficiently large

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[47] "The Afghanistan Campaign: Can We Win?" Center for Strategic & International Studies, July 22, 2009, http://csis.org/files/publication/090722_CanWeAchieveMission.pdf, pp. 21-22.

[48] See Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, "Does a Multi-Tier NATO Matter? The Atlantic Alliance and the Process of Strategic Change," *International Affairs* March 2009, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/ia/download/-/id/2363; and Stephen Castle, "U.S. Gains More Control as It Fights Afghan War," *New York Times* June 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/world/asia/12nato.html

and capable ANSF is many years away.[49] General George Casey, the US Army Chief of Staff, recently said that "training of local police and military in Afghanistan was at least a couple years behind the pace in Iraq, and it would be months before US deployed enough trainers. A significant expansion of the Afghan National Army above the 134,000 already envisioned in the Af-Pak strategy, perhaps double this number, is under consideration.[50] However, a recent report by Oxford Analytica argues that a rapid, significant expansion of the Afghan National Army will be problematic due to a retention rate of only 53% and shortfalls of volunteers, qualified officer candidates, and logistical support capabilities.[51]

Developing host nation forces able to secure their own population is perhaps the keystone of US counterinsurgency doctrine—and the Af-Pak strategy. Yet at this stage of the insurgency, this goal is still presents more of a challenge than a solution. We remain some distance away from a quantity and quality of Afghan forces that would enable the withdrawal of coalition forces to begin—that the point where, in the words of President Bush in the context of Iraqi Security Forces, "as they stand up we stand down."[52]

As a critical element of its strategy, the Obama administration must decide how much and how quickly it can rely upon Afghanistan's army and police forces to secure their own population. An early failing in Iraq was a rush to hand security responsibilities over to unreliable and inadequately trained Iraqi security forces in lieu of deploying the necessary level of US forces. Blunders such as the creation of the Fallujah Brigade, described by Thomas Ricks as having "far more in common with the insurgents than they ever would with the [US] Marines," proved to be steps backward instead of the hoped for shortcuts to victory.[53]

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[49] See C.J. Chivers, "Erratic Afghan Forces Pose Challenge to U.S. Goals," *New York Times*, June 7, 2009: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/08/world/asia/08afghan.html?th&emc=th

[50] Cordesman, "The Afghanistan Campaign: Can We Win?" p. 11.

[51] "Afghanistan: Army expansion is no easy option," *Oxford Analytica*, March 26, 2009.

[52] NewsHour interview with Jim Lehrer, December 16, 2005: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/white_house/july-dec05/bush_12-16-05.html

[53] *Fiasco* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), p. 343.

Economic development and good governance

Typically conceived as the "civilian" components of counterinsurgency, these elements are arguably outside NATO's portfolio. The most common phrase over the past few years about the war in Afghanistan is probably that it "cannot be won by the military alone." Yet the paradox is that while NATO's leverage over civilian entities is extremely limited, military success in Afghanistan is inseparably linked to the accomplishment of non-security objectives such as the delivery of basic services, offering economic opportunity, and achieving the perception that an elected Afghan government is a better choice for the population than the Taliban.

Unlike Iraq, the greatest challenge in Afghanistan has been nation-building from the ground up rather than reconstruction and stability. Tens of billions of dollars more in economic development assistance will be required during at least another decade of armed nation-building. Yet the US and other NATO members have yet to figure out how to implement an effective comprehensive approach within single member states (i.e., "whole-of-government" efforts) much less between ISAF contributors or in concert with key civilian elements of the international community.

Describing this as the problem of "Dealing with a Dysfunctional Mix of NATO/ISAF, National, UNAMA, and International Community Efforts," Anthony Cordesman asserts:

> NATO/ISAF and the US have sometimes been as serious a threat to themselves as the insurgency and the limitations of the Afghan government. To win, they must create an effective civil-military effort where civilian partners – and aid efforts in governance, economics, and rule of law – directly support or complement NATO/ISAF and US efforts to defeat the insurgency and create effective and legitimate levels of governance in the field.[54]

[54] Cordesman, "The Afghanistan Campaign: Can We Win?" p. 19.

Space limitations preclude repeating much of what has been written elsewhere regarding the challenges of putting together military and civilian efforts in stability and counterinsurgency operations.[55] However, it is imperative that ISAF develop and incorporate into its organizational structure integrated civil-military command teams at every echelon from the regional commands to the district level.

The creation of the Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group (ICMAG) in Kabul[56] was a very good step in the right direction. However, in addition to such efforts between US forces and the US Embassy in Kabul, ISAF headquarters needs better integration with embassies of all the major force contributing nations, the Europe Union, United Nations Assistance Mission-Afghanistan, and major non-governmental organizations. As the largest force contributor and provider of the ISAF commanding general, it has perhaps been too easy for the US—especially the State Department and US Agency for International Development—to concentrate solely on US interagency coordination efforts. Despite, and precisely because of, the political hurdles, similar efforts are required to integrate all the coalition civil-military efforts. Equally, the Afghan government—including its senior military commanders—must be brought into the planning process as full partners.

Although popular with the politicians in Washington, hardly any expert on Iraq believes that the Congressional benchmarks[57] were positive on the whole in changing the behavior of the Iraqi government. This observation begs the following questions: How can the US and its allies force a democratically elected government to change its behavior? Would threats

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[55] For more discussion on this topic, see Christopher M. Schnaubelt: "The challenge to operationalizing a comprehensive approach," in *Operationalizing a comprehensive approach in semi-permissive environments*, NDC Forum Paper Number 9: http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=79

[56] See "Prepared Statement of Ambassador John E. Herbst, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Before the Subcomittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs," US House of Representatives, May 19, 2009: http://nationalsecurity.oversight.house.gov/documents/20090519132337.pdf

[57] See Council on Foreign Relations, "What are Iraq's Benchmarks," March 11, 2008: http://www.cfr.org/publication/13333/

to withdraw American support be credible and effective? If not, will President Obama really be willing to walk away after the investment of so many lives and dollars?

Among the significant problems with the benchmarks established for Iraq were their design by a US Congress with the opposite party in majority having a view of disciplining the Bush administration as much as presenting a road map for the success of the Iraqi government. At the time of writing, the Obama administration has yet to release its benchmarks for Afghanistan (or Pakistan).

However, a better model would be the International Compact with Iraq.[58] This document was developed as a mutual agreement between the Government of Iraq and the International Community. As such, it not only brought a broad range of ideas into the mix but also buy-in from Iraqi leaders. It was more of an agreement of how to make progress than a mechanism for administering "carrots and sticks." Whichever route the Obama administration chooses to pursue in ensuring aid is effective and properly spent, the Afghan government, NATO, and the International Community should be involved in the process of establishing the goals and monitoring progress.

Conclusion

For the most part, the Af-Pak strategy is a continuation of the plans and policies of the Bush administration as they had evolved by the end of 2008. Nonetheless, it provides a coherent framework for implementing counterinsurgency and development efforts to the war in Afghanistan and will significantly increase the US military and financial resources devoted to carrying out the strategy.

If adequately resourced and properly implemented, the strategy

[58] See: International Compact with Iraq official website: http://www.iraqcompact.org/en/

has a good chance of turning around the security situation in Afghanistan and achieving the goals of the coalition and the elected government of Afghanistan while supporting the aspirations of the Afghan people. However, it is likely that an even higher troop levels and greater developmental aid will be required. Furthermore, successful implementation will require much better integration of planning and execution between military and civilian efforts, national contingents, and the US/NATO and the International Community.

For NATO, the Af-Pak strategy will mean more hard work ahead, more tensions over burden sharing and decision making, and a call for at least the same level of military effort if not even greater force contributions. However, if adequately resourced and wisely executed it also presents a reasonable probability of success in the largest "out-of-area" and combat mission in NATO's history.

CHAPTER TWO

NATO and Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Afghanistan

Benjamin Schreer

Can NATO conduct a sustained Counterinsurgency operation? Almost three years after the Atlantic Alliance assumed responsibility for all Afghan territory in October 2006 its troops now confront a complex and increasing insurgency. By July 2009 even northern Afghanistan, which used to be relatively stable compared to the embattled southern and eastern parts of the country, had turned into an area of almost daily clashes between NATO forces and insurgents. Indeed, that month proved to be the most deadly for NATO troops since the Alliance engaged in the country.[1] The ability of the Alliance to adjust to an insurgency challenge has, therefore, evolved from an academic question into one of the utmost political importance. Should NATO fail in what constitutes arguably its most important out-of-area operation so far, the repercussions could be significant, given that members might well decide never to engage in such an operation again. Since it is highly likely that modern insurgencies will be part of most major stability and support operations involving Western forces – and thus will be the norm rather than the exception – NATO's ability to contribute to international stability through the conduct of counterinsurgency operations would be significantly reduced.

Against this background, this paper examines the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan

[1] 'Bisher höchster Blutzoll der ISAF', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 July 2009, p. 6.

identifies some of the major lessons for NATO on both the political and the military level of counterinsurgency operations. This will allow some conclusion to be drawn on NATO's future prospects in this area. The article proceeds in three parts. The first part debates the concept of counterinsurgency and describes the evolving challenge for the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. The second part deals with the political and military lessons for the Atlantic Alliance in dealing with the insurgency challenge. The concluding part provides an outlook on future NATO capability development for counterinsurgency operations and highlights some potential strategic implications should the Atlantic Alliance fail to take on this challenge.

NATO and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: theory…

Simply put, counterinsurgency is 'all measures to suppress an insurgency'; it is a form of 'counter-warfare' that 'applies all elements of national power against insurrection'.[2] It follows that counterinsurgency is a strategy as opposed to a mere tactic at the level of military operations. Following classical counterinsurgency theory, the role to play for NATO in Afghanistan, then, is clear: devise in cooperation with national and international actors a 'comprehensive approach' (NATO wording for a strategy involving integrated political, military and economic instruments) to support the Afghan government in its struggle against Taliban and allied insurgent groups, and to 'win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people', meaning to convince them that their future lies with a pro-Western regime and a more liberal society.

In theory, the Alliance is well positioned to take on the Afghan insurgency. Politically, the ISAF mission represents the will of the larger international community to stabilize Afghanistan and to defeat Taliban insurgents. The operation is legitimized by a United Nation Security

[2] David Kilcullen, 'Counter-insurgency *Redux*', *Survival* 48 (Winter 2006-07) 4, p.112.

Council resolution. A large number of non-NATO countries as diverse as Australia, Sweden and Jordan contribute to the ISAF mission. Militarily, NATO is the world's most potent organization, having at its disposal not only U.S. forces but also almost the whole of European armies. Economically, NATO countries contribute a significant portion of the world's gross domestic product (GDP) to build Afghanistan's shattered economy.

The Alliance also is not alone in its Afghan undertaking. The United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the World Bank (WB) and numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are also engaged at the Hindu Kush. Afghanistan's important neighbors like Russia, Pakistan, China and Iran have no interest in the reassertion of power by the Taliban. Russia, for example, recently allowed NATO countries to transport supplies through its territory in the context of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). Russia has also granted the U.S. rights to shipping lethal cargo to Afghanistan. Finally, the Afghan government led by President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan population by and large still support NATO's presence.

…and practice

In principle, then, all the elements of international power to defeat the Afghan insurgency exist. In practice, however, NATO struggles to make and execute counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. To be fair, there are some shortcomings that cannot be blamed on the Atlantic Alliance, since they pertain to the role played by domestic and international actors. The Afghan government has huge difficulties in fighting corruption and adhering to principles of 'good governance'. The focus of international efforts on strengthening a central Afghan government also seems to conflict with the country's political culture of strong provincial and local entities.

International players like the UN or the EU also have so far failed to provide significant resources; the EU's mediocre achievement in training Afghan National Police (ANP) is the most prominent example. The

cultural resistance of many NGOs to working with the military, and the double-edged role played by Afghanistan's neighbors, add to this picture. For example, Afghan insurgents are able to use Pakistani border areas to retreat, recruit and launch operations, in the absence of effective countermeasures by the Pakistani government. NATO as a military alliance cannot succeed in conducting counterinsurgency in Afghanistan on its own, given its lack of civilian capacity and given the important role to be played by national and international actors. A comprehensive approach is next to impossible without stronger commitment and increased capabilities on the part of third-party actors.

The deficits on the side of NATO's national and international partners cannot, however, conceal the fact that many of NATO's problems in devising and executing counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan are homegrown. Both on the political and on the military level, the Atlantic Alliance suffers from significant constraints in conducting counterinsurgency operations.

The political level

NATO historically has no experience in engaging in and preparing for counterinsurgency operations. Force planning within the Alliance did not assume and prepare for a sustained insurgency challenge.[3] The Balkan missions in the 1990s were conducted in the doctrinal context of peacekeeping operations, which differ from counterinsurgency operations in important aspects. Most prominently, in counterinsurgency there is no peace to 'keep'; rather it has to be 'won' by engaging insurgents by political, military and economic means. The kinetic aspect of military power in such operations involves constant although usually small battles with a dispersed enemy who resorts to all forms of guerilla warfare. 'Small wars' might therefore be a suitable term to cap-

[3] Sean Kay and Sahar Khan, 'NATO and Counter-insurgency: Strategic Liability or Tactical Asset?', *Contemporary Security Policy* 28 (April 2007) 1, p. 163.

ture the operational reality for many ISAF troops engaged in Afghanistan in 2009.

This changing operational reality is only slowly sinking in with many European NATO allies; it is the result of an 'insurgency creep' which has affected more and more provinces of Afghanistan since the Alliance took over full responsibility for the country in 2006. Taliban forces have gained strength throughout the country.[4] Yet most allies signed up for the ISAF mission in the first place on a very different set of assumptions. European allies in particular sent forces on the following bottom-line: (1) the engagement was primarily for reasons of political solidarity with the U.S. ally, with NATO evoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty after the September 11 attacks, which posits that an attack on one member shall be deemed as an attack on all other allies; (2) NATO troops would be mainly engaged in stability and reconstruction operations, with combat operations left to (predominantly) U.S. troops in the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); and (3) the Taliban had been defeated by the OEF engagement, and thus the objective of stabilizing Afghanistan seemed therefore achievable at a reasonable cost. Nowhere was the ISAF operation expected to turn into a fully-fledged counterinsurgency operation.

Many allies were therefore not ready to embrace the concept of counterinsurgency when the tide began to turn in 2006. This was not the mission they had planned for. Nor was it the one that government in NATO countries had sold to their publics. The reluctance to acknowledge a resurgent Afghan insurgency movement was also due to the different operational realities experienced by NATO troops, depending on their area of responsibility. In 2006, troops predominantly based in Southern Afghanistan such as the Americans, the British, the Canadians and the Dutch, faced increasing resistance by Taliban insurgents. At that time, areas in the north in particular did not see a rapid increase in violence and attacks on ISAF troops. Allies operating in this area, such as Germany,

[4] The International Council on Security and Development, *Struggle for Kabul: The Taliban Advance*, London 2008.

assessed the situation rather differently from those fighting in the south. Different operational realities led to problems at the political level. In 2006, NATO force commanders' requests for more troops and a 'hard-hitting reserve' to use wherever deemed necessary were not met. Warnings that the security situation in Afghanistan was about to deteriorate failed 'to produce serious interest in additional force generation for counterinsurgency combat operations'.[5]

Different operational realities were only part of the problem NATO faced in finding a common approach to the growing insurgency challenge. Even when the security situation increasingly deteriorated in the rest of Afghanistan, allies such as Germany still resisted U.S. and other allies' efforts to introduce the concept of counterinsurgency at the political level of NATO. Different historical, political and societal factors shape individual NATO allies' perceptions of the concept of counterinsurgency.

On the one hand, there is a group of largely Anglo-Saxon allies and partners such as the U.S., the U.K, Canada and Australia. These countries do not contest that ISAF has turned into a counterinsurgency operation. Driven by hard lessons from Iraq, the U.S. military has updated doctrine for counterinsurgency (*FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Field Manual*) and has urged its NATO allies to do the same. British forces have significant experience in 'imperial policing' and share many doctrinal strands of counterinsurgency with their American counterparts. Australia traditionally 'goes to war' with its U.S. and British allies and also has started to invest more in counterinsurgency capability. Canadian forces were forced to adjust by operational reality in Southern Afghanistan. So were the Dutch.

On the other end of the spectrum is Germany, a major European ally.[6] Politically, the German government is still not ready to acknowledge that ISAF by now is engaged in a 'small war' in Afghanistan. Rather, the

[5] Kay and Khan, NATO and Counter-insurgency, p. 164.

[6] On the evolution of recent German NATO policy in general see Benjamin Schreer, 'A new "pragmatism": Germany's NATO policy', *International Journal*, Spring 2009, pp. 383-398.

mission is termed as 'post-conflict reconstruction,' partially at least out of fear of an increasingly skeptical German public. Additionally, for various reasons the strategic level of the German Armed Forces (The Bundeswehr) has not yet made the case for a deeper investment in national counterinsurgency capability.[7] German military doctrine also uses counterinsurgency as a kinetic tactic for specialized forces and not as a strategy in the Anglo-Saxon sense.[8] Germany has used its weight in the Atlantic Alliance to prevent the concept of counterinsurgency from gaining credibility at the political level.

Of the major NATO allies France represents a middle position between the Anglo-Saxon and the German 'pillars'. French counterinsurgency theorists such as David Galula have had significant influence on international strategic debate. French forces have also faced insurgency movements in Indochina and Algeria. In both conflicts, they 'lost' on the domestic political front. Judging from French operational conduct and personnel investment in Afghanistan, their political and military planners seem to have drawn the conclusion from their past experience that Western democratic societies are scarcely able to succeed in such operations.

This conceptual divide among major allies on the very nature of the ISAF operation prevents NATO from devising and executing counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. At the time of writing, allies still did not agree on the central question whether Afghanistan was a counterinsurgency operation or a stability and reconstruction mission. In this context, NATO's decision-making process based on consensus of all 28 members constitutes a 'strategic dilemma'[9] for its ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations. As mentioned above, individual member states can block the concept from being politically accepted. Instead, the German government in partic-

[7] See "NATO and Counterinsurgency: The Case of Germany" by Timo Noetzel and Martin Zapfe elsewhere in this volume.

[8] See in detail Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, 'Missing Links: The Evolution of German Counter-Insurgency Thinking', *RUSI Journal* 154 (February 2009) 1; same, 'Counter-what? Germany and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan', *RUSI Journal* 153 (February 2008) 1.

[9] Kay and Khan, NATO and Counter-insurgency, p. 164.

ular has publicly advocated a 'comprehensive approach' to the ISAF mission. But this concept is rather vague, means 'different things to different people', and for critics of the German position can be perceived as political rhetoric to downplay the military component of the operation.

Consensus rule also invites insurgents to get into NATO's decision loop by specifically targeting those allies deemed politically weak. Afghan insurgents have done just that. For example, in the run-up to the German parliamentary election in September 2009 they stepped up attacks on German troops. In turn, German politicians and some security pundits started to discuss the need for an 'exit-strategy' for the ISAF mission. Other countries such as the Netherlands have seen similar debates.[10] Such debates play into the hands of Afghan insurgents, particularly because many local elders reason that Western forces will eventually leave the country to Taliban control.[11]

In sum, the Afghan operation so far has demonstrated that the Atlantic Alliance is politically not built for counterinsurgency. There is no consensus within NATO on Afghanistan and counterinsurgency; in fact, this issue divides rather than unites allies. This intra-alliance division complicates political cohesion, force generation processes, and mission execution. If history is any guide, defeating the Afghan insurgency will require significant investment of people, money and time on part of NATO allies. But electorates in many NATO countries seem rather unwilling to support such a long-term engagement, particularly if it involves losing a significant number of soldiers and civilians. Time appears to be on the side of Afghan insurgents.

The military level

NATO also has difficulties at the military level adjusting to the Afghan insurgency. Counterinsurgency constitutes a major challenge for

[10] 'Im Profil: Scheidender NATO-Chef in Nöten', *Handelsblatt*, 3 February 2009, p. 4.
[11] Seth G. Jones, 'Averting Failure in Afghanistan', *Survival* 48 (Spring 2006) 1, pp. 111-128.

NATO's force structure and planning. Even if planners at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) had full political backing from NATO Headquarters to prepare for counterinsurgency (which they do not), they would need to face the fact that the Alliance lacks crucial military capabilities to conduct a sustained counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan.

Most European allies do not possess the military hardware for counterinsurgency. There is a significant shortage of tactical airlift—especially helicopters, specialized infantry, and military assistance units. This deficit also creates problems for the Canadian ally, since its infantry ranks are so stretched that some analysts believe that by 2011 its combat role will have to end.[12] ISAF also lacks units for military and police training, and highly mobile combat reserves. The fact is that most European allies have already reached their limits in terms of deployable assets for counterinsurgency operations. Germany, for example, has a mere 3,500 troops for highly mobile combat operations.

NATO's force structure in general seems to be of limited utility on the Afghan battlefield. NATO's defense transformation process in recent years has focused on reaching 'full operational capability (FOC) of the NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF is optimized for initial-entry, high-intensity operations; and many European allies have undertaken significant investments to meet their force commitments in the NRF cycles. Yet the NRF concept is not of much utility in a counterinsurgency environment; and some commentators have questioned whether 'transformation' has made NATO troops better prepared for today's operational challenges.[13] Further, the NRF ties up assets that would be useful in a counterinsurgency strategy – particularly since countries such as Germany and France have for political reasons blocked U.S. efforts to deploy NRF components to Afghanistan.

[12] Lewis Mac Kenzie, 'We can't answer the battle cry', *Globeandmail.com*, 27 May 2009.
[13] Mats Berdal and David Ucko, 'NATO at 60, *Survival* 51 (April-May 2009) 2, p. 61.

From the onset of the ISAF operation, force planners struggled with small troop numbers which were no match for Afghan geography. In counterinsurgency the ability to 'clear, hold and build' crucial areas is decisive for mission success; an experience felt by U.S. troops in Iraq. This three-stage model means not only that troops are able to defeat and drive Afghan insurgents militarily from an area but also that a long-term presence is combined with sustained political and economic build-up. ISAF by and large has not been able to conduct such a strategy on account of insufficient troop levels and inadequate force structure. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) deployed in Afghanistan to facilitate militarily guarded reconstruction are too small and too dispersed to have a significant impact on overall stability. Only the U.S. military seems able to transfer successful concepts from Iraq, such as Joint Security Stations (JCCs) or Special Military Liaison Teams (SLMTs) to Afghanistan. For many European allies, sustaining even one SLMT (an outpost in Afghan provinces to provide stability on the local level) is beyond their current capability, particularly with regard to airlift.

In the absence of joint doctrine on counterinsurgency and adequate troop numbers to 'clear, hold, and build', NATO's uncontested military superiority has been of limited utility on the Afghan battlefield. Insurgents suffer heavy losses but are able to refill their ranks quickly. Military superiority has not translated into strategic political and military currency, as ISAF has not been able to build on short-term tactical military successes. Worse, given their reluctance or inability to resort to risky dismounted infantry operations to clear insurgent areas, allies have sometimes been quick to call in air strikes causing significant civilian casualties – anathema to any counterinsurgency operation.

In addition, as widely discussed in public debate, most NATO countries have put their troops under national command arrangements, often with political 'caveats' on where and how to operate. This has led to a fierce debate within NATO on 'Alliance solidarity' and on 'unfair' burden sharing.[14] As analysts have noted: "Large coalitions with small troop

[14] 'Afghanistan Testing NATO Alliance', *Der Spiegel* (online), 17 November 2006.

concentrations, with restrictions on their rules of engagement, can create confusion in the military chain of command".[15] Indeed, separate command arrangements have been developed. The Alliance now faces a major challenge to coordinate the variety of chains of command, given that NATO, U.S. and Afghan forces conduct operations in parallel and through different command arrangements.[16] There is neither 'unity of command' (all forces under one chain of command) nor 'unity of effort' (all forces plus civilian actors working in an integrated manner towards common objectives) in Afghanistan. ISAF is an array of national troop elements dispersed all over the country, largely disconnected from other allied components and operating according to national priorities and national rules of engagement. In such an environment an effective NATO counterinsurgency effort cannot materialize.

The U.S. administration of President Barack Obama has reacted to NATO's military shortcomings in Afghanistan. Washington has more or less called for a division of labor between U.S. and European allies. The former would concentrate on counterinsurgency operations, involving combat missions and a significant troop increase to 'clear, hold, and build'. The latter would predominantly concentrate on reconstruction and combat support.[17] On the basis of lessons learned from Iraq, in 2009 the U.S. has poured more combat troops into the country and has started a major military campaign to conduct an 'Afghan surge'. Unless European allies heavily invest in additional forces and change their rules of engagement to allow them to operate alongside U.S. troops, one likely result of this development will be an 'Americanization' of the Afghan war. Already, coalitions of the willing are conducting counterinsurgency operations alongside U.S. forces through separate planning processes and command arrangements. The U.S. military has also built command structures that sideline those of ISAF.[18] To the dismay of some allies such as Germany,

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[15] Kay and Khan, NATO and Counter-insurgency, p. 164.
[16] Adam Roberts, 'Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan', *Survival* 51 (February-March 2009) 1, p. 50.
[17] Helen Cooper and Thom Shanker, 'Aides Say Obama's Aims Elevate War', *New York Times*, 27 January 2009.
[18] Mike Smith and Steven Baxter, 'US will grab power from British in Afghanistan', *The Times* online, 11 January 2009.

U.S. forces apparently also have conducted operations in their areas of responsibility without properly informing them beforehand.[19] While prudent from a military perspective, there is a risk that an 'Americanization' will further fragment the Atlantic Alliance. In any event, there is no cohesive military planning for counterinsurgency within NATO; and the Atlantic Alliance is not able to devise and execute counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan as a whole.

Conclusions

Today, the Atlantic Alliance faces a sustained Afghan insurgency for which it is politically and militarily unprepared. There is no political consensus on investing in counterinsurgency capacity as a precondition for ISAF's success. NATO's troop levels are too small for a country like Afghanistan and its forces face significant political as well as military restraints in conducting counterinsurgency strategies. The chances are high that NATO will fail in this 'war of political attrition'. To avoid this scenario, the Alliance needs to 'undergo considerably more adaptation if it is to be a strategic actor in counterinsurgency'.[20] Is this likely to happen?

Since its foundation more than 60 years ago NATO has displayed a remarkable ability to adjust to changing strategic paradigms. It seems perfectly reasonable to assume that the Alliance could also transform towards a capability to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Failure in Afghanistan would not so much be an institutional failure of a military alliance of 28 members but rather the result of insufficient political support among its members. Given its political and military resources, NATO could potentially play a very powerful role in creating Western counterinsurgency capacity; it could be a centre for the military training of coalition and indigenous forces in COIN capability, it could provide training for multinational and indigenous police and other agencies involved in secu-

[19] 'US-Operation brüskiert Bundeswehr', *Stern* online, 22 March 2009.
[20] Kay and Khan, NATO and Counter-insurgency, p. 178.

rity sector reform, and it could expand and provide its information-gathering and analysis capacity for global counterinsurgency operations.[21]

Unfortunately, it is unlikely that NATO will become an important actor in the 'long war' of global counterinsurgency. In the final analysis, most allies do not perceive Afghanistan to be an existential mission. Unlike the U.S., which sees the Afghan mission through the prism of its grand strategic design of 'liberal internationalism' and the potential damage to its regional hegemonic role in Central Asia, most European allies have always viewed the ISAF operation as primarily showing (largely) symbolic solidarity to its American ally. NATO's disintegration into 'multiple tiers' of interests and priorities reinforces the preference among many European allies to return to a focus on European security, particularly in view of rising uncertainty about Russia.[22] German Chancellor Angela Merkel is among those advocating that NATO should (re)-emphasize the importance of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.[23] Furthermore, some security pundits see a defeat in Afghanistan as not creating long-term institutional damage for the Alliance.[24] In this context, it seems reasonable to conclude that NATO allies will not come up with the political will necessary to invest significant resources in counterinsurgency capability. Instead, NATO will probably declare a victory of some sort and leave Afghanistan.

What would such a scenario mean for the future of NATO and counterinsurgency? Analysts are surely right in their assessment that defeat for ISAF will not signify the death knell for the Alliance. However, the inability to conduct a sustained counterinsurgency operation, let alone to agree on the concept altogether, would probably result in some strategic consequences for NATO. The most important one is that the Alliance will not qualify as an instrument of Western security to be used in global coun-

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[21] Ibid.

[22] Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, 'Does a multi-tier NATO matter? The Atlantic Alliance and the process of strategic change', *International Affairs* 85 (March 2009) 2, pp. 211-226.

[23] 'Plädoyer Merkels für eine Nato-Strategie', *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, 27 March 2009, p. 3.

[24] Michael Rühle, 'Afghanistan, Deutschland und die NATO', *Sicherheit und Frieden* 27 (2009) 1, p. 5.

terinsurgency campaigns. Afghanistan has demonstrated NATO's limits in conducting complex stability and support operations involving counterinsurgency.[25]

As mentioned earlier, most European allies will probably conclude that ISAF is the exception to and not the norm for NATO's operations. In the aftermath of Afghanistan, their battle cry will be 'never again', invoking some analogies to the U.S. military after Vietnam in the 1970s. Political support to make counterinsurgency an integral part of NATO's mission spectrum will therefore be only half-hearted or not forthcoming at all. In this scenario, the Alliance as a whole will be of limited utility in conducting global counterinsurgency missions.

Such a development will also increase the trend of 'coalitions of the willing' within the Alliance. Those allies who accept the concept of counterinsurgency to be an integral part of almost any future conflict scenario involving Western forces, and who are willing to deploy troops on a global scale to secure their interests, will build up their capabilities accordingly. And they would not again want other NATO allies' political and technical caveats to put restraints on the operation. They will therefore act outside NATO's consensus-based decision-making process. Without a political reform which allows for 'opting out' of such operations, NATO as an organization might not be called to contribute to such missions.

In any event, only a few NATO allies will probably be able to politically and militarily support global, sustained counterinsurgency operations. Apart from the U.S., only the United Kingdom and France seem able in the future to contribute significant operational capability to these missions. If politically in a position, smaller European allies will most likely only provide Special Forces components to counterinsurgency mission. Predominantly for political reasons, Germany will probably refrain from such undertakings. That makes integrating partners with counterinsurgency capabilities, such as Australia, even more important to those NATO

[25] Berdal and Ucko, NATO at 60, p. 57.

allies willing to act. Still, Western counterinsurgency capability as a whole will be fairly limited.

There are no other international organizations in sight for replacing NATO. Neither the UN nor the EU has counterinsurgency capabilities; and it is unlikely that they will develop them. The UN is notorious for its difficulties in executing its classical peacekeeping capabilities, let alone obtaining agreement on robust engagements. The EU has only a limited combat capability and has demonstrated in Afghanistan that it is also poorly suited to conducting police training on a large scale. Even more problematically, the Western concept of stabilizing 'fragile states' like Afghanistan has relied on multinational organizations such as the UN, NATO and the EU. In fact, as mentioned earlier, Western counterinsurgency strategy critically depends on these actors joining forces. But in practice this concept has proven to be beset by major problems. Both the UN and the EU will probably study NATO's problems with counterinsurgency in Afghanistan very closely.

So will potential foes of Western security. Just as states frequently readjust their military organizations in the light of lessons learned from conventional campaigns, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Afghan campaign will inspire future enemies of superior Western forces to also engage them in a long-term counterinsurgency. As witnessed in Afghanistan, insurgents try to apply successful lessons from the Iraqi insurgency. While all counterinsurgency to a certain degree is 'local', the inability of the world's most powerful military alliance to face a sustained insurgency will surely take a prominent place in future enemies' textbooks on how to engage Western powers. Perceptions will rank high that Western forces will not intervene if greeted by a complex insurgency movement or, if they nevertheless do, that they can be defeated in the long run. Thus, while NATO's future existence will not depend on its ability to confront a sustained insurgency, its persistent weaknesses in this area might at the same time decrease the Atlantic Alliance's credibility as an international security actor.

CHAPTER THREE

Hybrid Adversaries: a Challenge but Unifying Theme for NATO?

Chris Collett

"Securing, stabilizing and promoting democracy is our core business and will continue to be so into the future."

NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer[1]

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO's activities have spread well beyond the defense of its members' sovereign borders as the Alliance has sought to protect them from the consequences of dangerous instability in vital regions and also to eliminate or contain the violent challenges to the international system that can spawn from them.

This book is about insurgency and the challenges it poses to NATO. Not least of these challenges is whether to characterize and approach the current operation in Afghanistan as "Counterinsurgency" or "Stabilization and Reconstruction". However, such a distinction can be seen as largely unhelpful since success in any one of these endeavors depends entirely on success in the other. Stabilization and Reconstruction are goals commonly (and certainly in Afghanistan) challenged by organized, capable, persistent, adaptive and ferocious adversaries who must be countered if these goals are to be achieved. Simultaneous rather than sequential success in these diverse but related "population battlegrounds"[2] is required both today and into the foreseeable future.

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[1] 45th Munich Security Conference, Munich, Germany 7 Feb 2009.
[2] Col John J McCuen, *Hybrid Wars*, (Military Review, Mar/Apr 2008).

Attempts at defining or locating the borders of conflicts are increasingly difficult and indeed misleading; there is an undoubted process of blurring the boundaries between operational areas, activities and adversaries that can only grow as global connectivity and interdependence grow. Already Pashtu insurgents in Afghanistan link to, and sometimes overlap with, international criminal gangs and terrorist sympathizers who have long been domiciled in distant nations. Their historical links with the covert organs of some states are well documented. Similarly, proscribed Middle Eastern terrorist organizations have long had an active presence in the tri-border area (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay) of South America[3]. This view of the "omni- directional" nature of security challenges is conceptually bound together by the construct of complex operations involving hybrid adversaries simultaneously producing diverse and fused threats.

As a recent UK Joint Concept Note states, *"We see them (the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan) as forms of hybrid conflict in many ways typical of what we will face in the future"*.[4] The point is: neatly but restrictively labeling operations is not helpful. Better to focus on the nature of the threat NATO is most likely to face wherever and however its forces are deployed. This is potentially more far more productive. Allied Command Transformation's recent Multiple Futures Project is a strategic level view of things to come, looking as far out as 2030, but it is as relevant for today's world and for the tactical and operational levels when it states: *"It is crucial that we* ***build a mutual understanding*** *of the new and uncertain challenges for which NATO must be prepared to respond"*[5].

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[3] Rex Hudson, *Terrorist and organized crime groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America,* Federal Research Division, Library of Congress July 2003, accessed at: http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/TerrOrgCrime_TBA.pdf 4 July 2009.

[4] Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre, *The Evolving Character of Conflict: Joint Concept Note 01/09,* 22 May 2009.

[5] *"Military Implications point to seven broad focus areas. Five of the focus areas identify potential roles within the military realm that NATO could consider emphasizing for 2030: Adapting to the Demands of Hybrid Threats, Operating with Others and Building Institutions, Conflict Management (prevention and resolution) including Consequence Management, Counter Proliferation, and Expeditionary and Combat Capability in Austere Environments. The remaining two focus areas, Strategic Communications and Winning the Battle of the Narrative, and Organizational and Force Development Issues, represent the essential enablers associated with the roles its member nations envision for the Alliance."* http://www.act.nato.int/multiplefutures/20090503_MFP_finalrep.pdf, accessed 25 June 2009.

There are of course, many causes of instability, above all from insurgencies, but the broadest and most intractable challenge to achieving enduring stability is where there are active insurgents. It therefore makes sense to configure and prepare for this – the most challenging and not the most optimistic – variety of stabilization mission. We can also contend that insurgents and other lesser or greater (but less likely) adversaries across the world are looking increasingly similar, as knowledge, techniques and capabilities migrate, seemingly with little or no control by traditional state or international authorities. If current trends continue, as they are likely to do, we can be confident that such insurgents will also be far more challenging than those that NATO has encountered to date.

Without question the key to successful stabilization, and counterinsurgency within it, is to focus on the population and not the adversary. Providing the people with both security from insurgents' violence and also demonstrable benefits from the host nation that outweigh the insurgents' promises is what produces enduring success. However, there remains the fact that "the enemy gets a vote", and while decisive military defeat of insurgents is a chimera seldom worth concentrating scarce resources to chase, they cannot be left unmolested and free to act. The insurgent enemy may by definition be the militarily much weaker party, but he enjoys certain advantages that can derail the counterinsurgent's best efforts to achieve an acceptable stable outcome, undermine vital domestic will and ultimately allow him to outlast his conventional opponents. These characteristics are particularly advantageous to an enemy who is bound more by a narrative than a hierarchy and who is highly motivated, adaptive, decentralized and intricately networked. These are all characteristics we see now and can safely anticipate growing. This paper therefore deliberately confines itself to a rather unfashionable, or at least narrow, perspective on insurgency and chooses to focus on the adversary and the threats they produce rather than "the people" who – to repeat– are acknowledged to define both the environment and the prize.

Contemporary and future insurgents and other potential adversaries

have been called "hybrid" by Frank Hoffman[6] and others, and this is a characterization increasingly guiding the evolution of the US and British Armies' structure, equipment and – most importantly – thinking, education and training. Although I have drawn heavily from official thinking in the UK, I must state clearly that those thoughts have not coalesced into an agreed position as yet and what follows is my personal view and not officially sanctioned.

This paper will discuss some aspects of hybrid adversaries with particular focus on their "insurgent" manifestation and give some thoughts about what this means for NATO. In it I hope to suggest that achieving consensus on what the threats from future adversaries will look like is increasingly possible and will be a significant step to enhancing the solidarity, interoperability and future development of the Alliance.

Hybrid adversaries

The adjective "hybrid" has surely become over used and lost much credibility, having been appended variously to "wars", "warfare", "operations", "scenarios", "adversaries" and "threats" to cite a probably less than exhaustive list. Therefore, to be clear for the purposes of this paper, this particular author characterizes the challenge for the NATO Alliance and its members as consisting of *complex operations opposed by* hybrid adversaries *who simultaneously produce diverse and fused threats at tactical, operational and strategic levels*. In February this year, a JFCOM hybrid war conference adopted the following definition of a hybrid adversary:

"Any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs some combination of conventional, irregular, terrorism and criminal means or activities in the operational battle space. Rather than a single entity, a hybrid threat or challenger may be comprised of a combination of state and non-state actors."[7]

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[6] Frank Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Dec 2007).

[7] Definition adopted in support of U.S. Joint Forces Command hybrid war conference held in Washington, D.C., 24 February, 2009.

One might add that hybrid adversaries are likely to be highly motivated (for many the conflict will be seen as existential), able, knowledgeable and agile. They may not share our logic or a have a similar political calculus but they will know a great deal about their Western adversaries. They will actively seek to enhance that understanding from the tactical through to national strategic level and will be quick to adapt to avoid or negate strengths and exploit weaknesses. Furthermore, as Secretary of Defense Gates noted recently, their actions combine the: *"lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare."*[8]

Other definitions open Pandora's Box yet wider, citing the simultaneous and adaptive employment of information, ideological, political, social, civil and economic means[9] exploiting shifting alliances with disparate groups to achieve the hybrid adversary's aims. The key distinction claimed from what has gone before is that these elements –types of actor and types or activity, are fused (albeit perhaps without formal hierarchical orchestration) at the tactical level rather than being simply operational or strategic adjuncts to the main (military) effort within a conflict. However, although academically interesting, the question of whether this represents a new paradigm or not is hardly as relevant as whether this characterization is accurate and helpful. One element that certainly is "of our age" is that, thanks to globalization and in particular, the reach of global communications, there is a much more direct, swift and significant linkage between tactical events and strategic consequences. This amplifies and complicates the challenge that hybrid adversaries, including insurgents, pose.

Hybrid adversaries seek to create a range of threats in the same time and space[10] to overwhelm and provoke inappropriate responses. They will switch tack swiftly – they are highly adaptive because of their good access to information, flat structures, excellent communications and relatively

[8] http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63717/robert-m-gates/a-balanced-strategy. Accessed 25 June 2009.
[9] Col Margaret S. Bond, *Hybrid War: A New Paradigm for Stability Operations in Failing States,* Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 30, 2007.
[10] Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre, *The Evolving Character of Conflict: Joint Concept Note 01/09,* 22 May 2009.

modest requirements. These characteristics need to be met with a range of relevant and integrated responses, each of which, ideally, would have sufficient depth to be maintained while coping with new adversary moves. Failure to do so risks the prospect of surrendering the initiative to the adversary rather than progressively squeezing him into irrelevance. Perhaps more realistically, given real world resource constraints, a force must aspire to achieve sufficient flexibility to switch its own activities in response to or to pre-empt enemy moves.

A challenge for NATO is, therefore, to be capable of *adapting* at a pace which matches or exceeds that of its adversaries, thus meeting, or better yet anticipating, real demands and not those which suit current institutional preferences. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a purely protective approach will suffice, and active disruption or distortion of adversary information gathering and communications will have to be considered, despite the difficult and politically sensitive tangle of legal and moral issues that this entails. Developing a common view and understanding of future adversaries is a necessary step on this path. Institutionalizing and empowering a collective mechanism to gather information on and assess evolving threats would be another.

Without attempting to cover all the elements that characterize a hybrid adversary or list all the threats they may produce, the paper will now consider some of their associated "ways" and "means". It will deliberately avoid the question of "ends", which I believe remain diverse, and which take us back into territory where the debate is wide open and thus less helpful to fostering an agreed way forward for NATO.

Ways – people and time

Current insurgent adversaries have clearly chosen the population as their battleground, aiming not to defeat counter-insurgent forces head on, but rather to seize the key human terrain and to wear down their opponents through a Fabian strategy of protracted war. Exploitation of time and focus

on the people are inextricably linked and, if not new in concept, the scope, reach and impact of insurgent adversaries' actions, made possible by technology and fuelled by globalization, are contemporary features.

People

Influence – the battle of the narrative – matters when people are both the terrain and the prize being contested. The hybrid insurgent adversary's choice of tactics is largely driven by the effects they have on the perception, confidence and hence allegiance of their selected population and the will of their opponents' populations. They also seek to sway the actions of wider world spectators. They are concerned to present themselves as righteous and effective, and their opponents as degenerate and ineffective, and thus gain influence.

Both deeds and communications[11] count and they are more frequently than not integrated by hybrid adversaries at very low levels. Attacking symbolic targets and actions to provoke a disproportionate, hasty and hence ill-aimed response are common related tactics. It is clear that NATO's adversaries, whether they are acting according to a concerted grand design or merely informally aligned, have the means to effectively exploit the propaganda opportunities that their tactical actions produce[12]. Plainly, they have an ever expanding capacity to get their message out to many audiences, since the spread and diversification of information channels (often with little or no official visibility, let alone control) continues to be exponential. In this endeavor they are aided by their potential recruits, who increasingly have high levels of pertinent skills, as education levels improve and the spread of knowledge increases. As well as skill in

[11] "Communications" rather than "words", since it is frequently visual imagery, particularly combined with music or raw sound, that is used to great effect.

[12] It has of course become routine for sniper or IED attacks to be captured digitally, often on cell phones, and almost instantly distributed as part of an information campaign. It is clearly suspected if not proven that Afghan insurgents have themselves killed innocent civilians in the wake of coalition air attacks in order to stage imagery and produce higher civilian casualty counts. This clearly has both a strategic effect and a tactical one as coalition use of air power (often to compensate for a small ground "footprint") becomes ever more restricted.

utilizing information conduits and crafting products, their targeting sophistication is typically high and based on a solid understanding of their audiences. This can be derived from a natural cultural affiliation and/or because of the openness and exposure of Western civilizations and actors[13]. Precise targeting of individuals (often through their families) occurs today[14] and can be expected to increase through the exploitation of the social networking phenomenon. These general and specific threats have direct relevance to the protection of a mission and to members of the force.

Perhaps most disturbing is the broader manipulation, further alienation and radicalization of elements of diaspora populations or their children, locally born and bred. Exploiting disaffected members of an opponent's population is not a phenomenon of recent Islamic extremism. As Bruce Hoffman has pointed out, *"political subversion combined with armed action is a perennial dimension of insurgency"*[15]. It was also a feature of the inter-state Cold War. Counter-subversion, as David Kilcullen reminds us, needs to be carefully targeted, conducted and explained[16] if it is not to be damaging to itself or dangerously exploited by capable and agile adversaries. Again, such subversion will be, and indeed today is, directed against both the mission and against members of the deployed force, an example of the latter being the pressure being brought to bear on British Muslim soldiers.

Clearly therefore, contesting the influence activities of a hybrid insurgent adversary is far from a military activity alone and other arms of state and

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[13] The two are often combined, as in Jihadist DVDs that combine culturally rousing music and inspiring images with conversely damning ones inadvertently provided by Western forces via news reports, digital images or blogs.

[14] This is not a new phenomenon: during the Northern Ireland "troubles" the IRA and its sympathizers compiled extensive dossiers on individual Army personnel from open sources. Precise targeting is not only used to attack enemies, of course: precise recruitment is carried out, most obviously, to turn sympathizers into activists, but also – potentially at least – to recruit usefully placed individuals for information gathering or as agents of influence.

[15] Bruce Hoffman, *Islam and the West: Searching for Common Ground – The Terrorist Threat and the Counter Terrorism Effort,* RAND Testimony Series CT-263 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2006), 15.

[16] David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One,* (C Hurst & Co (Publishers) Ltd, London, 2009), 253.

indeed, civil society must be prepared to become involved. NATO as an extensive political and military alliance has a role in to play in formulating and energizing such a response. NATO also has to be better at explaining itself.

Time

There is nothing particularly new about protraction and exhaustion as techniques of the weaker party – the so called "Fabian" strategy is after all named after a 3rd century BC Roman dictator. It has been followed many times since and was cogently expressed by Mao in his 1938 lectures *On Protracted War*[17] – although the sheer scale of "parallel hierarchies" he sought to achieve is not evident today, nor are we likely to see the progression by insurgents to full conventional operations while NATO allies retain the will to engage them[18].

Insurgents have always surged in activity and withdrawn when government forces' pressure demands it, which greatly aids their longevity. Furthermore, since insurgents have the relatively simpler task of disrupting and promising rather than building and delivering[19], they can prolong the conflict almost indefinitely if left undisrupted. In the words of General Sir Rupert Smith, we, on the other hand, "*are seeking a condition which then must be maintained until agreement on a definitive outcome, which may take years or decades"*[20]

This disparity in the view of and impact of time[21] is a major challenge

[17] http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_09.htm , accessed 25 June 2009.

[18] South Vietnam, of course, was overrun by a conventional invasion that the US refused to blunt following the collapse of its own domestic will.

[19] This is not to suggest that some organizations, for example, Hezbollah, cannot be really effective at filling vacuums which they themselves seek to create, and of course they have the ideal excuse when they fall short of expectations.

[20] General Sir Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, (Allen Lane, London, 2005).

[21] Insurgents typically take the long view because of practical considerations, cultural predisposition and a shrewd analysis of the West's temperament – Mao, Pashtu, Al Qaeda, and Palestinian militants have all recognized this.

for NATO and must be addressed by configuring "whole of government" capabilities (not just militaries) for sustained campaigning to match our opponent's persistence. NATO's forces are mostly voluntarily manned, and with the possible exception of the US, individually small – conditions which make persistence difficult. Rotating responsibility for a mission deployment is a possibility, but plays against the imperative to achieve campaign continuity unless the forces involved are truly interchangeable in capability and approach. This is not the case in today's complex operations of choice, and indeed was never truly achieved even in the Cold War era.

Configuring forces to stay the military course is essentially far from sufficient. The centrality of both time and people factors drive the simultaneous need to craft and execute a comprehensive approach[22] that solves or at least suitably ameliorates the causes of instability and invalidates the appeal of the adversary. It is essential to make progress as *rapidly* as possible towards securing the conflict's strategic centre of gravity, namely the support of the indigenous people, while simultaneously protecting our own key vulnerability – the support of our own people. NATO's unity is a major factor in both the battle for perceptions and in achieving persistence. As an international organization it should look to develop expeditionary political, governance and economic capabilities in line with its military ones.

Means – terrain, dispersion, targets

Terrain

A skilled insurgent adversary will seek to neutralize NATO's conventional military superiorities by exploiting complex terrain and setting himself in close proximity to the people. Clearly, both of these factors, especially the latter, pose an intense dilemma for an intervening NATO force.

[22] In this paper, the Canadian conceptualization of military full spectrum operations nesting in national Whole of Government Approaches, which in turn nest within a multinational and multi institutional Comprehensive Approach necessary to remove or ameliorate the causes of violent confrontation, is accepted.

Some commentators have argued that clever opponents will actively seek to draw "the West" into such inhospitable terrain that they have prepared beforehand in order to raise the chances of inflicting a local defeat with strategic consequences[23]. This drives the imperative for applying minimum, precisely discriminated force which is fully integrated into an effectively targeted, constructed and delivered information campaign – no small challenge in a congested, obscure landscape. The "Sense" or "Find" function is therefore vital, but the technological aspects can be prohibitively costly for any one nation, especially when the operational space is large and persistence vital. There is an estimate that every enemy fighter killed by the IDF in July 06 cost them $2.2m[24] – mostly spent on finding them. There is nevertheless a broad range of technical capabilities available to NATO forces but there is a real challenge to improve the integration of intelligence and to develop the depth of situational understanding (especially of the human terrain) that allows such intelligence to be used to drive effective action. Gathering and exploiting human intelligence remains a sensitive area in coalition operations. However, developing the skills of cultural, political and economic analysis and the effective integration and dissemination of diverse sources of information is vital and a venture that a multinational organization with wide academic capabilities such as NATO must be engaged in. The NATO Defense College's new Regional Cooperation Course is an example of the kind of activity that contributes to contextual understanding.

It should not be forgotten that close proximity to the people can also be the undoing of the insurgent if those people are won over to the counter-insurgent side. Perhaps, however, more realistically in the early stages, fissures can be found in organizations[25] and between them and elements of the local population that can be exploited for high grade intelligence. This happened in Northern Ireland and seems to have been the case in the recent

[23] Julian Lewis MP, *Double I, Double N: A Framework for Counter-Insurgency,* First Defence, London, 2007.

[24] www.haaretz.com

[25] Kilcullen suggests that there is a preponderance of reconcilable fighters around the truly fanatic that could be used to infiltrate and disrupt – as has been done in many previous campaigns.

Israeli Gaza operation. The people themselves and urban complex terrain may also not always be as opaque as supposed – sensor and surveillance technology moves on, as does the application of sophisticated forensics and biometric data basing, for example. These, and other novel approaches which can be politically and legally sensitive, are areas on which NATO will need to take a collective view, codify and then train to employ.

Dispersion

Adversary dispersion and semi-autonomous action will continue to be significant challenges for our surveillance, but this is not their only attraction to the hybrid insurgent adversary. Critically, both also enhance the adversary's ability to strike, disrupt and spread their influence. This puts the old conundrum of whether to concentrate effort (i.e. mass) to achieve effect, economy and force protection, or to spread forces out to occupy ground, into stark focus. The adversary's dispersion and amorphous nature means that presenting a binary choice between investing in precision or mass is particularly damaging. Counter-insurgents certainly need to disperse to spread security and hinder the insurgents' freedom to act, but that can make them vulnerable, which in turn may endanger their sometimes tenuous popular support base. It can force a disproportionate reliance on fire power, which in turn plays badly in the perception battle and can lead directly to resistance growing. There is therefore, a challenge for NATO and its members to generate adequate numbers of forces to have a sufficiently large footprint and to be capable of sustained presence. Niche capabilities provided to a mission by Nations can be valuable, but only if there is a good doctrinal and technical match between these "plugs" and the "sockets" into which they are to fit. Perhaps even more of a challenge is that there is a danger that they draw in other allied combat resources if they are not at least capable of self protection – or better, of offering protection to the local population around them[26]. It will also not be enough to provide forces but surround them with national caveats that effectively

[26] An example of this issue was the Japanese contribution to Iraq: while no doubt valuable for reconstruction and for the political capital it generated, it did necessarily consume a considerable allocation of tactical forces for force protection.

reduce the ability of the command to spread and maintain security for the population. Numbers count, persistence counts, flexibility counts.

Targets

The hybrid insurgent adversary will also seek alternative means to inflict pain on NATO nations in order to raise the initial cost of intervention and subsequent perseverance. The Madrid and London bombings are obvious examples albeit with mixed results. Adversaries understand the domestic politics of NATO nations and adjust their attacks accordingly. They will attempt to single out apparently less committed countries, particularly when, say, they have an impending election with at least one credible party advocating withdrawal. Assaults on NATO homelands need not be physical – cyber attacks are already proliferating– and control of the flow of drugs can be used as a political tool as well as source of income.

Adversaries understand the critical nature and inherent vulnerability of the non- military participants in a comprehensive approach and will seek to fracture a mission's cohesion by attacking those softer elements: the civilian component, networks and logistics. In both Iraq and Afghanistan we have already observed the deliberate targeting of international and non-governmental organizations and individuals involved in reconstruction. We have seen the logistic pipeline into Afghanistan attacked and cyber assaults on our electronic networks. Without any great stretch of the imagination, we can posit future kinetic attacks coupled with Electro Magnetic Pulse attacks on critical communications, isolating dispersed detachments and denying them external support, all coordinated with a carefully prepared assault in the information realm. The right balance of deterrence, protection, offensive counter-action and risk taking will be increasingly difficult to strike, but it must be done if we are not to suffer prohibitively costly effects or to "exhaust" ourselves by trying and failing to protect everything. NATO needs to develop a common understanding, approach and capabilities in order that vulnerabilities and seams in an inherently joint, interagency and multinational effort are minimized.

Beyond insurgents

This short paper has just skimmed the surface of future threats, and there are many other characteristics that could be ascribed to hybrid adversaries: for example, the absence of legal restraint, their rapid, often novel, exploitation of cheap, advanced commercial technology, and their increasing acquisition of highly lethal armaments – perhaps one day to include chemical, biological, radiological or even nuclear weapons. However, it does seem that an overall characterization of evolving threats is becoming clearer and a consensus is forming. Such a consensus has wide utility to focus NATO's development of its capabilities and approach. Why wide utility?

While there appears to be no prospect of a direct territorial or existential threat of the Warsaw Pact variety emerging in the foreseeable future, we can be far less confident that NATO member nations will not face concerted, violent and immensely disruptive aggression from external actors – non-state, state-sponsored, or even from a state's covert arms. This could be against elements of national sovereignty including geographic boundaries or against those global commons on which industrial and trading nations depend. It seems likely that any such attack will include forms and elements of activity that will look virtually indistinguishable from the actions engaged in by insurgents. By this is meant the concerted use of violent, subversive, "irregular warfare" means to effect a permanent change in a recognized, legitimate power structure. Indeed, an attack might be solely "irregular" (perhaps backed by an implicit threat of conventional force or weapons of mass destruction), since one could postulate that this would be an attractive strategy for an adversary to adopt, if for no other reason than that it would at least horribly complicate a collective Article 5 response. It could also be seen as a means to negate much of the conventional systems which Alliance members have in their forces and continue to invest in developing. Such an approach was described some 10 years ago by the PLA's Colonels Qiao and Wang[27].

[27] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Chao Xian Zhan (Unrestricted Warfare) 1999.* Principle of Addition – overload, deceive and exhaust, "omni directionality".

Conclusion

Whether the confrontation is with disruptive non-state actors or a state challenging either a NATO member's sovereignty or the Alliance's collective interests, the hybrid adversary view suggests that there are universal characteristics the recognition of which would allow NATO to develop a common approach, set of skills, systems and arsenals of both physical and psychological tools. It is certainly not impossible to prevail against hybrid adversaries. Work in Israel has already begun to show how they might be deconstructed to identify vulnerabilities and internal tensions[28]. The challenge to NATO is to now codify this rapidly growing consensus view and to find the will in capitals to make the necessary changes to their forces, their wider government agencies and to their Alliance. The future will surely require even more integration of effort than during the Cold War era. As the Multiple Futures Project states, this process begins with *"… the building of a shared vision of the future…."* Building a shared view of the threat is a key and achievable element of such a shared vision.

[28] Hybrid Conflict Seminar hosted by the IDF in Tel Aviv, November 2008.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Goldilock Choice: The "Just Right" Balance for Setting Civil-Military Governance Goals in Post Conflict and Counterinsurgency Operations

Christopher A. Jennings

Introduction

NATO was built for conventional warfare, not counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency is a discrete form of warfare with its own identifiable characteristics, doctrine, strategy and tactics, which are all readily accessible and coherent to NATO military professionals. In counterinsurgencies, however, "getting it" is not enough. These fights require a different mix of organizational tools, many of which, as outlined in this paper, are housed in the civilian development and diplomatic agencies of NATO member states. However, civilian departments are not built to operate in counterinsurgency environments, either.

Standing up legitimate, host-country government structures is a core challenge of counterinsurgency operations. When crafting a governance strategy, civil-military planners must be aware of the opportunity costs associated with a short-term goal to bring about security and longer term efforts to consolidate democratic governance norms. In general, the bias of civilian planners is to pursue multi-year, sustainable development strategies, while military planners seek near-term "quick impact" strategies. For counterinsurgency campaigns, the planning orientation of civilians is too long, while the military is too short. The challenge is getting the balance between both orientations "just right"—not unlike the choice of Goldilocks in the British poet Robert Southey's fable, "The Story of the Three Bears."

This paper offers a framework to assist civilian-military campaign planners in the reconciliation of short-term and long-term tradeoffs in developing governance strategies for post-conflict countries. The first section of this paper reviews the limits of military and civilian equities in counterinsurgency campaigns. The second section offers an operating definition of "democratic governance." The third section outlines an assessment framework for setting realistic post-conflict democratic governance goals, while the fourth and final section applies this framework to present day Iraq.

Limits of military and civilian equities in counterinsurgencies

Throughout the Cold War, NATO member states raised an interoperable force structure of land, sea and air assets to assault or defend against the attacks of industrialized armies and societies—specifically those of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. The technological focus of conventional warfare requires a massive organization to manage and maintain the equipment and logistical demands of armored and artillery divisions on land, the aircraft-carrier-submarine combination on the sea, and the fighter-bomber combination in the air, but also (and most important) to facilitate their orderly and synchronized deployment in battle. The organizing principle behind NATO's complex of systems is that superior military technology and organization translates to decisive military victory when at war and, therefore, deters an attack on any member state in the first place.

However, conventional forces are not particularly well suited to quell politically salient insurgent or guerrilla forces. This lesson has been learned many times over: the United States in Vietnam during the 1970s, the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s, and the United States and NATO in Iraq and Afghanistan during this decade.

In the above examples, one of the principal challenges posed by insurgent forces is their decentralized character. At its lowest levels, the objectives of the guerilla or insurgent are purely negative—they obstruct

consolidation of governance and the orderly transition of power from the occupying foreign military force to the allied host nation government. Insurgent forces generally only arm themselves at a time and place of their own choosing, and when they strike their aim is not decisive military victory, but political destabilization. They cannot be easily distinguished from the surrounding population, making it exceedingly difficult to identify and separate (or marginalize) spoilers.

As an insurgent or guerilla force evolves into a more mature and complex organization – with financial interests, operational and supply logistics, human resources and territory to manage – it becomes much more easy for an outside conventional force to engage it and rack up "military wins." However, by this point it is highly likely that domestic politics has metastasized, leaving a large disaffected population for the insurgent movement to draw from and overcome even staggeringly disproportionate attrition rates.

At the onset of an insurgency, the counter-insurgent needs intense cultural and political guidance and capabilities to identify and separate spoilers from the population. Many papers in this volume address strategies to recruit and train host country nationals to provide this guidance and capability—from enhancing intelligence assets or standing up local security forces to recruiting a national police, military and other security forces. These forces are essential to separating the insurgent from the population, consolidating control of the environment, and ultimately transitioning power from military to civilian control. But they are not sufficient.

The loss of the political war makes a war of attrition against an insurgency extremely difficult to win, even by the most professional and capable host government security forces. The core challenge of the counter-insurgent is not merely to stand up a viable host-nation security force, but also to establish enduring state institutions where rival domestic factions can mediate their differences through a political process and maintain the confidence of the domestic population.

This sort of mission involves competencies and tasks that promote institution-building and the rule of law; economic development and opportunities; incorporation of indigenous military and police forces into a broader civilian justice sector; internal political accommodation and reconciliation; good governance and basic services to the people; strategic communications, and more. These competencies, however, are the bailiwick of diplomatic and development personnel traditionally housed in civilian agencies.

Quite simply, counterinsurgency is a challenge for NATO because its force structure was not "built" for this sort of mission. Neither were the civilian diplomatic and development ministries, departments, and country missions of NATO's member states.

Civilian professionals (along with their contract personnel, private-sector implementing partners and associated non-government organizations) are accustomed to operating in truly *post-conflict and permissive* environments within the cocoon of a peace agreement readily enforceable by a peacekeeping force. Just as NATO needs to adapt to the realities of a counterinsurgency framework, so too must civilian counterparts.

A gross oversimplification and generalization, to be sure, but civilian intervention and development methods are generally structured around long-term, sustainable development models, and are less sensitive to the immediate demands of transitioning responsibility for security and peace enforcement to a domestic civilian authority. As a consequence, civilian planning rhythms and strategies are less sensitive to the time pressures military counterparts face and are more inclined to invest in strategies that have a long-term impact, whereas military planning rhythms and strategies tend to be hypersensitive to time and will err on the side of quick impact strategies without regard to their long-term sustainability.

In their extreme forms, neither orientation can calibrate a coherent strategy to stabilize a country in the grips of an insurgency. As a result, the civilian-military conversation on planning issues tends to be tone deaf to

the subtle tradeoffs in the promotion of long-term sustainable development and concessions to promote near-term stability. Civilian-military planners require a common assessment framework to identify and reconcile these tradeoffs and the respective priorities of defense, diplomatic and development agencies.

Following a note on this paper's operating definition of democracy, the heart of this paper offers such a framework, one that specifically seeks to reconcile long-term democratic governance strategies of donor nations with short-term transitional governance goals of counterinsurgent forces.

Defining democratic governance

Democracy is a multidimensional concept, not readily reduced to an authoritative and operational definition. This paper's approach accords with the analysis of the "Committee on Evaluation of U.S. Agency for International Development Democracy Assistance Programs" at the U.S. National Research Council, who was asked by USAID to provide "an operational definition of democracy and governance that disaggregates the concept into clearly defined and measurable components":

> [T]here is little consensus over [democracy's] attributes. Definitions range from minimal—a country must choose its leaders through contested elections—to maximal—a country must have universal suffrage, accountable and limited government, sound and fair justice and extensive protection of human rights and political liberties, and economic and social policies that meet popular needs.[1]

As an alternative to a robust operational concept of democracy, the

[1] Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, National Research Council, Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research, at 76 (2008).

committee suggested that USAID disaggregate the various components of democracy and track changes in democratization by looking at changes in those components, ordered under four sectors: electoral contests, democratic culture, democratic governing structures, and rule of law. The definitional components of each sector are sketched below:

- **Electoral Contests.** Definitional components generally involve: whether a country holds elections at the national, regional or local levels; whether elected officials exercise sovereignty relative to non-elected elites; whether the administration of elections is credible and legitimate/free and fair; and a general assessment of the overall quality and nature of election participation, historic election results, and leadership turnover/transitions of government?
- **Democratic Governing Structures.** Definitional components of democratic governing structures first involve a baseline measure of national sovereignty (i.e., whether the state is dominated by outside force or is generally free from external interference in internal affairs), then moves on to issues of transparency (i.e., how transparent is the political system?) and the distribution of sovereignty (i.e., how decentralized is political power and how democratic is politics at national, provincial and local levels?) Measuring the representative, responsiveness & empowerment of popular law making bodies is also relevant, as are relevant checks and balances on state executors of law.
- **Democratic Culture**. Democratic culture broadly relates to whether citizens exercise civil liberties in matters pertaining to politics and whether civil society is dynamic, independent, and politically active.
- **Rule of Law**. Baseline indicators of rule of law examine whether laws are written, clear and accessible; whether the judiciary is fair and independent and is capable and willing to enforce the law against the state or powerful non-state actors; whether government officials follow the law and abide by rulings; and whether citizens have access to justice.

This paper is not, therefore, dependent upon a particularized vision of "democratic governance", but offers a flexible framework to identify and cultivate viable democratic progenitors in post-conflict countries. That

framework is outlined in the next section and is broadly conceived to balance long-term democracy promotion against near term efforts to promote stability.

Governance strategies in post-conflict operations

Before standing up a governance strategy in a post-conflict country and before committing to a course of interventions, this paper recommends an initial and continuously updated thee-step evaluation of the host country's social and political conditions. By way of overview, these steps involve:

1. **Identification of key actors and opportunities for democratic reform (if any).** This step involves identification of the key actors that animate the competition for influence and power over the apparatus of the state, and an overall assessment of the security and political constraints that inhibit the consolidation of democratic governance.
2. **Identification of key institutions.** This step involves analysis of the specific state and non-state institutional arenas where the game of domestic politics is played.
3. **Reconciliation of tradeoffs between long-term development and short-term "quick wins."** This step involves reconciliation of recurring tradeoffs between efforts to promote long-term sustainable democratic development and near-term concessions to promote stability and the handover of security from military to civilian hands.

What results is not a comprehensive plan of action, but a clear-eyed understanding of competing needs and priorities for advancing both military and civilian agendas. There is no best response to these tradeoffs, but awareness helps to guide strategic choices and reduce negative consequences.

Each conflict presents a unique context. The nuanced politics, resources and capabilities of each country shape the better course of action. However, two general principles underlay each level of analysis above:

1) Intervening forces and assistance providers must resist viewing a country emerging from a conventional phase of war as a clean slate, but endeavor to identify and strengthen proven methods, values, and institutions of governance familiar to the domestic context.
2) When a choice is between securing the peace and promoting democracy, peace should be given priority.

In post-conflict and transitional phases, a pragmatic civilian development approach would appreciate the primacy of sustainable security over what would otherwise be long-term development orthodoxy.[2] However, as the OECD Fragile States Group charter study recognizes, the operational arch of post-conflict development is not linear or sequential (security then development), but a concurrent civilian-military process that pursues three broad goals in tandem: "a political process that legitimates the state; the development of the framework of the rule of law…; and the re-establishment of a framework of security, including but not limited to reconstitution of the state security apparatus. … Efforts to achieve security first … in the absence of legitimate political governance," the OECD maintains, "have repeatedly failed."[3]

The remainder of this section defines the goals and objectives of each of the three steps outlined above. The final section of this paper applies it to Iraq circa 2009.

[2] This point is underscored in a USAID/UNDP report, "First Steps in Post-Conflict State Building." Using East Timor and Liberia as case studies, the report elevates security as the sine qua non in post-conflict operations: "without the state's legitimate monopoly on the means of violence, nothing else can work." First steps in post-conflict statebuilding: a UNDP-USAID study at 23 February 2007.

[3] *From Fragility to Resilience: Concepts and Dilemmas of Statebuilding in Fragile States*, OECD Fragile States Group Framing Paper at 20 (January 2007).

Step 1: Key actors & opportunities

Any governance strategy requires a clear-eyed assessment of key political actors, and appreciation of their interests, resources, alliances, opponents, and strategies. Key political actors include prominent leaders in the government, military, militias, insurgency, business, civil society, religion, criminal networks and other domains that exacerbate conflict or are auxiliary to its resolution. These actors can shape social patterns and institutional performance, mobilize people around core grievances, or provide a means to support other key actors.

This complex of interests generally reveals the core governance challenges facing a post- conflict country in transition. Crafting a governance strategy to overcome these challenges must control for the following variables[4]:

1. Competency of indigenous governance structures.
2. Consensus on existential issues of the state.
3. Capacity for political maturity through open competition for the right to govern.

Many of the drivers of conflict will track with one of these variables. In countries emerging from conflict, many if not all of these aspects of governance will be weak, as reviewed below:

- **Competency.** Overcoming shortfalls in governance capacity is perhaps the most important and hardest variable to control for in a post-conflict setting. The inability of the indigenous government to provide or otherwise ensure delivery of essential public goods and services will likely foment opposition. The extent and quality of services is generally dependent upon the population's historical service level and forward looking expectations, but generally include basic life sustaining needs (water, food, electricity, heath care, shelter), justice for deprivations of life and property, and other human services such as trash

[4] See Conducting a DG Assessment: A Framework for Strategy Development, USAID Document No. PN-ACP-338, November 2000.

collection or education. In a post-conflict context, governance deficits are usually extensive and will lag popular opinion. Not all grievances will be redressed, and in a post-conflict context, the most important determination is whether the host government is either unable or unwilling to provide services to a significant segment of its territory or its population. Inequalities (perceived or real) can contribute to a political climate where mere rejectionists or would-be spoilers develop into a destabilizing force or insurgent progenitor.

- **Consensus** involves the ability of key actors to agree on fundamental issues of national identity and citizenship, basic rules of the political game, and governing arrangements. Without consensus on these norms the underlying legitimacy is perennially at risk and increases the likelihood of renewed conflict.
- **Competition.** Competition is at the core of democratic process, but in a post-conflict setting can be a recipe for instability. Especially when there is low consensus among major population centers, allowing some groups to succeed while others fail may offer enough of a wedge within the population for an insurgency to take root.

Step 2: Identify key institutions

Knowledge of the key political actors and the issues that animate them are a necessary, but insufficient requisite to develop a baseline understanding of the constraints that inhibit the consolidation of governance in stabilization operations. Development, diplomatic and defense personnel also need a common understanding of *where* the game of politics is played, especially the institutional arenas where domestic political actors compete for control. By definition, this is a context specific exercise, but typically involves an understanding of three key social spheres[5]:

1. **The civil society sphere—**encompassing all forms of associational life such as retail media outlets, business associations, local religious institutions, labor unions, and even sports clubs.

[5] See, e.g., Conducting a DG ASSESSMENT: a Framework for Strategy Development, USAID Document No. PN-ACP-338, November 2000.

2. **The competitive arena**—encompassing non-state associational groups instrumental to the balance of power between local and national government and among the branches of government at all levels. These include political parties, economic/business cartels, professional associations that aggregate the interests of state officials (e.g., "national governors' association" or "association of attorneys general" or law enforcement unions), media gatekeepers, tribal governance or the governing bodies of religious institutions.
3. **The formal governance arena**—focusing on the authority, transparency, accountability, capacity and effectiveness of legislative, judicial and executive offices (including the military) at all levels of government as well as traditional governance structures. These primarily include law making authorities, judicial authorities and subsidiary civil and criminal legal authorities.

Knowledge of the key actors who shape social patterns and institutional performance is the tough part. Subsequent mapping of their respective spheres of influence should be a relatively straightforward application. The challenge, of course, is doing it in a manner that comprehends state and non-state structures as a connected system—capturing the internal politics of key institutions and their power to shape and be shaped by competing institutions.

Step 3: reconcile tradeoffs

An appreciation of the players, their objectives, and their power to shape formal/informal or state/non-state institutions brings realism to setting governance goals in a post-conflict setting. The underlying challenge is state stabilization in the short term, while not forsaking sustainable development in the long term. When crafting a governance strategy, civil-military planners must be aware of the opportunity costs associated with a short-term goal to bring about security and longer term efforts to consolidate democratic governance norms. There are many tradeoffs associated with building governance structures that are competent, promote consensus on the fundamentals of the state, and contain political competition. Some of the more prominent are reviewed below:

1. **Competent governance: meeting needs versus building capacity.** As a country emerges from conflict, governance services are necessarily going to be weak. The provision of basic humanitarian assistance—food, water, health care—is familiar to conventional war fighting. Kicking food staples off the back of helicopters during war time makes perfect sense, but continuing the practice in peace time distorts the agricultural sector, domestic distribution centers—doing more harm than good. In a post- conflict setting it is tempting to rely on international entities to meet the population's immediate needs and mitigate the risk of instability. Direct provision of services by internationals (e.g., picking up trash, opening heath clinics, providing electricity, standing up schools, or building transportation infrastructure) may be helpful in the short run—providing an illusion that the new government can meet the population's needs and, therefore, inflate public support for the post-conflict state. This instinct must be tempered. Laying the groundwork for state institutions to deliver essential services themselves (though time-consuming and certainly imperfect) strengthens the legitimacy and effectiveness of the governing structures. Interests in expediency can weaken post-conflict states, create dependency, and forestall handover from military to civilian control.

2. **Consensus: central executive power versus checks and balances.** Concentrating power in a strong central executive is a tempting short-term solution to the myriad of service and political issues that a country emerging from conflict must reconcile. In one respect, a strong executive can push through a reform agenda and forsake a deliberative process in order to expedite forward movement on more immediate problems: service delivery, standing up an indigenous government, and getting an occupying force structure out. However, generally only the population and political factions allied to the strong executive and the outside intervening forces "own" these reforms. Failure to engage representatives (elected or informal civil society leaders) in consultations over fundamental issues of the state can create major legitimacy gaps for the central authority. On the other hand, a government structured by consensus, (one that requires inclusion at every step of the domestic policy

making process) is a recipe for gridlock, where conflict groups use every issue of concern as a proxy battle for historic grievances.

3. **Competition: power sharing versus open elections.** The winner-take-all characteristics of a democratic process can marginalize minorities, foment a sense of exclusion, and incentivize rejection of the elected government (A recipe for renewed conflict). Thus, creating an inclusive process of disadvantaged, excluded groups and conflict groups in a power-sharing accord is often a centerpiece of post-conflict peace agreements. As noted above, however, this can be a recipe for paralysis in governance. Even attempts to split the difference and promote power sharing for interim periods risks cementing a conflict politics into nascent domestic political institutions. A related concern is deciding who occupies essential positions in the post-conflict government—warlords and other conflict entrepreneurs are essential to keeping the peace, and plum political appointments can give them a stake in the new government. However, the professional skills of an effective warlord do not necessarily translate to sound public administration practices and can inhibit capacity development efforts in the long term.

There are many other common tradeoffs, too many to exhaust here. In lieu of a laundry list of more abstractions, the remainder of this paper will focus on application of the framework.

Applying the framework

Looking forward to 2009 and beyond, Iraq offers a relatively straightforward example of how to apply this framework to a country emerging from conflict.

1. ***Identify key actors and opportunities***

Starting with the UN-sanctioned, invasion and occupation of multi-national forces in Iraq (MNF-I)(2003-2004), continuing through the establishment of a nascent democratic government – but disrupted by

ongoing internecine and insurgent conflict (2005-2008) – and looking forward to from 2009, Iraq seems to have attained a status of relative stability. Nonetheless, it remains an open question whether this hard won stability can lead to further development of the fledgling institutions of democratic governance already established.

Presently, Iraq can be looked on as a nation in transition, where democratic gains – e.g. through legitimate and credible elections and evolving organs of representative government – offer the opportunity for a continuation and deepening of democratization. However, as former MNF-I commander General David Petraeus and others have noted, Iraq's current status is also "fragile and reversible." The conditions for continued and destabilizing insurgency continue to exist.

While Iraq has always been multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual, the historic object of politics has not been to balance and ensure the collective welfare of its diverse populace. Instead, the name of the game has been domination and control of the country's natural resources – oil, water, and land – for the benefit of the few and excluding the many. The prevailing view has long been that government rules by discipline and force to ensure conformity with the ruling elite's vision of social order.

Thus, as historically conceived, "political community" has embraced not the individual citizen but, rather, dominant factions of interconnected family, clan, and tribal groups, overlaid by ethnic, sectarian and commercial webs of patronage. The centralized structures of the state – executive, legislative, and judicial organs – are guarantors of the political class's privileges. Within the political community, trust forms, ebbs and reforms in accordance with on rules of a transient and often violent power politics. The result is a politics of identity and conflict (Table 1 below further explicates these political descriptors) that is less bound to tradition than tied to material interests and pragmatic calculations associated with shifting centers of power.

Table 1: Identity Politics & Drivers of Iraq's Internecine Conflict	
Ethnic	Kurds and Arabs in the northern region of the country, (and while Kurds and Arabs are the largest groups, the Turkmen and Assyrian groups are often at odds with both Arabs and Kurds.) Ethnic animosity most often revolves around disputes over property and territory, resources, and the sharing of political power.
Religious	*Shi'a and Sunni Sectarian Violence.* The root of this conflict reaches back to the seventh century, but is exploited by Sunni nationalists and Sunni religious extremists (Wahabbi or Salafi influenced) to try and incite civil war. *Religious/Secular Violence.* In southern Shi'a regions, social liberties have been curtailed dramatically by roving bands of self-appointed religious/moral police (i.e., over "appropriate" interpersonal behavior between men and women, proscriptions against alcohol, or dress codes.) Salient examples of Sunni-based religious conflict involve attacks, murders and beatings of barbers providing "western style" haircuts or removal of facial hair as well as the bombing of restaurants, liquor stores, and night clubs.
Tribes	Tribal structures trace back to antiquity, are tied to territory and exist in both the Kurdish and Arab regions. Tribal conflict is generally linked to achieving redress for some injury against person or property. Key to the nature of tribal conflict is the sense of honor and shame. Offenses on property or person (including reputation) imply a duty upon the recipient of the harm to reestablish honor.
Criminal	In the social breakdown that has accompanied the defeat of Saddam Hussein's regime; criminal elements within Iraqi society have had almost free reign. Violent crime runs very high and blends in with the general disorder created by the insurgency.
Ancein Regime	*Sunni Nationalist. While the Baa'th party and Saddam Hussein controlled the centers of power, there was also a holdover effect from earlier British Occupation policies whereby the Sunni population was left feeling they were the rightful "class" to rule Iraq.* *Regime Loyalists. Former regime loyalists are generally regarded as members of the Baa'th party who derived power, wealth and social importance from links to the Saddam Hussein regime. These people hailed from the so-called Sunni triangle.*

Adapted from USAID/OTI Conflict Analysis (2006)

This historical model of Iraqi politics, which preceded and also applied to Saddam's regime, not surprisingly has largely remained the same since 2003. The highly centralized administration during Saddam's dictatorship permeated provincial, district, and sub-district governments, and enabled Saddam's authoritarian rule. After the fall of Baghdad, MNF-I forces undertook an aggressive and accelerated campaign to dismantle these systems of repression, and to erect new systems and institutions that create the foundation for an Iraq governed by consent.

The imposition of a representative but divided government left a security and governance vacuum, resulting in increased power for established political parties, most of which are religious in orientation and outlook. In the absence of essential state services, some of these parties have helped constituents with their basic needs and offered protection by militias or armed groups, thereby displacing and in some cases directly com-

peting with the state. However, no one group or governing coalition has been able to wrest control of the state apparatus and consolidate its power. Indeed, these parties and the communities they represent are locked in a protracted struggle over resources – most notably, land and oil – that closely tracks Iraq's long established political patterns.

While the 2007-2008 troop surge weakened insurgent forces, dampened violence and created pockets of stability and security in localities where insurgency once thrived, mere absence of violence should not be mistaken for lasting stability. Successful counterinsurgency operations reach into the decades, and are not structured around "military" solutions imposed from the outside, but through a domestic "political" process driven from the inside. Despite gains on the security front, Iraq's politics remains unstable—governed by a fractious and violent political culture. The trick to pacifying this culture and stabilizing Iraq's politics is somehow incentivizing Iraq's rival factions to resolve their differences and pursue their political interests within the parameters of law while respecting the authority of state institutions.

So while Iraq's politics is still coherently understood through a counterinsurgency lens, democracy and governance programs become the primarily tools for (1) consolidating the security gains made over the past two and a half years by resolving conflict through domestic governing institutions, (2) loosening insurgent/extremist grips on Iraqi society by discrediting their tactics as illegitimate in the eyes of the population, and (3) achieving a durable peace among Iraq's factions.

Even though there has been a sharp decline in politically motivated violence since 2008, increasing demand for technocratic governance, and a lessening of sectarian infighting, it remains an open question whether these promising developments have altered the long-standing patterns of political behavior.

However, in contrast to the 2005 provincial elections, participation in the January 2009 cycle was extensive and unconstrained, with no signif-

icant voter boycotts and overwhelming voter sentiment for non-sectarian and technically competent political leadership. Reports from election monitors indicate the elections were administered competently and safely. For these reasons, in addition to the important fact that Iraqis have been enthusiastic about elections, the latter appear to be a viable, ongoing tool of democratization and political maturation through peaceful competition.

Changes in the political landscape in 2008 and the provincial elections of 2009 are encouraging signs of a potential break in Iraq's historical political trend lines, suggesting an opportunity for peacefully resolving the difficult resource and power sharing issues outlined above.
While it is too early to know whether these changes will hold through the national elections in January 2010 and usher in a more pragmatic, technocratic, and responsive political class, they do provide a basis for planning. The most significant changes include:

- The decline in public support for religious parties, and a concurren demand for technocratic and competent political leadership in government;
- A shifting politics, where sectarian identity is less predictive of political support;
- The reemergence and ascendancy of secular political parties;
- Participation of former Sunni insurgents and tribal elements in the electoral process, and a durable ceasefire among Shia militias;
- Increasing assertions of Iraqi sovereignty and declining influence of foreign powers in Iraq's internal affairs.

The point of this assessment is not to indentify "a plan" as such, but to indentify positive political and social vectors that an outside or intervening force can support and encourage through diplomatic and developmental mechanisms. But the question remains: *intervene where*?

2. ***Identify key institutions***

A comprehensive mapping of Iraq civil society, competitive communities and formal governance structures is beyond the scope of this

paper. The figure below provides a glimpse into this exercise. It maps the intersection of Iraq's national, provincial and local governing institutions. It also identifies, to the right, significant non-state actors who compete for influence over the state apparatus.

Figure 2: State Institutions & Political Constituencies



The goal here is not only to identify the relevant institutions, but also to understand how they integrate as a system.

Abstracting from the political analysis in step one, the promising institutional arenas for political change and advancement of democratic reforms include:

- Elections – Particularly in the immediate aftermath of the January 2009 provincial council elections, Iraqis seem enthusiastic about elections and political parties view them as important gateways to power. Accordingly, the prospect of their becoming a fixture of Iraqi political development offers a promising toehold for democratic consolidation, as long as losing factions respect the outcomes and facilitate the attendant transitions of power.

- Strengthened Representation – The current political climate opens opportunities to encourage a shift towards a more technocratic, issue-based politics by enabling newly elected politicians at the national, provincial, district and sub-district levels to work to:
  - functionally integrate political parties within and between representational institutions;
  - support cross-sectarian/ethnic coalitions and develop communication plans and media strategies for them to foster the idea that Iraqis, regardless of their sectarian or ethnic background, can participate fully in a unified democratic state;
  - facilitate a national debate on the issues of power sharing and resources distribution; and
  - leverage the trend toward technocratic government by expanding the influence of professional organizations over sectarian and tribal groups in the political process.

- Executive Transparency – the current political environment is conducive to assisting constitutionally designated executive authorities, e.g., the Presidency Council, Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister's office, in developing transparent policies, procedures and regulations to facilitate law making, enforcement of laws, and an open budget process.

3. *Reconcile tradeoffs*

Looking toward 2012, Iraq is a nation in transition, where gains in security and self-government offer many opportunities to deepen Iraq's sovereignty, self-reliance and democratic maturity more generally. While the MNF-I troop surge weakened insurgent forces, dampened violence and created pockets of stability and security in localities where insurgency once thrived, mere absence of violence should not be mistaken for stability. Conditions are ripe to substantially lower the presence of international forces, and international troops are bound by treaty obligations to unconditional withdrawal by 2012. But the mission is not yet accomplished. Successful counterinsurgency campaigns are not structured around "military" solutions imposed from the outside, but through a domestic "politi-

cal" process driven from the inside. The end of occupation does not end the counterinsurgency campaign—it merely indigenizes it.

After six years of engagement, the political will of donor countries for maintaining a robust civilian assistance effort to support Iraq's political process is waning—especially when Iraq has considerable resources of its own. And in a context of rapidly diminishing resources, foreign assistance programmers will have to reconcile which programs to continue, which to pass off, and which to end. Most important will be what values (development, diplomatic, or security) will drive those considerations. That question, like most, boils down to a budget fight.

According to the U.S. Special Inspector General for Iraq, the United States has committed $52.27 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq. Approximately 90% of these funds are appropriated through four major funds: the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF)—$20.86 billion; the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF)—$18.04 billion; the Economic Support Fund (ESF)—$4.18 billion; and the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)—$3.63 billion. SIGR accounting as of June 30, 2009, shows that "more than $42.59 billion had been obligated from these four major funds, and $38.49 billion had been expended. Nearly $3.54 billion remains available to be obligated, and $8.22 billion is unexpended. The preponderance of unexpended U.S. funds is in the ISFF, which supports Iraq's military and police forces."[6]

In the same time period, the Government of Iraq has contributed $71.01 billion to their own reconstruction and non-U.S. international sources have contributed $17 billion.[7] Iraq provides more funding than the United States and all other international sources combined, and that share will increase precipitously between now, 2012 and the out years of international military withdrawal.

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[6] *SIGR Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to Congress*, July 30, 2009

[7] Id.

For the long run, the name of the game is leveraging Iraq's annual capital budget to ensure that governing structures prioritize the right investments for Iraq's sustainable development. The short-term game—and the one that is defined in terms of the annual foreign assistance budget cycle and two year election cycles—is to prioritize the administrative act of facilitating the logistical burdens of the military drawdown and the "right sizing" of a civilian diplomatic effort.

A retail itemization of tradeoffs associated with various political, governance, economic, rule of law, security, diplomatic, or other program lines is beyond the scope of this paper, but the smart money is on ensuring that a long-term technical assistance and capacity development effort is provided to Iraq's primary budget decision makers, executors and beneficiaries. Those include: (1) representative bodies responsible for setting and vetting budgetary priorities (the national parliament, Prime Minister and his cabinet, the President, provincial councils, governors, local governing bodies), (2) executive line ministries responsible for formulating and executing budgets at the national, provincial and local levels (e.g. the Ministries of Finance, Planning, Electricity, Water, and Public Works), and (3) civil society organs who can aggregate the interests of population centers and petition government in prioritizing population needs (e.g., non-government organization, community groups, tribal leadership, etc).

Conclusion

NATO is not a development agency, nor should it become one. NATO's prospective work in post conflict, reconstruction and, if need be, counterinsurgency environments will be dependent upon "joined up" work with civilian counterparts, who have their own shortcomings in conflict environments. The assessment framework advanced by this paper merely offers civilian-military campaign planners a common method for indentifying and reconciling competing diplomatic, defense and development priorities in post conflict environments. The process, ideally, will also bring a sense of realism to governance goals for nations emerging from conflict.

CHAPTER FIVE

Measuring Counterinsurgency Effectiveness Easier Said than Done

Kirk A. Johnson

> *"In the end, victory comes, in large measure, by convincing the populace that their life will be better under the [Host Nation] government than under an insurgent regime."*
>
> Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, 2006, p. 1-25

Introduction

"Winning the hearts and minds" is the common mantra of counterinsurgency campaigns; the extent to which the population supports local and national government structures while rejecting insurgents or other anti-government forces is a mark of success. Naturally, assessing when (and if) this situation arises is fraught with difficulty. It is not surprising that the U.S. Army's *Counterinsurgency* manual concedes, "Progress can be hard to measure."[1]

Nevertheless, measuring progress—or lack thereof—is critically important, not only for the military commanders engaged in ongoing conflict, but also for civilians working in counterinsurgency environments and policymakers deciding on future staffing and other civil-military require-

[1] U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, December 2006, p. x, available at http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/COIN-FM3-24.pdf

ments. Without both quantitative and qualitative metrics, assessments on progress—and therefore future policy decisions—are reduced to mere rhetoric and conjecture.

The purpose of this paper is to describe appropriate counterinsurgency metrics that can be used to support evaluation and decision making by senior military and civilian leaders on a strategic level. Much of this paper will focus on the Iraq experience while keeping in mind that all insurgencies and counterinsurgency campaigns will differ. Counterinsurgency metrics should focus on three overall topics:

1. Population Security
2. "Hearts and Minds"
3. Measures of Normalcy

As noted above, collecting these important measures is often difficult and, more importantly, cannot be done wholly by the civil-military organizations engaged in counterinsurgency. Coalition/allied civil-military actors must rely on a wide variety of sources for metrics, including those from the Host Nation government, international organizations, and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Without question, these third-party reports will be of inconsistent quality; nevertheless, they are necessary in order to gain a fuller picture of the operating environment.

The final section of this paper will focus on who conducts the assessments. Both civilian and military organizations need to have full-time, dedicated staffs whose job it is to plan and assess the ongoing counterinsurgency effort. While the military has a long tradition of planning, civilian agencies often lack this capability. Both military and civilian organizations need to have this capability in order to fully track the situation on the ground.

Population security

Without question, the first and most important aim of counterin-

surgency is to protect the population. Assessment measures should therefore focus on the extent to which the population is secure in itself and its neighborhoods. On the most basic of levels, assessing population security would be concerned with quantifying civilian casualties, incidents of threats/intimidation, and perceptions of safety/security in the area of operation.

Outside of the abstract, quantification becomes more difficult. Collecting even basic civilian casualty data can be difficult. Chief among the questions involved is what to collect and how to collect it. In peacetime, civilians are hurt and killed for any number of reasons: criminal actions, accidents, and any number of health-related reasons. During war or insurgency, civilians are the victims of targeted or random violence from insurgents, as well as by criminal actions, accidents, etc. Attempting to parse these components can sometimes be an impossible endeavor.

Coalition military leaders in Iraq, starting in 2006, focused almost exclusively on civilian deaths due to sectarian violence.[2] In theory, this has some allure because of the sectarian nature of the conflict, accelerated by the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque of Samarra. The military defined sectarian attacks as violent acts by one ethnic or religious group against another or violent acts perceived to have been targeted in that way. Thus, the cross-ethnic dimension of this definition is the indicative factor. Shia-on-Shia or Sunni-on-Sunni violence would not likely be considered sectarian in nature because the violence does not cross from Sunni-to-Shia or vice versa. Therefore, sectarian violence metrics only have meaning in mixed areas of Iraq, such as in Baghdad.

The U.S. Department of Defense used this measure of sectarian violence/civilian deaths in order to gauge population security in Iraq. Since 2005, the DoD has reported this measure of population security in

[2] Although ideally one would like a broader measure of civilian casualties to include those killed and wounded, attaining reliable statistics on civilians wounded in such security incidents is much more difficult and prone to error as compared to civilian deaths. Thus, civilian deaths became the initial—although not sole—indicator used for population security.

its Congressionally-mandated report, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," also known as the Section 9010 report.[3] In 2006, the DoD started using "sectarian incidents" (and the related casualties) as one of the key measures of population security as well, given the evolving nature of the conflict.

This limited measure of population security, however, opened the DoD up to criticism. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) specifically criticized the Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) on this point, noting that "[M]easuring such violence requires understanding the perpetrator's intent, which may not be known."[4] While the GAO uses this contention to argue that it is unknown whether sectarian violence had decreased (which it certainly had by the time that report was issued in September 2007), the basic criticism of the categorization of sectarian violence has some validity.

In addition, the method of data collection used in much of 2006 had its own issues. MNF-I relied on its own units in the field to provide data on civilian deaths, rather than attempting to utilize/rationalize data collected by official Iraqi sources, such as the Ministry of Health, Iraqi Security Forces reports, and the municipal morgues. By the end of 2006, civilian-targeted violence was characterized by retribution killings and kidnappings (commonly followed by execution-style killings), whereby bodies were often dumped into ditches or gullies and found later. In these cases, local residents would generally call Iraqi officials to collect the bodies, rather than Coalition Forces. Without military "eyes on" the scene to investigate, such incidents would not be included in the database. Therefore, MNF-I data would be subject to a systematic underreporting of these incidents.

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[3] It is sometimes dubbed the "Section 9010" report because that is the section of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2006 that mandated the reports. They may be found at http://www.defenselink.mil/home/features/Iraq_Reports/index.html.

[4] Government Accountability Office, "Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Reconstruction Benchmarks," GAO-07-1195, September 2007, pg. 51.

Recognizing this deficiency—and responding to pressures for better data coverage—MNF-I began to use more Iraqi Host Nation data to supplement their own understanding of civilian death statistics.[5] Starting in late 2007, the DoD began to report/compare the two sources of data in their Congressional reporting. One chart in the December 2007 "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" report[6] shows that MNF-I data augmented by Iraqi Host Nation civilian death information was sometimes as much as twice as high as MNF-I data alone. In July 2006, for example, MNF-I data estimated that about 1,250 civilians were killed that month, yet when augmented with Iraqi data the estimate was about 2,700 (see Figure 1). It is little wonder, then, that analysts have increasingly compared data from many sources—including Host Nation offices—to develop a fuller picture of the situation on the ground.[7]

Figure 1
Iraq Civilian Deaths, January 2006 to April 2009. Reprinted from Anthony Cordesman, "Iraq: Trends in Violence and Civilian Casualties 2005-2009", *Center for Strategic and International Studies Burke Chair in Strategy Report*, May 5, 2009, Figure 8.



[5] MNF-I also used this as an opportunity to train the Iraqis on better data collection techniques.
[6] DoD, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," December 14, 2007, pg. 18, at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/FINAL-SecDef%20Signed-20071214.pdf.
[7] See, for example, Anthony Cordesman, "Iraq: Trends in Violence and Civilian Casualties 2005-2009", *Center for Strategic and International Studies Burke Chair in Strategy Report*, May 5, 2009, at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090504_iraq_patterns_in_violence.pdf.

Some may argue that the actual levels or point estimates of these civilian casualties are not important; rather, policymakers should be more concerned with trends and changes over time. This argument has some merit. While it is important to know the extent of the civilian death problem, it is at least equally important to know whether or not the problem is getting better, staying the same, or getting worse. The difficulty, though, comes when different datasets show differing trends, which happened at a critical time just before the early 2007 "Surge" took place. Between November and December 2006, MNF-I data showed about a 20 percent drop in civilian deaths, while augmented Iraqi Host Nation data showed about a 15 percent *increase* (see Figure 1 above).[8] Given the debates occurring at that time regarding the wisdom of increasing troop levels, the data set used does make a difference. If military leaders and civilian policymakers had solely relied on MNF-I data for decision-making on early 2007 strategy, the situation today could easily be very different from what it turned out to be.[9]

Civilian casualty data are not the only ones useful for evaluating population security in a counterinsurgency. Standard measures of "security incidents," broadly defined as direct or indirect attacks on military and civilian personnel or property, can be useful and the DoD routinely uses such a measure in its quarterly report.[10] While this presentation lacks a sense of the severity of the discrete incidents (i.e. a single attack that causes a single casualty is given the same weight as a single mass casualty attack that kills dozens), such data, coupled with one or more casualty measures, can give a reasonably detailed picture of population security.

Nonetheless, any violence data collected during war or insurgency is subject to uncertainty and error, much like any other data. Military plan-

[8] *Ibid*.

[9] As an aside, it is worthwhile to underscore that in Iraq, the differences between Coalition Forces and the combined Coalition Forces/Host Nation reports have narrowed considerably in recent months. Part of this is due to the change in the nature of the war post-surge, and part to improved reporting from the Government of Iraq.

[10] See, for example, DoD, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," March 25, 2009, pg. 19, at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Measuring_Stability_and_Security_in_Iraq_March_2009.pdf

ners and ORSA (Operations Research/Systems Analysis) staff often collect civilian casualty data without communicating the level of confidence that they themselves have with the data. Therefore, it can be interpreted by outside readers as absolute truth, much in the way military casualty data are treated. In reality, civilian violence data are susceptible to a great deal of uncertainty, especially given the manner in which the data are collected. When released, such civilian data should include appropriate caveats. Even if the caveats are subjective (e.g. "very confident" or "somewhat confident," etc.), this would provide the reader more information about the data than is currently communicated. Although not foolproof, it can help guard against "garbage" data from being regarded as gospel.[11]

"Hearts and minds"

A central tenet of counterinsurgency is winning the "hearts and minds" of the populace while bolstering the legitimacy of the Host Nation government. As noted above, if the populace believes life will be better under the legitimate government as opposed to an insurgent regime, it would be a key determinant victory for coalition/allied forces. This is, of course, easy to conceptualize in the abstract, but can be very difficult to ascertain as a practical matter. While there are a number of other indicators that signal a populace more receptive of the legitimate government while turning against violence (see below), one of the primary ways to assess public opinion is through polling. Indeed, in early 2007 former MNF-I Commanding General George W. Casey, Jr. testified before the US Senate Armed Services Committee and observed, "We think it is important to turn the population against violence in general, and we measure that, their feeling on that, through polls.[12]

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[11] Bing West, "Garbage, Lies, and Uncertainties," *Marine Corps Gazette*, May 2009, at http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/238-west.pdf

[12] General George W. Casey, Jr., "Nomination of GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Chief of Staff, United States Army," Senate Armed Services Committee, February 1, 2007, *S.Hrg. 110-370*, pg. 209 at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_senate_hearings&docid=f:42309.pdf. In the same hearing, he also noted that the people's confidence in Iraqi Security Forces to provide security is measured through polls.

The *Counterinsurgency* field manual discusses these issues of polling, and suggests that "critical information" needed both on tactical and strategic levels focuses around the level of popular support for the insurgency as compared to the legitimate government.[13] While this can be garnered through human intelligence sources, other atmospherics, and open source reporting, these can be biased and otherwise unreliable at times. Broad-based or targeted-area polling can supplement these other sources to help validate or refute what is perceived by military leaders and civilian policymakers.

Polling, however, is not a panacea. Public opinion surveys in conflict areas are not only subject to the usual issues of sampling error, but are prone to a wide array of practical and statistical difficulties. Although the purpose of this paper does not include describing the ideal public opinion survey in a conflict zone, there are a variety of issues to consider when evaluating the usefulness of such polling data:

1. *Military and civilian leaders should look to outside groups to conduct polling, whenever possible*. While military units in the field can and should ask the local populace for their opinions on their local or national leaders, the information gleaned from these encounters can be suspect, depending on the power relationship dynamics from the encounter. In some cases (perhaps in many cases), the local resident will tell military personnel something very different from what they would say to a professional survey interviewer, who is usually a local national. The extent to which reputable polling organizations are conducting these surveys via generally accepted standards will determine to a greater or lesser degree the accuracy of the data.

2. *Much like other sources of data, surveys taken multiple times have more usefulness than single "snapshot" polls*. Winning "hearts and minds" is often a slow process that is measured over the course of months, if not

[13] U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, December 2006, p. 3-16, available at http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/COIN-FM3-24.pdf

years. While nearly any (reliable) information can be useful, looking at trends is more useful to determine whether an indicator is rising, falling, or staying constant.

One example is illustrative here: ABC News, in conjunction with three international television stations, commissioned a series of polls on Iraqi perceptions on a number of topics.[14] Many questions, where appropriate and applicable, are repeated verbatim. Because of that, opinions on important issues can be compared over time. For example, one key indicator is confidence in the Iraqi government. Over time, the public's confidence in government has fluctuated (see Table 1).

Table 1
Survey Question: How much confidence do you have in the national government of Iraq?

	Mar 08 (%)	**Aug 07 (%)**	**Feb 07 (%)**
Great deal of confidence	17	11	18
Quite a lot of confidence	31	28	31
Not very much confidence	26	31	27
None at all	25	30	24
Refused/Don't Know	1	-	-

Source: ABC News Poll Conducted by D3 Systems/KA Research, Ltd.
Sampling Margin of Error ± 2.5 percent

Here, confidence in the Government of Iraq (GOI) waned somewhat between February and August 2007, with the two top categories ("Great deal" and "Quite a lot of confidence") dropping from 49 percent to 39 percent. Then, confidence returned to 48 percent by March 2008. Although the actual numbers are somewhat lower, this trend is also seen when respondents are asked about the confidence they have in Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki himself (see Table 2).

[14] D3 Systems (Vienna, VA) and KA Research Ltd. (Istanbul, Turkey), *Iraq Poll*, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/poll/2008/0308opinion.pdf

Table 2
Survey Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Nouri Kamel al-Maliki is handling his job as prime minister?

	Mar 08 (%)	**Aug 07 (%)**	**Feb 07 (%)**
Approve	40	33	43
Disapprove	58	66	57
Refused/Don't Know	2	1	-

Source: ABC News Poll Conducted by D3 Systems/KA Research, Ltd.
Sampling Margin of Error ± 2.5 percent

Besides political questions, these polls can be useful in quantifying/assessing a broad array of other subjective opinions. One issue in particular is optimism for the future, as compared to the subjective assessment of the current situation. In Iraq, analysts found that Iraqis were far more optimistic about the future, defined as a year from the survey date, as compared to the current situation. Such optimism and hope for the future, where it exists, can be leveraged into support for the legitimate government that is trying to build a better future locally. Other important measures include perceptions of security inside or outside of one's neighborhood, and intercommunity relations. As previously stated, however, polling is not a panacea and there are a number of related issues to consider.

3. *Opinions can vary significantly across locations and/or ethno-sectarian/religious groups*. Consider the geographic composition of Iraq. While a quarter of Iraq lives in and around the urban center of Baghdad, sizable populations live in smaller urban areas, tribal villages, or Bedouin communities. By its very nature, then, Iraq is not a monolith. Opinion can and does vary by these geographic characteristics. While the above information, for example, regarding Prime Minister Maliki's approval ratings (Table 2 above) is interesting and informative on an overall level, it is less useful for local or provincial uses.

Poll responses differ by ethno-sectarian/religious group as well. Different communities often have varying views on a wide range of subjects. Obtaining separate results for Kurdish, Shia, and Sunni populations would paint a better picture of opinions than simply polling Iraqis at large.[15]

Take security perceptions, for example. The DoD described in its June 2007 quarterly report some results of a nationwide poll taken in April of that year.[16] One question asked respondents to agree or disagree with the following statement: "I feel safe and secure in my neighborhood." While most Iraqis in the Kurdish areas and in most of the Shia-dominated south agreed with that statement, there was far less agreement in the Sunni provinces just north and west of Baghdad. Even though 77 percent of Iraqis nationwide agreed with the statement, the distribution of answers clearly varies by geography and the variations may have important implications for policy and strategy.

4. *No matter how good the polling methodology is, quality control is always an issue when there is distance between the organization commissioning the poll and the interviewers themselves*. Polls in counterinsurgency environments are already difficult to field because of the security situation. In addition, there is little way to check that quality control protocols are being followed as the survey methodology would dictate. Such checks are not possible for polls where there is such a firewall between the polling company and the organization that commissioned the poll.

   By way of example, the ABC News poll above was not actually conducted by the news organization itself. Rather, the interviews were conducted through an Iraqi questionnaire form using Iraqi interview

[15] For more on this, see Kirk A. Johnson, Ph.D., "A Baghdad Statistician's Perspective on the Positives and Negatives of Polling in Iraq", Heritage Foundation WebMemo #1615, September 13, 2007, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm1615.cfm

[16] DoD, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," June 7, 2007, pg. 26, at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/9010-Final-20070608.pdf

teams. On one hand, this partially remediates the problem of respondents telling interviewers what they think they want to hear (see above), but on the other hand, basic validity checks of the resulting polling data cannot be undertaken. In the United States, a good survey methodology would allow for the commissioning organization to contact households to verify that someone actually contacted the interviewee. In a conflict environment, the poll often becomes a "black box" whereby the organization commissioning the poll must trust the results without verification. At least one organization, the International Republican Institute, cancelled a polling contract in Iraq in 2006 because (in part) of a lack of trust and problems with the internal validity of polling results.

5. *Response rates for polls become more important in dangerous areas*. The purpose of polling is to get a representative sample of opinion from a broad cross section of the population. If a large proportion of the population refuses to be surveyed for one reason or another, this can substantially affect the reliability of poll results. The ABC News poll again is illustrative. Roughly 2,200 Iraqis were surveyed for the mid-2007 poll, which itself is a reasonable number of people to survey in a standard poll; however, the polling company had to contact many more households than that in order to get to that 2,200. According to the methodological note, there was a response rate of only about 60 percent on the poll.[17] Therefore, nearly 1,500 households that were contacted did not participate.

   It is impossible to tell how the 60 percent who participated with the poll are similar or different to the 40 percent who did not participate. For example, are the 60 percent more likely to complain about the situation in Iraq? Are they more likely to be Shia (or conversely, Sunni)? Were non-responders adequately replaced by individuals with similar characteristics? Again, it is impossible to tell. This introduces error

[17] ABC News, "Iraq Poll: Note on Methodology," September 10, 2007, at http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=3571535.

into the results that usually cannot be adequately fixed via data analysis, especially when data are from unstable areas such as Iraq. In addition, this error is not included in the sampling margin of error calculations (reported as plus/minus 2.5% in the above ABC poll); therefore, these calculations may yield a false sense of certainty regarding the accuracy of the results.

6. *A larger poll does not necessarily yield a better poll*. Many survey companies will note—correctly—that the larger the sample taken for a poll, the smaller the margin of error. Other things being equal, a larger sample will be more precise than a smaller one. A poll of 100 people has a sampling error/margin of error rate of 10 percentage points in either direction. A survey of 1000 has a margin of error of about 3.2 percentage points.

   What is missing, however, is a good sense of the nonsampling error present in the survey. Even in a peaceful and stable environment, all samples are subject to errors when respondents fail to respond truthfully to survey interviewers for any number of reasons. Also, surveys can be subject to coding errors in data entry, nonresponse bias (noted above), and all manner of measurement errors.[18]

   The effects of nonsampling error on a poll are notoriously difficult to measure. Given the challenges of operating in a conflict environment, civil/military leaders need to be cognizant of these difficulties. Just because a 10,000 household survey claims to have a margin of error of 1 percentage point does not mean that total survey error is that low. As noted above, if nonresponse is a particular problem for a survey, this will introduce substantial error that is not included in the standard margin of error calculation. Therefore, the margin of error calculation may give a false sense of precision.

[18] For example, in answer to a question such as "How many hours of electricity did you receive last month?" the respondent might "measure" his/her response incorrectly by telling the interviewer how many hours were received, say, yesterday.

Good survey methodology anywhere requires a wide range of important steps be undertaken by the organization conducting the poll. The purpose, again, of this paper is not to discuss polling in general, but rather the issues of polling in a conflict zone. The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut has an excellent primer on basic survey methodology for those interested in further reading on the subject.[19]

Measures of normalcy

While polling has a significant place in counterinsurgency metrics, it cannot produce all of the information needed by civil and military leaders to ascertain progress in a society. Important social and economic measures are also necessary to gauge improvement in a society, or lack thereof. The development of indigenous capacity to evaluate these social and economic indicators is also important to the extent that Host Nation governments can collect and disseminate accurate (and publically available) information about their own country that will not only provide timely information to themselves, civilian, and military leaders, but also bolster their legitimacy in the process.

The U.S. Army field manual *Counterinsurgency* describes a number of progress indicators that can and should be collected and disseminated by the Host Nation government.[20] Chief among them are the level of economic activity, such as agriculture, construction, public utilities, new business start-ups, tax revenue, imports/exports, inflation, and employment/unemployment levels. Governments collect such information via both administrative data (e.g. tariffs collected at the border, tax revenue generated by source, business licenses generated, electricity megawatt hours produced), but also broad survey data (e.g. price surveys for inflation, labor surveys for employment/unemployment rates, agricultural use sur-

[19] See "Polling 101," Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, at http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/education/polling_fundamentals.html

[20] U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, December 2006, p. 5-28, available at http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/COIN-FM3-24.pdf

veys from a sample of farms). In Iraq, much of this kind of data comes from a GOI office called the Central Organization of Statistics and Information Technology (COSIT). In many respects, it resembles other centralized data offices in Western countries—in particular, Statistics Canada.

The Iraq experience was unique in that there was a history of data collection from the former regime and an underlying bureaucracy that could be re-engaged to collect survey and administrative data.[21] Other counterinsurgency environments may not be so fortunate. Until adequate Host Nation capacity is created, leaders can and should enlist the help of international organizations to collect baseline data. Bringing in Host Nation government statisticians into the process will, naturally, present a training opportunity to build up indigenous capacity.

Many international organizations have conducted these kinds of economic and social surveys in Iraq. For example, the Iraq Living Conditions Survey of 2004 was a joint project of COSIT, the Norwegian-based Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, and the United Nations Development Program.[22] Its purpose was to generate a comprehensive social, economic, and housing assessment in Iraq one year after the fall of Baghdad. More recently, the World Bank helped underwrite the 2007 Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey.[23]

The problem with these surveys is that they tend to be ad hoc or otherwise irregular. Therefore, they do not give a good sense of the trends occurring in the country, which is important for reasons noted above. Also, these highly professional survey efforts typically have a long lag time from interview phase to finished product—at times, several months. The additional data processing and post-survey adjustments yield an improved and

[21] It should be noted that some COSIT officials fled around the time of the fall of Baghdad, as did other Iraqi government agencies. There were enough remaining to reconstitute the organization later.

[22] The Iraq Living Conditions Survey Tabulation Report is available at http://cosit.gov.iq/english/pdf/english_tabulation.pdf

[23] The Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey's Technical Report is available at http://cosit.gov.iq/english/pdf/2008/ihses_part1.pdf. The data annexes are available at http://cosit.gov.iq/english/cosit_surveys.php

more reliable final product (as compared to standard polling), but this comes at the expense of timeliness.

This is not meant to be a criticism of comprehensive surveys versus contemporary polling. Both types of surveys have different purposes. Large-scale national surveys are meant to provide information on the status of major social and economic indicators that do not often change substantially over time. Public opinion, usually measured in quick-turnaround polls, often does change sharply and quickly. The Iraq Living Conditions Survey and the Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey measure concepts such as literacy rates, educational attainment, unemployment, housing adequacy, and other important macro indicators. The results of these large-scale surveys inform policy as to what will, in the long-term, need to be "fixed" in society and where. In comparison, public opinion surveys help analysts ascertain what people are thinking about the issues of the day, which change frequently.

Other measures of normalcy are less objective and quantifiable, and can only be estimated via observations and gathering "atmospheric" information from local contacts. One of the measures of insurgent control is the inability of local populations to travel in and out of a given area. The fact that local residents are on the road and able to conduct commerce or otherwise travel for personal or religious reasons is a key indicator of progress and stability.

In addition, personal observations will sometimes come in advance of "hard data" on normalcy. If local military or civilian staff see an increase of people out of their homes and in the markets, parks, and other public places, this information may precede confidence measures on, say, security or the economy gleaned from polling data. Although these data are, by definition, subjective, such information is useful for the purposes of comparison with more quantitative information.

Civil/Military assessment offices

No discussion of assessments in counterinsurgency would be com-

plete without a note about the offices and personnel tasked with collecting and analyzing data. The military has a long history of planning, assessments and ongoing analysis via various "J5" departments ("5" being the designation for the strategy, plans, and assessments offices in a standard military organization). For the State Department, the planning and policy analysis process almost always takes place in Washington, far from where the counterinsurgency is taking place.

That changed in 2006, when the Joint Strategic Planning and Assessment office (JSPA) was established and staffed at U.S. Embassy Baghdad. While nowhere near as large as its MNF-I counterpart, the Strategy, Plans and Assessment office (now simply dubbed the Combined-Joint 5, or CJ5, office), its staff included national security, political, rule of law, economics and assessments officers. As of this writing, there is no similar State Department office at Embassy Kabul although some capabilities exist in the political-military section. Such capability is greatly needed, considering the recent deterioration in the situation in Afghanistan.[24] If the State Department cannot staff such an office, military commanders should consider ways to enhance civilian analysis capabilities—perhaps even by adding civilian support from one of the public policy research organizations that contracts with the Federal government.

Counterinsurgency assessment offices—on both a military and civilian side—need to be staffed by individuals who not only can analyze statistics, but also know something about polling and survey methodology. While the military's Operations Research and Systems Analysis (ORSA) officers are typically very good at analyzing data, they do not always have a background on survey sampling methodology necessary to identify many of the potential issues raised above. While these officers will not be conducting polls themselves, even a small background in survey methodology can help towards recognizing some of the issues raised above.

[24] It should be noted that as of mid-2009, JSPA at Embassy Baghdad is drawing down and will eventually be decommissioned, given the change in the overall U.S. mission in Iraq.

The importance of the capabilities these offices can bring to counterinsurgency is substantial. During high-intensity combat operations, the military conducts "Battle Damage Assessment" (BDA), a process of continual measurement at many staff levels of how the enemy has degraded the capabilities of the force marshaled against it. Counterinsurgency needs similar ongoing assessment. In many regards, assessment in counterinsurgency is more difficult than BDA, given that many outcomes discussed above are far less tangible than the number of tanks or planes destroyed in combat.

Conclusions and implications for NATO in Afghanistan

Civil/military counterinsurgency assessments are obviously a very important—and sometimes neglected—part of the planning process. While important metrics of population security, winning "hearts and minds," and measures of normalcy are applicable to virtually any counterinsurgency campaign, depending upon the situation some issues will be more important than others. Although Afghanistan has not been discussed here, a comparison between the Iraq and Afghanistan experiences is warranted. In Afghanistan, a large part of the counterinsurgency campaign is concerned with the opium/poppies problem and transitioning Afghan farmers to other, legitimate, cash crops. In Iraq, on the other hand, the drug trade is not a pressing problem. As noted elsewhere,[25] not all counterinsurgencies are the same, and leaders must tailor the assessment process to fit their particular situation.

Therefore, the assessment process must be flexible to coincide with the evolving nature of the conflict. As *Counterinsurgency* notes, "Assessment…design can be viewed as a perpetual design-learn-redesign activity."[26] Even if thoughtful and well-planned, assessment metrics can and should change as time passes. In late 2006, for example, measures of pop-

[25] See, for example, Christopher Schnaubelt, Ph.D., "Lessons from Iraq: New White House Must Face Cost of Afghan Fight" *Defense News*, February 8, 2009, at http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3938404

[26] U.S. Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, December 2006, p. 4-6, available at http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/COIN-FM3-24.pdf

ulation security and safety were key concerns for civilian and military leaders in Iraq, as there was an average number of 100 civilian deaths every day. By early 2009, a time when population security was far better,[27] measures of normalcy and government legitimacy have risen in importance.

In many ways, gathering data and information in Afghanistan—particularly via polls—will be far more complicated than in Iraq, for at least two important reasons. First, Iraq had a number of educated, mostly university-based, survey statisticians who could be contracted to conduct polling throughout the country. Given Afghanistan's relative lack of higher education, finding sufficient numbers of staff qualified for polling may be a substantial challenge. Second, Afghanistan's mountainous terrain makes polling difficult in certain areas of the country. The former issue makes international polling expertise all the more important, although there will still be a reasonably steep learning curve for the dozens of survey interviewers who would be needed to staff any significant polling effort. In terms of the second issue, polling managers will need to weigh the value of having nationwide coverage in Afghanistan against the cost of interviewing relatively small populations. Some surveys solve this problem by only polling major population areas. If such an operational decision is made in Afghanistan, the results should be noted as such. In short, neither of these issues is insurmountable, but they do insert complications into the gathering of important data and information.

In closing, Albert Einstein reportedly had a sign in his office once that read, "Not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted counts." While data and quantitative metrics can be of great aid for civil/military planning and analysis on both tactical and strategic levels, they are not a universal remedy and cannot give insight into all that is important in a counterinsurgency environment. Only a robust mix of qualitative and quantitative data, atmospherics, and discussions with key leaders and local residents alike can adequately describe the operating environment necessary for planning and policy.

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[27] Robert H. Reid, "Iraq is Doing Better, But the Future is Still Shaky" *Associated Press*, March 18, 2009, at http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2009/03/iraq_is_doing_better_but_futur.html

CHAPTER SIX

The Trap of Doctrine: The Perils of Evolution in the Face of Revolution

Alexander Alderson

The paper's focus is counterinsurgency; "Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civil actions taken by the Government to defeat insurgency."[1] It will concentrate in particular on how the British approach to small wars and insurgencies has evolved in response to often very revolutionary threats. The central argument it will develop is that British doctrine is the product of an evolutionary process which is logical and secure when held up against the many different types of threat the Army has faced, sensible in terms of the size and capability of British armed forces at the time, and relevant at the time to the defence policy of the day. It will examine the apparently intractable problem of producing doctrine for future operations from an essentially rearward-looking perspective, and it will look at the issue of 'for whom is the doctrine written?'

The publication of the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency doctrine in December 2006 prompted an upsurge in interest in what had been, until the post-invasion insurgencies gripped Iraq, a niche field of study, both military and academic. Field Manual 3-24 was the subject of much heated criticism before and after its publication. Edward Luttwak, Jeffery Record, Steven Metz and Steven Biddle raised concerns about its approach, the

[1] Army Code 71749, Army Field Manual, Vol. 1 Combined Arms Operations, Part 10 *Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategic and Operational Guidelines)*, London: Prepared under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff, July 2001, p. A-2. Henceforth referred to as *Counter Insurgency Operations*.

cultural challenges it might pose the U.S. military, the relevance of the Maoist model which it appeared to address and its inapplicability to wars of identity rather than wars of ideology.[2] Others, in particular Ralph Peters and Gian Gentile, remain stronger critics still, accusing the authors of FM 3-24 of being politically correct, poor students of history and of threatening the U.S. Army's future warfighting capability by focussing on counterinsurgency.[3] Whether all the criticisms were valid or not, the fact that they were raised highlights doctrine's perennial problem: is the approach it puts forward relevant to the problem the armed forces face?

The purpose of this short paper is to examine what appears to be an intractable problem and to suggest ways to overcome it. The problem is that doctrine is generally the product of an evolutionary process, yet the threats it is intended to counter are revolutionary in purpose and character. Three assumptions need to be made before looking at the problem.

First, doctrine and strategy are not synonymous. Doctrine provides the common baseline of understanding, and strategy is the translation of national policy into objectives to which national resources are allocated: what Art Lykke describes as the Ends-Ways-Means paradigm:

> Strategy is all about *how* (way or concept) leadership will use the *power* (means or resources) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve

[2] Edward Luttwak, "Dead End," *Harper's Magazine*, February 2007 pp. 33-42; Jeffrey Record, *The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgency*, Cato Institute Policy Analysis Paper No. 577, 1 September 2006; Steven Metz, *Rethinking Insurgency*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2007; Stephen Biddle, "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon", Foreign *Affairs*, March/April 2006.

[3] Ralph Peters, "Politically Correct War: U.S. Military Leaders Deny Reality", *New York Post*, 18 October 2006, "In Praise of Attrition", *Parameters*, Summer 2004, pp. 24-32, and "Progress and Peril, New Counterinsurgency Manual Cheats on the History Exam", *Armed Forces Journal International*, 144, February 2007; Lt. Col. Gian P. Gentile, "Eating Soup with a Spoon: Missing from the new COIN manual's pages is the imperative to fight", *Armed Forces Journal*, September 2007; "The dogmas of war: A rigid counterinsurgency doctrine obscures Iraq's realities", *Armed Forces Journal*, December 2007, and "Our COIN Doctrine Removes the Enemy from the Essence of War", *Armed Forces Journal*, January 2008; "The Selective Use of History in the Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine", *Army History*, Summer 2009, pp. 21-35.

objectives (ends) that support state interests. Strategy provides direction for the coercive or persuasive use of this power to achieve specified objectives.[4]

Second, doctrine has three often conflicting functions:

a. It provides a military philosophy, capturing the enduring themes of military experience on which an approach or a military method can be built;
b. It provides practical guidance, serving the needs of the present-day army by presenting best practice and laying out an approach relevant to likely threats and situations;
c. It has a predictive element, taking account of foreseeable future developments either in the operational environment or in changes to an army's equipment inventory or its organizations.

The third assumption is that to be useful, doctrine has to be read, understood, and applied appropriately to the problem faced as 'the law is in the circumstances.'[5] The British Army defined doctrine as "what is taught."[6] If the doctrine is not taught, and not understood, does an army therefore have a doctrine?

No matter how rational doctrine may have appeared to be on the day it was published, and no matter how hard the doctrine writers may have worked to capture best practice or the latest compelling theory, just about every time it has been put into practice, some re-adjustment has been required. There have been exceptions. In the Oman between 1970 and

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[4] Harry R. Yarger, "Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S. Army War College Strategy Model", in U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Volume I: *Theory of War and Strategy*, 3rd Edition, Revised and Expanded, J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., ed., Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008, p. 43.

[5] Remark attributed to US industrialist, Mary Parker Follett, quoted in John Kiszely, "The British Army and Approaches to Warfare since 1945", in Brian Holden Reid, ed., *Military Power: Land Warfare in Theory and Practice*, London: Routledge, May 1997, p. 202.

[6] *BMD*, p.3.

1976, the Special Air Service used British doctrine as it was taught, adjusted it to fit the circumstances and the result was a very successful campaign. Indeed, until the Staff College at Camberley merged in 1997 to form the Joint Services Command and Staff College, the Oman, not Malaya, was proclaimed to be *the* textbook campaign. As Maj. Gen. Tony Jeapes, an Oman veteran, observed,

> The Dhofar War was a classic of its type, in which every principle of counterinsurgency operations built up over the previous fifty years in campaigns around the world by the British and other armies, often by trial and error, was employed. It was probably only the third campaign after Greece in the 1940s and Malaya in the 1950 and early 1960s to be won against a Communist armed insurrection.[7]

In the majority of cases, however, they were described – small wars, imperial policing, internal security, counter revolutionary warfare or counterinsurgency – much more doctrine needed much more adjustment than might have been expected. Indeed, in some cases, for example Malaya and Kenya, totally new doctrine had to be written to meet the challenge of the day. Not surprisingly, given the effectiveness of pamphlets that resulted (*The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya* (*ATOM*)[8] and *A Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations*[9]), British doctrine formalized the role and importance of theatre-specific publications, coming to see them as "a vital supplement to doctrine ... [to] impart both understanding and instruction concerning probable or existing operations ... within the theatre."[10]

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[7] Major General Tony Jeapes, *SAS Secret War*, London: William Kimber, 1980, republished HarperCollins, 2000, pp. 11-12.

[8] Director of Operations Malaya, *The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya*, 1952, republished with amendments1954 and 1958.

[9] General Headquarters, East Africa, *A Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations*, Nairobi: The Government Printer, 1954.

[10] Army Code No 71451, *Design for Military Operations - The British Military Doctrine*, London: Prepared under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff, 1989, Chapter 1.

Trial and error helped to shape an approach which John Nagl characterizes as learning and adaptation.[11] The British Military Administration in Malaya took two years from the start of the Emergency in 1948 to establish a jungle warfare school, three years just to come up with an effective comprehensive campaign plan – The Briggs Plan – and four years to produce doctrine for counterinsurgency in the form of *ATOM*. In Northern Ireland in 1969, the British Army got off to another poor start, as Rod Thornton highlights,[12] but it did recognize almost straight away that its previous experience, its training, and the techniques given in the pamphlets did not cover the situation. Riot control with bayonets fixed, and bugles sounding the warning for the crowd to disperse were simply not right for soldiers on British streets. So the Army adjusted its tactics and made adjustments in many other areas – organization, intelligence and surveillance, equipment, counter-IED, heliborne operations – with the result that Northern Ireland became part of the Army's psyche: junior leadership, manoeuvre, surveillance, 'hearts and minds,' just as Iraq and Afghanistan will become for the Army of today.

The problem is that doctrine, however well founded, is, to use John Nagl's expression, the trailing indicator of change.[13] If the philosophical overtakes the practical, and doctrine is too backward-looking, it should not be too much of a surprise when the gap between theory and reality catches the practitioner out. What is it about doctrine that creates such problems? Why is it that when doctrine is taken into the field we find it does not fit the problem we face? It is not as though these problems are new. Gen. George Erskine said in *The Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations*, a derivative of *ATOM*:

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[11] John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, September 2005 (Second Edition).

[12] Rod Thornton, "Getting it Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made in the Early Months of the British Army's Deployment to Northern Ireland - August 1969 to March 1972", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 1, February 2007, pp. 73-107.

[13] Lt. Col. John A. Nagl, remarks at the US Army Soldier Heritage Center and Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 19 October 2005.

> No one can forecast what future situation British forces may have to face at home or abroad. While each new threat arises in its own context to present a fresh set of problems, there are certain operational principles that remain valid for countering any type of insurgency... The way in which these fundamentals are applied would have to be adjusted to suit the particular circumstances, but it is apposite to note that the experience gained by the British Army from previous counterinsurgency campaigns should not be forgotten or overlooked when considering COIN... This is much more a book of ideas than a book of rules.[14]

Erskine's point is still valid today. There has always been a need to adjust the doctrine in line with practice and that generally takes time. Clearly, in the interests of operational effectiveness, the sooner that learning and adaption process starts the better. A line also should be drawn between tactics – what the soldier on the ground has to do – and the principles behind the campaign of which the soldier is a part. Nevertheless, however much we try to ameliorate matters, the root cause of the problem remains: how can something that is rooted in the past be useful in the future?

One answer may be to keep doctrine general. That is, after all, how British doctrine started out. Its very first doctrine, *Field Service Regulations*,[15] published in 1909 by the newly-formed General Staff – Col. Douglas Haig was their proponent – laid out general principles for the conduct of war. As Hew Strachan notes, when it came to small wars, or 'Warfare in Uncivilized Countries,' the emphasis was on *modifying*, not on replacing, the principles of warfare. Oddly, despite the considerable campaign experience of all those involved in writing it – South Africa, India, Afghanistan – it could only offer self-reliance, vigilance, judgement and discipline, as pre-requisites for what it described as "overcoming the diffi-

[14] General Headquarters, East Africa, *A Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations*, Nairobi: The Government Printer, 1954, foreword.

[15] General Staff, War Office, *Field Service Regulations* Part I: *Operations* and Part II: *Organization and Administration,* London: HMSO, 1909. Hereafter *FSR*.

culties inherent in savage warfare."[16] Those old regulations may have been written one hundred years ago but their author recognized an absolute constant: the need to adapt to the circumstances: "unless officers and men are ... capable of adapting their action to unexpected conditions, and of beating the enemy at his own tactics *the campaign will be needlessly long and costly*."[17]

It would be wrong to think that *Field Service Regulations* were the Army's only doctrine. A hundred years ago, rather like today, it had hundreds of training pamphlets and it was those, and books such as Charles Callwell's *Small Wars,* that kept the young officers primed; plus, of course, like today, their experience. As Ian Beckett highlights, *FSR* were not the sole source of information in these specialist areas. Francis Younghusband's *Indian Frontier Warfare* (1898), C. Miller Maguire's *Strategy and Tactics in Mountain Ranges* (1904), the Indian Army's *Frontier Warfare* (1900, later expanded in 1906 to include bush fighting), W. C. G. Heneker's *Bush Warfare* (1904) and W. D. Bird's *Some Principles of Frontier Mountain Warfare* (1909) contained the collected lessons from the campaigns at the end of the nineteenth century and provided an extensive informal doctrine for operations against irregular enemies. It was to these publications that officers turned for detailed guidance and could balance internal and external 'doctrinal' influences.[18]

Looking back through British doctrine four important changes can be identified, each being a response to things that had happened not necessarily as the result of identifying likely future developments. The first significant change to British doctrine came immediately after the First World War and the establishment of the principle of minimum force. The post-war gloom and economic depression threatened widespread civil unrest. The Russian Revolution reverberated around Europe and the

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[16] *FSR* Part I, 1909, p. 171.
[17] *Ibid*. p. 171 Emphasis added.
[18] Ian F. W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies, Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1750*, Oxford: Routledge, 2001, pp. 35-36.

Army's response was to clarify its role in domestic disorder in a little book titled *Duties in Aid of the Civil Power*.[19] The driving force behind it was the need to make sure soldiers knew what they could and could not do in the light of Gen. Dyer's at actions at Amritsar in India as well as the rebellion in Ireland, 1919-1921.[20] Whether Dyer was in the spirit or the letter of the law to shoot on protestors was not the point. The Hunter Commission which investigated said he was wrong and the Government response was unequivocal:

> The principles which have consistently governed the policy of His Majesty's Government in directing the nature, and the methods employed in the course, of military operations against a foreign enemy, may be broadly stated as the employment of no more force and destruction of life than is necessary for the purpose of forcing the enemy to subdue himself to the Military Commander's will. This principle has governed their policy still more rigidly when military action against enemy non-combatants is concerned; *a fortiori* it is, and His Majesty's Government are determined that it shall remain, the primary factor of policy whenever circumstances unfortunately necessitate the suppression of civil disorder by military force within the British Empire.[21]

The British philosophy for the use of force in wars among the people has not changed: minimum force applies. What is noteworthy about its imposition was not the decision but what prompted it. Although it may make

[19] War Office Code 1093, *Duties in Aid of the Civil Power*, London: The War Office, 1923. Reprinted with amendments in 1937 and 1945.

[20] On 13 April 1919, General Dyer ordered soldiers to open fire on some 10,000 unarmed men, women and children who were protesting in Amritsar in the Punjab. 400 were killed and over 1,200 wounded. The massacre resulted in martial law being imposed; Dyer was relieved of command and millions of moderate Indians became nationalists. It marked the turning point in Indian nationalist politics. Dyer thought his actions would create the right impression and thought it his duty to keep firing until the crowd dispersed.

[21] National Archive, CAB/24/105, *Indian Disturbances. Conclusions of the Indian Disorders Committee*, 6 May 1920, p. 2.

perfect sense in terms of not antagonizing the population among which military operations take place, 'just war theory' and Human Rights legislation, the government's decision had nothing to do with the threat a soldier faced. In fact, it was the reverse: the policy said that, almost irrespective of the threat soldiers faced, they could only use the force needed to bring the situation under control and no more. The principle of minimum force was quite clearly a response to what happened, not what was likely to happen in the future.

As it transpired, Minimum Force served the Army of the inter-war years very well, as Hew Strachan and Rod Thornton note.[22] It was such an important factor that Gen. Charles Gwynn, a redoubtable former commandant at the Staff College, Camberley, and a notable author, made it the underpinning principle of his book *Imperial Policing*, published in 1934.[23] And it is in *Imperial Policing,* and its official counterpart *Notes on Imperial Policing*,[24] that it is possible to get a feel of what had been required of the Army and to see a clear division in thinking. On the one hand the Army had doctrine for suppressing unlawful assemblies and riots at home. On the other, and much more likely, there was doctrine for restoring law and order in the dominions and empire. The domestic doctrine – Ireland excepted – was there just in case.

For campaigns in foreign fields, the doctrine for imperial policing was rooted in the absolute belief that the forces of law and order would prevail, and that any uprising would be dealt with firmly, indeed even punitively. Here the doctrine is telling. Although it has all the key themes that we currently regard as important – for example, the concern for the rule of law, minimum force, co-operating with the local police, the need for good intelligence – the doctrine offers no clue, or even shows any interest in why tribes might revolt, or why widespread civil disorder might occur. Nor did

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[22] Hew Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p.169; Rod Thornton, "Historical Origins of the British Army's Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Techniques" in Theodor H Winkler, et. al., eds., *Combating Terrorism and Its Implications for the Security Sector,* Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, June 2005, pp. 26-44, p. 16.

[23] Major General Sir Charles W. Gwynn, *Imperial Policing*, London: Macmillan, 1934.

[24] War Office Manual 1307, *Notes on Imperial Policing*, London: HMSO, 1934.

it give any impression that those reading the doctrine would have any interest in the underlying causes either, whatever such underlying causes might be: religious, racial, ethnic, nationalist or separatist. All these tensions existed when the doctrine was written but the underlying message it offered was that right would prevail and that wrong-doers would be defeated, then and for the foreseeable future. Against such an assumption, there was no need to think about adaptation, learning or development.

All this had to change after the Second World War, which served as a catalyst to ferment many of the underlying problems that the doctrine ignored and which Gwynn's *Imperial Policing* recounts.[25] In Malaya, for example, the Communist Party, which was the insurgency from 1947, had been fomenting trouble since the 1920s. In Palestine, the Arab revolt in 1936 spawned the Jewish self-defence militias which then fought the British administration after the war. The seeds of discontent were there well before the post-war rise of anti-colonial communism and revolution; those on the ground may have spotted them; but those writing doctrine did not. Doctrine in the inter-war years served the notion of returning the situation to the *status quo ante*.

The second important change came in 1949 with the publication of *Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power*.[26] With communist revolutions sparking around the world, doctrine now included a detailed assessment of the threat and the acknowledgement that insurgency and revolution were *politically* motivated. To counter such politically-motivated threats, it was at last recognized that this needed a political solution. Doctrine writers responded, lifting their sights from the tactics of riot control or punitive raids to put forward a much more sophisticated approach. This required very close co-ordination between the civil authorities and the security forces, police-led intelligence operations, and an increased emphasis on psychological warfare and counter-propaganda. All this should sound very familiar because it was

[25] Gwynn's campaigns included the Punjab, Waziristan, Peshawar, Cyprus, and Palestine.
[26] War Office Code 8439, *Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power*, London: The War Office, 1949.

the essence of an approach which has yet to be challenged as a method or fully implemented. The doctrine of 1949 drew together for the first time all the threads of counterinsurgency that we recognize today: a co-ordinated cross-government, unified plan; sound, integrated intelligence; tactical adaptability; recognition of the psychological dimension; and the need to secure the population and isolate the insurgent.

The question doctrine does not answer is why should that model of politically-led counterinsurgency work elsewhere? Here is the doctrine's significant weakness: the strengths of the plan developed in Malaya by Briggs, galvanized by Gen. Templer, and espoused by Sir Robert Thompson may have been self-evident in the context of Malaya but those strengths could only be realized if a future civil administration could recognize both the strengths and the fact that the doctrinal model fitted new circumstances. Generations of Army officers were taught the value of the Briggs/Templer/Thompson model at Staff College, but why should politicians or civil servants, who are not familiar with the notion of 'doctrine', either know about, or still less resort to an approach recognized by the Army as best practice and fixed in time in history?

The third major change was for doctrine to crystallize the principle of 'Separating Insurgents from Their Support.' This appeared in the 1960s in *Keeping the Peace*.[27] A government's first move had to bring the population back under its control and given effective security. This would isolate the enemy from the rest of the community by disrupting all his contacts, and allow the security forces to maintain a continual attack on the periphery of the enemy organization to eliminate the rank and file and to open up opportunities for deeper penetration. With this in place, the next important step would be to use an information campaign to "drive a wedge between enemy elements and the people and to develop resistance to the political ideologies of the former."[28] But most importantly it would help to increase the people's confidence in the government.

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[27] War Office Code 9800, *Keeping the Peace (Duties in Support of the Civil Power)*, *Part 1-Doctrine*, London: The War Office, 1963.

[28] *Keeping the Peace*, 1963, Part 1, p. 66.

The fourth change was to take account of the whole political-socio-economic problem posed by revolutionary warfare. In 1969, the Army published *Counter Revolutionary Operations*.[29] For good reason this is an exemplar of the 'trailing indicator of change' argument. The principal issue was its inclusion of the tactics used in Aden – that bloody and poisonous campaign which ended in 1967 – and to enshrine them as best practice. Some would make the argument that the wrong lessons from Aden were dropped in; it said nothing about supporting the Aden Armed Police in terms of intelligence, and, despite the Aden references, overall that 1969 manual smelled too much of the jungle for some commanders. It is here that we find the references to troops fixing bayonets and advancing on demonstrators, and the use of buglers and banners to order crowds to disperse.[30]

The drawbacks of mass arrests, tear gas and armoured cars to deal with widespread rioting quickly became apparent. On 5 December 1969, Lt. Gen. Sir Ian Freeland, GOC Northern Ireland, held a working group to examine and discuss the very considerable problems that crowd control, escalation of force, the gap between CS gas and opening fire and public relations posed in Northern Ireland. Interestingly, in terms of understanding doctrine and the application of best practice, the study period agreed that "winning 'Hearts and Minds' [was] as vital as winning the tactical battle."[31] The real doctrinal progress was, however, the realization that the aim of counter-revolutionary operations was not purely a matter of soldiers killing insurgents." Although it does not hint at just how difficult that might be, it asserted that counter-revolutionary operations must first contain and then eradicate the insurgent movement and its subversive support organization, after which they had to "rectify any political and social wrongs."[32] The inference is clear and fundamental to the notion of a polit-

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[29] Army Code No 70516 (Parts 1 and 2), Land Operations Vol. III, *Counter-Revolutionary Operations* - Part 1 *General Principles*, and Part 2 – *Procedures and Techniques*, London: by Command of the Defence Council, 1969. Henceforth *Counter-Revolutionary Operations*

[30] *Ibid*.

[31] Minutes of a Study Period held by Lt. Gen. Sir Ian Freeland, KCB, DSO, GOC Northern Ireland, 5 Dec 69, Upavon: TDRC, 00456, p. 33.

[32] *Counter-Revolutionary Operations*, 1969, Part 1, p. 41.

ical rather than a military solution: successful counterinsurgency now no longer meant returning to the *status quo ante*. Political change was a prerequisite for successful resolution of the problem, and some form of accommodation would have to be reached between the protagonists.

Doctrine in 1969 established a much more broad-based approach to military operations, and, following on from Sir Robert Thompson's thinking, introduced principles for *government* action: "The outstanding lesson from past revolutionary wars is that no single programme – political, military, psychological, social or economic – is sufficient by itself to counter a determined revolutionary movement."[33] So the first requirement was for a national plan: passing emergency legislation to support the campaign; implementing political, social and economic measures to "gain popular support and counter or surpass anything offered by the insurgents;" setting up an effective organization to co-ordinate civil, police and military action at all levels; establishing an integrated, national intelligence service, building up the police and armed forces; and imposing whatever control measures were necessary "to isolate the insurgents from popular support."

Here the Army's position gets drawn back into the difficult problem identified about the Briggs/Templer/Thompson model; that it was really doctrine for a government response written by soldiers and published in Army doctrine. It may have been taught at Camberley, with police and civil servants involved, but it was doctrine for the whole of government being advocated for and developed by the Army. In fact the doctrine published in the 1990s actually makes the point: "There has never been a purely military solution to revolution: political, social, economic and military measures all have a part to play in restoring the position of the civil authorities. Furthermore, the military contribution although important is only one element in the government's reaction to the crisis."[34] And General Sir Frank Kitson recognized the point as well:

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[33] *Ibid*, p. 41.
[34] *Counter-Revolutionary Operations*, 1977, p. 37.

> The problem is more difficult because so many of the people who will be most influential in determining success or failure are not in the armed forces at all. They are the politicians, civil servants, local government officials and police... [and] that may be in someone else's country. It is difficult to see how they can be prepared in advance to exercise the responsibilities that will be thrust upon them...
> Service officers must be taught how to fit together a campaign of civil and operational measures: they must know what is needed in terms of intelligence, and the law, and of moulding public opinion. Finally, they must be prepared to pass their knowledge on when the need arises and go on agitating for suitable action until all concerned are aware of what is required of them – *or more probably until they are sacked for being a nuisance*.[35]

The Briggs/Templer/Thompson model is about a politically-led, whole of government approach of which the military contribution is one part. Military doctrine may address the needs of the military planner and the military practitioner; however, all contributing parties should be familiar with the tenets of counterinsurgency if practice is to match the theory. The issue of political primacy and co-ordinated government machinery are central to effective counterinsurgency, certainly if concepts such as the Comprehensive Approach are to have any campaign effect at all. Lord Ashdown has spoken of the need for such co-ordination in the context of Afghanistan:

> First we have to agree a strategy. Even the wrong one would be better than what we have at present, which is none. Second we have to give whoever it is in charge of the international effort the authority to bash heads together and co-

[35] Lt. Gen. Sir Frank Kitson, *Practical Aspects of Counter Insurgency*, Kermit Roosevelt Lecture delivered May 1981, Upavon: Tactical Doctrine Retrieval Cell: Annex A to DCinC 8109 dated 11 Jun 81. *Emphasis added.*

> ordinate action, especially when it comes to international aid. Third, we have to link military action with our political aims. Lastly, we have to have priorities, and the ability to concentrate on them.[36]

Gen. Sir Frank Kitson also offered a suggestion on how this might be achieved in a multinational setting in 1972. He asserted that the underlying principle in such cases was that the ally's needs should "always take second place to the host country." In other words the sovereignty of the host nation had to be respected and reinforced. He also provided five guidelines for the relationship between ally and the host government. First, "no arrangement will work unless that host country itself has a properly ordered system for prosecuting the war." Kitson alludes to the Briggs/Templer/Thompson model. Next, the ally should be able to co-ordinate its aid through one individual who could represent it on the host country's supreme council to help formulate overall policy. Third, the ally needed to be represented at every level of government, "but always subordinate to the host country and in an advisory capacity." Fourth, the key was full co-operation between the host country and the ally and full integration of the full range of civil and military efforts. Finally, and specifically with coalition operations in mind, Kitson identified that allied efforts must mirror all four guidelines and that "the various contingents must have a common understanding of the problem."[37] The complex co-ordination, communication and consultation necessary to achieve Kitson's guidelines are only hinted at. Although no British doctrine writer subsequently developed Kitson's framework, it is evident that these remain relevant today.

So how can this process of evolution be summarized? In theory the doctrine writer should take enduring principles and current best practices, set them against the threats faced, and then write doctrine to deal with them. The point is that all doctrine writers would reasonably claim

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[36] Rt Hon Paddy Ashdown, "After Iraq and Afghanistan- shall we ever intervene again?" The Hands Lecture, delivered at Mansfield College, Oxford, 4 November 2008. Accessed at http://www.mansfield.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/Documents/pdf/Hands%20lecture%204%20Nov%202008.pdf

[37] Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, p. 61.

that is what they did. In this sense, the evolutionary process has served its military audience reasonably generally. It has produced a sound philosophy for counterinsurgency. It recognizes the political and psychological dimensions of the problem; the fact that there is no purely military solution to it; and that security operations require excellent intelligence, judicious use of force, and effective communications with those in the theatre of operations, regional and international audiences, and those at home.

The challenge is to reduce the time lag by which doctrine trails the changes that emerge in current campaigns, and to provide a framework of principles that is robust enough to absorb change so that it remains relevant. The latest British principles for counterinsurgency provide such a framework: recognize the political dimension; employ co-ordinated government action; develop and maintain an understanding of the cultural, social, and political situation, not just the military; secure the population; gain and secure popular support; operate in accordance with the law and use minimum force, to integrate intelligence; and learn and adapt. While these are all products of the evolutionary approach, despite inevitable campaign set-backs here and there, they proved their worth.

However, the principles are not the real issue. The important step now is to address the weakness that is inherent when the military is safeguarding doctrine that is fundamentally about a political solution. The present trap of doctrine is not so much its evolutionary development, or the generally rear-facing approach. Rather it is that the generally held doctrinal approach of a broad-based, politically-led whole of government response to insurgency is espoused largely by the military. In the period of withdrawal from empire, British colonial administrations could call on civil servants who themselves had served in the armed forces. The world has moved on and today's challenge is to institutionalize a whole of government approach, if necessary with doctrine, that not just the military espouse but the political and interagency communities understand and support as well.

CHAPTER SEVEN

NATO and Counterinsurgency: The Case of Germany

Timo Noetzel and Martin Zapfe

In Afghanistan the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is challenged by an insurgency that is continuously growing in strength. By now it is evident that the operational core challenge for ISAF in all of Afghanistan is to counter the insurgency. Germany has command responsibility for operations in northern Afghanistan. The evident operational dynamic is putting pressure on the countries' political leaders. Yet, there is deep reluctance to admit that efforts to keep the insurgency at arms length have failed and that by now even that part of Afghanistan for which Germany has had responsibility for the last few years is being shaped by increasing insurgency activities.

However, if NATO is to fight a successful counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan it is crucial that the United States and its European allies find consensus over strategy and operational focus. For NATO's counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan to be successful key European member states such as Germany will have to embrace the challenge presented by the insurgency in Afghanistan. If European NATO members fail to rally around the counterinsurgency challenge in Afghanistan it would result in an Americanization of the war in Afghanistan and, subsequently, in a long-term weakening of NATO. Not least for this reason, Germany's position on counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is of great relevance to the alliance.

The article proceeds in three broad steps. First, the use of German forces in NATO operations since 1990, leading up to counterinsurgency in

Afghanistan, will be discussed. Second, the strategic and operational frameworks shaping the German (in)-ability to implement counterinsurgency-practices in Afghanistan will be analyzed. Finally, the influence of the existing strategic and operational frameworks on operational practice in the context of ISAF will be discussed.

The article finds that Germany is likely to give up its insistence on conducting a stability operation in Afghanistan due to operational theatre challenges in Afghanistan. However, this change in attitude from bottom-up and resulting reforms will be hampered by political factors that are, if not unique to Germany, then at least exceptionally influential in shaping and constraining German thinking on small wars.

The Cold War and post-Cold War legacy

Throughout the Cold War, the Bundeswehr, even more than other Western armies, was structured, equipped and trained solely for the purpose of defending Western Europe against invading troops of the Warsaw Pact. It was heavily armored and mechanized to provide forces for the integrated operational command of NATO. The army was structured for the purpose of delaying, outmaneuvering and eventually overpowering a Soviet tank assault force on the battlefield. Naturally, this went along with a conventional strategic and operational mindset, drawing lessons from World War II, the Korean War or the Yom-Kippur-War that could serve as examples for the kind of operational challenges to be expected.

Since the end of the Cold War the Bundeswehr was first deployed in the context of an unarmed humanitarian assistance mission in Cambodia in 1992. This was followed by the deployment of a logistical support unit armed only for self-defense to Somalia in 1993 as part of a UN peacekeeping force.[1] In 1994 a Federal Constitutional Court ruling declared German

[1] See Richard Connaughton: *Military Intervention and Peacekeeping. The Reality*, Hampshire/Burlington 2001, p. 117.

participation in multinational military operations legal. Since then the Bundeswehr has been active in missions in the Balkans under a range of different mandates with Bundeswehr soldiers deployed under classic peacekeeping mandates as neutral forces meant to separate hostile factions. The German participation in the Kosovo air campaign to stop Serbian atrocities provides the only exception to this. The following ground force move under the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mandate into the province was then nearly unopposed and thus in accordance with the German operational paradigm that its forces were being deployed as neutral enforcers of UN-mandates.[2]

The Afghanistan-operation

This paradigm slowly began to crumble with the German willingness to join the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan beginning in Winter 2001/2002. Germany sent Special Operations Forces to fight against the Taliban and al-Qaida in combat roles. Subsequently, Germany became one of the largest troop contributors to the subsequently initiated ISAF-Operation. The German army provides the third-largest contingent, taking the NATO command located in the country's northern region (RC-North).[3] In accordance with the paradigm that its forces act as neutral mandate enforcers the official view in German politics always has been and remains so that German troops in Afghanistan only conduct a stabilisation and reconstruction operation as part of the UN-mandated efforts to re-build Afghanistan. The assumption in Germany remains principally that the Bundeswehr continues to support civilian development efforts in Afghanistan.[4]

The conduct of offensive operations was to remain a task for NATO allies assigned to conduct operations in other parts of Afghanistan.

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[2] See Timo Noetzel/Martin Zapfe: *Aufstandsbekämpfung als Auftrag. Planungsstrukturen für den ISAF-Einsatz*, Study of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs 13, May 2008, p. 7.

[3] See http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf (accessed on June 30, 2009), p. 2.

[4] See The German Federal Government: *Das Afghanistan-Konzept der Bundesregierung*, September 2008, p. 9.

Since the heartlands of the insurgency are in the south and east of the country this approach was feasible at first. Northern Afghanistan remained comparably stable and the threat potential to ISAF soldiers was low when compared to the rest of the country. The Bundeswehr was conducting low-intensity operations only. With the deterioration of the security situation since 2007 this has changed. As a result, German forces have been part of complex and frequently offensive military operations of some variety.

However, neither at the strategic nor at the operational level has the Bundeswehr been structurally prepared for the conduct of operations to counter an insurgency movement. The core reason for this is that insurgencies constitute challenges that may not be defeated by posing a neutral force posture.

Generally speaking, an insurgency constitutes an armed rebellion against a political order. The strategic aim of the rebellion is to coerce the indigenous population to shift sides. The long-term goals can range from maintaining state-free uncontrolled local spaces to overthrowing a national government by way of subversion and armed conflict.[5] The range of tactics used can include propaganda, riots, kidnappings, guerrilla warfare, and attacks on infrastructure such as roads or water supplies, but also conventional operations known from regular warfare. By now all of these can be observed as features of the conflict in Afghanistan.
Inevitably, strategic aim of counterinsurgent forces has to be to prevent the defeat of the challenged political order. Therefore, he has to concentrate on maintaining the existing government's power and legitimacy judged by the standards of the indigenous population. This is the strategic and operational challenge for Germany and NATO in the context of ISAF.

For the last two years German ISAF forces have faced a general downward trend in security[6] due to increasingly organized and aggressive insurgent activity. Instability has been growing and the number of direct

[5] This definition is based on the corresponding paragraph in United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative: *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, January 2009, p. 2.
[6] See *Wachsende Gefahr im Norden Afghanistans. Auch zivile Helfer werden immer öfter Ziel von Anschlägen*, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 21, 2008.

attacks has increased sharply. Insurgent forces in northern Afghanistan have intensified their attacks on ISAF in both quantity and sophistication, increasingly relying on complex, multi-phased ambushes that combine improvised explosive devices, small arms and rocket propelled grenades.[7]

The growth of violence in the north is a development that is undermining the German consensus about the country's participation in ISAF. The gap between the German politics about ISAF in both Brussels and Berlin on the one hand, and daily operationals routines and challenges German commanders are facing in the conflict theatre on the other hand, is growing day by day.[8] To acknowledge the deteriorating situation in the conflict theatre would contradict the politics of the last few years: the political message has been that the low-profile and indirect approach adopted by German forces in northern Afghanistan had prevented the manifestation of a credible insurgency movement. To now admit a deterioration of the security situation due to continuously growing insurgent activity would carry the message of failure. It would require recognition of the failure of a particular politico-military strategy concerning post-conflict stabilisation.

Regardless of political rhetoric in Berlin, on the ground German commanders reacted to the deteriorating security situation in northern Afghanistan by applying a range of measures aimed at enhancing German combat effectiveness. For the last two years, paratrooper units trained for counter-guerilla warfare have been deployed on a permanent basis to strengthen the garrisons in Kunduz and Mazar-e-Sharif. At the same time, Special Operations Forces[9] have been conducting special reconnaissance operations and, more recently, direct action operations aiming at insurgent leaders as well.[10] Parallel to this development, the Ministry of Defense's

[7] See *Angriff auf Bundeswehr war militärisch geplant*, in: Der Spiegel, April 30, 2009.

[8] See Timo Noetzel/Benjamin Schreer: *Missing Links: The Evolution of German Counter-Insurgency Thinking*, in: RUSI Journal 154, February 2009 1, pp.16-22, p. 17f.

[9] The German Special Operations Forces include the German Army's *Kommando Spezialkräfte* (KSK) and the German Navy's *Kampfschwimmer*, see: Timo Noetzel/Benjamin Schreer: *Spezialkräfte der Bundeswehr. Strukturerfordernisse für den Auslandseinsatz*, Study of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs 26, September 2007, p. 13.

[10] See *KSK-Soldaten setzen Taliban-Führer fest*, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 8, 2009.

doctrinal branches have initiated the drafting of an initial basic field manual for counterinsurgency. Thus, military leaders have begun to accept the challenges originating from the insurgency and have adopted countermeasures both in the field and at ministerial desks. However, neither in terms of institutional strategy-making capabilities, force structure nor, indeed, the state of doctrine is Germany prepared to conduct counterinsurgency operations. These factors are inhibiting a more flexible pattern of operational conduct.

Institutional strategy-making capability for counterinsurgency

Institutional strategy-making capability manifests itself at two levels. First, it is about military command and control capacities to lead expeditionary operations. Secondly, its dimension extends beyond the military dimension of operations and into government's capacity to execute a 'whole of government' approach. In the context of counterinsurgency operations this dimension is particularly crucial because of the vital importance of a comprehensive strategy to counter an insurgency successfully. For this to happen it is necessary to better integrate military and non-military government bureaucracies and instruments for the purposes of operational planning. Germany vehemently stresses the need for NATO to strengthen its comprehensive approach to military operations. The German concept of *Vernetzte Sicherheit*[11] *or 'networked security'* constitutes the German version of the comprehensive approach. Yet, this consensus on networked security does not extend beyond political rhetoric. Institutional reform efforts have not been initiated.[12]

[11] *Networked Security* („Vernetzte Sicherheit") is the German equivalent to NATO's-"comprehensive approach", see Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: *Weißbuch 2006 zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr*, p. 25.

[12] It should be noted that even NATO members which are fully imbued with counterinsurgency doctrine and define their operations in Afghanistan as such, e.g. the U.S. and U.K, have difficulty implement whole-of-government efforts. See Christopher M. Schnaubelt: "The challenge to operationalizing a comprehensive approach," in *Operationalizing a comprehensive approach in semi-permissive environments*, NDC Forum Paper Number 9: http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=79 (accessed on July 18, 2009).

Neither has there been a sustained and structural effort at enhancing the first dimension of institutional strategy-making capability: during the Cold War the Bundeswehr was developed into a territorial defense force firmly integrated into NATO. Therefore the German Ministry of Defense did not have its own national command and control apparatus at strategic and operational levels. If the Warsaw Pact would have attacked, operational control over the Bundeswehr would have immediately been handed over to the integrated command and control structure of NATO.
In the wake of the continuous increase of participation in multinational military operations beyond NATO-territory since the end of the Cold War, the Bundeswehr built a decentralized command structure to lead the individual services, i.e. army, navy and air force, in deployments. The result was a fragmented military command structure enhancing the inherent dynamic of institutional rivalry between the services. A fragmented structure can also be found at the level of inter-ministerial co-operation. The boundaries of authority among those ministries that have some stake in operations such as the one in Afghanistan are hard to overcome, thus resulting in unending institutional rivalry and a permanent lack of co-operation regarding civilian contributions to military operations. The German Government thus lacks a strategic decision-making centre to integrate policies and to formulate strategy. Authority over the making of strategy is diffuse. Institutional space for strategic decision-making is absent and the development of an interministerial whole-of-government approach to military operations remains an illusion.

Whilst at the interministerial level institutional reforms remain illusionary for the time being, at the intra-ministerial level of the German Ministry of Defense there has been at least some development. The establishment of the *Joint Commitment Staff*[13] in 2008 directly addresses the issue of the fragmentation of ministerial strategy-making capabilities of the German Ministry of Defense. Its establishment is a direct reaction to the recognition that institutional capabilities for operations such as those in Afghanistan were lacking. The staff unit comprises nearly all opera-

[13] *Einsatzführungsstab*.

tionally relevant units of the Ministry of Defense under direct control of the *Generalinspekteur*. Overarching aim of this institutional reform was to improve decision-making procedures between the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, Civilian Ministries and Parliament; thus, the aim was to improve inter-agency coordination in Bundeswehr operations and to weaken the boundaries of authority among the different ministries concerned with the Afghanistan-operation. For this purpose the Joint Commitment Staff combines civil and military capacities for military operations.

The reform was intensely contested within the Ministry of Defense and constitutes a crucial step towards developing capacities for operations with a wide operational spectrum such as counterinsurgency, but the lack of interministerial reform to enhance interagency co-operation remains a greatly inhibiting factor for the conduct of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.

Force structure for counterinsurgency

With the introduction of new Defense Policy Guidelines by the government of then Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in 2003 the government declared its ambition to prepare the Bundeswehr for expeditionary operations.[14] Derived from the Defense Policy Guidelines, the *Konzeption der Bundeswehr* was a new conceptual document developed in 2004. Its main purpose was to translate the Defense Policy Guidelines into transformational force planning. A tier-based force structure consisting of 'intervention forces', 'stabilisation forces' and general 'support forces' was introduced. The aim was to provide mission-oriented categories of forces to cover the entire operation spectrum from low-intensity stability & reconstruction missions to high-intensity combat operations. Those forces assigned to the intervention forces were to consist of 35,000 soldiers and meant to provide the German contribution to the EU Battlegroups and the NATO Response Force. Forces assigned to the stabilisation forces would

[14] Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: *Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien*, Berlin, May 2003.

be employed in low to medium intensity conflicts for longer periods of time. The stabilisation forces would consist of 70,000 soldiers. Operational capabilities for counterinsurgency operations thus should be expected to come from the stabilisation forces.

However, the boundaries between the categories are fluent, and in operational reality soldiers of both the intervention and the stabilisation categories serve in Afghanistan. Finally, a 137,500 support forces were to provide force enablers, logistics and other joint capabilities for operations.[15] The force structure outlined in the *Konzeption der Bundeswehr* was to be implemented by 2010.[16]

It is a national political prerogative that the Bundeswehr is only to participate in multinational military operations. For this reason the army leadership can confine itself to provide contingents structured and equipped for operational scenarios without having the need to establish "one size fits all" armed forces.

Despite this generally mission-oriented force posture, what has been lacking is the development of specific capabilities for complex operational spectrums, specifically in the realm of stabilisation operations. For instance, the development of specific capabilities for counterinsurgency operations has remained a neglected aspect of force structure reform. As the ISAF-mission makes evident, the German army is critically short of capabilities that are essential to the successful conduct of counterinsurgency operations. For instance, highly trained combat infantry in the army has been cut down to only 17 operational light and mechanized infantry battalions since the end of the Cold War.[17] Security Force Assistance units

[15] Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: *Konzeption der Bundeswehr*, Berlin, August 2004.

[16] See *Konzeption der Bundeswehr*, p. 27; Timo Noetzel/Benjamin Schreer: *All the Way? The evolution of German military Power*, in: International Affairs 84 (2), March 2008. pp. 211-221.

[17] The infantry of the German army consists of 1 battalion of light infantry, one battalion-sized regiment of airmobile infantry, 4 battalions of paratroopers, 3 battalions of mountain infantry plus 8 battalions of mechanized infantry. While the latter are technically part of the armored forces, they are employed primarily in their infantry role. In addition, the air force provides 2 and the navy 1 light infantry battalion in security roles.

have become crucial capabilities; however, in practice they are created ad-hoc from various units. Capabilities to provide commanders with political and cultural advice do exist but have not yet been developed structurally. Furthermore, the force structure is hampered by the demands of compulsory conscription. Current force planning fits 37,300 draftees into an overall force of about 250,000.[18] Since the majority of regular draftees cannot be sent out-of-area, the deployment of whole battalions, regiments and brigades provides huge difficulties, even though draftees are not expected to serve in deployable combat units Despite the fact that draftees can volunteer to extend their compulsory service in order to participate in out-of-area missions, the "hybrid" force structure of the Bundeswehr, combining compulsory and voluntary elements, hinders the sustained deployment of well-trained troops that would be ideal for counterinsurgency environments.

Additionally, the Bundeswehr also lacks vital technological platforms such as tactical air mobility, close-air support assets and unmanned surveillance capabilities. Bureaucratic resistance against providing resources for counterinsurgency capability is evident. The result is that German defense planning remains focussed on large military platforms for conventional warfare.

Doctrine for counterinsurgency

German forces deployed in the context of ISAF are demanding doctrinal innovation. The relevant core army document when analyzing doctrine for the Afghan operation still is the basic Army Field Manual *Truppenführung von Landstreitkräften*. The field manual touches upon aspects of small wars without addressing involved issues of counterinsurgency explicitly. It states that field commanders need to be prepared to cope with sudden changes in the intensity of conflict and the concomitance of symmetric and asymmetric threats within a narrow area of operations.[19]

[18] See Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: *Weißbuch 2006*, p. 145.
[19] See *HDV 100-100 Truppenführung von Landstreitkräften*, No. 12010-12014.

The need for forces to cover a wide operational spectrum and to be prepared for both combat and – simultaneously – close co-operation with civilian governmental and nongovernmental organizations is stressed. However, despite the adoption of operational paradigms such as the "Three-Block-War"[20] concept, the manual's greatest weakness remain its roots in operational scenarios of the Balkan wars, from Bosnia to Kosovo: the tactical leader is presented with a range of potential tactical procedures to adopt – namely offense, defense, delay, and stabilisation - that are to be applied according to the relevant context without elaborating what the consequences would be.[21] In effect, this is a "Balkan-centric" framework of doctrine.

Considering the relative stability of the Balkans theatre and cultural similarities between intervening force and the indigenous population, the result is an inherent danger of leaving forces unprepared for the current mission in Afghanistan and future deployments ahead. Indeed, the manual does not provide an overarching paradigm that advises German theatre commanders on *how* to operate within a scenario other than one dominated by stabilisation. It does not discuss the character of different manifestations of irregular warfare and small wars in depth, but restricts itself to a discussion of tactical phenomena like operations against irregular forces[22] or convoy-security.

Equally deficient is the December 2005 document, '*Einsatzkonzept Operationen gegen Irreguläre Kräfte*', which deals with operations against irregular forces and which remains of relevance to German Army thinking. The core issue here is that according to this document, in German army thinking, operations against irregular forces resemble an equivalent to the concept of counterinsurgency. However, there is a consequent focus upon the kinetic part of military operations and an evident disregard for the non-kinetic dimension. To underline this, oper-

[20] See Charles C. Krulak: *The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War*, in: Marines Magazine, January 1999.
[21] See *HDV 100-100*, No. 12011.
[22] *Operationen gegen Irreguläre Kräfte.*

ations against irregular forces are assigned exclusively to the paratrooper brigades that are specialising on irregular warfare.

Thus, German doctrine presents parts of the puzzle but fails to put them together to form a whole picture. As a result, crucial aspects and elements of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency that are discussed separately are not conceptually integrated. What is lacking is a comprehensive assessment of the situations theatre commanders could potentially face in a counterinsurgency conflict environment, something which would enable them to formulate an adequate *commander's intent*. Overall, German doctrine still breathes the spirit of stabilisation operations that are – generally speaking – less complex than counterinsurgency scenarios.

Parts of the military leadership of the Bundeswehr have acknowledged that there is a conceptual gap in doctrine. In 2008, work was initiated on a new basic doctrine for counterinsurgency operations, with the purpose of initiating debate on the issues involved. The overarching aim of this effort was to draw conclusions concerning the capabilities the services would require for such an operational spectrum. As of June 2009, the draft of this document is still in the ministerial process of approval.

The document *Konzeptionelle Grundvorstellungen zur Wahrnehmung militärischer Aufgaben im Rahmen von Counterinsurgency* (KGv counterinsurgency)"[23] is largely based on the respective NATO doctrine.[24] The document acknowledges that counterinsurgency operations should be expected to constitute a crucial part of the Bundeswehr's future operational spectrum. To give reasons for this, it discusses characteristics, dynamics and functions of known insurgencies and, by dint of that, draws conclusions for the counterinsurgent. Thus, it aims at providing the tactical leader with an understanding of the challenges he potentially faces. It follows Allied and U.S. doctrine in placing the population at the heart of every strategic, operational and tactical effort,[25] but focuses exclusively on

[23] "*Conceptional Basic Thoughts Concerning military Efforts in the Framework of Counterinsurgency*".
[24] See *AJP 3.4.4 for Counterinsurgency*.
[25] See *KGv Counterinsurgency*, p. 10.

kinetic means, largely leaving aside non-kinetic means. Not least this is due to the fact that civilian ministries did not participate in the process of drafting the manual combined with strong opposition amongst German politicians against the Bundeswehr performing genuine "civilian tasks". The overall tendency is to officially stress the crucial importance of civilian means within military operations while at the same time civilian efforts within the context of military efforts become under-resourced and interagency conceptual thinking remains tightly constrained.

To structure the military options available to the tactical leader, the document distinguishes between efforts to build a secure environment, efforts to enforce an operational aim, efforts to neutralize a threat, and supporting efforts.[26] Within these four fields of military action, the Bundeswehr has to be prepared to take defensive, offensive and supportive (for example humanitarian) action. Under the category of efforts to support operations the paramount factors listed are: military intelligence, the shaping of the information environment and civil-military cooperation to implement the comprehensive approach jointly with civil actors. Hence, interministerial cooperation with various governmental actors such as the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry for International Development is stressed as crucial.

Once approved, the document will constitute a first and important step towards giving the Bundeswehr a conceptual understanding of challenges provided by counterinsurgency scenarios and introducing appropriate terms for doctrinal and conceptual debate. The second major contribution will be the identification of necessary capabilities the armed forces will have to build to confront these challenges. As it is, German doctrine still lacks a realistic and overarching conceptual discussion of the potential operational spectrum of warfare, from peacetime operations to high-intensity warfare. Thus, as it is, overall German doctrine still differs fundamentally from the counterinsurgency doctrines of allies. These stress the

[26] Ibid., p. 14.

crucial role of population security, the political nature of operations, and assume that all force elements engaged in the theatre of operations should operate under the framework of a strategic approach guided by counterinsurgency principles. Such an approach stands in sharp contrast to current German army thinking as discussed.

In summary, it can be said that the framework provided by strategy-making capabilities, force structure, and doctrine is aligned in a manner that prevents German armed forces from conducting counterinsurgency operations effectively. Recent reforms in a range of fields are indicating a willingness to tackle this issue, but for the time being the existing framework will greatly impact upon strategic and operational thought. This has great influence on German operational conduct in the context of ISAF; a lack of integrated lines of operation, low risk tolerance and a generally defensive mindset of operational leaders are key factors constraining operational thought.

The lack of integrated lines of operation

The state of German doctrinal thinking, including doctrine under development, hints at a difficulty doctrine poses for the making of German strategy. Doctrinal thinking constrains itself to issues concerning the use of force in the framework of counterinsurgency operations. Indeed, both the development of non-kinetic capabilities and the integration of civilian and military capabilities at the strategic level remain underdeveloped. This is due to the development of doctrine being an entirely intra-ministerial process, and first and foremost, a lack of interest by civilian ministries in getting involved in issues at the strategic level. What results is a startling discrepancy between German political rhetoric and operational conduct. Civilian ministries refrain from engaging on operational issues regarding the Afghanistan conflict. ISAF is an operation that is led and conducted by the German military. The concept of "networked security" so persistently advocated by German politics as providing the key to a successful conduct of the Afghanistan operation does not in fact extend much beyond rhetoric.

The division of military and civilian spheres of strategic and operational thinking had not been problematic throughout the Balkan wars. In these kinds of operational scenarios the military could concentrate on securing a permissive environment so that civilian ministries could initiate and guide reconstruction efforts. However, such an approach remains illusionary in the context of a counterinsurgency operation since such an operation requires civilian and military efforts to be conducted simultaneously rather than sequentially, and to be integrated rather than coordinated. German civilian governmental actors lack the personnel and capabilities to operate in hostile environments. Thus, they are basically incapable of contributing effectively to counterinsurgency operations which in effect are "contested nation-building"[27]operations in which the provision of basic public services in the face of pressure from insurgents is paramount. With regard to the deteriorating security situation in ISAF Regional Command-North, it is unlikely that contributions by civilian actors will increase. De facto, the Bundeswehr is leading this operation in the face of declining civilian contributions to the operations, naturally emphasizing the security-related line of operation.

Low risk tolerance

Post-Cold War Germany has become accustomed to its armed forces contributing to military operations without having to suffer a significant number of combat fatalities. However, even forthcoming German doctrine admits that forces deployed for counterinsurgency purposes will have to reduce standards of force protection and accept risks for deployed units in order to be able to achieve a certain level of population protection. Neither German politics nor the German public have been prepared for this over the last few years. This is in part due to the ongoing insistence by German policy makers to view the ISAF-mission through a stability and reconstruction prism: a pattern of operational conduct that is associated in Germany with low-risks for deployed soldiers.

[27] See John Frewen: *Contested Nation-Building: The Challenge of Countering Insurgency in Afghanistan in 2007*, in: Australian Army Journal, Vol. V/1, Autumn 2008, pp. 19-37.

As a result of this, encounters with insurgent forces in Afghanistan are nervously observed by parliament, government and the wider public. These factors lead to a strict and paramount risk-averseness and no-casualty-policy which regularly hampers operational flexibility, turns German forces into armored and thus road-bound units and limits operational presence beyond bases. However, only by taking an offensive mindset and force posture will the deployed forces be able to continuously maintain situational awareness and to regain the initiative.

Defensive operational mindset

Counterinsurgency operations generally require restraint in the application of lethal force and an emphasis on a highly discriminate management of violence by the counterinsurgent. Civilian victims amongst the population the counterinsurgent is intended to protect directly undermine support in the local population as well as in the home country of the intervening force.

However, to protect the population a constant presence, aggressive patrolling, and a proactive operational scheme are, *inter alia,* paramount. A defensive mindset with a focus on force protection risks alienating the counterinsurgent from the population because such an approach isolates the population from the intervening forces and permits easier access by insurgents. Furthermore, a population-centric approach has, depending on the overall situation, to be supplemented with discriminate offensive action against identified leaders and members of the insurgency. In Germany, such operations would belong to the operational spectrum of Special Operations Forces, Long-Range-Reconnaissance elements and supporting paratrooper units of the airborne brigades.

In recent years an offensive force posture, however, has been hampered principally by a defensive mindset that derives from the above-mentioned focus on force protection, but also from political considerations. Until summer 2009, German soldiers in Afghanistan were allowed to use

lethal force only very restrictively. They were unable to act preemptively or to stop an individual from escaping custody by use of force. The defensive mindset has been established also as a derivative of the post-Cold War stabilisation operations Germany has participated in, in which multinational forces principally had to remain neutral. In classic stabilisation operations, force presence alone has a sufficient impact on the overall mission. However, in counterinsurgency operations, in the interest of enduring success, the paramount issue of protecting the population has to be supplemented by the ability to discriminately use force. Against the background of operational challenges, the pressure of German field commanders has resulted in operational improvements from bottom-up. In mid-2009, German Rules of Engagement have been adjusted to the new operational realities, allowing the Bundeswehr to act offensively before an insurgent attack unfolds and to execute the mission.[28]

Operational conduct: the case of Harekate Yolo II

Over the last two years the security situation in northern Afghanistan has deteriorated continuously. Beginning with a suicide attack on German soldiers in Kunduz in May 2007 attacks have increased in quantity as well as quality.[29]

When Taliban-related insurgents massed in the north-western provinces of Faryab and Badghis, the German ISAF Regional Commander-North, Brigadier General Dieter Warnecke, launched Operation Harekate Yolo II. The operations' aim was to reinforce military control over the area so that reconstruction programmes could be initiated in the interest of long-term stability. With this aim the operation marked a crucial change in ISAF's pattern of operational conduct from patrols that focused on gathering intel-

[28] See *Neue Regeln erlauben Deutschen offensiveres Vorgehen, in: Der Spiegel Online*, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,634338,00.html (accessed on July 8, 2009).

[29] See *Northwestern Afghanistan: Badghis province seeks security, revitalization*, in: The Long War Journal, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/northwestern_afghani.php (accessed on June 30, 2009).

ligence and enhancing the security of ISAF's bases in the north towards counterinsurgency "clear, hold and build"[30] operations.

In the RC-North region, criminal groups with linkages to the insurgency had attacked Afghan National Security Forces repeatedly, resulting in heavy casualties amongst them. For months indigenous people were exposed to terror perpetrated by those groups. The Afghan government was unable to provide security. Sections of the so called 'Ring Road', which is a lifeline for the Afghan business sector and increasingly of relevance to ISAF logistics and supply lines, came under the control of those groups. Intended to destroy and disperse insurgents and re-establish government control, the operation was the first large-scale ground offensive under German command since World War II. Supported by German force enablers such as logistics, reconnaissance and medical evacuation units, the main combat element was provided by the Norwegian Quick Reaction Force.[31] Harekate Yolo II was a success in that it succeeded in weakening the insurgency militarily. This success would have allowed RC-North to initiate civilian reconstruction programs in these areas.

The operation succeeded in dispersing insurgents, but failed in the two succeeding phases. Harekate Yolo II was cut short due to political nervousness that it would become too large-scale in its strategic and operational dimensions. Strategic support for economic reconstruction efforts and a quick infusion of development aid did not materialise; this despite the operation commander setting out ambitious and unambiguous targets. The goal was to defeat insurgents militarily and then to provide security so that civilian reconstruction programs could be applied. However, political and strategic support for the operation never materialised. Civilian resources remained unavailable and tight operational restrictions were imposed. Effective interagency coordination in the context of Harekate Yolo II remained an illusion; this being a result not only of the absence of

[30] Thomas X. Hammes: *Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks*, in: Military Review, July-August 2006, pp. 18-26, p. 24.

[31] See *NATO bittet Berlin um Eingreiftruppe in Nordafghanistan*, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 30, 2008.

effective coordination mechanisms between military and civilian actors in the field but also of an unwillingness on the part of government bureaucracy at the strategic level to recognize the changing nature of conflict.[32]

In addition, political and strategic leaders neglected the communicative dimension of the operation. It was passed over in astonishing silence by the Federal Government, including the Ministry of Defense, about the reason for it, its aim and its achievements. Quite the reverse, politicians and defense leaders resorted to downplaying its significance.

As an overall result of all these deficiencies, the operation failed to prevent the insurgents from reasserting their influence in the long term. Forces were withdrawn from north-western Afghanistan with the end of combat operations in 2007. In the wake of this the insurgency reasserted control over the area.

This fact notwithstanding, Harekate Yolo II marked the beginning of a new phase in Germany's involvement in ISAF. Afghanistan has become a "hybrid warfare"[33] scenario, in which enemy forces use a variety of tactical means within the same area of operations, combining an "asymmetric" approach relying on improvised explosive devices of varying sophistication, roadside bombs and suicide attacks with conventional battles and proficiently coordinated ambushes. In the face of such challenges, the strategic and operational mindset of stabilisation operations becomes useless. Furthermore, it would be even dangerous to cling on to it, as it would inherently provide ground for an underestimation of the enemy and continued overemphasis on a neutral force posture relying on deterrent presence alone.

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[32] See Timo Noetzel/Benjamin Schreer: *Counter- What? Germany and Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan*, in: RUSI Journal 153, February 2008 1, pp. 42-46, p. 45.

[33] Frank G. Hoffman: *Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict*, in: Institute for National Strategic Studies: Strategic Forum, No. 240, April 2009, p. 5.

Bottom-up planning: the case of Kunduz

More successful than top-down approaches out of the political and military bureaucracy have been efforts to introduce elements of counterinsurgency by piecemeal from bottom up. Such elements have been introduced reactively due to the deterioration of the security in Kunduz province, which is in the centre of northern Afghanistan. As the rest of the north the area is shaped by a non-Pashtun population, thus there is not much breeding ground for the insurgency. However, there are small villages at the fringes of the city itself populated by the main tribe supporting the insurgency in Afghanistan. These have a tradition of being Taliban strongholds[34] and provide sanctuaries for the organisation of attacks on ISAF forces. The German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team Kunduz has faced repeated rocket attacks for the last eighteen months and patrols have been ambushed with the German army suffering combat fatalities through suicide attacks, roadside bombs and enemy fire.

German military leaders have reacted to the deteriorating security situation by strengthening capabilities, addressing all lines of operations. Capabilities to conduct patrols and to support Afghan security forces carrying out house searches have been strengthened. In particular, Special Operations Forces have been inserted into the area for special reconnaissance purposes against the insurgency network. Simultaneously, paratrooper units were sent to strengthen the combat capabilities of the Kunduz garrison. In addition to troop enforcements, a range of structural measures were implemented to rearrange force posture and thus to regain momentum. A broader force presence concept in the province with some "combat outposts" in the wider vicinity of Kunduz garrison was designed to provide the ground for a sustained counterinsurgency effort. This change of force posture was identified as necessary in order to enhance force presence amongst the Afghan population and to provide ground for more effective Security Force Assistance efforts to build up Afghan security forces; in

[34] See *A Nation Challenged: Stronghold; Taliban Foes say Kunduz is Theirs*, in: The New York Times, November 26, 2001.

addition, a focus on non-kinetic instruments was perceived as crucial as well.

Thus, a different concept of force presence that would move units out of the garrisons and strengthen force presence amongst the indigenous population constituted the basis for the operation. Conceptually, this constituted a crucial step because it meant that military commanders were willing to assume risk and reduce the high levels of force protection as well as stringent medical and logistical standards for deployed forces in order to gain more presence amongst the contested population. This was seen as necessary in particular in order to enable theatre commanders to dispatch patrols to districts threatened by the insurgency. The overnight presence of infantry units in these districts was meant to demonstrate that ISAF forces are there to protect the indigenous population against night time insurgency activities, which, for instance, often resulted in the feared Taliban "night letters"[35].

Efforts to strengthen capabilities for the build-up of Afghan security forces have been driven by the same motivation. More recently, German forces have bumped up their efforts through combined operations and patrols with Afghan forces to build-up Afghan security forces. Force integration as an instrument to strengthen indigenous capabilities was a completely novel concept for an army such as the Bundeswehr that has neither experience with nor capabilities for Security Force Assistance efforts. However, within the context of the ISAF operation it has become more and more significant as an operational instrument. The introduction of structured meetings by ISAF representatives with local leaders, so called "key-leader engagements", certainly was the most innovative factor. To have effective meetings requires detailed planning and a suitable supportive apparatus to provide intelligence on the "human terrain"[36] and deduce guidance that has not yet been provided within the structures of the mili-

[35] Thomas H. Johnson: *The Taliban Insurgency and an Analysis of Shabnamah (Night Letters)*, in: Small Wars and Insurgencies, Volume 18/3, September 2007, pp. 317-344.

[36] Fred Renzi: *Networks: Terra Incognita and the Case for Ethnografic Intelligence*, in: Military Review, September-October 2006, pp. 16-23, p. 16.

tary leadership of the operational contingents. In the same context, the changing approach towards the use of military patrols was motivated by the increasing valuation of non-kinetic activities. Patrols increasingly are meant to contribute to development efforts. Tasked to identify possible development projects for so called Provincial Development Fund projects, i.e civil-military funds for on-site projects controlled by various ministries with German representatives and Afghan bodies deciding jointly on the use of the funds, the use of patrols indicated a change in operational thinking and a willingness to reform. The initiation of key-leader engagements, Provincial Development Funds and changes in the purpose of patrols provide evidence of the recognition that non-kinetic capabilities can be crucial.

Conclusion

Operational experiences of the German armed forces in northern Afghanistan make evident that the Bundeswehr is no longer conducting only stability and reconstruction operations, but has been confronted at least since 2007 with a determined, organized insurgency capable of inflicting serious casualties on German troops and determined to challenge the existing Afghan political order. Still, soldiers are fighting in an operational environment that is markedly different from what has been politically anticipated. This critically hampers the Bundeswehr's response. However, as operational experiences of the last two years show, the picture is nuanced and complex. Because of these experiences, debate within the German strategic community has started about the ability of German forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations.

At the strategic level German politics have maintained the view that the operational focus is on stability and reconstruction and not on counterinsurgency. While artificial at first glance, the distinction has had great strategic, practical and policy relevance for the German conduct of operations in Afghanistan and is of significant relevance to NATO's ability to agree on a joint counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan. If a key

European ally like Germany remains unwilling to politically acknowledge the challenge presented by the insurgency in Afghanistan and the necessity for the alliance to counter it as whole, NATO will remain unable to make the strategy that the situation demands.

The deteriorating security situation of the last few years has forced German operational commanders to adopt measures that practically lead them to cross the "counterinsurgency versus stability-operations" nexus on the ground. However, efforts are hampered by a narrow institutional, doctrinal and force posture focus that is shaping German strategic thinking; a framework based on the oversimplifying dichotomy of stabilisation operations as opposed to more obvious war efforts. This also greatly impacts on German operational thought and conduct in the context of ISAF. However, ongoing efforts to improve institutional strategy-making capability and develop adequate doctrine for counterinsurgency are crucial indicators of a willingness to learn and adapt, at least in some parts of the armed forces. For various reasons, Germany is to this date unable to formulate and execute a truly comprehensive approach acknowledging the challenge of *contested* nation building – and not just nation building. Thus, adaptation to the operational challenges of small wars in general and progress in the Afghanistan operation in particular will be gradual.

In the short term, Allies will need to accept the limitations of German resources and capabilities as well as an inadequate strategic mindset regarding the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Yet, operational pressure on the ground generating bottom-up innovation presents the most likely mechanism to initiate change in German politics regarding counterinsurgency.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Local Security Forces: Lessons for NATO in Afghanistan

Daniel Marston

"COIN is labour-intensive, and the recruitment of auxiliaries is often essential to enable an overstretched army and police to focus on offensive operations against the insurgents."

General Sir Frank Kitson[1]

As the focus on operations in Afghanistan intensifies, Coalition forces are examining what is needed to conduct an effective campaign. One idea that is receiving considerable attention is the establishment of local security forces to supplement the role of the Afghan National Army (ANA). The crucial question is: what kind of local security force? Should it be a "tribal" militia raised from the local elders; a more formal, tribally-based militia raised with support from the Afghan government and led and commanded by Coalition forces and raised with coalition funds; or a tribally-based militia that is raised by the ANA? Whatever the answer, we need to be careful and slow in developing this force, to make sure there is proper Afghan government and local buy-in with the program and that it is somehow linked to the overall strategy of clear, hold, build. Accordingly, this article delves into selected case studies of local security forces and the systems created to raise them.

[1] General Sir Frank Kitson, *Bunch of Five*, (London: Faber & Faber, 1977) pp. 294-5.

Locally raised irregular forces have been a "force multiplier" in COIN operations throughout history. As Drs G. Hughes and C. Tripodi recently noted, "success [in COIN] depends upon the mobilization of local support for the government against the insurgency. . . .[A] common feature involves the counter-insurgent's attempts to enlist indigenous participation, either from surrogate actors or from an array of auxiliaries."[2] This has been particularly true for forces raised to deal with a frontier or border region. They provide HUMINT to military and political masters, and the host nation provides the local population with jobs and *esprit de corps*. One could make the argument that without them, at least initially the host nation will most likely fail in its mission to prevail, on the basis that it will not have sufficient regular security forces to protect normal civil and civic life.

Some practitioners feel that the ANA's current ethnic makeup is not sufficiently representative of the Pashtuns in RC East and South. One Canadian officer's impressions are that: "It appears that the support of the ANA by Pashtuns, at least in terms of their willingness to join the army, is not being formally monitored. . . . It stands to reason that the overall legitimacy of the ANA is doubted by the Pashtuns, whose support for one side of the campaign or the other is deemed by some to be key to long term success. It appears that the design of the ANA is not seen as legitimate or viable by the Pashtuns. . . . One must question the initial analysis and design process upon which the ANA is built."[3]

Major General Jeapes[4], a British officer and veteran of Dhofar who helped to raise the *Firqa*, provides a concise summation of the challenges and benefits of local forces:

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[2] See Geraint Hughes and Christian Tripodi's 'Anatomy of a surrogate: historical precedents and implications for contemporary counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol 20, No. 1 March 2009, for more of an overview of other case studies; p. 22, as well as Will Clegg's 'Irregular Forces in Counterinsurgency Warfare', in the forthcoming volume of *Security Challenges*.

[3] Interview with a Canadian officer, 2009.

[4] Major General Tony Jeapes' excellent book, *SAS: Secret War,* or earlier published title *SAS: Operation Oman,* (London: William Kimber, 1980) should be required reading for any future team of officers and NCOs serving with irregulars in Afghanistan or beyond.

> It takes a great deal of patience, understanding and tolerance to deal with irregulars. Given those qualities, and treated with fair and reasonable firmness, irregulars can become an invaluable adjunct to a regular army. The Firqats provided information on the ground, the people, and the enemy which could not have been obtained in any other way. . . . The Firqats' understanding of ground and their speed of manoeuvre were both superior to SAF [Sultan of Oman Armed Forces] troops', but when it came to straight military tactics the SAF's discipline told every time. The two forces were complementary; neither could have won the war alone.[6]

It is essential that the Coalition learns to understand the tribal and cultural network[7] of the Pashtun community, particularly their potential interest in this sort of formation, which is likely to be motivated at least in part by the possibility of economic gain and infrastructure investment in their areas. Raising the *Firqa* in Dhofar (1970-1976), and the Frontier Corps (1919-1947) and Guides, later the Punjab Irregular Force (1846-1886) on the North-West Frontier, each presented issues with tribal structures, specifically how best to recruit and create formations along or against tribal structures.[8] We need to understand these lessons intimately. We need to make sure that we provide properly prepared training teams that will work hand and hand with the local imams and tribal leaders to set out planning and training for these forces. Units such as the UK's 22 Special Air Service Regiment, Special Boat Service, Special Forces Support Group (1 PARA), US Army Special Forces (3rd Special Forces Group)[9], United States Marine Corps Special Operations

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[6] Jeapes, p. 231.

[7] Without it, how can western efforts be appropriately targeted to help build effective governance?

[8] The British officers who served in Guides and Frontier Corps were fluent in local languages, since serving in the Indian Army required fluency in both Urdu and any relevant local language such as Pashtu. The officers and NCOs who served in the Firqa were also expected to have at least a basic language proficiency in the local Dhofari language.

[9] The US Special Forces had some success in the Vietnam War raising local security forces, as embodied in the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) and the Mobile Strike Forces (MIKE Force). There was one major issue of legitimacy and formal integration with the South Vietnamese government and security apparatus that we will need to avoid in Afghanistan.

Advisor Group, US Navy SEALS, Australia's Special Air Service Regiment, 4 Royal Australian Regiment (2 CDO), Special Operations Task Group, Canadian Special Operations Regiment, or properly trained American, British, Canadian and Australian officers and NCOs with an interest in this sort of role could be the answer to some of these issues.[10]

The use of US/UK and NATO special forces (SF) personnel would be an important force enabler in the start-up phases of these forces. While this has been a traditional role for US/UK SF over the last fifty years, the last eight years and the role of "direct action" have muddied the waters a bit in this mission. Many SF officers and NCOs feel that the raising and mentoring of these forces should be the primary mission of the SF community, but they feel that there has been a push at the strategic planning level to use SF in "direct action" roles only.[11]

The Coalition will need to avoid some aspects of the *Sons of Iraq* approach—which means Afghan buy-in, a slow building phase, and overwatch by the correct people to lead and train the forces. We need to be a risk-taking organization: accept that there may be setbacks (such as mutinies), and be ready to reform the system to deal with the changing environment. The historical vignettes below (*Firqa*, Frontier Corps, Guides and Punjab Irregular Force) document mistakes made, as well as mutinies. People learned and adapted organizations accordingly. There are lessons for the present from as far back as the efforts of the British on the North-West Frontier region of India in the 1850s to the more recent *Firqa* in the 1970s. Militaries have been too quick to dismiss lessons from the British Imperial age, not realizing that many of the fundamental themes that existed then are still relevant today.

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[10] If this role was taken seriously by the various NATO militaries, there are major personnel and promotion systems that would have to be dealt with to enable the selection, training and education of these officers and NCOs. This is one reason why many see US/UK/NATO SF personnel as a key enabler as the training mission for local forces.

[11] Interviews and conversations with US and UK SF personnel, 2006-2009.

History provides numerous examples of both success and failure in a study of locally raised forces.[12] The essay will focus on the Guides and the Punjab Frontier Force, the Frontier Corps of the old North-West Frontier region of present-day Pakistan and the tribally based *Firqa* from the Dhofar War.[13] The essay will not discuss policies or strategies developed for the North-West Frontier region or the Dhofar campaign, but instead concentrate on the specific methods employed in raising and training local forces in the relevant regions. Such methods and systems are still relevant today, but would of course require some modification for the changing environments in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

[12] The Regional and Popular Forces, MIKE Forces, CIDG program in the Vietnam War; Frontier Corps in the Northwest Frontier; *Firqa* in the Dhofar campaign; Harkis in the Algerian War; Kikuyu Home Guard in Kenya; and now the Sons of Iraq, to name a few. The lessons from Vietnam warrant their own article.

[13] The British Army's counterinsurgency campaign in the southern Dhofar region of Oman is generally considered one of the most successful COIN operations of its kind of the twentieth century. The British were successful working within an Islamic and Arab environment because they paid attention to both the negative and positive lessons of previous campaigns. While British commanders may have led operations at times, they were still answerable to the Omani civilian leadership and had always to be aware of not looking at the operational environment through the prism of a 'westerner'. The goals set by both the military and civilian leadership were tangible and worked out within the restrictive confines of a small military and limited civilian apparatus that had to be properly built up and supported over time. The military and civilian commanders understood that the war was for the support of the Dhofaris; listened closely to their grievances and demands; and met the challenges as they arose. They did not set out to fundamentally change the indigenous society. See John Akehurst, *We Won a War: The Campaign in Oman, 1965-1975* (Wilton, Salisbury, Wiltshire: M. Russell, 1982); Calvin Allen and W. Lynn Rigsbee, *Oman Under the Qaboos: From Coup to Constitution, 1970-1996* (London: Frank Cass, 1998); Ian Gardiner, *In the Service to the Sultan* (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword, 2006); Tony Jeapes, *SAS: Operation Oman*, (London: William Kimber Publishing, 1980) for more in-depth discussion of the campaign.

The Guides and the Punjab Irregular Force[14] (1846-1886)

The formation of the Guides in the 1840s and the Punjab Irregular Force (Piffers) in the 1850s are key examples of British attempts to create viable security forces recruited from local populations as part of a larger strategy to pacify a difficult region. The Guides and Piffers were created to "police" the Pashtun tribal belt on the North-West Frontier. The template used to create these forces, and the standards established as part of their formation, were replicated in many other theatres, by many other commanders, with varying levels of success.

A few British officers are familiar with the Guides and the Piffers, and their more traditional role within the Indian Army during the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but their original formation and directives were quite different. Both forces were raised initially as "Irregulars," and for the first few years dressed no differently than their Pashtun brethren. They were part of the civil administration, and commanded by the lieutenant governor of the Punjab until 1886. They served as guardians of the tribal regions, and carried out punitive raids. During the British presence on the frontier, the Guides and Piffers came to be known as the experts in mountain warfare and dealing with the local Pashtun tribal politics.[15]

In 1846, Sir Henry Lawrence outlined the roles that these forces were intended to fulfill. He also stipulated that no Sikhs were to be recruited initially, only Pashtuns, on account of ethnic tensions in the border regions. He had other requirements for the Guides as well:

> It was to contain trustworthy men, who could, at a moment's notice, act as guides to troops in the field;

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[14] See Charles Allen, *Soldier Sahibs* (London: John Murray, 2000); G. J. Younghusband, *Story of the Guides* London: Macmillan, 1911), T. R. Moreman, *The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), for further details.

[15] During the same period, the US Army experimented with the formation of similar units as part of the Indian Wars in the American West. See Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973), Chapter 3 for an in-depth exploration of attempts to pacify a region and the involvement of local auxiliaries in such an effort.

> men capable, too, of collecting trustworthy intelligence beyond, as well as within, our borders; and, in addition to all this, men, ready to give and take hard blows, whether on the frontier or in a wider field.[16]

The Guides and Piffers recruited men and NCOs; the British recruited native officers, predominantly from the Pashtun belt. Often they accepted men they suspected of being involved in *lashkars* (Pashtun raiding or war parties), both before and after their military service. This is a paradox that recurs in similar operations throughout history, up to the present: many members of the Guides and Piffers were former "enemies" who joined the corps for a variety of reasons, including *esprit de corps*, money, and status.

British officers were seconded to the Guides and Piffers from the East India Company initially, and later from the British Indian Army. The officers selected often had an interest in understanding the Pashtun ways or the *Pakhtunwali* code, or had fought Pashtuns previously and respected them as an enemy. Some British officers also sought service with these forces because they were interested in more independence than they could expect in the "line regiments." There were fewer European officers in the Irregulars, which gave British officers authority over larger numbers of troops, greater autonomy, and more opportunities for advancement. Of necessity, the structure of these formations also meant that the concept of "Mission Command" was being put into practice well before the Germans and the Americans came up with the terminology.

The attached appendix includes extracts from "Frontier Thoughts and Frontier Requirements"[17] written by General Sir Henry Lumsden, the original commander of the Guides, and a commander of the Piffers as well. His observations will be of interest to commanders contemplating the organization of irregular auxiliaries for future operations.

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[16] Younghusband, p.6 .

[17] General Sir Peter Lumsden, *Lumsden of the Guides*, (London: John Murray, 1899), Appendix A, p. 291.

The Frontier Corps (1921-1947)[18]

The Frontier Corps (Scouts) had its beginnings at the end of the 1800s in a group of tribal militias established by the British authorities to police the "Pashtun" Tribal Territory, chiefly Waziristan.[19] This area, which was distinct from the six districts of the North-West Frontier Province, was in need of a force to serve as aids to the civil power. The Guides and the Piffers had been brought under the chain of command of the Indian Army, and thus had lost some of their autonomous ability and responsibility in the region. The present-day Pakistan Frontier Corps is a shell of its former self, because of neglect and the tensions on its northern and eastern frontiers with India.[20]

Within the Tribal Territory there were no taxes and no Indian Penal Code, and six British Political Agents (PAs)[21] were responsible for keeping the peace. In the early twentieth century, Lord Curzon, as Viceroy of India, tried to bring together the various militias under the command of a single

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[18] See Charles Chenevix Trench, *Frontier Scouts* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985), Colonel H.R.C. Pettigrew, *Frontier Scouts*, (Selsey: privately published, n.d.) John Prendergast, *Prender's Progress* (London: Cassell, 1979), General Sir Andrew Skeen, *Passing it On* (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1934), John Masters, *Bugles and a Tiger* (London: Michael Joseph, 1956), and the official histories *Operations on the North-West Frontier of India*, 1921-1935 and 1935-1937, for further details of specific operations.

[19] Waziristan has plagued and continues to plague both the Pakistan and Afghan governments, owing to the tribal makeup of the region. As stated in a report from 1921, "The character [Waziris and Mahsuds], organisation and institutes have made them independent and strongly democratic, so much so that even their own Maliks have little real control over the unruly spirits. Any man may rise by courage and wisdom to position of Malik, but many who have attempted in undue assumption of authority have been assassinated. It is these characteristics which make these tribes so much more difficult to deal with and control from those which have acknowledged leaders and elders. Thus the democratic character of the tribes, especially the Mahsuds, has the disadvantage, from our point of view, that these jirgas have little restraining influence over the more lawless elements and can therefore not be said to be truly representative of tribal opinion, in other words a jirga can as a rule produce no reliable guarantee that the terms accepted by them will be carried out." British Library India Office Papers L/Mil/17/13/123 Waziristan and Lessons last 60 Years 1921.

[20] The post-1947 period in Pakistan was marked by tension and war with India. Hence, many of the key systems in terms of recruitment and officering of the Frontier Corps were allowed to lapse. It is only recently that the Pakistan government has been willing to discuss the need for reform of the present-day Frontier Corps. However, its recent history means that reform is likely to be more complicated than simply improving weapons and communications.

[21] District Officers.

HQ, creating the Frontier Corps. Another significant reason was that

> …the presence of the regular forces in Waziristan it is generally accepted, constitutes an irritant to the tribes and provokes rather than ameliorates trouble. The fact that they are an occupying force militates against the tribesman notion of independence and that they are non-Pathan makes it difficult for them to appreciate the Pathan mind and can cause quite [an] upset [and] on [the] part of the troops incidents of considerable gravity.[22]

The Pashtun militias created in the region functioned with varying levels of success in the period leading up the Third Afghan War, 1919. This conflict highlighted some of the problems that the militias presented to the British authorities; in particular, some militiamen sided with their cross-border Pashtun brethren from Afghanistan, and attacked British and Indian outposts along the frontier.

After the war's end, the British authorities set out to reform the Scouts organization into an effective force that they could rely upon to police the region. A number of Frontier Corps units were reformed and re-raised during this period, including the South Waziristan Scouts, the Tochi Scouts, the Kurram Militia, and the Zhob Militia. The reform efforts included improving the selection of British officers, the organization of the tribal make-up in the platoons and wings, and the gradual embodiment of *esprit de corps* through battle with the militias' Pashtun brethren. All of these eventually combined to make the Scouts a sought-after posting for British and Indian commissioned officers and a force respected by the local Pashtuns.[23]

The Scouts were not soldiers in the normal sense. They were a force under the control of civilians, the PAs of the Indian Political Service.

[22] British Library India Office Papers L/Mil/17/3/46, Report of the Frontier Committee 1945.

[23] Something that has clearly been missing in the present-day version of the Frontier Corps in Pakistan. It is not seen as a good posting by seconded Pakistan officers. Interviews with the Pakistan Army in 2000.

(This is still true today in Pakistan, since they fall under the command of the Ministry of the Interior.) However, as with the selection of the officers for the Frontier Corps, many have questioned the selection of the present-day PAs in Pakistan. The British PA relied upon the Scouts to supply him with the means to provide security, maintain peace throughout the area, intelligence and work with the local *Jirgas*. They were a light infantry force, commanded by seconded British and Indian commissioned officers from the Indian Army.[24] They were organized along similar lines to the military: platoon and wings were among the main organizational terms. All of the recruits and, later, some of the commissioned officers were Pashtun. The main units of the British and Indian armies were placed outside the tribal region, except for Razmak, so as not to aggravate the situation by their presence, and to allow the Scouts and the PA the authority to maintain order. One Scout officer described the force thus:

> The Frontier Corps is a specialized force that deals in the first instance with the troublesome Pathan tribes along the NW Frontier. The soldiers are recruited entirely from Pathans. They therefore both understand the locals and their ways as well as being more acceptable to them than the regular soldiers from the British and Indian armies.[25]

The role of the Scouts was further elaborated in a major Frontier Report of 1945 that highlighted some key points:

> In the Scouts and Militias the political authorities have their most effective weapon in the maintenance of law and order. They are highly trained, lightly equipped and very mobile troops, officered from the Indian Army or secondment and unit for unit are considerably cheaper to maintain than the Regular Army. They are an embryo police

[24] The chain of command went through the PA since 'they were his sword' with the tribes.
[25] British Library India Office Papers, Mss Eur 236 Major John Auret, Tochi Scouts.

> force of the tribal territories. Their duties include the maintenance of political control within the agencies, the prevention of raiding, safe guarding communications, protection of the country from both internal strife and external aggression, either alone or in conjunction with regular armed force. Their particular genius is that they are recruited entirely from the Pathans and have advantages in local knowledge of the country and ready association with the people and possess an organisation well adapted to local requirements.[26]

During more peaceful times, the Scouts carried out frequent *gashts*.[27] When there were larger-scale Pashtun uprisings, Indian and British army units were brought in for punitive expeditions to restore peace. The Scouts provided the "main forces," a light infantry force that was often better suited to dealing with frontier warfare, as well as useful intelligence on the enemy's intentions.

One of the most perplexing aspects of this Scouts force, as well as with Pashtuns recruited for the Indian Army, was that the Pashtuns who served were from the same communities that were later on the receiving end of punitive action from the British authorities. Many people have tried to assess the reasons for this. Money was one inducement for recruits, but not the driving force. Loyalty was not one of the key inducements either, as New Delhi was a faraway place and meant nothing to people along the frontier (as Kabul means little to people today). Many historians and practitioners have pointed to *izzat* or *nang* (honor) as the primary incentive; this was also true for recruits to the old Indian Army. Veterans returned to their villages with tales of *gashts* and fighting, inspiring envy and desire among the young men listening. Following their arrival, many recruits took as their primary loyalty the British and Pashtun officers who commanded them; this was not allegiance to a central government, but to their

[26] British Library India Office Papers L/Mil/17/3/46, Report of the Frontier Committee 1945.
[27] This term could be used to refer to a "patrol" or as a verb, e.g. to *ghast* for 25 miles.

organization, *esprit de corps*. As one officer noted: "The discipline of the Frontier Corps appealed to the Pathan soldiers. It was hard and arbitrary, that is to say decisions were given with finality and authority but not finicky. . . . But officers took endless trouble to get the real truth so the troops had great confidence in fair dealing. . . . Genuine mistakes may be generally forgiven but judgments made insincerely or with indifference cause serious resentment amongst Pathans."[28]

At the end of their term of service, men who had served were welcomed back into their communities; their service was considered honorable, partially because of the financial benefits to not only the serviceman, but also to his family and village. Recruits came from the tribes on both sides of the Durand Line, as well as from the Pashtun tribes in the "settled" North-West Frontier province. The organization of the tribes varied from one area to another. The commander of the South Waziristan Scouts in the 1920s decided to maintain "tribal [companies]." However, wishing to avoid the mutinies of the Third Afghan War, the garrisons stationed at each outpost drew from various companies, from different tribes. The British authorities believed that keeping the units heterogeneous would minimize the threat of tribal bonding turning towards mutiny.

The recruitment of British and, later, Indian officers for the Scouts was a key aspect of the reform. Many of the British officers who joined from the 1920s through independence in 1947 did so for a variety of reasons. Some of the most important included the desire to see active duty along the frontier, and a strong liking for Pashtuns. As one Scout officer noted: "Why serve on the Frontier with a regular regiment, sitting in camp behind barbed wire, and never moving out except on regular piqueting routine, when, instead, you can have the freedom of Scout life."[29] Officers had much more freedom of command than in the Indian Army generally. For example, there were 14 British officers in the South Waziristan Scouts (SWS), who commanded more than 2700 Pashtuns. The SWS were divid-

[28] British Library India Office Papers, Mss Eur 236 Major John Auret, Tochi Scouts.
[29] Trench, *Frontier Scouts,* p. 54.

ed into a Corps HQ commanded by a Major (within the Indian Army this would be a colonel or brigadier); three wings (battalions) commanded by a Captain; the companies were commanded by a *Subedar* (Pashtun officer), and the platoons by a *Jemadar* (Pashtun officer).

British officers were seconded to the Scouts for three to five years, and the rate of pay was considerably higher than in the regular Indian Army. As the 1945 Frontier Report stated: "[The o]fficer cadre of the Scouts and Militia [has] maintained a reasonably high standard in the past. Hitherto officers have been seconded from the Indian Army for periods of four to five years. Many often return to undertake a second tour of duty. The Pathan is especially responsive to good officering and the standard should be maintained in the future."[30] Competition for an assignment in the Scouts increased in step with the role, performance, and visibility of the Scouts in the 1920s and 1930s. An officer wishing to join needed to have a first-class report from his regiment and some ability to speak Pushtu, a big part of the reason why many Scout officers came from the Piffers and other Pashtun companies from within the Indian Army.

A British officer who wished to be selected could meet these first requirements, but in order to gain final acceptance he was asked to visit a Scout HQ and to spend time with a Scout formation, where he was vetted by the unit's British and Pashtun officers. Many failed this last level of selection. British officers were likely to be stationed along the Frontier with their men for months upon months, without seeing or communicating with other British officers or women. A great deal of responsibility rested on their shoulders. They were not permitted to be married during their first three-year tour. After completing a tour, officers would return to their old regiments, where they would pass along their knowledge and experience. Some officers would return to the Frontier Corps for a second or third tour. Service with the Scouts was seen as a benefit, not a hindrance to promotion.

[30] British Library India Office Papers L/Mil/17/3/46, Report of the Frontier Committee 1945.

Native or Pashtun officers (who were not commissioned) were the backbone of the Scouts, as they were in the Indian Army. Their role is best described in the following extract:

> All were men of immense experience and awesome authority, particularly in their own tribal platoons [with] whom they almost had a paternal relationship. They had gained their commissions after not less than twelve years' service in the ranks. They knew inside and out the internal economy of the corps; they knew exactly how to control a *gasht*, place a piquet, conduct a difficult withdrawal. They knew in dealing with tribesmen when to be tough, when to be flexible, when to be genial and when to bluff. Many were illiterate and intended to remain so. . . . [T]hey would cheerfully take orders from British officers younger and less experienced than themselves. . . . But the British officer would be very unwise, both in problems of man management and in the field, if he did not ask advice. . . . Race, language and cultural differences implied a certain separation between British officers and Pathan officers, but there was no feeling of social superiority on one hand and inferiority on the other. . . . Pathan society is essentially democratic, and this was reflected in the very close relations between British officers and Pathans when they were together in a small post for weeks on end.[31]

Firqa (1970-1976)[32]

The *Firqa* were a tribal levy that was created during the successful Dhofar campaign in Oman (1970-1976) to fight in the Jebel region.

[31] Trench, *Frontier Scouts*, pp. 60-1.

[32] See Major General Jeapes, *SAS: Secret War* for a very detailed discussion of the initial issues of raising a locally recruited force to be used as irregulars.

The commanders, drawing on previous experience, understood that locally raised and properly led auxiliaries or irregulars were key for success in terms of their ability to gather human intelligence (HUMINT), serve as a force multiplier, and hold cleared areas. As stated by a senior British officer in 1972, "Firqats are central to the overall success of the campaign in Dhofar."[33] Dr Geraint Hughes has recently written: "with their local knowledge and their ability to fight the *adoo* on their own terms the *firqat* forces played an important role in implementing the 'clear and hold' strategy that the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) conducted from 1971 onwards to recapture the *jebel*."[34]

However, as with all irregular forces, there were growing pains for the British and Omani authorities. They were raising a force that many British and Omanis initially did not trust, on account of the fact that they were ethnically different from the SAF, who tended to be Arab and Baluchi. The *Firqa* were recruited from the Dhofari tribes. Another issue was that many within the *Firqa* were "turned terrs" or Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP). This has always been a key ingredient in successful counter-insurgencies.[35] The first *Firqa* raised was a learning process. The personnel were drawn from a variety of tribes and in the end the experiment failed due to a mutiny. As stated in 1971:

> Firqa Salahadin—this was the first firqat that recruited from many tribes and this caused issues as the tribes did not want to fight together. Sixty men discharged from the Firqat and will serve in another firqat with the same tribe…. [F]uture firqats are to be recruited from one tribe.[36]

This outcome naturally raised questions about the *Firqa*'s role, but one British officer addressed these concerns as follows: "Far too many people condemn them [*Firqa*] out of hand without considering the good

[33] General Graham papers, St Antony's College, Oxford University, Middle East Centre (MEC), 9 Jan 1972.
[34] Geraint Hughes, "The Counter-Insurgency War in Dhofar, Oman," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 32, No 2, April 2009, pp. 283-4. The "adoo" were a guerilla movement in Oman.
[35] There is one notable exception: the SEPs who formed the successful Rhodesian Selous Scouts.
[36] General Graham papers, MEC, 27 April 1971.

work they have done already and the important part they have yet to play in the campaign."[37]

The British advisory mission provided some of the best of the British Army as four or five training teams for the *Firqa*, chiefly drawn from 22 SAS. The units were named British Army Training Teams (BATTs). The training teams also served in the field in battle with the *Firqa*, and provided other support in terms of medical, engineering and other non-military aspects, organized as Civil Action Teams (CATs). The SAS teams had to learn quite a bit about the Dhofari character and tribal structures as they started to recruit. The following excerpt highlights the steep learning curve that took place during the initial stages:

> It was my first experience of that Dhofari forthrightness which in the early days was to cause some friction between BATT and the firqats. In due course BATT came to understand the Dhofari attitude, and the firqats came to realise that BATT were not a God-given goldmine to be exploited at every opportunity, but in the early days there were misunderstandings. . . . The Dhofari tribal system, for all its faults, is possibly one of the finest examples of true democracy known to man. . . . Tribal leaders are elected on merit because of their personal virtues. Hereditary and class are meaningless; and even when elected, the leader is by no means paramount; he must consult on everything he does and all major decisions are arrived at collectively after each man who wishes to do so has had his say. . . . It took the SAS some time to understand this and Sultan of Oman Army Officers [many British] never understood it. A disciplined tribal unit is a contradiction in terms. Discipline, in the military sense that this is understood by a regular army, cannot possibly be achieved when everyone in the army thinks he has just

[37] Major RC Nightingale papers, Directorate of Intelligence, Oman, MEC, 15 July 1972.

> as much right to decide what is to be done as his leaders, and if he dislikes their decision feels free to take no part in the outcome. . . In the early days it was hard. BATT had to try to build up the trust of the firqats and this could only be done by personal contact and immense patience. . . . Later . . . the trust between firqat and BATT had been forged by fire. . The BATT commander was an adviser. It was a curious and often frustrating position to be in because he could advise but he had no executive authority; he had to persuade the man with power to issue the order. The advantage, however, was that whilst a person in an appointment of authority had defined limits to his work and tended to concentrate his mind upon the problems facing him within those limits, an adviser could look across the board and identify problems from outside which an insider, because of his many other worries, might not always see.[38]

As the COIN strategy developed in Dhofar, many key enablers came to the fore. The SAF was expanded slowly and carefully in terms of British seconded and contracted officers as well as an Omani officer and NCO corps. The Dhofar reconstruction efforts were streamlined and better people were brought in to help facilitate the systems. The *Firqa* were slowly expanded in regions that had been cleared and now were being raised for the clear, hold and build phase. They were fully integrated into the SAF command structure. The SAF and *Firqa* strategy is succinctly laid out in an excerpt:

> A SAF operation in strength supported by a *Firqat* secures a position of the *Firqat's* choice which dominated its tribal area. Military engineers build a track to the position giving road access, followed by an airstrip if possible. A

[38] Jeapes, pp. 51-8.

> drill is brought down the track followed by a Civil Action Team [who set up a] shop, school, clinic and mosque. SAF thins out to a minimum to provide security. Water is pumped to the surface and into distribution systems prepared by military engineers to offer storage points for humans and troughs for animals. Civilians come in from miles around to talk to the *Firqat*, SAF and Government representatives. They are told that enemy activity in this area will result in the water being cut off. Civilians move out in surrounding areas and tell the enemy not to interfere with what is obviously a good thing [they also provided intelligence]. Enemy, very dependent on the civilians, stops all aggressive action and either goes elsewhere or hides. Tribal area is secure. All SAF are withdrawn.[39]

More and more *Firqa* were created as the clearance of the Jebel proceeded, from the east to the central area and to the west. More and more SEPs came in from the insurgent ranks and joined the *Firqa*. As the war developed, a specific command structure was created for the *Firqa* and lessons learned were disseminated throughout the system. More and more within the SAF and the Omani government started to trust the *Firqa* as the war progressed.

Over time and with the correct mentoring and support, many of the earlier issues dissipated and the mission became secure. By the end of the war, there were more than 3000 in the ranks. British officers in the SAF described their impact thus: "Six reasons for success in Dhofar: 1. Firqats 2. SAF occupation of Sarfait 3. Defence of Mirbat 4. Occupation of the defensive positions on the Jebel 5. Iranian Army reinforcements 6. Human intelligence."[40]

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[39] Jebel Regiment, General Graham Papers, MEC, 31 September 1972

[40] Lt Colonel Charles Chipworth Papers, Northern Frontier Regiment, MEC, 3 December 1978. There are many other reports within the General Graham papers highlighting the key role that the Firqa played in the pacification of the Jebel.

Conclusion

As these case studies demonstrate, common themes recur through the history of local forces. The following internal report from the Dhofar campaign dealing with the *Firqa* highlights some of these, particularly what is needed from the advisory mission:

> It must be fully understood that it is not possible to create an instant army which will be successful. Time must be spent in selection and recruitment and care must be taken in establishing an adequate standard of recruit. . . . The most important factor in selecting an irregular indigenous force is to establish their true motive for fighting and to use this as bait as much as possible. In this way a force will be created using its own motivation which will hold it together and keep it going in difficult times. . . . The aim must be to select a force of men who have their own motivation for fighting—not necessarily in tune with the aims and motivations of the advisors. . . . Advisors must be suitable for the task: not all good instructors are capable of teaching irregulars. . . . They must be patient enough to spend hours talking out their problems large and small.[41]

Locally recruited security forces have been an integral part of COIN over the last 150 years. Debates have always occurred about which kind of local security forces is best for which situation. In an ethnically diverse environment such as Afghanistan, local security forces are critical to help hold cleared areas for a variety of reasons: their knowledge of local tensions that may exist; economic benefits that their involvement may provide to the community; and their own emotional investment in the *esprit de corps* and honor of being part of such a force.

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[41] General Graham papers, MEC, "BATT Notes on Raising and Training of Irregular Forces in Dhofar," July 1971.

If we proceed with a strategy for the development of local Pashtun forces, we need to do it carefully,[42] with Afghan buy-in at the village, district, provincial, and national levels. We need to provide a comprehensive plan that demonstrates real understanding of local and tribal issues. We need to provide outstanding officers and NCOs to help raise, train, and lead these forces into action in their given area of responsibility. This may mean, during the initial stages, the use of officers and NCOs from the US/UK/NATO SF community. As a British officer noted from his time in the Dhofar campaign:

> …the officers whom Britain sent to Oman, both contracted and regular, were highly trained volunteers. Most had the necessary commitment to stick it out and those who didn't left pretty soon. . . . The patience and tolerance to live harmoniously in an unfamiliar culture; the fortitude to be content with less than comfortable circumstances for prolonged periods; an understanding of and sympathy for a foreign history and religion; a willingness to learn a new language; the flexibility, imagination and humility necessary to climb into the head of the people who live by a very different set of assumptions; none of these are to be found automatically in our modern developed Euro-Atlantic culture. These attributes, and the attitudes they imply, often have to be taught in addition to purely military skills.[43]

[42] We need to avoid the rapid expansion of territorial or local security forces that sometimes becomes an issue. The Regional and Popular Forces in Vietnam were raised too quickly, without proper support, and did not succeed in their efforts to protect the local population. It was not until the refocus on the advising and training of these forces with the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development program that they began to receive the correct levels of support. While their efforts produced mixed results in the post-Tet period, they generally performed beyond expectations of many US and Vietnamese officials.

[43] Ian Gardiner, *In Service of the Sultan*, (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2007), p. 174.

Appendix

"Frontier Thoughts and Frontier Requirements (1856)"[44]

"It is difficult for any European officer, no matter of what experience, to pick out the caste of recruit by looking at or conversing with him for a short time. It is almost impossible, on the other hand, for a recruit to deceive a native of his own faith."

Native Officers: "The selection of good commissioned officers is the essence of success in a new corps, for good officers always make good men; the converse is equally true, and a bad native officer will by his bad example play the mischief, not only with his own company, but with possibly with half the regiment. Honesty and openness of character are far more essential than smartness and good looks. . . . [A] habit of command begets self reliance, which is the sheet-anchor of an officer in the hour of trial. . . . [C]ultivate the most intimate intercourse with your native officers, study each individual's character and weaknesses, talk with them familiarly on all subjects, teach them to be perfectly at home in your presence and encourage them to relate to you all ordinary occurrences. . . . [T]hese quiet conversations are the very essence of a knowledge of your corps."

Non-commissioned Grades: "Be exceedingly particular in your promotion to the NCO grades, and your selection for the higher ranks will be comparatively easy. Here, again, do all you can to make a havildar and naick feel his individual responsibility, and, when possible, punish the NCO in preference to the erring sepoy. . . . [P]eriodical examinations of the native commissioned and the NCOs, the CO or second in command, tend to keep up smartness in these grades, and keep you informed of the merits of individuals."

Drill and Discipline: "One of the greatest mistakes is to fancy that the high-bred Irregular soldier will not stand drill and discipline, whereas

[44] General Sir Peter Lumsden, *Lumsden of the Guides*, (London: John Murray, 1899), Appendix A, p. 291.

in fact no man is prouder of both when he has mastered them. The most exacting drill instructor you can find will always be your Pathan, Afridi [also Pathan] or Persian. The tender point of these men is not in the amount of work taken out of them while absolutely with the regiment, but in the amount of leave they get and the notice that their European officers take of them. So long as a liberal allowance of the former is permitted, and the men know their officers, you may drill and work your corps as much as you please. Never allow a man to overstay his leave by a minute under any pretext short of a medical certificate, and when one does forget himself stop all future leave for an indefinite period. This is the severest punishment you can give a Pathan or Sikh, and will engender habits of punctuality in these fellows unattainable by any other way."

Religion and Prejudices: "Respect the religion and prejudices of every sect, and establish as a rule that each may do as it pleases in private in its own lines, but that no one is to interfere with his neighbour in word or deed. Punish severely all attempts at proselytizing, invariably turning out a renegade from his creed. . . . Never for an instant permit religious discussions, not even between European officers and the men; the former are not here for missionary purposes, and should not be allowed to trespass on the functions of the clergy."

British Officers: "All the young European officers attached to the regiment should be made to study the religious prejudices of each sect, not for the purpose of turning Hindoo or Mahomedan themselves, but to know exactly what each do without prejudice to his caste. . . . I would give my European officers under me almost as much power as I myself possess; they can always consult me when in doubt. The more power they possess the greater will be their influence over their men. If a mistake is made you can put it right quietly on the spot, and by giving each officer his 'swing' you see how far he has imbibed and understood the principles on which you work the regiment. . . . It is the worst of all plans to concentrate power exclusively in yourself as CO, though it is pleasing to find yourself the mainspring of so large a machine; but you should recollect that you may any day be removed, and all should be so arranged in the corps that the

work will go on as smoothly as ever without you. I need not tell you to be kind, considerate, and sociable with all so long as they do their duty, but stand humbug from no one. Any officer who understands his trade knows how to let this be felt without having to show that he does so, and orders once given European or Native must alike obey, and carelessness or slovenly performance of duty be equally noted in both instances. If a young 'rip' won't take a hint, it is not worth while disturbing the harmony of your little circle by constant bickerings, but he must be told either to mend his ways or to return for correction to that great mill of discipline for officers—the line regiment."

CHAPTER NINE

"To Free the Oppressed" NATO Special Forces in Future Operations

Kalev I. Sepp

Any surmise that special forces units of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization might, after the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, be again committed to fight in counterinsurgencies, raises the question of the meaning of that sort of operation. If – as in Iraq – counterinsurgency means a campaign that will cost two trillion dollars, engage 150,000 troops and see the deaths of some five thousand of those soldiers, and last for at least six years with an indeterminate end, then only the United States can do it, and only once in a generation.[1] But what if an armed insurgency in an allied country could be suppressed at a cost to the intervening power of "only" about one billion dollars a year in military and economic aid, a commitment of less than one hundred troops at any given time, while suffering less than two dozen fatalities over twelve years – simultaneously democratizing the besieged country, building governmental capacity to enforce rule of law, and establishing elected civilian control over a reformed military that protected rather than oppressed the citizenry? Such was the remarkable accomplishment of the United States intervention in the Salvadoran Civil War, 1979-1991, and the key military component in this successful campaign was special forces.[2]

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[1] Terry Kelly of RAND made this prescient observation at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, June 4, 2009. Chris Schnaubelt of the NATO Defense College led the conference where such issues were raised and discussed, and inspired the ideas presented in this paper.

[2] For brevity and readability, the term "special forces" will be used throughout this paper to refer collectively to all nations' and services' elite combat and counterterrorist units, rather than the longer term "special operations forces" or its U.S. military acronym, "SOF," unless specifically cited as U.S. Army Special Forces or distinct units.

This successful counterinsurgency notwithstanding, the question remains: under what conditions would NATO countries commit themselves to engage in such operations overseas in a non-NATO country, to support Rule of Law in the world? It is in the national interest of all law-abiding countries in the world to be able to fight insurgencies. If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is indeed dedicated to the international rule of law and international stability, its governments and armed forces must be able to conduct counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and stability operations. Special forces are particularly well-suited to engage in these missions.

The involvement of conventional forces in counterinsurgency operations today in Iraq and Afghanistan does not obviate the original decision to create special forces. This choice was based on the experiences of specialized Allied teams aiding guerrillas fighting against German and Japanese occupation troops across Europe and Asia. Allied leaders came to learn that carefully selected personnel, who were older, more intelligent, more resilient, physically tougher and more independent than the greater body of soldiers and officers, were the most successful at training, advising, and often leading indigenous peoples in irregular warfare. This is still true.

What has changed is the scale and scope of the terrorist threat to global stability now confronting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This often amorphous threat drives the question: what factors will affect the shape, capacity and modes of operation of the NATO armed forces in future wars, like counterinsurgencies? This is not a choice of "one war form over the other;" that is, of counterinsurgency over conventional warfare.[3] NATO nations cannot ignore the rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, or smaller states armed with weapons of mass destruction. NATO was originally formed to be able to fight a large-scale conventional war. For almost half a century, it was organized, manned, equipped, trained, and in particular, educated to that singular end.[4]

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[3] Speech by the author to NATO Parliamentary Assembly and U.S. Congressional Representatives Pentagon Conference, January 28, 2008.

[4] As of 2009, at the NATO Defense College, where senior military and civilian officials attend a graduate-level course in Alliance operations, there are no counterinsurgency courses in the curriculum. The German armed forces officer schools do not teach this type of warfare at all.

NATO's special forces, however, can be useful across the entire spectrum of conflict.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed his view of the international security situation in a speech shortly after his appointment:

> The real challenges we have seen emerge since the end of the Cold War – from Somalia to the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere – make clear we in defense need to change our priorities to be better able to deal with the prevalence of what is called 'asymmetric warfare.' … [I]t is hard to conceive of any country challenging the United States directly in conventional military terms – at least for some years to come. Indeed, history shows us that smaller*, irregular* forces – insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists – have for centuries found ways to harass and frustrate larger, regular armies and sow chaos. We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts will be fundamentally political in nature, and require the application of all elements of national power. Success will be less a matter of imposing one's will and more a function of shaping behavior – of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.[5]

Despite Secretary Gates' views on the importance of counterinsurgency, a debate has fired inside the United States defense establishment, described by the *Wall Street Journal* as "This-War-itis vs. Next-War-itis." Mr. Gates has publicly stated that 'next-war' proponents are shortchanging current needs in Iraq and Afghanistan for advanced weapons which may never be needed.

Opponents of Mr. Gates say the Defense Secretary is taking a shortsighted position, and will leave the United States and its allies unpre-

[5] Robert Gates, speech at AUSA Convention, Washington, D.C., October 10, 2006.

pared for future threats. Mr. Gates is aware of this, and with the support of the newly-elected President Barack Obama is seeking a reasonable balance between these two types of warfare. In this case, "balance" means the proposed apportionment of 80% of the defense budget for conventional forces, and 20% for irregular warfare operations – up from approximately 10% now.

In any regard, it is more likely that any given country would engage in foreign military operations if small numbers of special forces could be committed, rather than large numbers of conventional troops. Why a small-numbers special-forces approach to counterinsurgency? Commitment of a nation's youth – nineteen-year-old soldiers – is understood to be necessary for wars of national survival, and similar vital national interests, but not necessarily for lesser conflicts. Special forces, on the other hand, are better trained and more experienced professionals: older, long-serving volunteers, who clearly understand the risks of their chosen line of work. Putting them at risk for less than vital national interests is acceptable. Success is more likely precisely because of who they are – elite special forces, who are more survivable, better able to train foreign armies and to teach and enforce respect for human rights. With small numbers, allied countries can be engaged and influential, but not irretrievably committed. Aid and advisers can be readily withdrawn if conditions require it. Long-term engagement, necessary in counterinsurgency, is possible because a handful of advisers are inexpensive and sustainable year after year. Also, with small numbers, the supported nation shouldn't feel that the advisers are running their units, or their war. Thus, in counterinsurgency wars, "less may be more" because greater reliance upon, and accountability of, the host nation is a necessity of the situation; "ownership" of the effort cannot easily be handed over to or assumed by the intervening forces.

The future of counterinsurgency

In considering future counterinsurgency operations, it is useful to

understand how the United States envisions warfare over the next two decades. This understanding can inform allied armed forces on how they can integrate themselves, in a complementary fashion, into military campaigns with the United States, particularly with regard to the emerging concept of irregular warfare. One distinct aspect of current counterinsurgency operations is that very few countries attempt counterinsurgency unilaterally. The United Nations should be involved, at least for the political viability gained, and it is likely that other international organizations and alliances will participate in such conflicts as they arise. The United States may well be an ally of any nation in a counterinsurgency effort, as the nations' interests and strategic goals, especially as regards international stability, are closely aligned. In this, special forces play a key role.

Much of this concept is in response to the threat of Irregular Warfare.[6] Now, and for decades to come, the United States, NATO and their international partners must contend with a number of serious challenges:
— Terrorism with a global reach;
— Rogue regimes that provide support to terrorists and seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction;
— Threats emerging in and emanating from fragile states and poorly governed areas; and
— New manifestations of ethnic, tribal, and sectarian conflict.
Many of these threats come from countries with which neither the United States nor any NATO countries are at war. The responses they demand extend well beyond the traditional domain of any single government agency or department.

Irregular warfare includes a variety of operations and activities to prevent and respond to these particular challenges. These missions include, but are not limited to, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. In the context of irregular warfare, these missions involve establishing — or reestablishing — order in a fragile nation, or a collapsed state.

[6] From a speech by the author to the National Defense Industrial Association, Washington, D.C., February 14, 2008.

Irregular warfare operations may occur independently of, or in combination with, traditional warfare campaigns. Many of the capabilities required to execute them are resident in some parts of the U.S. armed forces, but not with sufficient capacity to meet expected demand. Thus, allies are critical. In some cases, the United States and allied militaries need to develop new capabilities to address these emerging challenges.

Irregular warfare strategy

These irregular threats require an Irregular Warfare strategy. The old strategic paradigm held by the United States was to be able to win two conventional wars, or traditional wars, simultaneously, or almost simultaneously. The new strategic paradigm being considered is that the United States is now in a protracted irregular war. The 2006 U.S. Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review document (QDR) recognized and described irregular war, and also directed that the U.S. armed forces must still be ready to conduct conventional campaigns.

But irregular war is still war; it is a major commitment. So, in addition to traditional or conventional warfare, the new strategy envisions three campaigns in the context of irregular war. These are support to a large-scale counterinsurgency, support to large-scale unconventional warfare, and steady-state warfare.

The first campaign is support to a large-scale counterinsurgency. In large-scale irregular warfare like this, integration of special forces with conventional forces is essential. This special and conventional force combination is, finally, working very well right now in the U.S. forces in Iraq. The conventional forces employed in these campaigns — these surges — may not always be American or other foreign forces because, ultimately, local forces must defeat insurgencies.
The second campaign is a surge to support unconventional warfare.

Unconventional warfare is conducted against a hostile state, an

occupying army, or a transnational terrorist group. In a large-scale counterinsurgency, special forces usually support the conventional forces as they do in Iraq. That is the current practice. However, in unconventional warfare, conventional forces will almost always support special forces. Unconventional warfare requires partners and surrogates. It necessitates low-visibility operations, with some direct action and clandestine operations capabilities. An unconventional warfare campaign can drive some special forces capability requirements. An example is infiltration and exfiltration into and from denied areas.

It is likely that the United States and its NATO allies will face — and should plan to face — a formidable set of potential enemies. These likely opponents will have very strict border and internal controls, and will be equipped with biometrics, anti-access technologies, and first-class, full-spectrum anti-aircraft systems. Special forces will need particular skills to survive in these denied areas. They will also have to maintain contingency languages, possibly such as Farsi and Chinese.

The third campaign, steady-state warfare, is how the United States wants to win the Long War against transnational terrorists. The steady-state effort will require a global network of special forces in greater numbers than ever before. They will work with the national intelligence agencies, imbedded in the partner or allied forces who will support the United States in this effort. The operational core of this counterterrorist effort will be special and conventional forces, as well as Intelligence services, plus partners and allies. The U.S. military will seek to achieve the right mix of forward-stationed and rotational forces.

This will require both indirect and clandestine capabilities, which the United States will accomplish primarily via a combination of intelligence work and by-with-and-through approaches with allies. Intelligence drives the find-fix-fight-finish cycle against the terrorists, and more personnel are needed to do intelligence-related work. The implication of all this is the requirement to build a global counterterrorist network.

What sort of contingencies might occur in which it would be suitable for NATO special forces to engage? One possible scenario might be a crisis following an internal collapse of the existing government in a semi-industrialized country. A compounding difficulty could be the impoverishment and underdeveloped condition of large parts of the country, calling for humanitarian assistance on the scale of major disaster relief. Any deployment would have to occur with appropriate legal accords, and possibly under the direction of the United Nations.

In this scenario, special forces troops– this includes civic action and psychological operations units – could deploy quickly in order to:

— secure military arsenals, and nuclear facilities if they exist;
— maintain order and establish stability;
— obtain the cooperation of, coordinate with, and possibly provide advisors or command and control of the remnant military units of the collapsed state; [7]
— prevent looting;[8]
— de-mine minefields;
— protect the national economic infrastructure, resources, and cultural and historic sites;
— provide humanitarian assistance to the population;
— stop any exodus of refugees;
— reestablish communications, power, and water supplies; and
— eliminate fanatics who intend to wage guerrilla warfare to bring back the old dictatorship.[9]

Rapid action by professional units is the key. It is best to stop an insurgency before it starts. NATO special forces units can conduct almost all of these missions, but equipment must be procured and activities instituted to enable these campaigns.

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[7] Chris Schnaubelt of the NATO Defense College suggested this important task, considering the problematic results of disbanding the Iraqi Army in 2003. Letter to author, August 2, 2009.

[8] At the United Nations Command Special Operations Forces in Korea Conference in June 16-18, 2009, the employment of special forces in a collapsed state to prevent looting was considered an imperative, in order to prevent looting on the scale of what occurred in Baghdad, Iraq, in 2003, in the absence of security forces immediately following the fall of the Saddam regime.

[9] Russ Howard, Brig. Gen. (ret'd.), U.S. Army, developed this detailed list of possible necessary actions as a recommended response option to a collapse of the North Korean regime. Interview with author, Seoul, Korea, June 17, 2009.

Counterterrorism vs. counterinsurgency

Direct Action missions, also called raids and strikes, are a necessary part of any larger campaign to suppress terrorism, crime and insurgency, but cannot be the sole or even principal effort. Many special operations units were originally formed specifically to conduct counterterrorism missions – that is, Direct Action. When deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, it is only reasonable to expect they would do what they know best how to do.

In Afghanistan, special operations units have been conducting direct action missions since 2002, but the Taliban insurgency has continued to grow. A senior U.S. military officer in Afghanistan reported in March 2009, "I thought we could decapitate the insurgency. I was wrong. We've gone through twenty-two [high value targets] in this province, but [the insurgents] nominate someone new to take over the leadership very fast. The duration of our success is not more than three to four weeks before the insurgents have a new leader, and often that person is younger and more brutal. Even if someone killed [the head of the Pakistani Taliban], someone else will simply take over."[10] Commando raids and strikes must be conducted in the context, and subordinate to, a complete counterinsurgency campaign. The summary directive of "Clear, Hold, Build" must dominate military planning, with the emphasis on building a host nation's government structure and raising its security forces.

The role of technology

Technology will significantly support these three campaigns. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, or ISR, technologies and platforms are the top priority for the counterterrorism fight, and will be necessary in all three campaigns. ISR platforms, notably armed Predator and Reaper unmanned aircraft carrying precision-guided munitions, have

[10] Max Boot, Fred Kagan and Kim Kagan, "Yes, We Can," *The Weekly Standard*, March 23, 2009.

powerfully assisted special operations and unconventional warfare, such as during the 2001 expedition to Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime. The U.S. Department of Defense had initially under-invested in ISR platforms. A concerted building program is underway to meet the pressing demand from field commanders. The U.S. must also replace losses – almost a third of the unmanned aerial fleet has been lost over time, mostly as a result of crashes. Because of these shortages, the Defense Department must centrally manage its assets, platform by platform, and almost minute by minute. Eventually, the allied forces will need a variety of ISR platforms. Models similar to current versions will operate in permissive environments. Advanced platforms must be "penetrating models," capable of surviving in high-threat air defense environments, to conduct special missions and to support special forces in denied areas.[11]

The demand for aerial ISR platforms in current counterinsurgency operations around the world is enormous, and often unsatisfied. Many allied countries do not have specialized ISR aircraft, like the U.S. Navy's P-3 Orion or the fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles. However, all that is required to conduct effective airborne ISR is a sensor system, an aircraft to carry it, and a secure radio. Countries without purpose-built ISR aircraft can attain a near-term capability sufficient for some irregular warfare applications by mounting an advanced targeting pod to a fighter or patrol aircraft. With some additional training, an allied pilot – who already speaks English, the international aviation language – could provide some ISR support for special forces ground units.

Other manned aircraft can be valuable as well. Bombers, able to carry large loads of precision-guided munitions, can be very useful in both conventional and irregular conflict. Gunships have definitively proven their worth in Vietnam, El Salvador, Colombia, Iraq and Afghanistan. However, four-engine gunships carrying multiple guns and cannon are expensive, hard to maintain, and limited in number. It would be better to have a larger number of twin-engine fixed-wing gunships, mounting a sin-

[11] Speech by the author to Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, March 11, 2008.

gle gun and carrying small-diameter guided bombs. Of course, for precision close air support, small turboprop attack aircraft are useful.

Air-ground integration is critical in special operations.[12] In Iraq and Afghanistan, NATO and Coalition special forces air-ground integration works well because U.S. Special Operations Forces work directly with international special forces ground teams, acting as liaison to U.S. special aviation aircraft. Expanding this liaison capability would be limited only by the availability of U.S. special forces personnel who could be attached to allied units. English-speaking allied special forces, trained in tactical air control, would be a viable augmentation to coordinating the air-ground effort.

An expansion of joint aviation training and exercises would improve special forces employment options. The "Coalition Special Operations Forces Subject Matter Expert Exchange Program," based at Hurlburt Field in Florida, allows allied special forces personnel to train with U.S. special aviation platforms, such as the MC-130 *Talon* and the AC-130 *Spectre*. This program could include more personnel, and emphasize tactical skills such as convoy escort, infiltration and exfiltration, strike, and intra-theater mobility operations.

In the same way, U.S. special operations air planners should also be educated in allied air capabilities and procedures by attending training and exercises abroad, in those partner countries. This would make U.S. planners aware of what allied special forces, both ground and air, can and can't do before discovering this during actual operations.

Aerial refueling is a high-priority training requirement for U.S. pilots and crews, but given the demand for refueling aircraft in the theaters of war overseas, stateside aircrews only gain limited proficiency in this skill. Even KC-135s and KC-10s, the mainstay tankers for the U.S. Air Force, are not available in sufficient numbers in theater for all the requests

[12] David Jesurun, Major, U.S. Air Force, e-mail to author, May 20, 2009. Major Jesurun's extensive experience as a U.S. Air Force special operations pilot in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan provided the basis for this series of insights and recommendations for improvement.

to support special forces fixed-wing aircraft.

To alleviate this training shortfall, allied aerial refuelers could participate in the refueling exercises in the United States. U.S. receiver aircraft crews train in accordance with the procedures in NATO standard refueling publication ATP-56.
This would also give the visiting aircrews experience in refueling fixed-wing special operations aircraft, in addition to fighters and bombers. The mutual confidence and increased capability gained from such combined training would also be valuable in integrating allied refueling aircraft into special operations worldwide.

To take advantage of the increased capacity and capability in aerial refueling that would accrue from this training, all aerial refueling aircraft in the theater of operations should be combined under a single command. This would allow the U.S. refuelers to concentrate on supporting special aviation helicopters, which is almost a solely American requirement.

In the same way, all allied air mobility aircraft should be combined into a single fleet when deployed. Most allied air forces have smaller turboprop cargo aircraft, well-suited for tactical intra-theater missions, like C-160s and G222s. This could relieve the U.S. Air Force from having to use long-range strategic inter-theater lifters, particularly its C-130s and C-17s, and from tactical missions, like moving small special forces units inside the area of operations. Also, U.S. special operations aviation aircraft could perform more of the missions for which they are uniquely equipped, particularly night-time helicopter aerial refueling.

The nature of a particular conflict – the size of the area of operations, of the population, of the enemy forces, of the number of allied special forces available – may require conventional forces to augment special forces. National immediate reaction forces, like the NATO Response Force, may not necessarily be the appropriate unit for this effort. These kinds of units are primarily intended to provide humanitarian assistance in a disaster, stabilize short-of-war situations, and conduct direct action mis-

sions. They are usually not organized or trained for counterinsurgency operations in the way that many special forces units are. The very requirements necessary to produce elite units ensure there will never be enough special operations forces to meet the worldwide demand.

A possible solution for this shortfall in the quality and quantity of personnel to engage in counterinsurgencies is to create what the U.S. military calls "SOF-like" forces from the body of conventional troops available in land armies. ("SOF-like" means units or personnel with capabilities "like Special Operations Forces"). There are several ways to achieve this additional capability. It is unrealistic to attempt to make a 19-year-old infantryman into a "SOF-like" soldier. In the near term, the fastest way to create "SOF-like" forces is to put conventional units under the command of special forces officers and sergeants. At a small-unit level, this has produced excellent results in the U.S. joint Military Transition Teams formed from individual volunteers to train Iraqi and Afghani security forces. The commanders of the advisory program at Fort Riley, Kansas, where these teams are organized and trained, have stated that the teams led by U.S. Army Special Forces officers were the most cohesive, effective and confident. Another method to create "SOF-like" forces is to use special forces headquarters to direct operations using conventional forces.

In the long term, the best solution is to focus on making an officer corps more "SOF-like." This breed of officer would be:

— more politically aware, through graduate civil schooling;
— fluent in a language of an at-risk country or region; and
— able to think beyond the "manager of violence" self-image — not just a warrior, but a warrior-diplomat.

For example, instead of habitually assigning officers to internal headquarters and staffs, the defense ministries should post more officers to embassies, other government agencies, and overseas exchanges.

As part of this enhancement, these officer corps should educate and develop special forces and counterinsurgency strategic planners. The various armed forces could begin by grooming select special forces officers to per-

form in strategist roles, to shape Irregular Warfare and counterinsurgency strategies for their respective countries. Their management should include assignments to conventional force commands, as members of primary staffs, and duty as leaders in special and conventional units. Conversely, conventional force officers could be exposed to special units and operations early in their careers. As an example, U.S. Army Special Forces officers are required to attend conventional forces "captains' courses" after they are chosen for special forces. This conventional training is essential for these special forces officers; corresponding schooling in special operations for some number of conventional officers must likewise be beneficial.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of deployable special forces soldiers is their ability to speak other languages. Among the NATO nations in Europe, there are a variety of languages spoken in every country, and the rank and file of the NATO armies are familiar with these. For overseas "out-of-area" deployment, however, many other languages are necessary, to be able to engage with the local population, security forces, government officials, and even the enemy. Language skills make any soldier more "SOF-like."

Contingency languages

Much of any success that might accrue to NATO troops deployed "out of area" to fight an insurgency will depend on their skill in personal communication with the indigenous peoples – that is, at speaking the local language. In military interventions when this has been the positive case, the counterinsurgent held a marked advantage.

Hiring interpreters is a "quick fix," but not the optimal solution. Local interpreters often have uncertain backgrounds and loyalties. Some may be from different local ethnic groups, and may be attacked by their ethnic rivals. In any regard, the ability of an officer or sergeant to speak directly with members of the local population is essential in order to establish rapport and intelligence sources quickly, rather than having to speak

through a hired native of uncertain linguistic skill and allegiance.

The large number of at-risk regions and countries that might require NATO intervention presents a great number of indigenous languages and dialects. Officers and long-term soldiers in special operations units should become multi-lingual, particularly in these contingency languages. Their specific linguistic capabilities should derive from the counterinsurgency assessments and subsequent nation-by-nation requirements that result.

Some taskings for language proficiency may be readily aligned to regions where various NATO nations have longstanding relationships. Others will require schooling in arcane tribal languages. Even if only a single person in a military expedition is able to converse in the native dialect, it may be enough to make the best kind of difference. The axiom is true enough: "Learning a language is the way to learn a culture."

Training and advising

Training and advising foreign armies is a central special forces skill. The emerging thrust of the new strategy in the Afghanistan counterinsurgency will be a much increased dedication of personnel to the mission of training and advising Afghan security forces. Similarly, in the Iraq counterinsurgency, the new administration has announced plans to withdraw U.S. combat forces, but leave a large residual force of advisers and trainers. The U.S. forces are finally taking the advice of their own Special Forces commanders from the Vietnam War. They fought alongside Montagnard, Nung and Khmer tribesmen, as well as South Vietnamese, and took the chief lesson of the Vietnam War to be "teach them to fight for their own country – don't do it for them."

Intelligence

When Lt. Gen. Sir Gerald Templer arrived in Malaya in 1951 to take over as the combined civil-military leader of the fight against the

communist insurgency there, his dramatic first words to his staff were "This is an intelligence war." The British leaders in the three years of the Emergency up to that point had not seized on this critical understanding. Much the same could be said for the U.S.-led effort in Iraq for the first three years of the occupation, as ground force commanders wrestled with enemies whose objectives, methods, culture, languages and motivations they did not understand.

One American unit was positioned to overcome these shortfalls much more quickly than the rest of the U.S. forces: the U.S. Special Operations Command. But even they discovered the need for more and better intelligence to find the enemy more precisely and rapidly, particularly insurgent, terrorist and criminal leaders who came to be labeled "High-Value Targets" and operated not just inside Iraq, but throughout the Middle East and, in fact, around the world.

Their solution to this difficult targeting task was the Intelligence Fusion Cell, in direct support of the primary Special Operations combat unit, in Iraq itself. The membership included all U.S. Government agencies and departments with intelligence capabilities. In any given cell, there were capable representatives from the Defense and Central Intelligence Agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Departments of the Treasury, Homeland Security, and Justice, the National Geospatial Intelligence and National Security Agencies, the National Counterterrorism Center, the U.S. Central and European Commands, unmanned surveillance aircraft units, and from the special units in combat themselves, among others.[13]

The chief of any given intelligence fusion cell is not an intelligence officer. Instead, he is a former special unit commander, usually a senior major or new lieutenant colonel, marked for promotion and higher command, who has intimate knowledge of exactly what the special units need to conduct their operations. The individual military members of a cell

[13] Chris Fussell, Lt. Cmdr, U.S. Navy, interview with the author, Monterey, California, April 27, 2009.

are usually company-grade officers, such as experienced lieutenants and mid-grade sergeants. The civilian members are of comparable rank and already have one or two tours of duty in the overseas conflict zones.

The members' rank is less important than their personalities – of necessity, aggressive and engaging, with a keen, quick mind. Most importantly, they need two things: the confidence of their superior, which allows them to speak for their superior, and direct access to their superior, when necessary, at any time of the day or night. The Intelligence Fusion Cells, although led by Special Operations officers and most closely associated with special units, work for anyone in the theater of operations. They will prepare and hand off target packets to any unit commander who makes a suitable request.

Trust is the most important element in "fusing" intelligence – each component of the intelligence community must freely offer up its share of information. To accomplish this, the location of a Fusion Cell is well forward in the zone of action, in the immediate vicinity of the unit operations. It has been discovered that this has the effect of building trust among the members. Certain intelligence agencies, with a reputation for always wanting information, but never for sharing any of theirs, become highly cooperative in these circumstances. It is human nature to bond with one's comrades-in-arms. This sharing of intelligence must extend to all allies. As difficult as it seems, there must be no "keeping secrets" from allies in combat.

So, from a stumbling start in 2003 in Iraq, the U.S. military has developed a highly useful and efficient solution to one of its major intelligence challenges, in the form of the Intelligence Fusion Cell. In counterinsurgency, fusion is necessary because there is more than one enemy, and there is more than one war, as government and allied forces contend with criminals, terrorists, insurgents and foreign interventionists. The Intelligence Fusion Cell is also a metaphor for how all departments and agencies of a government must work together to achieve success.

Future issue

Several issues related to the employment of NATO special forces are emerging and deserve close attention:

- The NATO leadership should consider supporting the creation of regional multi-national standing headquarters to plan and direct combined special operations in a given region. NATO has at Mons, Belgium, the NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Center that conducts courses to train NATO officers to serve on special forces task group staffs. The Center, which will soon be renamed a NATO "Headquarters," also has a separate state-of-the art communications system providing direct connectivity with the national special forces headquarters of every country in NATO (it is technologically more advanced, in fact, than much of the existing NATO signal equipment). Similarly, the United Nation Command in Korea has the Combined Unconventional Warfare Task Force Headquarters to plan and coordinate special forces operations in the event of a crisis or war on the Korean Peninsula.

- It would aid the NATO governments and their defense establishments if they could reach an agreement as to who and what constitute "the threats" to the NATO and partner countries, collectively and individually.

- Similarly, NATO planners should establish how Information Operations will support special forces; or, following the example of several terrorist entities, how special forces might support Information Operations. Many NATO and partner nations have sophisticated Psychological Operations capabilities and experienced units, with similar doctrinal approaches, which ought to allow integration into allied operations overseas.

- U.S. commanders in the overseas conflict zones report that some NATO special units are over-reliant on U.S. logistical support. This detracts from the contribution an allied unit might otherwise offer. Logistics is not a "niche" capability for just a few countries to bear responsibility. Some degree of self-sufficiency is a necessary capability for all

special forces to permit the maximum possible flexibility in employment. This is most important to the national governments in deciding to commit their special forces in either allied or unilateral operations overseas.

- U.S. special forces experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has revealed the need for increased human intelligence capacity and capabilities in overseas contingency operations, particularly counterinsurgency. Dennis C. Blair, the new U.S. administration's director of national intelligence, said the United States still lacked intelligence about the power structures inside Afghanistan and other basic information necessary for a counterinsurgency campaign.[14]

- The political and military leadership of NATO must sort out and agree on definitions of key terms, especially counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics and foreign internal defense operations. This is not an academic exercise; it is necessary to ensure unity of effort. They should not be distracted by new terms and "buzzwords" for long-established and familiar activities. [15]

- To explore these issues fully and usefully, NATO special forces commanders and staffs, and their civilian superiors, should conduct a continuing series of "futures games" – not just exercises, which are for training, but to look ten and twenty years into the future in order to define likely problems and situations; to determine requirements; and to test processes, organizations, and possible solutions. These seminar-style games must engage all the relevant players – political and governmental leaders, allies, international organizations, etc. The objective is not to predict the future, but to help design special forces units with the flexibility and resilience to deal with an unpredictable future.[16]

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[14] David Maxwell, letter to author, May 9, 2009.

[15] For example, military officers at doctrinal conferences often note that terms like "hybrid wars" and "complex operations" are redundant, as all wars are "hybrid," and all military operations, particularly special operations, are "complex." Nonetheless, these may still be useful to help non-specialists unfamiliar with military activities to grasp their intricacies.

[16] Alexander Alderson, Colonel, British Army, proposed this objective at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, June 4, 2009.

Summary

As simple as this guiding principle seems, the United States, and hence its NATO allies and partners, should support a counterinsurgency campaign in a given country rather than conduct or lead it.[17] The doctrinal foundation for this perspective is in the official American definition of a Foreign Internal Defense campaign, or FID: "Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken *by another government* [author's emphasis] or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."[18]

NATO member governments must reconcile the moral and practical standard of avoiding undue belligerence with the obligation of the NATO states to assist in suppressing crime and violence that threaten developing nations, particularly nascent democracies. Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer note that Germany, with one of the largest economies in the world and a large, sophisticated, professional defense establishment, has chosen to cast its engagement in Afghanistan not as a counterinsurgency mission, but as a "stability and reconstruction operation." By way of explaining their deviation from the NATO-designated mission, German officials offer that ". . . unlike many of its allies, the Federal Republic never engaged in a 'small war.' Germany lacks historical memory of such conflicts which could inform current debate."[19]

This lack of a "small wars" expeditionary tradition since 1918 is arguably to the Germans' benefit. They will, for want of such martial conditioning, be much less likely to over-commit troops, resources and political capital to a developing crisis, avoiding the American tendency some have criticized as: "if it's worth doing, it's worth overdoing." Nonetheless, the German government and people believe in the value of a peaceful and stable world order, from which they and other nations will benefit. This sta-

[17] David Maxwell, Col., U.S. Army, letter to author, May 9, 2009.
[18] Joint Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, December 17, 2003.
[19] NATO Defense College, "Counterinsurgency Workshop" background paper, May 2009.

bility must be enforced, and that will occasionally require more force than can be brought to bear by law enforcement agencies. Careful and limited intervention by military forces is achievable, and can make the best kind of difference in many crisis situations. To imagine that these military forces can simply provide logistical support or base security and thereby avoid battle, and thus casualties, is not realistic. The military strategist and author David Kilcullen notes, "The distinction between combat and non-combat forces in a counterinsurgency environment is largely theoretical."[20]

In contemplating the design and employment of NATO special forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations, it is vital that the NATO allies do not become myopic and over-focus on this particular brand of conflict, as this could result in the creation of vulnerabilities to other threats. RAND Corporation senior analyst, former defense deputy assistant secretary, and Iraq veteran Celeste Ward cautions, "The question is not whether counterinsurgency works, but where, when, and to what ends it is wise to commit U.S. power and resources."[21] This warning extends to NATO as well: it should not see all limited wars as counterinsurgencies, and should not remake all armed forces, including special operations units, overly-optimized to combat insurgencies. NATO's special forces are in the best political and military position to provide both the sufficient answer, and the better option, to respond to the conflicts of the new century.

[20] Carlos Lozada, "A Conversation with David Kilcullen," *Washington Post*, March 22, 2009, p. B2.
[21] Celeste Ward, "Countering the Military's Latest Fad," *Washington Post*, May 17, 2009.

CHAPTER TEN

NATO Should Take the Lead in Police Training

Alex Crowther

Introduction

Part of the NATO slice of a comprehensive approach should be to embrace the lead for police training. The United States is not culturally or temperamentally suited for training local police forces. NATO, on the other hand, has 28 different members, many of whom have organizations that are well suited for this task. This potential asset is only partially utilized. National arguments over the propriety of participation in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations as well as competition between NATO and the EU have prevented the full utilization of these police training assets.

That police are hugely important in COIN situations is almost universally accepted. Police forces are the front line in a COIN situation, especially in urban settings. Local police know the area they are operating in and are often capable of identifying the presence of insurgents or other people whose presence is a signal. When theorists talk of force ratios,[1] the police often make up the majority of those force ratios. The police provide local security to the population and represent the daily presence of the government in the eyes of much of the population. Non-corrupt police can be a powerful legitimator of governments. On the other hand, incompetent or corrupt police can be a daily signal to the population of the lack of capacity or caring of their government and can detract from the legitimacy of the

[1] Typically defined as 20 security force personnel for every 1,000 members of the population. However, studies propose a number ranging from 10 to 40.

government. A well-trained police force is one of the main pillars of COIN.

Police forces have several functions in the 21st century. Norman LaCharite and Joan Wolfgang identify their tasks in a counterinsurgency environment as normal police operations (investigation, detection, detention, and intelligence collection); the maintenance of discipline and proper conduct; actions to clear an area of insurgent forces and to secure that area in order to prevent the return of the insurgents; the provision of intelligence, search and seizure or raid operations, manning checkpoints and roadblocks, and a population and resources control programs[2]. Police forces in many countries that are having emergencies (conflict, natural disaster, etc) are often challenged by the scale of the emergency and need assistance from the outside. As the United States is called upon to assist countries that are faced with these challenges, it would be very nice for the United States to be able to assist with police training. Yet it presently does not have the capability to effectively do so.

If a country is suffering from an insurgency, police forces are usually overwhelmed or part of the problem. In such cases, an outside force usually has to develop a new police force or retrain an existing police force. In both instances, someone needs to be in charge of the effort. NATO provides an organization that is fully capable of training police forces while the United States, unfortunately, does not.

The United States was very competent at training police forces in the 1960s, training police in their home nation and at an international police academy near Washington DC. By the early 1970s they had trained over 10,000 police from a variety of countries. Owing to human rights issues with the police in the Republic of Vietnam and some Latin American countries, the United States Congress passed Section 112 of the Foreign Assistance Act in December 1973. This legislation banned the use

[2] Norman A. LaCharite and Joan Rodman Wolfgang, *Police Role Of Internal Security Forces In Internal Defense*, May 1972, American Institutes For Research, p 14.

of foreign assistance funding for foreign police training. In December 1974 they passed Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, replacing Section 112, which prohibited USG elements from training foreign police. In spite of this prohibition, there is a waiver procedure. There are differing opinions on how well the waiver procedure works. Several RAND analysts state that Section 660 "provides exceptions and the possibilities for exemptions (which are usually granted)".[3] Indeed these exemptions are available for:

> assistance provided to reconstitute civilian police authority and capability in the post-conflict restoration of host nation infrastructure for the purposes of supporting a nation emerging from instability, and the provision of professional public safety training, to include training in internationally recognized standards of human rights, the rule of law, anti-corruption, and the promotion of civilian police roles that support democracy[4].

Walter Ladwig provides a different point of view when he says that:

> Congress has authorized several exemptions that allow police assistance in certain narrowly defined areas. The result is a system that is more chaotic and lacking in clear guidance than at any time under the Office of Public Safety. At present, the Departments of Justice, State, Treasury, Transportation, and Defense all conduct some form of foreign police training. None of these programs are centrally coordinated, and no agency has been assigned a lead role for foreign law enforcement assistance[5].

Although there is a waiver for Section 660, the upshot of the legislation has been to virtually disable the police training capability of the

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[3] Terrence K. Kelly, Seth G. Jones, James E. Barnett II, Keith Crane, Robert C. Davis, Carl Jensen. *A Stability Police Force for the United States: Justification and Options for Creating U.S. Capabilities* RAND, 2009, p 74.

[4] Title 22 USC Section 2240 (b) (6)

[5] Walter C. Ladwig III, *Comparative Strategy Training Foreign Police: A Missing Aspect of U.S. Security Assistance to Counterinsurgency*, Merton College, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom, 1 July 2007.

United States Government (USG). Since the early 1970s, the USG has retained a small-scale training capability. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) at the State Department has the lead for international police training. The Department of Justice also has the International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), which trains criminal investigators. Although these programs consist of professionals who perform their mission very well, they are overwhelmed by the need to provide wholesale training to an entire police force for a country. In order to supplement their capabilities, the US military has stepped into the arena in places like Iraq, where the Iraq Advisory Group was training Ministry of the Interior forces in conjunction with the Multi National Security Training Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). The police forces in Iraq were so bad in late 2007 (four years into the conflict) that Gen James Jones recommended that they disband the Iraqi police forces.

Although the efforts of both the IAG and MNSTC-I have borne fruit by the middle of 2009, this is clearly not the optimal solution. Additionally, when the US military seeks to train police, they tend to use Military Police. Although this seems like a good idea, in practice it has had some negative repercussions. The host nation police end up trained as military police, not as beat cops. This can be a very good thing when the need is for a national police force that has a paramilitary capability. This has manifested itself in Iraq, where the Iraqi National Police (recently renamed the Federal Police) are organized in battalions and brigades and are in the fight. They are competent fighters and very highly thought of by the US military. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the Iraqi Police. Although they have come a long way since the days when General Jones recommended their dissolution, they remain the weak link. Although having a high end military police capability is a good idea and a force multiplier, having beat cops on every street corner is the long-term requirement. Additionally, the kinetic-centric approach of the US military to COIN operations provides a lower priority to police training and operations. In the end, as an Italian *Carabinieri* commander noted to the RAND analysts: “Military forces do not have the expertise to conduct

most law enforcement tasks. They do not routinely perform law enforcement missions, and generally lack a law enforcement mindset."[6]

In addition to a dearth of police training capability and a US military training approach that minimizes police work, there is a US national bias against strong police forces. There is no national police force such as the *Carabinieri* or the *Gendarmerie*, nor is there any serious proposal to create one in a federal republic that prefers to maintain power at the state (provincial equivalent) level. Even though there are tens of thousands of police spread throughout the United States, the country has trouble generating civilian police (CIVPOL) capabilities to deploy overseas. As the RAND analysts mentioned previously state:

> But the United States has a mixed track record in establishing security. One reason is its federal structure of law enforcement: the United States has no federal high-end policing capacity that can help establish law and order by going on patrols, conducting criminal investigations, engaging in crowd and riot control, and performing other policing tasks. In the United States, policing functions are generally carried out at the state and local levels, with only limited law enforcement powers granted to the federal government. For example, agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) investigate suspected violations of federal law and lack jurisdiction over state and local matters. Limits to federal power are constitutionally rooted in the Tenth Amendment and have been recognized, especially in the policing arena, since the earliest days of the country.[7]

Why NATO?

NATO should take the lead in forming host nation police forces into a set of functioning organizations. NATO itself and the NATO coun-

[6] Kelly et al, p 22.
[7] Kelly et al, pp 15-16.

tries have demonstrated the capability to deploy CIVPOL capabilities and train police at both the local and national level. NATO is seeking ways to participate in global operations against the forces of instability. Although some of their military forces are limited by national caveats and political issues at home, these caveats and perceived weaknesses tend to center on the deployment of combat forces to participate in offensive operations. Police forces that are limited to training missions and whose security is provided for are less of a political issue. Additionally, many NATO countries have local, provincial and national police forces who can train their partner nation counterparts. NATO forces are already providing police training as part of NATO Training Missions in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq.

One could ask that, if the European Union already does police training, why should NATO seek to do so as well? The major difference is that EUPOL operates in a permissive environment but lacks the capability to do police training in high risk environments. Although only military forces should be operating in a non-permissive environment, with appropriate training and preparation, NATO police forces could operate in a semi-permissive environment—as the situation is currently in almost all of Iraq and most of Afghanistan.

Any training that NATO provides should be sustainable and scalable, and must also be culturally appropriate. It should train local, provincial and national level police. It should perform this training in the host nation. This training should include running an academy for new police recruits, specialized training, provision of embedded advisors and mentors to police units, and integrated with other efforts like those of INL and ICITAP. NATO police training should also address corruption and teach administration capabilities to ensure that host nation police forces are self-sustaining in the long term.

Any training regime needs to start with a good, solid analysis of needs and the situation. Historical examples of such analysis include the Woerner Report, which provided the conceptual framework for US actions

in El Salvador, and the ICITAP report prepared for the Commander of Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) at the beginning of the occupation of Iraq. Since NATO has a plethora of planners and access to police advice, this should not be an impossible task.

The proposed training should be sustainable and scalable. Unfortunately, some development agencies—whether oriented on security or not—tend to build large-scale very expensive programs that overwhelm the partner nation and may only be sustained with regular resourcing from donor nations. Programs delivered by NATO should be able to scale up or down, depending on the changing needs of the partner nation, and should be financially and logistically sustainable in the long term as part of a holistic law enforcement capability. Training high-end very capable investigators in a country with no forensic capabilities, for example, can be a waste of training and time unless donor countries are willing to build forensics labs, resource them in the short term, and build a sustainment capability. MNSTC-I is currently building seven forensics labs in Iraq as an effort in this direction. This may work in Iraq, which has a national law enforcement infrastructure to build upon and a regular funding stream due to oil revenues, yet equivalent efforts might be unsustainable elsewhere because of the lack of an educated work force and inadequate long term resourcing.

The proposed NATO training should be culturally appropriate. Several writers have noted that the United States tends to have trouble providing trainers who are culturally aware and sensitive. The other NATO countries should be able to provide trainers who are from a multicultural milieu, who speak other languages, and who have day-to-day experience with other religions and cultures. Such backgrounds should help to avoid preconceived notions and facilitate development of a culturally appropriate program of instruction.

Even with cultural nous, NATO police trainers and advisors would themselves need appropriate training before deploying. Although many Europeans speak other languages and have been exposed to other cultures,

a beat cop from a developed country cannot simply be moved to the middle of nowhere in another country/culture. NATO should develop an in-house capability designed to prepare police trainers for deployment to other countries. This would allow the organization to smooth over any differences that might be present as a result of country-specific origins of police trainers. It also would allow NATO to provide a uniformly prepared trainer. This approach would manifest itself in the quality of the training as well as a common approach, providing for common training of all host nation police forces regardless of the country of origin of the trainer. Additionally, additional threat awareness and mitigation training must be provided to any CIVPOL trainers who are deploying into a semi-permissive environment. Although this type of environment is challenging, proper training, equipping and employment will go a long way to mitigate the lack of security.

This proposed NATO capability should be able to train local, provincial and national level police. One of the strengths of bringing in police trainers from NATO countries is that different European countries have different approaches to policing, which enables different countries to provide different levels of training. As an example, some European countries have national-level police who perform paramilitary operations at home. The RAND analysts identified key examples which include the French *Gendarmerie*, Italian *Carabinieri*, Spanish *Guardia Civil*, Dutch *Koninklijke Marechaussée*, and Portuguese *Guarda Nacional Republicana*. They also identified another type of force that includes "high-end units from international organizations" such as NATO's Multinational Specialized Units (MSUs), the European Union's Integrated Police Units, and the European Gendarmerie Force.[8] These forces are perfect for training national-level paramilitary forces in the host nation. Indeed, the *Carabinieri* are currently training the Federal Police in Iraq and the National Police in Afghanistan. The European countries in NATO also have police forces operating at the provincial level and the local level who

[8] Kelly et al, p 17

can deploy to train, advise and mentor their peers in host nations that are challenged by insurgents.

An important aspect of this proposal is that the training should be performed in the host nation instead of an out-of-country location. This will require a modicum of political will on the part of the donor countries, as their forces will have to deploy into areas that are not the most secure. Yet this approach is desirable for several reasons. First, it shows the partner nation forces that police can survive and thrive in a challenging environment. Training local forces outside the country sets a bad example. Second, it allows for full cultural immersion on the part of the trainers. By living with their trainees, they get the most out of the event and become much better trainers because of their deeper understanding of the host nation environment. Finally, and perhaps most important for the donor nations, it is the most cost effective method. It is very expensive to transport and support students outside their own country. Such costs led to the demise of the NATO training program in Jordan, as the training proved to be just too expensive for the number of police officers they trained.

This proposed NATO training capability should also include running one or more police academies inside the host nation. Rather than just providing technical training, this approach also allows NATO to shape the host nation forces. By immersing the trainees in a carefully controlled atmosphere, NATO can not only provide basic and specialized training; it can also present examples to the trainees and concentrate on the conceptual work required to address underlying cultural issues that are inimical to national development, such as corruption, and often prove to be de-legitimators. While the training should be an adjunct to programs conducted inside the host nation, NATO countries should also be prepared to invite promising host nation trainees to their academies in Europe, where cadets can be exposed to different societies and see European norms in action in their home environment.

Training efforts should also provide embedded advisors and mentors from the strategic to the tactical level, from the Ministry of the Interior

and the headquarters of the national police to provincial level units, and from provincial command centers or fusion centers to local police units. Although this presence is extremely important for the success of the mission, it is vital to note that this makes security for the trainers and mentors a critical issue.

The NATO training program should be able to integrate with other international and regional efforts like those of INL and ICITAP. The involvement of regional organizations helps to provide legitimacy to the training mission, while the integration of other international efforts allows access to resources. NATO should consider a national-level presence that is designed to either integrate with other players, or preferably take the lead in integrating the efforts of others into the NATO-led effort. This would allow other actors to bring limited resources to the table without having to worry about their ability to provide overhead or to expend resources in integrating efforts.

One very important aspect of any police training program is the ability to teach administration capabilities. Any NATO training effort should be a holistic one that addresses requirements such as maintenance, planning and monitoring of operations, budgeting, procurement and programming to ensure that police forces are self-sustaining in the long term. The developed countries tend to have very functional administrative capabilities that act as force multipliers for their security services. No one can perform a mounted patrol with a vehicle that is non-functional because of lack of fuel, repair parts or mechanics. Everyone who has worked in challenging environments has seen host nation organizations that are not as capable as they could be, owing to a lack of administrative capability which was largely ignored because it was perceived to be unimportant. Teaching these administrative capabilities ensures that the host nation can maintain their capabilities after the eventual departure of the assisting forces.

Any proposed NATO mission requires a strong strategic communications program within contributing member states, internationally, and

in the host nation. These efforts are easy to misunderstand and can be manipulated by our global and local opponents. At both the local and global level, the enemy will twist facts and use pernicious lies to discredit NATO efforts. The local population will wonder what it is that NATO is teaching their police. Certain international actors may vilify NATO for training security forces that are accused of violating human rights. Furthermore, the domestic population may wonder why their police are stuck on the other side of the world training other police instead of providing security at home. A robust strategic communications capability can address all of these audiences and provide an accurate picture of where the police trainers are, what they are doing, and why this is important to both the host nation and NATO member states. Otherwise, the NATO training mission risks ceding the narrative to the enemy.

The advantages of a training mission executed by NATO include its ability to attract security specialists who have experience applicable to the host nations. As one example, the Iraqis seek to learn from the UK experience in Northern Ireland as they try to reconcile disparate sectarian groups. Having police trainers who have experience in Northern Ireland present at an Iraqi police academy has the potential to be a huge addition to the learning experience for the Iraqi police. Police forces from other NATO countries will also bring applicable experiences with them.

In the end, the most important issue may be the political will to perform the mission. NATO has demonstrated that it can deploy forces overseas to address certain challenges. However, not all countries in the Alliance share the same vision of NATO's role and how to achieve its purpose. Developing an extensive police training capacity would be an expensive project, and one in which security is problematic and the ability to plan and execute in the long term is at a premium. All of these issues require the political leaders of the NATO countries to take the lead and convince their citizens and legislatures that this is a worthwhile project.

Expense is a major issue for NATO countries, especially during the current global economic crisis. However, the case could be made that

a small investment in security in countries where insurgencies rage, where governments are challenged, or where large amounts of territory lie outside of government control, is cheaper in the long run than allowing insurgencies to succeed or allowing criminal and terrorist groups space to organize more attacks on the United States and Europe.

The length of these projects is also daunting. Politicians tend to focus on projects that will manifest themselves during their current term in office. Successfully training a police force for a country takes years, if not a decade or more. And as mentioned above, politicians must also be able to convince their legislatures and constituents that this is a worthwhile project that they should support. The politicians must then continue to support this project with resources and strategic communications so that their country will have the political will to continue it to fruition.

The biggest political concern is likely to be the security of the trainers. Many politicians feel that their citizens will not tolerate casualties in far-off lands. As a consequence, they impose national caveats on the types of operations that their forces are allowed to perform. Many of these caveats revolve around offensive action. As police training is not an offensive action, it should be easier for politicians and their constituents to tolerate. When done properly, however, police training eventually involves placing police mentors and advisors in dangerous positions. The enemy often targets police forces, especially in small villages and hamlets that are located far from timely assistance. Although this is difficult to deal with, in order to succeed in the long term, these isolated areas also need to be protected and police forces need to operate there.

As part of the larger police training program, NATO should develop a special course designed to train police to survive in a counterinsurgency environment. It should also equip these police mentors appropriately if they are deploying to a semi-permissive environment. In addition, the overall police training plan should identify when and where police mentors and advisors are deployed to dangerous areas. The plan should allow for the defense of isolated locations, provide for reaction forces and medical

evacuation in case of emergencies. These actions taken together can mitigate many of the dangers of serving in these locations; however, we should not fool ourselves into thinking that we can plan away all danger. NATO leaders need to be honest and explain the fact that some police trainers may be injured during their deployment. Only by being totally honest will the populations of contributing nations support such opportunities.

Conclusion

There is a very strong need for police training around the world today. There are countries that are beset by insurgencies, countries that are challenged by criminal organizations, and countries where the writ of the government does not hold sway over the entire land. All of these places could use better and larger police forces. These police forces will need training and mentoring. The United States, already overstretched with two simultaneous wars and numerous other deployments, and having institutional, legal and cultural biases against training police forces, is not the optimum solution alone for meeting this requirement. The 28 nations that make up NATO make the Alliance as a whole an ideal source of police training. This training would be less expensive and less offensive than military operations. It is more easily explained to domestic audiences. NATO countries have police forces that already do this type of training, and have expansive police forces at home that are available to provide this training. They have the experience and cultural nous that would make them superb police trainers just about anywhere. All that is lacking is for the NATO countries to grasp this opportunity and make themselves into the premier police trainers in the world.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Fixing Foreign Assistance for Counterinsurgency

Terrence Kelly, Larry Crandall and Laurel Miller

Introduction

Why study the effectiveness of foreign assistance in counterinsurgency?[1] Simply put, because efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated significant shortcomings in the U.S. government's ability to effectively conceive and deliver foreign assistance under these circumstances.[2] What changes are needed to improve U.S. capabilities to design and implement foreign assistance programs that contribute to meeting the goals of counterinsurgency? In order to answer this question, we first address how the objectives of and challenges to foreign assistance in counterinsurgency differ from those in "normal" development circumstances. Next, we look at what changes are needed in order to improve delivery of foreign assistance in counterinsurgency. We frame our discussion around four major and inter-related topics – authorities, resources, practices and organizations. We look at the challenges of designing and delivering foreign assistance in contested areas holistically, as real solutions require all relevant agencies and systems within those agencies to work together, and require adjustments in how work is conducted both in the field and in Washington – in both the executive and legislative branches of government. We also examine the need to work better with host nations. We conclude with recommendations for changes. Some of these would require statutory changes

[1] For a functional definition and reference on foreign assistance, see United States Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development, *U.S. Foreign Assistance Reference Guide*, 2005. As of January 23, 2009: http://rmportal.net/library/VIII/highlevel_faaguide/view.

[2] The literature on these shortcomings is vast, and will not be reviewed in depth here.

and/or reorganization of government agencies. Others would only require new or modified approaches or attitudinal changes, such as improving working arrangements with host governments by recognizing the centrality of their roles.

How does the U.S. government provide foreign assistance?

Foreign assistance is provided through a collection of programs funded by annual appropriations and authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act.[3] These authorities are generally found in Title 22 U.S. Code. Funds tend to be appropriated and sometimes earmarked for specific programs in specific countries. There are exceptions, some of which will be addressed in the following discussion, but, importantly, in most cases funding cannot be moved from one program/country pairing to another – or even from one project to another within a country when urgent new needs arise – without congressional notification and acquiescence.[4] Furthermore, even when they can be made, such changes can create real bureaucratic challenges among agencies and posts and consume considerable time.

With the exception of military assistance (Title 22 programs broadly overseen by the Department of State but executed by the Defense Department), the principal agencies for the delivery of foreign assistance are the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and certain functional bureaus of the Department of State.[5] These entities design and manage programs, but for the most part do not conduct programs them-

[3] Under normal circumstances, foreign assistance funding is provided by the Commerce, State, and Justice subcommittees of the Senate and House appropriations committees, as part of the annual appropriations cycle. However, for Iraq and Afghanistan most funds come through supplemental appropriations that are "off-budget" and so not broken down as separate bills under the jurisdiction of the respective appropriations subcommittees, though they still play major roles in the legislative process.

[4] Upon notification, Congress has 15 legislative days within which to object; if there is no objection, the notified action may proceed.

[5] These include the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau and the Population, Refugees and Migration Bureau.

selves. Rather, they employ program managers who oversee contracts with and grants to private companies and non-governmental organizations. Other funds are administered by special agencies and offices established for this purpose.[6]

In the most general sense, this system works more or less as intended when there is sufficient time to identify long-term development needs, coordinate approaches, design programs, publish requests for proposals, obtain and review contract and grant proposals, and execute programs. Program accountability is achieved by defining and documenting program objectives, performance metrics, and reporting requirements. There are exceptions to this need to plan ahead of time and execute as planned. Emergency humanitarian assistance, which works on a contingency basis, is a notable example. However, in these cases additional flexibility in planning and execution is usually provided by the Congress, such as the indefinite fiscal year availability of Migration and Refugee Assistance funds, or the "notwithstanding" authority recurrently given to USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives.

The opportunity to plan and resource efforts well in advance is almost never available in counterinsurgency. In these cases, needs arise quickly and often are unforeseen, and the delivery of assistance should be flexible enough to meet changing needs and conditions on the ground.[7] This leads us to our next consideration.

How does foreign assistance in counterinsurgency differ from foreign assistance in "normal" circumstances?

Three major factors that differentiate providing foreign assistance in counterinsurgency and in "normal" circumstances: the purpose of pro-

[6] For examples, see *U.S. Foreign Assistance Guidelines*, January, 2005, p.17-18.

[7] In some circumstances, particularly for extended counterinsurgency operations, developing multi-year assistance strategies also will be important in order to address needs such as capacity building and security force training.

viding assistance, the need for flexibility, and the effect of violence on assistance programs. In "normal" circumstances there is no significant violent opposition to the host nation's government or to U.S. assistance efforts, and each element of foreign assistance is designed to fill a specified need. For example, development assistance (DA) is designed to provide " ... sustained support of the people of developing countries in their efforts to acquire the knowledge and resources essential to development and to build the economic, political, and social institutions which will improve the quality of their lives."[8] DA programs usually are administered by USAID, in principle without much oversight from or connectivity to other elements of the U.S. presence in a country.[9] The principal – and often sole – purpose of these efforts is self-evident: i.e., improvements in agriculture, education or governance that will lead to economic growth and other positive social benefits.

In counterinsurgency the principal purpose of foreign assistance is to help the host nation's government stabilize the political and security situation in the country. This translates in practical terms into such programs as creating jobs, transitioning combatants out of militant formations, and promoting security sector and justice system reforms. These are types of programs that can help the host nation improve its political and governance effectiveness, legitimacy and reach – in reality and in the public's perception – and decrease the appeal of the violent opposition. This in turn helps the government suppress violent actors.

These objectives imply that determining what foreign assistance efforts should be undertaken must be part of a larger plan that integrates all civilian and military efforts and reflects larger and more overt political considerations. Specifically, such foreign assistance efforts must be linked to U.S. diplomatic efforts and to military efforts to address the security situation. The three Ds – Diplomacy, Development and Defense – must be part of a single unified effort to succeed.

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[8] The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), Chapters 1 and 10 of Part I, as quoted in the *U.S. Foreign Assistance Guide.* This is the authorizing statute for development assistance.

[9] The reality varies; some U.S. ambassadors engage actively in shaping USAID projects and strategies in their countries.

Though the primary providers of foreign assistance may not differ in "normal" and counterinsurgency environments, the demands and constraints placed on these providers will. In some cases, authorities may be insufficient for an agency to perform a needed mission in contested circumstances. For example, USAID is often the best-equipped agency to manage the reintegration component of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs, but sometimes is blocked by current statutory and regulatory restrictions.[10] In addition, the capacity limitations of U.S. agencies in some cases leave them unable to meet the resource requirements or time constraints common in counterinsurgency environments. With regard to resource constraints, security sector reform, for example, often requires capacity development in security-related agencies, yet USAID — the principal U.S. government agency with the technical skills and experience in developing bureaucratic capacity, has not been the primary actor in doing this in either Iraq or Afghanistan. As a final example, State International Narcotic and Law Enforcement (INL) is the lead entity for police training, yet lacks the capacity and skills to do so in violent circumstances, while U.S. law enforcement agencies are denied the opportunity to lead because of the structure of the U.S bureaucracy.

Policy makers responsible for foreign assistance emphasize fiscal accountability and formal assessments of progress. While these requirements may be manageable in normal circumstances, counterinsurgency often demands more flexibility in spending and execution than these requirements permit.[11] For example, contracts with firm deliverable criteria and dates are expected in normal circumstances, but can be unhelpful in high-

[10] Author's personal experience developing DDR policies and programs in Iraq for the CPA in 2004. Many of the "R" programs in DDR are natural fits for USAID; however, some "DD" programs are normally outside of USAID's portfolio. USAID can usually conduct reintegration programs once combatants have been demobilized, and can even assist in disarming under some circumstances, according to interviews with USAID legal staff. According to a former State Department official in Iraq, however, vocational training for former combatants was funded by the Defense Department because of USAID resistance on legal grounds.

[11] According to a former State Department official in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) repeatedly criticized efforts to change the focus and use of Iraq Reconstruction Fund monies to respond to changing circumstances, and both SIGIR and the Government Accountability Office insisted on clear strategies and mileposts.

ly dynamic situations. These differences are discussed further below.

The third major difference between the delivery of foreign assistance in normal and counterinsurgency situations is the presence of violent actors who may threaten those delivering assistance. If diplomats and development experts must travel in armed convoys wearing helmets and flak vests, then they are greatly restricted in what they can do and how they can do it. Yet, it is often in exactly these circumstances that their efforts are most important. For example, if winning the allegiance of the population is critical to defeating an insurgency, then, once some minimal level of security is established, the population's other basic needs and expectations must be met. In order to be most effective, efforts to do this must be undertaken before an area is perfectly safe, as explored below.

Organizations, authorities, resources and practices

As explained above, in counterinsurgency environments – just as in "normal" circumstances – civilian agencies ought to perform those foreign assistance functions that are inherently civilian in nature, and should be properly designed, managed and resourced to perform the required tasks and, importantly, work more collaboratively. If civilian foreign assistance providers need to deliver foreign assistance more effectively, then what authorities, resources, practices, and organizations are needed in the field and in Washington to succeed? We explore these questions in the following sections.

Authorities and funding mechanisms

Authorities for foreign assistance are not structured for counterinsurgency. The Foreign Assistance Act and Foreign Operations appropriations bills do not provide the flexibility or agility needed to create, fund, and operate programs that must be put in place on short notice or that require changes in the middle of program execution in contested areas. We identify three categories of issues concerning authorities and funding

channels that should be addressed in order to make the provision of foreign assistance during counterinsurgency operations more agile than it currently is.

First, it can be difficult to make funds available quickly when a counterinsurgency operation arises. Foreign assistance funds are authorized and appropriated for specific purposes and countries according to a budget process that takes from several months (if a supplemental appropriation is used) to more than a year (for the regular appropriations process). Funds then allocated by an agency for a particular program in a particular country cannot be moved to another program or country without notifying and providing Congress an opportunity to block the transfer – a process that can be lengthy, depending on whether members of Congress raise concerns, does not guarantee a positive outcome, and taxes limited staff.

Second, the expenditure of foreign assistance funds is subject to certain legal restrictions and limitations.[12] These include prohibitions on aid to countries that fit into certain categories – e.g., major drug producers, countries that expropriate the property of U.S. citizens, and sponsors of terrorism; a bar on aid to certain named countries – e.g., Cuba; and restrictions on what aid can be used for – e.g. assistance to police. In practice, such restrictions can be circumvented through waivers (which can be time-consuming to obtain) or use of "notwithstanding" authority provided in legislation,[13] or apply to countries (such as Cuba) that would not be provided aid in any event for policy reasons. In addition, in some cases prohibitions apply only to assistance to a government, leaving open the opportunity to provide aid directly to the people of a country or through NGOs.

[12] See Center for Strategic & International Studies, "A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States," pp. 19-26, 61-65 (March 2008).

[13] Congress often grants "notwithstanding" authority. It can be provided for discrete efforts and as a blanket authority for organizations with missions for which it is deemed appropriate (e.g., the Office of Transition Initiatives at USAID). For a list of examples of "notwithstanding" authorities, see Center for Strategic & International Studies, "A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States," p. 60 (March 2008). Such authority is seldom used, however, because of the risk that congressional appropriators will effectively penalize its use.

The two most significant limitations from the perspective of counterinsurgency operations are (1) the prohibition on use of economic aid to support military objectives (an essential tool of counterinsurgency); and (2) the restriction on using foreign aid for training foreign police.[14] The latter has been almost entirely eroded through the legislation of multiple exceptions, including very broad exceptions for "community-based" policing assistance and post-conflict assistance. But eliminating the restriction altogether could help clear the way for improving U.S. capacity to build police forces that can assume responsibility for security in counterinsurgency environments, as this would remove any remaining ambiguities.

Third, the multiplicity of foreign assistance accounts, and the multiple agencies and offices that manage programs under those accounts, create a bureaucratic tangle of legislative provisions, regulations and responsible officials. In counterinsurgency, navigating that tangle in order to put together rapidly a coherent package of foreign assistance for a country or region takes on special urgency. Consequently, for these circumstances, authority over foreign assistance program planning and funding allocation, and responsibility for negotiation and consultation with legislators should be concentrated and located with the civilian and military decision-makers who are responsible for the counterinsurgency operation. Consolidation of authority over how the foreign assistance dollars are spent would help minimize bureaucratic obstacles and delays, and would ensure that the assistance strategy is directly tied to the diplomatic and military strategy for reducing violence and promoting political stability.

Special authority of the type that could address all three categories of issues for counterinsurgency is provided by the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act[15] and the Freedom Support Act (FSA).[16] The SEED Act, for central and eastern Europe, and the FSA, for countries of the former Soviet Union, provide the State Department with a consolidated channel of significant funds together with relative bureaucratic flex-

[14] Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act.
[15] SEED Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-179).
[16] FREEDOM Support Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-511).

ibility for assistance programs for the relevant countries. The assistance Coordinator created by this legislation, a Washington-based senior State Department official, is authorized to:

1. move funds between programs and countries and across agency budgets with relatively minimal Congressional oversight (notifications are still required) and with or without the concurrence of the Chiefs of Mission in the affected countries;
2. provide assistance "notwithstanding" other provisions of law;
3. set region-wide funding priorities; and
4. act as the authoritative Executive Branch representative to the Congress with respect to the funds and programs under the Coordinator's authority.

Adopting a SEED/FSA type of approach to foreign assistance for counterinsurgency operations could require legislation creating a new funding account and designating the responsible decision-maker for allocating funds under the account. The legislation could provide that such a person be located either in Washington or in the field, at the President's discretion, depending on the circumstances. The account could be made available for use in any country, upon presidential determination of the need to access the account, based on criteria specified in the legislation. Provision could be made for shifting funds to the new account from others once a counterinsurgency operation arises,[17] so that funds can be made quickly available pending a supplemental or regular appropriation. The Stafford Act, which provides authorities and funding for reaction to domestic disasters upon presidential declaration of an emergency, offers an example of the type of authority needed to quickly ramp a foreign assistance program during a counterinsurgency operation.[18] This act specifies

[17] Current legislation already contains some provisions for transferring funds among accounts for contingencies.

[18] Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 93-288, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 5121-5207 (Public Law 100-707).

types of actions that may be taken, the agencies responsible for these actions, and reporting requirements to the Congress. It also provides funds immediately upon invocation.[19] A similar set of authorities would position the executive branch to react quickly and decisively at the beginning of a counterinsurgency operation.

Resources

Resources fall into two major categories – fiscal and human. Fiscal resources are intimately tied to authorities and organizations, and have been addressed above. One issue not yet addressed is whether the amount of funds requested by the President and provided by the Congress for foreign assistance and the organizations that provide assistance is adequate. While this paper cannot explore this issue generally, it is worth noting that for Iraq a strong argument can be made that the assistance funds provided were more than adequate but not well spent.[20] That said, funding for U.S. efforts in Iraq has been hugely imbalanced: according to one senior State Department official, ninety-eight percent of funds provided for Iraq went at one time to the military and only two percent to all other efforts, despite consistent statements about the importance of the political and economic issues at hand.[21]

A separate fiscal resources issue concerns funding of efforts to expand and improve the capacity of existing organizations (e.g., USAID) to provide foreign assistance. Such efforts are underway, but funding has not met policy goals as of this writing. Further, new organizations such as the State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) have been created but not funded to meet requirements. Perhaps most notably, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has on multiple occasions called for greater funding for development and the organizations that

[19] Contingency funding for humanitarian emergencies provides a further possible model.
[20] See the many SIGIR reports for details of problematic spending.
[21] Author discussion in 2006 with Bradford Higgins, who would later become Assistant Secretary of State for Resource Management, Chief Financial Officer.

conduct it, as this would relieve the Defense Department of these tasks, but the call has not been fully heeded.

Human resources can be viewed from two angles – quantity and quality. We note that the number of people required to deliver foreign assistance is an issue that is currently under debate. The paucity of FSOs (in USAID in particular) compared with the enhanced requirements posed by Iraq and Afghanistan, and the issue of whether USAID needs government personnel to deliver foreign assistance rather than program managers who contract for its delivery, are issues frequently raised.[22] Provincial Reconstruction Teams provide a good example. PRTs can be seen as an *ad hoc* effort to create the capabilities existent in USAID in 1970 – an indicator that the U.S. government does need some ability to do more with its own personnel, as contractors cannot be expected to operate in dangerous circumstances in the absence of exorbitant compensation (e.g. liability issues are significant).[23] This paper will not render a judgment on the proper government/contractor mix for the delivery of foreign assistance, other than to observe that the need for more government employees – FSOs, civil servants or temporary hires – to do this work is indicated by recent experience. An analysis that looks at requirements and costs over recent history and takes into consideration mid-term projections of needs is required to address this issue.

The quality of personnel needed is also important. As noted above, the failure of the CPA was due in part to the dearth of qualified personnel it was able to field.[24] The leadership qualities and other skills required of those responsible for foreign assistance in counterinsurgency include not only the technical expertise needed for delivering foreign assistance under normal conditions but also an understanding of what is required and the

[22] The shortfall in FSOs in USAID has been recognized, and authority for additional hiring provided. However, at the time of this writing, the funds to pay for this increase have not been provided.

[23] See Terrence Kelly, "PRT Lessons from Iraq" in *Operationalizing a Comprehensive Approach in Semi-permissive Environments*, NATO Defense College, Christopher Schnaubelt, ed., 2009.

[24] See, among many things, Terrence Kelly et al., *Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing: Developing U.S. Civilian Personnel Capabilities*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2008.

physical and mental ability to lead and work in dangerous situations. The normal promotion systems in civilian organizations do not explicitly consider these additional characteristics, nor are the assignment systems at State and USAID aimed at identifying the people best suited for counterinsurgency and quickly deploying them – involuntarily if need be – to these places. According to one senior FSO interviewed for this work who has had considerable experience over a long career in dangerous places, success in these circumstances requires people who are willing and able to assess and take reasonable risks.

These observations indicate that the systems that hire and promote civilians who work in dangerous places are not attuned to these needs, and there are not enough civilian government employees to do the work.

Without adjustments that:

- identify and fund proper staffing levels;
- identify and promote leaders and technicians capable of operating effectively in counterinsurgency;
- efficiently tap into civilian expertise, perhaps through use of innovative approaches such as a civilian reserve corps,[25] and
- identify and assign the proper people where they are needed in counterinsurgency,

effective foreign assistance will not be delivered. Note that without this element, better authorities, sufficient resources, good practices and well-designed organizations will not suffice. People are central to success in counterinsurgency.

Oversight

The Duke of Wellington once asked, in response to an admonition from London to better account for his supplies and equipment, for

[25] The State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction is developing such a corps. Even if fully realized, however, the corps will not fully resolve either the quantity or quality problems identified here.

guidance on whether he should train clerks or fight Napoleon, as he could not do both. As this anecdote indicates, oversight of resources is an area in which peacetime rules can hinder success in counterinsurgency. Put simply, during conflicts the machinery needed for properly assessing programs and accounting for resources may either be impossible to employ — because of the potential for violence, the dynamic nature of the situation, or time and personnel constraints — or may not work well, because of the limited availability of data.[26] However, government officials still bear responsibility for proper use of taxpayers' money. There exists a tension between effectiveness and accountability in counterinsurgency that is more powerful than in normal development conditions and needs to be addressed by reviewing statutory and regulatory oversight authorities. This task is critical. If to succeed a person must put his or her career on the line and possibly even skirt the law, in addition to possibly risking his or her life, then the enterprise is in jeopardy.

In the conduct of this study, we interviewed many current and former foreign assistance practitioners and scholars. All with whom we discussed this issue recognized this tension, but none had concrete recommendations for how to address it. Several indicated that there is sufficient leeway in current laws and regulations to create "work-arounds" and get special permissions, and that the key is leaders focused on accomplishing the task at hand and willing to roll up their sleeves and work hard to make efforts succeed. We believe that the responsibility for crafting programs that will work should not depend on leaders in the field coming up with imaginative ways to work around the rules, but rather a set of rules that would permit this to happen in a natural way. More work is needed to identify the specific changes to statute and regulation required to do this.

[26] Collecting data in conflict situations is not only difficult, but the veracity of the data is hard to ensure; author's personal experience.

Practices

Many U.S. capability shortfalls in providing foreign assistance are self-inflicted and stem from harmful practices. Here, we address three principal questions:

- Should Washington direct actions in the field?
- How much information is too much?
- How can risk management be more helpful?

Furthermore, successful practices are often not captured and institutionalized. Good practices need to be identified and institutionalized, and bad ones memorialized and eradicated.

Should Washington direct actions in the field?

Washington's role is to set policy, provide resources and to perform tasks that cannot easily be done in the field (e.g. coordinating with a host of international organizations and NGOs), and the role of leaders in the field is to provide advice to policy makers, execute policy and spend resources in well-crafted operations and programs. The right balance between authority in the field and in the capital will be unique to each situation, but there are some general rules of thumb. In particular, a balance must be struck between information demands from Washington and time constraints in the field. Washington wants to know as much as possible about how things are transpiring in the field, and often tries to direct operations from afar. This results in Washington levying tremendous requirements for gathering, arranging and reporting information, and officials not in touch with the current situation and indigenous players calling the shots. Decisions made by officials not in touch with the current situation can be quite damaging to U.S. interests. An example from U.S. experiences in Afghanistan during the 1980s illustrates this well, and shows that this phenomenon, though made more prevalent by information technology, is not new.

A certain Mullah Malang was in complete control of all opium production in southern Afghanistan, the sales proceeds of which he used to buy weapons and support troops to fight the Soviets. He wanted to meet the Ambassador to discuss a deal that would have the U.S. repair the hydro-electric facility at Kajakai Dam in the Helmand Valley as well as other assistance in exchange for ceasing opium production in that area. USAID arranged a meeting with him and the Embassy narcotics officer. The USAID Mission Director told him that the United States would give him resources now paid for by narcotics revenues if he would shut down production. He agreed. USAID Washington was informed of the arrangement.

After the growing season, the U.S. Mission carried out a triple inspection – DEA, USAID and the CIA all verified his compliance by different methods.

When it became apparent that USAID would have to follow through with support to an erstwhile narco-trafficker, a Washington-based high-level USAID official cancelled the deal at the eleventh hour after the U.S. Mission had started giving him what he needed to remain politically credible with his mujahideen and narco-trafficking cohorts. Left with no choice, the Mission terminated assistance. Mullah Malang's enemies soon learned of this and murdered him, literally cutting him in half with four blazing AK-47s on a busy street during daylight hours in Peshawar. The lesson was not lost on many Afghans.

Opium production immediately began anew. This story lives on in southern Afghanistan and contributes to today's reality that Afghanistan is now the largest illicit opium producer in the world, the proceeds of which helps fund Islamist extremists.[27]

Clear and useful practices are needed in defining the respective roles of Washington and officials in the field, and discipline should be exercised in following these guidelines to make sure that the best outcome is achieved. The President should instruct his principal Washington advisors to focus on

[27] Interviews with, and emails from, Ambassador Robert Oakley, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan at the time of this event; Larry Crandall, the USAID Mission Director, and his Narcotics officer, Phyllis Oakley, later to become Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research at State.

such roles as policy formulation, international coordination and the provision of resources, and insist that the key leaders at post and in the field be permitted to discharge their responsibilities without undue meddling from Washington. He should also insist that key leaders at post or in the field do so effectively, and relieve them if they are unable to achieve results.

How much information (for Washington) is too much?

Policy makers in Washington need current information to assess progress in counterinsurgency so that they can develop policy, coordinate and provide resources. However, information requirements need to recognize the size and capabilities of deployed staffs. This problem is particularly acute when civilian and military staffs are both deployed on an operation, owing to the much larger, more capable and formal military staffs. When military and civilian leadership in country and Washington demand data of deployed personnel, civilian staffs often cannot service these requests, or can only do so by devoting a disproportionate amount of time and effort to data collection and reporting to the detriment of the tasks they are charged to perform.

Military staffs are more capable, not only because of their size and character, but also because of their access to data, which is facilitated by greater access to the country and its people – as a result of the military's ability to operate in violent areas. Furthermore, military staffs and operators are distinct – for example, staffs do not conduct kinetic operations during the day and perform staff work at night. Civilian staffs, on the other hand, are often exactly the same people who conduct engagements with host nation personnel during the day. Large demands on the staff preclude them from conducting these engagements.[28] In some circumstances, advantages could be achieved by combining staffs. This discrepancy exists in Washington as well, where DoD staffs are large and formal, and civilian agency staffs smaller and less well-resourced. How to get the most from all staffs is an area for further investigation.

[28] Author observations, Iraq, 2006-2007.

This underscores a point made earlier: the President should ensure that his principal advisors stay focused on policy and resource issues, and not on running efforts in country from Washington. Doing so would limit the information needs of those in Washington and relieve those in country of unnecessary reporting requirements (e.g., on programmatic or operational level details). If valid information requirements – i.e. those needed for policy formulation or resource allocation – cannot be met with existing staffs, then staff resources should be increased.

How can risk management be more helpful?

Risk management in civilian organizations during counterinsurgency is the responsibility of the Ambassador, the Regional Security Officer (RSO) at the U.S. Embassy, and the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). Without reasonable security procedures, civilian officials responsible for planning and supervising the delivery of foreign assistance cannot work safely – or at all.

Our interviews raised two bedrock issues that need to be addressed:

- What is the risk to be managed?
- How should an organization take responsibility for risk?

Currently, according to some of our interviewees, the current approach to risk is one that focuses primarily on risk to people and locations. However, the system must also consider risk to the overall mission. According to one senior State Department official, this is because diplomatic security personnel are evaluated according to whether they keep their charges safe, not whether the overall diplomatic mission succeeds.[29] Without factoring in risk to the overall mission, the approach is one of risk avoidance, not risk management. In places where risk avoid-

[29] Interview with David Kilcullen, former Counterinsurgency advisor to former Secretary Rice, October 2008.

ance is the approach, the task of factoring in risk to the mission with other risks falls to individual FSOs or other civilian personnel. In particular, one senior State official we talked to indicated that many seek to work around the restrictions placed on them by the RSO, and so they individually assume the entire burden of risk management – in the form of personal risks that they may not be well placed to judge, as well as risks to their careers should they be caught violating policy.

While this study did not include the kind of data collection that would be needed to substantiate or refute these assessments on the part of senior officials, these statements ring true because of the authors' experiences. Experiences in less violent dangerous operations, such as those in the Balkans in the 1990s until today, have not suffered from these same failures.[30] However, operations in more violent places indicate clear characteristics that diplomatic security needs to have in order to facilitate the foreign assistance mission. First, the approach to risk needs to consider and balance risk to people, facilities and the mission. A "no casualties" policy can be achieved by never deploying diplomatic and developmental officers in harm's way. Second, risk management must be distributed across the organization, not concentrated in individuals. This can only be achieved by a risk management policy that takes into consideration the diplomatic and developmental missions. Third, the Ambassador must be involved in risk management, as he or she is best placed to balance risk to people and facilities with risk to the overall mission.[31] And lastly, the State Department should have a career officer with a diplomatic rather than security background as either the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security or his or her principal deputy, to better ensure a holistic approach.[32]

[30] The operations in the Balkans involved not a single casualty, military or civilian. Civilian government employees were able to travel throughout Bosnia and Kosovo freely almost from the day of NATO's arrival, and the military was never called upon to do essentially civilian tasks, other than some public order functions in the opening weeks before the civilian police missions were fully staffed. Neither was there any resistance in Haiti, Germany or Japan. (Email exchange with Ambassador James Dobbins, February 2009)

[31] Such an approach was implemented by Ambassador Ryan Crocker (author interviews with RSO personnel, Baghdad, October 2008).

[32] David Kilcullen, October 2008.

Organization

In this section we review the way the civilian providers of foreign assistance are organized in Washington and typically organized in the field during counterinsurgency, and identify the issues that hamper the delivery of foreign assistance in these circumstances. We address the question, "What changes in organization in Washington and the field would improve delivery of foreign assistance in counterinsurgency?" We conclude that greater unity of effort in both Washington and the field would yield significant advances in the contribution that foreign assistance makes to U.S. foreign policy goals. We present some thoughts on how this could be done, but make no firm conclusions on a best approach. Further analysis that pulls together the many efforts that are considering this issue would be helpful.

The executive branch – in Washington

Organization in Washington can be viewed as having three principal inter-related functions – the development of policy, international coordination, and the provision of resources. Foreign assistance (other than purely humanitarian aid) at its best is a set of strategic plans and a suite of programs that translates foreign policy goals into effects abroad that promote U.S. interests.

The U.S. government is principally designed for peacetime conditions, and many civilian agencies are not equipped to operate in and contribute to resolving conflicts. In the Executive Branch in Washington, there is no organizational structure that brings all civilian (to say nothing of the military) players together under one manager, apart from the President. Each agency has its own structures, goals and incentives, which often clash. They are not designed to facilitate counterinsurgency or unity of effort. Further, these structures and incentives are hard to change for a counterinsurgency when in the rest of the world they are operating on a peacetime basis. For example, the Department of State is organized and staffed for normal diplomatic missions. To staff major efforts such as in Iraq in the

early period, it must move Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) out of existing positions. Importantly, the civilian side of government, with rare exceptions, has no "float" of personnel waiting to deploy. Unlike the military, which is organized to deploy to wherever emergencies crop up, almost all civilian employees are always "deployed" in existing jobs.[33] FSOs serve in counterinsurgency in accordance with their desire to do so, as facilitated by the peacetime bidding system. Furthermore, FSO incentive systems have historically been structured largely for peacetime, and officers who go "out of cone" or normal jobs can be perceived as non-traditional officers (though this may be changing, because of the large percentage of officers who have now served in Iraq or Afghanistan).[34]

It should come as no surprise that civilian organizations across all agencies that participate in counterinsurgency do not automatically work well together. It took 40 years after World War II to reorganize the Department of War and the Department of the Navy into one organization – the Defense Department (the National Security Act of 1947) – and create the incentive systems needed to force the services to work well together (the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986). These efforts came about as the result of the recognition that distinct organizations will follow their own interests, and that to change this strong incentive systems were needed to force joint behavior. Furthermore, it took Congress rather than the Executive Branch to do this. There is no reason to believe that things are different in the civilian elements of government – the organizations and incentive structures are not in place to create effective joint civilian efforts.[35] Without changes designed for the tasks envisioned, true unified efforts remain unlikely.

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[33] This is particularly true for civilians with specialized expertise who are not employed in a foreign affairs or national security agency.

[34] According to many Foreign Service Officers, service in Iraq or Afghanistan does not provide enhanced career benefits, despite the physical risks, though the validity of this complaint is difficult to verify. Such service does come with enhanced financial compensation.

[35] Robert Komer's *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S. – GVN Performance in Vietnam*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1972, is still relevant. Kelly's impressions from almost two years in Iraq indicate that the shortcomings in structure and incentives highlighted in this important document are still quite damaging to U.S. efforts today. Crandall's experience in Iraq and Afghanistan (post-1975) also corroborates this point.

The principal deliverers of foreign assistance, excluding military assistance, are the State Department and USAID. Within these agencies, control of planning, programs and funding varies depending on the type of funding. In general, control of funds implies control of programs. The recipients of funding - implementing partners outside of government as well as semi-autonomous actors who receive earmarked funding – are responsible for program development, hiring contractors and overseeing program execution. This means that the line of control for programs runs from parent agencies in Washington to program managers who may or may not be in country. To bridge potential and real gaps in coordination between the State Department and USAID, Secretary Rice created the position of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance, dual-hatted as the USAID Administrator. Unfortunately, this process of foreign assistance coordination has focused primarily on budgeting and has not resulted in the marriage of policy, planning and programming as was originally hoped.[36]

Policy in the State Department – particularly that regarding a given country or region – is principally the domain of the regional bureaus (which oversee the U.S. embassies in foreign countries), the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and the Secretary and her or his key advisors. While Ambassadors work ultimately for the President and the Secretary of State, as a practical matter they generally take direction from the regional bureaus.[37] If they are career foreign service officers, they usually have spent large parts of their career in these same bureaus. While ambassadors have responsibility for foreign assistance programs within their individual countries,[38] foreign assistance design and implementation is the purview of

[36] Interviews with current and former State and USAID officials, September and October, 2008.

[37] Iraq and Afghanistan have at times been exceptions. During the Bush Administration, the National Security Council directly managed Iraq policy. In the current Administration, a special envoy outside of the bureau structure manages Afghanistan policy.

[38] An ambassador cannot compel USAID to fund any project to which it objects, but no assistance project in a particular country can be carried out without the ambassador's approval. That said, in many peacetime and some conflict environments, chiefs of mission choose to exercise their authority over assistance programs lightly or are subject to political or bureaucratic pressures to agree to particular projects. In conflict environments, such pressures have tended to be much reduced, and presently in Iraq and Afghanistan former ambassadors have been appointed as deputies to the chiefs of mission to oversee all non-military assistance programs.

USAID and the functional bureaus at State. Therefore overall responsibility for policy and diplomatic relations, on the one hand, and foreign assistance, on the other, are separate.

Further splitting program responsibility from foreign policy, Congress has earmarked some funds so that neither State nor USAID have much control over how they are spent. A prime example of this practice is the funding provided to the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) for democracy related programs. These programs run with little programmatic control by the U.S. government, including embassies.

One result of these arrangements that (1) split policy and program management responsibility and authority, and (2) provide stringent rules on how money may be used and moved, is that foreign assistance funding and programs, once appropriated and launched, tend to be very inflexible unless special authorities exist. Furthermore, because of the dynamic nature of conflict areas, foreign assistance that is funded through normal channels may not be responsive enough to keep up with changes in policy and priorities. The SEED and the Freedom Support Acts provide examples of such special authorities.

To rectify some of these problems, the principal civilian elements of counterinsurgency – diplomacy and development – must work better together. This is hindered by the different agendas and incentives that exist in the State Department and USAID. Suggestions on how to do this range from legislative proposals that would unify diplomacy and development, similar to the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols act,[39] to more modest proposals such as the creation of S/CRS.

[39] This approach was supported by, for example, a majority of the HELP Commission members. See *Beyond Assistance: The HELP Commission Report on Foreign Assistance Reform*, December 2007, pp. 7-8. Other viable options aimed at achieving the same objectives are outlined in the report. See also the *Project for National Security Reform* for further analysis of this problem, www.pnsr.org/web/page/682/sectionid/579/pagelevel/2/interior.asp.

The executive branch post, and its interactions with Washington

The Chief of Mission is almost always the senior U.S. official in country. He or she chairs the country team and formally oversees the actions of its members, but in practice oversight is shared with the country team members' home agencies. For example, just as diplomatic and program managing agencies are often separate in Washington, they are usually separate in country. The USAID Mission Director works under the authority of the Chief of Mission, but receives program funding and support (e.g. legal, contracting) from USAID in Washington. Program oversight is often more strongly linked to Washington than to the CoM. With respect to incentives, the Ambassador typically rates the USAID Mission Director, but the senior political person in the oversight bureau at USAID pens the review. For this reason, promotion and job selection are influenced as much or more by USAID Washington's impressions of the Mission Director's performance as by the Ambassador's impressions. The Chief of Mission has even less control over some other members of the country team. Though not the focus of this report, military personnel who provide the military assistance element of foreign assistance and the Defense Attaché – all part of the Country Team and in theory under the direction of the Ambassador – are much more firmly attached to their military chains of command, where they are rated, then to the U.S. Mission.[40]

It is worth noting that the military operates under a different model, which has significant advantages over the country team model in that it is able in general to achieve true unity of command. In particular, there are clearly defined "command and control" relationships that cause military units to work together and make clear what is expected. In most cases, all personnel are rated by members of the command, and receive their funding and support from it (though there are important exceptions).[41] In particular, there are clearly defined "command and control" relation-

[40] See Kelly et al., *Security Assistance Organizations in the Country Team: Options for Success*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, forthcoming in 2009.

[41] For example, in Iraq and Afghanistan the special operations forces fighting global terrorism are outside of the local commander's command and control.

ships that cause military units to work together and make clear what is expected.

Although foreign assistance is something that the civilian side of the U.S. government in theory controls, in counterinsurgency similar programs are often run by the military – e.g. through the use of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which have often been spent without regard to the foreign assistance strategies developed by the U.S. Mission. Moreover, civilians require military cooperation to deliver foreign assistance, for security and other considerations. Such overlaps and linkages have led to calls for "unity of effort" among civilian and military actors so that their work is complementary and geared to a single set of goals.[42] Unfortunately, "unity of effort" is often a euphemism for the fact that it is too difficult to put one person – civilian or military – in charge of the overall effort. Significant disagreements on crucial elements of successful efforts such as goals, conceptual approaches, operations and investments significantly harm U.S. efforts.[43] For example, CERP tends to focus on security goals and force protection, which tend to be short-term in nature, whereas foreign assistance may ignore valid security concerns in favor of development, which is long-term in nature. These differences in approach can lead to efforts that are at cross-purposes.

Yet there are at least two, and arguably three, successful examples in U.S. history in which the United States did in fact place military and civilians under one leader. The first was in the Philippines (1900 – 1910), where President McKinley appointed William Howard Taft Governor General with authority over the substantial military presence. A different model was used in Vietnam in the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program (CORDS), initiated in 1967, which operated as part of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) under the *command* of a civilian Deputy Commander of MACV, with MACV –

[42] Joint Campaign Plans in Iraq have been produced since Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey published the first jointly developed plan in April 2006. Unfortunately, they do not assure unity of effort.

[43] Kelly's experiences in 2004 and 2006-2007 as a member of the CPA and later Embassy Baghdad staffs, and in August and October 2008 when conducting an assessment of the PRT effort in Iraq.

for this purpose – subordinate to the ambassador.[44] In CORDS, the integration of military and civilian personnel extended from Robert Komer and later William Colby, all the way down to the district level. Significantly, it was a joint U.S.-Government of Vietnam program as well. Furthermore, the British counterinsurgency history provides similar successes, most notably during the Malayan Emergency.[45] Lastly, during the "Soviet era" in Afghanistan from 1979-89, covert and overt programs were well managed by Embassy Islamabad through close coordination among USAID, the intelligence community (US and Pakistani) and the resistance forces as well as other actors like the Saudis, UAE and UK. Effective arrangements in this case depended mostly on local and highly flexible bureaucratic fixes and good interpersonal relationships, and not on Washington-based "coordinators." So-called "special envoys to the resistance" were appointed and made field trips, but their contributions and influence were negligible on field operations and, some would argue, on policy making in Washington as well. However, no large military units were present.

For completeness, one must note that bifurcated arrangements have worked in the past. Most notable is the Ambassador Crocker-General Petraeus team in Iraq. Yet in the same conflict, disastrous results have occurred with other dual-leader arrangements. One might conclude that traditional methods can work given the right personalities, but it would be better to design less personality-dependent arrangements. To the extent that this is true, organizational arrangements that do more to ensure unity of effort seem promising. However, senior U.S. leaders, including the President, should insist upon teamwork between their civilian and military

[44] This may be the only time in which civilians "commanded" military forces. Though Vietnam is widely believed to have been a failure at all levels, CORDS did in fact largely succeed in pacifying South Vietnam after 1968. An important element of CORDS' success was the interweaving of civilian and military authorities and capabilities, rather than a subordination of one to the other.

[45] For a detailed look at how that effort was organized, see Robert Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, RAND Corporation, 1972. For an exposition of the British principals, see Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam*.

subordinates and put people in place who will work in that manner; no organizational arrangement can fully replace such an approach.

Finally, there are significant challenges in the connection between Washington and the field, discussed previously.
The discussion above illustrates the fact that the country team is a useful organizational construct that aims to provide a coordination mechanism and achieve unity of effort on the civilian side at post, but one that falls short of what the military would call unity of command. The Chief of Mission has great influence over the representatives of the different agencies resident in country, but often does not directly affect their budgets, programs, or personnel (short of sending personnel home), unless special authority is granted.

We look next at an organizational structure that has been used when such special authorities are provided – the Coordinator for SEED/FSA. The authorities provided by this model would be useful in solving many of the foreign assistance challenges that Chiefs of Mission currently face in counterinsurgency, but there are questions as to how this model should be translated to counterinsurgency operation environments that might have very different political and geographic contexts.

First, should such authority be vested in a Chief of Mission or a Washington authority, such as the SEED/FSA Coordinator? If a counterinsurgency operation is limited to one country, then a strong argument exists for establishing no new organization, but rather providing the Chief of Mission concerned with appropriate authorities.

However, one of the key tasks of the SEED/FSA Coordinator is interacting with the Congress, and a Chief of Mission involved in a counterinsurgency situation would not be able to do this him- or herself. Further, moving funds across agency budgets would require frequent interaction with Washington agencies. These two facts alone would argue for at least a senior deputy in Washington. However, if a counterinsurgency situation spanned multiple countries, there would be a stronger argument for

a Washington-based – or perhaps regional-based – coordinator and associated organization.[46]

Second, are the Coordinator's authorities sufficient? The Coordinator is not an equivalent to a regional ambassador, meaning that the country ambassadors and other key actors do not work for the Coordinator. If this model were adopted for a counterinsurgency in a single country, this would not be an issue. He or she would control funds and programs, but not personnel or organizations. This means that if an organizational structure for counterinsurgency based on the SEED/FSA model were adopted without providing authority over personnel and organizations operating in the region of the counterinsurgency, the person with the overall responsibility would only have programmatic control, not operational control. This would be a serious shortcoming.

Finally, does the SEED/FSA resource allocation approach make sense for counterinsurgency? In the current model, the Congress allocates funds to USAID and relies on the Coordinator to reallocate them to other agencies as needed. This approach sets the conditions for conflict between USAID and the Coordinator.

One additional shortcoming of the Coordinator model, particularly at the outset of counterinsurgency, is that while it provides flexibility and a consolidated channel of funding, it does not permit the immediate access to funds that could be needed at the onset of U.S. involvement in a counterinsurgency, unless provisions for doing so were provided by legislation. One way to provide this would be to permit funds to be moved from other accounts into an operational account for the impending operation. This is essentially how the Defense Department funds its initial efforts, by moving funds between existing accounts until a supplemental appropriation is approved. Alternately, a funding source that could be accessed prior to country- or region-specific

[46] The Obama Administration has chosen to use high visibility special envoys for Afghanistan/Pakistan/India, West Bank/Gaza and other conflicted areas. It is not yet clear how these efforts will be structured with respect to the issues raised in this paper.

legislation, with appropriate Congressional oversight, would be useful. As noted earlier, a model for such a fund is provided by the Stafford Act – legislation that provides funding and spending authority to agencies charged with response to domestic emergencies. These authorities are triggered and funding made available upon Presidential declaration of an emergency, and there are reporting requirements to ensure the Congress has oversight. Having well-defined triggers for such a declaration would likely make this more palatable for the Congress.

In sum, the Coordinator model provides precedent and good insights into how authorities could be changed, but the legislation is not sufficient for counterinsurgency and the organizational implications are not clear. Indeed, different circumstances could call for different arrangements. A standing statutory arrangement that could be invoked by the President, with Congressional oversight and approval, that provides initial funding, relief from country, program and agency specific funding restrictions, and gives the President the flexibility to decide if the "Coordinator-like" executive would be in Washington or at post, would be tremendously helpful. This could be built into an approach based on the SEED/FSA model, or created as a separate funding source. This implies that the authority of the Chief of Mission in counterinsurgency should be strengthened. He or she, or a regional Coordinator in case of a situation that encompasses more than one nation, or when the President decides this is desirable, should have authorities over all funding and programs similar to the SEED/FSA Coordinator, and over personnel responsible for foreign assistance similar to that exercised by a military commander over all personnel in his or her area of operations.

The Congress

The Congress' ability to react quickly and appropriately with legislation that provides needed authorities and funding for, as well as to conduct proper oversight during, emergency situations is critical to success. However, its structure of committees and subcommittees makes coordination and notification burdensome and reaction slow. When one considers the

full set of functions required to effectively conduct counterinsurgency, the actors involved in them and the oversight committees and appropriation subcommittees that must be involved, the complexity is immense. Besides the Armed Services Committees and Defense Appropriations Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and Foreign Relations/Affairs Committees and Commerce, State, Justice appropriations subcommittees, oversight and appropriations bodies for several other departments are implicated (e.g., Intelligence, Treasury, Energy, Commerce, and Agriculture, to name some of the more central). Just as unity of effort is important in the Executive Branch, so too is it in the Congress.

One recommendation offered during our interviews was to establish a joint committee to provide one point of contact for oversight and fiscal issues. Doing so would help the executive branch significantly, particularly if created in conjunction with granting SEED/FSA Coordinator-like authorities to the executive overseeing the civilian effort.[47] For Afghanistan during the Soviet era, there was a joint Senate/House bipartisan Committee for Afghanistan that worked well in terms of addressing interagency policy disputes, establishing resource levels, and garnering public support.

Conclusions and recommendations

The United States could enhance its ability to deliver foreign assistance in counterinsurgency by making some changes in authorities, resources and oversight, practices, and organization. The Executive Branch alone could undertake some of these, while others require cooperation with the Congress.

Changes in authorities fall into three main categories. First, SEED/FSA prefer authorities that would provide greater flexibility to the senior executive overseeing a counterinsurgency, and permit him or her to move funds across budget categories and between agency budgets. This flexibility would pro-

[47] This suggestion was provided by a senior civilian in the Defense Department.

vide the ability for the U.S. government to react to unexpected events and on shorter timelines than normal foreign assistance rules provide. Second, at the program level, "notwithstanding" authority would provide greater tactical flexibility in program design and execution. Finally, a standing authority similar to the Stafford Act for international counterinsurgency would permit the U.S. government to react quickly to new problems as they arise, while providing the Congress a reasonable degree of oversight.

Resource considerations fall into two categories – fiscal and human. The fiscal resources available to civilian agencies have been much smaller than those available to military commanders to perform essentially civilian tasks. While this study produced no specific estimates of what funding is required for success, the Executive and Legislative Branches must cooperate to provide adequate funding if foreign assistance is to be successful in contested situations. Furthermore, simply providing resources is not sufficient; properly overseeing their use is a critical task and rules for doing so require revision if the U.S. government is to succeed in counterinsurgency. A tension exists in these operations between peacetime accounting rules and the exigencies of a counterinsurgency situation. Providing leaders with greater flexibility would provide greater likelihood of success.

Human resource shortfalls are perhaps more important than fiscal ones. Directly related to fiscal resources is the ability of the government to hire enough people to provide effective foreign assistance in counterinsurgency, but numbers are not enough. Quality is equally important, and the systems that hire and promote civilians who work in dangerous places are not attuned to these needs. Without adjustments that

- identify and fund proper staffing levels;
- identify and promote leaders and technicians capable of operating effectively in counterinsurgency; and
- identify and assign the proper people where they are needed in counterinsurgency,

effective foreign assistance will not be delivered. People are central to success in counterinsurgency.

Unhelpful practices also have a negative effect on success in counterinsurgency. Three categories of changes would help significantly. First, Washington should rely on leaders in the field to run operations while they concentrate on providing policy guidance and resources. Doing otherwise can result in those who are not most familiar with the situation directing actions without a thorough understanding of the implications. Further, servicing Washington decision makers acting in the place of the leaders on the ground places a significant demand for information on those in the field, often distracting from their ability to do their jobs. This is the second practice that requires re-examination. However, information demands that permit an assessment of overall success and resource needs in keeping with the role of policy makers are justifiable, and must be met. Staffs should be large enough to support this. Finally, risk practices should account not only for risks to personnel and facilities, but also to the mission. Such practices are just now gaining traction in Iraq, and need to be institutionalized and shared broadly.

Some major and some less drastic organizational reforms would make the provision of foreign assistance in counterinsurgency more effective and efficient. First, goals and incentive structures across organizations participating in such efforts need to be aligned. So long as the major civilian providers of foreign assistance in counterinsurgency have different visions of what needs to be done in a country and incentive structures that make meeting agency goals more important than the success of the overall endeavor, unity of effort will be impossible to achieve. The same could be said for military-civilian efforts. Ideas such as legislation that would unify diplomacy and development, similar to the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act, should be on the table for consideration.

Placing one person in charge of all aspects of counterinsurgency would help resolve organizational problems. Relying solely on the authority of a "responsible executive" – the Chief of Mission, Commanding General or a Regional Coordinator in case of a situation that encompasses more than one nation or when the President decides this is desirable – in counterinsurgency is insufficient. This will not be easy. For example, plac-

ing all aspects of an effort under a military commander, for the simple reason that this is where most of the assets reside, might not make sense, given the preeminence of political considerations in many such circumstances. On the other hand, preserving the chain of command from the ground commander through the Secretary of Defense to the President is a legal requirement that cannot easily be waived, making civilian leadership problematic. However, solutions have been successfully implemented in the past, as noted above.

Finally, Congress must consider how it organizes itself to support and oversee the Executive Branch during counterinsurgency. A structure that provides the Congress with adequate ability to oversee the Executive Branch's efforts, but that minimizes the number of committees and subcommittees that must be informed of and approve actions, would significantly simplify efforts. A joint committee formed to oversee all aspects of counterinsurgency is one way to meet this need.

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Alexander Alderson

Visiting Fellow and Infantry officer, Colonel Alderson was commissioned from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in April 1984, and has since served in a wide range of Armoured, Mechanized and Light Infantry appointments in Germany, the Middle East, Northern Ireland, and Africa. He served on operations in the 1991 Gulf War, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, and, most recently, Iraq, where he was Chief of Campaign Plans for General Petraeus in Headquarters Multinational Force Iraq.

A graduate of the Army Staff College, Camberley, and the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham, Colonel Alderson has held a variety of staff appointments principally in the operational field. After commanding 1st Battalion The Highlanders, Colonel Alderson was promoted to Colonel in 2004 to run the Army's Mission Support Group, before establishing the Land Warfare Development Group to develop the Army's doctrine and its experimental programme. He has instructed at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, where he specialised in Campaign Planning, and Counterinsurgency.

In 2007, he led the team that rewrote British Counterinsurgency doctrine. He is currently researching a Ministry of Defence-sponsored PhD, examining the impact of contemporary campaigns on the British approach to COIN.

Chris Collett

Colonel Warfare Development, Land Warfare Development Group, Land Warfare Centre.
Responsible for the capture and dissemination of lessons from operations. Responsible for Army experimentation and research. Responsible for the development and promulgation of Land Tactical Doctrine.

Col Chris Collett joined the Army from university (where he read psychology) in 1983 and was commissioned into the Army Air Corps (AAC). After a six month attachment to the GREEN HOWARDS com-

manding a platoon in the Mechanised Infantry role he completed his Army Pilot's Course and joined 4 Regt AAC in Germany as a reconnaissance Flight Commander flying Gazelles. After 2 years there he became the second in command of 657 Sqn which was then an independent squadron assigned to the fledgling 24 Airmobile Bde. This appointment subsequently migrated to become the operations officer of 9 Regt AAC as it formed to support air mobility in the context of the NATO Multinational Division (Centre). Two years at the Royal Military College of Science and the Army Staff College followed and led to 2 years in the Ministry of Defence's Operational Requirements organisation dealing with procurement of helicopter equipments.

After this appointment he moved back to regimental duty commanding 652 Sqn, 1 Regt AAC based in Germany but including 6 months in Bosnia as part of IFOR. Col Collett then spent a year in J3 at PJHQ largely dealing with the Balkans before taking up his SO1 appointment back at the Ministry of Defence as a member of the Directorate of Force Development part of the Strategy Directorate. While here he was responsible for the "Evolution of Warfare" project and among other force development issues including the formation of the EU military force. During this time he undertook his Masters in Business Administration.

Command of 1 Regt AAC back in Germany followed during which the Regiment provided support Op TELIC and numerous overseas training deployments in the Light Utility role. Leaving 1 Regt AAC on promotion, Col Collett then spent 3 years as Commandant of the School of Army Aviation which included a 6 month operational deployment as Colonel Training and commander of the international mentoring team at the Iraqi Military Academy Baghdad. Most recently, Col Collett was the UK's International Fellow at the US Army War College where he gained his Masters in Strategic Studies before taking up the appointment of Colonel Warfare Development.

Col Collett is married to Jenny and has 2 children. His interests are travel, skiing, scuba diving and all aspects of military history.

Larry Crandall

Larry Crandall has more than 30 years in developing and managing large and politically complex development programs in sensitive areas throughout the world, including lengthy assignments in the former Soviet Union, Haiti, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Vietnam and Bangladesh and Iraq. For the latter,=2 0his Program Management Office office supervised the $18 billion reconstruction program. Mr. Crandall joined the Project Management Office from his position as Vice President for International Programs with the RONCO Consulting Corporation. While in that position, he led a U.S. Army-sponsored study to determine best practices for the Demilitarization, Demobilization and Reintegration of Iraqi Security Forces into civil society. He previously held numerous senior positions with USAID. He served as Executive Director of the U.S.-Asia Environmental Partnership, an organization that introduced U.S. clean environmental technology suppliers to potential Asian business partners.

Mr. Crandall was the USAID Mission Director in Port-au-Prince, Haiti from 1994 to 1997. He orchestrated the redesign of assistance programs and managed the successful political transition program which culminated in the first constitutional power transfer in Haitian history. Prior to that, he served as the Deputy Assistant Administrator of the Newly Independent States Task Force for the former Soviet Union from 1991 to 1994. He generated innovative programs for a multi-billion dollar assistance program for the fifteen newly independent republics.

Mr. Crandall was the Mission Director for USAID Afghanistan resident in Islamabad, Pakistan from 1985 to 1990. He first led a combined State Department/USAID strategy team to develop a cross-border humanitarian assistance strategy which included interagency support to the Interim Afghan Government in exile in Peshawar. He then led=2 0the USAID effort which contributed to the departure of Soviet Troops from Afghanistan.

Mr. Crandall served three years in Vietnam as a field “language” officer, Provincial Military Advisory Team Leader and directed the national Political Attitude Analysis Survey in his final year at MAC/V headquarters. Mr. Crandall has received numerous awards during his

career including the Distinguished Presidential Award, the Meritorious Presidential Award, the Distinguished and Superior Unit Citations for heading multi-year missions in Afghanistan and Haiti, Superior Honor Awards and Language Incentive Awards. Mr. Crandall was selected for two one year sabbaticals at the Senior Seminar on International Relations conducted by the Foreign Service Institute of the State Department and the National War College at Ft. Mc Nair.

Alex Crowther

Col. Glenn Alexander Crowther was born in Washington DC. He spent his childhood living in New England, Ethiopia, Brazil, Bolivia, and Indonesia where his father worked as a civil engineer.

Col. Crowther served 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord, California, United Nations Command Security Force – Joint Security Area – Pan Mun Jom and the Cheju-do Training Center in Korea. He also served in a variety of positions in US Army South and US Southern Command in Panama and Miami. He served two tours at the Pentagon working as a Strategic Plans & Policies Officer on the Department of the Army Staff and as a Politico-Military Officer at the Joint Staff J-5 (Strategic Plans & Policies Directorate). He also served as Principal Advisor for Hostage Affairs to US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan C. Crocker.

Col. Crowther is assigned as a Research Professor of National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA. He is currently deployed as the Interagency Advisor for the commander of Multi National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I). He also serves as the MNC-I Deputy Foreign Policy Advisor (POLAD).

Col. Crowther has a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Relations from Tufts University, a Master of Science degree in International Relations from Troy State University, and a Ph.D. in International Development from Tulane University.

Col. Crowther is married to the former Marie Elizabeth Toothman-Lim from the Panama Canal Zone. Their children are Laura, Geoffrey and Elizabeth.

Christopher A. Jennings

Christopher A. Jennings is a "democracy and governance" consultant based in Washington DC, specializing in parliamentary development, legislative process, constitutional law and election monitoring. Between 2006 and 2008, he served two tours in Iraq under the auspices of the U.S. State Department—first, as an embedded advisor to Iraq's National Parliament under a grant administered by State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; and second, as a political affairs and governance advisor to Ambassador Ryan Crocker in the Joint Strategic Planning and Assessment office at the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad. In Washington DC, Christopher has served as a political appointee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights during President Bush's first and second terms; as a legal analyst and consultant to the Republican National Committee during the 2002, 2004 and 2008 election cycles; and as non-partisan legislative staff attorney in the United States Congress during the 106th and 107th Sessions.

Kirk Johnson

Kirk A. Johnson is currently the Senior Economic Adviser at Provincial Reconstruction Team, Muthanna, Iraq. As a representative from the U.S. Department of State, he is part of a 15 person team of civilians who are working to build the capacity of local and provincial government officials, directly administer small reconstruction projects, and oversee U.S. taxpayer dollars spent in the province.

Previously, he was also the Director for Strategic Projects and Strategic Planning for the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). He was part of a management team that oversaw the production of the book *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Story*.

Prior to that, he was Deputy Director for Assessments in the Joint Strategic Planning and Assessment office at U.S. Embassy Baghdad, where he was responsible for analyzing the quantitative and qualitative metrics associated with the ongoing counterinsurgency campaign for the U.S. Ambassador and other senior American officials.

Dr. Johnson has also held positions at the Washington, D.C.-based

Heritage Foundation, a non-profit research organization, the U.S. Census Bureau, and was an adjunct professor of public policy at George Mason University, where he taught quantitative methods.

Dr. Johnson earned his Ph.D. in public policy from George Mason University, holds a master's degree in applied economics from the University of North Texas, and has a bachelor's degree in economics from California State University, Sacramento.

Terrence Kelly

Dr Terrence Kelly is a Senior Researcher with the RAND Corporation, where his primary research areas are national and homeland security policy. From February 2006 to April 2007, he served as the Director of the Joint Strategic Planning and Assessment Office for the U.S. Mission in Baghdad. In 2004, he was the Director for Militia Transition and Reintegration Programs for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq.

He served as the Senior National Security Officer in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, held many Army field and staff positions, was a White House Fellow and served as the Chief of Staff of the National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office.

He is currently an Adjunct Professor of Security Policy and Management at Carnegie Mellon University's Heinz College of Public Policy and Management, and he has held faculty positions in West Point's System Engineering Department and the Mathematical Sciences Department (visiting) at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, from which he received a Ph.D. in Mathematics and an M.S. in Computer and Systems Engineering.

He is a 1982 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and holds a Masters in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

Daniel Marston

Dr Daniel Marston holds the Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair of Counterinsurgency at the US Army Command and General Staff College. He is also a Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at

the Australian National University, the Changing Character of War Program at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. He has also served as a Visiting Fellow at the Multi-National Forces Iraq COIN Center for Excellence in Taji, Iraq on four occasions. He has focused on the topic of how armies learn and reform as a central theme in his academic research. His first book, Phoenix from the Ashes, an in-depth examination of how the British/Indian Army turned defeat into victory in the Burma campaign of the Second World War, won the Templer Medal Book Prize in 2003.

His most recent work, co-edited with Carter Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, was published in 2008 and is now being revised as a second edition. He has lectured widely on the principles and historical practices of counterinsurgency to units and formations of the American, Australian, British and Canadian armed forces in and out of theatre, as well as serving as an adviser for all of the above. Dr Marston is currently engaged in research into the lessons of counterinsurgency for the Australian and British armies from the 1960s to the present. Dr Marston is a graduate of McGill and Oxford universities.

Laurel Miller

Laurel Miller is a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation. She has been an adjunct professor of law at Georgetown University and a senior expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace, where she focused on constitutional issues and rule of law development in countries emerging from conflict, and international justice issues.

During previous government service she focused on conflict resolution and post-conflict stabilization, including as Senior Advisor to the U.S. special envoy for the Balkans, Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Deputy to the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues. She was involved in peace negotiations in Macedonia, Kosovo, and Bosnia. Miller also served as Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security Council. Miller received the State Department's Superior Honor Award three times. She was an International Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, practiced

law with the firm of Covington & Burling in Washington and Brussels, and clerked for a federal judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Miller received her J.D. from the University of Chicago Law School, where she was an editor of the Law Review, and her A.B. from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.

Timo Noetzel

Dr. Timo Noetzel is a Research Group Leader at the Centre of Excellence at Konstanz University. He is also a Fellow of the Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, Berlin and Senior Policy Advisor to the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference. Previously, he has been a Transatlantic Postdoctoral Fellow at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin and at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House. Between 2003 and 2006 he worked as a parliamentary aide in the German Bundestag. Over the last few years he has been a political advisor to the German army at ISAF Regional Command North (Autumn 2007), HQ ISAF (Summer 2009) and Allied Joint Force Command Headquarters Brunssum (Autumn 2009). He received his BA (Hons) in European Politics from the Queen's University, Belfast and his MPhil and DPhil in Politics from St Antony's College, Oxford. He is also a graduate of the Federal College for Security Studies, Berlin. One of his recent publications (co-authored with Thomas Rid) is, Germany's Options in Afghanistan', *Survival*, October/November 2009.

Benjamin Schreer

Dr Benjamin Schreer is the Deputy Director of the Aspen Institute Germany. Prior to his appointment, he was a research fellow in the research unit "Atlantic and European Security" at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) in Berlin (2003-2008), and co-leader of a research group in the Centre of Excellence at Constance University (2008-2009). He received his doctoral degree in Political Science from Kiel. Dr. Schreer has published widely on international security and defense policy issues, including the issue of Germany and counterinsurgency.

Kalev Sepp

Dr Kalev I. Sepp is presently Senior Lecturer in Defense Analysis at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

Until January 2009, he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Capabilities.

Dr Sepp was responsible for the Department of Defense global counterterrorism portfolio. This included policy oversight of all special operations world-wide, and formulation of the Department's global counterterrorism strategy. He received his appointment in July 2007.

A former U.S. Army Special Forces officer, he earned his Ph.D. in American Diplomatic History at Harvard University, and his Combat Infantryman Badge in the Salvadoran Civil War. His unit assignments included the 82d Airborne Division, the 2d Ranger Battalion, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the 2d Infantry Division, among others. He was also an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

He served as an analyst and strategist in Iraq and Afghanistan, and as an expert member of the Baker-Hamilton Bipartisan Commission on Iraq, a.k.a. the Iraq Study Group. For his service in Iraq and the Pentagon, he has been awarded the Department of the Navy Superior Civilian Service Medal, the Department of Defense Medal for the Global War on Terrorism, and the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service.

Dr Sepp also graduated from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College with a Master's degree in Military Art and Science.

Christopher M. Schnaubelt

Dr Chris M. Schnaubelt holds the Transformation Chair at the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy.

Prior to coming to the NDC, he worked for the US Department of State as the Deputy Director for National Security Affairs, Joint Strategic Planning and Assessment Office, in the US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq. He served as the embassy's lead for writing the 2006 Joint Campaign Action Plan and the 2007-09 Joint Campaign Plan in coordination with HQ Multi-National Force-Iraq and was also a co-director of the Joint Strategic Assessment Team. In recognition of his accomplishments, General David

Petraeus presented the Commander's Award for Public Service to Dr. Schnaubelt.

Dr. Schnaubelt has published numerous articles on security issues and interagency and civil-military operations; the most recent are "Whither the RMA?" in the Autumn 2007 issue of *Parameters*, NDC Research Paper 40 "What NATO can learn from "the surge" in Iraq," and an Op-Ed in the *International Herald Tribune* on "Lessons of Iraq."

Martin Zapfe

Martin Zapfe is Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence at Konstanz University. From 2003-2008, he studied Political Science, Public Law and Islamic Studies in Bonn, in which fields he holds an M.A. In his doctoral thesis, he explores the relationship between strategic culture and the capability of different NATO-members to implement a national comprehensive approach in Afghanistan. He is an Associate of the "Stiftung Neue Verantwortung" in Berlin for the years 2009/2010, focusing on Bundeswehr transformation.

Before, Martin Zapfe worked as an intern in the German Institute for International and Security Affairs of the "Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik" (SWP) in Berlin and the German Bundestag. His main fields of research include the transformation of the German armed forces and scenarios of irregular warfare, including counterinsurgency. He is a First Lieutenant and platoon leader in the Bundeswehr light infantry reserve.

Contributors:

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