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NATO Defense College
Collège de Défense de l'OTAN

NDC OCCASIONAL PAPER

Cultural Challenges in Military Operations

NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE
COLLEGE DE DEFENSE DE L'OTAN

Research Division
Division Recherche

CULTURAL CHALLENGES
IN MILITARY OPERATIONS

NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE

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INTRODUCTION[2]

Tibor SZVIRCSEV TRESCH[3]

On 15 and 16 March 2007 a conference was held at the NATO Defense College on the topic of "Cultural Challenges in Military Operations". It offered a preliminary overview of the operational and multicultural challenges of cooperation among different forces with NGOs, IOs and the local population in theatres.

The conference was the follow-up to a preliminary meeting held at the NDC on 27 November 2006. Its specific objectives were to advance understanding in multinational forces during operations, to discuss different military cultures and forms of cooperation, and to address the issue of cultural interoperability and mission effectiveness in multinational forces. Presentations were given on the lessons learned in military operations, the inter-cultural and intra-cultural challenges in organizations, and educational and leadership aspects. Military sociologists and psychologists together with experts and practitioners from Mediterranean Dialogue countries and NATO nations offered the findings of their individual research projects on the cultural aspects of armed forces assigned to missions, lessons learned during missions and cross-cultural interaction.

The speakers presented different approaches: 1. Theoretical approaches; 2. Case studies (surveys, questionnaires, expert interviews); 3. Personal experiences in the field, as former commander of a unit/battalion.

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The conference was divided into five panels:

1. Cooperation in multinational forces, practical experience and national case studies,
2. Peacekeeping experience from Mediterranean countries and the Middle East,
3. Kosovo, Afghanistan and Lebanon, case studies from military missions,
4. Educational and leadership aspects,
5. Effectiveness of missions.

The main issues discussed were the problem of lack of language expertise in the field, the variety of leadership styles and rotation systems, prejudices, and the lack of appropriate preparation of the units to be sent on missions. Additionally, national military traditions and the different formal and social hierarchy systems may lead to tension among armed forces and hinder success.

This volume includes most of the papers presented at the conference. The concluding chapter summarizes the highlights of discussions, takes note of additional considerations and briefly describes the different papers.

EFFECTIVENESS WITHIN NATO'S MULTICULTURAL MILITARY OPERATIONS[4]

Tibor SZVIRCSEV TRESCH[5] and Nicasia PICCIANO[6]

1.   Introduction

Effectiveness is crucial for a military mission based on multiculturality – in other words a force consisting of different national contingents. Effectiveness is a broad term that comprises several aspects to be considered, when applied to NATO's military operations. One is the distinction between past and present military missions. While Cold War operations[7] mostly involved border monitoring and force separation tasks, the tasks assigned to post-Cold War operations deal with more complex issues. Most are internal rather than interstate conflicts. As far as NATO[8] is concerned, since the fall of the Berlin Wall the Alliance has undergone profound transformation and, already in 1992, about a year after the beginning of the war in former Yugoslavia, NATO had stated its willingness and readiness to participate in peace support operations on a case-by-case basis. The idea was to place its expertise at the disposal of the OSCE.[9] In addition, NATO looked for effective operations and tried to avoid involvement in uncertain operations, as the then NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner emphasized in 1993: "The Alliance,

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[4] The views expressed in this paper are the responsibility of the authors and should not be attributed to the NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
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[7] Lakhdar Brahimi (2000), *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/

[8] Eirini Lemos-Maniati, *Peace-keeping Operations: Requirements and effectiveness: NATO's role*. Final Report, NATO-EAPC Fellowship, June 2001, http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/lemos-maniati.pdf

[9] Press Communiqué, M-NAC-1(92)51, NATO, Brussels, June 1992, p. 2.

in the security interests of its own members, is prepared to assist the UN. But it cannot commit itself to supporting globally every peacekeeping operation; especially where conditions for success are absent, where it believes that the mandate and rules of engagement are inadequate, and where it cannot exercise unity of command."[10]

A second aspect is the multinational composition of NATO forces in peacekeeping missions, related to the different national cultural styles of the respective national military organizations. In this case effectiveness depends on successful cooperation within all involved armed forces. NATO's experience in the field has proved that effectiveness implies no delays over deployment, well trained national forces, clear political objectives, a unified command structure and a firm political control of the military.[11] Therefore, NATO's mission effectiveness in multinational forces depends on its clear lines of command and control, understandable rules of engagement, readily available forces, and mutual understanding. Furthermore, military action requires a close relationship between intelligence and operations, a fluent, functioning decision-making machine and forces with experience of working together to perform dangerous and complex tasks. The effectiveness of a mission is also affected by the complexity of the tasks assigned to the mission itself. At that time, NATO's involvement in peacekeeping was a new phenomenon and its substantial contributions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan suggest that the Alliance's support is necessary in complex situations now and will continue to be required in the future.

Over time, the meaning of peacekeeping has changed, since it covers not only humanitarian and police tasks, but also enforcement actions to be undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the so called peace enforcement missions. This obviously requires troops that are trained not only for classic peacekeeping missions, but who have professional expertise in a variety of missions. NATO proved to have the organizational structure and experience to provide timely support in complex security and humanitarian situations.[12] For this purpose, NATO's allies have developed common operating procedures, command

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[10] Speech by Secretary General to the International Press Institute, Venice, NATO, Brussels, 10th May 1993, p. 7, at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1993/s930519a.htm
[11] Eirini Lemos-Maniati, *Peace-keeping Operations,* p. 30.
[12] Ibid p. 37.

and control systems and logistic systems and capabilities to reduce operational and cultural differences. Lastly, NATO can provide a range of military forces on a scale and degree of readiness not available elsewhere, as well as an extensive and experienced multi-dimensional planning capability. "Field experience indicates that the momentum for peace created by the signing of an accord dissipates fairly quickly if there is no visible movement to implement that accord."[13] For this purpose, a rapid and effective deployment is required, as well as selected and pre-trained military and police personnel. All these tasks have been implemented and adapted in a multicultural environment. In reality, planning, recruiting, training and leadership sometimes lie behind the major need for a field operation which is ready and able to deal with cultural diversity between national armies.

Moreover, operational risks can be mitigated by the decreasing of intelligence about the mission area, by better field intelligence for the operations themselves, and by more robust operations which would cost more initially but would be better able to deter violence. In addition, NATO's effectiveness depends on whether or not burdens are distributed equitably.[14] Mission effectiveness in general, particularly in NATO's case, is essential for several reasons such as protecting civilians, limiting destruction and ensuring rapid and sustainable reconstruction in the country where it is operating.

2.   A model of mission effectiveness

Mission effectiveness can be divided into objectives and means, as Figure 1 shows. Mission effectiveness on the strategic and operational level implies - in terms of objectives - protection of civilians, unity of effort, improvement of relations and building of confidence within the respective national armed forces, and strengthening of cooperation in general, as well as coordination between civilian and military authorities in particular.

Objectives influenced by means can be ordered into at least two groups (see Figure 1). Firstly, general military means such as the

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[13] William J. Durch (2001), *UN Peace Operations and the "Brahimi Report"*, The Henry L. Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pdf/peaceopsbr1001.pdf
[14] Kantarelis, Demetri (1999), "NATO's mission, threat environments and effectiveness", http://www.westga.edu/~bquest/1999/nato.html

professionalism of military personnel, division of responsibility and interoperability. Secondly, functional military means, which help to achieve effectiveness with appropriate equipment, rules of engagement and different types of task forces, for example.

Figure 1: Model of Effectiveness

In the following sections the respective objectives and means will be described briefly. The theoretical model can help determine the best circumstances for effective missions based on a composition of multinational armed forces.

3. Means

In our model, means are divided into general and more functional operational means. Functional means are more connected to the military organization in a narrow sense.

General military means

Professional soldiers and training

NATO's past peacekeeping operations – e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina – have shown that "in addition to the ability to fight, soldiers require a range of skills to fulfil a wide spectrum of roles".[15] In other words, a much broader range of competence is required for the final success and effective outcome of a mission. Soldiers have to be more flexible, better trained and better educated, and forces have to be capable of rapid, decisive and sustained deployment abroad. Past peace operations have proved that well trained and well disciplined armed forces are accepted by the local population and they can work better with soldiers from other nations. In this case, they can act as successful peacekeepers. "A partially trained *gendarmerie*, or an army trained only for peacekeeping-type duties, is unlikely to be effective".[16] Soldiers have to prove that they are flexible and human, and in this way combine combat readiness with compassion. They also have to compromise with the other local actors such as aid agencies, NGOs, international organizations and local governments. However, overloading soldiers with civilian functions should be avoided. Civilian employees of the Ministry of Defense have to be ready for simultaneous deployment with the military during peacekeeping operations.

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[15] Chris Donnelly, "Shaping soldiers for the 21st century", *NATO Review*, Brussels, vol. 48, Summer-Autumn 2000, p. 28.
[16] Christopher Bellamy, "Combining combat readiness and compassion", *NATO Review*, Brussels, vol.. 49, Summer 2001, p. 11.

Previous experience/lessons learned

Previous experience in long-term missions could be a useful asset in current peace operations. For this purpose, a central role is played by the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre located in Monsanto (Portugal) conducting analysis of NATO and Partnership for Peace joint military operations and exercises. It maintains a database of lessons learned from these operations and exercises, and monitors the process to implement these lessons. The Centre conducts analysis on tactical, operational and, occasionally, strategic level exercises.[17]

Division of responsibility/tasks

In missions abroad a clear division of responsibility between the respective armed forces helps to improve the mission's effectiveness. If every national contingent is aware of its tasks, misunderstandings can be minimized. A division of tasks makes it easier for the different contingents to concentrate solely on one part of the mission. For effective sharing of responsibility, trust in the other national armed forces is extremely important. Without it the whole mission abroad can be jeopardized.

On the strategic, organizational and tactical level within NATO two command structures share the responsibility for missions abroad. On the one hand, SACEUR (Supreme Allied Command Europe), who is responsible for operations and exercises strategic military command over the NATO Response Force. This comprises standards and certification, as well as exercises. "On the other hand, the Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SACT) is responsible – within the military structure – for developing and planning future capabilities, applying emerging technologies and adapting military doctrine and training, including for the NRF. Both commands work closely together."[18] As a principle, missions are determined on a case-by-case basis by the North Atlantic Council. The innovative measures introduced by the Prague Summit 2002 make NATO more flexible and able to adapt to specific types of operation.

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[17] NATO on-line library: Briefing: *NATO military structure*, updated August 2005, http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/nms/html_en/nms03.html
[18] NATO briefing (January 2005), *NATO Response Force. Deploying forces faster and further than ever before*, http://www.ourpledge.org/nrf.pdf, p. 5.

Communication/language

Communication between the military, international organizations, NGOs, local authorities and the media is crucial for the positive outcome of a mission. There should be one official language to guarantee effective communication flow within the mission. A successful mission requires a deeper mutual understanding between the various actors involved in the field, in terms of each other's culture, policies, procedures, decision-making, resource bases and capabilities.

Interoperability

NATO has been developing interoperability since the Alliance was founded in 1949. The objective of interoperability is the capability of different military organizations to conduct joint operations. It allows forces, units or systems to operate together, to share common doctrine and procedures, and to be able to communicate with one other. Interoperability reduces duplication within the Alliance, allows pooling of pool resources and does not necessarily require common military equipment. It is important for this equipment to be housed in common facilities and be interoperable with other equipment.[19]

NATO militaries have achieved such interoperability through joint planning, training and exercises within NATO-led operations that could include disaster relief, humanitarian relief, search and rescue, and peace support operations. Moreover, interoperability requires the establishment of the necessary levels of compatibility, interchangeability or commonality in operational, procedural, material, technical and administrative fields. In addition, NATO Standardization Agreements, known as STANAGs, establish processes, procedures, terms and conditions for common military or technical procedures or equipment shared by NATO member nations.[20]

Interoperability has been fostered by NATO operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. An important role is played by the Joint Force Training Centre[21] in Bydgoszcz (Poland) which provides combined joint

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[19] Backgrounder, *Interoperability for joint operations*, Brussels, 2006, http://www.nato.int/docu/interoperability/interoperability.pdf
[20] Ibid.
[21] NATO Briefing, *A new command structure for a transformed Alliance*, Belgium, August 2005, http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/nms/nms-e.pdf

training of Alliance and partner forces at the tactical level to achieve joint tactical interoperability.

Functional military means

Equipment

Equipment – in terms of new and modern weapons – is also essential for effectiveness. NATO has to face a transformation in the concept of peacekeeping itself, which has become more complex and is undergoing sweeping changes. Standards of equipment among national armed forces should not vary too much. The aim is that the various national equipments share common facilities and communication procedures. Otherwise interoperability is difficult to achieve.

Integrating troop-contributors appropriately

NATO has to guarantee an appropriate integration – both in the planning and the decision-making process – among the different national contingents contributing to the peace operation. Such integration requires: 1) consultations with Partners, and 2) a proper acknowledgement of the commitment of the non-NATO troop-contributors in the field.

Hierarchy

Military organizations are structured in a similar way. A strong hierarchy is one of the aspects that can be noted in any armed force. This organizational form is crucial to ensure that armed forces act in an appropriate manner even though parts of them have been destroyed by the enemy or are unable to fight. The principle is that any military person with a higher rank can give orders to subordinates. With this type of organizational structure, possible gaps in the command chain can be resolved and missions can be continued.

The level of hierarchy differs in two ways among national armies. Firstly, various ranking systems exist in armed forces around the world. In Europe or within NATO it is obvious that national armed forces are more and more in line with NATO standards. In this case, the structural problem seems to have been solved in recent years in Europe. Secondly, there are differences in the social aspects of hierarchy. These are much more interesting. Some countries draw a clear distinction between the ranks, not just in a structural sense but also in a

psychological and social sense. This means that comments from subordinates are not welcomed and that orders are not questioned. In other armed forces discussions are allowed to a certain degree regardless of the rank of the discussants. For mission effectiveness it is imperative to have the same or at least similar concept of hierarchy both structurally and socially within the respective national armed forces. Without it the different tasks assigned to the actors will be hindered and the mission runs the risk of failure due to mutual misunderstandings.

Rules of Engagement

Rules of engagement are essential in order to clarify the mission and the main steps to be undertaken in peace operations, thus avoiding any misunderstandings or duplication of efforts. Linked to this is also the need to harmonize ways of dealing with a variety of contingencies and emergencies.

Task Force

For its operations NATO has also developed the concept of a small multifunctional group of experts. For example the Bosnia Task Force[22], later renamed the Balkans Task Force, which included political, military, humanitarian, legal, media and other experts as required. With these task forces the role of the military will be widened, and there is a general approach instead of a set military approach. For long-term effectiveness it is vital that all actors are involved in conflict resolution. An institutional framework like the NATO Task Force can strengthen communication and help coordinate the complex situation in the field.

NATO Response Force

Another instrument that has been developed to ensure mission effectiveness is the NATO Response Force[23], a multinational joint force at very high readiness consisting of land, air and sea components. The decision to create this force was taken at the Alliance's Prague Summit in November 2002, which focused on NATO's transformation. At the Summit meeting in Riga in November 2006, NATO declared that the NATO Response Force was at full operational capability.

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[22] Christopher Bellamy, op. cit. p. 15.
[23] NATO topics: *The NATO Response Force,* update 18. December 2006,
http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/index.html

Information Centre

An information centre is required to provide data on *who's doing what, where, when.*[24] This is critical for a safe and efficient operation. Identifying individual actors and their tasks is very important, and enables a distinction to be made between military and civilian duties.

4.   Objectives

Protection of civilians

NATO's peacekeeping forces are engaged in protecting the population and facilitating the return of displaced persons to their homes, as well as fighting against gross violations of human rights. If these objectives can be achieved, the level of effectiveness will be higher.

Unity of effort

The maintenance of a secure environment for civil implementation can be achieved through close cooperation with a wide range of participants in the peace process. It also implies a greater understanding between the various military, civil, humanitarian and development organizations, understanding of one others' culture, policy, procedures, decision-making processes, resource bases, capabilities, strengths and limitations.

Improving relations and building confidence

Within a multinational peace operation, good relations among all the actors – both military and civilian – have to be fostered. It is one of the main steps in building confidence and facilitating team work. This entails: 1) sharing of information; 2) coordination of activities; 3) cooperation and 4) working together without any boundaries and with a single mission target.

Integrated Network/Cooperation

A high level of cooperation with other armed forces or civilian organizations on the ground can lead to an integrated network for improving the effectiveness of the operations. An integrated network of

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[24] For example, the *Humanitarian Coordination Information Centre* developed in Kosovo and tasked to feed information to all organizations and agencies; See Christopher Bellamy, *Combining combat readiness and compassion*, op. cit., p. 10.

the NATO CIMIC type (Civil-Military Cooperation – AJP-9)[25], developed at military level in the field, may be necessary because it provides a framework for a network of mutually-reinforcing relations between NATO and the other international organizations involved in peace operations.[26] This type of cooperation, based on the sharing of information on the capabilities, structure and organizational characteristics of all involved actors, is essential in order to deal with cultural differences and can dispel any misconceptions arising in the field in a constructive and operational manner. The integrated network is also vital for the organization of integrated training programmes, seminars and exercises (e.g. NATO Military School in Oberammergau, Germany). Careful preparation is the key to successful military cooperation, and results in more challenging exercises and more effective training. This can take place within the different national armed forces as well as among the military and civilian organizations.

Joint and integrated approach

Furthermore, a joint and integrated approach – among the armed forces, police, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), aid agencies, international organizations, private industry and other companies – is required. The need for an integrated approach is recognized both in the field and at the highest levels of government.[27] A challenge NATO has to deal with – once in the field – is the cultural differences between national armed forces and between NGOs and the military. Close coordination is required to avoid any kind of confusion or confrontation. The priority, therefore, is to break down the barriers to closer communication and to avoid misunderstandings arising from the use of different languages and terminologies.

Planning coordination between civilian and military authorities

In order to succeed, a mission needs a well-planned and coordinated combination of civilian and military measures to create the conditions for long-term, self-sustaining stability and peace. Armed

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[25] NATO, AJP – 9, NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, available at http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/AJP-9.pdf (6 Oct 2006).
[26] Dick Zandee, "Civil-Military interaction in peace operations", *NATO Review*, Brussels, vol. 47, Spring 1999, pp. 10-13.
[27] Christopher Bellamy, op. cit., p. 9.

forces on the ground must not be "heavy-handed or remain too remote from the local population"[28], otherwise they lose respect and effectiveness. Military personnel need to talk more with ordinary people, and to bear in mind the common dictum "many nations, one team".

Diversity

In the accomplishment of a successful mission, NATO views diversity among many actors as a strength rather than a weakness. Since cultural differences could have a negative impact on the mission's effectiveness, the main goal is to enhance cultural integration and interaction, and to use them to operational advantage. Such integrative solutions largely depend on the ability of the commander in the field to combine them with a degree of direct instruction.[29] This implies emphasizing and creating common bases, emphasizing superordinate goals, creating shared norms, and sharing the same fate of being "Foreigners in a Foreign Land". However, even the sharing of the most convivial moments such as drinking, eating and partying are central to the creation of sentiments of cooperation and affiliation.[30] The most important attitude to adopt, in order to consider *diversity* from a positive perspective, is the suspension of judgement and the avoidance of immediate cultural stereotyping. This does not mean that a process of assimilation is necessary, but rather openness – in terms of listening, looking, and intuiting – towards different cultural experiences.

This model shows just some elements, in the form of means, both general and functional, and objectives for the achievement of mission effectiveness in the long run. In particular, it focuses on the field's operating mission and does not examine national policies and restrictions on the home front. Political support for sending troops and funding allocations differ widely among countries. The model does not show the discrepancy between a well formulated mandate and the resources to implement it successfully. Nor does it not address the problem of forces sent by states under international or regional authority, or the fact that

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[28] Ibid.

[29] Efrat Elron, Nir Haveley, Eyal Ben Ari, and Boas Shamir, "Cooperation and Coordination across Cultures in the Peacekeeping Forces: Individual and Organizational Integrating Mechanisms", in *The Psychology of the Peacekeeper – Lessons from the field*, Thomas W. Britt & Amy B. Adler, US, 2003, p. 267.

[30] Ibid., p. 273.

national military forces normally create parallel reports and control structures with their home base.[31] Because of this double standard fast reactions may be hindered by political decision at home.

Another important factor to be taken into consideration is the reluctance of civil societies and politicians in Europe to sacrifice the lives of their soldiers deployed in missions abroad. This weakens the effectiveness of international operations and it can be counterproductive, as the experience in Bosnia has shown. In the end, successful operations are a mix of clear political objectives shared by all parties involved, a robust mandate, a unified command structure on the ground with a common language, trust in the capability of the other national armed forces involved in the mission, and, from the standpoint of civil-military relations, firm political control of the armed forces abroad.

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[31] Eirini Lemos-Maniati, *Peace-keeping Operations,* p. 11.

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PART 1

COOPERATION IN MULTINATIONAL FORCES:
PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE
AND NATIONAL CASE STUDIES

PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE FROM A FORMER OFFICER IN MISSIONS ABROAD[32]

Michael E. FIRLIE[33]

1.   Introduction

The challenges of multicultural military operations are nothing new, although many people think that multicultural military operations are something that only started to take place after World War II and after the so-called "globalization" of our society. Today, we tend to think of NATO and the UN as the premier organizations who were the first to take on these complex missions. However, these types of military operations have been going on from Alexander the Great to Frederick the Great. One such operation, or, better said, "campaign" which illustrates the difficult challenges of such an operation and the dramatic outcomes that can occur as a result of employing and leading "multicultural" forces is the Austrian-Prussian War.

2.   Historical Example – Austrian-Prussian War

When examining the Austrian-Prussian War of 1866 and specifically the Battle of Königgrätz, one can quickly see the effect of multicultural operations. There were many reasons for the Prussian victory; among them were the use of the breech-loading rifle, a better-trained force, and a single chain of command; but one other significant cause, in line with the subject of this article, was the ineffective manner in which Austrian forces prepared and used their multicultural troops.

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[32] Proofreading by Julie Dixon.
[33] EDEL Consulting, Switzerland.

The Austrian forces consisted of two major armies, the Imperial Austrian Army and the Army of the German Confederation. The Army of the German Confederation was actually a group of eight separate German National Armies; such as Bavaria, Baden and Wurttemberg, and they were obliged to fight as part of the German Confederation treaty with Austria. These Armies were all from separate German "States" and their loyalty was first to their "state" or land and then, if at all, to the German Confederation. Therefore, they were all "nationally/culturally" different armies. They had never trained together, there was no consolidated chain of command, and most did know their Austrian commanders. With respect to the Imperial Austrian Army, they also had multicultural difficulties. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was by its very nature a multicultural state since the nations or parts of nations within the empire's fringes were in a constant state of flux. This led to a limited amount of loyalty to the crown. In this particular battle, the Austrian Army consisted of Poles, Ukrainians, Romanians and Venetians as well as the native Austrians. Language barriers were just one example of multicultural issues that negatively affected the Austrian Army. The Polish/Ukrainian XXX Regiment fought reasonably well until it got dark, at which point they could no longer see the faces of the their Austrian commanders and mimic their orders because they could not speak or understand German. Another example occurred with the Venetians. They had no desire to fight for the Austrians, as many of their fellow Italians were allied with Prussia in order to become independent from Austria. As a result, many of these non-Austrians deserted or allowed themselves to be captured. The final outcome of the war resulted in the Prussians losing 360 officers, 8,812 men killed, wounded or missing, whereas the Austrians and allies lost 1,372 officers and 43,500 men killed, wounded or missing. 20,000 of these were prisoners. The war was over in seven weeks and resulted in a Prussian dominated Germany for the rest of the century until World War I.

3.   Multicultural Groups

There are many things to take into consideration when conducting multicultural military operations. One of the most important is that it is not just the multicultural aspect of the military forces that can affect the operation. There are many other multicultural groups to

consider. These may include different political factions, national/regional parties within the area of operations, governmental organizations or non-governmental organizations.

All of these can have an effect on the outcome of the operation and one should factor these in when planning and conducting military operations. For the purpose of evaluation, I have broken this collection of people or organizations down into four groups.

The first group I would like to address is the different *armed forces*. This multicultural aspect involves the ability or inability of different services, such as Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, or Border Control, from the same nation to work together. Many of these services have their own "cultures" and standard operating procedures even though they are from the same nation. These are what are now known as "joint operations" and the United States military is well versed in this area, but they have been training for these kinds of missions since the Grenada operation in 1983. That does not mean that difficulties and problems do not occur. Different, incompatible equipment is procured, units are deactivated and activated, training methods change; all of these types of factors must taken into consideration when conducting joint operations. Other nations are not so adept at these types of operations. Many problems are encountered when these operations are attempted by nations who have not trained specifically with other services or departments within their own countries prior to execution.

A second group to consider when conducting multicultural operations are the *government sponsored organizations and/or government agencies* that normally do not work or train with defense departments or military forces. These could be government sponsored organizations such as the UN, the African Union, the OECD, or government agencies like the national health departments, the nations' intelligence agencies, and the nations' energy agencies just to name a few. Each of these groups normally has their own agenda and their own ideas on what they want to achieve from the operation and how they define success. It is especially important to bring these groups into the planning process at the very beginning in order to ensure that each group's goals are understood, and more importantly that the overall commander's mission intent is understood and that each of these separate goals support that intent.

A third group that must be taken into account and understood are the *non-governmental organizations (NGOs)*. These can be either a great help or a great hindrance to a military operation. These organizations can be difficult to understand and therefore difficult to operate with since they do not represent any particular government and there are literally thousands of them. It is often difficult to determine whom they represent and sometimes what their objectives are. Some examples include Doctors without Borders, Amnesty International, Green Peace and everything in between from Adalah to Zonta International. These groups can be very helpful and can sometimes take over missions or conduct tasks, normally humanitarian in nature, that might otherwise have to be conducted by military forces. The difficulty with these groups, in addition to their unknown loyalties and objectives is that they are not involved in the planning process and you normally do not encounter them until you are in the area of operations and the mission has already begun. This is where flexibility and adaptability are essential; military commanders must meet with these groups as soon as possible and "win them over." The commander must ensure that they understand his intent and will work together with the military forces to achieve the overall military objective. If this is not done early in the operation, the typical stereotyped views of each other's groups often take over and that evolves into a mistrust that is too difficult to overcome, thus jeopardizing the success of the mission.

The fourth and finally group is the *civilian populace*. This group is very important and must not be taken lightly when considering international military operations. This group is especially important for three reasons:
- First, they are usually the most diverse.
- Second, one never knows exactly how they will react to the actual military operation.
- Third, most of the military operations NATO is likely to conduct are some form of "peace-support or humanitarian" operations and the overall objective of these operations is for the benefit of this group.

Therefore, if an organization or groups of nations are conducting a military operation to assist the civilian population or some part of it, they should seriously take into consideration how all parts of the civilian population, within the area of operations, are expected to react. There are many examples of where the reactions and actions of the civilian

populace had a direct impact on the operations. A few examples are the main groups of the Balkan conflict: Serbian, Bosnian and Croat; the various clans and sub-clans within Somalia; and most recently the three major groups in Iraq: Shiite, Sunni and Kurd.

4. Recent Examples

Two examples worth exploring in more detail, and directly related to the author's personal experience, are Somalia and Haiti. For both of these operations, there is a chart (Figure 1 and Figure 2), which provides a "snapshot" of the author's view on the relationship between certain groups and their effect on the operation. These were both very different operations conducted on two opposite sides of the globe. Neither of these countries posed a national security threat to the United States but the effect of the global media and internal politics of the US resulted in the commitment of military forces to each of these lands. This is direct evidence of how some parts of the groups mentioned above have an effect on a military mission. If it were not for the pressure of some non-governmental and international governmental organizations, it is doubtful that these operations would have been conducted.

4.1. UNOSOM II/JTF Somalia

The first operation is that of the UNOSOM II/JTF Somalia. The objective of the Somalia mission was to prevent further starvation in a land that was besieged by an ongoing drought and years of internal strife, by providing humanitarian aid and facilitating the end of internal hostilities. The second operation is the intervention in Haiti, which was to restore the democratically elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and remove the military junta of Lt Gen. Raoul Cedras, who overthrew the Aristide government in 1991. This was supposed to help the Haitian civilian populace, who lived in abject poverty, by removing the organizations who supported Cedras: the police/military (Fad'H), the Front for Advancement of and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) and the *attaches*, a mafia style criminal element; and its aim was also to reduce the amount of Haitians arriving on the US coast of Florida.

For the Somalia operation, the analysis includes the period immediately following the battle of 3-4 October, "Blackhawk Down", until the final withdrawal of US forces 6 months later.

As illustrated in the chart below, the Armed Forces, the effect of multi-cultural factors was more significant at the onset than later on in the operation. This can be explained by the way in which the Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia was sent very quickly to the theater as a result of the battle of 3-4 October. It was more or less a "pick-up" team. Members of the staff had rarely worked together before and they were "falling-in" as fast as possible to form the nucleus of the staff. As a result, you can see that the effect of the different members of armed forces (mostly Army and Marine Corps) had large consequences in the beginning and these tapered down as the staff began to work together and began to understand each other's tactics, processes, and different operating procedures. It took quite a bit longer, and in some cases they never managed to operate with other national forces in and around Mogadishu. There were two main reasons for this. First, many nations had their own political agenda and second, many of the nations had been there for over two years and the prejudices and distrust were just too hard to overcome.

Figure 1: Somalia Mission[34]

	Planning	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
Armed Forces	5	5	3	2
Government/Sponsored Organizations	3	4	4	5
NGOs	2	3	4	5
Civilian Groups	2	2	3	3

Level of Multicultural Effect on Operations
Scale from 1 to 5: 1 having least effect, 5 having more effect

In the next two groups, government and non-government organizations, the trend is the opposite. This was due to many factors. One factor is that the JTF had to learn how to operate among itself before it could operate effectively with outside organizations, so there was little time given to those relationships. Another reason is that it takes a while for prejudices and attitudes to be overcome and thus there was not a great desire for these groups to work with another military organization that did

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[34] These charts should be read as the AMOUNT of effect these groups had on military planning and operations, NOT whether the effect was positive or negative. Many of the effects were both positive and negative and the purpose here is to show that many different groups must be taken into consideration when planning and conducting military operations.

not seem to have similar goals. Therefore, the multicultural effect of these groups was minimal at the start. However, once operations started to expand and the US was planning to "pull out" of Somalia, cooperation became inevitable. Most of these organizations were planning to stay in Somalia, so they either had to work with the US to take over the missions the US was conducting or to work with the US to figure out where they were going to get the support once the US forces left.

The final group in the chart is the civilian groups. This group exhibited a similar but less pronounced trend as the last two groups. Since much of the populace in and around Mogadishu already had a hostile attitude toward the US presence, the effect remained steady because the entire civilian populace was considered as an enemy threat. Both the political and military attitudes were those of combatants. The effect and involvement of the civilian groups increased later as they attempted to fill voids left by the departing forces.

4.2. Operation Restore/Uphold Democracy - Haiti

With respect to the Haiti operation, the analysis concentrates the planning phases from November 1993 until a few days after the operation commenced in September of 1994.

Figure 2: Haiti mission

	Planning	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
Armed Forces	1	2	3	3
Government/Sponsored Organizations	1	2	3	3
NGOs	2	3	4	4
Civilian Groups	2	4	3	3

Level of Multicultural Effect on Operations
Scale from 1 to 5: 1 having least effect, 5 having more effect

In the review of the first group, the armed forces, there was an increasing effect from multi-cultural factors as the mission got more complex. In the early planning stages, this was mostly an "Army" operation with a Joint Task Force "stood up" around an existing army corps headquarters, so most of the staff had worked together for a very long time. However as the political situation took on a new dimension, a large naval contingent was added and a completely different Joint Task

Force was "stood up" in the event of a "permissive entry" operation as opposed to a "forced entry" operation.

The effect of the various government organizations was limited in the beginning but they were kept abreast of the planning since the US forces did not plan to stay very long, and the mission was expected to become more of a civil police operation. These organizations were usually comfortable with the information they received and their effect began to be felt once it was determined there would be no "forced-entry," just 24 hours prior to the scheduled attack. As the operation continued, these organizations took over more of the missions as the military reduced its presence on the island.

The non-governmental organizations (NGO) were included in the planning early on because of the media attention given to the plight of the Haitian people and it was important to have them in synch with the US. They were very helpful and this proved effective since we both started at the same time with the same information. As a result of the lack of cooperation from the Cedras regime, there was very little NGO presence in Haiti prior to the military intervention, unlike in Somalia, where NGOs were already on the ground.

For the civilian groups, the effect shifted back and forth because of the political factors in Haiti itself. There were always shifting allegiances and the US could not determine who would be friend or foe, especially since 24 hours before the operation was to begin we expected to fight our way into Haiti. Because of the change to a "permissive entry" operation, some civilian groups were at least "saying" they would cooperate with the US forces, so Haiti was termed a "semi-permissive" environment.

5.   Conclusion

In answer to the question regarding "*to what extent and in which circumstances multicultural diversity influences operational effectiveness",* there are many factors in which multicultural diversity influences military operations, and *it is not just the employment of forces from different nations*. Military operations today are highly complex and have a much greater political aspect to them, given the "globalization" of our society. Each of the political entities involved usually has a different objective and the effect of these objectives on each other is much greater

now than in the past. Therefore, I recommend reviewing each of these groups to determine what possible "players" may be involved in your operation and how the multicultural aspects of these "players" may effect your operation. In addition you need a clear understanding of the political objectives of each of the parties involved in the operation and a clear understanding of the overall mission objective and desired end-state.

Concerning the strictly military aspect of these multicultural operations, the key is continual training in an international environment with the forces and organizations you expect to operate with and, if at all possible, specific pre-deployment mission training.

CULTURAL CHALLENGES FOR SMALL COUNTRIES IN MISSIONS ABROAD[35]

Ljubica JELUŠIĆ[36]

1.   Introduction

In-depth analysis of internationally agreed peace operations and mandated military operations has established numerous historical, organizational, institutional and systemic characteristics of both types of operation. It has laid the foundations of what is now referred to as peace operations. The studies of peace operations include the analysis of the use of force (Berdal, 2001), organizational dilemmas in military and police peacekeeping (Haltiner, 2000), the multinational character of peace operations (Latawski, 2001), strategic peacekeeping operations (Gow, Dandeker, 2001), the civilian police as a new actor in peacekeeping operations (Hansen, 2002; Broer, Emery, 1998), and many other challenges encountered during peace-keeping missions. Very few articles have been written on individual perceptions of peace operations, diverse opinions of peacekeepers, or the impact of cultural diversity upon the outcome of operations. This said, some case studies reveal one country's experiences of peacekeeping (Caforio, 1996), life in one unit (Moskos, 1976) or one aspect of a peacekeepers' life. For example, there is a study of peacekeepers and their wives (Segal and Segal, 1993), the psychological stress they encounter (Bartone et al, 1998), the motivation behind their participation (Battistelli, 1997) and the predominant type of flexible military professional who chooses to participate in peace operations (Caforio, 2001). There are also studies of the multi-national nature of the armed forces (Haltiner, Klein, 2004), of multinational

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military culture and uniformity (Soederberg, Wedell-Wedellsborg, 2005), problems of integration in multinational units (Lang, 2001) as well as recent social studies of the multi-national dimension of military education and training and management of cultural diversity by the armed forces (Manigart *et al*, workshop in Brussels, November 2006). Discussion of the theme of cultural diversity both in and outside the armed forces dominated a workshop organized by Joseph Soeters and Jan van der Meulen in November 1998 and two sessions on "Sociological aspects of international military activities", which were organized in July 2006 by Jelušič and Soeters at the World Congress of the International Sociological Association in Durban.

Certain countries have only recently started to analyze social challenges to military operations, particularly peace operations, and in these cases data remain limited. This is largely due to the lack of public interest in problems experienced by the military. It is also due to strong resistance of certain military authorities to any field research among peacekeepers (Caforio, 1996). Military authorities tend to like to maintain an image of their soldiers as 'peace angels', which field research suggests they do for dubious reasons.

There are also virtually no studies of how the local population, the recipients of the peacekeepers, or host nation of the military operation, view peace operations and in particular the peacekeepers. Nuciari (2001:72-73) describes military awareness of tensions with civilian populations in peace mission theatre, underlining the difficulties experienced by the military when working with civilian populations. Her research is based on information from officers who participated in peace missions and later (in 2000) completed a cross-national survey on the matter. The survey also revealed attempts to clarify local perceptions of the deployed units, data which was then used to develop a robust public relations policy (Malešič, 2000). Riots and increasing criticism of the behavior of foreign troops in certain regions suggest a certain dissatisfaction with or rejection of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which provides some indication of the mission's perceived effectiveness and outcome from the perspective of citizens of the recipient countries. The local population, as was observed in the Balkans (2003 – 2006 survey results: Defense Research Centre, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ljubljana,) repeatedly emphasized the problem of "peace business": a term used to describe the negative aspects of peacekeeping

missions. More specifically, this means the commercial and sectoral interests of international organizations in their peacekeeping efforts and, on occasion, the inappropriate behavior of international workers towards the local population.

Johansson also emphasizes (2001: 40) that though here have been several studies of peacekeepers' views of operations, they lack continuity. In the new era of peace operations (since the end of the Cold War) the situation is little better. However, there is at least one new trend in analyses by participants in the post-Cold War generation of peace operations: various surveys of cooperation between military and police personnel in peacekeeping efforts have been carried out in the Balkan region, all of which, though not coordinated, have been focused upon the resolution of similar problems: daily experiences, stress and motivation of the peacekeepers. This new approach suggests that cross-national surveys of peacekeepers in one conflict area may well be carried out using a similar methodological approach in the future: Johansson, 2001, and in the development field: Biehl, Mackewitsch (2002), Bennett, Boesch, Haltiner (2003); Jelušič, Vegič, Garb, Trifunović (2004).

A longer introduction to the topic of cultural challenges experienced by small countries in military operations was necessary in order to explain that the military has now been studied from numerous angles. There are also handbooks and guidelines on the use of equipment, technological integration of troops in operations, hierarchy, rules of engagement and assigned tasks of deployed units. It also seemed important to emphasize the general lack of acceptable, professional guidelines with which to train professional soldiers as to how to execute their duties whilst demonstrating empathy to the local population, despite their often basic level of education, the challenge of distinct cultural backgrounds and limited analysis of the impact of language barriers on communication between troops and inhabitants of areas in which missions are being carried out.

All these issues influence the quality and effectiveness of the military. They affect the outcome as well as soldiers' satisfaction with their work. Recognition of a soldier's participation in multiple operations can enhance job satisfaction, which is fundamental as disappointed soldiers tend to be less motivated, as well as less prepared to cooperate effectively in multinational peace operations worldwide.

2.   Small countries in missions abroad

Soldiers from small countries are often perceived as having greater empathy with the local population of the country in which the mission is being carried out. This may be explained by the lower expedition experiences of small countries, provoking the question of how we define a small country. Is it defined by its size in terms of square kilometers, numbers of inhabitants, or by the size or performance of its economy, or by the size of its armed forces? In military operations a small country may be seen as one with limited aspirations of international cooperation, one with small military contingents in missions dominated by subcontractors, or by countries with limited diplomatic skills to negotiate for higher ranking positions in military operations.

3.   The circumstances in which military contingents meet cultural diversity

Military troops of small countries are placed in diverse circumstances in which they experience cultural diversity first hand and to which they are forced to adapt. For example:

1. Multinational military formations in which cultural diversity is limited and mission management is linked to the interests of donor countries. The multi-national nature of military formations after the end of the Cold War has become the basic organizational principle of larger military units, although the multinational structure of the armed forces has been prevalent in European history for centuries (Haltiner, Klein, 2004). Some countries decided to form common units, for example the German-Netherlands Army Corps, and the Italian-Hungarian-Slovenian Brigade of Multinational Land Force. The MLF unit was formed in 1997. Since then the unit has encountered certain sociological problems (See Gasperini 2004; Gasperini et al. 2001) common to multinational military formations. These include controversies regarding use of the official language (English) and the native languages of the composite parts of the mission (Slovenian, Italian, Hungarian).

Other sociological challenges relate to operational procedures, such as when the lead nation principle (Italy) was challenged by two historically different military styles (Slovenia have been a non-NATO

member in 1997, a country which maintained traditions of its territorial defense history, whilst Hungary, a new NATO member state in 1999, still operated in line with traditions dating back to the Warsaw Pact).

The initial level of unit integration depended on participants' past experience (Italian soldiers with a long tradition of NATO cooperation, Hungarian soldiers with key knowledge of UN peacekeeping operations, notably in UNPROFOR; Slovenian soldiers with no such military experience).

Language barriers and historical burdens often characterize personal and professional relationships in a unit. A proportion of the Slovenian public expressed deep concern when the political decision was made to form a military unit with Italians, a concern provoked by memories of Italian occupation of Slovenia during the Second World War.

2. Military peace operations tend to be ad – hoc multinational military formations with no formal 'lead nation' principle. The mission is managed by the UN Department for peacekeeping operations.

3. The circumstances of the host nation in which the peace support operation or crisis response operation takes place.

Contingents from small nations have to adapt to all three conditions of military culture imposed by the commanding nation or by those with a decisive role in the specific mission. They can make proposals aimed at encouraging troops to be friendly towards the local population. They can also share aspects of their own culture with the locals, though international staff tend to adapt to common values rather than demonstrate their own distinct values or impose specific aspects of their own military culture on the locals.

4.   Concerns of contingents from small countries in military missions

In this article I articulate concerns relating to cultural diversity that arose from my 3 years of research of Slovenian units involved in military operations/missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR, EUFOR), Kosovo (KFOR), Afghanistan (ISAF), and Iraq (NTM-I).

4.1   Leading nation principle and forced adaptation

First, small countries very rarely lead multinational units as this role is generally designated to larger countries with more substantial resources to form battalion or brigade level units, and with sufficient personnel to establish the unit's framework. Small countries may well be assigned crucial duties in such units, but no matter how significant their duties and how well performed, soldiers from small countries are expected to surrender their cultural norms, their professional standards and disciplinary codes for those of the lead nation.

Another aspect of adaptation of units from small countries relates to the degree of responsibility they can accept. Small countries are usually too small to establish their own specific area of responsibility within the mission, and are thus expected to integrate into larger units with the capacity to organize transportation, logistical support, develop the infrastructure of the bases, organize retreats to prepare for emergencies and so on. Their status in such operations is that of subcontractors, i.e. their soldiers/units are integral to a group commanded by another country. As they cannot operate with complete autonomy (though this point is debatable as very few units function entirely independently), they must be ready to carry out orders professionally and yet have hardly any influence upon the way in which the operation is carried out and personnel are managed.

On the other hand, the lead nation principle helps establish uniform rules of engagement and codes of behaviour, which should help achieve higher level of military effectiveness. However, experience of countries with a multinational military, such as Switzerland, Belgium, or the former Yugoslavia, suggests that enforcing the "lead" nation principle in a national military force can lead to its dissolution (former Yugoslavia). Their experience also underlines the importance of respecting the expectations and objectives of all member nations when establishing a system of sophisticated, internal military relations, which is sustainable in the long run (Switzerland, Belgium).

Day-to-day use of language and use of language under pressure

There is a general expectation for there to be one official language to guarantee effective communication flow within a mission (Background paper by Szvircsev Tresch, Picciano, 2007), and indeed in every multinational military formation. For practical reasons units formed

within the NATO framework, or established for co-operation in NATO missions, tend to use English as their official language. Communicating in English can also be very useful as it is often very widely spoken, and can thereby facilitate communication. For example: the Italian-Hungarian-Slovenian Multinational Land Force (MLF) agreed to use English as its official language, because it was very difficult for all Hungarian and Slovenian officers and NCOs to speak Italian with a sufficient degree of fluency to communicate on all practical aspects of military life. Hence, despite the fact that the lead nation was Italy, the working language was a foreign language for all three participating nations. With regard to language, the constituent parties in the mission were thus placed on an equal pegging with one another. This said, in 1997 when the unit was formed, Italian officers were more fluent in military terminology and NATO abbreviations phraseology than their Slovenian and Hungarian counterparts, thanks to their extensive experience of NATO operations and activities. Indeed, the survey carried out by Gasperini et al. 2001 suggested that the Italian officers had a greater level of fluency in English than the Slovenian and Hungarians, at least according to the officers themselves.

The problem undoubtedly influenced the effectiveness of training sessions, common exercises and mutual understanding within the officers corps of the MLF. Research carried out suggests that the Hungarians and Slovenians found it difficult to communicate effectively in English, but this was not the only reason for the slow development of the unit readiness. The lead nation officers also used to communicate among themselves in Italian for convenience, then filtering the information they later conveyed in English to their Slovenian and Hungarian counterparts. As officers' English language skills have improved over the years, the need for Italian officers to speak their own language while working with the two other groups has decreased.

The officers and the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) from the Slovenian and Hungarian military, who joined the MLF Headquarters in Udine, were based there for between two and four years. In Udine, the mission headquarters not only housed the MLF home base, but also that of the Alpine Brigade Julia. According to the survey of Slovenian participants based at HQ, the majority of activities carried out there could not be accessed without joining the Brigade Julia network, whether for logistical, communication or training purposes. Although English is the

official language of the MLF HQ, Italian staff outside MLF often does not speak good English and hence Italian proves to be the only effective language of communication. Slovenian officers therefore decided that in order to enhance their life in Udine (in some cases they had also families there), they would try to learn Italian before arriving or during the initial stages of their work.

When I talked to them in June 2006, they mentioned the significance of English as the official language of the mission. However, it appeared that English was essentially used to cooperate in NATO activities. To work effectively in Udine basic knowledge of Italian seemed fundamental and the officers seemingly adapted to the situation by improving their English and learning Italian as a second language. Such tendencies were not, however, reported in the Hungarian unit. Instead, another behavioural pattern developed: the Slovenian officers simply tried to learn some basic expressions in Hungarian without attempting to learn basic Hungarian.

Members of the MLF HQ were deployed in peace operations as MLF staff in KFOR to HQ Brigade South-West in 2004 and 2006. They were incorporated into the German-Italian HQ as individuals and their work was executed in English, this being the official mission language. As members of the Slovenian Army and of the MLF structure they found themselves in a particularly sensitive situation, for as members of MLF, which was under Italian leadership, they sympathised with the Italians and yet also felt a bond with the Germans, with whom they shared greater cultural similarities. Some Slovenians even understood some basic German, having studied the language at primary school.

To the amazement of the Slovenian officers, in an emergency, although English was the official language, German staffers tended to discuss the situation at length between themselves in their own native tongue, rather than translating the debate into English to convey orders more efficiently. From this experience they learned that under stress people tend to speak their mother tongue, which placed these officers in an interesting situation for they knew some German, could understand nearly all the information that German officers exchanged between themselves, and could later translate for the Italians when they had difficulty understanding the short English version of the data at a later stage. Not only was the translation useful in itself, it also helped establish

potential risks in the broad context of the mission, thereby reinforcing the Slovenian officers' bond with their MLF comrades.

Respect and understanding of host nation culture

Every mission is carried in a different cultural setting, which means that the armed forces deployed around the globe must be aware of the culture and social system of the region to which they are deployed. However, there is no a rule obliging contributors to the peace and stabilization efforts to learn about the host nation. In general military personnel from larger contributing nations show less empathy for locals, though such knowledge would enable them to execute their mandates more effectively.

Exposure to local culture is of particular significance to the military operation in Iraq. The renowned military sociologist, Charles Moskos, stressed this point in his report on 'American Military Interaction with Locals in Iraq Operation', which was issued to top military officials in Iraq in 2006. He mentioned the need for language and cultural training of the American soldiers deployed there (Moskos, 2006).

Slovenian soldiers, deployed in the ISAF operation, also have experience in this field. In Kabul in 2004 the Slovenian Army participated in ISAF, sending soldiers to integrate with Canadian forces. After three rotations, a political decision was made to move these troops from the Kabul region to Herat. Prior to deployment to Afghanistan, the soldiers received basic language training in Pasthuni language and were lectured as to the religious characteristics and historical background of the region. Working at the entrance check point of the military base, they learned additional cultural characteristics of Afghani people whom they perceived as very proud; at least, such were those who entered the base on a friendly basis. The Slovenians also realized that soldiers from other countries can be disproportionately tough and even humiliate the local population, particularly those of lower social ranks. It appeared that such incidents were not founded upon a fear of threat from possible terrorist attacks, but simply intended to put these locals down. In an attempt to overcome this problem, particularly as this disrespect towards the locals could provoke additional risks for all those working at this entrance, for humiliated locals may seek revenge, and possibly upon innocent victims, the Slovenians who bore witness to such incidents reported them to the

base commander, who in turn ensured that the soldiers behaved more respectfully and professionally towards the locals thereafter.

The small Slovenian contingent learned that if soldiers behave professionally, their behavior can be admired, no matter how small the contingent.

4.2   National caveats

Some governments like to limit the risks to which their deployed troops are exposed. They do so by expressing and formally enforcing national caveats. In some cases, such restrictions are necessary in order to ensure that military personnel are not deployed for activities for which they have not been trained. Alternatively, such caveats serve to enable national decision-makers to protect their units. This leads to different levels of deployability of the units within the mission, and forces the mission commander into very detailed planning of what he can and cannot do with the troops available.

Slovenian soldiers were protected by caveats in nearly all missions. The only one in which they were deployed without any caveat was KFOR SICON 15 in February 2007 in Kosovo.

Often, the soldiers did not perceive the caveats as protection, but rather as a means by which their vulnerability and dependency on other units for their security was increased. Being small and "protected" they also felt less useful to the mission as a whole, whilst also sensing that they did not serve their full potential.

4.3   Democratic political control over the forces after transfer of command

The deployed units are part of the national armed forces, governed by democratic political control of the parliament and public of their home country. In military operations involving transfer of authority to the mission's military HQ, there is doubt as to who would protect soldiers in political terms. Their executive command is in the hands of the mission commander, who could execute the mission in such a way that it would not meet expectations of those executing parliamentary control, or of the other units in the mission or even by those who designed the structure of the mission. Democratic control is generally executed in different ways by different countries. Sometimes governments decide on deployment in missions and sometimes parliaments decide whether or not

to send troops for a certain mission, and there appears to be a connection between the level of interest shown in democratic control of the armed forces in operations and the degree of responsibility of parliaments for sending troops abroad.

In some cases, the public of parent nation shows greater interest in their soldiers' missions than in their parliaments, and sometimes for security reasons, national authorities may also not know the range of responsibilities of each of their units. For example, in July 2005, EUFOR units in BIH were responsible for ensuring the protection and safe travel from Sarajevo to Srebrenica of participants in the remembrance ceremony for the tenth anniversary of Srebrenica genocide in July 2005. The whole route was checked in advance for leftover landmines and monitored for any signs of potential terrorist attacks.

The Slovenian military company that belonged to the Multinational Battle group (MNBG) was assigned this task, which was highly classified. Slovenian political authorities did not know the level of risk to which their soldiers were exposed during this exercise until the final ceremony in Srebrenica. The general public may indeed never be aware that these classified undertakings were carried out by their country's personnel, as the risks to which the soldiers were exposed were not widely publicized for security reasons.

5.   Conclusion

The military of small countries are challenged by the fact that usually they have to subordinate their units and codes of behaviour to those of the larger and seemingly more important contingents. As subcontractors they have to adapt to the military culture of the larger units. In civil-military relations they show tremendous sympathy for social and humanitarian problems experienced by the locals, but rarely form units with those who share their cultural heritage. They therefore risk being treated as members of the bigger units, and are thus not recognised by the local community as more neutral or less repressive than their larger, more forceful counterparts.

Multinational units with a standing tradition, or those formed on an ad-hoc basis for one specific assignment, decide upon their official language. What complicates this decision is the environment in which the

multinational unit operates. Members have to speak the language of the unit and of the surrounding neighbourhood, which could be a civilian or military neighbourhood. Personnel of small nations tend to have better language skills than those of their counterparts from larger contingents.

Soldiers should show empathy for host nation culture and codes. In order to establish more pleasant communication with the locals, they have to learn some basic words in the language of the host nation, even if, as Moskos suggests, it might be a Pidgin version of the language. Additionally, they have to learn and respect the habits of the local population.

Democratic control of a mission's units is not yet fully regulated. Related scientific and operational advice is still required. The surveys suggest that the dominant/lead nation in a mission may dominate perceptions of the mission as a whole, which could in turn result in soldiers being treated as strangers at home, as was the case of some American soldiers in the Vietnam War.

Small nations regularly put national caveats on the units while being deployed in other regions. These limitations may then reduce their ambitions and mandates. Contingents from small countries more frequently develop sympathies with the host nation, and usually adapt very quickly to the military culture of the leading nation too.

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THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE
WITH CULTURAL DIVERSITY:
AN OVERVIEW[37]

Claude WEBER[38] and Saïd HADDAD[39]

1.   Introduction

In peacetime or in operations, the French Armed Forces (the Army in particular) experience diversity on a daily basis. Diversity occurs within the Army, in relations between civilian and military personnel or with new recruits, and within the combined-arms or the joint processes. Overseas diversity is experienced within the multinational context in peacetime in some units, with international staff assignments, and especially during operations within multinational coalitions under a UN, NATO or European Union mandate. We are particularly interested in this last scenario, because it allows us to examine both internal and external diversity.

The new international configuration is characterized by the prevalence of Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The overlap of human, political, economic and military elements as well as an increase in the number of actors involved, e.g., friendly and/or enemy armed forces, governmental and nongovernmental organisations, populations, civilian, political and religious authorities, the media, etc., force us to take into account the complex nature of the environment in which armies operate.

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Through experience and knowledge acquired during the colonial era by units, through basic training of officers, through special training before foreign operations, and with the increasing thoroughness of After Action Reviews, French soldiers are well prepared for managing diversity and the intercultural process.

In light of recent operations, the purpose of this paper is to describe and evaluate how the French Army manages these questions and incorporates new knowledge into the basic and permanent training of its troops.

2.   Methodology

Our aim is to analyse all organisations, personnel and practices within the French Army and look at how they sensitize military personnel to working in an intercultural environment. To draw up this inventory and to evaluate the potential know-how and knowledge within the French military, we have proceeded by:
- Reading general works on intercultural management.
- Reading studies concerning cooperation difficulties at all levels.
- Approaching various organisations within the French Army dedicated to training.
- Analyzing After Action Reviews.
- Interviewing military personnel who have returned from mission.

3.   Levels and natures of difficulties of cooperation

We have identified five levels of difficulty of cooperation, from the regiment level to the multinational operation level - which might indicate that complexity is increasing in terms of interpersonal cooperation. Our aim in this paper is not to detail the obstacles but rather to examine the institutional solutions to these challenges:
1. First level: in a regiment (battalion).
   Cooperation in this context concerns the presence or the intrusion of a range of personnel such as civilians,[40] women and ethnic minorities[41] that challenge the "established" military culture;

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[40] Thierry Nogues, Jacques Moreau et Clotilde Caraire, *La cohésion entre civils et militaires de la Défense,* Observatoire social de la Défense, Paris, September 2006, 102 pages.

2. Second level: the combined-arms level.
   The Army is a mosaic of cultures (professional specialities and identities);
3. Third level: the joint process.
   "Jointness" brings different French services into contact with each other. In spite of being legitimized by the political, strategic and operational changes, it faces some resistance because it clashes with the concerned actors' practices and representations;[42]
4. At the multinational level, during peace time.
   Many international studies examining multinational cases underline essential characteristics likely to generate cooperation concerns. In France, by comparison with other nations, there are very few studies on diversity and multicultural dimensions in multinational coalitions.[43]
   This is very revealing about the French position. One explanation could be that the French are often one of the biggest contingents in multinational coalitions. As a result, multicultural factors might be felt less by the French because in such circumstances it is often easier to stay in one's national environment and to "impose" one's own model rather than to have to accept other models;
5. At the multinational level, on operations.
   New missions are characterized by an intercultural dimension between military personnel, e.g., allies, adversaries, enemies, and with various civilian actors on the ground e.g., local populations, members of NGOs, journalists, diplomats, political, economic and religious local

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[41] Catherine Withol de Wenden, Christophe Bertossi, *Les militaires français issus de l'immigration*, Les documents du C2SD, n°. 78, C2SD, Paris, 2005, 335 pages; Saïd Haddad «La culture militaire à l'épreuve de la professionnalisation: quelques pistes de réflexions» in François Gresle, *Sociologie du milieu militaire. Les conséquences de la professionnalisation sur les armées et l'identité militaire*, Paris, l'Harmattan, coll. «Logiques sociales», 2005, pp 27-43.; Saïd Haddad, «Jeunes officiers français d'origine étrangère. De la différenciation entre co-membres. A propos de quelques parcours d'intrus. Premiers témoignages, premiers enseignements», *Migrations et Société*, vol 18 n° 103, janvier-février 2006, Paris, Centre d'Information et d'Etudes sur les Migrations internationales (CIEMI), pp 33-54; Bernard Boëne et Claude Weber, «Diversity in The French Armed Forces», in J. Soeters and J. Van der Meulen, *Cultural Diversity in the Armed Forces*, Routledge, 2007, pp.154-170; Katia, Sorin, *Femmes en armes, une place introuvable?*, Paris, l'Harmattan, 2003, 239 pages.

[42] Saïd Haddad, Thierry Nogues et Claude Weber, *L'interarmisation: expériences vécues et représentations sociales*, Les documents du C2SD - SGA-Ministère de la Défense, n°. 80, C2SD, Paris, 2006, 73 pages.

[43] Claude Weber, «L'Eurocorps: l'expérience d'une quotidienneté multinationale», *Les Champs de Mars*, *Cahiers du C2SD*, La Documentation française, n°.14, janvier 2004, pp 5-40. A paper in which we studied the effectiveness of this multinational unit in peacetime and many cultural aspects: languages, status, equipment, uniforms, celebrations and rituals, food, etc.

authorities. "Multinationality" of missions has many advantages, e.g., more power in monetary terms (economic), increased legitimacy (political), diplomacy and military capabilities (human, technological, etc.). But there are also institutional, structural, strategic and intercultural considerations that can create challenges:

- Language: *"Especially by the French - even during the last decade - there have been huge efforts"* (one officer).
- Organisation with a dual chain of command, with the size of each national contingent. *"The success of a multinational operation is linked to the ability of a nation to assume the leadership role"* (quoted by one officer).
- National interests: *"Without admitting it officially, during a crisis, each participating country strives toward a specific goal to protect its own interests. There will always be "national reactions" particularly regarding intelligence, civil affairs or logistics".*[44]
- Delays due to decision by consensus.
- Conditions for cooperation are not always met, e.g., different status, rights and duties, pay, rules of engagement, doctrines, capabilities, equipment, nature of the military organisation, etc.
- Differences in national cultures, e.g., history and military history, language, food habits, uniforms, drills, relations in the chain of command, leisure, national holidays and celebrations, etc.

When addressing these issues, the following should be taken into consideration:

- The level of cooperation: multinationality at a tactical level is possible when the situation is very secure. The real multinational level is at the strategic level. It is the responsibility of staff officers, and it is easier for them to cooperate because of their training and open-mindedness. *"For a coercion force, the most effective level must remain the brigade or even the division. For overcoming violence, the multinational battalion is considered most effective. At platoon level, the multinational element remains anecdotal and is limited to exceptional contact within the framework of*

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[44] Commandement de la Doctrine et de l'Enseignement Militaire Supérieur de l'Armée de Terre, Objectif Doctrine, *La Multinationalité,* n°. 27, 07/2001.

exchanges. The company is the first level of contact with foreign armies in operations but it seems desirable that multinationality be limited to the battalion level at the lowest and never at company level".[45]

- Length of the operation: sharing a long-term experience with other national contingents seems to be a good way of avoiding misunderstanding and enhancing mutual understanding. Some people interviewed believe that short multinational operations are more conducive to developing mutual understanding, because soldiers will engage more easily with others when they know that it is only for a short period of time.
- Nature of the mission: if the context of the mission is very stressful, a short tour of duty is recommended. When there is no imminent danger, people are more likely to converse with others. Activities should also be organized to avoid boredom, as this could be problematic for cohesion and morale.
- Languages: proficiency in foreign languages (especially English) is very important. In the past, this has caused problems in communication and cooperation for the French. Language proficiency is one of the most important areas of training.
- Professional skills: if complementarity between different national contingents is a positive thing, a challenge could also be a certain amount of rivalry. Planning is very important in this regard. The fair distribution of missions is one of the most strategic ways to avoid tensions and enhance cooperation. In this case, the size of each contingent and, of course, the nationality of the commander of the coalition is critical.

Different types of training to improve the military's understanding of others must be developed:
- Importance of training based on common principles. *"Doctrinal thinking (…) should be conducted alongside our Allies (…); Field manuals will not solve every challenge faced by multinational forces and will never be a substitute for the strategic thinking and action of commanders in the field"* (French Army Chief of Staff).

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[45] Commandement de la Doctrine et de l'Enseignement Militaire Supérieur de l'Armée de Terre, Objectif Doctrine, *La Multinationalité,* n°27, 07/2001.

- Integrating "multinationality" into officers' and NCOs' education and training. Officers must make serious efforts to familiarize themselves with other cultures and to share this information with their subordinates. *"You have to recruit the best, and most motivated personnel"* (quoted by one officer).
- Importance of interoperability and standardizing of procedures.
- *"In some cases we have to enhance the value of multinational postings because many officers think that the best way to have a great career is to stay within the national context"* (quoted by one officer).
- Acceptance of the command structures (the "core HQ" concept, etc.).
- Language is a central issue in the training of officers (exchanges, studies in a foreign country, participation of liaison officers in training, etc.).
- In official documentation, we often read that we should seek a better mutual understanding. However, concrete solutions to address this issue are rarely suggested. The best way to enhance understanding between multicultural groups is informal interaction. For example, it is easier to create links whilst playing sports, or over a good lunch, or during festivities. During formal activities, other issues tend to come into play, e.g. evaluations, power play, recognition and potential rivalry. During operations, organizing social activities is rarely a priority, but people often do so because they feel that is important to mix and discover more about each other's cultures. The problem is that there is rarely enough time for these informal get-togethers. Arranging such activities should be, in our opinion, one of the officer's duties.

These five levels of complexity illustrate the various natures and stakes of cooperation. In all these cases, the mechanisms vis-à-vis diversity are the same; only the awareness seems to be different. Differences experienced within a multinational setting are immediately visible. In national contingents, issues are less obvious or even suppressed. Many interlocutors consider that their multinational experience makes them aware of cultural diversity.

Poor cooperation within a unit can be detrimental to operational effectiveness. Staff are aware of these dimensions and try to address these concerns as well as they can, by ensuring, for example, a distribution of the geographical areas on the ground to the various national contingents taking part in the force. Sharing a common military culture also constitutes a considerable advantage. And finally, sharing a minimum of common objectives facilitates cooperation.

Taking into account the cultural diversity of populations during mission remains a major challenge. "Winning hearts and minds" is an important part of military doctrine but is difficult to achieve. Some nations are recognized for their particular skills and "know-how" in this area. Our intention is to analyse the French skills in this field.

4. Structures, training and know-how regarding management of intercultural relations

We will now examine how skilled the military personnel of the French Army are at building intercultural relationships (the internal levels mentioned previously are not part of the approaches and analyses which follow).

4.1 How to cooperate and communicate: a course to train managers in intercultural relations, the Military Academy of Saint-Cyr

The overlap of the human, political, economic and military components of operations demands the development of cooperation between military actors and the environment in which they work. Cooperation also requires education because to cooperate does not simply entail coordinating separate actions.[46] Working together involves communicating, and building and developing a mutual understanding between all actors. On the basis of these reports, efforts are made to train the soldiers to deal with specific situations they are likely to face, by giving them a better understanding of the social rules that organize intercultural or even interprofessional relations.[47]

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[46] Philippe Zarifian, *Travail et communication*, P.U.F. Paris, 1998, pp. 11-25.

[47] Bernard Boëne, Saïd Haddad, Thierry Nogues, *A missions nouvelles des armées, formations nouvelles des officiers des armes?,* Les études du C2SD, n°. 46, C2SD, Paris, 2001, 200 pages.

To achieve this, a course entitled "*Gestion des rapports interculturels*"[48] is offered to all the cadets during the last six months of their training. The objective of this course is two-fold – firstly to train future platoon leaders to analyze and understand interactions in a multicultural environment and, secondly, to train the leaders to communicate and act in a culturally-appropriate manner.

This course includes theoretical and practical sessions with officers' presentations and practical scenarios in the field. Video recordings of these exercises allow us to re-examine the exercise with the cadets. This instruction is an intercultural experience in itself: in spite of the fact that they all work for the Ministry of Defense, the various speakers belong to several institutional circles e.g., some are teachers, members of different arms or services, or from the French Gendarmerie - specifically for sessions which deal with negotiation of crisis situations.

However, cadets often consider these lessons unhelpful and make comments such as: "*We will see what it's like once on the ground*"; "*We know how to cope it*"; "*This is simply common sense*".

4.2   L'Ecole Militaire de Spécialisation de l'Outre-Mer et de l'Etranger (EMSOME)

L'Ecole Militaire de Spécialisation de l'Outre-Mer et de l'Etranger (EMSOME) is the "maison mère" of the Troupes de Marine and consists of approximately fifty people. Created in 2003, it is open to all military personnel, as well as to people who do not work for the MOD (e.g. teachers) who want to learn more about overseas operations.

The "Troupes de Marines" are in charge of training personnel assigned to overseas service. Decades of experience built up on overseas missions, and knowledge accumulated during the colonial and post-colonial periods, proves very useful. The courses aim to prepare soldiers for their new environment. There are many types of courses, including:

- "General" training courses intended for the NCOs and officers of the Troupes de Marine, who, during their career undertake short missions (4 months) or longer ones (2 to 3 years) in the French overseas "departments" and territories.
- Specific training courses (one day) for 11 specific destinations in the French overseas "departments" and territories, 42 cooperation

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[48] Couple with another one «*Techniques de négociation-médiation*». In 2007, this course will be called «*Relations et négociations interculturelles*».

destinations. The spouses of personnel sent on long missions are invited to attend these symposia. The courses serve as a forum for soldiers to discuss a range of practical issues including medical, lodging, transport, links with mainland France, children's education, leisure, administrative concerns and questions about living conditions.

- Compulsory courses (half day) for every unit to be deployed, are undertaken by all categories of personnel. These courses give soldiers information about their foreign destinations - the history, geography, culture, traditions, etc. of the country. One purpose of these courses is to give the soldiers advice on how to approach the local populations on the ground.

Apart from useful recommendations on how to behave in a specific context, e.g. when interacting with a Muslim, or with a village chief, the training provides general information on the country, e.g., geography, history, ethnic groups, religions and festivals. These tools might appear rather trivial compared to some of the sources of information available to the forces and the EMSOME, which include direct contacts with defence attachés abroad, experienced feedback from the military personnel deployed, etc. However, this basic knowledge is important. It is also easily transportable, usable and accessible by personnel on mission. Trainees can also receive documents (CDs, online documents, etc.) produced by EMSOME, e.g., dossiers entitled: "Water", "35 keys to understanding Islam", "Behaviour of the soldier in a foreign country", etc.

4.3   The French CIMIC Group (GIACM)

The French CIMIC Group (*Groupement Interarmées des Actions Civilo-Militaires* - GIACM) was established in 2001 and was declared operational in 2004. It is, to date, the only joint body of the French armed forces that specializes in the preparation, planning and implementation of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). CIMIC is defined as "the operational function designed to improve an armed force's incorporation into its human environment. Its aim is to facilitate the execution of the mission, the restoration of a normal security state and crisis management by civilian authorities, e.g., administration, humanitarian actions, and economic recovery".[49]

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[49] *The French Armed Forces and Civil-Military Cooperation*, Ministère de la Défense, October 2005, 32 pages.

The new missions have confirmed the crucial role of the armed forces in crisis resolution and the urgent need for cooperation between the armed forces and civilian actors, e.g., local authorities, international organizations, NGOs and populations. If the paramount mission of the armed forces is to secure the area in question, CIMIC legitimates their action and facilitates their incorporation into complex civilian environments.

CIMIC has four goals. These goals are in line with the overall strategy for crisis management: contributing to achieving political goals; bolstering military actions; speeding up crisis exit; and supporting and promoting national interests.

GIACM comprises nearly 570 personnel, divided as follows: 94 active duty personnel (on a permanent basis); 96 active duty personnel from other units, assigned depending on requirements; and 350 reserve personnel.[50]

GIACM trains its own personnel. All are deployed overseas at least once a year. It also fulfils the role of information sharing and awareness-raising within the Ministry and outside e.g. with universities and NGOs.

Two types of training are organised. The first is more general and is given to personnel newly assigned to GIACM. The second is more specific and is dedicated to personnel who are about to be deployed. The first training program is based on general aspects of civil-military cooperation (administrative and operational levels): presentation of the various posts (services), production of documents and reports, behaviour and ethics, legal framework of the operational context, After Action Reviews, physical training, English language training, first aid training, marksmanship, introduction to NGOs and international organizations, how to draft an After Action Review, and how to work with an interpreter etc. Approaches of various cultures also comprise part of the training.

In addition to the presentation of military doctrines and the law of war, the second week of training is devoted exclusively to the country itself, e.g., the political and economic situation, habits, ethnic groups. Training is also given on tools such as Internet sites, data on foreign countries, Intranet sites which facilitate communication between the

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[50] Five areas of expertise (Civilian Affairs, Civilian Infrastructures, Humanitarian Affairs, Cultural Affairs, Economic Life) and 164 positions.

personnel abroad and the rear base, or formal discussions (oral report to the chief after a mission) or informal exchanges.

Data are so general and it can be difficult to obtain detailed information on the behaviour, practices and know-how implemented in the field of intercultural relations during a mission. The examples given are familiar to us, e.g., do not eat with your left hand when in a Muslim context, female personnel facilitate certain contacts, rules regarding places of worship, patrols during festivities.

The CIMIC personnel's main mission is to come into permanent contact with the local population. So it is obvious that the personnel in charge of CIMIC are likely to be ideally positioned to observe and gather information.

4.4 After Action Reviews and relief of troops

The role of the After Action Review (or AAR, RETEX *in French)* is to draw lessons from the various operations (whatever the subject) and to address any mistakes in order to improve the organisational and operational capabilities of the armed forces. Based on the report of each operation, the AAR is a decision-making tool, which can help with the training of personnel in the future.

Having studied this process,[51] it appears that some of the information collected obviously reflected stakes for the armed forces in terms of power, symbolic struggles, and questions of legitimacy. It also appeared that collecting information is not always simple.

A lot remains to be done to improve the structures of the AAR - to go further than it being simply a report and to use the results and information to improve knowledge and training of personnel in the field. However, only GIACM seems to use the AAR to full effect. Approximately 10% of the personnel are involved in systematically processing and disseminating all useful information from the AAR.

Similarly, the relief of personnel in foreign or national operations constitutes a valuable source of information for newly assigned officers. An exchange of information at the time of handover is crucial and will be instrumental in advising the newly assigned officers on how to cope with any tactical situation on the ground as well as to learn important information about the local human environment. The importance of the

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[51] 60th Anniversary of D-Day: See Haddad (S), Nogues (T) and Weber (C.), *op. cit.*

role of the officer and the transmission of this knowledge is key. An officer who has not fully understood the importance of his/her role or who grants too little importance to his/her education and training in this field, will not sufficiently grasp the complexity of the "human" stakes relating to the accomplishment of the mission and will experience difficulties in communicating key points to his/her successor.

Direct contact between personnel during handover is extremely important. Unfortunately, this stage is often neglected due to time and transport constraints. In GIACM, the relief period of personnel theoretically lasts five days. This time period allows for a direct exchange of information and allows time for the new officer to be introduced to important interlocutors and local actors on the ground. Introducing the substitute to the local authorities, recommending that he avoid certain behaviours or giving him advice on how best to interact with local civilians forms a critical part of his handover education.

5.   Conclusion: About Colonial Heritage

Experience is the best way to prepare individuals and institutions in how to manage diversity. In this field, the perception of cultural differences is more obvious for those who have served in a multinational environment and have experienced diversity in joint operations for instance. It is impossible to draw up exhaustive guidelines on the best ways for soldiers to behave every possible situation. It is even potentially dangerous to give soldiers exact instructions on how to conduct themselves in every situation where they are interacting with someone from a different culture. What is valid for technical and military procedures differs from what is relevant in interactions with others human beings – individual context is what matters more than anything else.

The main ambition of these training programs is to sensitize, to propose some useful data but as soldiers say "*Mission comes first*".

"*We are not at home. Act like guests. Keep smiling. And remember that here, the most important international code is respect for others. Look at people in the eye and smile at them. You can see everything in someone's eyes. That's why I forbid my guys from wearing sunglasses. Friendly gestures are important: a raised thumb, a nod, a salute and always smile. Children are the best medium for initiating*

contact". These are some of the words from NCOs and officers and are good examples of positive ways to interact with locals.

Within the French Army, there is no doubting the will to sensitize personnel to cultural diversity. Obtaining information, winning over the local population and consequently facilitating the action of the force within its zone of responsibility, and contributing to France's influence, constitutes a pivotal role in the accomplishment of the current missions of the armed forces.[52]

In this field, because of their reputation, the skills of the French Army and the French Marine Corps are sought after by the other French services, e.g., the Air Force, or by other foreign forces, e.g., the United States and Germany, to provide support or information in the field of military education.

However, we cannot attribute the good intercultural behaviour of French soldiers solely to training and education. There are other possible explanations – such as colonial heritage.

Like other countries, e.g., Great Britain, and unlike others, e.g. the United States of America, it seems that nations with a colonial history are more at ease with their new missions. We often hear the sentence "We know how to do it", which reflects this colonial experience. According to those interviewed, the colonial experience has been naturally transmitted through generations of soldiers. In our opinion, if the work of remembrance occurs in all the units, this dimension is more a matter of mythology and can prevent the deepening and improvement of training.

The soldiers questioned also mentioned other explanations for their broadmindedness and behaviours:

- The Latin-based French culture: "It is cultural: The French are curious, they naturally go towards others"; "It is obvious for us to go and experience what other people offer us".
- As a result of French history, related for a long time to military history: "History is important for French people and particularly so for the French soldier. I do not know if other nations give so much importance to military history during the basic training of officers. While the Americans, for example, constantly focus on the future, we always look to our past. Perhaps this explains our interest for some

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[52] *The French armed forces and Civil-Military Cooperation,* op. cit.

populations with which we have historical ties". In the same way, celebrations and other commemorations constitute important aspects of the socialization of the new personnel.

- The ethics of the soldier and his personal commitment: "By definition, every serviceman who respects the rules and the law of armed conflict respects others, and he is able to manage diversity and meeting people from other cultures". "I have noted that the French soldier is much more dedicated than other soldiers. He has a stronger capacity for empathy with regard to the populations he meets. For instance, with his traditional resourcefulness, he systematically not only tries to improve his own comfort but to give others some material benefits" (an officer).

For some people, this empathy is synonymous with naivety and could constitute a real danger for men who underestimate the dangers.

If colonial heritage could justify and legitimize the French savoir faire to a certain extent, another aspect of colonial history is noticeable through the use of certain language during the training[53] or through an empathy which cannot always hide paternalism. Colonialism and its heritage have to do with these representations:

"The good savage"; "They are big children"; "the feeling of abandonment of populations which remind us some decolonization wars..."; "benefits brought..." Colonial heritage is not irrelevant to the behaviour of some soldiers, behaviours not always relevant in term of safety, impartiality and detachment: "Contrary to the Americans, for example, we must often fight with our guys to urge them to wear their helmets and bullet-proof jackets to go on patrols, they always find an excuse not to wear them." (quoted by an officer).

Beyond the procedures specific to each nation, the importance of military socialization as well as the solidarity and cohesion sought within the military community and against those who are "foreigners", constitute valuable elements of comprehension. This last point raises the question of the deployment of some units even when they're not trained for some missions.[54]

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[53] It can also be explained by the fact that some trainers are not specialized in a particular subject. They are above all military experts (for instance, the trainers at the EMSOME must at least have been abroad two years to give a course on a particular country).

[54] Winslow (D), *Le régiment aéroporté du Canada en Somalie. Une enquête socioculturelle,* Ottawa, Commission d'enquête sur le déploiement des forces canadiennes en Somalie, 1997.

In our opinion, the officers' involvement in training (in particular training aimed for NCOs and soldiers) is relevant and essential. The officer has a crucial role to play in this regard: as a model for his troops and as a "provider" of information for his men, enabling them to better understand their environment.

Finally, the officer is accountable for the good behaviour of his men. Depending on the nations and their work organization, relatively close bonds between officers and other ranks are of utmost importance in managing diversity.

Considering the responsibility and the role of officers, efforts must be made to improve the education of military personnel in the field of diversity management and the intercultural process.

CULTURAL CHALLENGES IN MILITARY OPERATIONS: HUNGARIAN CONSIDERATIONS AND EXPERIENCE[55]

Ferenc MOLNÁR[56]

1.   Introduction

Cultural challenges to international military operations can be understood at different levels and in different dimensions/contexts. These are the *macro* (strategic), the *mezzo* (organizational), and the *individual/interpersonal level*, which can be assessed in diverse contexts, such as the *type of military mission* (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, etc.), *the interaction between cooperating organizations* (Armed Forces, International Organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations), or between the forces and the local population.

Challenges can be approached on the ***strategic level***, defined primarily by the history of participating countries, overall threat and risk assessment, foreign political aims, and domestic political dynamics. Cultural context is also of significance since this strategic level not only determines the extent to which a country participates in certain missions (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, United Nations mandate, etc.), but also the type of military force the country maintains (e.g.: strong territorial defence, compulsory military service, militia system, etc.) and its specific military culture in relation to the country in which the mission is taking place. Furthermore, the effectiveness[57] of national military units is also judged by strategic criteria.[58]

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[57] For further details on organizational culture and effectiveness see: István Jávor - Tamás Rozgonyi, *Hatalom, Konfliktus, Kultúra,(Power, Conflict, Culture),* Budapest: KJK-KERSZÖV, 2005. pp. 26-29.
[58] E.g.: Participating in international missions and avoiding involvement in any combat activities or suffering losses can be evaluated as an effective contribution to strategic, political goals since it

Another means by which cultural challenge might be approached is by examining the ***organizational level*** of an operation; this referring to the organizational culture of the given military and inter-organizational cooperation in peacekeeping operations. Although this level of cooperation is highly influenced by strategic considerations, organizational culture may also be affected by the composition of the military operation (all-volunteer force, conscription, mixed, nation in arms, militia); its organizational history, traditions, predominant duties (territorial defence, combat operations, peace support operations (PSO), etc.); the imported culture of the given society (transmitted by members of the defence forces) and strategic/organizational goals of the operation's leadership.

Finally, the cultural aspect of international operations can also be assessed on an ***individual/interpersonal*** level, this consisting of essentially psychological and social-psychological considerations. When considering mission effectiveness, is also worth highlighting the impact of staff having differing levels of training and language proficiency, as well as their views being tainted by any stereotypical assumptions.

This article aims to describe and analyse various different degrees of cultural challenge experienced by Hungarians participating in international missions, and the preparatory phases thereof. Although the paper emphasizes the need recognize the hierarchy of cultural considerations, it nevertheless concludes that the different levels are very much interconnected and – more importantly – that strategic level considerations are the dominant cultural concern of a military organization, notably because they most dramatically influence its effectiveness. Nevertheless, this description of the Hungarian experience, based upon articles in national military periodicals, and telephone interviews with officers in key strategic positions, clarifies the distinction between these levels of cultural concern.

2.   The strategic level

When examining strategic aspects of Hungarian military culture, it is important to note the rapid speed with which Hungary has undergone significant change:

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demonstrates both support for foreign political ambitions and non-involvement in war; the latter of which helps avoid domestic political turbulence; a primary goal of governments.

- The post-Cold War security evolution resulted in the role of Hungary's armed forces being reviewed numerous instances in the last 16 years (e.g.: dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Balkan War, NATO partnership and then membership when Hungary was surrounded by non-NATO members and then by members and partners);
- Legal, economic and social democratic transitions which took place in parallel to the above.

Beyond these primary considerations, it is important to emphasize Hungary's eagerness to maintain strong ties with, and to be fully integrated into, NATO and the EU. Hungary provides key forces and services to NATO and other organizations which in turn enable it to achieve its own foreign politico-strategic goals. Obviously, *Hungary can only do so by participating in multinational operations*. Consequently, the Hungarian Parliament and government have adjusted the country's legal system[59] and redefined requirements of national forces accordingly.[60] Furthermore, after decreasing the number of conscripts over a ten year period, Hungary suspended conscription and decided to rely upon all-volunteer forces in 2004. It aimed to build a national military with a definitive new culture, which is far more focused upon international missions. (The Hungarian Defence Forces remarkably improved both their technical and humanitarian capabilities in order to participate effectively in multinational PSOs.)

Nevertheless, the AFs are not considered a high priority in Hungary's foreign or domestic politics as they seemingly do not represent any immediate or obvious security threat. Hungary therefore generally prefers to participate in peace support operations (including state/nation building). In missions the country's forces *cannot be involved in "real" combat activities or take high risks which may endanger even a single member of their contingent*. (e.g.: Hungary reached a political consensus in Parliament by agreeing to send a logistics battalion to Iraq. When casualties were experienced this consensus was immediately broken and the political opposition requested that the country's troops be recalled. This coalition was already fragile as a result of torture in Abu-Ghraïb.)

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[59] Most eminently, for NATO and EU missions alone, the Parliament deferred the right to the government to send soldiers abroad.
[60] In this process the ratio of conscripts was reduced and the ratio of volunteers increased and the structure of leadership adjusted accordingly, etc.

Furthermore, as a result of economic constraints and an apparent lack of immediate threat, *the country's defense budget has been reduced continuously*. Consequently, organizational effectiveness has only been improved to the extent seemingly required by key, foreign politico-strategic goals, which could not have been pursued by non-military means alone. Reliant upon the "creativity" of the military organization and the soldiers achieving a greater level of effectiveness, this non-declared strategy has reduced the number of procurement programmes, exercises and training sessions offered to Hungarian conscripts. *These very premises fostered a specific military culture while managing to effectively eradicate the combat culture of the Cold War.*

Hungary and its military performance are also characterized by other significant, pervasive cultural features: historical experience (e.g.: the country's perception of itself as a transition zone between East and West), and a general desire to somehow overcome financial difficulties. These factors generally *resulted in Hungary providing highly motivated soldiers for international missions and cooperation.*[61] In other words, Hungarian soldiers have proved keen to demonstrate their capacity to accomplish missions successfully despite financial difficulties and limitations of the historical, social, and political constraints/framework.

In summary, on the macro level culture allows for the transfer of crucial information required for challenges to be understood and limitations of desired improvements to international operations recognized. In other words, historical, political, economic, and social settings have a pervasive effect on military culture and have a distinct role in defining the limits of international operations.

3. The mezzo level

The *organizational level* is essentially defined by the operation's dominant task(s), military traditions, manning system, the personnel available, and the organizational and strategic goals of leadership. On an organizational level so-called cultural challenges could emerge *within the military* in relation to international operations; in the course of

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[61] József Tokovitz, (former commander of the Hungarian contingent in ISAF), "A XXI. század háborúi – aszimmetrikus hadviselés sajátosságai", (The wars of the 21st century – the characteristics of asymmetric warfare), *Új Honvédségi Szemle*, 2006/05. pp. 3-4.
http://www.honvedelem.hu/hirek/kiadvanyok/uj_honvedesegi_szemle/a_xxi._szazad_haborui_2

interactions of different military organizations or *between the military and other organizations* (NGOs, IOs); *between the military and local society*. In national and international operations, the Hungarian AFs have faced all the following cultural challenges since their post-Cold War transition:

a. Primarily, post-Cold War international operations required *cooperation with, instead of sole subordination to,* other national forces.[62] Furthermore, the so-called new missions, and the necessary preparation for them, called for the adjustment of the entire military culture to newly emerging norms, attitudes and approaches to problems (Cold War style approaches to war vs. negotiation, mediation in PSOs). This adjustment has also affected the entire rhythm of military life, relationships between soldiers, etc.[63]

Recognition of this need for professionalism and cultural adjustment became increasingly obvious during Partnership for Peace activities and was undeniably confirmed in multinational operations when Hungary sent soldiers to missions to the Sinai Peninsula, Cyprus and the Balkans in 1995.

This learning process did not stop in the 1990s. Instead, changes to the new post-Cold War security environment have now extended to the realm of UN, NATO and EU missions – the HDF having participated in all NATO peace support operations since 1999. In this process, the military organization shrank and adapted to peace support operations. Initially selected officers, non-commissioned officers and common soldiers participated in operations and later – especially after joining NATO – participation took place on a unit level. The latter proved more

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[62] This called for officers and commanders to be increasingly professional and thus more self-confident and independent in decision-making. As a former KFOR contingent commander confessed: "The degree of independence given to me as a contingent commander was higher than I had ever previously experienced…", Péter Lippai, Egy kontingensparancsnok tapasztalatai (A Contingent Commander's Experiences), *Új Honvédségi Szemle,* 2006/5.

[63] Zoltán Szenes (former CHOD), A békefenntartás hatása a magyar haderőre, (The Effects of Peacekeeping Operations on the Hungarian Defence Forces), *Hadtudomány,* 2006/3, www.zmne.hu/kulso/mhtt/hadtudomany/2006/3/2006_3_1.html

effective and resulted in a so-called "fragmented professionalization[64] of the Hungarian military".[65]

Professionalism, including the cohesion of the units, developed dramatically in units which participated in missions. They were better equipped and trained, and had real life operational experience, which in turn provoked cultural evolution. For example, communication improved (which required shared experience and knowledge) and resulted in better mutual understanding between members of a given unit. Furthermore, they learnt a great deal about one another and about their international partners. In turn this enabled them to ensure more effective functioning of their organization.

The Hungarian military adapted to the changing requirements of its political masters. It developed its capacity to participate in multinational peace support operations, primarily in NATO and EU coalitions. The transformation of its military structure, regulations, training, equipment, and entire military culture then stemmed from these requirements.

b. Besides the changing nature of post-Cold War missions and democratization, interaction with other national military organizations required a parallel and additional cultural learning process. This process implied a need to learn languages, increase multilateral co-operation, establish a common means of understanding and an ability to react in the same way to a wide spectrum of challenges, to be tolerant, and amongst other things, anticipate possible reactions from other nations.[66] The latter refers not only to general stereotypical reactions of states in certain political circumstances, but highlights the need to ensure general mutual understanding, which is vital for effective international cooperation.

Successful international cooperation on an operational level requires more than simple, common Rules of Engagement, Memorandums of Understanding or technical agreements. It requires anticipation of certain, perhaps new, ways of thinking, or reactions by

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[64] Ferenc Molnár, "Professionalism, Military Culture, and Esprit de Corps", Conference paper, December 2005, edited version published in Gyula Hautzinger, (ed.), "A testületi szellem és a professzionalizmus dilemmái", *Új Honvédségi Szemle,* 2006/3.

[65] One has to note that the cohesion of Hungarian military actually eroded in the early phase of the transition period.

[66] Interview with LTC Zoltán Mátyus, Commander of the Hungarian Peace Support Training Center, 15/02/2007

international partners. Effective anticipation of behaviour, which enhances mission functionality, could be encouraged through various forms of common preparation, training or by means of other collective experiences.

Although heightened cultural awareness could help improve multinational cooperation in the field (as was the case in Iraq, for example), the apparent impact of such adaptation seems limited,[67] especially in the case of nations such as Hungary, which was its own distinct language and culture.

Hungarian experience suggests that constantly enhanced and improved cooperation is the key to overcoming cultural differences. It is thus not surprising that cooperation between Italian, Slovenian and Romanian militaries is generally considered most successful than when it includes a Hungarian component (Hungary having permanent units with these nations). Although these forms of permanent co-operation are based on common political interests, it does not necessarily follow that the countries concerned share strategic considerations (e.g.: Romanian–Hungarian military cooperation has a long lasting history, but this unit has not yet been engaged in international missions).[68]

Other cases of Hungarian participation in international military missions were also unreservedly perceived as successful. They also contributed to the country's pursuit of strategic foreign political goals and, with the one exception of Iraq, did not cause any dramatic domestic political turbulence. Nevertheless, these units or individual soldiers always participated in low intensity conflicts. The Hungarian military has not engaged in combat missions since the Second World War, though it started to develop certain such capabilities.

c. In peace support operations, Hungarian officers and NCOs learnt how to negotiate with representatives of other organizations (mainly with IOs and national NGOs). This also required certain specific adjustments to the relevant military culture. Nonetheless, interaction with local societies probably resulted in a rich variety of interesting cultural experiences, which should not be under-estimated.

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[67] Interview with Col László Domján, Head of division of the Hungarian Center of Operation Coordination, 28/02/2007.
[68] Interview with Col László Szép, Hungarian Minister of Defence, 03/02/2007.

In preparatory phases of missions, Hungarian soldiers are briefed as to the demographics of the local society in the area in which the operation is taking place. The preparation and training undoubtedly enhance soldiers' cultural awareness and proves to be an integral element of each soldier's grounding, albeit that the intensity of such training varies in accordance according to the soldier's level of responsibility. Learning more about nations where operations are taking place and applying appropriate means of communication and behaviour are generally considered by the Hungarian Defence Forces as central to operational success.

Besides this cultural awareness, some nations are better suited to certain PSO missions for historical, social or economic reasons. For instance, Hungarians had no problems finding Afghan translators as many Afghans studied in Hungary in the 1980s. The Hungarian PRT also, for example, provides highly effective education to Afghan children, this enhancing their knowledge and their attitude to the PRT and ISAF.[69] As result of the afore-mentioned, historically rooted, educational relationship and because Hungarians have never been involved in combat activities in Afghanistan, their cooperation with locals tends to be smooth.

These cultural challenges to missions should receive more attention. Nations which have never wanted to impose power on the country in which a mission is taking place, were not involved in combat activities there, and place a premium on cultural awareness, may well be more effective in peace support operations. However, force generation does not focus on these contributions. Instead it focuses upon political, strategic, and budgetary considerations.

4.   Conclusion

Historical, political, economic and social settings have a pervasive effect on military culture and determine the limits of international operations. Other issues aside, this means that domestic political considerations will probably not allow governments (at least in Hungary) to lift caveats in Afghanistan. However, their international commitments forced them to encourage AFs to establish effective new

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[69] "Új utakon a magyar PRT" (The Hungarian PRT is on new track), at www.honvedelem.hu/honvedseg/missziok/afganisztan_prt/angolora_prt

capabilities which undoubtedly called for a new military culture to be established.

The Hungarian military has adapted to the current requirements of its political masters and can now carry out its role in multinational peace support operations effectively. From a national perspective, mastering its capacity to participate in PSOs without casualties defines Hungary's effectiveness. In this process, permanent, enhanced cooperation also provides the best opportunities with which to develop an improved military culture. However, increased liaison, exchange programs and common preparations are highly recommended, as budgetary constraints have already jeopardized these activities.

From an international perspective, it could prove beneficial to recognize the new "peace support" culture. Furthermore, recognition of the rather soft (e. g. cultural, historical) elements of certain national militaries would also seemingly improve effectiveness of complex missions far more than would forcing nations to sign up to war. After all, this can result in a loss of support both at home and on the ground in the country of the operation in question, as was the case in many former colonies.

PART 2

PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCE FROM MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES AND THE MIDDLE EAST

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THE CULTURE OF PEACE AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: MIDDLE EAST CASE STUDY[70]

Faysal O. AL-RFOUH[71]

1.   Introduction

The notion of world peace is a relatively recent concept. Not so long ago, every generation worldwide, and Europe in particular, had experienced 'its' war. A certain fatalism with regard to war was ingrained in the human mindset and war was perceived as a virtual inevitability, whilst peace was seen only as a vague utopian dream. The first peace movements of the 20th century were born between the two wars, in the 1920s and 1930s, perhaps culminating in the advent of the League of Nations. Unfortunately, however, the League failed in its quest as the member states did not endow it with the appropriate instruments and powers with which to establish peace. According to some, the rise in nationalist movements of the 19th and 20th centuries that provoked the two world wars played a major role in creating the ideal of world peace; the First World War having claimed the lives of more than 9 million people after which 55 million people died in the Second World War.

Faced with the largest catastrophes in human history, people around the globe began to dream of a better, more peaceful world. The United Nations was established on October 24, 1945, with the aspiration to free the world from the scourge of war. The UN implemented several programmes designed to reduce all the factors perceived to aggravate the outbreak of conflict to the greatest possible extent. These programmes not only focused on peacekeepers who intervene once a conflict has already erupted, but also on economic and social development, human rights, and

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[70] Proofreading by Anna Peel.
[71] The Orient Center for Studies and Cultural Dialogue, and Former Minister of Culture, Jordan.

the struggle to end world poverty and hunger. Indeed, all of these United Nations programmes aimed to directly or indirectly prevent conflicts and thus bring peace on earth.

The UN Security Council is the main body of the United Nations, dedicated to the resolution of conflicts and peacekeeping. It is composed of fifteen member states, five of whom are permanent members; China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Council is also composed of ten non-permanent members, elected by the General Assembly every two years.

When confronted with a potential threat to international peace and safety, the Security Council first tries to resolve the problem by peaceful means. In the past it has acted as a mediator or, in cases of armed conflict, proposed a cease-fire. The Council can also reinforce its decisions by enacting sanctions, which are a means by which its decisions can be enforced, thereby constituting intervention on a level between that of simple condemnation or armed intervention. Sanctions can also include arms embargoes, trade and finance restrictions, the ceasing of air and sea contact, or diplomatic isolation. Furthermore, the Council can also demand an extension of a mission's manpower and or material capacity.

Until the end of the Cold War, at the outset of the 1990s, the UN only tended to intervene if the conflict involved two or more states. This came to be known as the principle of non-interference. At that time, the principle of state sovereignty was 'officially' adhered to far more than it is today.

The first UN mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO), began in 1948 in Palestinian Territory and is still in place. However, the role of such UN missions has undergone considerable change since then. Indeed, UNTSO was only made up of observers mandated to observe whether or not the truce was obeyed. However, at the insistence of Lester B. Pearson, the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), was set up with a wider mandate during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956. This was the start of veritable peacekeeping missions supported by military, police and civilian contingents.

The role of peacekeepers has further evolved in the post-Cold War period. For various reasons, peacekeeping missions now tend to be operational in a single country. Firstly, international public opinion and

governments are more aware of a country's internal affairs than in the past, as there is greater access to information. Images of extraordinary violence are no longer accepted by the international community. This was the case for Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and, more recently, in Sierra Leone. Not so long ago one may even have been unaware that conflicts such as these were taking place, for the simple reason that the world in general was not exposed to such a degree of information.

The establishment by former colonial powers of state models in countries with no such tradition is also central to the development of a peace-keeping culture. Imposition of totally arbitrary borders proved instrumental in bringing different ethnic groups together, some of whom imposed their will on others due to their strength in numbers and educational superiority. Now the situation has evolved and state authorities can no longer dictate to minority groups on their territory. International standards serve to prevent belligerents from committing greater massacres. However, this calls for a stronger, more interventionist approach in defiance of state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference. Peacekeeping missions are thus now required to have greater capabilities in order to accomplish their objectives. They must be able to rebuild, disarm, supervise elections and ensure that human rights are respected. Military intervention is no longer a viable solution. After such missions, democratic institutions that have never existed, or that were destroyed must be rebuilt with the capacity to provide all citizens with equal rights, as in Kosovo and East Timor.

2.   UN Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping missions allow the Security Council to watch over the cease-fire and help provide the necessary conditions to achieve peace. On a few rare occasions, it has authorized member states to use all necessary means to keep the peace, including collective military action. According to General Indar Jit Rktye, former President of the International Peace Academy, peacekeeping is "the prevention, limitation, moderation and cessation of hostilities between or within states due to the intervention of a third party, which is organized and

directed at the international level and which calls upon military, police and civilian personnel to restore peace."[72]

Since 1948 there have been 60 UN peacekeeping operations, of which 47 were created by the United Nations Security Council since 1988. Close to 130 nations have contributed personnel at various times, and 108 are currently providing peacekeepers. As of March 2006, there were 15 peacekeeping operations underway, with a total of almost 90,000 personnel. The top contributors of military and civilian personnel to current missions were Bangladesh (10,255), Pakistan (9,638), India (9,061), and Jordan (3,723).

3.   Peacekeeping in the Middle East

Below, table 1 indicates completed peacekeeping operations undertaken by the United Nations in the Middle East, whilst table 2 demonstrates those still in operation.

Table 1:
Completed UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Middle East[73]

First UN Emergency Force	November 1956 - June 1967
Lebanon	June - December 1958
Yemen	July 1963 - September 1964
Second UN Emergency Force	October 1973 - July 1979
Iran/Iraq	August 1988 - February 1991
Iraq/Kuwait	April 1991 - October 2003

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[72] Cited in "UN and Peacekeeping", available at http://www.unac.org/peacecp/factsheet/role.html
[73] Compiled from http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0862135.html

Table 2:
Current UN Peacekeeping Operations in the Middle East[74]

Middle East	May 1948
Golan Heights	June 1974
Lebanon	March 1978

Both tables show that the Middle East has witnessed ample peacekeeping operations, generally established in an attempt to control the unrest which is perhaps prevalent in the area as a result of Israeli occupation of Arab territories and Israel's intransigence to vacate those territories in tandem with relevant UN resolutions.

Peacekeeping has undergone a transformation during the post-Cold War period. For various reasons, peacekeeping missions which now take place are more frequently operational in a single country. This is firstly because information is more readily acceptable, and also because international public opinion and governments are more aware of a country's internal politics than they were in the past. When images of extraordinary violence now reach the international community, they are not considered acceptable, whether the apparent tension is seemingly religious or ethnic in origin, or whether or not it occurs within a single country. It was not accepted in Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone or, more recently in Lebanon.

4. UNIFIL in Lebanon

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established in March 1978 for an initial six-month period. It was intended to help confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and assist the Lebanese government in ensuring the effective reestablishment of its authority in the area. Since then, UNIFIL's term has been extended continuously, largely as a result of the fragile, unstable situation in Lebanon. Again, on 28 January 1997, its term was extended by the Security Council for a further six-month period, until 31 July 1997. By unanimously adopting resolution 1095 in 1997, the Council reiterated its "strong support for the

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[74] Compiled from http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0862135.html

territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries". Also, in condemning "all acts of violence committed in particular against the Force", urging "all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate" and to end the violence. It encouraged "further efficiency and savings" provided these did not influence UNIFIL's operational capacity.

In his report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan set a demarcation line at to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon[75] The UN Secretary General endorsed this line of action, whilst the Security Council also stated that "the adoption of this line for the practical purpose of confirming the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in compliance with resolution 425 (1978) is without prejudice to any internationally recognized border agreement that Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic may wish to conclude in the future". The Security Council has since repeatedly endorsed the Blue Line, calling upon both parties to respect it. The Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), painstakingly negotiated and passed a full month after the hostilities began in Lebanon, established the framework for United Nations efforts to secure an end to the hostilities, which were to be underpinned by a stronger UNIFIL. However, this expanded UNIFIL was intended to buy time, and not to substitute political progress within Lebanon or between Lebanon and its neighbors. The Security Council's adoption of resolution 1559 (2004) was in keeping with its commitment to support Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity, which then led to Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in the spring of 2005, five years after the Israeli withdrawal.[76]

In his letter of 1 December 2006[77] the UN Secretary General reported the most recent progress made and outstanding challenges to the effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006). He further noted that only the historic achievement of the deployment of the Lebanese army in the area south of the Litani River and along the Blue Line, as well as the crucial role played an expanded UNIFIL, were actually helping the Lebanese army to ensure that the area was "free of armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government

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[75] UN Doc.S/2000/459, 22 May 2000.
[76] UN, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Middle East*, UN Doc. S/2006/956, 11 December 2006, p. 10.
[77] UN Doc. S/2006/933, 1 December 2006.

of Lebanon and those of UNIFIL". He also commended the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force for effectively assisting the Lebanese navy in securing its territorial waters. Recognizing the limitations of peacekeeping activities, the Secretary General nevertheless stressed that such activities could only be effective in a certain, specific political context. The period following the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon until the outbreak of hostilities in the summer of 2006 illustrates the limitations of the monitoring and peacekeeping capabilities of UNIFIL, especially if operating in a sensitive political environment and with limited mandates and resources. Hezbollah's arms build-up during this period was also a constant cause for concern, as are reports that such activities may have continued.

5.   Culture of Peace

The first definition of a Culture of Peace was provided by General Assembly resolution A/52/13 which called for a "transformation from a culture of war and violence to a Culture of Peace and non-violence". A Culture of Peace consists of "values, attitudes and behaviors that reflect and inspire social interaction and sharing based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, all human rights, tolerance and solidarity, that reject violence and endeavor to prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation and that guarantee the full exercise of all rights and the means to participate fully in the development process of their society." The Program of Action for a Culture of Peace (A/53/243), also adopted by the General Assembly in 1999, encompasses eight program areas: education for a Culture of Peace; equal rights for women; democratic participation; sustainable development; human rights; understanding, tolerance, solidarity; free flow of information and knowledge; international peace and security.[78] The UN is advised by key organizations reporting on each of these areas.

Some 50 civil society organizations[79], developed in various Arab countries, strive to establish a Culture of Peace in conflict-affected areas

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[78] UN General Assembly Resolution (A/53/243), 1999.
[79] There are 50 Civil Society organizations from Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen that are working

of the region. These organizations send their progress reports to the United Nations and, seemingly, the most significant obstacles to progress are the obstinacy of the Israeli government to deny fundamental and national rights to the Palestinian people and the aggressive politics applied by those who call for a violent response.

There are a record number of organizations trying to promote peace in this area. The Palestinian/Israeli project "Good Water Makes Good Neighbors" established by the international NGO 'Friends of the Earth Middle East' has achieved concrete and practical reconciliation on the ground. In each community its volunteer youth water trustees centered their efforts on shared water and environmental concerns. A conflict resolution institute in Ramallah has also promoted "peaceful conflict resolution techniques among a generation of future leaders through the design and implementation of unique programs and services … reaching more than 50,000 beneficiaries in Palestine through the development of relief projects and programmes."[80] Despite adverse circumstances in Iraq, a commission for civil society enterprises has established a wide organizational network to coordinate the work and activities of different organizations striving to promote political participation, develop the community's capabilities and contribute to sustainable development.

Despite their best efforts to establish a Culture of Peace in the conflict-prone areas in the Middle East, the UN agencies and Civil Society organizations, largely established by the Arab world, are faced with following difficulties:

1- Insufficient funding;
2- Lack of experts in the Culture of Peace;
3- Inadequate infrastructure to build capacity, implement projects, ensure sustainability and targeted marketing to enhance civil society and private sector participation in reconstruction exercises;
4- Weak cooperation and networking for joint activities;
5- Lack of practical coordination on the ground either between international institutions and local NGOs, or between the local NGOs themselves;

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for establishing a Culture of Peace in the affected areas of the Middle East, namely Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, etc.
[80] *Youth for Peace Annual Report,* International Peace Academy, Geneva, 2005.

6- Local and international media focus on reporting of violence and bombings in the region and indifference to reporting endeavors of organizations engaged in Culture of Peace activities;

7- Lack of accurate information-sharing between the Arab world and the West, which has created an unhealthy environment in which to establish a Culture of Peace.

6.   Peacekeeping and Intra-Cultural Challenges

Peacekeepers are drawn from different member states of the United Nations as part of the UN Peacekeeping operations in the Middle East. Thus, the peacekeeping force comprises persons hailing from diverse geographic and cultural backgrounds who are assigned the difficult task of maintaining peace under the aegis of the United Nations in different geographic regions with a variety of cultural backgrounds. Such a scenario requires close coordination between peacekeeping and peacemaking activities if the mission is to help achieve lasting peace. Effective peacemaking can establish a cease-fire, at which point peacekeepers may enter to play either a traditional or expanded peacekeeping role.

Impartiality is an essential requirement for peacekeepers. In some recent peacekeeping operations, conventional understanding of impartiality and the use of force have been challenged and attenuated, in part as a result of the more active role peacekeepers are playing in such missions. The more complex the situation, the greater the challenge of retaining the confidence of all parties. In many situations, the possibility of certain parties trying to manipulate the presence of UN peacekeepers to advance their own goals cannot be excluded, particularly in the absence of a clear reconciliation process, or when parties have differing interests in the absence of such a process. Where peacekeepers are involved in inter-state conflict, the UN strives to underline its impartiality to the local population by clearly explaining the role of peacekeepers when they first arrive in the community. Being clear about their aims is an intended means of developing a positive reputation in the local community.

Local support is vital to the success of a peacekeeping force within a conflict-blighted country. Consent and full cooperation can be qualified, particularly in the case of multi-dimensional internal conflicts.

Significant local support must be a prerequisite for the deployment of an international peacekeeping force. If all parties are to remain committed to an agreement on which deployment of a force has been based, they need to believe that their interests are served by that agreement.

If a UN peacekeeping force finds itself losing support from one or more parties to the extent that it is clearly unable to fulfill its original purpose without going on the offensive militarily, it may well have crossed the line from being a peacekeeping operation to being an actor in a peace enforcement mission and must re-evaluate its response accordingly. Sometimes the situation can be more ambiguous, as in Cambodia after the withdrawal of Khmer Rouge from the peace process. In either event, the options open to the UN remain limited. One option could be to change the force's mandate to peace enforcement, recognizing that any mid-stream change of this kind is likely to cause major handicaps for the troops of contributing nations. A second option would be to soldier on in a peacekeeping capacity, re-emphasizing the peacemaking function, thereby potentially risking the safety of the peacekeeping force and creating a hurdle to the peace process indefinitely. The last and most difficult option is to withdraw.

In conflicts in which UN peacekeeping operations have long been ongoing, for example between Israel and its neighbors, the stakes have consistently remained very high, because there is probably no alternative to soldiering on indefinitely. However, in other circumstances the UN may simply have to acknowledge failure and withdraw in order to preserve its credibility and conserve its resources.

The UN peacekeeping forces are multi-national and multi-cultural in composition and nature because the troops are drawn from different member countries willing to contribute forces to that particular mission. Members of each peacekeeping force are also of diverse geographic and cultural backgrounds to the locals of the region to which they are assigned, in efforts to ensure the impartiality of the mission as a whole. This calls for prior understanding by peacekeeping troops of the geographical and cultural background of the region to which they are posted. On top of this, development of this understanding will go a long way towards addressing the issue of cultural interoperability and mission effectiveness in multinational forces. It is thus appropriate that a peacekeeping agreement incorporates a provision for the socio-cultural reorientation of the troops in the region, and such training should be

carried out by the cultural department or civil society organizations of the country in which intervention is to take place.

The Middle Eastern countries are predominantly Muslim and Arabic is usually the *lingua franca.* The region is also rich in Islamic religious and cultural traditions. As deployment of peacekeeping forces in the Middle East is currently a recurring phenomenon, the following suggestions aim to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping troops in this region:

1- The troops designated for peacekeeping operations in the Middle East should preferably be from Islamic countries so that the members are familiar with Islamic tenets and do face minimal difficulties when dealing with local populations;
2- If possible, the Arab League should form a 'Peace Force' comprising troops of Arab member countries and some contingents could be borrowed from the League by the United Nations to perform peacekeeping operations when required;
3- A similar mechanism can be devised by the International Islamic Conference to help the UN peacekeeping missions in the Middle East;
4- A permanent training institute should be established to impart training in cultural traditions to members of UN peacekeeping forces. For deployment of troops in the Middle East, special training in Islamic and Arab cultural traditions could be provided by specifically trained personnel of the Arab League.

7.   Conclusion

Establishment of permanent, lasting peace in the Middle East is the goal towards which the United Nations, other key global actors and countries of the Middle East have all inevitably been striving.

Israeli intransigence to vacate the Arab-occupied territories has essentially been the root cause of ongoing tension in the Middle East. In efforts to achieve peace in the region, viable options for both Israel and the Arabs have been considered. Past experience shows that an active and systematic third party role is indispensable. Nevertheless, Israel has traditionally been suspicious of third parties, though the evidence available attests to the fact that an international presence on the ground

has been a key feature of nearly every *modus vivendi* reached between Israel and its adversaries. The Israeli-Syrian border would not be stable without the peacekeepers of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. The situation in Hebron, tense and dangerous as it is, would be even worse without the Temporary International Presence. Full disengagement from Gaza would seemingly not have been achieved, had the European Union not stepped in to monitor the Rafah crossing. The Israeli-Hezbollah war of 2006 would probably have taken place much sooner and been yet more explosive had UNIFIL not been present. It would also not have been ended without a reconfigured UNIFIL to help implement Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), full implementation of which appears to be in the interest of all states in the region.[81] Reports indicate growing awareness among Israelis that third parties on the ground can serve Israeli as well as Arab interests, which augurs well for peace, as a stronger third party on the ground may well help bridge gaps, demonstrating that a viable and lasting solution would be beneficial to all parties.

There is a dire need to establish how to pursue an effective, comprehensive regional approach to the conflict. Ultimately, the Arab-Israeli conflict does not require intervention between Israel and the Palestinians alone. The region and diverse strategic priorities of all actors must be fully addressed, as ultimate peace must involve Israel and all its neighbors. One aspect of progress should not be held hostage to another. Israel should consider that comprehensive regional peace may not be achieved without returning the Golan Heights to Syria and at the same time Syria may well be advised to pursue policies demonstrating its commitment to peace and stability in the region, particularly with regard to its immediate neighbors.

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[81] For more details, see *United Nations Report of the Secretary-General on the Middle East*, UN Doc. S/2006/956, 11 December 2006, p. 14.

The time is ripe to convene an international conference, along the lines of that held in 1991 in Madrid, to ensure that all regional dimensions of the conflict can be addressed. The revival of the regional track of the peace process, which is a *sine qua non* of the road map to peace, is in the interests of all. It is high time for all the parties concerned to work to ensure that conditions in the region favor the establishment of peace, thereby laying substantive foundations for trust, successful negotiations and peace in the region.

UNIFIL II, ISRAEL, LEBANON, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: NEW AND RENEWED PARTNERSHIPS AND IMPLICATONS FOR MISSION EFFECTIVENESS[82]

Efrat ELRON[83]

As a result of the Lebanon War and in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 of August 11, 2006, UNIFIL's (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) mandate was extended and enhanced, and troop strength significantly enlarged. An important number of major European countries and several Asian, African, and Moslem countries have responded to the UN's call, sending troops to Lebanon and contributing to the creation of an upgraded multinational force that is currently deployed on land and at sea.

Peace operations are used in the region in abundance, mostly deployed at the borders between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries. These forces all have the mandate of observing and monitoring, among them UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force), deployed on the Israeli-Syrian border; UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization), the first UN peace mission whose military observers staff observation posts in southern Lebanon and on the Golan; and the MFO (Multinational Force and Observers), an independent international organization responsible for supervising the implementation of the security provisions of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. EUPOL COPPS (EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories) and EUBAM (EU Border Assistance Mission) at the Rafah crossing point on the Gaza-Egypt border are recent creations of the

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[82] Proofreading by Anna Peel.
[83] The Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Hebrew University and Tel Hai College, Israel.

European Union and the EU's first forces involved in the region.[84] UNIFIL II is an example of a contemporary peace operation that is mandated to go beyond traditional peacekeeping, holding responsibility for some of the broad spectrum of activities now typical to such operations.

This paper outlines a model describing the effects of the cooperation between UNIFIL II, Israel, Lebanon, the UN, the troop contributing countries (TCCs), and the international community on the effectiveness and success of UNIFIL in fulfilling its mission and mandate. The model presents the knowledge creation, activities and actions UNIFIL stakeholders need to engage in to manage effectively the complex interfaces between them in order to create closer and more effective partnerships.

1.   UNIFIL I, UNIFIL II, and the Security Council Resolution 1701

UNIFIL was created in 1978, following the adoption of Security Council Resolutions (SCR) 425 and 426 on 19 March. to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, assist the Lebanese Government restore its effective authority in the area and promote international peace and security, It was (and is) deployed in south Lebanon from the Israeli border north to the Litani river and operated under a Chapter Six mandate.

During its long-standing presence in Lebanon, UNIFIL's mandate did not evolve to fit the changing conditions on the ground, and its mission was further complicated by growing disenchantment with UNIFIL's performance and relevance by the various actors involved in the mission or influenced by it. As the conflicting parties did not fully respect or adhere to its mandate, UNIFIL became increasingly irrelevant over time. Moreover, it was regarded by many, including some of its own participants, as collaborating too closely with either Hizbollah or the IDF, depending on one's perspective.[85] Overall, the Israeli withdrawal did not

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[84] Since the Hamas takeover of Gaza in June 2007, the two missions are no longer actively operating and their future is uncertain.

[85] Complicating the conceptual debate over the force periodical renewals was the abduction of Israeli soldiers at Har Dov by Hizbollah in October 2000 with tapes relating to the abduction held by the UN for two years, which further overshadowed the basically strained relations between UN and Israel at the time. See also Beker Avi, *The United Nations and Israel - From Recognition to Reprehension*,

result in the restoration of the Lebanese Government's authority, and Hezbollah, supported by Iran and Syria, continued to operate freely in south Lebanon and close to the Blue Line.[86]

To a large extent UNIFIL's failure was a result of too many unresolved conflicting interests and contradictions at the global and regional political level, causing a breakdown in the diplomatic support system of the operation.[87] A significant decrease in its troop size in 2002 and the gradual withdrawal of its European contingents[88] further diminished its importance and impact in the region.

UNIFIL I can be seen as a classic case of a difficult mission with an inadequate mandate. Although it made some contributions in stabilizing the area, it did not achieve its basic goals. This failure became more prominent after the signing of SCR 1559 on 2 September 2004[89], which called upon "all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon" and "for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias." Whilst in 2005 Syrian troops departed Lebanon as a result of intense international pressures and the "Cedar Revolution" mass demonstrations, UN reports indicated that deployment of the LAF in South Lebanon and disarmament of militias had not been implemented,[90] and Syria still had significant political control over Lebanon[91] The inadequate mandate played a part in allowing a volatile situation to continue and develop over the years, culminating with the

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(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988). For more recent updates that also discuss recent examples of the changing relationships, see Beker Avi, "The UN shows some balance", *Haaretz*, 25.1.1.04, and Dayan Aryeh, "The UN uncut", *Haaretz*, 30.5. 2005.

[86] For a detailed summary of UNIFIL's history and the related UN Secretary General and Security Council reports and resolutions, see UNIFIL's official web site:
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unifil

[87] MacKinlay, John, *The peacekeepers: An assessment of peacekeeping operations at the Arab-Israeli interface*, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989); Skogmo Bjorn and Urquhart Brian, *UNIFIL: International peacekeeping in Lebanon 1978-1982,* (Boulder and London: Lynne Riener Publishers, 1989).

[88] It needs to be noted that Western forces have gradually been decreasing their participation in the UN peace support operations in the past decade for several reasons, one being their deep involvement in NATO operations and in Iraq, another being the perceptions of the problematic effectiveness of some of the UN operations.

[89] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559 (2 September 2004).

[90] For a detailed analysis of the LAF role in Lebanon, the challenges it faces, the transformations it went through and its prospects for the future, see Barak Oren, "Towards a representative military? The transformation of the Lebanese officer corps since 1945", *The Middle East Journal*, no. 60, 2006, pp. 75-93.

[91] *Progress report on implementation of Security Council Resolution 1559*, Special UN Envoy Terje Roed-Larsen Report, October 25, 2005.

Second Lebanon War. The update Report of the Security Council on 20 July, 2006 indicated that:[92] "It is clear that UNIFIL, with a very limited mandate, has only been able to play a peripheral role in the current crisis and many have rejected it for the newly proposed international force."

SCR 1701 ended 34 days of fighting between the IDF and Hizbollah. The Lebanon War was triggered by Hezbollah's raid from southern Lebanon into Israel, the killing of eight soldiers and the, abduction of two more. It also signaled a dramatic change in the roles of the UN and the international community in the region, calling for a significantly expanded and more robust UNIFIL with an authorized strength of 15,000 troops. It provides for a strengthened mandate coupled with the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in South Lebanon, who became jointly responsible for the implementation of the resolution. SCR 1701 is based in part on SCR 1559, with important additions including the creation of a weapons free zone in south Lebanon, a ban on sales and supply of arms to Lebanon except as authorized by its Government, and a call for the delineation of Lebanon's international borders.

The enhanced UN mission now amounts to well over 13,000 troops from 30 countries. Italy, France and Spain are each contributing two infantry battalions or their equivalent, while Indonesia, Ghana, India, Malaysia and Nepal have one battalion each stationed across southern Lebanon and the Blue Line. The mission has integrated artillery, tanks, armored vehicles, radars and an intelligence capacity, in addition to its main body of light infantry and engineers. Daily patrols have been increased from just a handful to around 400 and new observation posts have been built along the Blue Line. Its maritime task force (MTF), under German command and with more than 1,600 sailors, is the largest naval contingent in UN history. Consisting of fifteen naval ships from Germany, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Turkey, it is responsible for supporting the Lebanese Navy in monitoring its territorial waters, securing the coastline and preventing arms smuggling. The LAF has deployed a large force to south Lebanon for the first time, consisting of four brigades, and is cooperating with UNIFIL in joint patrols and operations, including the destruction of bunkers and arm caches.

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[92] Security Council Update Report No. 5 on Lebanon/Israel, 20 July 2006.

As is the case for most peace operations, UNIFIL's main purpose is to serve as a military means to help achieve a political objective – assisting in achieving domestic stability in Lebanon and contributing to overall regional stability. More specifically, its mandate is positioned between the UN's classic Chapter Six and Chapter Seven, informally referred to as "chapter six and a half". Its troops can therefore "take all the necessary action in areas of deployment of its force … to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind." In other words, and as stated more explicitly in UNIFIL's Rules of Engagement, there is a mandate to use force beyond self-defense.

UNIFIL's tasks also include "assisting LAF in disarmament of all armed group; assisting the Government of Lebanon, at its request, in securing its borders and other entry points to prevent the entry of arms or related materials". Stated also in the resolution is the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current crisis, including the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers. Another important statement in the resolution is the "intention to consider in a later resolution further enhancements to the mandate".

2. Partnerships and Cooperation in the International Arena – Implications for Mission Effectiveness

Partnerships and effective cooperation in and around a complex entity such as a multinational force need to be based on multiple formal and informal cooperation mechanisms that contribute to the different dimensions of mission effectiveness, as all actors are interconnected in numerous ways.[93] Unified goals within the force, over and above the national interests and cultures and in sync with the mandate and mission are essential. No less important are the identification and enhancement of common interests of the parties with a direct interest in the peace that the force is mandated to keep. According to the definition of the SWORD model developed by Max Manwaring,[94] this is the 'War for Unity of Effort'.

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[93] Tetsuro Ilj, "Cooperation, coordination and complementarity in international peacemaking: The Tajikistan experience", *International Peacekeeping*, V. 12, 2, 2005, pp. 189-204.
[94] Manwaring, Max, D. and John T. Fishel, "Insurgency and counterinsurgency: Toward a new analytical approach", *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, no. 3, 1992, pp. 276-284.

In the case of UNIFIL, deeper partnerships need to include a mutual change of existing attitudes, approaches, and levels of cooperation of all parties. Such bi-lateral and multi-lateral developments have been taking place continuously since the adoption of SCR 1701 and the deployment of the multinational forces, and more are needed. As this is a dynamic process, and UNIFIL II is a reformed military, organizational and political entity, representing an emerging new mentality and mandate, this is seemingly the best time for all parties to ensure that the means and conditions necessary to fulfill of UNIFIL II's goals and maximize its performance are in place.

A combination of the two closely related factors, successful diplomatic efforts and UN commitment, has been found to predict success in achieving the overall goals of peace operations.[95] These in turn influence yet another crucial key leading to effectiveness - the fit between the situation on the ground and the missions' mandate,[96] force size and force composition. Rwanda, Somalia and UNPROFOR in the Balkans are examples of a misfit leading to failure. The level of a mission's success or failure in achieving its overall goals, influences other important performance indicators: from fulfilling the greater vision behind the mandate – the alleviation of human suffering and global peace - to the will and motivation to fulfill the specific mandate, to operational unity within the mission and between the national contingents, the overall positive perceptions of the mission, its effectiveness and significance,[97] leading to with it the long-term commitment and involvement of TCCs at the national level,[98] and their troops at the ground level in the fulfilling the mandate.[99] Other effectiveness indicators are the legitimacy of the mission, as perceived by all those involved as beneficiaries or contributors, the mission's cost effectiveness, and the effective leadership and authority of the force commanders to achieve interoperability and the

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[95] Pushkina Darya, "A recipe for success? Ingredients of a successful peacekeeping mission", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 13, no. 2, 2006, pp. 133-149.

[96] Diehl Paul, Druckman Daniel and Wall James, "International peacekeeping and conflict Resolution: A taxonomic analysis with implications", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1998, pp. 33-55.

[97] Tomforde Maren, "Motivation and self image among German peacekeepers", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 12, no. 4, 2005, pp. 562-575.

[98] Schoenmaker Ben, "The debate on the Netherlands contribution to UNIFIL", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 12, 2005, pp. 586-598.

[99] See for example, Bennett Jonathan and Boesch Rolf, "Motivation and job satisfaction in the Swiss Support company in Kosovo", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 12, no. 4, 2005, pp. 562-575.

mission's goals. All these factors determine the "attractiveness" of the mission to TCCs and highly professional militaries, and are weighed against the level of risk posed to the troops.

UNIFIL II operates in an especially complex conflict theatre. Lebanon's frail democracy is constantly under threat from within and from neighboring Syria and Iran. It is deployed in a volatile region, which suffers from active conflicts in Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian arena, is shadowed by Iranian nuclear threats, and is renowned for the involvement of many other regional and international players. The complexity of the theater compels the professional militaries involved in UNIFIL to adjust their doctrines and means in a coordinated manner in order to successfully cope with the dynamic and ever-changing challenges.

Despite the complexity, a basic assumption of the partnership model is that Israel, the government of Lebanon, the UN, and the wider international community share the goal of regional stability, as manifested in SCR 1701.[100] Another shared and related basic assumption is the notion that an effective UNIFIL II and an effective mandate is a necessary mean for the achievement of stability. Recent conceptualization and thinking, based on a large body of theoretical models and empirical evidence from the literature in different fields[101], reports from the field, reports produced by different NATO and UN bodies - the Brahimi Report[102] being a prominent example - promote effective negotiation and cooperation between all parties that are involved in a conflict as one of the preconditions to its effective management and resolution. Moreover, these partnerships are essential for the operations' internal workings and smooth coordination, as operational effectiveness is inherently challenging in peace operations as they are multicultural organizations consisting of forces from different nations, speaking multiple languages,

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[100] The concept of "regional stability" is also in the eyes of the beholder – and Hizbollah, Iran, and Syria for example have very different and versions of the terms that differs from that of the Western and non-western democratic world and the more moderate players in the region such as Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

[101] For two examples, see several chapters in Richard M. Price and Mark W. Zacher (eds.), *The United Nations and Global Security, (*New York: Palgrave*, 2004)*, and Lipsky, David B., Ronald L. Seeber and Richard D. Fincher, *Emerging Systems for Managing Workplace Conflict*, (Jossey Bass, 2003).

[102] Brahimi, Lakhdar, Report of the panel on United Nations peace operations, UN Security Council, A/55/305-S/2000/809 (August 21, 2000); NATO, AJP – 9, NATO Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/AJP-9.pdf (12 Dec 2006).

and representing a variety of cultures and military traditions.[103] Furthermore, it is a circular relationship - as a more effective force, UNIFIL has the potential of strengthening the partners and their partnerships on the ground and at the political levels, and this reputation of competency and success tends to give rise to more achievements and accomplishments in a perpetual cycle.

In the case of SCR 1701, what then are the necessary present and future conditions and actions necessary to enable its successful implementation? We will now turn our focus to the international and inter-military cooperation as mutually affecting each other, and the effects of both on the mission's effectiveness.[104] First and foremost is the significant and continuing involvement and commitment of all parties in fulfilling the mandate and ROE. A precondition is a basic belief in the usefulness of both as means of achieving the overall goal, and in their possible and positive implications on the conflict situation. In UNIFIL's case, there is a consensus on the potential of SCR 1701 as bringing a positive change in the theater, also from the Lebanese and Israeli governments.

The most compelling signal of involvement on the ground is that it is the largest contribution of Europe and the EU to any current UN force[105], and the quickest deployment of any UN force of such magnitude. Four European states - Italy, France, Germany and Spain - dominate the force, along with their democratic values and highly professional and well-equipped militaries. The contribution of forces from Moslem and Arab countries – Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey and Qatar - further enhances UNIFIL's legitimacy and acceptance in the region.

TCCs are motivated to participate in peace operations for various reasons and if their specific goals are satisfied positive perceptions of the peace operation are enhanced, which in turn strengthens the will to contribute to the mission. Joining the war on terror and strengthening democratic principles around the globe is one motivation. Other motivations include the ability to influence global and regional politics, and contributing to the burden of global security. Having a good

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[103] Elron, E., Halevy, N. Shamir, B., & Ben-Ari, E., "Cooperation and coordination across cultures in the peacekeeping forces: Individual and organizational integrating mechanisms", in A. Adler and T. Britt (Eds.), *The psychology of the peacekeeper: Lessons from the field*, Praeger Press, 2003.

[104] Due to the scope of this paper, the topic of CIMIC will not be explored.

[105] In fact, UNIFIL's is Europe's first large scale contribution to the UN since Bosnia; see *Annual Review of global peace operations*, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, 2007.

reputation while doing this increases both visibility and influence in international bodies like the UN, NATO and EU. Take, for example, Italy's aspirations to become a more prominent force in Europe, Germany's wish to burnish its military's reputation and Turkey's aspirations to raise its international profile as it strives to join the European Union as well as to reassert Turkish influence in its region. All these motivations align with the formal UNIFIL mandate and goals, as well as its perceived importance. An additional result of aligned motivations has enhanced feelings of accountability of the troops on the ground. These are transmitted by the nations in pre- and post deployment training and throughout the service on the mission[106].

There are considerations at the national level that are a potential faultlines between the contingents and their respective TCCs. The level of risk to soldiers' lives is one, the possible increased risks of a terror attack in the home country as a result of participation is another. Financial considerations and allocation of resources always play a crucial role in national theatres, especially in Europe and North American for their troops are heavily involved and deployed within the NATO framework. All these consideration are also weighed against the perceptions of an operation's success and importance.

A consequence of countries having different motivations is manifested in the interpretation of the ROE of an operation, the level of willingness to engage in active combat, and the extent to which national restrictions and caveats are imposed on troops. The current case for ISAF in Afghanistan is a well known example[107], and the question of how actively to engage in the disarming of the Hizbollah and other militias is the case for UNIFIL. Distinct perceptions and goals of different countries can hamper, in many respects, the headquarters ability to effectively

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[106] Based on interviews and observations of Italian military pre-deployment training before joining UNIFIL, and on numerous interviews summarized in Elron, E., Halevy, N. Shamir, B., & Ben-Ari, E., "Cooperation and coordination across cultures in the peacekeeping forces: Individual and organizational integrating mechanisms", in A. Adler and T. Britt (Eds.), *The psychology of the peacekeeper: Lessons from the field*, (Praeger Press, 2003).

[107] See a summary in French N. N., "Our seven wars in Afghanistan: Progress under the SWORD model", *The Pearson Papers*, Vol. 10, no. 1, 2007. One prominent example is NATO's summit meeting in Riga, where prior to the summit, a request to restate their national restrictions on troops was circulated to all nations. The request also included a pledge for aid to NATO partners whose troops were in danger, even if the day-to-day rules of some countries restricted offensive operations. As a result some nations did remove some of their operationally restrictive caveats, allowing ISAF commander to use 2000 troops to a greater effect (U. S. General James L. Jones, outgoing Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the Atlantic Council meeting, December 21, 2006).

command its mission– the difficulty of moving forces beyond specific
areas of deployment or unwillingness of rescuing troops from another
contingent when needed are cases in point. Moreover, perceptions of
unfairness when some troops take greater risks than others also impede
cooperation between contingents and affects troops' motivation.
Nevertheless, at times, overall good cooperation can lessen the impact of
these rifts. The next section focuses on the current cooperation and
coordination mechanisms between UNIFIL, the IDF and the LAF and
their positive effects on the implementation of SCR 1701.

3. Implementation of Cooperation on the ground: Coordination and Liaison Mechanisms

The success of the cooperation between the parties on the ground
is highly dependent on the coordination and liaison mechanisms
implemented at the strategic and tactical levels. While the primary goal of
liaison mechanism is to relay information on current incidents and future
events in order to prevent violence and misunderstandings, the more
comprehensive coordination systems also serve as means to several ends
that affect mission effectiveness: bringing together knowledge and
doctrines accumulated in each of the militaries, shared learning, the
creation of new and important knowledge about the theatre, enhanced
decision making capabilities specific to the mission, and improved
troops' actions and reactions. It also allows deeper insights and
knowledge of all relevant parties of their partners, and in turn the
identification of mutual overall interests, the safety of UN personnel
being one example. No less important, it allows an understanding of
relevant organizational and national differences – in terms of operational
conduct, command structures, definitions of professionalism, interests,
motivations, and cultural values and emphases as they are manifested on
the ground. In UNIFIL's case it is essential that high levels of knowledge
and familiarity will also exist between UN headquarters and the DPKO,
the individual TCCs and their militaries, Lebanon/LAF, Israel/IDF,[108]

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[108] It needs to be noted that the Israel and the IDF are unique recipients of peace operations in terms
of IDF capabilities that are similar to those of the European contingents.

NATO (who operate in other arenas and many of UNIFIL's European troops have served under its command), and the EU.[109]

As a reflection of the global arena, coordination is possible at both the bi-lateral and multi-lateral levels. Specific to UNIFIL's history and the fine line it treads between the conflicting interests of Israel, the Lebanese government, Hezbollah, and many others, close coordination can also pave the establishing the trust, confidence and mutual respect required for an effective mission. More specifically, efficient cooperation can lead to changes in perceptions: from "enemies" to partners, from a mission with an irrelevant mandate to a mission with promise, from stereotypes to personal and professional perceptions, to adjustment of expectations and wishes related to UNIFIL's role.

The cooperation and coordination mechanisms implemented and the actions taken to enhance their effectiveness include:

- DPKO's creation of a Strategic Cell responsible for UNIFIL II only. The Cell was created as a response to the complexity of the operation and to the requests of the main European TCCs. The Cell consists of around 30 officers, proportionally representing the TCCs. The cell serves as an instrument for enhanced military guidance at the strategic level, whilst simultaneously allowing the DPKO more direct connections with the forces on the ground, a better understanding of the specific contingents and their needs and challenges, and more closely coordinated decision making processes.[110]
- Regular and effective tri-partite meetings of UNIFIL, IDF and LAF senior officers, run by the UNIFIL force commander. Discussion can include violations of SCR 1701 by both sides, activities related to better demarcating the Blue Line and actions required to enhance bi-lateral liaison and coordination mechanisms between UNIFIL and the two militaries.
- Frequent bi-lateral meetings between UNIFIL's Force Commander and senior officers in the IDF and LAF which strengthen the role of UNIFIL as mediator of the conflict.

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[109] Knowledge of Hizbollah, terror and terrorist organizations, local and influential actors, such as Iran and Syria, is indeed crucial, but is not part of mutual knowledge creation.

[110] It must be noted that while there are many advocates of the strategic cell, who tend to see this as a test case for other large missions, there are those who believe it undermines the established UN command structures, by adding a further layer between UN DPKO and the ground.

- Additional liaison units in the IDF and LAF at the regiment level, battalion level (LAF), in the navy, and in the air force (IDF) have been put in place.
- Significant enhancement of existing liaison units at the brigade and headquarters level of in terms of personnel and resources.
- More direct communication channels between the liaison units, and easier access to their commanders and senior officers.
- Participation of LAF officers in UNIFIL's Joint Operation Center.
- Establishment of a UNIFIL office at the IDF Northern Command headquarters manned by two officers from the liaison unit.
- Increased accessibility of UNIFIL commanders to high level IDF and LAF officers in emergency situations.
- More frequent attendance of UNIFIL officers in conferences and events both in Israel and Lebanon.
- More frequent bi-lateral and tri-lateral visits to UNIFIL AO and Israel by senior military officers and high level political representatives from TCCs.
- Significantly higher levels of information and intelligence sharing regarding the situation and threats in South Lebanon at different levels.
- Instructions to units on both sides of the border to exercise more caution and act in a less provocative manner when dealing with situations that can evolve into frictions.
- Increased use of media to convey information about UNIFIL to the public in both Israel and Lebanon.[111]

One of the common threads in all the measures and actions taken is allowing the space and time for closer and more personal interactions. These in turn allow the establishment of common rules of interaction and the creation of higher quality solutions to challenges at the tactical and strategic levels.[112]

Reports from all parties, official and un-official, have repeatedly indicated that the enhanced coordination mechanisms have so far facilitated closer, more effective cooperation than ever before. A realistic

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[111] General Graziano's recent interviews with the Israeli *Jerusalem Post* and *Yediot Achronot* are an example.
[112] DiStefano Joe and Maznevski Martha, "Creating value with diverse teams in global management", *Organizational Dynamics*, Vol. 29, no. 1, 2000, pp. 45-63.

test of the effectiveness of the coordination mechanism is the dealing with the incidents and frictions as incidents are bound to happen not only between foes but also between friends in such a complex setting involving such a wide spectrum of issues and relationships. To date, escalations of incidents were prevented, with the aid of the enhanced communication and trust. One concrete example is the exchange of fire between the IDF and the LAF across the blue line on 7 Feb. 2007. A far more serious incident was essentially contained in large part because of efficient liaison activities on the ground and the effective relationships created between the liaison units and officers over time. At the next tripartite meeting, less than a week after this clash, despite UNIFIL's having reprimanded both parties for violating resolution 1701, all agreed with UNIFIL's recommendation to improve coordination and the need for discussions of the alternatives of achieving yet smoother liaison (e.g, reduce reaction times and implement a mechanism for conducting emergency meetings). The tripartite meeting was preceded by intense talks of the force commander with senior Lebanese officials, including Prime Minister Siniora and the LAF chief of staff – UNIFIL's stable and regular good cooperation with the Lebanese authorities have helped in easing the tensions created.

Nevertheless, interviews conducted for the study repeatedly indicate that formal learning mechanisms and knowledge creation at the deeper levels both within UNIFIL, the IDF, the TCCs and DPKO need further enhancements. As two examples, familiarity among most IDF commanders and soldiers with UNIFIL's mandate, structure, operations is lacking at best. The in-depth knowledge of UNIFIL troops and personnel regarding the nature and history of the Lebanon War and the lessons learned from it, the regional conflict and the actors involved in it, the IDF, and Lebanese and Israeli cultures is in a similar state.[113] As effectiveness is also related to knowledge beyond the merely daily operational level, especially at the commanders' levels, the creation and dissemination of these understandings must be integrated into the formal training and learning processes of participants on the ground.

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[113] At present, only a handful of UNIFIL commanders and IDF officers situated in Lebanon are in direct contact and troops not allowed to cross the border to Israel.

4.   Current State of Affairs

SCR 1701 and UNIFIL II in its new form have been in existence for only a short time. It is, however, good timing to reflect on its initial relatively positive results, and on the problems that still need to be resolved through better coordination and international cooperation.

At the immediate level, UNIFIL II's new found enthusiasm in fulfilling its mission has generated significant results. Israeli withdrawal has been completed without incidents, the ceasefire is being adhered to, Hezbollah is no longer situated at the border with Israel or alongside UNIFIL posts, the actual separation between the IDF and Hezbollah is effective, the negotiations on issues such as Rajar village, the Blue Line demarcation and Shebaa farms are advancing with partial implementation, some of the areas contaminated with unexploded ordnance have been cleared, humanitarian assistance operations are conducted on regular basis, including troops' involvement in various projects, and overall UNIFIL's area of operation is more stable and quiet than has been the case for many years (at the same time, reports of relatively minor violations and Israeli over-flights continue and there is still no direct bi-lateral communication between IDF and LAF).

The wider picture however is a darker one. The UN force is deployed in an extremely complex situation, and the restrictions in its mandate mainly in terms of its limited area of operations and disarmament activities may limit its contribution to the region's short and long-term stability. Both the March and June 2007 reports of the Secretary -General to the Security Council warn of several problems and weaknesses: Iran and Syria are involved in unlawful transfer of arms and munitions to Hizbollah and other armed groups in violation of the embargo;[114] Lebanese border customs critically lack equipment and training; and the armed groups have been only partially disarmed at best. The LAF are facing capacity challenges which impacts on their ability to quickly respond to UNIFIL requests. Lastly, UNIFIL remains subject to the differences between contingents, mainly relating to the will to use

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[114] The report refers to intelligence evidence shared by Israel and the Lebanese authorities with the UN and TCCs; see also public proclamations by Hizbollah leader, Hassan Nassrallah, on 16 February stating Hizbollah's intention to move munitions to the "front" and claiming the presence of Hizbollah fighters in South Lebanon.

force when necessary and to differences in military standards and equipment.

While actors on the ground grow stronger (IDF, LAF, Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran), UNIFIL operates within the need for the delicate balance that is typical of many peace support operations – being deterrent on the while getting the support Israel and Lebanon with all its factions and at the same time taking into account the specific threats against its troops.

Overshadowing this situation is Lebanon's fragile democracy, political impasse, and the growing internal violence. Despite regional and international efforts to encourage dialogue and compromise between Lebanon's factions, the political struggle that has paralyzed Lebanon since the assassination of Rafik Hariri and 22 others in a massive suicide truck bomb in Beirut, continues. Despite the departure of the Syrian army in 2005, the Lebanese parliament suffers a deadlock. At the heart of the dispute are Lebanon's ties with Syria. Its pro-Syrian Parliamentary speaker supports the Hizbollah dominated opposition, which is also tied to Iran and has for months prevented the Parliament from meeting at all. The UN Security Council adapted SCR 1757 on 30 May 2007, thereby unilaterally establishing an international tribunal through which to investigate Hariri's murder. Resolution 1747, on 24 March 2007, also provided an international response to the situation by toughening sanction against Iran.

Warnings by Lebanon's pro-Syrian president, Emil Lahoud, indicated that setting up the tribunal could trigger a wave of violence. Subsequently, three bombs exploded in the Beirut area, and fighting broke out between the extreme Islamist al-Qaida supported militant Fatah al-Islam and the LAF at Nahr el Bared, the northern Palestinian refugee camp. At least 130 soldiers, Fatah al-Islam rebels and civilians have been killed by the time of the writing, and additional fighting had broken out in a camp within UNIFIL's area of operation. Lebanon's prime minister vowed to uproot the groups, and to strike at any sign of terrorism. The international community also voiced strong support, partly demonstrated by shipments of arms to the LAF.

5.   Conclusions and Future Implications

The implementation of resolution 1701 remains a barometer, not only of the will and commitment of the international community to support sustained stability in the Middle East, but also of the UN's ability to successfully lead an active, complex peace operation in an especially intricate arena. The history of peace-making and peacekeeping forces world-wide is studded with both accomplishments and failures, and performance in this particularly important operation serves in many respects as a test case. The eyes of many are watching UNIFIL closely, and whilst the operation currently provides a source of optimism, in view of its potential to demonstrate international cooperation and renewed significance on the ground, the dangers of returning to relative ineffectiveness and problematic reputation are continuously "lurking around the corner". To this end, existing international and military cooperation need to maintained, and additional significant steps need to be taken to ensure UNIFIL's continued meaningfulness. What more can be done to enhance UNIFIL's chances of success in achieving its overall mandate?

First and foremost, UNIFIL's new and welcome commitment must be continuously matched by ongoing international support and assistance not only to UNIFIL troops, but also to Lebanon, Israel, and the wider Middle East region.[115] In line with the paper's main theme, and in the words of the departing Military Adviser to the DPKO, a crucial step in managing complex tasks "requires a rise in operational flexibility and innovative relationships with regional organizations and individual Member States".[116]

The notions of cooperation and flexibility, combining the diplomatic and the operational levels, will be best used in accordance with the new doctrines of peacekeeping, where a consensus emerges - in complex conflicts and emergencies, where the level of consent of some of the parties is uncertain, peace operations need coercive in nature to some

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[33] See the debate on how the lack of similar international commitment is central to the failure of international missions in the Israeli-Palestinian arena in Michael Kobi and Kellen David, "Israel-Palestinian Bi-level conflict zone and its implications for international intervention: What went wrong and what can be done?", *The Pearson Papers*, Vol. 10, no, 1, 2007, pp. 78-108.

[116] Major-General Randhir Kumar Mehta, *UN News*, 31 May 2007.

degree.[117] To be a credible peace operation, not only does it need to engage in state building, but its forces must be armed and organized according to the situation it is embedded in, and to be perceived as being willing and capable in over-matching whatever opposition they might encounter. Forces are better able to fulfill their mission using a combination of negotiation, consent promotion techniques, deterrence, and the will to use limited force if necessary to protect the population and the mandate. High levels of adaptability, creativity and flexibility displayed in UNFIL's deployment and operations are also critical. Existing empirical and theoretical expertise and models can serve as important guidelines.[118]

Taking all of the factors of the situation into account, it seems that the risk of not moving forward may be greater than the risk of moving forward. Collective experience demonstrates that allies to peace operations need to be proactive, informed, knowledgeable, and coordinated. Short and long-term implications of the risk to peacekeepers' risk need to be taken into account alongside the implications to local and regional stability, European and global security, and UNIFIL's own capabilities and limitations.

Establishment of a high level formal advisory council under the auspices of the U.N. could well prove an effective mean for effective decision making, followed by successful implementation. The council's responsibilities might include active reviewing of SCR 1701 and UNIFIL's mandate and its implementation. It could also provide subsequent recommendation for changes. The council could be made up of diplomatic and military representatives of all parties with a direct stake in the resolution. It could hold regular meetings, consider the expert recommendations of UNIFIL's top commanders, their IDF and LAF counterparts, and professional and academic experts in PSOs and the Middle East.

The guiding principles of the council (or a similar high level cooperation and coordinating mechanism) would be unity of effort combined with the attainment of the deep level of knowledge needed for

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[117] Jakobsen, Peter, "The emerging consensus on grey area peace operations doctrine: Will it last and enhance operational effectiveness?", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 7, no. 3, 2000, pp. 36-56.
[36] See Fishel John and Manwaring Max, *Uncomfortable wars revisited*, (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), and French, N. N "Our seven wars in Afghanistan: Progress under the SWORD model", *The Pearson Papers*, Vol. 10, no. 1, 2007.

UNIFIL's enhanced effectiveness and the adjustment of its operations and structure to the conditions and larger context the mission operates in. Potential implications of every action taken or not taken need to be considered. The council is just one example of cooperation and knowledge creating mechanism operating under these guidelines – similar lower level mechanisms are also crucial within UNIFIL and with UNIFIL and its partners on the ground, or at the TCC level. It is these processes and mechanisms that can enhance the chances to help the parties in conflict to implement a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution, perhaps even in achieving, in the words of Resolution 1701,"a comprehensive, just and lasting peace"

An end note – several major events have recently occurred in the ever dynamic theater: a deadly terror attack against a UNIFIL patrol killed six Spanish troops on 24 June, the first direct attack on the UNIFIL forces in their new form. A rocket attack was also launched against northern Israel a week earlier. Coincidentally two important UN reports were issued in June by the Secretary General. The first, written by the recently appointed Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Michael Williams, on the implementation of 1701 and among other issues discusses the evidence of rearmament of Hezbollah north of the Litani river as well as the extremist Palestinian factions, the shipments of heavy weapons across the Syrian-Lebanese border, and the two attacks as an indication that weapons and people able and willing to use them remain in South Lebanon.[119] The second report, written by an independent group of experts assigned to inspect the Lebanon-Syria border, found no effective controls to prevent arms smuggling, The team highly recommends joint headquarters that will include all the Lebanese security agencies as well as, urgent international aid to be provided in terms of both training and equipment to strengthen Lebanon's ability to secure its borders. It also urges Lebanon to improve its control of its borders with its present capacities.

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[119] One relevant example is the case made by John Mersheimer in his seminal paper on "The false promise of international institutions", *International Security*, Vol. 19, no. 3, 1994, pp. 5-49.

While many events and reports provide evidence of the overall effectiveness of the renewed UNIFIL-IDF and UNIFIL-LAF cooperation and liaison on the ground, together with the two reports they also present an opportunity and an obligation for all stakeholders in UNIFIL to re-examine the mandate, Rules of Engagement, the cooperation between them, alternative future actions on the ground and at the diplomatic levels to that need to be taken to ensure enhanced security and stability.[120]

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[120] Indirectly, the terror attacks also raise questions, however, regarding the limits of cooperation. For example, who are the partners to an investigation on the terror attack needs to be considered, and cooperation with Hizbollah and Syria in the investigation may seriously limit the uncovering of the culprits, when Iran and Syria may have played a direct or indirect role in the attack as part of their continuous efforts of destabilizing Lebanon. A recent noteworthy analysis of the issue was written by Michael Young from the Lebanese *Daily Star* on 5 July 2007, relying partly on the recent statements made by Javier Solana, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union.

CULTURAL CHALLENGES FOR PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS: THE JORDANIAN EXPERIENCE[121]

Saleh AL-ZU'BI[122]

1.   Introduction

Since its creation in 1945, the main objective of the United Nations, as embodied in its Charter, was "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war which brought sorrow to mankind". The Charter also asserted that the "peoples of the United Nations determination to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women, and of nations large and small".

Article 1 stipulates that the purposes of the United Nations are: to maintain international peace and security by taking effective collective measures in order to prevent and remove threats to the peace, develop friendly relations between nations based upon respect for the principles of equal rights and self determination of peoples. Finally, it strives to achieve international cooperation by resolving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character.[123]

Since that date in 1945, the most challenging and over riding component of the international agenda has been to achieve peace and security in all its dimensions. Today the central challenge for the 21st century is "to fashion a new and broader understanding bringing together all nations for collective security, because, on many occasions, it has been proven that threats recognize no national boundaries".[124] They are

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[121] Proofreading by Anna Peel.
[122] Mawahib, Institute for Consultation and Training, Amman, Jordan.
[123] UN Charter, Article 1.
[124] UN "Amore secure world: our shared responsibility" Report of the Secretary General, High level Report on: Threats, challenges and change. New-York, Dec. 2004, p. 11.

inter-related and must be addressed at global, regional and national levels. More than ever before, the problems face today are complex - due to their diversity - and interrelated. A threat to one is a threat to all. Superpowers are besieged by the problems of smaller states. The mutual vulnerability of weak and strong has never been more apparent.

Individual, national and international security are profoundly connected. Individual security must be the basis for national security and national security the basis for international security. National and international security cannot be achieved without respect for individual security. That is to say, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Therefore, the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN General Assembly in 1948 was a landmark achievement in world history. It was the first time the international community set down formal standards of human rights and freedoms to be enjoyed by everyone, everywhere.[125]

Peace is not merely the absence of war. It involves cooperation and interdependence among nations with a view to this fostering economic and social development, arms control and limitation, human rights, strengthening of democratic institutions, protection of the environment, and an improved quality of life for many. Such components are indispensable if we are to establish peaceful, more democratic societies.[126]

To maximize all possibilities of achieving international peace, security and stability, it is fundamental to meet such challenges. We must create sufficient deterrents to war by accepting a new collective discipline in which the community of nations as a whole actively assumes responsibility for promoting and ensuring peace by preventing and resolving conflicts.[127] Peacekeeping operations must be carried out in order for peace and security to be attained. However, peacekeeping operations can only be successful if the international community works together to pursue peace and stability, because peacekeeping operations

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[125] Ramcharan B.G, "Human Rights and Human Security", Studies of H. R. British Library Directorate, Vol. 70, 2002.

[126] On the activities of the UN 48-49 sessions, see Ghali Butrus, *Peace building and development,* UN New York, 1994, pp 3-4.

[127] Gesar Gauira, "Peace keeping and peace building", Inter American Symposium on Inter American Deference College, p.18 (no date).

are multinational and multidisciplinary in nature, which can make it more challenging to achieve key objectives.[128]

2.   Challenges Facing Peacekeeping Operations

2.1.   Military Challenges of the Troops themselves

Peacekeeping troops face varied and complex military challenges, the most significant of which are:

- Maintaining discipline and order in the face of different disciplines, backgrounds, and environments;
- The magnitude of the organization (and diversity among multi-national peacekeeping troops) creates a great challenge to command and control. This is particularly difficult when one considers that the organization of these troops is always unique in structure, with specific features, such as high differentiation, low formulation, distinction between different locations, decentralized command, high levels of specialization and flexible communication;
- The difficulty of forming collective groups of troops, and training or retraining them in preparation of their deployment;
- The difficulty of providing adequate logistical support;
- Coordinating operations in view of the constant need to replace and reinforce resources, compensating for losses;
- The difficulty of reaching a mutual understanding; communication is usually carried out through interpreters whilst customs, values, traditions and languages of participants vary;
- Smooth communication and transfer of information;
- Effective selection of individuals and units to work with peacekeeping troops, as this kind of work requires intensive training, efficiency, patience and self–confidence;
- Public support for participation of troops in their home countries;
- The challenges of conducting training on site (ie in the field of operation) in addition to the problem of evacuation and salvation;
- Differences in military and security concepts and plans held by the participant countries. A "Command" plan imposed by a leading country on all participant troops;

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[128] Ibid., p.15.

- Leaders (commanders) of multinational troops might not realize the differences in capabilities, policies, and military capabilities of the troops under their command and may develop plans and procedures without taking these differences into consideration.

2.2.   Military challenges to host countries may include:

- Peacekeeping troops perhaps suffering casualties or losses caused by acts of violence, terrorism, kidnapping and riots carried out by individuals from host countries, as was the case in former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq;
- Difficulty of imposing disengagement and separation of the warring parties in the host countries;
- Difficulty of establishing effective, meaningful contacts with the natives (local people) due to differences in customs, traditions, ideologies and language;
- Difficulty of controlling the movement of refugees in and out of the country, and securing food, medicine, housing and health services;
- Difficulty in civil–military cooperation. Differences in style of military organization, ineffective armament, poor fighting capacity, and particular military approach of troops from the host nation which may lead to poor tactical and administrative support including: supply maintenance, evacuation, rescue, salvage transportation. Such conditions will eventually create an additional burden for multinational troops.

2.3.   Other Challenges for host countries

There are also other challenges experienced by countries which host peacekeeping operations. These can be summarized as follows:[129]

- The infrastructure of the host country can be one of the toughest challenges experienced by peacekeeping operations, especially when there are insufficient, ineffective transportation networks (including air- and seaports) and modern technology. Sometimes there no accommodation adequate accommodation for them either;
- Ethnic cleansing and conflicts, armed violence, terrorism, resistance, separation movements and disputes about borders can seriously hinder the work of peacekeeping operations. Examples may be cited of

[129] Jordanian Armed Forces Documents: "Meeting the challenges of peace operations cooperation and coordination", *Challenge Project*, Phase II, Report 2003-2006, p. 25.

Albanian minority in Kosovo and the Serbs, or between the Croatians and the Serbs (as the former were fighting for separation), or between the Serbs and Bosnians. The best examples of this are demonstrated by encounters of NATO troops in Afghanistan and Iraq;

- Poverty, hunger, underdevelopment, disease and epidemics prove to be a substantial cost to the United Nations. Moreover, there is a need for manpower to provide food, medicine, and necessary health services, as was the case in some African countries, where peacekeeping operations were assigned a humanitarian role;

- Differences of language, religion, history, values, customs, and traditions between the peacekeeping troops and nationals of host countries can add a further challenge that requires tremendous effort to establish understanding, tolerance and security;

- Environmental conditions may also constitute a challenge to the mission. Certain places are infected with diseases and epidemics, whilst others are challenged by features such as deserts or forests, which always require special protection or equipment for the international troops to carry out necessary tasks effectively. Sometimes extreme weather conditions make it harder still for the troops to do their job;[130]

- Shortage of qualified civilians for administrative jobs in host countries can also prevent the United Nations from attracting employees from other countries;

- Shortage of water, electricity, and fuel supply;

- Movement of refugees within the boundaries of the field of operation might also make it difficult to conduct operations smoothly, and would certainly call for special management of this problem, whilst transportation, accommodation, food, medical treatment and security are also required;

- Transportation may also prove a logistical challenge, particularly if participant and host countries are geographically far apart.

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[130] "Land war theory No5", Joint operations and multinational operations: A Report of J.A.F. role in peace keeping, Royal War College, 2006, pp. 214-215.

3.   Cultural Challenges

3.1   The concept of culture

Culture can be understood as a particular set of customs, traditions, beliefs, behaviors, attitudes, and values. More specifically, culture might be represented by patterns of behavior, ethical and religious norms, methods and production techniques, as well as products of a literary or scientific nature, heritage, and human and social sciences.[131]

3.2   The Culture of the Organization

A force carrying out a peacekeeping operation, which takes the form of an organization, should have a culture of its own in order to sustain its existence and operate both efficiently and effectively. Accordingly, all members of such a force (or organization) should contribute to the beliefs and values developed within the organization, which may later constitute a behavioral guide to organizational values and beliefs. It also ensures some degree of compatibility between the values, rites, slogans, and symbolic actions of the organization and those of its members. Prominent member states may take part in various activities of the organization and should ideally serve as a figurehead,[132] a voice through which new members can learn from collective or composite past experience of the organization and all its members. Background briefings are usually based on past events, experience, lessons learned, unique stories, religious events and common rites. Acknowledgment and understanding of organizational values can also be developed by forming groups in which general assumptions about the mission's collective goals are demonstrated by collective experience and discussion. Supposedly, cultures must "penetrate" all aspects of organizational life. When carrying out a specific task or requirement, an organization should be able to adapt to the particular external environment, whilst simultaneously using internal surroundings to its advantage. Establishing the best means by which to adapt to the outside world and maximize capacity would, of course, help both parties reach a mutual understanding of the organization's mission and strategy, which

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[131] Fuad Ikhleifat, "Educators and cultural Normalization", in *Furkan* (Society to maintain the holy Qur'an in Jordan), Issue 58, Vol. 3, November 2006.
[132] Danis D. Umstot, *Understanding Organizational Behavior*, Library of Congress, Cataloging in publication Data 587 pp. 412-425.

would in turn enable them to develop standards by which to measure progress, and adapt strategies to the mission's overall objectives. Integration and coherence within the organization can be achieved by improving communication between the members and groups in order to ensure clear consensus on the expectations of participants. Improved communication could also require the establishment of a new common language in addition to which standards of discipline, friendship, cooperation, recognition and sanctions should serve as a framework to the members' interaction. Finally, member states should be linked by an overarching ideology.

The most significant cultural links within the organization are demonstrated by the slogans it embraces, its philosophy of large-scale participation, members' familiarity with its rules, policies and products (which may be termed 'formalization'), adherence to objectives, high level performance by creative leaders, strong belief in the organization's rites and the need to establish and maintain a public identity as well as a good understanding of the organization's informal rules and expectations, mutual recognition of one another's contribution to the mission, and understanding the importance of sharing information and ideas. However, the ethics of the organization may have been best reinforced by its serving as a platform for effective performance, individual friendships, individual and group interests, social responsibility, personal morals, standard rules and procedures, and professional codes.

3.3 Cultural challenges

Cultural challenges may arise due to:[133]

- *Multiplicity of Loyalty.* Multinational forces are made up of staff from different countries, each of which may express strong affiliation with homeland policies or ideologies, which could provoke divided loyalty and associations. It is thus crucial for clear lines to be drawn between loyalty to one's country and to the organization. Leaders should, realize the potential negativity of this, and work to keep it to a minimum. If not managed by developing a culture of shared values and ethics within the organization, a system based upon divided loyalty may lead into corruption;

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[133] A'Raji Asim, *The impact of the New World Order and Globalization*, Department of Public Administration, Yarmouk University, 2003-2005.

- *Differences of cultural background*. Peacekeeping forces are made up of personnel of different cultural backgrounds, which would inevitably influence participants' behavior, interaction, and responsiveness to orders and obligations of the organization uniting them. Despite differences, an officer has to interact with all individuals. It takes time for them to get to know each other and establish a good understanding and tolerance of their respective customs and traditions. At any rate, the objectives of the organization should be the primary goal, over and above any other concerns. The role of leadership and the rules of the organization can never be underestimated in achieving such objectives;
- *Differences of language and dialect*. Such challenges may hamper effective decision-making processes, whilst also making it difficult to convey accurate information and communicate effectively. All of this will make it harder for leaders and officers to carry out command and control tasks. Intensive training is thus required to facilitate mutual understanding among all interacting personnel. Sometimes translation will prove necessary in order to ensure clarity of communication, which is vital to the overall success of the mission;
- *Differences in standards of living.* This is closely connected to the average salary and benefits of participating personnel, and the main challenge here is to provide staff with a standard of living comparative to that in their home country;
- *Feelings of separation and alienation.* Home-sickness can provoke low morale, staff having left their home countries and come to a new environment where everything looks different. An individual working with the peacekeeping operations may feel isolated too, which could undoubtedly affect performance. For this reason leaders are encouraged to do their utmost to alleviate such suffering and to try to create a friendly environment for all participants;
- *Different customs, traditions, religions, and beliefs.* Such differences can prove to be a great challenge to establishing an enhanced understanding and harmony between the participants.

4.   The Jordanian Experience [134]

Jordan recognizes the multiple and varied dimensions of globalization and the new world order, and has taken anticipatory action in order to keep abreast of such developments, remain open to the world at large and contribute to the United Nations' efforts to maintain or establish world peace.

The participation of the Jordanian Armed Forces in international peacekeeping missions started in 1989 in Angola. Participation in this mission reflected Jordan's vision, and its persistent endeavor to create a world in which peace, stability and security prevail. Since then Jordan continued to provide both peacekeeping troops and international observers for United Nations peace missions worldwide. It participated in UN missions in Rwanda, Georgia, Former Yugoslavia, Tajikistan, Angola, Liberia, Somalia, Congo, Kosovo, Eastern Timor, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Iraq and Haiti.

In total, Jordan has sent approximately 41,500 troops to participate in such missions and currently has 3,270 troops participating in missions. Jordan has also provided various types of public security in peacekeeping missions. To date there have been 17 Jordanian martyrs and 506 injuries.

Jordan has established a distinctive status, thanks to the eminent political and military role it has played in peacekeeping operations. This status is particularly apparent in speeches and reports made by the political leadership of peacekeeping operations under the command of the UN, or in cooperation with the NATO, in which Jordan's basic principle has been to support all humane and peace missions, and demonstrate the country's willingness to provide broad levels of support for the missions.

The philosophy of the Jordanian contribution to peacekeeping missions is based on the following factors, which can be seen to both limit and motivate its contribution:

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[134] Jordanian Armed Forces Documents and interviews with officers who have participated in peacekeeping operations.

Political factors
- Jordan's declared and permanent commitment to the UN Charter and to the mission's international legitimacy.
- Jordan's support of human rights protection, public freedoms and commitment to international peace by all possible means.
- Jordan's commitment to political moderation, both regionally and internationally.

Economic factors
- Limitation of resources may affect the size of Jordan's contribution.
- Difficulty to re-supply resources.
- Financial compensation by the UN helps to support the Jordanian treasury by providing it with hard currency.

Military factors
- Organization and armament of the Jordanian forces make them well qualified to carry out international peacekeeping operations.
- The desire to acquire experience from other international armed forces can further motivate Jordan's participation.
- The Jordanian tendency to establish good, friendly relations with other countries that could contribute to enhance the organization and armament of the Jordanian forces.

Environmental factors

The environment in which operations are to be conducted is central to Jordan's decision to join peacekeeping operations as some environments have geographical features that require special training which can be expensive and time-consuming.

Command and control

Jordan only participates in peacekeeping operations supervised by the UN, or as member of an international coalition, and not those under the command of one country, as was the case in Somalia.

Position of the host countries

The opinions of the conflicting parties disputing whether or not to allow peacekeeping operations on their territory could influence Jordan's decision to join certain operations. If Jordan participates in a

mission, it generally requires the approval of the mission by the warring parties; a reflection of the country's desire to take a neutral stance which is supportive of the interests of all parties.

Regional Security Situations

Dimensions of this situation may influence Jordan's contribution to peacekeeping operations either positively or negatively, as it always seeks to maintain a moderate position in its relations with countries in the region.

Challenges Facing Jordan's participation
- Elaborate procedures regarding participation in international peacekeeping efforts.
  – Several administrative units are neither entirely ready, nor qualified, for such missions, especially tasks such as packaging and shipping of supplies to peacekeeping forces in line with UN instructions.
  – Participants may also not be highly disciplined.
- There may be difficulties in preparing vehicles and other types of equipment.
- Participation procedures are often hampered by red tape and personal opinions.
- Financial and logistical support difficulties.
- Difficulties mastering foreign languages.
- Limited or no computer literacy of participating personnel.
- Difficulty providing adequately qualified participants.
- The huge burden of serving in such a mission may not in turn provide participants with the opportunity to develop and improve their skills.

Future vision for Jordanian participation in peacekeeping operations

Current regional and international circumstances suggest that attempts may be made to resolve disputes in a specific way. Certain conflict resolution methods are generally supported by Jordan, such as:
- Preventive diplomacy (Jordan's participation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).
- Peace-making (Jordan's participation in Liberia).
- Peacekeeping (Jordan's participation in Rwanda, Georgia, Former Yugoslavia, Tajikistan, Angola, Liberia, Somalia, Congo, Kosovo,

Eastern Timor, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Tahiti).
- Peace-building (Jordan's participation in Afghanistan).
- Imposing peace (Jordan's participation in the peace–imposed force missions in Eastern Slovenia Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Past experience suggests that Jordan is seemingly willing to take part in any peacekeeping or peace-imposing effort mandated by the UN.
The most significant role the country may play in future peacekeeping operations would be:
- To command a main mission (major force command) or sub-force within a sector of an international peacekeeping operation.
- To take part in international peace missions through governmental and nongovernmental organizations (by extending humanitarian aid, food, medicine, etc).
- To provide medical support for UN forces in field hospitals.
- To provide highly qualified political individuals to represent the UN Secretary General in peace missions.
- To extend help monitoring safety during elections and providing experts from the Ministry of Interior to do so.
- To provide training for civil police in various fields.
- To provide teams specialized in handling mines and explosives.

5.   Conclusion

Jordanian and other field experience suggests that certain measures should be undertaken in order to render peacekeeping operations effective. These include:[135]
- Developing a broad knowledge of past peacekeeping operations, and specific geographic, demographic, socio-economic and cultural knowledge of the area in which the mission is to take place, as well as its local customs, traditions, religious practices and beliefs.
- To maintain vigorous recruitment standards when selecting personnel and units, this including psychological tests.

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[135] Jordanian Armed Forces Documents, op. cit.

- To provide intensive training for participants, particularly disciplinary training, as these missions often require, a high degree of self-restraint.
- Beside English, key contingent commanders should master the language of the host country, and individual soldiers should have a basic vocabulary in both English and the local language.
- To provide officers with training on negotiation techniques and other diplomatic skills.
- To ensure that civil action and humanitarian assistance are always an integral part of military doctrine. Though these are not always believed to be integral to peacekeeping operations, such considerations proved to be important in Cambodia, and were central to securing popular, local support and thus cooperation that of various factions.
- To hold training courses on the provision of logistical support for the forces in the field.
- To provide further language and computer training for military observers, contingent staff, and force command officers.
- To develop the capacity of the committee in charge of controlling the shipping of supplies to peacekeeping forces in line with UN guidelines and to take on staff from purchasing, maintenance, and medical services departments.
- Establishment the trust of other national armed forces is extremely important to ensuring effective division of responsibilities.
- Communication between the military, international organizations NGOs, local authorities and the media is crucial for the mission to be effective.
- Consultation with partners and proper acknowledgment of the commitment of non-NATO troop contributors in the field is fundamental to achieving effective coordination and cooperation in the mission as a whole.
- Identifying individual actors and their roles is vital to distinguishing between military and civilian duties.
- The maintenance of a secure environment for civil implementation can be achieved through close cooperation with a wide range of participants in the peace process. Effective cooperation on the ground also requires the various military, civilian, humanitarian, and development organizations to improve their understanding of each

others culture, police, procedures, decision-making processes, resource bases, capabilities, strengths and limitations.
- Close coordination is required to ensure that priorities do not conflict, and there is no confusion. To do so, barriers to close communication must be dismantled, such as those created by language barriers.

To conclude, the challenges of multiculturalism strongly influence the effectiveness of modern peace support operations, which are also common to the international world we live in today.[136]

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[136] Lessons Learned from Major General Tamlicha Ali, Indonesian Army, in Haseman, John B. "Garuda XII: Indonesian Peacekeeping in Cambodia", *JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 12, Summer 1996, pp. 89-94.

PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCE
OF THE MOROCCAN ARMED FORCES[137]

Rachid EL HOUDAIGUI[138]

Mohammed Benaïssa, Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, has consistently promoted Morocco's active support of the UN objective to consolidate peace and security and to enhance international relations. He also underlines that Morocco is currently contributing to five peacekeeping operations in Africa, America and Europe, which makes of it the thirteenth largest international contributor, the second largest in the Arab world and the sixth largest in Africa.[139]

This article intends to raise the inherent problems of working in an intercultural environment: When Moroccan military personnel participate in peacekeeping operations as Moroccan nationals with international experience, how do they behave? How do they confront intercultural requirements?

This paper does not aim to provide an exhaustive answer to these questions, nor does it attempt to suggest a superior theoretical framework. Instead it strives to underline the capacities and cultural readiness of the Moroccan military and its aptitude to simultaneously cooperate with international colleagues and to communicate with local inhabitants.

To this end, this paper strives to expand upon 4 fundamental and complementary themes:
1. Moroccan engagement in peacekeeping operations;
2. The cultural challenges of peacekeeping operations;

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[137] Proofreading by Anna Peel.
[138] University of Tanger, Morocco.
[139] Mohamed Benaïssa, ministre des Affaires étrangères, «Le Maroc a toujours œuvré pour le renforcement du rôle de l'ONU dans la consolidation de la paix et de la sécurité», New York (United Nations), 23/09/2006.

3. Determining Moroccan military culture;
4. Lessons learned from Morocco's past experience.

1.   Moroccan engagement in peacekeeping operations

Peacekeeping missions are by nature international, taking place beyond Morocco's national borders. They thus require the army to undergo a specific type of training.[140] Further to the UN Security Council decision of 14 July 1960, Morocco first participated in peacekeeping operations (PKO) in 1960, deploying a contingent of Royal Armed Forces (RAF) to operate within the framework of the UN operation in Congo (UNOC). The nomination of the Moroccan expedition president, General Kettani, as a Commander-in-chief (*commandant en chef*) of the UN force there, was perceived by officials as a reflection of international will to render Morocco a genuine performer in the PKO in Africa.

For a considerable time Morocco did not participate in peacekeeping operations. Indeed, not until the end of the Cold War did Moroccan doctrine once again render such operations a strategic priority. However, once it did, the country's decision-makers did not hesitate to develop a diplomatic dialogue which emphasized the humanitarian dimension of the PKOs and the primordial role of the UN in the resolution of conflicts. To this end the country committed its military forces, specialised in international intervention, to the service of the UN. Africa, the Balkans and the American continent then served as the first operational theatres for the new Moroccan peacekeeping contingents.

Africa

In 1992, under the aegis of the UN[141] and in the framework of the operation *Return of Hope*, Morocco sent a contingent of 1,250 personnel to act as peacekeepers in Somalia. They were designated to return peace to Somalia, which had been destroyed by civil war. The mission lasted almost 16 months, until the end of March 1994.

In 2001, again under the aegis of the UN, the Kingdom also participated in a multinational mission aimed at maintaining peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). The Infantry Battalion

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[140] Rachid El Houdaïgui, *La politique étrangère sous le règne de Hassan II*, L'harmattan, Paris, 2003.
[141] In accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution no. 794, December 1992.

embarked upon this mission and officers were designated to the headquarters of MONUC, in Kinshasa and a hospital.

Once again in the framework of the UN, in 2004 Morocco became involved in a mission to stabilize the Ivory Coast. The Moroccan contingent, composed of 736 military personnel, was assigned to command the eastern area of ONUCI.

Balkans

On 15th December 1995 the UN Security Council tasked NATO with the execution of the Dayton agreement in Bosnia, thereby replacing the UN Protection Force (FORPRONU) with an Implementation Force (IFOR) of some 60,000 personnel; some 1,300 of whom were Moroccans. This time, the Moroccan contingent, which was largely military in its composition, intervened under the aegis of NATO, in a European theatre. Here, for the first time in history, Moroccan personnel took action beyond Morocco's territorial boundaries. This presence was then prolonged under the Stabilisation Force (SFOR), though there was a reduced number of military personnel (220). There was also a new mission, which sought to establish political order by promoting conditions in which elections could be organized in accordance with the Dayton agreement. It also facilitated the return of refugees and displaced populations to their homeland.

In the same region and also under the aegis of NATO, since 1999 Morocco has participated in the Multinational Forces in Kosovo (KFOR), providing a contingent of 220 military personnel, this including a medical hospital with surgical facilities, management and support for infantry.

Haiti

Between 2004 and March 2006, Morocco cooperated with Spain in the framework of the UN Mission of Stabilisation in Haiti (MINUSTAH).The Moroccan contingent was composed of 130 military personnel, whilst the Spanish contingent comprised 200 military personnel, who were deployed to North East Haiti.

Table 1: Peacekeeping Operation of Morocco

Operations	Militaries	Military Observers	Police	Others	Total
EUFOR-Althea	135	0	0	0	135
KFOR	220	0	0	0	220
MINUSTAH	130	0	0	0	130
MONUC	809	4	0	0	903
ONUCI	735	1	0	0	736
Total	1892	5	0	0	1897

Morocco's participation in these operations raises three key issues:

Firstly Moroccan contingents tend to include medical and social elements, infantry companionship or other military elements. This seemingly demonstrates the Moroccan authorities' intention to maintain well balanced contingents, taking care of them in both military and humanitarian terms.

Moreover, the Moroccan contingents are entirely autonomous. This renders Moroccan officials less dependent on other countries with regard to their movements, arms, structure and logistics.

This autonomy is apparent, despite Morocco's cooperation with France in Kosovo, the Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and with Spain in Haiti, for example.

2. Cultural challenges of peacekeeping operations

Cultural interaction is considered essential to the efficiency of the PKO and to multilateral military coalitions. In fact, a military element of a peacekeeping operation cannot be considered effective on the basis of credibility alone. Credibility must be measured in terms of the mission's legal legitimacy, its capacity to achieve its objectives and to adopt an interactive model of leadership in a heterogeneous, multicultural working environment.

This multicultural model raises numerous questions which require profound reflection. Creating a multicultural working environment means integrating personnel of various nationalities in multinational units in a heterogeneous, usually multi-ethnic, often stressful setting.

This mode of management automatically creates certain problems:

1. Staff members are expected to adapt to the socio-cultural surroundings from the outset of a mission.[142]
2. Adaptation of personnel to the socio-cultural and professional environments: In their more personal life, military personnel are expected to act as the product of a national process of military socialisation founded upon the elimination of individual difference, and discouragement of national traditions or symbols. However, field activities are very multicultural, due to the diverse nature of the military force in operation and the cultural and socio-politic specificities of the region in which intervention is taking place.
3. The force interaction model for the field, and management thereof, help to ensure that contingents of small countries are not marginalized or humiliated.
4. The neutrality and impartiality of personnel to maintain or enforce peace can be questioned when considering the ethnic composition of forces serving in a regional crisis (particularly in Kosovo).
5. Establishing reliable, permanent contact with the local population and its representatives. This is useful for consolidating trust, though it is vital to ensure that this proximity does not result in any social or moral threat to the reputation of the forces and the mission as a whole.

How do these problems with RAF participation in the peace keeping operations come to the surface?

3. Determining of Moroccan military culture

At a political level

The nature of Morocco's political regime and the historical context in which the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) were established mean that the army is subordinate to the King. Soldiers joining the FAR[143] are obliged to take an oath of the loyalty to God, the country and the King. The first article claims that the right of command is an individual decision of the King, which means that each member of the force must

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[142] *International Solidarity*, Royal Armed Forces magazine, n°. 309, November 2004.
[143] *Dahir*, n° 1, 5 August 1974.

qualify every decision with his chief, this in turn rendering the RAF extremely hierarchical.

Education

The RAF has been an integrated structure since it was first created, and its Moroccan members served in both the French and Spanish armies, from whom Morocco inherited a system of training for officers which may have improved its structure. Today, the RAF has its own institutes and schools, in which officers are trained, and in which high ranking officers participate in programs to reinforce their existing capacities. Great importance is placed on developing foreign language skills in languages such as Spanish and English, as well as French, of course.

Sociological composition

The social composition is multi-ethnic (Arab, Berber, Saharans) and bi-confessional (Muslims and Jewish); a factor which results in the Moroccan army being predisposed to act in a multicultural environment.

This aside, since conscription and the professional army were abandoned, recruitment methods and personnel management, style of command, training and communication have been adapted to meet the new requirements, which results in increasing numbers of graduate youths from cities signing up.

4. Lessons Learned from Morocco's Past Experience

The fundamental principles guiding Moroccan participation in the PKO are:
- Firstly that the Kingdom's contribution is set out in the UN framework approved by the SC.
- The intervention area is not dangerous, which avoids humiliation of Moroccan soldiers and explains why Morocco refuses to participate in FINUL;
- The missions which include Moroccan forces should be significant and not marginalized; the missions should have a clear strategy, which is also applied. There should also be human interoperability.

This aside, comparison of Morocco's intervention in Africa, Haiti and the Balkans draws key elements of Moroccan culture in the PKO to our attention:

- The RAF systematically adopts an integrated global approach, which incorporates military, humanitarian, sanitarian and social concerns.
- Moroccan forces are obliged to maintain neutrality and impartiality towards the ethnic composition of the state in which intervention takes place: in Kosovo the RAF guaranteed the same services for Serb populations as for Muslims, or those of any religious faith. They knew how to avoid the trap of developing a religious affinity with any one group.
- Before being deployed on the field, all the units carry out a cohesion exercise in the southern headquarters, aimed at soldering together the training received by staff from different regions, with different arms and specialities. This period allows them to learn how to manage in UN operations, particularly in terms of crisis management. In any case, the physical, moral and technical preparation of staff aims to help staff on field missions immediately. It also aims to provide an additional guarantee of constant personal effectiveness. It seems that in the future the RAF will continue to operate in joint missions, such as the joint Moroccan-Spanish mission in Haiti.

CONSTRUCTING A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL PERSPECTIVE OF MULTICULTURALISM IN ARMED FORCES[144]

Orit SHALEV[145]

1.   Introduction

Not all armed forces are organized in the same way, even though we consider them as parallel organizations. They are similar to each other in that they carry an equivalent mission and function similarly in each society. Nevertheless, every army is structured differently and operates in variety of different ways. Scholars attribute this variety to the cultural background of the people in the armed forces and to the environments in which those organizations developed.

When I think of multiculturalism with regard to the Israel Defense Force (IDF), three perspectives come to mind:

1. Israel, or the IDF, as a "Third Party" or at the receiving end of multi-national task forces: at the southern border with Egypt, at the northern border with Lebanon etc.
2. The IDF as part of, or as a participant in bi-lateral forces:
   a. The cooperation with the South Lebanese Army (militia) from the mid 1980's until the year 2000
   b. The cooperation with the Palestinian authority
3. Israel is a country of immigrants - Jewish people from 100 different countries now live in Israel. For many years, the Israeli experience derives from the "Melting Pot" concept of Israeli society as an immigrant-receiving society. Therefore, the IDF as an army of the people faces challenges of multi-culturalism within the armed forces

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[144] Proofreading by Anna Peel.
[145]National Defense College, Research Unit, Israel.

themselves (Lumsky-Feder and Ben Ari, 2003). The army is made up of:

a. A variety of ethnic Jewish groups
b. Non-Jewish minorities: Druze, Muslims, and Bedouins; and
c. Women
d. Orthodox recruits.

The IDF was, and still is, one of the major paths of integration into mainstream Israeli society for immigrants and Israelis alike. Military service is considered one of the key aspects of integration in Israel (Lumsky-Feder and Ben Ari, 2003; Sapir, 2003).

We can learn much from our experience of multiculturalism *within the military*, in order to better understand the challenges relating to multiculturalism *between forces*. Multiculturalism is a reflection of many different components. Different settings could create a variety of combinations that, in turn, influence the mission as whole. As well as indicators of multiculturalism that have already been identified, we can also include language, uniforms, ranks, insignia, structure, chain of command and/or power distance, division of labor, discipline, technology, legal boundaries, time perception and more.

The Israeli experience is composed of many mechanisms of both inclusion and exclusion of different groups. The "Melting Pot" was initially the dominant concept of integration into Israeli society in general - and into the military in particular (Lumsky-Feder E. and Ben Ari E., 2003; Sapir, 2003, Cohen, 2003). For example, immigrants to Israel from different ethnicities were requested to change their names to Hebrew names.[146]

Social inclusion varied for different groups based on their gender, ethnicity, religion and whether or not they were part of a minority group (Lumsky-Feder E. and Ben Ari E., 2003; Sapir, 2003). At the same time, exclusion was also a way to treat multiculturalism. Sapir (2003) describes the Desert Scouts Battalion – a unit created specifically for a minority group – the Bedouins – where a unique culture within a military unit based on their specific cultural background was created.

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[146] For a discussion on the differences in Israel between ethnicities (among Jews) and minorities (usually non-Jews), see Lumsky-Feder E. and Ben Ari E., 2003.

How do armed forces overcome multicultural challenges?

Military researchers have identified four approaches that were used to reduce or control cultural differences: support; controlled assignment; internal exclusion; and screened information (Lumsky-Feder E. and Ben Ari E., 2003; Sapir, 2003).

Support was given to new immigrants, such as giving them specific training to assist in their assimilation process, e.g., Hebrew classes. Controlled assignment was used mostly for women who for many years were assigned to non-combat duties as part of a general military policy. Internal exclusion was the approach mentioned by Sapir (2003) with regard to the Bedouins – their assignments were limited to specific locations and missions. The last approach to be identified was screened information.

In what ways does multiculturalism contribute to, or influence effectiveness?

When studying the influence of multiculturalism and the challenges it raises within the armed forces, we need to take into account the complexity of the topic. Looking at the phenomenon of multinational forces from an organizational perspective, we can analyze it from three perspectives: ad-hoc organizations, complex systems and jointness.

Ad-hoc organizations are made up of a variety of previously unrelated small units (different from classical organizational patterns that join together into a cohesive framework). These organizations are for a specific mission within a given geographical parameter and are dismantled at the end of the mission (Ben Shalom et al, 2002; Lundin and Soderholm, 1995). This structure type raises issues with regard to organizational life span, leadership, contributions by different players, trust and cooperation between players etc. (Shen, 2003). Long term ad-hoc organizations tend to create work techniques and vocabularies that serve the rapid creation of the organization and operational functionality in the minimum amount of time. Peacekeeping operations and other UN or NATO multi-national task-forces can fall under this definition. Forces are created to address a specific place, to deal with specific incidents, and for a limited amount of time. Different countries in various combinations contribute to these forces (Segal and Gravino, 1985).

Razi and Yehezkealy (2007) define complex systems as a "dynamic structure evolving from the existence of interactions which is developed in order to achieve missions" (p. 23). They differentiate complex system from non-complex systems by three criteria.

First: the diversity of components operations. Components of complex systems are flexible in using a variety of possible responses to a known situation. Components of non-complex systems have a preset response or responses. Second: the certainty of system operation. In a complex system, there is a choice between diverse and sometimes contradictory paths of operations. In non-complex systems, if components are operating correctly, there is a high degree of certainty in regard to the way they should operate. Third: planning. In complex systems, planning involves learning and adjusting targets and activities to suit a changing reality. In non-complex systems, operations are pre-planned and activities are based on those plans.

Similarly to ad-hoc organizations, multinational missions, peacekeeping or others can be described as complex systems.

Jointness is defined as: "…fully integrated, network-centric, adaptable expeditionary, lethal and able to perform decentralized operations….a joint solution is better than a single service solution" (Bednarek, Odom and Florich, 2005: 54). Another definition refers to "team work among members of separate teams, wearing different uniforms" (Roman and Tarr, 1998: 92).

Examining both definitions suggests that multinational operations fall under the broad definition of Jointness, i.e. forces from different countries as opposed to different branches of the military from one country.

Taking into account the different components and elements of those three organizational theories gives us a multi-layered perspective of multinational operations. Cultural differences have an impact on those tasks and forces in variety of ways. House et al. (2004) identified the importance of cultural differences in the current climate of global qualities. Cultural dimensions identified in GLOBE are, for the most part, applicable to military cooperation as well. For example, DiMarco (2004) suggests that each of the military services in the United States have separate cultural characteristics that contribute, in different ways, to joint operations.

Measuring the effectiveness of multinational operations requires a non-traditional or flexible perspective. Effectiveness is defined as producing "a decided, decisive, or desired <u>effect</u>" (Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, 2007). When studying multinational military operations, there are many layers that should be considered simultaneously.

In order to do this, we can create a multi-dimensional prism. A three-dimensional diagram illustrates the complexity of the situation. The three axes are indicators of different components (of the many) that construct and affect multiculturalism, and their combination reflects positions that armed forces could be in. Different weights of each indicator would position the relevant force into a different position (cell) on the graph.

Based on the theoretical background discussed earlier, we can look at multi-national armed forces in theatres as ad-hoc organizations, as joint operations and as complex systems. Therefore, when we define or measure effectiveness - and the influences of a multi-cultural environment on effectiveness - we should construct effectiveness in a way that reflects those organizational arrangements. The key features that characterize those specific organizational formats are mission, structure and results over time.

For example, we should consider the nature of the mission – peacekeeping, peace enforcement etc. with regard to individual vs. organizational cultural influences, on the one hand and organizational hierarchy, e.g., structure; what is the level of the participants we are focusing on etc. (see Diagram 1).

Diagram 1:
Indicators that shape
Multiculturalism

Organizational
Hierarchy

Individual Vs.
Organizational

Mission

Based on the principal presented above, from the first diagram we can breakdown the mission component into indicators that construct it. In this way we can study the way in which mission indicators affect and are affected by multiculturalism and how, in turn, it relates to effectiveness. Mission, for example, can be defined by the relationship between the length of time mission is designed for (short period to indefinite), the level of formality of the multinational force, and the level of teamwork between the different forces: Information sharing – loose ties, collaboration, cooperation - to act or work with another for mutual benefit, coordination - harmonious functioning for effective results (see Diagram 2).

Diagram 2:
Multiculturalism and Mission

Level of
Teamwork

Level of
Formality

Time
Line

The third level of measurement should be the success in accomplishing the task for that force. It is important to distinguish between different missions of multicultural forces as the basis for effectiveness measurement. It is also important to take into account aspects that are beyond the control of the task force, such as a change in political conditions.

The third graph relates to results over time. For each mission, we can measure immediate results – for the very short run, intermediate results – for limited period of time and long term results - for the long run (see Diagram 3).

Diagram 3:
Effectiveness and
Multiculturalism

Immediate

Long Term

Intermediate

2.   Effectiveness of Multicultural Forces

Understanding the complexity of multicultural forces requires a holistic perspective. There are many players taking part in, or in some way connected to, a peace mission. The obvious players include countries participating in the force, countries or entities that are the "clients" of the specific mission, as well as other countries or entities that have interests in the mission. Effectiveness can be measured from the perspective of each of these three groups.

We can define the overall effectiveness as the overlapping part of the relevant effectiveness for each group (see Diagram 4).

Diagram 4:
Overall Effectiveness

When looking at the way in which each country or entity measures or defines effectiveness from its own perspective, another complex picture is revealed. This is best illustrated in a table.

The columns are the interests or focus point of the countries: Between Nations/Forces or within the force of each country. The rows represent the perspective from which each country looks at the issue of effectiveness: National or international. Each cell of the table presented below offers relevant criteria (see Table 1). If the focus is between nations and the perspective is international a criterion for effectiveness could be recognition of other nations, or gaining power in the international arena.

Table 1:
Defining and Measuring Effectiveness

Focus / Perspective	Between Nations/Forces	Within Forces
National	Sense of achievement	Professional progress
International	Recognition, power	

When the focus is Within Forces and the perspective is national, a criterion for effectiveness could be gaining professional progress within the military. The third cell illustrates a "between nations" focus and a national perspective where a criterion for effectiveness could be a national sense of achievement due to an event or accomplishment within the mission. Finally, the model enables us to see different perspectives (e.g., mission, time, organization) from diverse view points of effectiveness (national, international) by different players (participants, clients and others). Showing them side by side allows us to perceive a more coherent vision of overall effectiveness. The theoretical framework suggested above illustrates effectiveness measurement in multinational missions specifically and in complex systems in general.

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PART 3

KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN AND LEBANON
CASE STUDIES FROM MILITARY MISSIONS

FINDINGS FROM FIELDWORK ON GERMAN-ITALIAN COOPERATION AT MNB SW (KFOR), PRIZREN[147] (September 2005)

Jörg KELLER[148] and Maren TOMFORDE[149]

1.   Introduction

In 2005, the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences conducted a study of the 11th Operational KFOR Contingent at Prizren, in collaboration with the Political Science Faculty of University III in Rome. The focal point of the study was Multinational Brigade Southwest (MNB SW), for which Italy and Germany provided the majority of forces, whilst exercising command and control of the brigade on a rotational basis. The study worked on the assumption that military culture is a specific form of organizational and national culture. There is no single military culture across the armed forces, and in multinational operations differences between the participating forces become apparent. However, though national military cultures undoubtedly differ in certain respects, they do have common features.

The aim of this study is to determine the potential and problems of this particular multinational mission and to ascertain both differences and commonalities between the German and Italian forces co-operating in Kosovo in 2005.[150]

In August/September 2005 scientists from both research institutes met in Camp Prizren in Kosovo to carry out the survey and to conduct

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[147] Proofreading by Anna Peel.
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[150] Quoted from the common project description prepared by Faculty of Political Sciences University Rome III and Bundeswehr Institute of Social Sciences.

field research. Here they explored German-Italian cooperation in greater
detail, using tools they developed together, such as a written
questionnaire, oral interviews and participation in observation exercises.
Only military personnel operating in combined German-Italian
organizational elements were questioned for the purposes of this study.
They included staff from Headquarters, MNB SW (HQ), Headquarters
Company (HQ Coy) and the Multinational Logistic Unit (MLU). The
Main Impact upon Cultural Interoperability and Mission Effectiveness at
the Headquarters (HQ) of MNB SW and the MLU constituted an issue of
great significance to military practice addressed during these activities
and expanded upon below.

2.   Description of the HQ/Units

As part of KFOR, the mission of the MNB SW is to guarantee a
secure environment, to quell any attempts to initiate unrest or violence
against ethnic minorities or cultural assets, and to promote peaceful and
sustainable development of Kosovo. With a view to accomplishing this
goal, HQ commands and controls the brigade along established NATO
guidelines and as ordered by HQ KFOR in Pristina. To this end, several
smaller elements from different nations, as well as the following five task
forces, were also subordinated to the Brigade:

- TASK FORCE TIZONA (Spain)
- TASK FORCE DULJE (Austria, Switzerland, Germany)
- TASK FORCE AQUILA (Italy)
- TASK FORCE PRIZREN (Germany)
- TASK FORCE DRAGS (Turkey)

The multinational HQ MNB SW was staffed by Italians and
Germans in more or less equal numbers. In addition, there were a smaller
number of Austrian, Swiss, Spanish and Turkish military personnel. The
individual staff divisions were composed of female and male military
personnel from different nations and headed a proportional representation
of officers from the different member states. The following
organizational chart depicts the national leadership of the respective
divisions.

The central roles at headquarters, such as Commander, Chief of Staff, ACOS OPS and ACOS SPT, and heads of staff divisions are roles carried out by German, Italian, Spanish and Austrian officers. Obviously, no nation holds a pre-eminent position. Although the Germans provide the Commander, they are not more powerful by default because they are not represented in substantial numbers at COS, ACOS and the head of staff division level. Indeed, more Italians seem to be operational at that level.

While the Germans provide the Company Commander of HQ Coy, the Germans and Italians are represented on more or less equal terms in all the subunits. Here Italians and Germans carry out their national business in shared offices. They are accommodated in joint sleeping quarters. The MLU was also collectively tasked with providing POL, ammunition etc and employing German-Italian vehicle crews. However, as their national driving licenses were not mutually recognized, this intensified level of cohesion and cooperation did not occur.

3.   Factors Affecting Effectiveness of Work at HQ

3.1.   The HQ as a System

The central concern of this limited investigation is to address factors influencing mission effectiveness rather than the effectiveness itself. Expanding the scope of the investigation would have required a

precise definition of 'mission effectiveness' which, to date, does not exist. However, in analysis of potential effectiveness and influential factors, an army, or part of an army, must be recognized as an organization, as many authors have done (Roghmann/Ziegler 1969: 156–185; Keller 2004; Haltiner et al. 2005). "By organization, here the entirety of measures aimed at achieving goals and objectives is to be understood, by which a social system is structured and the activities by the people who belong to the system, the employment of means, and the processing of information are regulated." (Hill et al. 1974: 17).

This definition suggests that the headquarters of MNB SW should be seen as a system intended to convert input, i.e. information (mission and situational information received from a higher level) into some form of output. This output is the coordinated effort intended to enable the subordinate elements, for example the task forces, to achieve the objectives defined by HQ KFOR. Hence, from this perspective, the headquarters can be perceived as an information processing system, and the transformation activities accomplished by the system elements (staff divisions and their military personnel) as units designed to translate input into output (missions and situational information to the subordinates).

To this point the mission's core objectives seem plausible and perfectly applicable to the HQ of MNB SW. However, the term *system* requires redefinition if further analysis is to be carried out effectively. "Generally speaking, a system can be understood as an organized entity of *elements* that interact with one another" (Hill et al. 1974: 21). As previously mentioned, the key focus of the paper is the functional relationship between these elements (aimed at achieving goals and objectives), rather than the elements themselves. These relations also define the *order* of the system and represent *system boundaries*; the intensity of relations within the system being more significant than any entertained with the outside world.

Application of this straightforward, analytical model to the HQ of MNB SW brings forth interesting aspects of German-Italian cooperation on this mission. The HQ can be seen as a system within the super-system of the brigade; staff divisions and branches forming the system elements. However, what is dominant line of command? Do soldiers from different nations perceive HQ as "the relevant system" or is their primary loyalty national, and their national army hence their dominant authority, over and above that of any multinational organization?

Our secondary consideration is the order of the elements within the system. According to Hill et al. (Hill et al. 1974: 26), this order may be perceived either as system structure or system culture. System structure determines the organizational structure and organizational procedures, while system culture reflects relations on the basis of value systems and role expectations. From a perspective of system culture, it is fundamental to consider whether or not the value systems held by the Germans and Italians towards each another and towards a combined HQ were shaped to ensure effective cooperation, i.e. did they share core values? The second issue relates to the complexity of system structure, or more precisely, to organizational procedures. Were clear common organizational procedures been established and could they be followed by all concerned?

Based on these issues, the following sections analyse the effectiveness of multi-national and bi-national cooperative exercises carried out at the HQ of MNB SW.

3.2   Multinational HQ or National Army

When asked whether they prefer to serve in a multinational or national unit, approximately half of the Germans and Italians surveyed still favour working in a multinational unit. Nonetheless, almost 30 percent of the Italians surveyed voiced a preference to work in a purely national environment, whilst 35 percent of the Germans apparently preferred to operate in a solely German unit. However, these Germans voiced a preference for this unit to be co-located in a single camp with Italian staff. Overall, these figures indicate that a preference to serve on bi-national teams was far from unanimous.

Nevertheless, when the question was rephrased, "What is your attitude towards serving alongside soldiers from other nations?", respondents responded far more favourably: 69 percent of both Italian and German service personnel liking, or very much liking, to cooperate with soldiers from other nations.

The earlier description of the HQ of MNB SW indicates a relatively balanced distribution of strategic roles between the two nations and the absolute figures also suggested a relatively balanced ratio between the two. HQ was staffed by 100 Germans, 74 Italians, 18 Spanish, 16 Austrians, five Swiss and one Turk. However, this ratio does not necessarily reflect perceptions of those concerned. 38 percent of the

Germans and 40 percent of the Italians do not perceive the other as an equal partner, both Germans (100 percent) and Italians (90 percent) being of the opinion that the Germans are the dominant partner in the exercise.

Analysis of the overall situation in the camp suggests that it was essentially stamped with a German trademark, in that its entire infrastructure was German; German field huts, German containers, German side walks and German street names, though Italian or Spanish flags were sometimes waved. The overwhelmingly German impression of the camp was also no doubt provoked by the fact that there were more Germans serving there than other nationals. Not only did HQ and HQ Coy appear to be German-run, a huge number of other German units were also located there. To the Italians, the entire environment must have come across as German, this explaining their responses to the survey.

With regard to the system at HQ, a significant percentage of both Germans and Italians (particularly Italians) seemingly preferred to operate in a national working environment and yet the Germans were clearly the dominant force here, which may well not have been conducive to the promotion of good working relations between staff at HQ).

3.3   Attitudes towards the other Nation and towards Work

With regard to national pride, there is a major difference between Germans and Italians with 86 percent of the Italians being very proud to be Italian, while only 57 percent of the Germans indicated they were very proud to be German. Nationals of the two countries also did not demonstrate similar levels of sympathy to the other. 32 percent of the Germans very much the Italians, while only 9 percent of the Italians claimed to very much like the Germans. Also only 36 percent of the Italians and 52 percent of the Germans respond to the statement "If I had to decide again to come to a German-Italian HQ/unit, I would come again ...without hesitation". However, more than 40 percent of the respondents from both nations state that their opinion about the professionalism of the respective other side improved over the course of their deployment. Although on the one hand Italian national pride might have been seen to be divisive, the German contingent and they themselves saw them as rather sociable, friendly and easier to get along with than the Germans.

Such differences between the two groups were also noted during the participative observation. Germans and Italians could often be observed in separate groups in the camp area, in particular in the mess at

mealtimes; a significant event in the otherwise monotonous camp life, and one that provides an excellent opportunity to observe the different forms of social behaviour. Germans walk to the centrally situated building in groups of two and three, not saying very much, while Italians almost exclusively form larger groups of five to six persons. Differences are to be noticed, even in ambulation and posture. Italians clearly tend to talk on their way, gesticulating a lot and showing a lively facial expression. Their pace is rather like sauntering, people walk abreast and turn towards one another whilst talking. Italian posture tends to be far more upright, a factor which is further emphasized by the tight-fitting Italian uniform. In contrast, the Germans simply cover the distance from A to B and do not use the way as a group social event. Occasional attempts made by smaller German groups to imitate the Italian pace and walking style also clearly demonstrates that the differences are tangible. However, generally speaking these attempts result in self-deprecating suggestions that the Germans simply aren't up to the task: "No German can walk that slowly!"

Statistics and observations suggest that Germans and Italians live in culturally distinct worlds within the same camp. Although they share a workplace, they do not mingle. The attitude towards one another is friendly, but not marked by empathy. During interviews and informal talks, however, Germans seemingly demonstrated greater prejudice than Italians, usually with regard to Italian working habits. For example:

- Italians work far less;
- Italians always arrive later than the Germans;
- Germans often have to "pull the chestnuts out of the fire" for Italians because they often take last minute action;
- Italians are not reliable and shirk work;
- Italians only follow detailed tactical orders and have to be guided.

However, observation of work at headquarters did not confirm these prejudices. Germans and Italians came and left work almost simultaneously. Both took coffee breaks equally often. Nevertheless, there was one noticeable difference in working habits: the Italians were more patient when carrying out tasks and more focused on essential aspects of the matter in hand. They were more disinclined than their German counterparts to make a fuss about minor details.

Findings of the questionnaire suggest that the Germans and Italians have rather different views of their working objectives and responsibilities. Although 70 per cent of both countries nationals who participated in the survey consider achievement of goals and meeting of deadlines to be important, the Italians clearly place a higher premium on other significant aspects of their work.

Table 1:
Prioritisation of Goals on a Daily Basis

"How much do you focus on the following matters in your daily work? *Percent of answers "Very important"*		
	Italian	German
To fulfil my function	78.3	54.7
To reach common decisions	46.2	29.0
To share my experience with others	46.2	33.6
To reach the optimal solution	73.3	59.8

Italian n=106, German n=107

The findings outlined so far suggest that soldiers from both nations come from distinct cultural backgrounds, and that the *system culture* of the camp is, therefore, not homogenous. However, operational productivity and efficiency at HQ requires a functioning system; the input-transformation-output relationship must be interpreted in the same way by all concerned. Yet, as discussions of prejudice and different perceptions of working priorities and obligations by the two groups demonstrate, a major prerequisite for effective, efficient functioning of the system is seemingly lacking, notably because German perceptions of the Italian element do not correspond to reality.

3.4 Organizational Procedures – Uniting and Separating

Procedures in a headquarters reflect the manner in which the system is organized, thereby defining input-transformation-output relations. As a matter of principle, it is vital to make a distinction between official written or oral procedures (SOPs: Standing Operating Procedure), and unofficial procedures which often tend to be applied in real life. However, in this context, only aspects of the official procedures shall be considered to simply demonstrate the underlying principle.

Earlier in this article, the HQ was described as an information processing system, i.e., within the input-transformation-output relationship, information is first collected, then processed, and then passed on as output. The basic prerequisite required to make this process effective is the establishment of standard characteristics for such a system. In our case, this means using a common language, with standardized technical command and control systems (IT and telecommunication) being only a secondary point of consideration. The working language to be used with KFOR is English. To make the HQ work as a system, everybody working there needs to have a sufficient command of the English language. This command of the English language, however, is not limited to understanding; speaking, reading and writing skills are also required. In the written questionnaire, the German and Italian military personnel were asked to evaluate their English language skills in these four fields. 30 – 40 percent of the Italians claim to be good or fluent in these four fields, while the Germans assess their skills to be a little better. 75 per cent of Germans claim to have good to excellent listening skills, while 56 per cent believe that they have good to excellent reading skills. 39 per cent of Italians and 33 percent of Germans also believe their written and spoken English language capacities to be poorer, these skills also being more apparent to an external observer.

However, day to day observations of working life at the HQ, notably briefings and meetings, did not confirm participants' self-assessment; their actual English language skills appeared to be poorer than they believed. In interviews, German service personnel in particular almost unanimously demanded English language training in preparation for their deployment, or as part of their vocational training, which goes against questionnaire findings that they believed their language skills to be acceptable. Nevertheless, German service personnel of all ranks were generally more willing to try and make themselves understood, despite their limited English language skills. On the other hand, Italian soldiers themselves commented on their own attempts to avoid the potential embarrassment of having to use their poor English language skills and therefore exercised caution when summoning up the courage to speak English. Whilst HQ requires all staff to possess general skills in their common language, command of specialized vocabulary is also required and any technical terms must be employed in the same way by both armed forces. During the participative observation it was to be noticed

that none of the three prerequisites (language skills, specialized vocabulary and common definitions) was fulfilled to a satisfactory extent, which significantly affected the work in the HQ.

The operational planning process (OPP), which sets out the core structure of all work carried out at HQ and which is defined in the Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP), will hereafter be central to this paper's analysis and observations. This process must govern the thinking and actions of all HQ staff, thereby ensuring the good functioning of HQ operations. Indeed, to a certain extent, it must have become second nature to them. NATO-established rules and procedures apply for both KFOR and, of course, MNB SW.

Indeed, as the fundamental principle within Headquarters, the Operational Planning Process (OPP) of NATO governs all staff activity. On principle, it is comparable to the civilian management cycle and, at a high level of abstraction, involves use of a universally applicable structure to operational planning processes, and thus to operational planning processes of probably all armed forces worldwide. The basic abstract structure is made up of the Analysis of Situation/Mission, Courses of Action (COAs), Decision, Development of Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Operational Plan (OPLAN) / Operational Order (OPORDER)), and finally Review/Evaluation.[151]

In the armed forces, an immense number of variations and alternative courses of action exist within this rough, self-explanatory framework. Even within the Bundeswehr, the operational planning process differs from one armed service to another and it is therefore to be assumed that members of different armed services and from different nations have also acquired distinct training in operational planning processes and in effective cooperation with HQ, MNB SW. At best, they have also become familiar with the OPP of NATO as a second option. For the soldiers of the Bundeswehr this meant that COM, DCOS and G4 OPS were the only German members of HQ to have come to know the OPP of NATO during their education and training. Until recently it was only taught during General Staff Courses. Only COM and DCOS attended a course of this nature. It was by chance that G4 OPS attended the Austrian Army's General Staff Course in Vienna, where they familiarized themselves with the NATO OPP in a non-NATO nation.

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[151] Following the Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP) of NATO, BI-SC Document, January 2001.

Three of 100 military personnel to have been familiarized with the fundamental planning and information processing at HQ seems too insignificant a number, particularly since the personnel attached to a HQ in theatre cannot conduct any more focused training prior to transfer of authority to the next contingent in the rotation. However, by conducting a map exercise COM had attempted to alleviate this shortcoming during preparatory training. Unfortunately, most of the personnel earmarked for the contingent were not yet available for the exercise. However, a few HQ officers from COM's home brigade were deployed with him, thereby acquiring necessary knowledge from a pre-training session. These staff then acted as HQ's backbone on COM's policies.

"Uniting and Separating Aspects" of work at HQ was the chosen headline of this section of the article. However, only separating forces have so far been discussed. It should, however, be noted that a great uniting force is hidden in the existing NATO procedures, which is not apparent in routine work carried out on a daily basis. In fact, proven and connecting procedures exist which must simply be taught. Providing this kind of professional training simultaneously addresses two more weak points described above: the common working language, English, and the common vocabulary of concepts. All NATO documents and procedures are available in English and there is also an extensive glossary that can be used as a starting point for education and training. Particular characteristics of specific national armed forces and services can then be addressed in a second phase of cultural adaptation. Applying the principal notions of organizational procedures and structures by providing a general, common model in the education and training of military personnel can serve as an easily adaptable and beneficial basis for subsequent differential training and specialization. Once troops have been deployed it would be very difficult to adopt an opposing strategy towards cooperation between nationals of the two countries.

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HOW ABOUT PASTA AND BEER?
INTERCULTURAL CHALLENGES OF
GERMAN-ITALIAN COOPERATION IN KOSOVO[152]

Maren TOMFORDE[153]

1. Introduction: The transnationalization of the armed forces

Peacekeeping rather than "traditional" military operations form the mainstream of current military operations (Williams 2000: 266). In these operations, national militaries interact and co-operate increasingly with other forces, in most cases unified under an integrated command structure. In the light of co-operative military units and action, the character of armed forces - not only from Europe - becomes more and more multinational. When deployed abroad, troops interact with up to 40 other partners from all over the world. Camp Warehouse in Kabul (Afghanistan), which hosts more than 30 nations, is a good example for a truly multinational military setting. These multinational arrangements have to meet a number of diverse challenges both on an operational and sociocultural scale: For example, next to operational challenges, actors also have to deal with multiple cultures and have to successfully operate under increasing diversifying and demanding conditions. Anthony King stresses in that regard:

"This is a new and important development. Today, the armed forces are concentrating on certain key, specialist units that are best adapted to the current strategic environment and these units are being drawn into ever closer integration with other similar units from other

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member states. The armed forces of Europe are becoming transnational."
(2005: 332)

One aim of this article is to examine, using the empirical example
of German-Italian co-operation in Kosovo, to what extent military
personnel is becoming *transnational* in the true sense of the word and
how military identities and boundaries are renegotiated in novel ways.
The term "transnational" generally stands for relations between
individuals of different states, in contrast to international relations, which
refer to contacts between states, governments, or organisations.
Transnational are generally those organisational structures and relations
which are independent of any nation state in particular. In migration
theory, "transnational" is used for a type of movement where connections
are kept both with the former country of origin *and* new state(s).
Assimilation into the new society is not a priority, because close ties
continue to be maintained with the country of origin and among
individuals from that state who might be spread all over the globe.
Transnational migratory movement is not unidirectional but can go back
and forth and even involve further countries. People usually do not have
an overriding feeling of obligation or loyalty to the nation states involved
but rather are deeply connected to their own group of reference. Diaspora
groups such as the Jews, Armenians, Chinese, Hausa, or Afro-Americans
are a good example of true transnational communities (see also
Kokot/Tölölyan/Alfonso 2004; Appadurai 1991). In the context of the
armed forces, "transnationalism" does not imply that national identities
become irrelevant, or that national armed forces relinquish their
sovereignty to one *supranational* military such as a "European Army".
King stresses the contrary:

"There is no evidence to suggest that the national identity of
personnel will become irrelevant or that the sovereignty of member states
will be subsumed to a higher authority. [...] Specialist military units are
co-operating with each other ever more closely but their national
identities and their nation-state's control over them remains a manifest
reality." (King 2005: 333).

Therefore, when investigating multinational co-operation, the
level of transnationalism and the nature of military identities/cultures
need to be analysed to better understand processes and challenges of
multinational military integration. Yet so far only little is known about
processes of identity making and boundary drawing among multinational

forces. In general, academic research activities dealing with multinationality have been mainly taking place since the 1990s as a research gap needed to be closed (Gareis et al. 2003: 16). It becomes crucial for military organisations to comprehend how military personnel from all ranks manage cultural diversity instigated by the necessity of international cooperation between the various national contingents and by relations with the other actors in the theatre of operations. The major questions are: How do the armed forces cope with the challenges connected to the shift from purely national roles to increasing multinational tasks in intercultural missions? What kinds of challenges are encountered by military personnel during missions and for what reasons? How are the soldiers prepared for intercultural encounters? What do mutual perceptions look like? What kinds of implicit and explicit self-concepts exist? And, last but not least, what are the main constraints *against* and the main prerequisites *for* "veritable" deep integration in multinational theatre?

2.   Data

On the basis of a comparative German-Italian case study, this article explores the intercultural challenges with which the soldiers are confronted in multinational co-operation. It also explores how soldiers cope with diversity within multinational task forces, and how their identities and military cultures are transformed by that interaction. In collaboration with social scientists from the Department of Peacekeeping Studies, University III in Rome, the German-Italian co-operation in the Multinational Brigade (Southwest) in Kosovo was studied by questionnaire as well as by means of numerous semi-structured interviews and anthropological participant observations in summer 2005. Results from the qualitative research are at the centre of attention here.[154] To better understand the processes of the constitution of (transnational) identity and culture during peacekeeping, the article looks at the individual level of the soldiers' practices, problems and ideas and puts these into the larger frame of peacekeeping.

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[154] Results from the German and Italian questionnaires will be published in October 2007.

3.   Military culture

In the field of sociocultural anthropology, definitions of culture have been largely disputed in the past decade. It is argued that rather than remaining wedded to a concept of culture as a conceptual structure comprised of representations of reality to orient, direct, and organize action in systems, we should understand culture as a constant flux of continual re-creation of "living, experiencing, thinking, affectively engaged human beings who follow […] particular lifeways" (Rapport/Overing 2000: 96). The concept of culture should thus be strongly related to *practice* in order to combine the perceiving and the acting agent. This (new) praxis oriented approach to cultures that emphasises social action as a central constituent of any cultural phenomenon is also useful to the assessment of military cultures.

At first glance, all military cultures have many aspects in common, yet on second glance they are also very unalike in many ways. The military creates a common professional military culture and a common military mind, as Slovenian sociologist Ljubica Jelušič (2003: 356) puts it:

"The military is tied to distinct goal, mission, and methods of executing a particular mission. It is the product of intraoccupational socialization, which provides a homogenisation of values or occupational minds."

Basic military and auxiliary trainings as well as daily work experiences, the so-called "practicalities of real life", socialize an individual into the military organisation. This military socialization process is similar around the globe: The "old self" is deconstructed in favour of a personality who shares military values and is willing to subordinate and commit her- or himself to military rule, even in times of danger. Discipline, hierarchy, strict organization, bureaucracy, comradeship, trust, loyalty, the importance of uniforms and other military symbols are part of the peculiarities of the military profession worldwide. All soldiers constitute a new identity and are initiated into a new status and social roles (Soeters/Winslow/Weibull 2003: 250). However, not all military cultures are completely alike. Of course, variations exist between different countries, and also between various types of military organizations such as the army, the air force or the navy. In addition to common historical military roots, all armed forces have their particular

military identities, micro-traditions, doctrines, styles of leadership, training practices, work concepts, etc. since they are part and parcel of the societies and nations they belong to. These characteristic features of national cultures and sovereign armies need to be recognized and shaped when encountering mixed units and multinational structures. This is the ambiguity and ambivalence that multinational settings and actors are confronted with. In other words, increasing integration in multinational headquarters, staff organizations and military units is a more demanding challenge for military personnel than purely national tasks are because cultural particularities of participating soldiers of other nations have also to be taken into consideration.

It goes without saying that it is easier to standardize technical equipment, regulations, and organizational framework structures than to achieve a common perception of terms, work results, and concepts of time (Lang 2001: 42; 2001a: 757). Of course, because of these and other challenges not all missions run smoothly or effectively at all times. On the contrary, more often than not institutional and intercultural differences between military organizations account for challenges and problems in international co-operation.

As far as successful military co-operation goes, the most important conflict is between national military traditions and sovereignty on the one hand and the demands of deepened, multinational integration on the other (Ben-Ari/Elron 2001:298). For example, in joint meetings, the flags of each participating nation are put on the table or on Power Point slides instead of a single, joint flag replacing the others.

Not only are national identities and cultures stressed, in daily practices during missions they are also represented in a simplified way, omitting national varieties and differences. As the discussion of research results below shows, national cultures are for example represented by means of national foodstuffs such as pasta for Italy or beer for Germany. In the following, it will be shown that these simplistic representations of national cultures facilitate the formation of national in-groups on the one hand, but also the demonstration of national values and identities to the "out-group" on the other. This kind of boundary drawing does not impede, however, the constitution of a multinational peacekeeping identity existing *next to* national, regional, or service identities.

4.   Case study: German-Italian co-operation in Kosovo

In summer 2005, the Headquarters (HQ), the Headquarters Company (HQ Coy), and the Multinational Logistic Unit (MLU) of the Multinational Brigade Southwest (MNB SW)[155] in Prizren, Kosovo were mainly staffed by German and Italian military personnel. These two nations were in principle contributing equally to the functioning of the multinational headquarters. The organizational structure of the HQ MNB (SW) was similar to those of other corps staffs and headquarters within NATO in times of peace. The HQ MNB (SW) was structured according to the principle of deepened integration. At the time of research, the Headquarters was led by a German Commander, an Italian Deputy Commander, an Italian Chief of Staff (COS), assisted by a German Press and Information Officer (PIO), a German Legal Adviser (LEGAD), and the distinct divisions. These divisions were headed either by a German or by an Italian with deputies belonging to the other nation. Owing to the lack of available qualified personnel, the Italian side could not, however, provide staff for all positions. As Italian officers claimed, too many specialists were involved in other missions, especially in Iraq, so that these positions were only given second priority and were left vacant. Three positions in the Headquarters were staffed by two Austrian and one Spanish officer. Because of linguistic and other cultural similarities, the two Austrians defined themselves as belonging to the "German side" while the Spaniard identified himself with the Italian side of the Headquarters. The main task of the MNB (SW) was to guarantee a secure environment for all (ethnic) groups, to prevent ethnically motivated, violent uprisings and to ensure peaceful and sustainable development in Kosovo.

As far as the context of the Multinational Brigade is concerned, the Headquarters, the HQ Coy and the MLU were staffed by Germans and Italians in more or less equal numbers. However, the Headquarters was located in Camp Prizren, which hosted next to the MNB (SW) the German and Italian National Headquarters as well as 1,800 German military personnel belonging to the German troops of the contingent. The Italian troops, more than 2,000 in number, were located in "Camp

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[155] In the fall of 2005, the Multinational Brigade Southwest (MNB SW) was replaced by a Western Brigade and a Southern Brigade.

Aguila" in Pec, which is about 1½ hour's drive northwest of Prizren. The Multinational Logistic Unit (MLU) was put up in "Camp Airfield", not far from "Camp Prizren". In the following section, daily life in Camp Prizren as well as in neighbouring Camp Airfield, where the German-Italian Logistics Unit was stationed, is analysed in terms of sociocultural practices, arrangements and understandings. These shape (and vice versa are shaped by) (sub)cultural structures of the armed forces deployed in multinational peacekeeping missions.

Daily life in Camp Prizren

Because of its German national contingent, "Camp Prizren" was, despite its multinational Headquarters, a truly German camp with a large majority of German military personnel, German buildings, German equipment, German streets, sidewalks and street-names, mainly German food, etc. Even German road traffic regulations applied, so that an Italian could theoretically get a German parking ticket if parking in front of the Headquarters, for example. Italian soldiers lived separately in their own barracks, which were provided by the German contingent. All in all, the *spatial setting* was dominated by the German forces, while the Italians had built "small national enclaves" within the Camp, such as "the Italian mile", with two Italian espresso bars and an Italian *baita* (house, restaurant) which also had an area outside in the open with tables and chairs. This is worth mentioning, as the German service members not only liked to visit the "Italian mile" for a cappuccino, but also the *baita* – the only official open space within the camp to relax outside in the sun.

In their everyday routines, German and Italian military personnel interacted in many different ways and on many different levels, both formal and informal. In the Multinational Headquarters, they jointly convened formally each morning for multinational staff meetings to update each other on the most important tasks and organize future operations. Owing to some English language deficiencies both on the German and Italian sides, the communication process in these meetings did not always run smoothly so that some of the decisions and information had to be re-discussed in the national meetings held right afterwards. Thus the lack of functional communication and multinational structures can strengthen a tendency towards (informal) national networks and can have, in the end, a disintegrating effect. Unofficial networks serving national interests only disrupt the functioning of the

formal organization charts and chain of command. These networks can thus pose a threat to good mutual co-operation and understanding. Good integration did not fail on all levels, if one can indeed speak of failure in the true sense of the word, as the MNB (SW) fulfilled all its tasks successfully, even if it did not manage to provide the basis for deep integration in every aspect. For example, the G3-Division co-operated well both on a formal and an informal level. German and Italian service members accomplished their assignments by truly sharing responsibilities, and also came together after work on a regular basis to invite one other for either German or Italian specialties, such as beer or pasta. Through these mutual invitations, good relationships between Germans and Italians were built, and strong reciprocal ties woven (cf. Mauss 1923-1924).

Despite this clearly positive example of good formal and informal co-operation, various challenges had also to be met by the multinational forces. For example, Italian servicewomen and servicemen had arrived prior to German soldiers and were also going to stay longer than their German comrades, as German military personnel are deployed for four months and the Italian term is six months. As a consequence, structural conditions, added to the fact that both nations constituted a separate contingent, with its own time frame and psychological phases connected to the different emotional stages of deployment (see Tomforde 2006). In addition, for the Italians the mission in Kosovo, in comparison with other operations abroad (e.g. Iraq), was considered to be a minor task, while for the Germans the Kosovo mission forms a major part of the out-of-area military involvement of the Bundeswehr.

Majority-minority differences within the German dominated camp as well as different structural conditions of both the German and Italian contingents accounted for challenges that had to be met , in addition to the ones that had already been experienced in other multinational operations: e.g. lack of a clear common task profile, varying language capabilities, priority of national (legal) systems over multinational rule sets, lack of opportunities to meet on a formal and informal basis, and thus existing prejudices and stereotypes about the other partners. Also, no joint pre-mission training had taken place that could have facilitated the development of mutual trust and a joint mission identity. Ljubica Jelušič and Bojan Pograjč (2006) have shown for the tri-national Italian-Hungarian-Slovenian Brigade (Multinational Land Force,

MLF) from Udine (Italy), which took over the MNB Headquarters in Prizren in fall 2005 after the German contingent had returned home, that joint pre-mission training adds to better multinational understanding and successful deep integration at all levels.

It goes without saying that it is always an intricate endeavour to judge the *efficiency* or *success* of multinational missions. What is efficient, what is success and what can be seen as a failure? For example, judged from the outside, German-Italian co-operation in Kosovo was a success in that mission tasks were fulfilled and no major incidents happened. If we look at the levels to which true integration was reached, however, this mission was not an overall success, but not a complete failure either. Although for a number of different reasons, as outlined above, national identities and boundaries were clearly maintained *inside* Camp Prizren. Interestingly enough, both German and Italian service members displayed a multinational peacekeeping identity outside the Camp. For example, German and Italian soldiers did not necessarily greet one other within the Camp boundaries. However, once outside the site, Germans and Italians would greet one other even heartily if they met when walking the streets of Prizren or patrolling the roads in Kosovo. Also, German and Italian military personnel changed their national uniforms to the extent that they added badges of the MNB (SW), or that soldiers of both nations wore name tags with both the German and Italian flags. Even if some of the soldiers did not interact daily with members from the other forces, they viewed multinational co-operation as an extra added-value to their job and held other UN, NATO or EU military partners in high esteem. In a way they were proud to be part of a multinational body and grateful for the opportunity to work multinationally. By participating in the mission, German and Italian servicemen and servicewomen felt initiated into a "global peacekeeping community", which has the important responsibility to provide the grounds for peace processes in former war areas. Indeed, the mere fact that more than one nation is contributing to a peacekeeping mission is a message of non-alignment and even-handedness conveyed to the (multi-ethnic) populations of conflict regions. Soldiers are very aware that their daily multinational co-operation symbolizes neutrality and is meant to set a good example of multinational/multiethnic integration for the conflict and war ridden host cultures (see also Rubinstein 1998: 190). From this viewpoint, the effectiveness and legitimacy of multinational military

operations do not only rely on military skills but also on the symbolic role of the armed forces themselves (Soeters et al. 2006: 132). In other words, military forces during peacekeeping missions indeed *perform* in a multinational *theatre* in the real sense of the words. As Eyal Ben-Ari and Efrat Elron (2001: 277) astutely put it: "[…] it is the very multi-nationality of peacekeeping forces – and their constant visibility to the opposing forces – that signals the forces' neutrality and impartiality."

Daily life in Camp Airfield

In the nearby "Camp Airfield", located on a former, desert-like airfield, living and working conditions were harsher and in many ways different from the main "Camp Prizren". There, both Italian and German service members lived together. Theoretically, they were also supposed to work together in the field of logistics. This co-operation was, however, toppled by national rules and legislation. For example, Italian soldiers were not allowed to drive German military vehicles as the Italian driver's license is not accepted under German law. German personnel, on the other hand, could not drive Italian cars as these were not fitted with seat belts – a requirement laid down by German regulations. Many such rules hindered co-operation on a technical level. However, soldiers of both nations helped one other as buddies, which provided for good work and personal relationships. In spite of the fact that soldiers (mainly NCOs and enlisted personnel) from both nations were not fluent in English or the other nation's language, many good personal contacts developed between Italians and Germans. People started not only to improve their English, but also to learn Italian or German.

After work, soldiers convened in their common recreation room to cook and drink together. "Pasta and beer parties" were held on a regular basis to introduce one other into the main aspects of the respective "national culture", but also to improve mutual understanding and co-operation within the Camp. Just as in Camp Prizren, these pasta and beer gatherings were part of an informal, reciprocal network maintained by German and Italian soldiers in which national identities are stressed on the one hand and a new, joint transnational peacekeeping identity is established on the other.

As "Camp Airfield" was much smaller and less well equipped with recreational facilities than "Camp Prizren", both Germans and Italians developed a bi- or even transnational "Camp Airfield identity"

distinguishing them from personnel working in the much larger "Camp Prizren". By maintaining a "Camp Airfield identity", soldiers could strengthen cohesion and camaraderie within their in-group in the Camp and make the harsher living conditions tolerable. This specific identity stood out from the mere "German/Italian" identities and underlined the uniqueness of the "Camp Airfield" experience. By means of this special identity, people could be proud of belonging both to a special unit and coping with hard conditions, as well as belonging to a transnational military body.

Cohesion among Italian and German military personnel was strengthened as people were in personal contact with their international partners. Attempts were even made to learn, on a rudimentary level, either German or Italian for daily use with soldiers from the other nation. As a result of these structural conditions and sociocultural practices, relationships were characterized by motivation, trust, and understanding of the other. People had a joint task to fulfil, bonded in order to make living in the Camp bearable and interesting, and lived the identity of a minority group belonging to a transnational military body.

5.   Multiple Identities

"Multi-national peace-keeping forces as organizations are characterized by an inherent tension between national and transnational belonging." (Ben-Ari/Elron 2001: 271)

Military sociologists Charles Moskos, John Williams and David Segal (2000: 5-6) assume that participation in multinational missions diminishes soldiers' ties with the nation-state and causes them to diverge from national structures. Eyal Ben-Ari's and Efrat Elron's (2001:298) contention is, on the contrary, that the feeling of belonging to a nation state is not decreased, but rather intensified during these missions abroad. The general conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that the truth lies in between: National identity is retained and in some cases and settings even enhanced, *but* at the same time multiple new identity structures related to multinational peacekeeping missions are constituted. As identities are not primordial but rather negotiated situationally and flexibly (cf. Hannerz 1992: 230-241), peacekeeping soldiers can display both their national identities and multinational or even transnational identities at the same time.

It is through concrete interactions and sociocultural practices found in peacekeeping missions that (new transnational) identities are constituted, negotiated and played out on a situational basis. Research data shows that this is only partly the case. Indeed, daily interactions and sociocultural practices during multinational operations bring differences between co-operating military forces into the foreground. But, and most importantly, they also have a socializing effect. It is my contention that multinational service members are, step by step and to varying degrees and at differing paces, initiated into a truly transnational peacekeeping identity and subculture that exist *next to* national ones. Each deployment adds to further experiences that are passed down from one service member to the next, from one contingent to the other. In total, each mission plays an important part in socializing the military personnel into today's new, transformed "global" armed forces that nowadays are mainly involved in multinational missions. Soldiers become accustomed to international co-operation and integrate these (new) military tasks into their self-perceptions. Multiple military identities and alliances are the result.

A transnational peacekeeping habitus ("we are all the same working towards the same aims") is developing that can help to overcome obstacles hindering integration such as language problems, lack of clear tasks, structures aimed at integration, prevailing prejudices or stereotypes. People thus see a deeper meaning in what they do and show a high level of commitment to multinational structures. When working in peacekeeping operations, soldiers derive more motivation for their jobs from the multinational context than from the military service in their home countries. Many soldiers are convinced nowadays that one has to have participated in at least one mission abroad in order to talk about multinational missions, which have become so central to today's armed forces (cf. Tomforde 2006a). Despite the differences and challenges that have to be met, there seems to be a broad acceptance as well as support of multinational structures. The soldiers we interviewed were convinced that they served the important transnational goals of stabilization of conflict areas and peace. This shared meaning of peacekeeping missions as well as a common military culture form the basis for a new transnational military identity that is gradually developing alongside its national counterpart (see also King 2005: 331; Evetts 2002).

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DUTCH PREJUDICE[156]

René MOELKER[157] and Schelte VAN RUITEN[158]

1.   Introduction: the Dutch myth of tolerance

The Dutch are often portrayed as tolerant, progressive and liberal, or better still, they like to sell themselves as such to the world. However, reality unfortunately suggests otherwise. The research team that investigated German-Dutch cooperation over a period of 10 years was stunned to repeatedly discover a very judgmental and negative attitude of young, lower ranking Dutch soldiers towards their German colleagues. The researchers often wondered how German-Dutch cooperation could be improved, and consistently established that lower ranking, young Dutch soldiers proved particularly resistant to a change of attitude.

'True Love', the title of the 2003 study, is illustrative of the entrancing image of cooperation between German and Dutch troops in an international headquarters (Hagen, Klein, Moelker & Soeters 2003). On the whole, the Germans and Dutch soldiers seem to like one other and to 'evaluate the collaboration between the soldiers of the two nations as 'positive' or even 'very positive''. However, it must be noted that the Germans tend to like the Dutch more than vice versa. The Dutch rank and file seem accountable for this skewed perspective, being a group generally susceptible to negative stereotyping. They are the group to examine for evidence countermanding the traditional Dutch self-image as a tolerant, progressive nation. Opinions of this group mirror those of Dutch youngsters in wider society, who are seemingly uneasy, prejudiced and hostile to foreigners.

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On an earlier occasion in 2002, when German and Dutch contingents were deployed to Kabul, these latent feelings of unease and prejudice almost led to animosity, and certainly to very outspoken opinions in the media. For example, newspaper articles quoted Dutch soldiers who claimed that, 'the Afghans are not the problem, the Germans are…' (Soeters & Moelker 2003). This demonstrates that whilst collaboration in one German/Netherlands corps 1(GE/NL) was evaluated as very successful over the years, when we examine the opinions and feelings of the Dutch rank and file, the equilibrium upon which their cooperation is based is seemingly fragile and precarious when put to the test.

We will firstly review literature which focuses upon the impact of group composition on operational effectiveness and performance, and after presenting core theories related to these issues key research questions will be brought to the fore. A methodology section will then serve to demonstrate the manner in which the study was conducted, after which results will be highlighted and conclusions drawn.

2. Effects of group composition on effectiveness and performance

A workforce of both German and Dutch servicemen might collectively benefit from their shared values and beliefs; solid common ground for their integration and cohesion. Research suggests a universal human tendency to respond positively to similarity and negatively to dissimilarity. We are generally attracted to people with similar attitudes to ourselves because they confirm our norms and values and because similarity facilitates communication ('similarity attraction' hypothesis and self-categorization theory). Greater levels of diversity – i.e. less sameness - would frustrate integration and internal cohesion.

On the one hand, a bi-national unit might encourage polarization into two camps. In-group and out-group affiliation mechanisms might cause a more juxtaposed internal atmosphere than would be the case if the group were more diverse. On the other hand, however, 'diversity ensures richness of input that may facilitate creative and innovative work outcomes' (van der Zee et al. 2004). A study of Watson et al. (1993) even shows that heterogeneous groups outperform homogeneous groups, regardless of the nature of the task in hand.

Other scholars state that team members in homogeneous groups generally report greater affinity towards their team than towards members of heterogeneous groups. Thus, a shared conception of, and affinity towards a team, would seemingly result in the team or team member being more inclined to contribute fully to collective goals, thereby stimulating the team to be more successful.

Earley and Mosakowski postulate an integration of these different perspectives (2000),

"Research has shown that both highly homogenous and highly heterogeneous teams tend to perform better than only moderately heterogeneous teams. In the instances of high heterogeneity, teams must develop a common ground and sense of order before they can be productive. This leads to an emergent culture within the group, called a hybrid ... the researchers hypothesized that a curvilinear relationship would eventually develop between heterogeneity and team performance, and satisfaction. The result would be an upright U-shaped curve, as teams moved from homogenous to highly heterogeneous".[159]

Essentially, the greatest strength of homogeneous teams lies in pre-existing communalities between their members. With relative speed and ease these will result in the establishment of a unified team culture. Within highly heterogeneous teams there is a total absence of such commonalties, as people tend to be so different from one another. However, time and opportunities for exchange and interaction should generally result in development of a distinct, binding operational culture. Within moderately heterogeneous teams, sub-group identities will result in low levels of cohesion and team spirit. There are also inter-group commonalties between sub-groups in such teams. As challenges or threats confront the team, members will retreat towards pre-existing subgroup identities for 'ego protection.' Instead of forming a unitary identity, the team divides into pre-existing subgroups, thereby creating potential for relational conflict (Earley and Mosakowski 2000). This theory suggests that the greater the heterogeneity within the 1(GE/NL) corps, the better performance will be.

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[159] Quoted from Amy Nelson, 'Synopsis of P. Christopher Earley and Elaine Mosakowski's, "Creating Hybrid Team Cultures: An Empirical Test of Transnational Team Functioning", Kravis Leadership Institute, *Leadership Review*, Winter 2002, based on P. Christopher Earley and Elaine Mosakowski, "Creating Hybrid Team Cultures: An Empirical Test of Transnational Team Functioning," *Academy of Management Journal*, February 2000, pp. 26-49.

The aforementioned approach assumes that shared expectations, value systems and overlap in personal identities, combined with a vivid 'identifiable' organizational identity, would be the key to productive cooperation. Groups with strong team cultures will outperform the rest.

Cooperation is the embodiment of integration. This means integrating the 'other' as part of your team, identifying with the 'other' and the team as a whole. Voluntary collaboration builds successful cooperation. We therefore hypothesise that identification processes lie at the very core of successful integration and cooperation within multinational teams.

Furthermore, trust is essential to establishing identification and integration. Integration requires you to adhere to a wider collective group, thereby allowing other actors to exercise control over you. You thus acknowledge your mutual dependencies and render yourself vulnerable to the actions of others. In professions, such as the army, when people may be required to execute tasks that may endanger their lives, a connection between trust and cooperation becomes extremely salient: employees depend on one other, and non-cooperation between soldiers may even cost lives (Kloet 2005).

The following research questions have been formulated in deliberations of the aforementioned points:
- How do members of the corps narrate success of cooperation and integration within it?
- Can the corps overcome national differences and integrate different nationalities into a common structure?
- Does a supra-national organizational identity exist? Do members of the corps affiliate with one another and identify with it as such, thus allowing it to supersede their national affiliations?
- How do trust mechanisms play a role in cooperation and identification processes?
- How do these theories differ when considering national, bi-national and multi-national groups?

The last question requires further explanation as it is linked to the theory of Earley and Mosakowski (2000). We hypothesise that homogeneous groups (national troops, such as the systems company in Garderen, national components of 1 (GE/NL) Corps) and highly heterogeneous groups (the multi-national troops at the Münster Headquarters) will score lowest on prejudice. This study suggests that bi-

national troops supporting the battalion in Munster and the systems company in Eibergen would be mildly heterogeneous teams, and would be the groups scoring highest on mutual prejudice.

3.   Methodology

Integrated multinationality within 1 (German/Netherlands) Corps has been a much debated and studied topic within the NATO corps in Münster, a bi-national corps having been established there in 1995. The integrated Dutch-German headquarters resides in Münster, under alternating Dutch/German command. Formation and development of this corps and the bi-national cooperation has been monitored by the 'Netherlands Defense Academy' and the 'Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr'. Previous surveys were conducted in 1995, 1997 and 2000.

The reported study is predominantly qualitative. Participatory observations and open interviews served to gain insight into life of the 1(GE/NL) corps. Data has been collected on three instances: two days in the Münster Headquarters, two days in the Staff Support Battalion in Münster and a full day at the SYS battalion in Eibergen. During those visits in-depth, open interviews were conducted with a total of fifteen respondents. Each interview lasted approximately one hour. Essentially respondents were selected at random, though efforts were nevertheless made to ensure that the group reflected a cross section of all hierarchical layers of the corps.

A large scale questionnaire was simultaneously issued throughout the organization, in a joint effort by the 'Netherlands Defense Academy' and the 'Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr' (N=223). Ten respondents were 'multi-nationals', that is to say military personnel of countries other than Germany and the Netherlands. No statistical inferences could be made to these multinationals due to the small number of participants in the survey and they were thus deleted from the data file.

4.   Narratives

Tales of cooperation and integration

In general, the respondents positively evaluated multinational cooperation within the corps:

'I greatly appreciate the diversity of people within the unit and I think we can learn a great deal from each other.'

'As is normal, this cooperation knows its ups and downs. It greatly depends on the people you work with on a daily basis. We used to be quite a tight bunch, but cohesion varies from one group to another.'

This view is seemingly supported by data gathered by the questionnaires:

'Bi-nationality is in itself a hollow phrase. It is something you should yourself strive for in a sincere way on an every day basis'… 'In the end we make far too little use of all the advantages we could gain from this dual nationality cooperation. People have become stuck in their own ways of working. Our tendency for routine has made us attached to a certain way of working.'

In general, respondents claim to have gradually come to realise that they should invest daily in genuine 'integrated multinationality' for such cooperation to be effective.

'Bi-nationality is something you should actively pursue, not a purely political, good intention. But in practice, I hardly see any support for it.'

The people with whom we talked often held a rather peculiar dualistic approach to cooperation and integration. They all see 'multinationality' as valuable, and yet some seemingly found it hard to reconcile themselves with its more practical implications: that is the apparent differences that stem from heterogeneity.

The same respondent stated: *'I greatly appreciate the diversity of people within the unit and I think we can learn a great deal from each other'* also said:*' I was called to order in a totally improper manner by a German superior. Minutes later I returned, flung open the door of his office and threw in a dog's leash… 'that's the way you talk to an animal,*

but not to me!' ...With that [he smiles*]... I've set him straight and he now knows how not to deal with us Dutch.'*

This juxtaposition of bi-national relations *'has something to do with language and the relation between the two countries. It is very easy to say to an English lieutenant 'good morning Sir', but somehow it feels very different for a Dutch soldier to say to a German superior 'Guten Tag Herr Oberstleutnant...'*

De-categorizing outgroups
Nevertheless, on a large scale, a movement from categorical out-groups and stereo-typing, towards a more piecemeal, individualised system of information processing can be beneficial.
'The Dutch that are stationed here are quite a close group, but they are mainly internally focused. I do not know anyone who sees German people socially or visits them at their house. I myself also do not have any Dutch friends.'
'The social contacts here are quite good, but I must admit that I hardly see them outside duty hours. I sleep on the Prinz Claus Kaserne. But, I chat with my German colleagues on the work floor every now and again.'

It appears that each group predominantly socialises with its own nationals and that, on a social level, clear faultlines are often drawn between the two groups of nationals:
'We have our own bar... The BBT-bar... We never see any Germans there. They also have their own place, the Heimbetrieb, but this probably is not so much fun. It's also closed at night.'... and, *'That is where all the Dutch are. Beers only cost 25 cents.' It is of course not prohibited for Germans to come in and have a beer, but I have never seen a German enter.'*

Even when accommodation is organized collectively, as opposed to nationally, people tend to uphold divisions along national lines.
'We do have bi-national quarters here... In my hallway we are with 20 Dutch and 2 Germans. We [Dutch] *took possession of the living room, but the Germans don't seem to mind. They never come to sitting with us, but always go to a German living room on another floor.'*

In one office we visited, the smoking room downstairs was held by the Dutch, whilst the coffee room upstairs was considered German territory.

'You still see that there is no full integration between the nationalities. During lunch breaks everybody sticks to their own [nationality]*. Also, for instance, this meeting I attended lately. Around the big table there was free seating. Within minutes the room was divided into a Dutch and a German side. Our group is too small to close ranks, so we dangle in-between.'*

Interestingly, many respondents underline the distinct approach of the 'new' commander of the Staff Support Battalion who: *'makes the positive bi-national attitude the leading ground rule'… 'really genuinely wants to work bi-national, puts in the effort and functions as a leading example.'*

Although the corps as a whole is now multinational, the organization is typically rendered a '*Dutch-German-affair.*' In the lower echelons of the organization respondents perceive themselves part of a bi-national organization, which, in effect, they also are on a battalion level. Nevertheless, the Dutch-German-dichotomy also strongly pervades headquarters.

'Against the GE/NL majority we, other participants, do not have much to say. The 'other participating nations' are not represented in the highest positions of the organisation. The Germans and Dutch tend not to be very open minded. A real open exchange of views does not takes place.' … and: *'It is quite clear that there are two distinct pillars (GE and NL). In both pillars there are parallel efforts that are not always harmonized and sometimes even really conflict, due to different agendas. They are not always 'in tune'.'*

Overall, various respondents suggest that the Dutch and Germans are the dominant parties in the corps. For some, this is hardly surprising: *'For in the end, he or she who pays the piper calls the tune.'*

5.   Foundations of 'otherness'

Procedures

The strongest leverage for distinctiveness - or 'otherness' - is seemingly variation in rules, procedures and legislation. Indeed, most respondents see '*Juggling your way through the administrative jungle*' as one of the biggest day-to-day challenges of life in the Corps. However, views of this differ between the Headquarters (HQ) and Staff Support battalions. Within HQ, (NATO-based) uniform procedures are increasingly established...'*Overcoming differences by uniform procedures.*' … This said, at the lower echelons of the organization, work procedures lean more heavily towards national legislation.

'We have German, Dutch AND NATO procedures working here. They sometimes simply don't match.'

'Which procedures dominate depends upon heads of division. The amount of relative power and authority this person has, will guide the choice of either Dutch or German procedures…Planning and execution on a battalion level is predominantly Dutch-oriented. On a company level this is mostly German-oriented.'

'A superior is not allowed to punish a German subordinate. Who is under the jurisdiction of whom?'

Differences in rules prove to be a major pitfall in cooperation, often preventing unity and cohesion within the corps: …'*On paper I have one battalion at my request for maintenance of vehicles. In reality I have 4 battalions. One German and a Dutch battalion here in Münster and a German and a Dutch battalion in Eibergen.*'

On the other hand, however, this is exactly what some people see as a positive, unique feature of a multinational HQ: *'The integration of all the different protocols is what makes work here so much fun.'*

Military culture

Distinct military cultures also elicit 'otherness' within the corps:

'The German and Dutch military cultures simply don't fit together. This is largely because the German army is used to conscript soldiers and they therefore have a much more authoritarian culture.'

'What we [the Dutch*] see as joviality can also be perceived as rude* [by the Germans]. *But, to be honest, we Dutch also make deliberate*

use of this. We Dutch tolerate/accept directly confrontation with your superior. They tolerate (and perhaps sometimes even expect) behaviour from us they wouldn't tolerate from a German in the same position.'

These views are increasingly mitigated, the higher up the hierarchy you go. The construct 'they are so very different from us' is most readily employed in bi-national parts of the organisation (i.e. the Staff Support Battalion and the Systems Battalion). The heightened heterogeneity of the multinational HQ cushions this effect considerably:

'You come across different mentalities here in Münster, but all in all I don't think working with Germans is any different from working with Dutch people. As long as you anticipate their strictness and more hierarchical approach. We Dutch tend to do things outside of set rules and functions. Germans play it more by the book.'

'Differences in culture are not something you should want to change, but rather something you should get used to. Learn to accept from each other.'... 'the eventual goal they all strive for, is very often the same. It's just the way they think they can achieve it which differs.'

Language

Although the official language of the corps is English, its overall proficiency in the language could certainly be improved, particularly as this can be a barrier to effective cooperation.

In the Staff Support Battalion in particular: *'Everyday informal practice requires the Dutch to adjust to the Germans and start speaking their language, whilst, on a more formal level, people usually try to speak English.'*

Noteworthy is the increased percentage of German-Russian cooperation in the battalions. Besides low proficiency in English, Russians only tend to have a very basic knowledge of the German language.

'When working with Germans I immediately start talking German. Just to prevent myself from the hassle of having to say the same thing twice.'

Within HQ, proficiency in English is far higher, though people often tend to resort to their native language in their interactions.

Pride in membership

At several layers of the organization, membership of the corps evidently inspires a feeling of being *'part of something special.'* *'Working here is something I have never experienced before. Incomparable with other places I have been. Within this bigger NATO picture we Dutch are merely a smaller part of things and I get the chance to work together with a variety of nationalities.'*

On the one hand, the diversity of nationalities within the corps is a 'foundation for 'otherness,'' though it simultaneously provides leverage for the 'special feeling' associated with group membership:

'… we are special here. Nowhere in the world do corporals work together like this on a corporal level… this diversity is something special and I wear this beret with pride.'

Especially after (successful) exercises, there is a continued sense that *'we pulled it off together; no matter how difficult 'they'* [HQ] *made it for us… we did it again.'*

There is seemingly a 'sense of attachment' to the corps. People apparently feel an emotional connection with the organisation. Nevertheless, a large percentage of the group does not have these 'family feelings'. There is also no significant difference in these attitudes between the Dutch and the Germans.

Tales of trust

Most direct references to trust in the interviews were framed around calculus and deterrence-based trust mechanisms:

Several respondents refer to their fear of contributing too much, in relative terms, to the collective goal and thereby demonstrating a preoccupation with an 'honest division of labour'. *'Especially during an exercise you see a lot of people absolutely doing nothing and a few shoulders who pull all the load'*…and*: 'I do not have a negative attitude towards Germans at all, but if I resent one thing it is the easiness with which they sometimes leave all the work for us'*…and: *'I do not trust the Dutch. All the work always seems to land on our shoulders. I always try to be of help and co-operate, but get kicked back time and time again.*

They run off with your work and take the credit for it and always play the 'rank' card.'

Differences in (military) culture can also make it more difficult to establish trust. *'I do trust my German colleagues. The trust I feel towards my Dutch colleagues is far less. This is quite natural, it is normal to be more trustworthy to people that speak your own language.'*

A profound distinction between 'them' and 'us' seemed to stem from behaviour 'not worthy of a soldier' (from a cultural perspective), and differences in regulations:

'In the Afghanistan deployment, the Germans were allowed to drink as much as they liked – and did so on a large scale while we had to obey the 'two can rule.' One night an officer waggled into our tent, utterly drunk and fell down on his bed… When there is a bomb attack and I have the choice of saving either a German or a Dutch soldier, I will immediately choose the Dutch guy. I think a German colleague would do the same, or would be too drunk to do anything.'

As previously mentioned, evidence suggests a 'them and us' construct which divides groups by nationality. All respondents firstly deliberated upon how difficult they found cooperation between different nationals. Overall people seem to feel safe with those of their own kind; the 'nationality-based 'we''. There is a general sense that different levels of 'we' pervade.

'The continuous switch between different procedures is sometimes very difficult and I have the feeling that I am drifting away from my Dutch procedures. My knowledge of Dutch regulations is no longer up to date. This can make it difficult for me when I apply for positions in Holland, as I have been 'out of that system' for too long. I am not fully adjusted to either regulatory system, which is can sometimes be quite frustrating.'

'On the one side we have the NATO élan here, but at the same time this is held back by Dutch and German restraints.'

There is a sense that we are drifting away from old certainties and are being asked to reconsider what we always saw to be valid: *'It also has something to do with fear. You know your own rules and*

procedures. That is how you have been brought up. When you are in unknown territory and feel insecure, you try to fall back on certainties.'

There is also a general desire to protect resources: *'I am not giving away 'my'* [either Dutch or German] *material.'*

People appear to fear losing control and demonstrate a reluctance to become an integral part of a larger, newly defined 'we', out of concern for their preservation of own self-worth and self-image.

Essentially, this is the full extent of the trust dilemma: if you are asked to place yourself in a vulnerable position, give up own certainties and contribute to the collective, without guarantees that actions will be reciprocated, the range of your trust will of course be limited.

6.   Conclusions

Though multinationals and German soldiers were also interviewed, this chapter predominantly focuses upon the opinions of lower ranking Dutch servicemen. This was a conscious decision. Previous studies demonstrated that the most negative opinions would be expressed by lower ranking Dutchmen soldiers. These illustrations serve to illustrate that a biased perspective on working relationships is largely a Dutch problem.

The findings, and the stories people tell, seem to support the hypothesis of Earley and Mosakowski (2000), who propose an upright U-shaped relationship between team heterogeneity and effectiveness. That is, given sufficient time to work together, homogeneous and highly heterogeneous teams will be more effective than moderately heterogeneous groups.

A much more moderate view on the 'difficulties of integration' can be found in the more heterogeneous HQ (including staff of more than 12 nationalities). Nevertheless, these findings may have been influenced by the higher level of education of staff at HQ and their (generally) higher level of proficiency in English. Integration is more problematic in the more moderate, heterogeneous elements of the corps, such as the Sys

company in Eibergen, and the support battalion stationed in Münster. The homogenate SYS company in Garderen was not confronted with problems of integration simply because it was only made up of soldiers of one nationality (table 1).

Table 1: A summary of key findings

	Homogeneity	**Moderate Heterogeneity**	**High Heterogeneity**
Unit	SYS company Garderen	SYS company Eibergen & support battalion Muenster	Headquarters Münster
Narratives about success of cooperation	Neutral / no narratives	Negative in rank and file, positive at NCO and CO level	Predominantly positive
Overcoming national differences	Not appropriate: only one nationality in the company	Self-chosen separation for informal contact, mainly professional contacts	Professional and informal contacts occur regularly
Does a supra-national organizational identity exit?	No	No, on the contrary, national identities are simply reinforced	Heightened openness but one keeps his/her national identity
Trust	High levels of trust based on mutual professionalism	High levels of trust based on mutual professionalism, but with frictions stemming from daily problems	High levels of trust stemming from personal contacts and joint exercises
Language	Not problematic (one language)	Problematic	English is the common and accepted language
Procedures	Only national procedures	Many bi-national differences	Many multi-national differences but convergence as a result of NATO procedures

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BELGIAN TROOPS IN UNIFIL[160]

Delphine RESTEIGNE[161] and Joseph SOETERS[162]

1.   Introduction

The participation of Belgian troops in UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) was the first time that Belgian soldiers had contributed to a UN operation since the death of ten Belgian Para's in Kigali in 1994 (during the MINUAR operation). For this reason and in accordance with recommendations made by the "Rwanda Commission"[163], Belgium decided not only to send troops to carry out demining, reconstruction and medical tasks, but also to ensure the security of its own contingent. This mission, entitled "BELUFIL", began in October 2006 and was originally expected to last 6 months. In January it was extended to October 2007.

In this article, we will examine the daily life of Belgian soldiers deployed in Tibnin, in south Lebanon. After a brief description of the mission, we will first look at multicultural diversity - both within the Belgian contingent as well as between the various national contingents deployed in the same area. In the second section of the paper, we will analyze in which circumstances multicultural diversity could have had an influence on operational effectiveness. As we had the opportunity to take part in this operation and to conduct interviews in Lebanon during a one-week period, we have approached our topic in an empirical way, focusing

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[160] Proofreading by Anna Peel.
[161] Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium.
[162] Tilburg University, The Netherlands.
[163] According to these recommendations, «le Gouvernement doit veiller, en cas de participation à une mission, à ce qu'une série de conditions soient remplies, de manière que la sécurité des troupes soit assurée au maximum et que les chances de réussite de la mission soient optimalisées» (Sénat de Belgique, Commission d'enquête parlementaire concernant les événements du Rwanda, document législatif N°1-611/7, 6 décembre 1997. See http://www.senate.be).

mainly on soldiers' impressions and personal assessments of the effectiveness of the mission. As we will see, these impressions depend very much on the position the soldiers held in the organization (e.g., officer, NCO or private soldier), the kind of tasks they performed (reconstruction, medical assistance or force protection), the period of the mission (first or second rotation) as well as other additional factors that we will examine. Finally, the last part of the paper discusses what we have termed a "small steps" approach and refers to a particular and more neutral operational style - different to approaches adopted by larger countries.

2.   Methodology

We spent the week of February 6th to February 12th 2007 in Lebanon, during the rotation between BELUFIL 1-BELUFIL 2. The data used for this article are based on observations, and approx 20 formal interviews carried out during our fieldwork.

Depending on the language of the respondent, the interviews were conducted in Dutch, French or English and were not tape-recorded. Instead we took detailed notes. In this article, we have included excerpts from these interviews (translated into English for those conducted in Dutch or French) when they contained particularly revealing information. Respondents were selected depending on their function - also according to the type of information we needed. Some quantitative data were also included in our comments. These come from standardized questionnaires routinely administered mid-mission by the Department of Behavioral Sciences at the request of Adjunct Chief of Staff Operations and Training to Belgian military personnel deployed in operations abroad.[164] Our sample included Belgian and French servicemen working in different specialities, e.g., logistic, medical unit, mine clearance team, etc, as well as other individuals working in the same compound but not part of the Belgian contingent e.g., interpreters and a LAF officer. As we analysed the interviews, we kept in mind various factors, e.g., level of cooperation, character of the mission, time span, hierarchy, level of formality, language and professional skills, which were drawn up during the preliminary working session organized by the Academic Research

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[164] In November 2006, 359 Belgian military personnel were deployed in Tibnin. 335 questionnaires were distributed and 259 filled out. The response rate is equal to 77%.

Branch of the NATO Defense College on operational and multicultural challenges in military forces at the end of November 2006.[165]

3.   UNIFIL and the Belgian contribution

UNIFIL was created by the Security Council in 1978 to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, to restore international peace and security, and to assist the Lebanese Government to restore effective authority. But with the July-August 2006 crisis, Security Council Resolution 1701[166] called for a full cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of all Israeli forces from southern Lebanon. The Resolution also called upon the government to deploy its forces in the south in order to exercise full control over its territory. So, in addition to the original mandate, the force has been charged with monitoring the cessation of hostilities and supporting the Lebanese armed forces as they deployed throughout the south of Lebanon. They were also charged with helping to ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons.[167] UNIFIL is currently deployed along the UN-drawn Blue Line dividing Israel and southern Lebanon. Its activities have centered on monitoring military activity between Hezbollah and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) with the aim of reducing tensions and allaying continuing low-level armed conflict.[168]

In February 2007, UNIFIL counted approximately 12,400 military personnel and about 400 civilian (international and local) workers,[169] working closely with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Since February 17th 2006, UNIFIL has been under the Italian Force Commander Major-General Graziano who succeeded French Major-General Alain Pellegrini. Belgium is one of 30 countries[170] contributing to this force with about 350 Belgian troops located in the Scorpion camp of Tibnin. In addition, Belgium has also sent military policemen and

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[165] Preparatory workshop on 'Cultural Challenges in Military Operations', 27 November 2006, NATO Defense College, Rome.
[166] S/RES/1701 (2006).
[167] See: http://www.un.org/
[168] See: http://www.naqoura.com/
[169] See :http://www.un.org/
[170] The other contributors to UNIFIL are: China, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Republic of Korea, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Tanzania and Turkey.

liaison elements to Naqoura (HQ UNIFIL) and to New York (UN DPKO).

Belgian's contribution to UNIFIL is to assist in three main areas of activity: mine clearance, reconstruction and medical support. It is also envisaged that Belgian soldiers engage in humanitarian assistance but, according to their mandate, this is limited solely to 'urgent matters'. However, in the field, it is not always easy to distinguish what is "urgent" when speaking about the health of people and when troops have such good equipment at their disposal. "*The UN has decided that the hospital (role 2) cannot perform humanitarian tasks and that we can take care of locals only in emergencies but it is a little bit frustrating to have such beautiful equipment and not be allowed to use it*". In that regard, the Belgian medical role 1 (first aid care) and role 2 (hospital) have carried out approximately 5,400 medical interventions in less than four months (see Table 1).

Table 1:
Achievements: Med ROLE 1& 2[171]

Role 1	Total
Consultations	2919
Ambulance	444
House calls	115
Role 2	
Surgery	65
Hospitalisation	238
Dentist	887
Laboratory	268
RX	468
Total	*5404*

For some respondents, the UNIFIL mandate was clear but not everybody we met had the same opinion. Working in the context of a UN mission was generally considered to be more difficult than, for example, working under NATO command. "*In a UN operation, the mandate is not really clear. We have to do different tasks but it is more confusing. It's*

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[171] BELUBATT briefing for visitors, 5 February 2007, Tibnin, Scorpion camp.

clearer in a NATO mission because they have more military rules". Our respondents essentially gave four main reasons to support this judgement.

First, they have to work with countries "*which are not up to NATO standard*". As T. Szvircsev Tresch & N. Picciano underlined in their working paper,[172] NATO's allies have developed common operating procedures, command and control systems, logistic systems and capabilities, which reduce operational and cultural differences. But, in a UN operation, there is a greater number of countries involved and the cultural differences are, in some cases, more apparent. "*We see a difference between the most exotic countries like Ghana or India… and western countries*". Moreover, some organizational elements in the UN bureaucracy tend to delay procedures and give little autonomy to the field. Other respondents mentioned the different status of countries working for UNIFIL as having an influence on the way things are executed. "*Ghanaian or Polish troops, they are less autonomous… the UN gives everything and they are deployed here for the long run and also perceive the mission differently*".

Thirdly, the UN structure contains more civilian elements than NATO. "*Military personnel think differently to their civilian counterparts*". For example, civilians play an important role in Naqoura HQ and, according to some military personnel, "*civilians work differently*". For example, during the weekend, they are off-duty and this can be problematic if an urgent matter arises. A final element relates to the fact that even though UNIFIL has been in existence for nearly 30 years, at the beginning of the so-called UNIFIL 2 operation, some aspects were not totally ready, e.g., the HQ was too small and the personnel could not always answer the questions put to them. However, within the last couple of weeks the situation seems to have improved and structures have been increasing developed "*in line with NATO operations*".

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[172] T. Szvircsev Tresch & N. Picciano, "Effectiveness within NATO's multicultural military operations", Working Paper for the Conference "Cultural Challenges in Military Operations", 15/16 March 2007, NATO Defense College, Rome, p. 2.

4.   Multiculturality among Belgians

4.1   Period of preparation

"*The preparation is a good indicator but here, it is permanent, it is for four months non-stop*".

The preparation period for a foreign mission for Belgian soldiers usually lasts about two months. However, for the first rotation, the mission was not planned in advance and the soldiers had only followed a short preparatory session. For the second rotation, the force protection detachment was originally planned to deploy to Afghanistan where the nature of the mission is quite different. The soldiers were informed only five weeks before departure that they would be deployed to Lebanon rather than to Afghanistan: "*They were prepared for Kabul, for making patrols*".

The entire detachment is a mix of different units and specialities and it was only during the last week of training that they exercised together. For some of the respondents, it was not sufficient to simply know each other better. Belgian militaries also followed a one-day course on Lebanese culture consisting of several presentations about Lebanese society and ending with a Lebanese meal.

4.2   A very diverse detachment

As we can see in graph 1, the BELUBATT contingent includes five main components: operational staff, force protection, medical staff, construction and demining, and logistical & service support.

Graph 1: BELUBATT Organization chart

The majority of military personnel (53%) have a logistical function and one third (35%) a combat one. The rest (12%) perform administrative tasks. The majority are privates (61%), a little less than one third NCOs (28%) and 11% officers. Concerning the proportion Dutch-speaking/ French-speaking, the majority (73%) is Dutch-speaking. The contacts between the two groups were apparently good but they did not fully integrate. Even if they were deployed in the same compound for four months, they did not really mix. At the level of NCOs and private soldiers, the majority could not speak the second Belgian official language. This situation, combined with some other cultural factors, kept contacts between the two linguistic communities to a minimum.

Belgian military personnel working for the BELUFIL mission do not have a common background. In all, they come from 18 different units and according to some comments, as a result, "*it is difficult to create a cohesive spirit*". In such temporary frameworks – termed "instant

units"[173] by some authors - and based on short–term, ad hoc and diverse components - the nature of cohesion is not the same and new forms of collaboration appear. So that, in those temporary combinations, the integration of disparate units into cohesive forces will be a challenge.[174]

Among a speciality, however, they were usually trained at the same school and in a relatively small army like the Belgian army, "*we usually know each other already*". With such diverse units and specialities located in the same compound, it was not easy for the Commander of each detachment to find a good balance. "*In the infantry, for example, officers are also living like the troops… but it is not the same in other units*". For example, military work clothes and work rhythm were somehow fitted to the tasks done so that there were some differences allowed between a soldier working in an observation post and another in concrete blocks. "*It is an atypical detachment with different cultures and we have emphasised these differences (…) not to put everybody in the same pot*".

One other element particular to this mission and already mentioned in the introduction is the support role of the force protection detachment. As the force protection Commander said to us, it was "*difficult but feasible*". In fact, such collaboration between an infantry unit and other units is not new - but this support role was unusual. This is due to the fact that, in Lebanon, Belgian troops do not have their own area of responsibility (AOR) and so, do not carry out patrol missions. This situation also limits the possibility of contact with the local population for many Belgian soldiers (about one third of Belgian soldiers are working in the force protection detachment) and gave the impression of living in a closed camp for several months.

But, in general, the mission is going quite well for most Belgian troops. According to our quantitative survey, 73% of military personnel were "*rather or very happy with the mission*". Those who were not were mainly soldiers from the force protection detachment[175] because, as we have seen, their work combines routine tasks, few contacts with the local population and no real combat.

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[173] U. Ben -Shalom, Z. Lehrer and E. Ben -Ari, "Cohesion during Military Operations: a field study on combat units in the Al-Aqsa intifada", *Armed Forces and Society*, October 2005, vol. 32, pp. 63-79.
[174] Ibid., p.76.
[175] According to our survey, 40% of the force protection detachment was rather not happy with the mission.

5.   Multiculturality between Belgians and other nations

Initially, the Scorpion camp had been led by Polish troops for about ten years. Since the events of summer 2006, Belgium took over the command of the camp - but an area is still occupied by about 80 Polish soldiers. Besides the Belgian contingent, there are also three French soldiers (working in the Belgian hospital), some Lebanese (Christian and Muslim) interpreters and one LAF Liaison Officer. Close to this area, there is also an Italian camp, a French camp and a Lebanese quarter.

According to our survey, working in a multinational environment was considered to be "*not a problem at all*" for 81% of respondents. For 78%, it was "*rather or very rewarding to work in a multinational environment*". But, in the camp, the multinational element remain at a very low level in comparison with other camps (KAIA,…) because, as mentioned before, besides Belgian, there are only Polish and some French troops at the same location. Contact with foreigners also depends on the nature of the tasks: for instance, some specific functions (medical unit, staff level, Info Ops officer, military policemen) tend to work more with interpreters, local people and foreign military personnel.

Table 2:
Frequency of contacts (%)

Do you have contacts with…? *(% rather or very often)*	
Local population	54%
Polish soldiers	38%
French soldiers	36%
Lebanese soldiers	27%
Italian soldiers	11%

Table 3:
Quality of contacts (%)

How are the contacts with…? (% rather or very good)	
French soldiers	97%
Local population	96%
Lebanese soldiers	90%
Italian soldiers	89%
Polish soldiers	79%

In tables 2 and 3, we note that 54% of military personnel had "*rather or very often*" contacts with the local population. For the large majority (96%), contacts were "*rather or very good*". These 'good contacts' seem connected to the neutrality and the nature of the tasks carried out by the Belgians (essentially, mine clearance and medical assistance) – i.e., tasks that are viewed positively in comparison with other tasks executed by foreign soldiers. "*There were some complaints about the French because of the political discourses (…) but also because they have heavy materials with chains… which make noise and destroy roads*". In general, contact with locals is also facilitated by the common language because, after Arabic, French is the second language in Lebanon.

Among foreign military personnel, Belgians mainly have contacts with Polish soldiers (38%), but even though they are located in the same compound, they still have limited contact. Common activities (football matches) were organized once or twice during the four months of the mission but did not really improve the situation. "*We cohabit,*" said one of our respondents. From figure 4, we can see that only 79% of the respondents had "*rather or very good*" contacts with Polish soldiers, which is the lowest level. The two main reasons proposed were their different working habits and "*another drinking culture*".[176] This last reason apparently explains why, contrary to other multinational

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[176] Contrary to Poles who were allowed to drink spirits and without real limitation in their bar, for Belgians, the '2 cans' rule was effective. One exception to this rule was during the week of rotation process where no alcohol at all was allowed.

compounds where there is generally free access to all national bars, in Lebanon, it was forbidden for Belgians to go to the Polish bar. *"We are living side by side. They have another mission and are working differently. They work from Monday to Friday"*. The second reason for limited contact between the two nations is a weak knowledge of English among Polish soldiers. During the cohabitation period, some minor problems were reported and these were mainly related to the sharing of common sanitary installations or to the noise made by some Poles at night. Nevertheless, contacts between the two nations were better during the previous rotation of Polish troops because the current detachment came from a different area, which, according to people from the previous Polish rotation, "*would not be the best one*".[177] However, sometimes they had to collaborate, e.g., to transport Belgian soldiers from Beirut airport to the camp or for the security assured by the Belgian force protection detachment to all soldiers inside the camp, Polish soldiers included.

If we now look at contacts between Belgian soldiers and soldiers from other countries, we see that only a small proportion comes into daily contact with foreigners – and it is essentially with French, Lebanese and Italian soldiers. This is not really a surprise to the extent that those three nationalities are deployed close to each other. When speaking about contacts with other nations, the main barrier is language - because soldiers from some nations are not able to speak English. This situation can sometimes generate significant negative consequences: "*Sometimes, when we are going to a meeting, some people do not react because they do not understand. And they ask me afterwards to translate what was said and then realize that they did not agree with what was decided ...but it is too late!*"

This language problem can become even more problematic in case of crisis because, then, everybody has the tendency to use his mother tongue. The second difficulty (which we have already mentioned in our first point) is related to operational and cultural differences. "*Some countries have other norms, other standards (…) In Belgium, we are following severe norms which are NATO norms and everybody knows them*". Another difficulty mentioned is the legal heaviness of some collaborative procedures that require the support of lawyers. One example given was in the context of a bilateral agreement between

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[177] This confirms the importance of the transmission of information and, in our case some prejudices, between the personnel's rotations.

Belgium and France about munitions storage: the problem lasted for months. "*It is frustrating because for three months, we have been in a deadlock. (…) It is a ping pong game*".

6.   Defining effectiveness

According to Hall[178], many conceptualizations of effectiveness are much too simplistic. For profit-making organizations, an effective organization is one that makes a profit. However, in the public sector, and in the military in particular, what is the core element of organizational and, in our case, operational effectiveness? In his goal model, Etzioni defines effectiveness as the degree to which an organization realizes its goals. However, the problem is that organizations have multiple and sometimes conflicting goals. Others also put an emphasis on cohesion as a crucial factor for enhancing effectiveness. Facing this conceptual complexity, we have decided to focus on the subjective perceptions of effectiveness of military personnel after four month of deployment. As perspectives of effectiveness will vary with the position in the organization, we will present different points of view reflecting several categories of military personnel.

Another element, as we study the perception of a mission in a new and very diverse environment, is that effectiveness cannot be achieved through following one organizational model. There is not one optimal way of organizing an operation for the purpose of achieving highly varied goals".[179] For Belgian troops, Lebanon is a new theatre of operations and "*We have determined several objectives (...) For other operations and at school, we have usually worked with tables (...) But here, it was more intuitive*".

6.1   A good image

According to 88% of the respondents, the mission can be considered as "*rather or very useful*". And, generally, when asked about Belgian's accomplishments, respondents were very positive: "*Belgium has been singled out and some countries have asked Belgium to help them build their own camp*". Many respondents emphasized all

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[178] See chapter 11 on organizational effectiveness in R. H. Hall, *Organizations: structures, processes and outcomes*, fourth edition, 1987, Prentice-Hall, USA, pp. 261-297.
[179] R. H. Hall, op. cit., p. 69.

achievements in four months by a relatively small country: "*For such a small country, Belgium has achieved a lot in its areas of activities. According to some people, it has also attracted a kind of jealousy*". To gain a more objective response and to learn more about the consequences of their presence in the region, a survey among the local population had been planned but it had to stop because it was perceived by locals as a method to spy on them. Instead, they have tried to collect information informally, in particular, with the help of the Info-Ops cell. Good contact with the locals is essential and as some said "*locals are the best life insurance for us. We ask them to warn us if something is going to happen*".

6.2   A successful mission?

For one of the company commanders, a successful mission is: "*When everybody and also my own detachment is safely back home … and, on the professional side, when we have done what was asked of us*". "*To know new people*" was also pointed out very positively. Among the people of the first rotation, many mentioned that, although they started the mission with nothing, they had done a good job during their four-month rotation. "*When you begin with nothing you begin building everything*". As in other Belgian operations, many tasks were sometimes executed with improvisation but the global appreciation remains generally positive. And with the short preparation period (approximately three weeks) that preceded the first rotation personnel, "*it is rewarding to see what we are able to do in relation to our preparation and to see the fact that we were not an organic unit*". In reference to the nature of the Belgian mission, respondents also had the impression that they were of directly useful for Lebanese people - even though some of them were not very optimistic about the evolution of the general situation in Lebanon. "*We will be deployed here for one year maximum but to guarantee peace, we need to stay much longer*".

Others were more divided about the general situation in Lebanon. "*We can always do better,*" said one of the commanders of the five detachments: "*On the whole, I am satisfied with what was done, but we could have done some things differently, e.g. the command tasks.*"

7.   A 'small nations' or a 'small steps' approach?

"*We are a small country but we can place ourselves among the best (...) And contrary to other big countries like the United States, Great Britain or France, we don't have to prove that we are the best*".

In all interviews we found out that the Belgians pride themselves on being neutral, violence-averse, casualty-averse ("everybody back home") and, basically in doing good and "creating public value" in the area of operation. The Belgian commanders were eager to show how many medical contacts their doctors and nurses had had with locals (figure 1), how many unexploded devices their bomb experts had defused (more than the half of the amount defused by the whole UNIFIL mission during that period, see table 4), and how they had helped the local population restore the roof of a mosque using the large crane that Belgian engineers had brought with them.

Table 4:
Belgian achievements EOD/demining compared to other countries[180]

UNIFIL Construction support	Total items
CHINBATT	5833
FRENCHBATT	1212
ITALBATT	2615
BELUBATT	*11759*
FINIREBATT	36
TURKBATT	1
SPANBATT	1308
TOTAL	*22764*

In their work, Belgians value Civil Military Operations and Information Operations, which are both military activities that bring the soldiers into close contact with local authorities and ordinary, local people.

In general, Belgian military personnel see themselves as socially capable, connecting to the local people easily using their language skills,

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[180] Figures counted since the end of conflict and updated on January the 27th 2007, BELUBATT briefing for visitors, 5 February 2007, Tibnin, Scorpion camp.

the French language in particular. But it is not only about language: due to their display of military power on the streets and the interference of French politicians in the Lebanese political situation, French troops were far less popular among the locals than the Belgians were.[181] This was the general opinion of both the Belgians and the Lebanese interpreters we interviewed. This was true to such a point that – at least during the time of our study - Hezbollah allowed local people to interact with the Belgians, but not with the French troops. In general, Belgians soldiers, NCOs and officers alike keep a completely neutral stance about the situation, and cannot be persuaded to make any sort of provocative remarks concerning any party in the conflict.

When asked if this operational, neutral and modest operational style can be described as a typically "Belgian" approach, our interviewees reacted a little confused and surprised. They did not find their way of working that special, but they agreed that their operational style is at least different from the approach developed by the militaries from larger countries, such as the USA and France. As a matter of fact, we discovered that what the Dutch military consider to be a unique operational style, the so-called "Dutch approach"[182], comes very close to what – in fact - the Belgians do in Lebanon. This approach emphasizes:
- Dealing and communicating respectfully with the local population;
- Keeping a neutral position in the tense and precarious relations between the opposing fractions in the area;
- Using a careful 'oil spot' strategy in the deployment of their troops;
- Minimizing the use of violence; and
- Trying to 'do good', developing 'hardware' (e.g., bridges, demining) and 'software' (e.g., broadcasting, medical services) projects in the area.

It is more of a communicative than a war-fighting approach. In this way, they want to help the country or region of action to start

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[181] This has a long history going back to the time Lebanon was a French protectorate; but also during the UNIFIL times the French have not always demonstrated a completely neutral stance in the civil war and corresponding upheaval in the country. See for instance: J. Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers. An Assessment of Peace Keeping Operations at the Arab-Israel Interface*, Unwyn Hyman, 1989. The same applies to the performance of US troops in Lebanon in the early 1980s, which led to severe suicide attacks on US troops in Beirut and the surrounding area, killing hundreds of servicemen.
[182] See for instance R. Gooren, Soldiering in unfamiliar places. The Dutch approach, *Military Review*, March-April 2006.

reconstructing their social, economic and infrastructural fabric and restore public order and safety in the area.[183]

What the Belgians endeavour to do in Lebanon and the Dutch currently in Uruzgan in Afghanistan, the Swedes and the Irish are doing in Liberia as we discovered in another period of fieldwork.[184] Perhaps this is an approach smaller countries are inclined to develop and display, not necessarily because they are a morally better nations, but because they have less pure military ambitions and capabilities. There are also reports that countries such as Hungary and Italy seem to act in this manner. However, even Germany, Japan and China seem to develop this sort of subdued military operational style. Given the fact that Germany, Japan and China are not small nations, the military's ambition and the role that nations prefer to play may be decisive in the operational choices nations make while participating in peace missions. Given this fact, we have chosen not to talk about a 'small nations' approach, but rather about a 'small steps' approach[185], which is not the same as an approach of 'small ambitions'. It is simply a different approach that relies less upon pure and classical war-fighting military capabilities. This case study of the operations of the Belgian troops in the UNIFIL mission may form an illustrative example of what this particular approach consists of and tries to achieve.

8.   Conclusion

In this article, we have described the mission carried out by Belgian soldiers in Tibnin during the UNIFIL operation. In so doing, we have underlined some topics dealing with multicultural interactions, first, among Belgians and, second, with their foreign counterparts.

Between Belgians, the mixed context of the mission (different units, specialities, languages, period of rotations) was not always easy to cope with but, in general, Belgian troops were positive about the mission and about the effectiveness of their presence. Those impressions were also confirmed by concrete achievements presented in some of the

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[183] See e.g. T. Mockaitis, M. Grandia and J. Soeters (eds.), "Cimic and Counter Insurgency", *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, December 2006.

[184] Together with E. Hedlund and L. Weibull, J. Soeters conducted fieldwork at the binational QRF of the UNMIL mission in Liberia, near Monrovia (October 2006).

[185] In the business literature this is referred to as 'logical incrementalism'; see G. Johnson, "Rethinking Incrementalism", *Strategic Management Journal*, No. 9, 1988, pp. 75-91.

figures. Some negative comments were still reported, particularly from the force protection detachment, about the routine character of their job and the functioning of UN structures. Being under the UN flag is not without consequences for military personnel who generally seem to be more at ease on a NATO mission. For example, the range of countries under the UNIFIL mandate generates more difficulties connected to significant cultural and organizational differences among countries. Contacts with other nations, except for some specific functions, were however limited, even with their Polish neighbours.

Among 'facilitating' factors for developing professional trust and social cohesion in such ad hoc situations, we will single out the following: experiences of previous military operations, a good knowledge of English, cultural closeness among some countries, clear rules of engagement or common operating standards, and some other elements related to military practices.

PART 4

EDUCATIONAL AND LEADERSHIP ASPECTS

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EDUCATING ADAPTABLE MILITARY LEADERS AND TRAINING OF TEAMS FOR COALITION OPERATIONS[186]

Yantsislav YANAKIEV[187]

1.   Introduction

1.1   Theoretical Framework

During the post-Cold War era there has been a significant increase in the number of military operations that have required NATO nations and partners to contribute forces as part of multinational coalitions. The forces implement a variety of missions such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, anti-terrorist, stability and support, search and rescue, and humanitarian aid. Under these circumstances, a gradual change in the fundamental nature of the military profession and the traditional military culture has taken place. Military sociologists have defined the period as "post-modern" and described the "change in military purpose from fighting wars to conducting missions not traditionally considered military" as a major organizational shift.

Another aspect of the postmodern military organization is the "more extensive use of multinational military forces" and the "internationalization of military forces themselves."[188] The broader range of current operations requires additional knowledge and skills. Besides the role of traditional warrior, today's military professionals are expected to implement "supplementary roles" such as "soldier-statesman", "soldier-scholar", "soldier-diplomat", etc.[189]

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[186] The views expressed in this article are solely of the author and should not be attributed to the G.S. Rakovski Defense and Staff College or the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense.
Proofreading by Anna Peel.
[187] Defense Advanced Research Institute, Rakovski Defense and Staff College, Bulgaria.
[188] Moskos Charles. C., Williams J. A., Segal D. R. (eds.), *The Post-modern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War,* New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 275.
[189] Ibid., p. 19.

Both researchers and practitioners agree that political legitimacy and cost-effectiveness are among the most important advantages of multinational coalitions. At the same time, operational effectiveness of multinational forces continues to be a controversial issue. There is also broad consensus regarding possible sources of inefficiency in coalition operations. Recent studies show that the main barriers to the effectiveness of international coalitions include different goals, differences in logistics, different levels of education and training of troops, different doctrines, intelligence-sharing and language barriers as well as leadership skills.[190] In addition, different national and organizational cultures, concepts of tactics and mission planning, different disciplinary codes, different command and control systems, equipment and armament, and payment differences can reduce the effectiveness of a coalition.[191]

The factors described above are organizational and cultural barriers to adaptability in multinational setting, and are related, to a large extent, to the preparation of military leaders and their teams to work in diverse environments. Among all those important factors of effective cooperation in multinational setting, the role of cultural adaptability in a coalition is vital. Cultural adaptability refers to "the ability to understand one's own and others' cognitive biases and to adapt as necessary, to ensure successful team performance."[192] Besides, cultural differences may not be a direct or causal factor for effective integration. They can also have a more indirect impact and affect other components of effective cooperation in multinational coalitions.

In brief, multinational coalitions are complex assemblies of people - both leaders and followers - made up of teams and networks, representing diverse national and organizational cultures, with different levels of education and training, doctrines and concepts, organizational structures, decision-making procedures and levels of technological advancement.

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[190] Stewart. K. et al. (2004), "Non-technical Interoperability in Multinational Forces", http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2004/ICCRTS_Denmark/abstracts/130.pdf 21 April 2004.

[191] Klein Paul., Haltiner Karl W. (2005), "Multinationality as a Challenge for Armed Forces", in Giuseppe Caforio, Gerhard Kümmel (eds.), *Military Missions and their Applications Reconsidered: the Aftermath of September 11th*, Elsevier Ltd..

[192] Sutton J. L., Pierce L. G., C. Shawn Burke, Eduardo Salas (2006), "Understanding Adaptability: A Prerequisite for Effective Performance within Complex Environments", *Advances in Human Performance and Cognitive Engineering Research*, Vo. 6, pp. 143-173, Elesevier Ltd..

The research findings clearly indicate that a lack of skill in multinational teamwork is a specific barrier to effective performance in coalition operations.[193] Therefore, we consider the education of culturally-adaptable military leaders and the training of the teams as the most critical issue in improving the effectiveness of a multinational coalition.

In order to be effective in current and future multinational operations, leaders and their teams must be able to adapt rapidly not only to the military requirements of the current operation, but also to collaborate with the many civilian actors implementing tasks which are not traditionally considered military. They have to be able to pursue a mixture of roles, combining traditional warriors' skill and supplementary skills of soldier diplomat, statesman, mediator, etc. In addition, military leaders have to develop a strong coalition and joint culture, since joint, multinational and interagency format will be essential for future operations. However, this mixture of roles could put some strain on the professional identity of the military and lead to a possible role crisis that some authors warn about.[194]

1.2 Goal and main focus of the article

The goal of this article is twofold: firstly, to identify possible organizational and cultural barriers that occur in the integration of Bulgarian Armed Forces units in multinational coalitions; secondly, to put forward recommendations for improving the education and training of Bulgarian military leaders and their teams to ensure effective multinational teamwork.

The article focuses primarily on the following topics:
- Pre-deployment situational awareness;
- Perceived deficiencies in education and training of the Bulgarian military to work in multinational setting;

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[193] Pierce L. G. (2002), *Barriers to adaptability in a multinational team*, Proceedings of the human factors and ergonomics society 46th annual meeting (pp. 225–229); Pierce L. G., Pomranky R. (2001), *The Chameleon Project for adaptable commanders and teams*, Proceedings of the human factors and ergonomics society 45th annual meeting; Sutton J. L., Pierce L. G. (2003), *A framework for understanding cultural diversity in cognition and teamwork*, Proceedings of the 8th international command and control research and technology symposium, (pp. 513–517). www.dodccrp.org/8thICCRTS/Pres/track_1.htm.

[194] Moelker René (2002), "The Schizophrenic Soldier: Illusion or Reality? Opinions on MOOTW", in Harai D., Malomsoki J., Kiss Z. (eds.), *The European Officer and the Challenge of the New Missions,* Miklos Zrinyi National Defense University, Budapest, pp. 95-121.

- Perceived points of tension in multinational military settings;
- Assessment of the impact of the existing differences among the diverse military forces on the effective multinational teamwork;
- Perceived difficulties in cooperation with civilian actors in the field.

1.3   Empirical data and methodology

The article studies results from an expert survey of Bulgarian officers with long experience in Peace Support Operations (PSOs). The survey was carried out by the Defense Advanced Research Institute (DARI) in 2006. A self-administrated questionnaire was used as the main method of data collection. The questionnaire follows a structure developed by the international research team for a similar project coordinated by ERGOMAS Working Group entitled "Military Profession, New Missions and Legitimacy."[195] The author originally collected data from Bulgarian officers in 2000.[196]The common methodology creates an opportunity to identify changes over time and in different operations.

The sample comprises 157 Bulgarian officers who have carried out duties as senior national representatives, staff officers, platoon, company and battalion commanders in PSOs as well as United Nations Military Observers. The respondents have experience in UN, NATO and EU multinational operations in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Macedonia, Kosovo, Tadzikistan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Afghanistan and Iraq. The officers vary in rank from lieutenant to colonel from both the Army and the Air Force.

In addition to the survey, four focus groups have been established to give the respondents a forum in which to discuss the opinions expressed in the questionnaire.

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[195] Caforio G. (Ed.) (2001), *The Flexible Officer, Professional Education and Military Operations Other Than War: a Cross-national Analysis*, Centro Militare Studi Strategici, Rome.
[196] Yanakiev Y. (2002), "Problems of Education and Training of Bulgarian Officers for Operations Other than War", in Harai D., Malomsoki J., Kiss Z. (eds.), *The European Officer and the Challenge of the New Missions*, Miklos Zrinyi National Defense University, Budapest, pp. 181-198.

2.   Analysis of the Results of the Survey

2.1   Pre-deployment situational awareness

Relevant pre-deployment information about the local political and economic situation in the host country, as well as knowledge about customs, traditions and religion of the local people in the area of operation, is one of the most important factors for the success of an international operation. It is critical that this issue receives particular attention in the pre-deployment training of leaders and teams participating in PSOs. How effective in this regard was the education and training of the Bulgarian military according to their evaluations?

The analysis of the data shows that most of the officers who took part in the survey were well prepared to adapt to the diverse cultural and socio-political environment of the mission area. At the same time, about 40% of officers evaluated their previous information about the situation in the host country and particularly knowledge in local culture, traditions and language as insufficient to implement their duties. This result can be explained by the fact that most current operations are carried out in regions with predominantly Arab populations, practicing to a great extent an unfamiliar religion, with a number of cultural differences. Bearing in mind the essential purpose of PSOs, the lack of familiarity with the local language, culture and customs pose a serious obstacle to achieving the aims of the mission.

These results raise concerns to which special attention must be paid. The divergence between previous information and expectations on the one hand, and the reality on the other, is a potential stress factor that could affect the morale of the personnel and their effective cooperation in the coalition. For that reason, it is important to manage expectations and to provide information that is as close to reality as possible about what the officers might expect during deployment and what difficulties the military might encounter.

A comparison with 2000 survey data items shows a slight improvement in the pre-deployment training of PSO participants as regards their awareness of the social-economic and political situation and the specific customs and traditions of the local population in the mission region. In 2000, the majority of respondents assessed their awareness of the situation as "insufficient" to fulfill their duties. For that reason they

needed additional time to get accustomed to the local political situation and the different actors in the field.

2.2 Perceived deficiencies in education and training of the Bulgarian military to work in multinational setting

Most experts participating in the survey considered insufficient English language training to be the basic deficit in their preparation to work in a multinational setting. Approximately two thirds of the respondents (64%) declared that they needed additional self-training on site to fulfill their tasks during the deployment. The challenge that they faced when communicating with their native English-speaking teammates relates to the use of specialized military terminology and abbreviations/acronyms as well as difficulties in understanding others when they speak too quickly.

In addition, some officers indicated that training in the official language of the country where the mission is carried out would be useful – as well as training in the official language of the mission. This is particularly true for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The problem with English language proficiency and the quality of communication between native and non-native English speakers should be broadly discussed in coalition operations because it is not only considered a language barrier but also a generic issue related to intercultural competencies - which is one of the fundamental factors of effective cooperation.

More than half of the respondents (55%) pointed out a need for additional knowledge of intercultural management techniques. This deserves special attention and highlights the need to develop and include special courses on intercultural and specialized English language training in the curriculum of military academies and the Defense College. Moreover, the officers should be instructed not only in the culture of the local population, which is current practice, but an emphasis should also be put on how to adapt to the different national and organizational cultures of other military contingents. A comparatively large number of the Bulgarian officers (42%) highlighted a lack of knowledge in logistics, used particularly in coalition operations. Last but not least, more than one third of the officers (between 34% and 37%) declared that they needed additional knowledge in international law, international affairs, history, religion and improvement in their communication skills.

The above-mentioned observations concerning the education and training of the Bulgarian military participating in multinational operations are important issues and demand immediate attention. It is important to stress that when compared to colleagues from other countries, an overwhelming majority of Bulgarian officers (79%) feel they did not face any deficiencies in their professional military education and training. The survey results clearly indicate that in education programs of leaders for participation in multinational operations, more attention should be paid to the training of officers who perform supplementary roles of diplomat, manage interagency process. The development of new leadership skills adequate for the complex nature of current and future military operations is key. It is also very important to broaden English language proficiency on subjects such as Rules of Engagement (ROE), logistics, staff procedures, etc.

2.3   Perceived points of tension in multinational military setting

Acknowledging tension in military-to-military relations in a coalition is critical for effective multinational teamwork. To identify possible points of tension in a multinational military environment a special set of questions was included in the questionnaire.[197] Analysis shows that a predominant part of the Bulgarian officers (65%) does not experience tension whilst cooperating with colleagues from other national contingents. At the same time, a thorough examination of the collected data, applying factor analysis method, identified two main factors that deserve attention. These two factors "explain" 78% of the overall data variation.

The first factor, which can be defined as "cultural barriers to effective integration in multinational teamwork", consists of four variables - "cultural differences"; "diverge ROE interpretation"; "diverge mission interpretation"; and "military ethical issues problems". Based on the high correlation among the variables included in the factor, one can conclude that cultural differences are related to other aspects of the

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[197] The wording of the question is: "Based on your experience in PSOs, please identify whether the possible points of tension working in multinational environment listed below have been actual in your case". The items are: "cultural differences"; "diverge ROE interpretation"; "diverge mission interpretation"; "military ethical issues problems"; "different professional military education and training"; "problems in the operational interoperability", "double subordination and lack of coordination between the national commands and international organizations". The response categories are "Yes" and "No".

effective cooperation in multinational teamwork. Obviously there exist cultural biases in the mission and ROE interpretation, as well as the understanding of the military ethical issues (code of conduct for example).

The second factor, which can be defined as "organizational barriers to effective integration in multinational teamwork", comprises three variables - "different professional military education and training"; "operational interoperability problems" and "double subordination and lack of coordination between the national commands and international organizations."

The comparison with 2000 survey data shows an improvement in the situation. Indicative in this regard is the fact that about half of the respondents in the 2000 survey identified difficulties when co-operating with colleagues from other countries.

2.4 Assessment of the impact of the existing differences among the diverse military forces on the effective multinational teamwork

The data presented in Table 1 clearly demonstrates that the different rotation periods in a coalition seriously influence effective multinational teamwork. For example due to differences in the rotation period, Bulgarian contingents in Afghanistan have had to adapt twice to different deployment cycles with German colleagues. This is a typical organizational barrier, which could be easily overcome if consensus on the rotation period among troop-contributing nations was achieved in the planning stage of the coalition operation.

The next important cultural barrier to effective teamwork in a multinational coalition is the different leadership style of the troop-contributing nations. Experts participating in the survey described main differences as "direct vs. indirect leadership culture" and "individualism vs. collectivism leadership manners".

Another organizational barrier that influences the effectiveness of the cooperation in coalition format is the difference in national strategies, doctrines and decision-making procedures. The process of de-nationalization of national military policies will most likely be helpful in overcoming this problem. Moreover, according to Bulgarian experts, different organizational culture is also a factor that influences effective teamwork in a multinational coalition. During focus group discussions,

officers frequently identified problems in this regard with "centralization vs. decentralization of decision-making process in different cultures". Some officers focused on the need for better job descriptions to achieve a common understanding of duties and responsibilities.

Table 1:
Influence of the differences between military contingents from different nations on the effective multinational teamwork[198]

Potential barriers/ Level of influence	Large 3	Average 2	Small 1	Do not influence 0	Mean score (Min=1, Max=3)
Different rotation period	68%	26%	3%	3%	2.59
Individualism and collectivism as leadership styles	45%	18%	26%	11%	2.09
Different national strategies, doctrines and decision-making procedures	34%	24%	29%	13%	1.97
Different organizational culture	42%	18%	27%	13%	1.88
Coordination between national command and coalition command	24%	29%	16%	32%	1.56
Different education and training systems	26%	26%	32%	16%	1.53
Different experience in international operations	24%	32%	31%	13%	1.53

Factors such as lack of coordination between the national command and the coalition command, different education and training systems, as well as the different experience in multinational operations, have less of an influence on effective cooperation in multinational setting according to the surveyed officers. It appears that the comparatively lengthy involvement of the Bulgarian military in PSOs after the first international mission in Cambodia in 1993, enhanced international military cooperation in South-Eastern Europe and the participation in

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[198] The wording of the question is: "To what extent the listed below differences with the military from other national contingents influenced your effectiveness working in multinational setting?" The responses categories are "large extent", "average extent", "small extent" and "do not influence".

international military exercises, education and training programs can explain this result.

2.5 Perceived difficulties in cooperation with civilian actors in the field

Current international operations involve many actors in the field - both military and civilian. Both sides often have different perceptions of the success of an operation. A civilian organization's way of working is quite different from a typical military understanding of organization, discipline and responsibility. This situation could produce tension in implementing the supplementary military roles. This should be taken into account when discussing the education of leaders, and training teams for coalition operations. To identify possible tension in civil-military relations in the field a set of questions was included in the questionnaire.[199]

Analysis of the data shows that approximately one third of officers (34%) experienced difficulties in their contact with the local fighting parties. In addition, one quarter (25%) encountered challenges with the local population in the deployment area and with local church or religious organizations. Less than one fifth of the experts (18%) encountered difficulties communicating with the local authorities. The data show that Bulgarian officers perceive the relations with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs), as well as media, to be less problematic. Finally, fewer of the respondents experienced problems in their interaction with civil officials in the field (UN, NATO, EU, OSCE, etc.).

Comparison with the 2000 survey data shows that the number of officers describing problems in relations with the belligerent parties and the local population has risen significantly. Most probably, this is a result of the new type of multinational operations (different from traditional peacekeeping) in which the Bulgarian military has been participating in recent years, e.g., support and stability missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Data analysis also registered a rise in the number of experts experiencing difficulties with the local church and religious organizations.

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[199] The wording of the question is: "Based on your experience in PSOs, please identify whether you encountered tensions working with the civilians listed below". The items are: "international organizations"; "local population"; "local authorities"; "local church"; "media"; "NGOs/PVOs" and "local fighting parties". The response categories are "Yes" and "No".

Respondents gave the example of problems during the religious holidays in Iraq. Difficulties in relations with different international organizations in the mission area have declined significantly.

3.   Conclusions and recommendations

3.1   Joint, multinational and interagency education and training

Bearing in mind the changing nature of current military operations, defined as joint, multinational and interagency, the joint education of the military leaders is a key factor in improving the effectiveness of coalition operations.

Various troop-contributing nations have different organizational settings and force structures, for example joint vs. service or branch, and different traditions in this regard that can influence the effectiveness of coalition operations. A possible solution could be to put in place joint multinational education and training programs to develop joint culture, particularly among the military with a still predominant service culture, such as Bulgaria. Thus, military leaders could expand their ability to understand different Army, Navy and Air force capabilities and to use different assets in multinational coalitions effectively.

Regarding the interagency nature of current military operations, it would be useful if, besides the basic war-fighting training, officers were to receive training in skills corresponding to the new tasks expected in these operations. Building social and cultural competencies is vital. This includes building knowledge and skills on how to manage diverse multinational teams; how to interact with civilian agencies; how to work with the local population and local authorities in the host country; how to react in hostage situations; and how to interact with the media, etc.

It is very important to promote understanding among the military professionals and to help them identify many actors (diplomatic, military, NGOs, media), diverse cultures and the importance of developing good working relationships with them. They should be prepared to assist the work of the civilian organizations and to understand the way these organizations work.

3.2 Cultural awareness: education and training

The development of cultural awareness should be an essential part of professional military education and pre-deployment training. The most important component of cultural awareness training is related to the coalition partners' national and organizational culture, leadership styles, values, ethics and habits. This training should include general knowledge of the mission area, local population, culture and history. As a consequence, the military will better fulfill their duties and the local population will be less likely to resist their presence. Last but not least, it is essential, particularly for the stability and support operations, to ensure that military leaders have sufficient knowledge to understand adversary culture.

The GLOBESMART® COMMANDER tool, which was developed in the framework of NATO SACT "Leader and Team Adaptability in Multinational Coalitions" project, is an effective practical tool for cultural awareness training. Its effectiveness has been proven both as an instrument for team assessment and development of skills in multinational teamwork.[200]

It would be sensible to integrate existing experience and knowledge in NATO on the factors that surround multinational inter-working and to develop an Allied Joint Publication on cultural awareness training.

3.3 Leadership training

Leadership training is one of the most important factors in improving the effectiveness of coalition operations. The survey identified that differences in leadership styles and training models influence effective teamwork in multinational setting. In this regard, the role and responsibility of small unit leaders deserves particular attention.

One possible approach to reduce the existing differences in national leadership models is to develop and introduce a leadership-training tool, which will help develop specific leadership skills for participation in coalition operations.

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[200] Sutton J., Presentation at the International workshop Leader and Team Adaptability in Multinational Coalitions, G. S. Rakovski Defense and Staff College, Sofia, 24-26 October 2006. For more details see www.globesmartcommander.com.

3.4   Language skills

Overall language preparation as well as specialized English language training is one of the more serious challenges for the integration of the Bulgarian military into a multinational environment. The problem still exists despite measures undertaken in recent years. Therefore, language training should not only focus on the language problems themselves e.g., difficulties in understanding when native English speakers talk too quickly and use slang/abbreviations, etc., but also on culturally-based cognition biases and perceptions. In addition, English for Special Purposes (ESP) training should contribute to correct usage of specialized military terminology, as well as understanding of the differences in national and NATO expressions. Only by overcoming the above-mentioned shortfalls will a mutual understanding be assured. This will be fundamental for the successful integration in multinational teamwork.

In an attempt to tackle the above problems, a concept for implementation and expansion of English language training has been proposed to the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense. The development of several ESP courses is in progress. One of these is the course entitled "ESP for Participants in Multinational Operations", led by one of the outstanding ESP lecturers in the G.S. Rakovski Defense and Staff College.

3.5   Further research collaboration

The development of adaptive performance in multinational coalitions can be improved by the collaboration in the framework of NATO research and education institutions like NATO Defense College, NATO Research and Technology Organization (RTO), NATO SACT CD&E Program, NATO School, etc. It is also important to improve the collaboration between researchers from the NATO Alliance and the Partners contributing troops for current operations.

An example in this regard is the established Exploratory Team (ET) "Educating Adaptable Military Leaders and Training Teams for Improved Coalition Operations" in 2006 in the framework of NATO RTO Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Panel. The ET was defined as "Meta" ET because it includes the Chairs of four extant Research Task Groups (RTG). Those are HFM-120/RTG "Exploration of the Area of Multinational Operations and Inter-Cultural Factors"; HFM-127/RTG

"Operational Validation of Command Team Effectiveness Instrument"; HFM-138/ RTG "Adaptability in Coalition Teamwork" and HFM-139/ RTG "Developing National Models of Military Leadership for Improved Coalition Operations".

The objective of this research is to reinforce and consolidate the research efforts of social and behavioral scientists from NATO, Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialog nations. In addition, based on the research findings of the current activities, further steps towards practical implementation of recommendations and utilization of published training materials for NATO commanders and staff will be explored. Moreover, the Meta ET focuses on the study of the results of previous research activities. It also examines the opportunity for supplementary research and educational activities within the NATO community.

Finally, the program of work envisages bringing together Subject Matter Experts, researchers and ESP instructors at an Advanced Research Workshop to review and cross-reference knowledge on the perceived and real inefficiencies in coalition operations. The results are expected to advise the priority issues to be addressed by researchers and practitioners in their work to improve the effectiveness of coalition operations.

Currently, researchers from Bulgaria, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom and the USA are represented in the ET and it is open for more nations to join. It is expected that the next HFM Panel Business Meeting will accept and support our suggestion to transform the ET to RTG entitled "Improvement Effectiveness of Coalition Operations" with a time-span of work from 2008-2011. Our vision is that this initiative should be open for collaboration with Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialog nations.

DETERMINING FACTORS
OF INTERCULTURAL LEADERSHIP:
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK[201]

Stefan SEILER[202]

1.   Introduction

The main task of a UN peace enforcement or peacekeeping operation is to fulfill the objectives set by the respective UN resolution. Operations take place in a chaotic, complex and unpredictable environment. The local intervention zone is often still in or just out of a state of war or turmoil. This unstructured operational area generates extremely demanding leadership situations at all levels.

In addition to the complexity of traditional military interventions, UN interventions are most often operated in multinational units. Military personnel often are confronted with major cultural differences not only between the "home culture" and the "host culture" but also within their own multinational unit. In addition, intense interaction with non-military organizations is required to bring quick relief to the civilian victims. Besides managing the chaotic situation and respecting mission-specific rules of engagement (ROEs), military leaders have to generate high performing and effective multinational units within a limited timeframe. Furthermore, they have to manage the interaction between the UN troops and the NGOs, which often are dependent on a UN force to complete their humanitarian mission (Studer, 2001). If it is an ongoing mission, leaders have to ensure that the UN force is embedded in the host nation, so that intercultural frictions can be minimized and the required help can

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be delivered in the fastest and most effective way possible and for as long as necessary.

This intercultural and multi-organizational dimension plays an important role when it comes to effectiveness and efficiency in UN interventions. In their analyses on the Anglo-Dutch cooperation in Cyprus (UNIFICYP) and the U.S.-Danish cooperation in Bosnia (SFOR), Soeters and Bos-Bakx (2003) found that significant problems arising from intercultural differences between the involved parties occurred in both missions. Similarly, Soederberg and Wedell-Wedellborg (2006) studied the interactions of German, Danish and Polish troops in two NATO institutions in Poland and found that tensions between the troops emerged as a result of intercultural differences. Findings from this study show that organizational culture of an institution is one of the main reasons for good or bad intercultural interaction.

The tragic crash of Avianca Flight 052 in 1990 (Helmreich, 1994) is another example that illustrates the importance of intercultural competent leaders in multinational settings. One of the main reasons for the crash was the poor communication between the pilot, the co-pilot and the tower, partially due to intercultural differences, which resulted in a different interpretation of the attributed role responsibility.

These examples illustrate that a multinational environment calls for additional leadership competencies compared to a mono-cultural environment, in particular when it comes to interpersonal communication, problem solving and decision making. Such national cultural differences between the different UN troops as well as between the UN force and the host country present a barrier to a successful coalition command and control (Elron, Halevy, Ben-Ari and Shamir, 2003). Leaders have to create a functioning system throughout the different cultures to be able to work efficiently towards the desired goal. One of the most important success factors required to implement such a system is good interpersonal interaction between leaders at all levels and from all different nationalities. There are several reasons for the importance of this factor. First of all, it is necessary that the structure and goals as well as the issued orders are understood and interpreted correctly by each member of the force (Varoglu, 1998). No one should be affronted by the way people interact with each other. In addition, general commitment, motivation and trust should be presupposed. Research shows that misunderstandings regarding general structures and a lack of

common understanding of role responsibilities and duties cause the greatest amount of problems (Downes, 1993; Palin, 1995). The importance of an adequate and sensitive intercultural interaction for successful leadership is also highlighted by Segal and Tiggle (1997). This aspect is not only important when it comes to intercultural interaction between people from different continents but also between troops from similar western cultural societies (Soederberg and Wedell-Wedellsborg, 2006). The management of these intercultural differences is critical to the success of the engagement (Altman Klein et al., 2000).

Most psychological research in successful intercultural leadership focuses on individual leadership competencies in an intercultural environment (Bolten, 2005; Herbrand, 2002). An example of such an individual competence is given by Altmann Klein et al. (2000). They illustrate the importance of a "cultural lens", which is the ability to see things from a different perspective and through "different eyes". This competence helps to understand the reasons and motives of other people and to anticipate their behavior and reactions. Such individual competencies are important factors for leadership success in an intercultural environment. A systematic description of individual intercultural competencies is given in section 2.1 of this article. However, individual competencies are not the only factor that influences a person's leadership behavior. The following model is an attempt to provide a holistic description of the influencing variables on leadership behavior.

2.   Determining Factors of Intercultural Leadership

Why is the same person successful in one environment but not in the other? Most situations are embedded in a complex net of different influencing variables such as the situation, the general context, the team members or the organizational setup. These factors may change over time whereby this complex net gets its dynamic character. Therefore, the variables that define successful leadership are not only in the individual itself but also in its environment.

In a theoretical analyzes we extracted five different factors that influence intercultural leadership behavior. The five factors are a) the individual competencies, b) the team, c) the organization, d) the general context and e) the specific situation. Figure 1 summarizes these five factors that influence intercultural leadership behavior.

Figure 1:
Determining factors of intercultural leadership behavior

2.1   Individual Competence

Individual competencies are the basis for adequate leadership behavior. Bolten (2005) classifies individual intercultural competence in the following three dimensions: affective, cognitive and behavior-oriented. Earley and Ang (2003) proposed in their concept of "Cultural Intelligence (CQ)" four elements to understand inter-individual differences in the ability to adapt effectively to new cultural settings. They conceptualized CQ as comprising the following four components: a) meta-cognitive CQ (the mental process that individuals use to acquire and understand cultural knowledge), b) cognitive CQ (general knowledge about cultures), c) motivational CQ (the direction of energy towards learning about and functioning in cross-cultural settings) and d) behavior CQ (capability of appropriate verbal and non-verbal behavior in cross-culture interaction). The concept of "Cultural Intelligence" is also described by Thomas and Inkson (2003). They define CQ as a system of interacting knowledge and skills linked by cultural meta-cognition that allows people to adapt, to select and to shape the cultural aspects of their environment. For Thomas and Inkson (2003), the combination of cultural knowledge, mindfulness (the ability to pay attention in a reflective and creative way to cues in cross-cultural situations) and behavioral skills lead to cultural intelligence.

Some of the competencies named in these descriptions of intercultural competence are important leadership skills for monocultural and intercultural environments. However, an intercultural environment adds an additional level of complexity that requires additional competencies and a different approach to certain aspects of leadership than a mono-cultural environment. In Bolten's (2005) model "components of international management competencies", a leader has to acquire competencies in five different segments to be successful in an intercultural setting. The first four are general management competencies for intercultural as well as mono-cultural leaders. These are a) professional competence (e.g. market-, law-, business knowledge), b) strategic competence (e.g. cost knowledge, knowledge management), c) individual competence (e.g. motivation, ability for self-criticism), and d) social competence (e.g. team ability, communication competence). The fifth competence is e) the intercultural competence in leadership. To be an interculturally-competent leader, one has to have - in addition to the first four competencies - the ability to describe and explain his/her own culture, the foreign culture and the intercultural interaction. He/she has to have knowledge of the foreign language, the readiness for intercultural learning, the ability for meta-cognition (McFarland, 2005; Thomas and Inkson, 2003), a tolerance for ambiguity and a polycentric view compared to an egocentric view. A classification with similar competencies has been described by Yamazaki and Kayes (2004).

In order to be a successful leader in an intercultural environment one needs to have a certain level of meta-cognitive, cognitive, motivational and behavioral intercultural competence. These competencies are improving the communication and interaction amongst people from different cultures. However, if the following four determining factors of intercultural leadership behavior are not considered, a leader with a high CQ might still fail.

2.2   Team/Group

This factor focuses on the importance of the team that a leader is integrated in. Earley and Gardner (2005) found that successful intercultural teams develop and define a new group culture and mutual trust between team members from different cultures was established. Yet, the implementation of this group culture takes up to three times longer than in mono-cultural groups (Lehmann and van den Bergh, 2004). As a

result, multicultural groups need more opportunities to get to know each other and to develop their culture. This ranges from the ability and the will to communicate with each other to practice their problem-solving and decision-making skills. The more heterogeneous a group is, the more important this "finding-phase" will be (Stumpf, 2005).

The importance of the group culture is illustrated by Chang (1998) in the context of ethical decision making. He found that a combination of the perceived wishes of others, and the desire to comply with those wishes, are very good predictors of ethical behavior. The "Groupthink" phenomenon (Janis, 1972) is another example that underlines the importance of the social group surrounding a leader: People tend to override their motivation to develop realistic alternatives or ask critical questions when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group decision making process. In other words, individuals often behave in the way they think the group wants them to behave and by doing so they create an in-group dynamic that can influence the decision-making process in a negative way. That is to say that the group spirit has an important influence on individual behavior.

2.3   Organization

The third relevant influence on intercultural behavior is the organization. As intercultural interactions are at the heart of UN interventions, organizations involved in these interventions have to foster a polycentric and open culture when it comes to interpersonal interaction and problem solving. Effectiveness in intercultural settings can only be achieved if the organization as a whole is willing to turn this into their governing statement and to adjust the organizational structure where required. Important organizational factors are the internalization strategy, the infrastructure and the selection and development of employees. These factors are explained in the following paragraphs.

When it comes to internalization strategies, organizations typically follow one of these three strategies: the strategy of cultural dominance, the strategy of cultural compromise or the strategy of cultural synergies (Podsiadlowski, 2002). Organizations following the cultural dominance strategy are geared to their traditional culture whereby new entering cultures have to adjust to the existing culture. The strategy of cultural compromise tries to integrate different rules, regulations, attitudes, etc. into the new structure and management style. The

development of a completely new organizational structure and management style based on different cultural backgrounds of employees and interest groups represents the strategy of cultural synergies. Depending on an organization's internalization strategy, a leader will act in accordance with the chosen strategy when it comes to intercultural interaction.

Soederberg and Wedell-Wedellborg (2006) illustrate that the culture of the institution is one of the main reasons for good or bad intercultural interaction. Findings from related fields support the thesis of the importance of the organizational culture: Bartels et al. (1998) found that an organization's ethical climate is inversely related to the severity of ethical problems in the organization and is positively related to the ability to resolve ethical conflicts. Jones and Ryan (1997) provided similar evidence for the importance of an organization's ethical climate. They found that people tend to act in accordance with their perception of the "average" moral standards of others in the organization.

In addition to the organizational culture, the organizational infrastructure has an important influence on leadership behavior. Are there adequate resources and communication channels in place to facilitate international interaction and knowledge transfer? These aspects are particularly important when it comes to the integration of a new group into an existing organization as the transfer of shared group knowledge helps the new group to integrate faster into the existing structure.

Another important organizational responsibility is the selection of the right employees and their development (DiStefano and Maznevski, 2000; Thomas and Inkson, 2003). Selection criteria related to intercultural intelligence, diversity of the workforce, deployment related intercultural training programs or opportunities for informal interaction between people from different cultures have an impact on individual leadership effectiveness. However, when it comes to intercultural training, much depends on the quality and type of training. Depending on the mission, cultural distance and previous experience, the cultural training may vary from a short factual information session about the other culture to an ongoing, more experiential training including cultural sensitivity training, cultural awareness training, factual knowledge instructions, language training or advanced short-term placements before taking on a leading role in a new environment.

2.4   Context

The fourth determining factor of intercultural leadership is the historical and current context in which the mission is embedded. Historical circumstances or changes in the general situational context influence a leader's behavior. The discussion about the German engagement in the Lebanon is an example of the influence of the historical context. Historical, political or economical tensions between two or more countries can also influence the collaboration between leaders from these countries.

Other context variables are the general situation (Is the deployment a peacekeeping or a peace enforcement mission?, Is the environment relatively stable or is it a high-risk area?, Is someone working in the field or in the headquarter?), the ROE, the infrastructure in the camp, the composition of the military unit (e.g. Is there only one nation or are there several nations in the sector?), the degree of interaction between the troops and the local population, etc. All these elements drive the flow of interactions and create a basic spirit within the intervention forces that has an important influence on a successful leadership style.

A number of comparative studies in intercultural management (Hall, 1990; Hofstede, 1980; Triandis et al., 1988; Trompenaars, 1993) illustrate that people with a different cultural background are used to a different management style. The most well known classification is the one developed by Hofstede (1980) in which he defined four independent dimensions of cultural differences: i) "masculinity - femininity", ii) "uncertainty avoidance - risk seeking", iii) "individualism - collectivism" and iv) "high - low leadership distance". Although most armed forces around the world are structured in a similar way, frictions in the daily interaction arising from differences in national attitudes, norms and values are a reality and can be explained by Hofstede's (1980) dimensions. Varoglu's (1998) analyzed armed forces from several countries using Hofstede's (1980) dimensions "power distance" and "uncertainty avoidance". He found that the American culture is defined by moderate uncertainty avoidance and low power distance whereas the French culture is classified as strong in uncertainty avoidance and high in power distance. Even the Belgian and the Danish cultures which are neighboring countries are classified quite differently. The Danish culture is classified as weak in uncertainty avoiding and very low in power

distance whereas the Belgian culture is classified as high in power distance and strong in uncertainty avoidance. These differences are explanations for the reported problems in the Anglo-Dutch cooperation in Cyprus or the U.S.-Danish cooperation in Bosnia (Soeters and Bos-Bakx, 2003). Apart from Hofstede's (1980) model, findings from the GLOBE project (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness) indicated nine intercultural leadership dimensions - Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Humane Orientation, Institutional Collectivism, In-Group Collectivism, Assertiveness, Gender Egalitarianism, Future Orientation, and Performance Orientation (House et al., 2004). The authors of the study demonstrated that nations with similar characteristics in the nine dimensions follow a similar leadership style while nations with larger differences in the nine dimensions differ in their leadership style. This illustrates that the composition of the unit and the degree of interactions between troops from different nations as well as between the troops and the host population, have a major impact on effective leadership as an increasing level of intercultural complexity demands a more differentiated form of interaction.

2.5   Situation

The fifth determining factor that influences personal behavior in intercultural interaction is the imminent situation. The Milgram (1963) study of obedience illustrates in an impressive way the influential power of the situation. Ordinary people showed a behavior that was potentially deadly for others as they were following instructions from an accepted authority. Similarly, Zimbardo (1972) emphasized in his Stanford-Prison-Experiment that the power of the situation should never be underestimated. The experiment had to be stopped earlier than planned as the group of "guards" (randomly selected students) in the staged prison started to torture the group of "prisoners" (randomly selected students as well).

Each situation has specific characteristics and based on former experience, a situational assessment takes place. Often leaders have to act under ambiguous situations and a situational assessment is based on fragmentary information. Under such conditions, the tendency to fall back to proven behavior and problem solving strategies in previous situations can be observed (Kaempf et al., 1993; Morrison et al., 1997). Often these strategies are based on mono-cultural experiences in different

environments and are therefore not appropriate for the new situation. It can be observed that the interpretation of a situation is strongly influenced by the problem solver's cultural background (Altmann Klein et al., 2000). The more dangerous the situation, the more influence the cultural background will have as the leader's behavior will be less controlled and will be based on basic cultural patterns.

3. Developing intercultural leadership competence

As outlined in section 2, successful intercultural leadership behavior is dependent not only on the individual's competencies but on the team, the organization, the general context and the imminent situation as well. Consequently, successful intercultural leadership development has to focus on all five determining factors.

The leader's CQ is a fundamental aspect of successful leadership behavior. Being able to view situations and problems from the perspective of a different culture qualifies the leader to interact with individuals of foreign cultures and lead them in the most efficient way. From a cognitive point of view, the leader has to know about other cultural norms, values and traditions and their differences to his culture. Furthermore, he has to be able to anticipate and attribute the emotional reactions of the individual from the other culture correctly. Finally, he has to act according to the situation and anticipate others' behavior within the specific social setting.

Often leaders and troops are briefed about the cognitive dimension of the host culture (e.g. history, language, traditions) before being deployed to a UN mission (Ng et al., 2005). In addition to the cognitive competence the meta-cognitive, affective, motivational and socio-behavioral dimensions have to be developed. This is far more complex but as important as cognitive knowledge. Military training courses with an international audience are avenues to create learning opportunities to develop intercultural competencies. However, the meta-cognitive, affective-emotional and socio-behavioral intercultural aspects have to be an explicit part of the training program and not just a welcome side-effect. The same can be said about the impact of the group, the organization, the context and the situation. Participants in international training programs have to focus and reflect on their personal intercultural skills, collaboration style, team structure, organizational variables,

context variables and the influence an imminent situation will have on their behavior.

3.1   Intercultural Dilemma Training

How can we address all five determining factors of intercultural leadership behavior in training programs? As the situational context is an important factor in intercultural leadership, training interventions have to focus on real life scenarios and not on general theoretical reflections about intercultural leadership. 'Intercultural Dilemma Trainings', where an international group of people is debating on a real intercultural leadership conflict, has a positive influence on all five aspects. Intercultural dilemma trainings start with the description of a concrete intercultural conflict to a group of professionals. The closer the situation to the natural environment, the more useful the exercise will be. Therefore, the dilemmas should be presented and discussed under the ROE of a concrete mission and if possible be carried out in a realistic context (e.g., the next deployment). In the second phase of the dilemma training, all participants develop a personal solution and are required to provide justifications for their proposed solutions. In the third phase, the discussion about the different possible solutions takes place. Participants need to explain their point of view, listen to others and integrate those reflections and arguments in their own situational analyses. The goal of this phase is to reach the best possible group solution at a given time. This underlines the importance of achieving an objective and being able to come to a commonly-accepted group solution. The achievement of a common solution in phase four can be evaluated as the group's ability to make decisions in an intercultural environment. Figure 2 illustrates this dilemma training process.

Figure 2:
Dilemma training process (Seiler 2004, 2006)

1. | Presentation of a mission-specific intercultural conflict to a group of |

2. | All participants develop a personal solution including justification |

3. | Presentation and discussion of different solutions and motives in groups of 4-6 |

4. | Reaching a group solution |

3.2 Benefits of Intercultural Dilemma Training

These trainings present a way to develop intercultural competence in a holistic way. If participants are open to the discussion, the learning curve will be steep as they are evaluating their own reflections while taking into considerations the reflections and conclusions of others. They get to know and understand the positions of people from different cultural backgrounds (their values, beliefs, personalities, problem-solving strategies, communication style, etc.). As they are in direct interaction, not only the cognitive and meta-cognitive but the affective, motivational and behavior-oriented components can be developed as well. In addition to the individual competencies the interaction between group members increases as they work together to solve the problem. Reflections about the influence of the organizational structure also can be made by analyzing the causes of the problem. Similarly, the knowledge about a specific mission's context and the competence of adequate situational assessment can be trained as the dilemmas reflect an imminent leadership situation under specific ROE.

4.   Conclusion

Interculturally-competent leadership behavior is based on individual intercultural competencies, the ability to understand and manage the dynamics of a team, the capacity to work in a given organizational setup and to improve it where possible, the understanding of the importance of the general context of the mission and the ability to make appropriate situational assessments.

Most multinational organizations can "afford" to initially have decreased performance in newly-created multinational teams or units to create more profitable structures in the mid term. This is problematic in UN interventions as the reality is a field of utmost urgency and life-threatening risks from the first day soldiers are deployed. Therefore, they have to be prepared for intercultural interaction, problem solving and command execution to ensure that processes and actions are well-rehearsed. Intercultural dilemma training is a promising way to increase a leader's ability to act effectively in this complex net of influencing variables of successful leadership behavior.

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PART 5

EFFECTIVENESS OF MISSIONS

THE PARADOX OF MULTINATIONALITY[203]

Anthony KING[204]

1.   Introduction

On 22 April 1951, the Chinese Communist Army launched their fifth offensive against United Nations forces in Korea (Appleman 1989: 7; Blair 1987: 823). Britain's 29 Independent Brigade were positioned along the Imjin River north of Seoul. The 1st Battalion, the Gloucestershire Regiment, held a position overlooking the shallow Imjin, the Northumberland Fusiliers were positioned to their right at the Brigade's centre while, on the north side of the river, an attached Belgian battalion defended an obvious feature on the right flank. The Royal Ulster Rifles were held in reserve by the Brigade Commander, Brigadier Brodie. Over the next three days, three Communists Divisions attacked 29 Brigade, forcing the withdrawal of the Belgian and Fusilier Battalions. On 24 April, Brigadier Brodie informed 3 Division's Commander, Major-General Soule, that the situation on Gloucester Hill was 'a bit sticky' (Farrar–Hockley 1995: 127). Unused to British understatement, the US commander ordered the Gloucesters to hold, not realising that by 'sticky', Brodie, in fact, meant desperate (Blair 1987: 837). The Gloucesters were about to be overrun. When Major General Soule eventually gave the order to withdraw on the 25 April, it was too late. The Gloucesters were surrounded and although a handful of survivors made it back to UN lines, the battalion was lost: 622 were killed, wounded or captured.

The episode on Gloucester Hill, which has now attained a mythic status in British military history, illustrates many of the problems of multinational operations which endure to this day. The organisational

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structure, practices and assumptions of the different armed forces problematises multinational co-operation. On Gloucester Hill, the Divisional Commander, familiar with American candidness, misunderstood Brodie's phlegmatism, with disastrous results. Indeed, Gloucester Hill suggests *avant la lettre* that the very concept of multinational may be paradoxical. Multinational operations have become necessary for strategic and financial reasons but multinationality militates against operational success. Multinationality may vitiate the achievement of the very strategic goals for which multinational co-operation was enjoined in the first place. Minimally, the armed forces need to recognise that if multinationality is to function at all, measures need to be introduced which at least alleviate the most serious contradictions of multinationalism.

2.   A Common Strategic Goal

In his analysis of the performance of the Commonwealth Division in Korea, Brigadier Barclay noted how the frictions which existed between the American Forces and especially American Headquarters and the Commonwealth forces led to 'misunderstandings', 'temporary loss of efficiency' and 'a lot of extra work' (Barclay 154: 190). By contrast, 'Within the Commonwealth Division only trifling difficulties arose. The policy of standardising organisation, equipment and methods, and the system of interchanging personnel, which had existed for forty years, had produced in every Commonwealth country a body of officers capable of functioning efficiently in any integrated force – whether in command or on the staff. Standardisation was not complete, but it was probably as near perfection as possible' (Barclay 1954: 194). Fifty years before multinational operations existed, Barclay lucidly emphasised the requisite conditions for successful multinational co-operation. In order for coalitions to engage in effective military action, the national forces must be organised, equipped and trained compatibly and there must be a pattern of regular personnel exchange between them to ensure that common standards are sustained across the forces. Successful multinational action in 1950, as in 2007, requires shared concepts and common procedures and, therefore, dense patterns of interaction across the forces.

During the Cold War, NATO imposed a degree of standardization on Alliance forces. However, as many commentators and military personnel noted at the time, standardisation was extremely shallow. In the context of the Cold War, NATO was able to function (if not excel) militarily with only limited common practices and procedures. The endurance of highly distinctive national military organisational structures and cultures was not disastrous. In the current era, as NATO engages in global operations which are becoming increasingly intense, the question of professional interoperability has become more pressing. If NATO is to be successful, it must unify its forces ever more densely around common practices and procedures. It must, like the Commonwealth, impose common professional understandings and practices on its constituent forces.

The first principle of war is 'the selection and maintenance of the aim'. In order to prosecute multinational missions and to encourage the adoption of common military practices, it is vital that NATO identifies a clear strategic goal to which all its members are committed. One of the initial problems which the United Nations forces confronted in Korea was that the coalition was not unified around a clear strategic goal. The United States itself was ambiguous about whether it was pursuing rollback or containment, while Britain, France and other Allies sceptical about the very significance of Korea, were explicitly opposed to the remotest prospect of unlimited conflict against China. Only after the appointment of Matthew Ridgway as 8th Army Commander in December 1950 and the eventual dismissal of MacArthur in April 1951 did the Eighth Army commit itself explicitly to limited war. It does not seem to be a chance that this unified strategic goal coincided with the operational success in Korea. Successful multinational action requires common strategic goals.

Today, strategic goals have been identified in the New Strategic Concepts of 1990 and 1999, which identified failed states and terrorism as the major threats to the Alliance. All Alliance members have assented to this new strategic orientation. Nevertheless, although NATO members are unified at the strategic level against the new threats unleashed by globalisation, at the military strategic and operational levels consent is not so apparent. The current and future centre of strategic gravity for NATO is Afghanistan. It is possible that NATO may have to intervene in crisis management in other theatres and military intervention is possible

in the future in Iran, and North Korea while the United States, in particular, is concerned in the long term with a potential Chinese threat. None of these interventions will alter the strategic centre of gravity for NATO. The crisis management interventions are likely to be small-scale, while the other projected operations against Iran or North Korea will almost certainly be conducted as US-led coalitions, if they occur at all. Afghanistan is the key theatre of operations for NATO, since defeat there would mean the end of NATO as a credible military alliance. Given the operational challenges in Afghanistan, it is essential that all NATO members are unified around this priority. Yet this is not the case. France, committed to important national missions in Africa, has only a small contingent in Kabul. Germany has limited its involvement to the north and restricted what it can do there with burdensome caveats. Moreover, the Afghanistan mission is conceived by Alliance members in national terms. Nations focus on their own national contribution and the threats which their own forces face without fully identifying with the NATO mission as a whole. The contrast with the willingness with which UN forces committed themselves to the collective mission in Korea is noticeable. Until national contingents prioritise the NATO mission in Afghanistan strategically and operationally, military operations in that country will remain compromised. Successful multinational operations require a clear common goal to which the participants are collectively committed.

NATO command shares some of the blame for this. Nominally current operations – and above all Afghanistan - remain the priority for NATO today. However, in Europe, NATO has emphasised transformation, and above all the NRF, as decisive. In the light of the deficiencies in European military capability, General Jones's promotion of the NRF is understandable and necessary. Nearly twenty years after the end of the Cold War, European forces are still insufficiently deployable for contemporary operations. However, the NRF and the supporting CJTF concept imply that the future of NATO lies in other, as yet unforeseen, global interventions. Afghanistan is a sideshow, while the NRF represents the reality of future operations. This conception of future operations undermines the possibility of effective multinational actions by confusing Alliance members about the decisive collective goal which they must pursue. The Alliance needs to unify itself around its mission, which becomes the single collective priority of the Alliance.

3.   Common Concepts and Practices

Brigadier Barclay emphasised that the Commonwealth Division was successful because it had adopted common procedures. This emphasis on common concept and practices will be vital today. At the strategic level, NATO has always had common doctrine articulated by the Military Committee. In the current era, one of the most important developments has been the appearance of NATO operational doctrine and common operational procedures. In the face of new strategic circumstances in the 1990s, NATO began to develop new methods for operational planning informally in order to deal with non-Article 5 deployments. Out of this initially ad hoc process, the Guideline for Operational Planning (the GOP) emerged in the late 1990s, to be ratified two years ago. The GOP lays out a single, established structure and method for operational planning, from initial situational analysis to the eventual issuing of the commander's directive. The GOP represents the appearance of common operational concepts and practices. It has been disseminated, formally, through the NATO School and the Joint Warfare Centre and, practically, through NATO operational headquarters. Significantly, the major national staff colleges, especially in Britain, France and Germany, are playing a very important role in promoting this common operational culture. While the French and British armed forces have their own distinctive operational planning processes, these methods, MARS and the Estimate, are closely compatible with the GOP, employing the same concepts and most of the same procedures as the GOP. A multinational staff cadre is appearing in Europe, unified around common concepts and skills, which parallels the Commonwealth staff that served in the Korean War. Underpinning this cultural convergence are thickening patterns of interaction. NATO officers recurrently work with one other in NATO headquarters in Europe and on operations and have developed dense professional ties with one other. As one German officer noted, 'an operational community' is emerging in Europe where a small transnational professional group of staff officers are developing a unifying form of expertise.

The NRF has played an important role in propelling this convergence of military practice. The NRF has facilitated invaluable training opportunities which have improved the performance of European militaries, unifying them around common military practices. For instance,

the chief of staff of UK 3 Division, which provided the Land Component for NRF 6, emphasised the value of the NRF rotation. During their period as the NRF, they were able to leverage additional training resources out of the MOD on the basis of which they had been able to conduct a full divisional exercise (Allied Warrior 05) in Britain. An exercise of this scale is almost unprecedented and the benefits of the training for 3 Division were significant. In particularly, it allowed the logistic brigade within the Division to test new logistics concepts which were utilised on a subsequent deployment to Iraq in 2006-7. Even a highly professionalised force like the British army with extensive operational experience has found the NRF cycle a beneficial process in developing its expertise and unifying itself with other European nations. However, the fact that in July 2006, while still on NRF stand-by, 3 Division was deployed to Iraq suggested that the British government did not take its NRF commitment seriously. The NRF has proved to be an extremely useful training programme but it is not an operational concept. It has successfully developed Europe's armed forces and has disseminated common tactical practices across the Alliance. Multinational operations demand this convergence of military expertise.

Of course, unification at the level of expertise presumes linguistic unification. Given the priority of the US in the NATO alliance, it is essential that the English of NATO officers is fluent. Although German and Dutch officers have excellent English, there are linguistic deficiencies among other NATO nations. A British Brigadier who served in ISAF IV emphasised some of the problems which the HQ experienced as a result of linguistic difficulties.

"Some of these problems were compounded by the poor English of some officers, especially the Spanish and the Belgians. Two years ago, we went over to English as the official language of NATO, and French and German officers are now good at English. However, this meant that quite a lot of the time the staff did not understand one another. And worse – they did not realise that they did not understand one another. I tried to help as native British speaker by acting as translator. I would never use the phone but would go around to the people I needed to talk to. I would explain the situation and then say, 'Have you understood that?' They would repeat what I had said. And I would say, 'No you didn't understand. Sorry - it is my fault. I am the native speaker. Let me try

again'. We would go over it again. But there was a serious level of misunderstanding". (Personal interview, 18 July 2005)

It is, of course, easy for British and American officers to stress the importance of English as the lingua franca. It is certainly convenient for them that English has become established as the language of multinational operations. However, given the dominance of the US, the number of nations now involved in multinational operations and the fact that English is already established as the international language of the air, it is difficult to see an alternative. This does not, however, absolve English-speaking officers of all linguistic responsibility. Firstly, as this Brigadier emphasises, it is incumbent upon English-speaking officers to facilitate communication in the headquarters. There is a certain irony in the notion that native speakers always facilitate communication in the multinational context. The current French commander of the Multinational Brigade in Mostar recently noted that the absence of English-speaking officers in his headquarters improved communications. Since all were non-native speakers, none employed colloquial, complex or idiomatic language which was typical among British and American officers. English speakers need to ensure they speak NATO English. Secondly, British and American officers might usefully be compelled to speak a second European language up to the level of fluency. Formal meetings and commands may be given in English but this ability to interact with officers from other nations in their native tongue can only improve relations within multinational operations. In order to counter the paradox of multinationality, NATO partners must unite ever more densely around strategic goals and common concepts and practices. This convergence of military expertise will be both expedited and signified by the adoption of English as the official language of NATO.

4. Multinationality at the Operational Level[205]: The Framework Nation Principle I

Common concepts and practices are essential for successful multinational co-operation, but this in no way implies that the optimal model for future military operation is genuine multinationality in which individual nations contribute equally to composite formations and headquarters. In the mid-1990s, a wave of multinational formations came into being, such as the German-Dutch Corps, the German-American Corps, the American-German Corps, Multinational Division Centre (Germany, Belgium, Holland and the United Kingdom), Eurofor (the Rapid Deployment Force) (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and Euromarfor (European Maritime Force) (France, Italy, Portugal and Spain) (Cameron 1999: 75; Edwards 2000: 8). One of the most significant of these was the Franco-German brigade, which was founded in 1987 and subsequently became Eurocorps when Spanish and Benelux elements were incorporated into the formation in 1992 (Cameron 1999: 75; van Ham 1999: 6). The multinational bubble was an understandable response to the immediate post-Cold War context. Multinational formations offered nations a means of sustaining their military capability in the face of often drastic budgetary reductions. At the same time, national militaries and NATO itself supported the formation of these multinational formations because they affirmed the existence of the Alliance at a time when there was significant scepticism about it. By binding themselves into multinational projects, the armed forces prevented the dissolution of the very Alliance itself. Whatever their operational usefulness, the formations affirmed the validity of the Alliance and raised the political stakes of dissolving it. In the mid-1990s, the future seemed multinational. Indeed, in the late 1990s, as European powers called for the creation of an autonomous military capacity, the drive to deeper multinationality in which nationality would be less important seemed to have accelerated.

Eurocorps remains undoubtedly one of the most important multinational experiments, comprising five nations, but its operational

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[205] The commands discussed here represent deployable operational headquarters in theatre, not the operational commands at Brunssum, Naples and Lisbon. Strictly speaking, these commands are defined as tactical headquarters in NATO doctrine, but this misrepresents the range of activities in which they are engaged.

performance, especially as ISAF IV HQ, brutally illustrates the paradox of multinationality. Thus, in assessing the Afghan deployment, senior officers, including the ISAF IV Commander himself, General Py, have stressed the weakness of the organisation. Eurocorps was structurally compromised by the fact that forces deferred to their national commands, constantly undermining the Commander's attempt to sustain united planning goals.

"There were 36 nations in Eurocorps and consequently you couldn't do what you wanted as Commander. There were national caveats…In this situation, the Commander cannot make decisions. He doesn't know what the reaction will be in national capitals. For instance, I wanted to lower the security state in Kabul to authorise soldiers to go downtown. However, I had to unofficially consult nations before I could make the decision. This is very difficult to manage and you are never sure whether troops will obey. It puts great restriction on the flexibility and autonomy of commander. It reduces the manoeuvrability of the commander by a great coefficient". (General Py, Commander ISAF IV, personal interview, 14 December 2005)

The interference of national interests in the very operations of the headquarters manifested itself at a personal level. As one British brigadier who worked as a PRT director during ISAF IV noted, 'When I went out there, I thought I would find international accord and good relations. Not at all. They distrusted and hated each other and, as the stranger, I became the recipient of complaints about each nation. And these undermined the unity of the staff effort and impacted on the mission'. He summarised the situation economically: 'The Germans and the French would criticise each other. The French were considered impulsive; the Germans too cautious. Both disliked the Belgians and everyone hated the Spanish'. As a result of the lack of unity in the headquarters, the staff work of the headquarters was weak throughout the operation. The British brigadier claimed that Eurocorps's planning practices were weak and while individuals were competent, much of the documentation was underdeveloped. For instance, during his 9 month tour, he never saw an estimate. There were neither campaign plans nor any directives. Standard concepts which have now been disseminated by means of GOP, such as the centre of gravity or lines of operation, were absent. Eurocorps suggests that the best prospects for multinationality reside in re-

nationalising military formations. The future of multinational operations may depend upon eliminating multinationality as an organising principle.

To illustrate the weakness of multinationality, it is useful to compare Eurocorps, which acted as ISAF IV, with the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, which provided the core HQ for ISAF IX. ARRC was created in the early 1990s as part of the wave of multinational mergers. It was heavily promoted by the British, substantially as a means of preserving as much of the old BOAR as possible. With US approval, the British formed the framework nation around which this new Corps HQ developed, despite German opposition. ARRC is a multinational formation but it is a framework nation headquarters, with Britain providing over 60 per cent of the staff and filling all the important command and staff positions, including commander, chief of staff and most of the assistant chiefs of staff. The headquarters has benefited from this strong national element, developing robust and unified staff procedures. Because the British forces are dominant, it is possible and even relatively easy for officers from other nations to attach themselves to the headquarters. Equal national contingents are not vying for superiority, as in Eurocorps, nor prioritising their national strategic requirements. ARRC's performance in Bosnia, Kosovo and, most recently, in Afghanistan demonstrates the validity of the framework nation headquarters as the model for multinational operations. Since ARRC was already unified around a single national military culture, the headquarters could expand dramatically and yet retain its coherence in a highly challenging operational environment.

Ironically, the most effective multinational forces may be precisely those which retain a localised national core. European armed forces may be recognising this point. For instance, although France initiated Eurocorps, the French seem to have become disillusioned by it since ISAF IV and in the last two years they have planned and inaugurated a new Corps de Réaction Rapide Français, which will be activated this year. This is an autonomous, national headquarters which imitates and indeed seems to rival ARRC directly. It is currently implementing what are now standard staff procedures and has been certified as a Higher Readiness Force by NATO. Interestingly, because it is a national headquarters, not a NATO one like ARRC, it may display greater coherence than ARRC. Certainly, visiting British officers have noted that the national autonomy of the HQ is an advantage in

comparison with ARRC. Describing NATO's six land component headquarters, the British commander of NRF's LCC emphasised precisely this point: 'While the multinational element remains important, the national command link is likely to strengthen, which is understandable, given the increasing number of HRFs' (personal interview, 29 March 2006). The commander is careful not to disparage multinationality but he envisages it occurring in a context where the framework nation principle and the connection between the lead nation, their armed forces and these commands are strengthened.

5. Multinationality at the Tactical Level: The Framework Nation Principle II

The salience of the nation as the key element in multinational operations has been emphasised at the tactical level. From the Balkans in 1995, NATO forces have operated in multinational brigades, consisting of national battalions, one of which provides the Brigade commander. In low intensity operations, this arrangement has proved adequate. Dividing their commands into multinational brigades, SFOR and now EUFOR and KFOR have been reasonably successful in the prosecution of their missions. Multinational brigades compensate for the stretched military budgets of contributing nations while ensuring that there are enough troops for the mission. Multinational brigades appear to be a necessary and workable compromise. Their adequacy is questionable and many of the tensions and frictions observable at the operational level in Eurocorps are replicated at tactical level. One of the most obvious examples of this is the performance of the German-Dutch Multinational Brigade at Camp Warehouse in Afghanistan in 2003. Although this formation had been successful in previous exercises and deployments to the Balkans, the Afghan operation proved decisive. The Dutch battalion accused the German command of administrative bias; the Dutch were accommodated in tents rather than huts like the Germans and received fewer luxuries than the Germans. Operationally, they claimed that they were forced to mount guard duty more often than the German contingent and because of the stringent German caveats, the Germans deployed only in armoured vehicles, while the Dutch troops were given the most dangerous patrolling tasks (Soeters and Moelker 2003). Dutch soldiers infamously summarised the situation: 'We do not have a problem with the Afghans.

We have a problem with the Germans'. If the mission had been at any higher level of intensity, the Brigade would have failed.

Interestingly, experiences in Helmand this summer may demonstrate that the multinational brigade concept is unworkable at any level of intensity above benign peace enforcement. In May 2006, the 3 PARA Battlegroup with headquarters elements from its own 16 Brigade deployed to Helmand under the multinational brigade commanded by Brigadier-General Fraser. The Battlegroup proceeded to be involved in intense warfighting, especially around Sangin, in which numerous casualties were taken. In order to monitor this highly sensitive deployment, the Brigadier Commanding 16 Air Assault Brigade was appointed Commander British Forces in Afghanistan for the duration of the deployment. He was not in the chain of command in Helmand. Brigadier Fraser commanded Colonel Knags, commander of British forces in Helmand, who was supported by elements of the 16 Brigade staff. In reality, however, as the mission became intense, the British Brigadier operated as an independent commander alongside Brigadier Fraser, answering to ISAF headquarters and to PJHQ in Britain. It quickly became clear that the 3 PARA Battlegroup was far too small to achieve the mission and the group was augmented with companies of Fusiliers and Ghurkas. 3 Commando Brigade relieved 16 Air Assault Brigade in October. The Brigade deployed two Royal Marines Commandos (rather than a single battalion) and also had an additional infantry battalion under its command. Although 3 Commando Brigade's commander did not infiltrate the command structure, the supposedly Multinational Brigade-South in fact consisted of two battlegroups so enlarged that they are effectively acting as small brigades: a Canadian Brigade (minus) in Kandahar and a British Brigade (minus) in Helmand. Operational pressures have demanded that the armed forces nationalise their tactical forces. Small Danish and Estonian contingents have bolted on to the British national brigade. These have not always been operationally easy relations. However, precisely because the foreign contingents are small, the disruption manifest in the Dutch-German Brigade, where two equal contingents were able to squabble among themselves for superiority, has been avoided. Resources will continue to be stretched and, on low intensity mission, multinational brigades can be effective. However, high intensity military action necessarily drives national military commands back to national brigades, augmented by

foreign attachments. At the tactical level, the framework nation principle may be optimal.

At the tactical level, the framework nation approach may eliminate the invidious free-riding which has often occurred on missions. Thus, certain national contingents will devolve tactical responsibility to sister units from other nations, with more robust rules of engagement, in their multinational brigade. For instance, there have been cases in Afghanistan where Alliance members have failed to fulfil the role of quick reaction force adequately. If these nations were responsible for their own area of operation, as a national brigade, this free-riding would be impossible; it would rebound on their own national forces, with all the political implications of this failure to protect themselves.

NATO military co-operation is most likely to be expedited not by eliminating national military cultures but, on the contrary, by building the alliance around national concentrations of military expertise. The future of multinationality may be transnational. Multinational operations may be most effectively conducted by utilising national concentrations of military force at operational and tactical levels which are co-ordinated ever more closely with other national contingents by the adoption of common concepts and practices.

6. Mechanisms of Shame and Honour

Multinational operations have become synonymous with caveats. The commander of ISAF IV, General Py, recorded the difficulties of conducting this operation in the light of the national caveats. The issue of caveats was a major theme for ISAF IX. Military action is one of the most sensitive areas of state sovereignty and it is understandable that states should monitor the employment of their forces. In a mediatised age, when the deaths of a single soldier can become a strategic issue, states would be reckless not to control the employment of their forces. Although Britain's approach to military operations is robust, the British were very careful to ensure control over their forces in Helmand. Caveats are necessary and they will not disappear in the near future. However, given their detrimental impact on operations, some amendment of caveat culture may be possible.

The mechanism for reforming caveat culture is well recognised by politicians and military commanders. In discussing the necessity of

contributing to the Korean operation, the British government committed itself to military action on 27 June 1950 in a Cabinet meeting. As the meeting dispersed, the Cabinet Secretary remarked to Clement Attlee, the Prime Minister, 'Korea is rather a distant obligation, Prime Minister.' 'Distant – yes,' Mr Attlee replied, 'but nonetheless an obligation' (Farrar-Hockley 1990: 33). The obligation of which Attlee spoke was not to the people of Korea, nor indeed to Britain itself: Britain did not fight the Korean War for direct national interest. The obligation was to Britain's allies and above all the United States. In order to sustain its relations with the United States, it was essential that it contributed to the conflict on the remote Manchurian peninsula. Britain was obliged by its commitment to its allies and the collective benefits which it gained from them. The international order has undergone profound transformation since 1950, when Britain was still a genuine world power, but the importance of collective goods and the mechanism of honour and shame by which access to those goods are policed remain. The mechanism of honour and shame does not refer to idealized notions of personal integrity, then. On the contrary, it refers to a member's access to vital collective goods; Alliance members can impose good behaviour on one other by threatening to withhold access to these goods to non-contributors. Mere non-recognition – shame – is a potent motivator.

Thus, in 2006, Germany's Fallschirmjäger Bataillon 26/3 was acting as the nominated EU Battlegroup. In the course of its standby period, the EU decided to deploy troops to the Congo to support the elections there. The obvious candidate for the deployment was Battalion 26/3, already acting as the EU Battlegroup. In the event, the German government was reluctant to commit its troops to the Congo; it was expensive, the mission was of no national interest and it was potentially dangerous. However, Germany was forced unwillingly to deploy its forces to the Congo or risk exposure to French criticism that its contribution to the ESDP was hollow. Britain's initial enthusiasm for the ESPD could be explained in a similar way. The German armed forces are currently under intense pressure from fellow NATO members to expand their presence in Afghanistan, to reduce their caveats and to deploy their troops into the troubled south. Interestingly, a senior *German* officer serving in ISAF HQ explicitly highlighted how the process of NATO transformation was being propelled by these concrete processes of shame, which demanded that even reluctant members contribute.

The mechanism of shame and honour operates in the micro-co-operation between the armed forces. Thus, ISAF's intelligence branch (CJ02) has representatives from all the major contributing nations but, formally, it is impossible for the national officers to share national secrets with their colleagues. However, as they worked together during 2006, intelligence officers built up close professional relationships in which they were bound by honour to divulge operationally relevant intelligence to their colleagues. Intelligence officers described the visceral sense of shame which drove them to divulge relevant intelligence to their colleagues: 'If I think that the Germans have intelligence and there is a threat to life, I demand that I have it. There are soldiers bloody dying here' (German Major, CJO2, ISAF HQ, personal interview 12 July 2006). The shame of failing to help and potentially causing casualties for other nations actively encouraged close co-operation. The mechanism of shame and honour is central to the future of multinational operations. It provides an explanation of why the European armed forces have been compelled to undertake the painful and expensive process of military transformation and how recalcitrant members can be encouraged to contribute more in the future.

NATO offers central collective security benefits to its allies, without which members would be dangerously exposed. Alliance members recognise these collective goods and consistently exert pressure on one other to contribute; they shame non-contributors into co-operating even against their individual interests out of fear of exclusion from the military benefits of the Alliance. In order to improve multinational co-operation, NATO might usefully strengthen mutual mechanisms of honour and shame. The contribution and non-contribution of nations should be recorded ever more publicly so that consistent renegades are impelled to co-operate through a visceral sense of shame and the threat of the withdrawal of Alliance benefits.

7. Collective Memories

All coherent social groups have a clear goal but, interestingly, all coherent social groups also have a clear sense of their own past. This is not because the success of an organisation today is, in fact, the optimal product of past adaptation. Rather, successful organisations have a clear understanding of their history because this enables them to unify

themselves in the present. Social groups utilise an often invented idea of their past in order to unite themselves around common projects now. History does not determine the present. It is a resource mobilised in the present to identify common purpose and unite those who would be members of a group to that end.

In this context, NATO's history is important. However, it is only important insofar as Alliance members vivify that history to unite themselves. NATO forces need to share collective memories of how they have faced military threats in the past and opposed them by multinational co-operation. The problem here is that NATO history is almost entirely a history of the Cold War, when mass forces were organised into more or less autonomous national contingents, assigned to distinctive service missions, to face conventional threats. Obviously, the history of NATO does not provide a resource for unification around contemporary strategic demands, involving joint global operations that span the spectrum of conflict. However, while the Cold War provides few useful collective memories for current operations, the Korean War – effectively NATO's first war – might provide precisely the rich historic resource on the basis of which multinational partners could mobilise themselves. The Korean War was a limited conflict involving joint operations across the spectrum of conflict. While the decisive operations were directed against the North Korean and Chinese Armies, United Nations forces were engaged throughout in a bitter counter-insurgency campaign against North Korean guerrilla forces. Moreover, as the Battle on the Imjin demonstrated, multinational forces were engaged in high-intensity actions at the lowest level. The Belgian battalion fought alongside the British. Significantly, the French, despite their subsequent reluctance to commit themselves to NATO, distinguished themselves in the campaign. A French battalion deployed under the command of the pseudonymous Ralph Monclar, who was in fact the much decorated, veteran French Lieutenant General Magrin-Vernerey (Blair 1987: 664-8; Appleman 1990:210). The French battalion was integrated into an American Brigade and was heavily engaged in numerous actions throughout the war. During the Thunderbolt Offensive, the French held Hill 453 under intense pressure, for which action Monclar was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. The Korean War is useful as a collective resource because it is closer to current conditions than any other post-war operation.

It is not just historic memories which are significant but recent collective memories which are vital to group coherence. In the representation of current NATO operations, each nation frames operations in exclusively national terms. For instance, in the descriptions of operations in Afghanistan in the national media, the overarching NATO mission is subordinated to a concern with national tactical action. The actions of other national contingents and their contribution to NATO are ignored. In order to unite members, the ISAF mission as a whole should be established as a collective resource for each member and the successful operations of the Germans in the North, the Italians in the West, the British and Canadians in the South and the Americans in the East should become a collective memory. Not only will such a collective memory unite NATO members to a common purpose but the creation of Alliance-wide memories will act as a decisive mechanism of honour and shame. National contingents who contribute to the mission will be knowingly honoured in Alliance memory, while non-contributors will be shamed. As in Korea, NATO needs to establish a shared public record of those nations in good standing, encouraging the recalcitrant. It would be beneficial to re-negotiate independent national remembrance into a shared NATO memory.

8.   Conclusion

Multinational operations are paradoxical. In the face of new threats and declining budgets, NATO and the EU have been forced to engage in multinational operations. Alliance members simply do not have the resources to engage in independent military action and, for political legitimacy, it has become essential even for the US to operate in coalitions. Multinational operations are a reality. However, although it is essential to conduct operations in multinational coalitions, the dependence of states on these coalitions vitiates the very military effectiveness of the deployed forces. The necessity of engaging in multinational operations jeopardises the prospects of success. NATO and EU are trapped in a strategic paradox.

This paradox cannot be eliminated but it can be alleviated. In order to overcome the potentially paralysing effects of multinationality, NATO members must unify themselves around clear strategic objectives: Afghanistan. At the same time, they must unite themselves ever more

closely around common concepts and practices so that they pursue these ends in compatible ways and are able to co-operate with one other. The multinational element of the armed forces might usefully be minimised by the introduction of a framework nation principle at operational headquarters and tactical forces; one nation provides the core operational and tactical forces, which the international alliance augments. Finally, multinational forces need to develop a shared collective memory of themselves which co-ordinates their current action; uniting forces around an evocative shared understanding of themselves and imposing compliance on one other through publicly shaming non-contributors and honouring the willing. To this end, Korea may stand as a useful memory not merely illustrating the ways of overcoming the problems of multinationality but encouraging a sufficiently long-term strategic commitment by the Alliance. The Armistice which ended the Korean War was signed on 27 July 1953. UN troops still patrol the 38th Parallel today. It would seem unwise to assume that Afghanistan represents a lesser commitment today than that very distant obligation did then.

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DOING THE RIGHT THING THE RIGHT WAY: THE CHALLENGE OF MILITARY MISSION EFFECTIVENESS IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN A "WAR AMONGST THE PEOPLE"[206] THEATRE[207]

Kobi MICHAEL[208]

1.   Introduction

"Peace Support Operation" (PSO) is the generic term for the new generation of complicated peacekeeping operations with major state-building components.[209] These kinds of operations demand broad and coherent cooperation between military forces and non-military organizations (different kinds of NGOs and international organizations). Such cooperation must rely on a deep understanding of the local population and its culture, as well as the required mechanisms and principles for "gaining their hearts and minds."[210]

PSOs usually take place in post-conflict theatres, but international experience shows, at least during the last decade, that such operations were, and still are, conducted in live conflict theatre as well. Operating in a live and violent conflict theatre compels intervening peacekeeping forces and organizations to increase and elaborate their

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[207] Proofreading by Anna Peel.

[208] The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (JIIS) and the Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (HUJI).

[209] Kobi Michael and David Kellen, "Israeli-Palestinian Bi-level Conflict Zone and Its Implications for International Intervention: What Went Wrong and What Can be Done?", *The Pearson Papers - Measures of Effectiveness: Peace Operations and Beyond*, Vol. 10, Issue 1, May 2007, pp. 60-90. G. Allen. Sens, "From Peace-Keeping to Peace-Building: The United Nations and the Challenge of Intrastate War," in *The United Nations and Global Security*, ed. Richard M. Price and Mark W. Zacher. (New York: Palgrave, 2004).

[210] Smith, *The Utility of Force.*

efforts in order to establish and improve cooperation and effectiveness between intervening actors. This is in addition to major efforts required to cooperate effectively with local actors and the population.

In most cases the intervening actors simultaneously face two major challenges: the first is stabilizing security and stopping violence and the second is providing the required assistance for state building, mainly rebuilding civilian institutions, enforcing law and order and rehabilitating the economy and infrastructure. International experience in Afghanistan and Iraq indicates that it is almost impossible to advance both missions in parallel, at least in the initial stages.[211] There is first a need to stabilize the conflict arena by using military force. Only after achieving relative calm can the second mission begin, at which point both missions can be conducted simultaneously.

Adhering to the above-mentioned rationale, the military mission becomes yet more complicated. Military forces must operate in a violent conflict theatre characterized as a war amongst the people. In such a theatre, citizens and civilians are the cause of the war, the target and the means manipulated by the hostile groups.[212] Military forces have to face non-state actors; terror and guerilla groups that operate in a civilian context, using them as shelters and human shields. This complex evolution of war compels professional Western military forces to adjust their doctrines and means of application in order to cope effectively with new challenges. In such a theatre, the utility of force is limited.

The utility of force becomes dependent on the quality of cooperation between the military and civilian actors in the arena: NGOs and international organizations, as well as the local populations and institutions. Professional soldiers are often trained and educated to utilize military force to defeat an enemy and yet civil insurgency cannot necessarily be effectively tackled using the same principles. When civil insurgency occurs military force should be used differently and in a more controlled manner, and yet restraining force largely contradicts the professional instincts of the qualified, professional soldier.

PSOs pose two additional difficulties for military forces (assuming that their mandate is clear, robust and generally acknowledged

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[211] Kobi Michael and David Kellen, *Israeli-Palestinian Bi-level Conflict Zone*.
[212] Haim. Fass, ed., *The Battle of the 21st Century: Democracy Fighting Terror - Discussion Forum*, *The Israel Democracy Institute L I B R a R Y* (Jerusalem: the Israel Democracy Institute, 2006).– Giora Eyeland pp. 310-332.

as internationally legitimate, i.e. by UN resolution). The first challenge of PSOs is on *an organizational and operative level*. That is, the multi-national composition of the military force must be managed effectively. In most cases the military component of the PSO is made up of several nationalities and forms, thereby establishing coalition of sorts. Different countries have different military and organizational cultures, this resulting in the second substantial challenge to PSOs, which is *cultural*: these missions require tolerance, an ability to cooperate and communicate effectively in a multicultural environment, to accept the other and those perceived as different.

Under these circumstances the question of "doing the right thing the right way" becomes yet more acute and challenging. Doing the right thing means being effective: correctly defining the aims and working towards their implementation, which also requires "the right"- efficient and strategic use of the resources available in order to maximize effectiveness.

The military mission should follow the mandate and serve the political goals defined by the international authorities. There is therefore a need to ensure that military strategies are relevant to the specific political context and that they are well developed. Without a conceptual platform based upon cumulative knowledge and experience and converted to well-established doctrine and training, the military mission and the PSO as a whole are doomed to fail. Rupert Smith finds that in most cases of war amongst civilians (Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo), to date Western professional militaries have failed to change their traditional paradigm, which is better suited to conventional warfare, and therefore mission effectiveness and efficiency have been hampered.[213]

Military planners are compelled to understand and adapt military doctrine to the complex context of the conflict zone in question, thereby enabling PSOs to achieve their goals effectively and efficiently (simultaneously redefining the traditional military paradigm as Smith suggests). Operating in a 'war amongst civilians' theatre demands fast adaptation to change in a dynamic environment and planners should therefore take the following four key points into account:

1- Mandate – its clarity, legitimacy and authorities;
2- Means – qualified and trained manpower, equipment and intelligence;

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[213] Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force.*

3- Professionalism – doctrine/strategy, training and knowledge;
4- The Arena – local population and institutions, local culture, NGOs and international organizations and other military forces in the coalition.

Essentially this article aims to describe and briefly analyze the main characteristics of PSO's military missions, which are uniquely associated with "war(s) amongst the people." It also strives to outline the effectiveness and efficiency of such military missions and, finally, to define four major elements required for their success.

2. The Military Mission of PSOs in a Civilian 'War amongst the People' Theatre

PSOs are generally used by the international community as a means of intervention in intra-state conflicts in order to resolve or manage them by controlling the adversaries and the conflict environment. Violent conflicts are thus transformed into non-violent processes that enable societal and political reconstruction and, eventually establish peaceful relations between the parties in conflict. The assumption behind these operations is that functioning institutions, stability and a rationale of statehood (ie the state maintaining a monopoly over violence) enable a normalization of daily life that provides the local population with peaceful tools to manage their disputes.

This aim is characterized both as a military and civilian mission. Therefore, from the very beginning, the establishment of the intervening force requires the integration of civilian components into the military arena. The military mission is to stabilize the conflict theatre and to secure it in order to facilitate the effective and efficient operation of civilian missions. Stabilizing the conflict theatre means decreasing violence to a degree that enables civilians to move freely, enabling civilian missions to engage with the local population and institutions to fulfill their assignments. From a military point of view, stabilization should be achieved in at least two stages:

1- Disarming the local militias and armed groups and controlling their activities. This means minimizing their destructive and lethal potential which can be achieved by direct confrontation and by depriving them of the local population's support and shelter.

2- Supporting the local security establishment by providing it with resources, military means, professional training and guidance. Professional and material support is required to enable local security establishments to regain control of security by monopolizing the use of violent force.

3. Reaching Effectiveness and Efficiency – The Required Elements

The complexity of PSOs means that systematic advance planning is fundamental to their effectiveness. The intervening force should be integrated and trained as a unified mission force before reaching the theatre. The unique characteristics of each theatre should be explored and studied by the intervening force in order to ensure that preparatory training is conducted effectively.

The first preparatory consideration should be the mandate, which is determined and defined by the international community (most commonly by the UN). If the mandate is insufficiently broad or robust it will limit and possibly paralyze the mission, especially its military component. The mandate should reflect broad international support and legitimacy and should include clear definitions of the military aims and authorities granted to the intervening military force, including rules of engagement (ROE).[214] The mandate is one of the most important foundations of the operational platform and to be effective must be neither too vague nor too general.

The second crucial element of mission preparations is means. This category includes qualified and trained personnel/manpower, equipment, intelligence gathering and analysis of capabilities. In addition to the preparations and training of the force as a whole, it is particularly important for the mission's senior officers to be skilled and capable. Military professionalism and excellence are not enough; officers should be able to conduct diplomatic operations and possess high levels of emotional intelligence. They should be able to communicate with people of different cultures, tolerate cultural diversity and cooperate with civilian

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[214] David Last. "Command and Control", in Sean Byrne, James Fergusson, Eyal Ben-Ari and Kobi Michael, ed., *Old Conflict, New Challenges - Peace-Building in Israeli-Palestinian Relations*, Vol. 8, *Bison Paper* (Winnipeg Manitoba: The Centre for Defence and Security Studies The University of Manitoba, 2006). pp. 79-108.

and international organizations as well as with locals. They must be open-minded and flexible in order to restrain the force when necessary and to adapt use of power to the changing theatre.

The third consideration is professionalism. This largely relates to the military doctrine/strategy that should be developed, adjusted and used in the theatre. Strategy should be based on accumulated knowledge and vast experience from similar theatres in the last decade. Although each theatre is unique, there are many common characteristics of theatre. Knowledge of the theatres forms the intellectual platform for the doctrine. The doctrine in turn forms the platform for training the force and providing it with the means to maximize effectiveness.

The last vital element required for a PSO to be effective and efficient is analysis and study of the arena itself. This should take place both prior to and during a mission, as the environment may well evolve as understanding of the theatre develops. Even the best qualified and professional military force cannot successfully cope with insurgency, terror and guerilla warfare without understanding the local culture and characteristics of the theatre in which it operates. Successful counterinsurgency demands cooperation with the locals, coalition military allies, civilian components of the mission force and the usual NGOs and international organizations.

Special emphasis should be given to intelligence. Intelligence should be used by commanders to interpret political and societal contexts. In a 'war amongst the people' theatre, political and societal intelligence become as important as traditional military intelligence and sometimes more so. Such intelligence, which can be compared to diplomatic and anthropological knowledge, demands deeper and more sophisticated networks and accessibility.

4.   The Political Nature of the Mission and the Importance of Intelligence

The PSO's key goal is political. Military forces are employed to reach this end-point and therefore military commanders must understand the political context and be able to adjust the military means and doctrines to the political environment.

As mentioned before, one of the most important operational tools in this type of exercise is intelligence. Intelligence should provide

commanders with relevant information and estimations. Therefore, intelligence means and methods must be adjusted to the political context of the theatre and its dynamic nature; factors which military commanders accustomed to operating in a traditional military theater are not accustomed to considering.

Therefore, special means and qualifications should be acquired and developed to ensure that the intelligence used as a basis for intervention is accurate. Understanding the culture, language and conflict environment is a must and intelligence professionals should understand that gathering information in this type of context requires intensive engagement with the local population. The local population is simultaneously the arena, the target and a key source of intelligence. American experience demonstrates continued oversight in this regard and has done since the Vietnam War. Intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan provide valuable examples of such failings, from which many lessons can be drawn.[215] This experience indicates the problematic nature of cultural encounters; the encounter between local inhabitants and those who are mostly perceived by the locals as foreigners or invaders. In such tense, complex circumstances cultural intelligence becomes a necessary qualification among commanders and senior officials in the theatre. Cultural intelligence as "the ability of being effective in the interactions with people who are culturally different"[216] becomes the cognitive platform for absorbing information, understanding it and communicating with the local population and institutions as well as with the different civil organizations operating in the theatre.

5.   What is the Difference between Cultural Intelligence and Culture Intelligence?

This word-play demonstrates the link between the psychological and operational dimension of the mission. The first type of intelligence refers to the fundamental idea of being able to adapt to the environment; the cognitive and behavioral abilities required to adapt to, as well as

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[215] Williamson Murray, ed., "Strategic Challenges for Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terrorism", *Strategic Studies (Ssi) Monographs* (Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), US Army War College, 2006).

[216] Thomas, C. David (et al.), *Cultural Intelligence: Domain and Assessment* (forthcoming).

select and shape an environment.[217] The second, however, refers to the military operational function of gathering and analyzing information about the theatre and the enemy. There is no doubt that intelligence culture is required in any sort of military intelligence operation. There is always a need to understand the context and differences between yourself and your adversary, but in the context of a 'war amongst the peoples', this demand becomes more acute and critical.

David Thomas and his colleagues have recently developed a rich conceptual platform about the first cultural intelligence. They view cultural intelligence as a system of interacting abilities and the ability to adapt to, and enact a specific type of environment: one characterized by cultural diversity and cross-cultural interactions.[218] Although they find similarities between social and emotional intelligence and cultural intelligence, they do distinguish between them by claiming that "both of these constructs are specific to the culture in which they were developed and do not necessarily relate to cross-cultural interactions".[219] Therefore, they find cultural intelligence distinct in that it is "a unique construction of interacting abilities that exists outside the cultural boundaries in which these abilities were developed".[220]

The military organization, as a well established hierarchal and disciplined organization, lives by the principle of differentiating itself from other organizations, particularly civil organizations. Under such circumstances a limited capacity to go beyond certain cultural boundaries becomes a serious obstacle. In principle, we can claim that the cultural boundaries of the military organization are well blocked to outside cultural influence, and that therefore the military establishment does not welcome engagement with different cultures, particularly those of a civilian nature.

Military intelligence is organized and conceptualized in a way that serves the military organization's rationale. It should provide the commanders and the establishment with the capacity to understand the military aspects of the theatre in order to maximize the utility of military force as a destructive force that determines the enemy in the shortest

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[217] Ibid.
[218] Ibid.
[219] Ibid.
[220] Ibid.

possible time and thereby minimizes casualties. Military intelligence and knowledge are focused and developed to achieve precisely this goal.

On the other hand, the knowledge and skills associated with cultural intelligence are "linked by cultural metacognition that allows people to adapt to, to select, and to shape the cultural aspects of their environment".[221] Thomas claims that cultural intelligence is knowledge and related skills can only be developed in a cross-cultural context. However, as mentioned before, the military establishment is generally less exposed to local culture (instead of cultural intelligence) and therefore its capabilities to develop such knowledge and skills are limited.

"Specific knowledge of cultures is the foundation of cultural intelligence" says Thomas and explains that such a basic knowledge forms the basis for "decoding the behavior of others and ourselves". Such knowledge enables us to recognize the existence of other cultures. Thomas believes this knowledge is necessary to achieve "greater predictability, more accurate attributions, and ultimately more effective inter-cultural behavior".[222] Development of these skills and capabilities result in improved learning processes which lead to enhanced adaptability.

As mentioned before, mission effectiveness requires a focus upon the specific nature of any one context and adaptation to the changing, dynamic environment of the theatre in which a 'war amongst the people' takes place. Improving adaptation in such a theatre requires systematic generation of new knowledge, a process which "involves learning from specific experience with culturally different others and is the result of reflective observation, analysis, and abstract conceptualization, which can create new mental categories and re-categorize others in a more sophisticated category system".[223]

In order to achieve military mission effectiveness in the complex theatre of 'war amongst the people' military commanders must understand the distinctions between the environments in which they act. This kind of warfare requires openness to the other and to a variety of strategic military aims. Different military aims in a new war theatre requires a diverse form of intelligence - cultural intelligence - and to be

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[221] Ibid.
[222] Ibid.
[223] Ibid.

effective such intelligence requires well established foundations, as described by Thomas and his colleagues.

6. Effectiveness as an Outcome of the Multidimensional and Complex Mission and the Importance of Cooperation

Cooperating with civilians is not a straightforward mission for professional soldiers. Both soldiers and civilians have to be trained to acquire the necessary capabilities to cooperate with one another. Unity of command and chains of command are the basic modes of organization for military professionals, while civilian organizations are far more flexible and unity of command is an almost alien concept. Civilians talk and think in terms of management and not in terms of command. The difference in organizational culture between military units and civilian organizations can constitute a tremendous obstacle to successful cooperation. However, because PSOs demand integrated mission forces, composed of military units and civilian organizations, both have to establish the means to cooperate effectively and devote their efforts to bridging the gaps. If their cooperation is poor, both the international community and the locals are doomed to suffer a painful failure.

CONCLUSIONS
CULTURAL CHALLENGES IN MILITARY OPERATIONS:
AN OVERVIEW[224]

Tibor SZVIRCSEV TRESCH[225]

1.   Introduction

The end of the Cold War has not seen the expected decline in the relevance of armed forces. In fact, armed forces across the world, especially those of NATO member countries and NATO partners, are busier than ever before. They have to cover the whole range of missions – from peacekeeping to combat. For this reason, armed forces are deployed in missions in an array of tasks to combat threats of a military and mostly a non-military trans-national nature emerging from political, economic, societal, and environmental considerations.[226]

To combat these threats, NATO armed forces are deployed together with Alliance partners in missions. These missions require more adaptive, flexible and mobile forces to deal with the broad range of tasks.[227] Consequently in the NATO Handbook 2001 we find three main changes in NATO forces: Reduction in size and readiness; increasing flexibility and mobility; and multinationality.

Various evaluations of multicultural missions can be found in research literature: They deal on the one hand with the advantages of diversity in missions and on the other with the pitfalls of such multicultural missions. In military missions a huge number of parties are

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[224] Proofreading by Julie Dixon.
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[226] Heinecken, Lindy (2005), *New missions and the changing character of military missions*, Paper presented at the Biennial International 45th Anniversary Conference, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, 21-23 October 2005, Chicago.
[227] Boëne, B. (2003), "La professionnalisation des armées: contexte et raisons, impact fonctionnel et sociopolitique", *Revue française de sociologie*, Volume 44, No. 4, pp. 647-693.

involved: the host nation with its distinct culture, traditions and religion; the thousands of NGOs and international organizations, and also the UN agencies in the theatre. The private sector, for example Private Military Companies and the media also have an influence on military missions. Behind the various national military contributors are the national populations, which indirectly exercise political and social influence on the forces deployed. However, cultural challenges can be examined under three main headings, at least:

1.   Military-military challenges
2.   Military-NGOs / IOs challenges
3.   Military-host country challenges

The first one was the most important in the conference and the discussions centered on the relationships between different national armies. Military operations have been analyzed mainly from historical, organizational, and institutional aspects. In recent years there has also been a growing interest in culture-related factors and issues in multinational operations. Findings show that the basic conditions for successful military cooperation within armed forces are communication, mutual understanding, friendliness, open-mindedness and social competence.[228] Furthermore, the research findings clearly indicate that the lack of skills and training in multinational teamwork is a specific barrier to effective performance in coalition missions.

But what were and what are the main reasons for multinational forces? First, the Cold War: in the context of East-West confrontation, alliances were far more important and urgent. Second, the UN missions conducted since 1948. In these missions, the different armed forces were used to working together and had a good opportunity to share experiences in the field. The third major reason was the end of the Cold War, which saw an increase in multinational forces accompanied by downsizing of armed forces, low military budgets, and new threats and combat missions.

However, although multinational military operations in themselves are nothing new, since the end of the Cold War military

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[228] See also: Moelker, René; Soeters, Joseph; Vom Hagen, Ulrich (2006), "Sympathy, the Cement of Interoperability – German-Netherlands Military Co-operation, Cross-cultural Images and Attitudes in Longitudinal (10 Years) Perspective", in: Vom Hagen, Ulrich; Moelker, René; Soeters, Joseph (eds.) (2006), *Cultural Interoperability. Ten Years of Research into Co-operation in the First German-Netherlands Corps,* Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr. Forum International. Volume 27, Breda & Strausberg, pp. 15-51.

multinationalism has acquired a new dimension. The most important fact is that the quality of cooperation has changed. In the past cooperation took place at chief of staff and headquarters level, while today national units are also being integrated into bi-national or multinational formations.[229] So the internationalization of personnel (for instance in multinational headquarters or in standing formations), and the multinational and multicultural character of military contingents during deployments have become principal features of current military activities. Since the end of the Cold War all European states have reduced their armed forces and now face the problem of shrunken defence budgets that do not allow them to train and equip their troops to the level required for employment in autonomous missions. Generally speaking, by applying the principle of multinational cooperation it is possible to concentrate capacities and produce military goods in higher quantities with lower costs.[230]

2.   Multiculturalism and Multinationality in the Military

On the whole two different kinds of multinationality can be observed, each with different preconditions for the working process in multinational units. Firstly, standing multinational corps in barracks in one of the participating countries: at most two to four countries are involved in these standing formations. Examples are EUROFOR, permanently headquartered in Florence, or the 1st German-Netherlands Corps, located in Munster. These units have encountered some of the sociological problems typical of multinational military formations, such as language, different ranking systems, payment and so on. But all in all smooth cooperation is possible in standing formations.

Secondly, nowadays the form of multinational cooperation more frequently observed is based on ad hoc cooperation in military missions abroad, for example in Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq. Here nations from

[229] Klein, Paul; Kümmel, Gerhard (2000), "The Internationalization of Military Life. Necessity, Problems and Prospects of Multinational Armed Forces", in: Kümmel, Gerhard; Prüfert, Andreas D. (eds.) (2000), *Military Sociology. The Richness of a Discipline*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, pp. 311-328.

[230] Klein, Paul; Haltiner Karl W. (2005), "Multinationality as a Challenge for Armed Forces", in: Caforio, Giuseppe; Kümmel, Gerhard (eds.) (2005), *Military Missions and Their Implications Reconsidered: The Aftermath of September 11th*, Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Volume 2, Elsevier Ltd.: Amsterdam, pp. 403-414.

more than 40 countries may be involved in one mission. This can cause misunderstandings and jeopardize the mission goals. In most cases multinational forces are needed to intervene quickly and on an ad hoc basis in crisis situations which are ambiguous, dangerous and complex. National militaries assigned to urgent missions often have no time for specific joint training with the other armed forces. Additionally, they are subjected to different Rules of Engagement (ROE) and different legal systems governing discipline and the use of violence.[231]

In multinational missions, national units have to surrender some control and have less autonomy. People in general, and military personnel in particular, do not like to be dependent on other nations in situations that can be life-threatening and dangerous. This dependence has to be adapted to interdependence, which means that it is essential to stress the equal status of all units involved in the multinational mission. If each nation insists on having its own support, this can lead to lack of confidence in the ability of other nations to provide it adequately.

3.   The Different Presentations

The first paper by Tibor Szvircsev Tresch and Nicasia Picciano offers a theoretical model of effectiveness in multicultural military operations. Mission effectiveness can be divided into objectives and means. Mission effectiveness on the strategic and operational level implies - in terms of objectives - the protection of civilians, unity of effort, improvement of relations and confidence building within the respective national armed forces, and the strengthening of cooperation in general, as well as coordination between civilian and military authorities in particular. Objectives influenced by means can be ordered at least into two groups according the authors. Firstly, general military means such as the professionalism of military personnel, division of responsibility and interoperability. Secondly, functional military means help to achieve effectiveness with appropriate equipment, rules of engagement and different types of task forces for example.

In Part 1 Michael Firlie provides a comprehensive overview, based on his practical experience as a former U.S. commander of two

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[231] Elron, Efrat; Shamir, Boas; Ben-Ari, Eyal (1999), "Why Don't They Fight Each Other? Cultural Diversity and Operational Unity in Multinational Forces", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 26, no. 1, Fall 1999, pp. 73-98.

missions in Haiti and Somali, of how the various "players" (armed forces, government/sponsored organizations, NGOs and civilian groups) have cultural effects on the missions. Each of these entities involved usually has different objectives and the effect of these objectives on each other is much greater now than in the past, he concludes. Firlie recommends reviewing each of these groups to determine what possible "players" may be involved in operations and how the multicultural aspects of these "players" may affect the operations. In addition, a clear understanding of the political objectives of each of the parties involved in the operation and a clear understanding of the overall mission objective and desired end-state are needed. As far as the strictly military aspect of multicultural operations is concerned, the key is continual training in an international environment and specific pre-deployment mission training.

What are the challenges that have been faced by small countries in missions abroad? With this question Ljubica Jelušič develops an analytical model based on the experiences of the Slovenian Armed Forces. Her thesis is that soldiers from small countries share more sympathies with the local population in the theatre, but they also have to adapt to the military culture imposed by the commanding nation or by those who have a decisive role in the specific mission. Small countries very rarely organize multinational units in which they would take the role of the leading nation. According to Jelušič, small countries usually join military operations in which their units are too small to take their own area of responsibility. So these militaries are challenged by the fact that as a rule they have to subordinate their units and behaviour to the bigger and more important contingents.

The long years of colonial experience, the basic training at the French Military Academy of Saint-Cyr, the special training before missions abroad at the Ecole Militaire de Spécialisation de l'Outre-Mer et de l'Etranger and at the Groupement Interarmées d'Actions Civilo-Militaires, and the After Action Reviews are demonstrating the growing importance attached to cultural factors and the intercultural process by the French military. Through the experiences of current operations, Claude Weber and Saïd Haddad describe and evaluate how the French Army manage the diversity in multinational operations and how the lessons learned are incorporated into the basic and permanent training of French soldiers. Training and experience are the best way to prepare individuals and institutions to manage diversity. Considering the

responsibilities and the role of officers, the authors believe that an effort must be made to improve and strengthen the education of military personnel in the field of diversity management and the intercultural process.

Ferenc Molnár's paper examines three different levels of cultural challenges in military missions to the Hungarian armed forces. These are the macro (strategic), the mezzo (organizational), and the micro (individual/interpersonal) levels. The macro level of culture provides crucial information in order to understand the challenges and the limits of the desired improvement in international operations. Molnár argues that historical, political, economic, and social settings have a pervasive effect on military culture and have a distinct role in defining the limits of international operations. The cultural challenges on the organizational level could emerge within the military in the course of interactions of different military organizations or between the military and other organizations (NGOs, IOs) and between the military and the local society. The individual/interpersonal level mainly covers psychological and social-psychological facts, such as training levels, language skills, and stereotypes. He concludes that the rather soft cultural and historical elements of certain national militaries can improve the effectiveness of complex missions much more than forcing these nations to get involved in war fighting, which may result in loss of the social support at home.

Part 2 of the publication deals with the experiences of Mediterranean and Middle East countries in military operations. The first paper, by Faisal O. Al-Rfouh from Jordan, refers to the Culture of Peace as a phenomenon of recent origin which has gradually gained international recognition and is broadly regarded as a *sine qua non* for averting war and conflict. In this sense the United Nations have played a crucial role not only in popularizing the notion of Culture of Peace, but in the maintenance of international peace through its peacekeeping operations. Cultural acclimatization of members of the peacekeeping forces that are drawn from different regions with diverse cultural backgrounds is essential for the effectiveness and success of the mission. Such a task can be facilitated by imparting cultural training to the designated troops prior to their deployment in cooperation with the trained personnel drawn from concerned countries. Al-Rfouh states that in the case of the Middle East, the cooperation of the Arab League in this regard can be useful. Since peacekeeping operations require frequent

interaction with local population, it follows that if peacekeepers are aware of local language and cultural customs, then their task of establishing a good relationship with the locals becomes easy and it helps maintain peace.

Efrat Elron stresses the importance of the UN and the International Community as conflict solvers in the Middle East. Her article outlines a model of the partnership between the UN, UNIFIL II, troop contributing countries, Israel and the international community, based on knowledge from the fields of international relations, intercultural management and peacekeeping literature, combined with themes from organizational behaviour. The model presents the knowledge creation, activities and actions that all parties need to engage in to manage effectively the complex interfaces between them and thus create closer and more effective partnerships that will facilitate UNIFIL's ability to fulfil its mission and mandate.

Peacekeeping operations can be successful only if the international community works closely together in pursuit of peace and stability, because such missions are difficult to carry out, according to Saleh Al-Zu'bi. In this regard Jordan has realized the multiple and varied dimensions of globalization and the new world order, and has initiated anticipatory action in order to keep pace with the developments of this order, maintain openness to the world, and contribute to the United Nations' efforts in keeping peace all over the world. The philosophy of the Jordanian contribution to peace missions can be described as a multiple approach which includes political, economical, military, and environmental factors. On the basis of the Jordanian experience in the field, Al-Zu'bi highlights certain measures which should be taken in account in order to make peacekeeping operations effective and manageable, e.g. broad knowledge of the area of peacekeeping operations, vigorous standards in selecting personnel and units, intensive training, especially with regard to discipline, and language skills, just to mention a few points.

Rachid El Houdaïgui's article raises the inherent problems of working in intercultural cooperation from the perspective of the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces when participating in peacekeeping operations. The Moroccan contingents are usually composed of medical and logistics elements, and infantry units or other military elements. This shows the intention of the Moroccan authorities to maintain a well

balanced engagement that takes into consideration the humanitarian and the military roles in missions abroad. The autonomy of the Moroccan contingent over their movements, their arms, their structure and their logistics means demonstrates the will of the Moroccan officials to be less dependent on other countries. El Houdaïgui concludes that for Moroccan participation the intervention area should not be dangerous, so as to avoid a humiliating situation for Moroccan soldiers, and that Moroccan units in missions should be important and not marginalized.

International military operations are multi-dimensional and multicultural. As Orit Shalev explains, each army is structured differently and operates in a variety of ways. In the first part of her paper, multiculturalism with regard to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is described from three perspectives. Furthermore, the Israeli experience is composed of many mechanisms of both inclusion and exclusion of different groups. The "Melting Pot" was initially the dominant concept of integration into the Israeli society in general and the military in particular. In the second part of the paper, a theoretical framework, with three main levels to improve effectiveness in missions, is described. The complexity of multicultural forces requires a holistic perspective. There are many players taking part in or connected to peacekeeping missions. The obvious players are: countries that participate in the force, countries or entities that are the "clients" of the specific mission, and the third group to be considered are other countries or entities that have interests in the mission.

The third part of the publication is related to empirical research conducted in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Lebanon. Jörg Keller and Maren Tomforde give an insight view of the German-Italian cooperation at the Multinational Brigade Southwest in Prizen in the framework of KFOR. When they asked whether the soldiers prefer to serve in a multinational mixed or in a national unit, the result was that about 50 percent of the Germans and Italians favour the multinational mixed unit. Nonetheless, almost 30 percent of the Italians, nearly twice as many as their German counterparts, wanted to work in a purely national environment. Their findings highlight the fact that the soldiers from both nations come from different cultural backgrounds, with their own system culture, and do not appear to be homogenous. Also, NATO standards are not well known by both contingents. According to Keller and Tomforde, three out of 100 military personnel who had been familiarized with the fundamental

planning and information processing system of the HQ during education and training appear to be too small in number and officers should be taught these NATO mechanisms more intensively.

Maren Tomforde again examines the German-Italian cooperation in Kosovo in 2005. The aim of her article is to analyze the effect of multinational missions on the individual soldier, and on identity and military culture in general. In a multinational theatre, military personnel are confronted with a plethora of challenges, not only on the operational but also on the sociocultural level, as soldiers have to show intercultural competence, be loyal to their nation and, at the same time, integrate themselves into the multinational forces. The main assumption of the article is that military personnel are, step by step and with every mission, socialized and initiated into a multinational peacekeeping military culture - a process which will in due course result in a true "transnational military identity" established alongside national identities and which will help to diminish intercultural problems.

The 1st German-Netherlands Corps in Munster serves as an example of cooperation in a longstanding formation. René Moelker's and Schelte van Ruiten's interest lies in the perception of lower ranking Dutch soldiers in the special situation of a bi-national cooperation. The cooperation is successful -within the limits of its natural ups and downs- and the operational and cultural compatibility between the two nations seems to be no obstacle for cooperation. However, a 'redefinition of the we' has not taken place. There is reluctance to accept a collective identity. The findings seem to support the hypothesis of Earley and Mosakowski, who propose an upright U-shaped relationship between team heterogeneity and effectiveness. Given enough time to work together, homogeneous and highly heterogeneous teams will be more effective than moderately heterogeneous ones.

Delphine Resteigne and Joseph Soeters describe in their article the daily life of Belgian soldiers deployed in Tibnin, South-Lebanon. They underline certain issues related to multicultural interaction, first among Belgians and, second with their foreign counterparts. Among Belgians, the mixed context of the mission (different units, specialities, languages, period of rotations) was not always easy to cope with but, in general, Belgian troops were positive about the mission and about the effectiveness of their presence. Some negative comments were still reported, particularly from the force protection detachment, about the

routine character of their job and the functioning of UN structures. Being under the UN flag is not without consequences for military personnel who generally seem to be more at ease in a NATO mission. The authors conclude that the whole range of countries under the UNIFIL mandate generates more difficulties connected to significant cultural and organizational differences among countries.

In the panel "educational and leadership aspects" two articles were presented. The goal of the article by Yantsislav Yanakiev is twofold: first, to identify possible organizational and cultural barriers that occur in the integration of Bulgarian Armed Forces units in multinational missions; second, to formulate recommendations to improve the education and training for effective multinational teamwork of the Bulgarian military leaders. He sees four important factors for effective leadership in multinational forces: 1. Joint education of the military leaders is a key factor in improving the effectiveness of multinational operations. 2. The development of cultural competencies should be incorporated as an essential part of professional military education and pre-deployment training. 3. Leadership training is among the most important factors to improve the effectiveness of coalition operations. 4. Overall language preparation, as well as specialized English language training, is one of the serious problems challenging the integration of the Bulgarian armed forces in the multinational environment.

Stefan Seiler concentrates in his article on the determining factors of intercultural leadership and develops a theoretical framework. His assumption is that the multinational environment calls for additional leadership competencies compared to a mono-cultural environment, in particular when it comes to interpersonal communication, problem solving and decision making. In his model, intercultural competent leadership behaviour is based on individual intercultural competencies, the ability to understand and manage the dynamics of a team, the capacity to work in a given organizational setup and to improve it where possible, the understanding of the importance of the general context of the mission and the skill to make appropriate situational assessments. In this sense intercultural dilemma training is a promising way to increase a leader's ability to act effectively in this complex net of influencing variables of successful leadership behaviour.

Part 5 – the last section of the publication – focuses on the effectiveness of missions. Anthony King describes the paradox of

multinationality. Using the Korean War in the fifties as an example, he explains the difficulties facing multinational forces. He believes that a common strategic goal can overcome the potentially paralysing effects of multinationality. NATO members must unify themselves around clear strategic objectives, as in the case of Afghanistan. At the same time, they must unite themselves ever more closely around common concepts and practices so that they pursue these ends in compatible ways and are able to cooperate with each other. But King is critical regarding the multinational element of the armed forces and he suggests minimizing it by the introduction of a framework nation principle in operational headquarters and tactical forces. In the end, multinational forces need to develop a shared collective memory of themselves which coordinates their current action, uniting forces around a shared understanding of themselves and enforcing compliance with one other by publicly shaming non-contributors and honouring the willing.

In the view of Kobi Michael, contemporary operations demand broad and coherent cooperation between military forces and non-military organizations (different kinds of NGOs and international organizations). Such cooperation must be based on a deep understanding of the local population and its culture as well as the required mechanisms and principles for winning hearts and minds. Operating in violent conflict theatres compels intervening peacekeeping forces and organizations to increase and develop their efforts. Extra efforts are required to establish and improve cooperation and the effectiveness of intervening actors. The new missions demand rapid adaptation to changes in the dynamic environment and therefore planners must take into account the four major elements to make a mission successful: Mandate – its clarity, legitimacy and authorities; Means – qualified and trained manpower, equipment and intelligence; Professionalism – doctrine/strategy, training and knowledge; and the Arena – local population and institutions, local culture, NGOs and international organizations and other military forces in the coalition.

4.   Main Findings

The different presentations by the participants highlight different levels of challenges in cooperation.

The biggest challenges – it seems – are within the host nation. The UN, NGOs and IOs have longstanding experience with the national

military contributors concerned, which can minimize frictions between the civilian world and the military world. The smaller problems and challenges are found among the different armies in the field. The military as an organization is fairly similar in most nations. And as far NATO is concerned, standardized procedures have been implemented for years. The participants shared the opinion that, all in all, smooth cooperation within various national armed forces is possible. But if the level of intensity is high, than multinational armies have their limits.

If we look at a mission, we can identify at least three main phases: intervention, when the main work is done by the militaries; reconstruction, with shared responsibilities; and rebuilding, which should be managed to a greater extent by civilian organizations. Multinational / multicultural forces seem to be more successful in the last two phases, whereas in the high intensity phase the national lead principle plays a more important role.

Sociological researches related to military-military challenges have been conducted in standing formations like the 1 German Netherlands Corps in Munster (1 (GE/NL) Corps), or at courses at Military Schools and Colleges[232], or in conflict zones, by ad-hoc formations, mostly in Kosovo, Bosnia, East-Timor, and Afghanistan.[233] This research field is relatively new and different case studies exist, but there is no comprehensive approach to compare the various missions and the cultural challenges which the various armed forces are facing in the theatre.

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[232] Vom Hagen, Ulrich (2006), "Communitate Valemus – The Relevance of Professional Trust, Collective Drills & Skills, and Task Cohesion within Integrated Multinationality", in: Vom Hagen, Ulrich; Moelker, René; Soeters, Joseph (eds.) (2006), *Cultural Interoperability*., pp. 53-95; Soeters, Joseph; Recht, Ricardo (2001), "Convergence or divergence in the multinational classroom? Experiences from the military", *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, Vol. 25, no. 4, July 2001, pp. 423-440.

[233] Ballard, John R. (2002), "Mastering Coalition Command in Modern Peace Operations: Operation "Stabilise" in East Timor", *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 13, no. 1, Spring 2002, Frank Cass Taylor and Co. Ltd, London, pp. 83-101; Essens, Peter; Vogelaar, Ad; Tanercan, Erhan; Winslow, Donna (eds.) (2002), *The Human in Command: Peace Support Operations*, Mets & Schilt, Amsterdam and KMA Royal Netherlands Military Academy, Breda. Sion, Liora (2006); "Too Sweet and Innocent for War"?, *Dutch Peacekeepers and the Use of Violence. Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 32, no. 3, April 2006, pp. 454-474; Soeters, Joseph; Resteigne, Delphine; Moelker, René; Manigart, Philippe (2006), "Smooth and Strained International Military Co-operation", in Vom Hagen, Ulrich; Moelker, René; Soeters, Joseph (eds.) (2006), *Cultural Interoperability*, pp. 131-161; Soeters, Joseph; Tanerçan, Erhan; Varoğlu, Kadir; Siğri, Ünsal (2004), "Turkish-Dutch Encounters in Peace Operations", *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, no. 2, (Summer 2004), Taylor & Francis Ltd, London, pp. 354-368.

Effectiveness is crucial for a military mission. In multicultural missions, effectiveness depends on successful cooperation among all the armed forces involved. NATO's experience in the field has proved that effectiveness implies no delays in deployment, well trained national forces, clear political objectives, and a unified command structure. Furthermore, military action requires a close relationship between intelligence and operations, a fluent, functioning decision-making machine, and forces with experience of working together to perform dangerous and complex tasks. Moreover, operational risks can be mitigated by the increase of intelligence about the mission area and by more robust operations, which would cost more initially but would be better able to deter violence. In addition, NATO's effectiveness depends on whether or not burdens are distributed equitably.

What are the beneficial but also the critical factors in multinational / multicultural missions? Both researchers and practitioners agreed that political legitimacy and cost-effectiveness are among the most important advantages of multinational coalitions. At the same time, the operational effectiveness of multinational forces has been a controversial issue over a rather long period. There was also wide consensus on possible sources of inefficiency in coalition operations. To sum up: on the basis of the discussions during the conference, attention should be paid to the following:

- The political end state should be absolutely clear and shared. The military mission should follow the mandate and serve the political goals as defined by the international authorities.
- A broad knowledge must be developed of the area of military operations, including aspects related to geography, demography, socio-economics, culture, customs, traditions and religion.
- Communication between the military, international organizations, NGOs, local authorities and the media is crucial for the positive outcome of a mission.
- Past peace operations have proved that well trained and well disciplined armed forces are accepted by the local population and can work better with soldiers from other nations.
- Success normally comes to those who train together for a common mission. Specific pre-deployment "mission" training, cross-training, combined exercises and seminars are key training factors in

interoperability and success in missions. More general intercultural training is needed, not special training.

- Homogeneous and highly heterogeneous teams will be more effective than moderately heterogeneous ones.
- Participants should be provided with intensive training, especially as regards language skills (in a common language, normally English). Language training should focus not only on the language problems themselves (difficulties in understanding the use of slang, abbreviations, etc.) but also on culturally based cognition biases and perceptions. In a critical situation people tend to speak in their own language.
- The personality of the commander and personal relationships are very important: Common activities have a positive influence on social interaction. They foster integration and multinational contacts; e.g. eating and drinking together or sports competitions.
- The differences in leadership styles and training models influence effective teamwork in a multinational setting.
- For effective sharing of responsibility, trust in the other national armed forces is extremely important.
- An operation needs time, both during the planning and the conducting phases. Handover should be well planned.
- Women in military missions: this is a very important consideration in the countries of the Middle East, where there are specific traditions and customs regarding women.