NATO, OSCE, EU:
ROLE MODELS FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA?

BJØRN MØLLER

Paper for the ***Collaborative Security in Africa***
(Forthcoming from the Institute of Global Dialogue, IGD, South Africa)

Preliminary version, Not for quotation
Comments welcome to bmoeller@copri.dk

Contents

1 INTRODUCTION 3
1.1 EUROPE: FROM WAR TO PEACE 3
1.2 INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECHTURE 4
2 THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION 6
2.1 THE COLD WAR (1949-1990) 6
2.2 AFTER THE COLD WAR (1990-TODAY) 9
2.3 NATO TODAY AND TOMORROW 15
2.4 LESSONS FOR AFRICA? 17
3 THE EUROPEAN UNION 18
3.1 AN EXPANSIVE SECURITY COMMUNITY 18
3.2 THE EU AND CONFLICT PREVENTION 20
3.3 THE MILITARY DIMENSION 22
3.4 THE EU TODAY AND TOMORROW 26
3.5 LESSONS FOR AFRICA? 26
4 ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 28
4.1 THE CSCE AND DÉTENTE 28
4.2 THE SECURITY BASKET 30
4.3 FROM CSCE TO OSCE 32
4.4 THE OSCE TODAY AND TOMORROW 34
4.5 LESSONS FOR AFRICA 35
5 CONCLUSION: LEARNING FROM EUROPE? 36
6 ENDNOTES 37

1 INTRODUCTION

Europe is special in several important respects. Hence, one should always be cautious about using the European experience as a model for other regions. Nevertheless, there may be some lessons to be learned, and these will be highlighted in the following. The paper focuses on those aspects of the European experience which appear particularly relevant for security in a moderately enlarged sense of the term. The suggestions of what may be relevant for (Southern) Africa are deliberately very tentative, as this is a question that the Africans themselves will have to resolve.

1.1 Europe: From War to Peace

Until quite recently, Europe was one of the least secure places in the world. Just remember the Thirty Years´ War, the Napoleonic Wars and the two world wars of the 20th century, each of which was at its time a disaster without precedents in human history.

Even though the Cold War has been described by some as a "long peace",[1] its "peace" was built on the risk of mutual annihilation in a nuclear conflagration. It thus hardly deserves the label "negative peace", much less that of "positive peace".[2] Moreover, the peace did not extend much beyond Europe, but left most of the Third World with little peace to speak of. Indeed, the relative peace in Europe may even have come at the expense of the Third World, which was used as a convenient battleground for "proxy wars" between the two bipolar blocs as, for instance, happened in Angola [3]

Gradually, however, most of Europe was transformed from a "conflict formation" into what Karl Deutsch aptly labelled a "security community", defined as a group of states "where there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way"—i.e. almost synonymous with what others have called a "zone of peace".[4] While certain parts of Europe remain outside this community (the Balkans, for instance), the very fact that a community has emerged and apparently grown in most of Europe is significant and in need of explanation.

Several explanations recommend themselves as inherently plausible.

- Europe may simply have "learned the lesson" that war is a futile, costly and destructive endeavour.[5]
- Europe now consists almost entirely of such democracies as, according to "democratic peace theory", never (or at least very rarely)

wage war against each other.[6]

- Europe also contains mostly such "trading states" as (according to another version of "liberal peace theory") are unlikely to go to war[7]—especially against each other, and even more unlikely to do so when they have become truly interdependent.[8]

In the present paper, however, the focus is placed on a fourth explanation, namely that war has been prevented by virtue of the presence of instututions and regional organisations,[9] more specifically NATO, the EU and the OSCE. Even if a case can be made to this effect, this would not contradict the other theories, as it is quite possible that European peace has been "overdetermined", i.e. that there are several sufficient, but not one necessary, cause of the same phenomenon.

1.2 Institutional Architechture

If institutions matter, the density and configuration of a region's institutional "superstructure" is surely a matter of some signifcance.

Even during the Cold War, Europe had far more, and generally stronger, organisations than any other region of the world, some of which were all-European while others were "half-European", i.e. comprising members of one of the two opposing blocks.[10] However, the entire institutional setup was completely transformed by the end of the Cold War around 1989-1991.

- The organisations of the East, i.e. the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, better known as the Comecon) simply vanished into thin air. Having never been voluntary in the same sense as the organisations of the West, there was nothing to keep them in existence once the Soviet Union decided not to use force as a means to preserve them.[11]
- New opportunities seemed to open up for institutions with an all-European scope, most importantly the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), which was transformed from a series of conferences into a permanent organisation, the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe).
- Other organisations which had been intimately tied to the East-West conflict (especially NATO) saw their very ***raison d'être*** being questioned, hence embarked on a quest for new roles.
- Some organisations (e.g. both NATO and the EU) were flooded with applications from prospective new members and thus apparently had the option of transforming themselves from western to pan-European.
- For a short while, it seemed as if the United Nations might be given the means to perform the tasks originally assigned to it, which would have added question marks to the roles of regional organisations such as

those in Europe.

From this confusion arose a debate about the relationship between the various institutions, often referred to as institutional "architecture". In reality, however, the division of labour among the various organisations came about more by chance than according to plan, and it often took the form of "buck-passing". The optimistic vision of "interlocking institutions" was thus partly superseded by a pessimistic one of "inter-blocking institutions", e.g. in relations with the Balkans.[12]

This pessimism may well be self-fulfilling because of what one might call ""the Catch 22 of organisations". For member states to confer authority to, and provide resources for, an organisation it must perform "satisfactorily". This is entirely understandable as political decision-makers are accountable to their electorates, hence must be able to justify any allocation of tax-payers' resources. However, unless member states confer the authority and allocate the requisite resources to them, organisations are unable to pass the test.

Not only does this problem arise in comparisons between unilateral action by individual states and multilateral action through organisations such as the UN, giving rise to claims that "the US can do, the UN cannot".[13] It also affects the choice between organisations, as when NATO member states dismiss the UN as a suitable instrument for "crisis management" and intervention, with reference to the UN's lack of the military means which NATO possesses.[14] The explanation of this is, of course, that member states have themselves chosen to assign their forces to NATO rather than to the UN. This observation should be kept in mind in the following description and comparison of NATO, the EU and the OSCE.

Table 1: Membership of NATO, EU, OSCE and CIS

NATO + OSCE		**CIS + OSCE**		
Canada	Norway	Armenia	Kazakhstan	Tajikistan
Czech Rep.	*Poland*	Azerbeijan	Moldova	Turkmenistan
Iceland	Turkey	Belarus	Kyrgyzstan	Ukraine
Hungary	USA	Georgia	Russia	Uzbekistan
NATO + EU + OSCE		**Only OSCE**		
Belgium	Italy	Albania	Holy See	*Romania
Denmark	Luxembourg	Andorra	**Latvia*	San Marino
France	Netherlands	Bosnia-Herz	Liechtenstein	**Slovakia*
Germany	Portugal	*Bulgaria	**Lithuania*	**Slovenia*
Greece	Spain	Croatia	Macedonia	Switzerland
UK		*Cyprus*	*Malta*	Yugoslavia
EU + OSCE		**Estonia*	Monaco	
Austria	Finland	*: Scheduled for NATO membership in 2004		
Ireland	Sweden	*Italics:* Scheduled for EU membership in 2004		

The membership of these three organisations in Europe is listed in Table 1 along with that of the successor to the former USSR, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The picture is one of a considerable overlap, as most European NATO members are also members of the EU and vice versa, just as all belong to the OSCE. However, the table also shows an clear division into "tiers" with most of the former Soviet Union and parts of the eastern block countries remaining on the sidelines. They are not at all, or at least too slowly, being admitted into NATO and/or the EU, regardless of their expressed wish to join a.s.a.p. This sets them apart from countries such as Norway or Sweden, who would surely be most welcome in the EU and NATO, respectively, but who have chosen not to join.

The comparative strengths and weaknesses of NATO, the EU and the OSCE may be summarised as in Table 2.

Table 2: NATO, EU and OSCE Compared	**NATO**	**EU**	**OSCE**
Legitimacy	Controversial	High	High
Military power	Very strong	Potentially strong	Weak
Other power	Weak	Very strong	Weak
Security function	Hard	Soft (+ hard)	Soft

Perhas unfortunately, this does not point towards any such hierarchical subordination of organisations under each other as might bring some "order" into the picture. Those organisations with the highest (or, perhaps better, least controversial) legitimacy are not militarily strong, but have their strength in the realm of "soft security" which is often regarded as inferior to "hard security". Conversely, the militarily strongest organisation is also the most controversial in terms of legitimacy. Rather than any hierarchical order among organisations we should thus probably hope for a certain functional division of responsbilities.

2 THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

This section is devoted to NATO, its rationale, basic structure, membership and missions—all with due attention paid to the inherent dilemmas and continuing controversies. The account is subdivided into two main sections, covering the Cold War and its aftermath, for which no appropriate term has yet been found, and which is therefore referred to as "the post-Cod War period". It concludes with some tentative suggestions for what might be relevant lessons for Africa in general and the SADC region in particular.

2.1 The Cold War (1949-1990)

NATO was founded in 1949, i.e. at a time when all illusions about the

“new world order” after the carnage of the Second World War had dissipated, the East-West conflict had developed into a veritable cold war, and sincere fears of a hot war were widespread on both sides of the “iron curtain” which separated the two parts of Europe.[15]

Even though the Soviet threat loomed large in the minds of western politicians, it was not the only rationale for the creation of NATO, but three different rationales are usually referred to (first outlined by then Secretary General Lord Ismay)—to “keep Russia out, America in and Germany down”. For obvious reasons, this threefold rationale called for a broad panoply of means.

To “keep the Russians out” was not initially seen as a predominantly military task, as the Soviet threat was viewed by George Kennan and others in the early post-war period as mainly a political threat, closely related to the emergence of strong communist parties. Even though “containment” was thus initially seen as a political strategy for meeting a political threat (and for which an organisation such as NATO would not be suitable),[16] the emphasis soon shifted to the presumed military threat posed by the huge Soviet conventional forces in Europe. Deterrence of an attack was (proably wrongly)[17] believed to be beyond the capabilities of the European countries, even if they were to pool their resources for collective defence.[18]

Throughout NATO’s history numerous decisions have indeed been taken which obliged NATO members to increase their defence budgets and military capabilities, but none of them has ever been implemented—a plausible explanation being that the matter was governed by the so-called “logic of collective action”. As the security provided by deterrence was a “public good” it was in each state’s interest to let the others carry most of the burden of providing it, i.e. to be “free-riders”. Hence the total defence potential of an alliance such as NATO was bound to amount to less than the sum of that of its members.[19]

Because of this inability of the Europeans to muster the force levels deemed necessary, the most important means to keep Russia out was therefore to “keep the United States in”, preferably with forces forward deployed in Europe. Given the long US tradition of neutrality (codified in the 1823 Monroe Doctrine)[20] and of military improvisation rather than preparedness,[21] it was far from obvious that the United States would be prepared to link its security to that of Western Europe in peacetime, and even less self-evident that it would be willing to do so by military means.[22] Gradually, however, the USA came to accept this, which led to its drafting, signing and duly ratifying the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, article 5 of which obliged the United States (as well as everybody else) to the following:

> The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them (...) will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

The United States also, somewhat reluctantly, came around to acnowledging the need for stationing a substantial part of its armed forces in Europe as well as (for similar reasons) in Korea.[23] Even more important, however, was ensuring a credible US deterrence, mainly by nuclear means, for which a forward deployment was also regarded as suitable—as this would face a US president with a "use'm or lose'm" choice of either using the nukes or seeing them rendered useless by invading Soviet forces.[24] After some vacillation and disagreements about the original nuclear strategy (labelled "massive retaliation"), the role of nuclear deterrence was in 1967 codified in the "Flexible Response" strategy.[25]

Neither the reliance on nuclear deterrence nor the US commitment to the "defence" of Europe came for free, however. First of all, while nuclear deterrence relieved the European members of NATO from the need to match Soviet conventional forces with all the costs that this would have entailed, it also entailed an incalculable risk that deterrence might fail. If this had happened, several studies have demonstrated the immense destruction that a nuclear war in Europe would have caused, even if it were to have remained "limited".[26] Secondly, even though the North Atlantic Treaty was formally based on the equality of its members, some members were clearly "more equal than others". As the "producer" and net provider of security, the United States certainly felt (and probaby was) entitled to a greater say on alliance matters than its European allies, all of whom were "net consumers" of security. NATO thus became a vehicle for US hegemony over Western Europe.[27]

The third rationale for NATO was to "keep Germany down". That its neighbours (not least France) wanted to prevent a resurgent German threat was both obvious and understandable, but just how to achieve this was controversial. It was initially attempted through a complete disarmament of the defeated (and divided) Germany, but there were serious drawbacks to this method Not only did the historical precedent of the Versailles Treaty not really invite emulation, as it had fed German resentment and ***revanchism*** without being able to prevent the eventual rearmament of Nazi Gemany.[28] A German military contribution was also seen as indispensable for the deterrence of the USSR from an attack against Western Europe—and especially so as the faith in the credibility of nuclear deterrence began to recede with the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.[29]

NATO attempted to "square the circle" by creating a Germany that was strong enough to help deter the USSR, but not strong enough to threaten its smaller neighbours. The means to this end was to meticulously "embed" the new German ***Bundeswehr*** in NATO's integrated military structures. Not only was the FRG not allowed a national general staff, but its forces were also deployed in such a way as to make it impossible for them to operate independently—at considerable expence for the rest of NATO in terms of military efficiency.[30] Moreover, as it was considered politically imperative to treat Germany no differently from the other members, all members were (more or less) subsumed under the integrated command structures. France, however, withdrew in 1967, but it remained a member of NATO's political structure. In the 1980s it strengthened its collaboration with Germany, thereby indirectly moving closer to the rest of NATO.[31]

Even though we may never know to what extent either objective was actually called for,[32] it was certainly no small accomplishment that NATO that it thus managed to simultaneously keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down . When the Cold War finally came to an end around 1989, however, one might have expected NATO to celebrate "a job well done" and dissolve itself. This has obviously not appened, to which enigma the following section is devoted.

2.2 After the Cold War (1990-today)

Since 1990, NATO has undergone quite a profound transformation, both with regard to membership and to missions.

Among the first challenges facing NATO was that of membership. As emerges from Table 3, this was not the first time this issue had been addressed, but NATO had throughout its existence been "moderately expansive".

Table 3: NATO Membership	
1949	Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the USA
1952	Greece, Turkey
1955	Germany (FRG)
1982	Spain
1990	East Germany (GDR, through unification with the FRG)
1999	Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland

Geopolitical and balance-of-power considerations had led to the admission of first Greece and Turkey and then West Germany, whereas the accession date for Spain (which already had a bilateral military relationship with the United States) had more to do with domestic politics, ***in casu*** the replacement of the Franco dictatorship with

democracy. Not that democracy had always been a ***sine qua non*** of membership, as both Portugal, Greece and Turkey had also had their periods of military rule. Unless there were other compelling reasons to admit states, however, NATO certainly preferred ***bona fide*** democracies.

With the end of the Cold War and German unification, the former East Germany (German Democratic Republic, GDR) joined NATO "by default", i.e. by being incorporated into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), albeit with some temporary constraints with regard to the deployment of NATO forces on its territory.[33] Apart from this, however, NATO was far from eager to admit new members, but the alliance had the matter forced upon it in the form of numerous applications for membership sent by former "enemies", who had now come to embrace the Western values of democracy and market economy. While it was very difficult to refuse such membership applications, NATO was also aware of the problems which admitting former Warsaw Pact members might entail for its relationship with Russia. Hence, its chosen strategy was one of procrastination.[34]

As a rather inadequate substitute for an enlargement, a new affiliate organisation was created to include former Warsaw Pact members: the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Being little more than a forum for discussions (mostly for parliamentarians) NACC was, however, a very far cry from such iron-clad security guarantees as were obviously what the applicants wanted.[35] Subsequenly, NATO therefore established another affiliate with a little more military substance, namely the Partnership for Peace (PfP), under the auspices of which various (small and low-key) military exercises and other forms of practical cooperation have taken place. Most of this has been intended for "pegagogical purposes", and it has included not only actual and "wannabe" NATO members, but also self-defined neutrals.[36]

Moreover, in order to allay Russian concerns, NATO in 1997 signed the ***Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation***, tantamount to a "special reationship" with Russia. Both sides committed themselves to "refrain from the threat or use of force against each other as well as against any other state". Arguably, both sides have subsequently broken this pledge—NATO with regard to Yugoskavia and Russia ***vis-a-vis*** Chechnya. A similar treaty was signed with the Ukraine.[37] As a corollary thereof, the PfP was slightly restructured and renamed Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).[38]

In its negotiations and pre-negotiations with possible future members, NATO consistently placed demands on the applicants which the actual members had never been expected to meet, e.g. with regard to standardisation and interoperability. This was even more paradoxical

and unfair than it might appear at first glance, as the actual need for interoperability was surely much less urgent in the relatively peaceful post-Cold War period than it had been at a time when NATO might have been involved in a war "to the death" against a foe as powerful as the Soviet Union—but when very little progress was ever made in terms of standardisation.[39] A consequence of this new demand for standardisation was that prospective members such as Hungary and Poand (and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the Czech Republic) were presurred to effectively dismantle their defence industries (under the parole of "conversion") and thus forced to bail out the endangered western (and especially American) arms industries.[40]

The actual decision to admit new members was only taken in 1997 and implemented in conjunction with the 50th anniversary of the alliance in April 1999. By that time, however, NATO had been transformed from a strictly defensive alliance into something diffrerent and more ominous, certainly as seen from Moscow or Belgrade—or New Delhi or Beijing for that matter (***vide infra***).

Subsequenly, "membership action plans" have been formulated for Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, FYROM/Macedonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, all pointing towards membership at an indefinte point in the future. The next actual enlargement was aggreed to at the Prague Summit, 21-22 November 2002, where invitations were extended to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

This process of gradual enlargement lends itself to different interpretations. Either it represents the initial steps in a transformation of a subregional ***collective defence*** organisation into an all-European ***collective security*** arrangement—or it may represent nothing more than geopolitical expansion, leaving NATO as an alliance for collective defence, only larger and stronger. Whether it is one or the other depends, inter alia, on whether it is directed against external threats or enemies, or whether it serves merely to preserve the peace among its members.[41]

NATO's missions have undergone an equally profound transformation after the Cold War, in all three of the above "dimensions".

- With the signing of the CFE Treaty (see below under OSCE) the military balance of power changed so dramatically in the West's favour that "keeping the Russians out" (i.e. deterring them from attack) became so easy as to no longer warrant the continued existence of an organisation such as NATO. Moreover, after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1989 most of Eastern Europe simply "crossed the floor" to side with the West, thereby further

improving the balance of power. Finally, the dissolution in 1991 of the USSR itself and the subsequent transition of Russia to democracy and market economy rendered balance-of-power considerations completely irrelevant. It simply became undesirable to keep Russia out of Europe, in whatever sense. What mattered was rather to "keep the Russians in", i.e. to strengthen the "European" or "Western" elements on the Russian political scene in their ongoing struggle with the "Eurasians". This required engagement rather than containment.[42]

- "Keeping the Americans in" was no longer necessary. No longer was there any real need for US security guarantees, and certainly not for any "coupling mechanisms" in the shape of US forces or nuclear weapons stationed on European soil.[43] A continued American presence or involvement in European affairs might, at best, play a certain role in preventing a re-nationalisation of security and defence policies, but this was already unlikely for other reasons, mainly as a result of the progressive EU integration.
- "Keeping the Germans down" after German unification became both superfluous and impossible. Superfluous because the FRG was itself very eager to prevent any re-nationalisation of its security and defence policy; and impossible because the FRG would obviously be in a position to "go national" (i.e. become a "normal state"), if it should choose to.

This left NATO in urgent need to define new missions. When he was Secretary General of NATO Manfred Wörned had argued that the alliance had to go "out of area or out of business". As there was simply no credible threat to the security of any of the members, the security guarantees around which NATO had been built were no longer important enough to anybody (and especially not to the old members) to justify NATO's continued existence.

Going "out of area", however, also meant venturing beyond the familiar (and legal) field of defence. As an alternative, the alliance appointed itself the guarantor of "stability" in all of Europe, entailing ***inter alia*** a certain "obligation" to help bring about peace in the former Yugoslavia, i.e. in what was effectively (albeit not in legal terms) ***intra***state conflicts, whereas the alliance had been tailored for ***inter***state war. To which extent to go out of area and wage wars rather than preserving peace, however, was somewhat controversial.

In preparation of the 1999 anniversary summit, the United States apparently sought to persuade its European allies to relinquish some of the constraints embedded in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, including its paragraph one:

> The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

U.S. Senator William Roth, in his capacity as President of the North Atlantic Council, in October 1998 published a report ***NATO in the 21st Century*** which undoubtedly reflected the American vision for NATO.[44] It contained, inter alia, the following recommendations:

> NATO's purpose is to defend values and interests, not just territory (...) NATO must preserve its freedom to act: The Allies must always seek to act in unison, preferably with a mandate from the United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the framework for collective security in Europe. Even though all NATO member states undoubtedly would prefer to act with such a mandate, they must not limit themselves to acting only when such a mandate can be agreed. All NATO actions should nonetheless be based on appropriate legal authority.

The formulation was, of course, utter nonsense, as there is no other "legal authority" than the UN Security Council which can legitimately issue an authorisation to use force. In spite of the illegality thereof, from the autumn of 1998 until the launcing of the attack on 24 March 1999, all NATO members appeared prepared to go along with first the threat and subsequently the actual use of force against Yugoslavia.

However, NATO's poor military performance in this war[45] seems to have tempered the interventionist urge considerably by the time of the anniversary summit in Washington, 23-24 April 1999. Even though some of the ideas and formulations of the ***Roth Report*** were retained in the documents from this meeting, the general tenor was somewhat more moderate. In the ***Washington Declaration***, it was thus solemnly proclaimed that

> (4) We reaffirm our faith, as stated in the North Atlantic Treaty, in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and reiterate our desire to live in peace with all nations, and to settle any international dispute by peaceful means.[46]

The new ***Strategic Concept*** which was decided on the same occasion went a little further in the direction of the Roth Report with formulations such as the following:

> (49) In contributing to the management of crises through military operations, the Alliance's forces will have to deal with a complex and diverse range of actors, risks, situations and demands, including humanitarian emergencies. Some non-Article 5 crisis response operations may be as demanding as some collective defence missions. (...)[47]

The so-called “non-article 5 operations” were, of course, a neologism for military intervention. On balance, however, the decisions were more moderate than what one might have expected, and certainly more moderate than the USA would have wanted, also because both documents contained references to the UN's supreme authority:

> We reaffirm our faith, as stated in the North Atlantic Treaty, in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and reiterate our desire to live in peace with all nations, and to settle any international dispute by peaceful means. (***The Washington Declaration***, art 4)
> In fulfilling its purpose and fundamental security tasks, the Alliance will continue to respect the legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set out in the Charter of the United Nations.(...) The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, as such, plays a crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. (***The Alliance's Strategic Concept***, articles 11 and 15)

As the entire war against Yugoslavia was such a dismal failure, it thus seems reasonable to assume that NATO will think twice before embarking on a similar intervention.[48] It has nevertheless agreed to proceed with creating the means for such operations.

NATO's military posture was previously, for obvious reasons, designed for a major war, waged by all NATO states in an integrated fashion against the Warsaw Pact along the Central Front in Europe—a scenario which is obviously no longer relevant. For interventionist purposes, the requirements are quite different. There is no need for all member states to take part in such operations which could be undertaken by “coalitions of the willing”; they require lighter, and exclusively conventional, forces (fewer tanks and no nukes, for instance); but the need for transport facilities may be greater. NATO's answer to this has been the development of its CJTF concept for the use of Combined Joint Task Forces.[49] Its actual utility, however, remains to be demonstrated.

In both Bosnia and Kosovo NATO “blundered into disaster” in the erroneous belief that a combination of threat diplomacy and aerial bombardments would do the trick. They did not, even though the eventual capitulation of Serbia allowed NATO to uphold the illusion that its strategy had worked. As a corollary of its two Balkan “victories”, NATO also had to go into the “business” of peacekeeping, mandated by the UN but outsourced to NATO in IFOR and SFOR (in Bosnia) and KFOR in Kosovo—in all three cases with the participation of non-members.[50] While several NATO countries (e.g. Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands and Canada) had a long experience and considerable skills

in such missions, they have all acquired these outside the NATO framework. Other NATO members have more modest experiences and



the "alliance supremo" (the USA) has virtually none and a clear propensity to get it wrong whenever it tries.

NATO became involved, in a far less dramatic fashion, in what was effectively "post-conflict peace-building" in Macedonia. Even though it committed no glaring mistakes in the course of this mission, its accomplishments were also rather modest. In the course of a month's deployment of 3,500 troops for this "Operation Essential Harvest", the Alliance managed to collect as many (or few) as 3,875 light weapons (mostly old AK47s) from (its former allies in the Kosovo war) the UCK, i.e. about one weapon per NATO soldier.[51] While this was certainly useful, it may not really suffice to prove the continued utility of an alliance standing for around two thirds of the world's military exenditures (see Chart 1).[52]

2.3 NATO Today and Tomorrow

The first time NATO's mutual assistance pledge (article 5 of the treaty) was ever activated was in response to the 11 September terrorist attack

against the United States. The Alliance chose to regard this as one of those attacks which they were all committed to "consider an attack against them all".[53] As it happened, however, the United States, while appreciating the diplomatic support, did not really want a military NATO contribution to its "war against terrorism". NATO as such did disatch a number of AWACS surveillance aircraft to help patrol the US airspace, thereby freeing some US planes for the war against the Taleban in Afghanistan; and parts of NATO's "Standing Naval Forces" were deployed to the eastern Mediterranean "in support of US operations", but in fact rather as their replacement, so that the US Navy had more ships to deploy to the Persian Gulf. All member states further granted the United States the right to use their airspace and various ground-based facilities, and individual member states offered the contribution of troops and/or equipment for the war in Afghanistan, some of which offers were accepted by the USA. What became operational was, however, a "coalition of the willing" comprising also non-member states, whereas NATO as such played a distinctly minor role in the Afghan war.

Part of the explanation was undoubtedly that the United States did not want to have to operate though NATO channels, but preferred its own chain of command, but it surely also mattered that the military strategies within NATO diverge. There is nothing new about this, as NATO has on several previous occasions seen a similar divergence—as when the USA effectively switched from "Massive Retaliation" to Flexible Response in the early 1960s, but only received a NATO endorsement thereof in 1967; or when it in 1982 unilaterally replaced "Active Defence" with its own "Airland Battle" (ALB) doctrine.[54] As the present juncture, the United States holds beliefs about the role of air power and about the promises of the so-called "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) which are not really shared by its allies.[55]

This strategic or operational disagreement as well as a more general one about the advisability of war is also the reason why it seems highly unlikely that the USA will receive any NATO endorsement of its planned war against Iraq, much less any actual military contribution from the Alliance as such. At the NATO Summit in November 2002, a resolution was passed on Iraq which contained strong support for the United Nations, but promised no NATO support for a unilateral American attack against Iraq.

Moreover, it was decided to establish a small "NATO Response Force" (NRF) with initial operational capability in 2004 and expected to be fully operational by 2006. Even though this the fighth against terrorism was listed among its rationales, it remains to be seen whether it will actually come to play a role.

The time may thus be running out for NATO, which is not to say

that its dissolution is imminent. Rather than dismantling a military alliance which is not really needed any longer, member states may well decide to retain it, albeit relegated to do “menial jobs” such as peace-keeping, outsourced from other international organisations which might just as well have performed these jobs themselves if only NATO member countries had allowed them to do so, and provided them with those military contributions that they have chosen to reserve for NATO.

2.4 Lessons for Africa?

As will appear from the above it would seem to make little sense for Africa to try to emulate NATO, for several reasons:

- Even though it also had internal functions, NATO was primarily directed towards an external threat. There are, fortunately, no such threats to Africa (any longer), neither from within nor from the outside. To create a collective defence organisation that would not encompass all states is likely to alienate non-members, and the more so the more offensive capabilities the alliance would include. Without long-range power protection capabilities, the alliance would not be able to do the job; but with such capabilities it would almost automatically constitute a latent threat to others.[56]
- NATO’s military strategy would neither be worthy of emulation nor possible to copy. Unworthy because it rested, for the entire duration of the Cold War, on nuclear deterrence which Africa has already decided (in the Pelindaba Treaty) to rule out.[57] Impossible because it would require huge increases in defence expenditures.
- A hegemonic arrangement similar to that of NATO might appear feasible both the West Africa (ECOWAS) and in Southern Africa (SADC), with Nigeria and South Africa playing in their respective sub-regions a role similar to that of the United States in NATO. However, not only is the RSA not in the same position of being able to extend a (nuclear or other) “umbrella” over the region,[58] as the costs thereof would be prohibtive and come at the expence of economic development. Such a role would also be resented by a number of other members, Zimbabwe playing a role within SADC similar (in some respects) to that of France within NATO.
- A “minimalist NATO” might be more appropriate as model, i.e. a “generic” collective defence pledge like that contained in article five of the North Atlantic Treaty, committing member states to regard an attack on either one as an attack on all—yet without any specific obligations and without any elaborate command structure.

There is thus not much to recommend NATO as a role model for Africa.

3 THE EUROPEAN UNION

The present European Union is arguably the most successful regional organisation in the world, but it is often regarded as an exclusively civilian organisation with little if any impact on security and conflict. Nothing could be more wrong, as the following will, hopefully, show.

3.1 An Expansive Security Community

The European project has all along been motivated by the desire for peace, as was made explicit in the 1952 "Schuman Declaration" which referred to the incipient European Coal and Steel Community (ESCE), the first building block of the present EU:

> Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. (...) The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe (...). The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible. [59]

The intention was thus to transform Europe from a conflict formation into a security community, starting with a "core" consisting of those two countries deemed most likely to end up at war with each other unless prevented from this—and to do so by furthering interdependency among them. This was, indeed, a very "indirect approach" to security—and especially so as interdependency and integration were supposed to proceed almost automatically.

Both "functionalists" and "neofunctionalists" thus imagined bureaucrats, technocrats and economic actors to be the main integrating actors who should be given as much freedom as possible to forge all sorts of cross-border links. Only in the case of crisis (e.g. when sovereignty was at stake) should issues be politicised,[60] according to this school of thought. Others, such as the "neoliberal intergovernmentalists", expected the process to be less smooth, but still to produce a gradual "pooling of sovereignty".[61]

The EU has already proceeded way beyond the "Westphalian model" of a state system, and today constitutes far more than a "pluralistic security community" in the traditional sense of a group of states among which war has become inconceivable (***vide supra***). Whether its progressive amalgamation will eventually produce a new "superstate" or, more likely, a polity ***sui generis*** remains to be seen.[62] In any case, the history of the European communities is clearly one of expansion, both in terms of institutional structure, membership, capacities and tasks (see tables 4 and 5).

Table 4: History of the European Communities: Highlights	
1952	European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
1958	European Economic Community (EEC)
1986	Single European Act
1993	European Union (Maastricht Treaty)
1999	Amsterdam Treaty
2000	Nice Treaty[63]

The membership of the EU has steadily been increased and the communities were, by the time of writing, approaching another round of enlargement. Contrary to NATO exansion, which has always been controversial, there have never been any serious objections (e.g. by Russia) to EU enlargement, perhaps by virtue of its almost exclusively civilian nature.[64]

Moreover, the very fact that the communities are, in principle, open to newcomers may be the EU's main contribution to European security—not so much ***doing*** something as ***being*** something, namely an immensely attractive market and community of nations. In order to join states have to meet various EU standards, not only in terms of their economies, but also with regard to democracy and human rights, including minority rights. The very prospects thereof may induce what has aptly been called “anticipatory adaptation” in the sense that would-be candidates strive to meet these standards by modifying their behaviour, even before actual membership negotiations commence—as Turkey has done with its recent reform package, e.g. abolishing the death penalty.[65]

Table 5: The EU: Membership

Present Members	

1952	Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy	
1973	Denmark, Ireland, UK	
1981	Greece	
1986	Portugal, Spain	
1995	Austria, Finland, Sweden	
Prospective Members		
2004 (?)	Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus Bulgaria, Romania	
2007 (?)		
Later	Turkey	

3.2 The EU and Conflict Prevention

The above does not, of course, imply that the EU does nothing, only that these activities are not the EU's most important contributions to peace in Europe.

The EU has gradually, and not without obstacles, developed a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and, as a corollary thereof, for instance, acheived a unified stance on the recognition on new states such as those in the Balkans.[66] The EU countries are, furthermore, consulting with each other as a caucus within other organisations such as the UN with a view to (but not always succeeding in) reaching a common position on most issues. Moreoever, the ministerial and summit meetings of the EU always pass resolutions on foreign policy issues which have over time become increasingly comprehensive and elaborate, probably reflecting a growing agreement on most issues.[67] Finally, the EU has established an office of the High Representative for CSFP, which is fused with the post as Council Secretary General and presently filled by former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana.[68]

While these are usually just related to single issues, the EU has also promoted various more comprehensive “stability pacts” and “partnerships”, mostly with countries on its periphery, as in the Stability Pact for Europe[69] and the more recent Stability Pact for Southern Europe, intended for post-conflict peace-building in the Balkans[70] or in the Euro-Mediterannean partnership agreements (under the auspices of the “Barcelona Processs”.[71] All of these initiatives are intended to promote peace and security “EU style”, i.e. by creating benign synergies between peace, prosperity, democracy and human rights as illustrated in Fig. 1.

Fig. 1: Benign Synergies



Peace is thus viewed as both a consequence of, and a precondiition (or at least a factor) of democracy, in its turn furthering human rights. Likewise, peace is seen as a precondition for, as well as a consequence of prosperity, based on the general principles of a market economy (but not necessarily "jungle style" capitalism), in its turn promoting both democracy and human rights, etc.

In its dealings with Africa the EU has largely followed the same strategy of "partnerships", intended to further similar benign synergies, as when it in 2000 met with the OAU and adopted the ***Cairo Declaration*** and ***Cairo Plan of Action***, in which it pledged to support the OAU's conflict prevention endeavours, to support programmes for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, including child soldiers, and to take steps to stem the illicit trade in, e.g. "conflict diamonds", small arms and light weapons.[72]

While most of the above fall into the category of what the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict called aptly called "structural conflict prevention", i.e. "strategies to address the root causes of deadly conflict", the EU has also more recently ventured into the field of "operational conflict prevention" (defined as "strategies in the face of crisis")[73] as well as conflict management. What it has done so far, apart from dispatching various mediation teams, e.g. to the Middle East, is mainly to pass a number of resolutions and other documents (listed in Table 6), the actual effect of which still remains to be demonstrated.

Table 6: Recent EU Documents on Conflict Management

1997	The "EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms"[74]
1998	"The Role of Development Cooperation in Strengthening Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution"[75]
1998	The "EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export"[76]
1998	"The European Union's Contribution to Combating the Destabilising Accumulation and Spread of Small arms and Light Weapons"[77]
1999	Council Resolution on Small Arms[78]
1999	"Co-operation with ACP Countries Involved in Armed Conflicts"[79]
2001	"Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development–An Assessment"[80]
2001	*Conflict Prevention* (Commission communication) [81]
2001	EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts[82]
2002	Check-list for Root Causes of Conflict[83]

The communication from the Commission on ***Conflict Prevention*** of 2001 contained a long list of recommendations for conflict prevention. Under the heading of "long-term prevention" it expressed the intention to

> (...) give higher priority to its support for regional integration and in particular regional organisations with a clear conflict prevention mandate;
> (...) ensure that its development policy and other co-operation programmes are more clearly focused on addressing root causes of conflict in an integrated way
> (....) implement, for countries showing conflict potential, more targeted actions, where appropriate, to open the way to a more favourable democratic environment.
> (...) play an increasingly active role in the security sector area. This will take the form of activities aiming at improving police services, promoting conversion, disarmament and non-proliferation both as regards weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons.
> (...) in post-conflict situations, concentrate EC assistance on the consolidation of peace and the prevention of future conflicts, in particular through rehabilitation programmes, child-related rehabilitation measures and DDR programmes as well as programmes supporting reconciliation processes.
> (...) give higher priority to its support aimed at controlling the spread of small arms.

Under the heading of "short term prevention" it mentioned regular reviews of potential conflict zones, including the establishment of early warning mechanisms, the use of preventive sanctions, systematic use of the political dialogue where a crisis appears imminent, the use of special representatives for mediation and training initiatives in the fields of rule of law and civil administration for personnel to be deployed in international missions.[84]

3.3 The Military Dimension

Until recently, however, the EU deliberately avoided military matters, even exempting arms production from its general industrial integration schemes,

and thus leaving the military aspects of security to NATO and/or the Western European Union (WEU).

The latter, for most of its existence, played virtually no role, as all of its members placed their faith in NATO. It was, however, resurrected from almost complete oblivion in 1984, mainly in order to serve as a convenient framework for an intensified Franco-German collaboration.[85] In connection with the EU's Maastricht Treaty of February 1992, the WEU was proclaimed to constitute "an integral part of" the EU—even though not all EU members had been, or even wanted to become, members of the EU. In June the same year the WEU formulated its future tasks, henceforth known as "Petersberg tasks", named after the venue of the meeting and comprising peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and crisis management.[86]

One of the impediments to faster progress in European defence collaboration has all along been (and remains) the ambivalent US attitude. On the one hand, the United States wants its European allies to shoulder a larger part of the total "burden" of collective defence (as the US defines it). On the other hand, it would lose most of its hegemonic roles if the Europeans were to become too independent.[87] As so often in alliance matters, the outcome has been compromises which are only acceptable to all because they lend themselves to different interpretations and which may therefore make little sense if taken at face value.

In the Washington Summit Communiqué (24th April 1999) on ***An Alliance for the 21st Century***, NATO took a stand on the relationship between the EU/WEU and NATO (including the United States) with the following formulations, representing a compromise between the EU and the USA.

> We confirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of our Alliance for the 21st century, which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members. In this regard:
>
> a. We acknowledge the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged;
> b. As this process goes forward, NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, co-operation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and the WEU;
> c. We applaud the determination of both EU members and other European Allies to take the necessary steps to strengthen their defence capabilities, especially for new missions, avoiding unnecessary duplication;
> d. We are determined that the decisions taken in Berlin in 1996, including the concept of using separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations, should be further developed.

These formulations seemed tantamount to a NATO (i.e. American)

approval of further European collaboration, paving the way for a gradual "Europeanisation" of European security. Other obstacles to such a development had by then also been removed.

- France had gradually abandoned most of her reservations concerning NATO's military structures to become almost a normal member of the alliance,[88] thereby making its European allies more confident in their ability to combine NATO and EU/WEU cooperation.
- The UK had, under the Labour government, become increasingly European in its orientation, even though its "special relationship" with the United States continues to play a role.
- The fact that the very meaning of "neutrality" had undergone transformation after the Cold War allowed the neutral members of the EU more ample scope for collaboration in security and defence matters.[89]
- Paradoxically, the most likely "spoiler" is now Denmark which upholds principled objections (based on a referendum) to participating in EU military collaboration, its long-standing NATO membership notwithstanding. So far, however, the other EU members have acquiesced with this Danish "opt-out", even though it has absurd consequences, such as preventing the participation of Danish forces in military operations under EU auspices which are regarded by everybody as totally uncontroversial if taking place within the framework of NATO.[90]

EU countries, spearheaded by Germany, France and the UK, have thus recently taken significant stepts in the direction of creating a genuine European security and defence capacity, the interim goal being to be able to field 60,000 troops on short notice for the aforementioned "Petersberg operations".[91]

In the ***Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy***, presented to the European Council Nice, 7-9 December 2000, the following assessment and predictions were included:[92]

> In developing this autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises, the European Union will be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks as defined in the Treaty on European Union: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. This does not involve the establishment of a European army. The commitment of national resources by Member States to such operations will be based on their sovereign decisions. (...) The development of the European Security and Defence Policy strengthens the Union's contribution to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The European Union recognises the primary

> responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for maintaining peace and international security.

It was further mentioned that discussions were underway on the "implementation of the specific goal regarding police capabilities, whereby Member States should be able to provide 5,000 officers by 2003 for international missions, 1,000 of whom could be deployed within less than 30 days," which would indeed be a valuable contribution if dispatched to countries in, or just coming out of, violent conflict.

The ***Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration*** provided the following details:

> In the field of military capabilities, which will complement the other instruments available to the Union, at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 the Member States set themselves the headline goal of being able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year forces up to corps level (60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. (...)
>
> In quantitative terms, the voluntary contributions announced by Member States make it possible to achieve in full the headline goal established in Helsinki (60 000 persons available for deployment within 60 days for a mission of at least a year). These contributions, set out in the 'Force Catalogue', constitute a pool of more than 100 000 persons and approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels, making it possible fully to satisfy the needs identified to carry out the different types of crisis management missions within the headline goal.
>
> By 2003, once the appropriate European Union political and military bodies are in a position to exercise political control and strategic management of EU-led operations, under the authority of the Council, the Union will gradually be able to undertake Petersberg tasks in line with its increasing military capabilities. The need to further improve the availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability of forces has, however, been identified if the requirements of the most demanding Petersberg tasks are to be fully satisfied. Efforts also need to be made in specific areas such as military equipment, including weapons and munitions, support services, including medical services, prevention of operational risks and protection of forces.

It is one thing to have the instruments for military interventions available, but quite another to know if, when and how to use them. Whether the EU member states will be able to agree on this remains to be seen. In any case, it seems highly likely that that Europe will make Europe and its immediate periphery its first priorities, which may well exhaust its ability and will to intervene militarily.

3.4 The EU Today and Tomorrow

The EU is thus probably the most important provider of security in Europe, albeit mostly by indirect and
predominantly non-military means. Not only is it able to make countries within its own ranks so secure that they tend to forget that security was ever a problem. It is also able (and much more so than NATO) to "extend security" beyonds its borders, e.g. to prospective members, as a corollary of its progressive enlargement.

There is every reason to expect the enlargement to be fairly slow, as accession to the EU entails much more than NATO membership, e.g. in term of a harmonisation of legislation—but there is no reason to expect enlargement to come to a complete halt. Turkey is already wating in the ***antechambre***, hoping soon to be invited to real negotiations. After that may come the remaining countries of the former Eastern Europe, perhaps in due course also Russia. It is also conceivable that, in the even more distant future, the EU may transform its present "partnerships", e.g. with the Medietarranean countries, into preparatory stages for actual membership.

The EU, furthermore, has obvious ambitions to play a constructive role in conflict prevention and management as well as post-conflict peace-building, especially in Europe but also elsewhere; and it does seem to have (or at least being in the process of generating) the wherewithal for such tasks—most of them civilian, but gradually also including a military component.

3.5 Lessons for Africa?

As will appear from the above, the EU would certainly be worth for Africa, or sub-regions thereof, to emulate. Unfortunately, however, that does not really seem to be an option.

- The EU was built in a piecemeal manner on very strong foundations, i.e. on strong states, who were then fairly comfortable with gradually relinquishing parts of their sovereignty to supranational authorities. As state-building is still underway in Africa, it seems likely that African states would be just as reluctant to cede newly acquired sovereignty as European states would have been at a comparable stage of state-building.
- The strong state system in Europe was based on a long history of intense interaction in many sectors—perhaps most importantly in terms of intraregional trade—which had made them truly interdependent, making actual integration as fairly modest additional step. As intraregional trade in Africa is much less extensive, and the general level of interaction much less intensive, it would be premature

to talk of interdependency, hence also to aim for integration.

While Africa could thus not emulate the EU “in a big way”, it might still draw some inspiration from it in specific policy areas.

The EU’s rather modest military ambitions might correspond roughly to what would be realistic in Africa, i.e. to be able to perform the panoply of “Petersberg tasks” by means of fairly small numbers of troops, ready for rapid deployment.[93] Even quite small numbers would probably suffice for making a difference, at least in countries such as Burundi—or in the case of a genocide like that in Rwanda in 1994, where a force contingent of maybe 2,500-5,000 troops might have saved literally hundreds of thousands of lives.[94]

4 ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

For Africa to draw inspiration from the OSCE and its predecessor, the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) appears obvious as well as to be already taking place.

4.1 The CSCE and Détente

The CSCE process was launched during the détente phase of the Cold War, i.e. at a time when both East and West had come to realise that they had to coexist for an indefinite period, hence that this coexistence had better be peaceful. The latter was far from self-evident, given the huge concentration of weapons, conventional as well as nuclear, on Europea soil.[95]

Table 7: CSCE and OSCE : Historical Highlights

1972	Negotiations begin
1975	Helsinki Conference: *Final Act*
1977	Belgrade Follow-up Conference (until 1978)
1980	Madrid Follow-up Conference (until 1983)
1986	Vienna Follow-up Conference (until 1989)
1984	Stockholm Conference on CSBMs (until 1986)
1990	Paris Summit: *Paris Charter for a New Europe*
1992	Helsinki Summit: Institutionalisation
1994	Budapest Summit: Change of name to OSCE

Starting in 1972 with the preparatary negotiations leading up to the Helsinki summit of 1975,[96] the CSCE process was set motion. Even though there was no predefined timetable for the entire process, it nevertheless maintained a considerable momentum, proceeding from one conference to the next (see Table 7),. without any "fixtures" such as a permanent secretariat. What maintained this momentum was probably that there was "something in it for everybody". This meant that states were "deterred" (by soft means) from acting as spoilers, which they could easily have done given that every agreement presupposed consensus. There was surely some obstruction, procrastination and feet-dragging in the process, but eventually each obstacle was overcome.[97]

Membership in the process was far from obvious in the beginning. As a means to ensure that the USSR would not come to dominate the process by virtue of its sheer size, "Europe" was defined quite broadly. "CSCE Europe" thus encompassed not only all of the Soviet Union as well as Turkey (rather than merely those parts usually referred to as European), but also the United States and Canada. Hence the term "Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostock". These borders have never since been changed, but the membership has nevertheless almost doubled (from 35 to 55) as first the USSR, then Czechoslovakia and finally the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia broke up into several states which all joined the CSCE.

The principles guiding the entire process were formulated as early as in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.[98] These principles ensured the rights of states to peace, equality, sovereignty and territorial integrity; but these state rights were accompanied by a set of rights for peoples and citizens, tantamount to obligations for states to respect human rights (see Table 8). The latter at least gave the fledgling civil society groups in the East a platform from which to wage their struggle against opression.

Table 8: The "Helsinki Decalogue"[99]	
· Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty · Refraining from the threat or use of force · Inviolability of frontiers · Territorial integrity of states · Peaceful settlement of disputes	· Non-intervention in internal affairs · Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms · Equal rights and self-determination of peoples · Cooperation among states · Fullfillment in good faith of obligations under international law

The various decisions were arranged in "baskets" (see Table 9), and their total contents, as well as the fact that the fnal documents combined all three baskets, ensured that the product was one of "comprehensive security". It was not at all the case that all parties agreed on the contents of each basket, but the total package was a true compromise between opposing preferences.

Table 9: CSCE "Baskets"		
1st Basket: Security	**2nd Basket: Cooperation**	**3rd Basket: Human rights**
Inviolability of borders Confidence-building Disarmament	Economics Science Technology	Human contacts Information Culture, Education

The Soviet Union was thus, from the very beginning, primarily interested in basket one, as its contents would ***ex post facto*** legalise its territorial gains from World War II, i.e. those parts of Eastern Germany and Poland which had been incorporated into the USSR. Its ally Poland also had an interest in securing its new border with Germany, the Oder-Nei_e border, even though it was not all that happy about legalising the Soviet annexation of its eastern border areas. Besides basket one, the eastern block was also interested in basket two, hoping that economic collaboration with the more advanced West would give it access to western technologies.

The West was neither particularly interested in baskets one nor two, but all the more in the contents of basket three which it hoped would gradually lead to a liberalisation, perhaps even democratisation, of the communist regimes., Indeed, the West saw this as a much more significant potential contribution to its security than any disarmament agreement.

4.2 The Security Basket

The contents of the security basket, i.e. the CSCE's direct contributions to security in the traditional sense, can be subdivided into "functional" and "structural disarmament", the former referring to the activities of the armed forces and the latter to their size, composition and deployment.

Most functional disarmament measures negotiated under the auspices of the CSCE have been intended to further transparency and have been labelled confidence-building measures (CBMs). The underlying philosophy was that there was a significant risk of an "inadvertent war", i.e. a war stemming from misunderstanding. One side might, for instance, interpret the other's military exercises or other movements as concealed preparations for surprise attack. In the worst of cases this might lead the first party to attack pre-emptively, believing that striking first would improve its chances of prevailing, or even of surviving. Hence the desirability of making such inherently ambiguous military dispositions as transparent as possible. To this end, the parties committed themselves to such CBMs as an obligation to invite the respective other's representatives to attend military exercises above a certain size in an observer's capacity; to announce exercises well in advance; and to provide a calender of such manoeuvres combined with a ban on non-scheduled exercises or other redeployments of forces.[100]

The latter stipulation strictly speaking belonged into the category of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) which were debated under the auspices of the CSCE (as well as in acedemic and political circles) but very few of which were ever implemented. Intended to actually hamper surprise attack they would have included constraints on maneuvres and/or on deployment, for instance with a view to lowering the overall state of readiness and/or reduce fores stationed close to the border.[101]

A later addition to the panoply of transparency-enhancing measures, albeit not formally labelled CBMs were the seminars on military doctrines which were conducted under the auspices of the CSCE.[102] Finally, transparency was also enhanced as a byproduct of structural arms control agreements which, since the breakthrough with the INF Treaty all stipulated the terms for quite elaborate and intrusive on-site inspections, which also gave each side improved insights into the other's military dispositions.[103]

Table 10: The CFE Treaty[104]										
	Holdings 1990					Reductions				
Country	MBT	ACV	Art.	CA	Hel.	MBT	ACV	Art.	CA	Hel.
Armenia	258	641	357	0	50	38	421	72	0	0
Azerb.	391	1,285	463	124	24	171	1,065	178	24	0
Byelarus	2,263	2,776	1,396	243	82	463	176	0	0	2
Georgia	850	1,054	363	245	48	630	834	78	145	0
Moldova	155	392	248	0	0	0	182	0	0	0
Russia	10,333	16,589	7,719	4,161	1,035	3,933	5,109	1,304	711	145
Ukraine	6,475	7,153	3,392	1,431	285	2,395	2,103	0	341	0
Bulgaria	2,145	2,204	2,116	243	44	670	204	366	9	0
Czech R.	1,198	1,692	1,044	232	37	241	325	277	2	0
Slovak R.	559	846	522	116	19	81	163	139	1	0
Hungary	1,345	1,720	1,047	110	39	510	20	207	0	0
Poland	2,850	3,377	2,300	551	29	1,120	961	690	91	0
Romania	2,851	3,102	3,789	505	13	1,476	1,002	2,314	75	0
Belgium	359	1,381	376	191	0	25	282	56	0	0
Canada	77	277	38	45	12	0	0	0	0	0
Denmark	419	316	553	106	3	66	0	0	0	0
France	1,343	4,177	1,360	699	418	37	357	68	0	66
Germany	7,000	8,920	4,602	1,018	258	2,834	5,474	1,897	118	0
Greece	1,879	1,641	1,908	469	0	144	0	30	0	0
Italy	1,246	3,958	2,144	577	168	0	619	189	0	26
Netherl.	913	1,467	837	196	90	170	387	230	0	21
Norway	205	146	531	90	0	35	0	4	0	0
Portugal	146	244	343	96	0	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	854	1,256	1,373	242	28	60	0	63	0	0
Turkey	2,823	1,502	3,442	511	5	28	0	0	0	0
UK	1,198	3,193	636	842	368	183	17	0	0	0
USA	5,904	5,747	2,601	626	243	1,898	375	109	0	0
Total	56,039	77,056	45,500	13,669	3,298	17,208	20,076	8,271	1,517	260

By far the most significant of these structural arms control agreements was the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE, i.e. without the A) Treaty of 1990. Its preample clearly formulated its “objectives of establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels than heretofore, of eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security and of eliminating, as a matter of high priority, the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe.”

The 1990 treaty only stipulated reductions in the holdings of major weapon systems, more specfically main battle tanks (MBCs), armoured personnel carriers (APCs), artillery, combat aircraft and armed helicopters. Reductions were stipulated both in terms of total numbers within the ATTU (Atlantic to the Urals) area (i.e. excluding the USA and Canada) and in terms of numbers within geographical zones., thereby

thinning out those forward-deployed forces deemed most suitable for surprise attacks. It thus envisaged a build-down to lower ceilings for each alliance in all five categories (See Table 10). The treaty was subsequenly revised (in 1992, 1996, 1999) with regard to the territorial ceilings and with the addition of manpower limits.[105]

It is possible to view the CFE both as an astounding success and as a complete failure. On the one hand, a significant degree of actual disarmament was entailed by its various provisions. This set it apart from most previous arms control agreements which had tended to merely establish rather generous ceilings. On the other hand, the CFE might well have simply codified what was anyhow bound to happen with the end of the Cold War.

A few other items have subsequently been added to the security basket, now of the OSCE, more about which in due course.

4.3 From CSCE to OSCE

With the end of the Cold War, what began as a mere process was transformed into a permanent institution, i.e. the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). At a summit meeting in 1990 the heads of state and government of the CSCE member states adopted the ***Paris Charter for a New Europe***, celebrating "a Europe whole and free" and deciding on an institutionalisation of the process, leading to the actual establishment of the OSCE in 1992.

It was further decided to proclaim the OSCE a "regional organisation" in the sense referred to in the UN Charter's chapter VIII, and the UN subsequently recognised it as such, i.e. as the European counterpart of the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the Organisation of African Unity, OAU (now African Union, AU). Along with its all-inclusive membership within the Europe as usually delimited (except for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia whose membership was temporarily suspended) this makes the OSCE the most "legitimate" organisation in Europe, also because nobody seriously objects to its authority. It is thus the OSCE which should serve as a "first resort" international organisation for the prevention and settlement of disputes rather than NATO, which has neither any UN recognition nor all-European membership and whose claims to represent "Europe" have been disputed, to say the least.[106]

The institutionalisation has produced a fairly elaborate organisational structure, featuring a permanent Secretariat, a Permanent Council, a High Commissioner for National Minorities, an Office for Free Elections (subsequently renamed "Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights"), an Economic Forum and a Forum for Security Cooperation.[107] However, it is far from obvious that this institution-building has been accompanied by any real increase in the importance of the organisation,

and especially not in the field of security and conflict prevention and management.

The immediate aftermath of the Cold War saw a considerable optimism about the possibilities of creating a functioning collective security system on the basis of the CSCE/OSCE.[108] This would have entailed a replacement of the opposing alliances (NATO and the former Warsaw Pact) with a single system based on the twin principles of non-aggression and mutual assistance to the attacked party in the case of aggresion. Whether the OSCE would have been able to perform this role if the requisite political will had been there is impossible to determine. As it happened, the initial enthusiasm and optimism soon gave way to an "OSCE pessimism". Because the West refused to grant the OSCE the requisite authority, its role was quickly reduced to secondary tasks such as oversight of democratisation, the sending out of election observers, meadiation teams, etc.

In the realm of security policy, a Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) was created at the 1992 Helsinki summit, meeting on a weekly basis in Vienna and dealing mainly with arms control, disarmament and CSBMs in the broad sense of the term, including the exchange of military information. In 1994 a "Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security" was adopted which might be seen as a CSBM in its own right. It is tantamount to a set of norms such as not to assist aggressors militarily, to maintain only military forces commensurate with legitimate (individual or collective) defence needs, to ensure civilian and democratic control of the military, etc. All of these provisions were, however, left without any underpinning in the form of enforcement means.[109]

The OSCE was also placed in charge of the implementation and revision of the CFE Treaty (***vide supra***) and of those part of the Dayton Agreement for Bosnia that dealt with arms control and CBMs. The provisions in both respects might be seen as a subregional application of the general principles, stipulating maximum numbers of the same categories of weapon systems and similar CSBMs.[110] Finally the OSCE was placed in charged of the 1992 "Open Skies Treaty", providing for as well as regulating aerial surveillance by states of neighbouring countries.[111]

A Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) was also established under the Secretary General and the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, tasked with implementation of early warning, crisis management and the like to the (limited) extent that the organisation as such has been involved in this. Among other things it maintains contacts with the various OSCE missions, plans future missions, stores all information exchanged between member states and maintains a computer network intended to facilitate communication between governments during crises. It thus resembled

such crisis management centres as had been suggested by several independent analysts.[112]

The "tool box"of the OSCE in this field has thus included factfinding and rapporteur missions, field missions and other field activities, ad hoc steering groups, personal representatives of the Chairman-in-Office, and mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes. The OSCE has furthermore dispatched various missions (with different labels), especially to some of the new states in the Former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, including Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Kosovo, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Russia (Chechnya), Tajikistan, Turkmenistan Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

Some of these missions have probably been quite succesful in preventing an outbreak of violence.[113] On the other hand, such "preventive diplomacy"[114] (and particularly when undertaken with a deliberately low profile as usually done by the OSCE) tends to be ignored by the media, hence also by politicians. Moreover, if it is succesful, no violence will occur, but then it is often difficult (and always counterfactual) to prove ***why*** it did not. While it was initially envisaged that the OSCE would also do peacekeeping, this has never been implemented, but UN peacekeeping operations have rather been outsourced to NATO.

The OSCE has further developed a number of "mechanisms" (i.e. procedures) for dealing with issues such as "unusual military activities" and "hazardous incidents of a military nature" as well as one for "early warning and preventative action". The latter allows countries involved in disputes as well as third parties and the OSCE institutions themselves to raise matters of concern with a view to action by, e.g., the Permanent Council. At the Valetta Summit it was further decided to establish a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes ("Valetta mechanism"), consisting of persons, selected among a slate of candidates, able and willing to engage in mediation efforts. If need be state parties can also take matters to the Court on Conciliation and Arbitration, which is not a permanent institution, but established on an ad hoc basis.[115]

4.4 The OSCE Today and Tomorrow

As the above accont has, hopefully, shown the institutionalisation of the former CSCE has proceeded steadily, at least on paper. However, it is important not to confuse an elaborate institutional structure with actual importance. On closer analysis, most of the "branches" of the "OSCE tree" are very weak, understaffed, underfunded and granted quite inadequate competences to allow them to fulfill their stated objectives.

This was aptly illustrated by Kosovo conflict, when the OSCE was tasked with providing unarmed observers to monitor the ceasefire

negotiated in October 1998.[116] Even though the deployment never reached the envisaged size, the presence of observers seems to have contributed to a clear decline in violence. Eventually, however, these observers were extracted at the request of NATO, which was by then fully committed to the bombing campaign which was launched the 24th of March 1999. This whole affair did little to enhance the OSCE's authority, even though the failure (if so it was) might also be attributed to NATO's obstruction.

There are few, if any signs, that this attitude of the West to the OSCE will change and the prospects therefore seem bleak for the OSCE to ever become able to perform satisfactorily—not because this would be inherently impossible, but because the most powerful members are unwilling to allow it to do so.

4.5 Lessons for Africa

Even though the OSCE's track record is thus far from impressive, its evlution may nevertheless hold some lessons for Africa and some of its specific structures and mechanisms may be suitable for emulation beyond Europe, eg. in Africa, as has been suggested by a number of independent observers.[117] Indeed, the Nigerian initiative for a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, CSSDCA (which was subsumed under the new African Union in 2002 along with the supplementary South African initiative New Partnership for Africa's Development, NEPAD) also appears to be almost carbon-copied on the CSCE or OSCE.[118]

Among the relevant lessons for Africa from the process as such, one could mention the emphasis on politically binding piecemeal decisions (each of which pointing forward) and the multi-dimensional negotiations, allowing for asymmetrical "payoffs" (e.g. human rights concessions in return for security), and the respect for the sovereign equality of the participating states—all of which would seem relevant for Africa, i.e. both for the former OAU and the incipient AU.[119] The various "mechanisms" as the Conflict Prevention Centre described above also have their counterparts with the all-African organisations, ***in casu*** in the OAU's "Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution".[120]

Even more glaring are the resemblances between the OSCE and SADC, the stated objectives and basic principles of which include "the sovereign equality of all Member States; solidarity, peace and security; human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; equity, balance and mutual benefit; and the peaceful settlement of disputes" (SADC Treaty, art. 4). The field of "politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security" was mentioned as one among several areas of cooperation (art. 21g). The structure also bears resemblances with the OSCE, featuring main bodies such as a Summit of Heads of State or

Government, a Council of Ministers, various commissions, a Standing Committee of Officials, a Secretariat headed by an Executive Secretary and a Tribunal (articles 9-16).[121]

The same is the case of the gradual formalisation of SADC structures, which also appears somewhat inspired by the OSCE. In 2001 the SADC treaty was thus amended,[122] inter alia with a view to regulate (in art. 10A) the structure, competences and objectives of the "Organ on Politics, Defence and Security" (OPDS), which exhibits similarities with both the OSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation and its Conflict Prevention Centre. The Organ had been established by the SADC summit of 1996,[123] but had initially enjoyed a special status, but it was in 2001 subsumed directly under SADC and placed in charge of, inter alia, the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC)

Judging by the European experience, however, such organisational development may be a necessary, but is far as a suffiient, precondition for effectiveness as it cannot substitute for political commitment.

5 CONCLUSION: LEARNING FROM EUROPE?

The caveat mentioned in the beginning of this chapter thus seems confirmed: Africa should not allow itself to be lured into uncritically emulating "the European experience".

First of all, the Europeans have erred so often in the past, and occasionally with disastrous consequences, that they are hardly the obvious role models. Secondly, the point of departure are simply too different, both in terms of economic foundations, political strength and military capabilities. On the other hand, Africa may certainly learn from the past mistakes of Europe and thus, hopefully avoid repeating them. It may thus be able to leapfrog over several stages in a learning process which in Europe lasted for centuries. Moreover, various elements of some of the European security arrangements might be directly applicable to Africa.

The comparative analysis above has, hopefully, showed that NATO has very little to recommend itself as a role model for Africa. Its security role in Europe of the Cold War may have been important (even though it remains disputed just how important it was), but its functions in the post-Cold War era are much less important (and probably declining) as well as much more controversial.

The EU has a lot to recommend itself as a primarily non-military security community, safeguarding peace in Europe without alienating neighbours. Unfortunetaly, however, the solid foundations upon which this community rest do not exist in Africa, nor are they likely to be created in the short or medium term, which means that the EU will remain impossible to emulate. On the other hand, various specific EU

mechanisms, e.g. for conflict prevention and management, might be worth studying more closely as possible sources of inspiration. Even the military ambitions of the EU are so modest that they may prove a relevant yardstick for African rapid deployment forces tasked with (an African counterpart of) "Petersberg tasks".

The OSCE and, perhaps even more so, its predecessor the CSCE have even more to recommend them for emulation. The CSCE played an important role in ensuring that the Cold War in Europe remained cold (rather than erupting into a shooting war) and in paving the way for more collaborative relations. Moreover, several of the concrete instruments developed by the CSCE and OSCE appear to be very relevant for Africa, e.g. confidence and security building measures, seminars on military doctrines, etc.–as well as, perhaps even more so, the numerous non-military and low-profile instruments employed by the OSCE for conflict prevention.

6 ENDNOTES

[1] Gaddis, John Lewis: "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System", ***International Security***, vol. 10, no. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. 99-142.

[2] Axelrod, Robert: "The Concept of Stability in the Context of Conventional War in Europe", ***Journal of Peace Research***, vol. 27, no. 3 (1990), pp. 247-254. On the concept of "peace" see Galtung, Johan: "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research", in idem: ***Peace: Research, Education, Action. Essays in Peace Research. Volume I*** (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers Forlag, 1975), pp. 109-134; idem: "Peace Research", ***ibid.***, pp. 150-166; idem: "What is Meant by Peace and Security? Some Options for the 1990s", in idem: ***Transarmament and the Cold War. Essays in Peace Research, Volume VI*** (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers Forlag, 1988), pp. 61-71; Boulding, Kenneth: ***Stable Peace*** (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978); Rapoport, Anatol: ***Peace. An Idea Whose Time Has Come*** (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992).

[3] Berridge, Geoff R.: "The Superpowers and Southern Africa", in Roy Allison & Phil Williams (eds.): ***Superpower Conpetition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World*** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 206-226; Zacarias, Agostinho: ***Security and the State in Southern Africa*** (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 62-92.

[4] On conflict formations see Senghaas, Dieter: ***Konfliktformationen im internationalen System*** (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988); Väyrynen, Raimo: "Conflict Tranformation and Cooperation in Europe", ***Bulletin of Peace Proposals***, vol. 21, no. 3 (1990), pp. 299-306. The classical work on security communities is Deutsch, Karl W. ***& al.***: ***Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*** (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 3-9. A revised version of the theory is Adler, Emmanuel & Michael Barnett (eds.): ***Security Communities*** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). On zones of peace see Singer, Max & Aaron Wildawsky: ***The Real World Order. Zones of Peace/ Zones of Turmoil*** (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993); Kacowicz, Arie M.: ***Zones of Peace in the Third World. South America and West***

Africa in Comparative Perspective (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998).

[5] Mueller, John: ***Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*** (New York: Basic Books, 1989). See also Evera, Stephen Van: "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War", ***International Security***, vol. 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990-91), pp. 7-57

[6] Recent works on democratic peace include Russett, Bruce: ***Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World*** (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Elman, Miriam Fendius: ***Paths to Peace. Is Democracy the Answer?*** (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); MacMillan, John: ***On Liberal Peace. Democracy, War and the International Order*** (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998); Brown, Michael E., Sean Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller (eds.): ***Debating the Democratic Peace*** (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996); Gowa, Joanne: ***Ballots and Bullets. The Elusive Democratic Peace*** (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor: ***Elections and War. The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic Politics of War and Peace*** (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Ray, James Lee: ***Democracy and International Conflict. An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition*** (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995); Weart, Spencer R.: ***Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Other*** (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

[7] Mansfield, Edward D.: ***Power, Trade and War*** (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Barbieri, Katherine & Gerald Schneider: "Globalization and Peace: Assessing New Directions in the Study of Trade and Conflict", ***Journal of Peace Research***, vol. 36, no. 4 (July 1999), pp. 387-404; Morrow, James D.: "How Could Trade Affect Conflict?", ***ibid.***, pp. 481-489; O'Neal, John R. & Bruce Russett: "Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict", ***ibid.***, pp. 423-442.

[8] Keohane, Robert O. & Joseph S. Nye: ***Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition*** (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1977); idem & idem: "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age", ***Foreign Affairs***, vol. 77, no. 5 (Sept-Oct. 1998), pp. 81-94; Wilde, Jaap de: ***Saved from Oblivion: Interdependence Theory in the First Half of the 20th Century. A Study on the Causality Between War and Complex Interdependence*** (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991); Copeland, Dale C.: "Economic Interdependence and War. A Theory of Trade Expectations", ***International Security***, vol. 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 5-41; Barbieri, Katherine: "Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict", ***Journal of Peace Research***, vol. 33, no. 1 (February 1996), pp. 29-49.

[9] On the dispute between neoliberal institutionalists and neorealists on the importance of institutions see Keohane, Robert O.: "Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics", in idem (ed.): ***International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory*** (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 1-20; idem & Lisa L. Martin: "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory", ***International Security***, vol. 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51; Ruggie, John Gerard: ***Constructing the World Polity. Essays on International Institutionalism*** (London: Routledge, 1998). For a Realist critique see Mearsheimer, John J.: "The False Promise of International Institutions", ***International Security***, vol. 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49.

[10] A good overview is Rotfeld, Adam Daniel & Walther Stützle (eds.): ***Germany and Europe in Transition*** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

[11] On the Warsaw Pact see Holloway, David & Jane M.O. Sharp (eds.): ***The Warsaw***

Pact. Alliance in Transition (London: Macmillan, 1984); Jones, Christopher D.: ***Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe. Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact*** (New York: Praeger, 1981).

[12] Clarke, Douglas: "A Guide to Europe's New Security Architecture", ***European Security***, vol. 1, no. 2 (Summer 1992), pp. 126-132; Cornish, Paul: "European Security: the End of Architecture and the New NATO", ***International Affairs***, vol. 72, no. 4 (October 1996), pp. 751-769; Lodgaard, Sverre: "Competing Schemes for Europe: The CSCE, NATO and the European Union", ***Security Dialogue***, vol. 23, no. 3 (September 1992), pp. 57-68; Anderson, Stephanie: "EU, NATO and CSCE Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: Testing Europe's New Security Architecture", ***European Security***, vol. 4, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 328-353. On the general phenomenon of buck-passing see Christensen, Thomas J. & Jack Snyder: "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity", ***International Organization***, vol. 44, no. 2 (1990), pp. 137-168.

[13] A good example of this is Haas, Richard: ***The Reluctant Sheriff. The United States after the Cold War*** (Washington, D.C.: Council of Foreign Relations, 1997). On the general US attitude to multilateralism see Ruggie, John Gerard: ***Winning the Peace. America and World Order in the New Era*** (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); idem: ***op. cit.*** (note 9). See also Krause, Keith & W. Andy Knight (eds.): ***State, Society, and the UN System: Changing Perspectives on Multilateralism*** (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995).

[14] Good examples of this phenomenon are available in Daniel, Donald C.F., Brad Hayes & Chantall de Jonge Ouddraat: ***Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises*** (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999).

[15] A useful reference work is Kort, Michael (ed.): ***The Columbia Guide to the Cold War*** (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). On the origins see Jensen, Kenneth M. (ed.): ***Origins of the Cold War. The Novikov, Kennan and Roberts "Long Telegrams" of 1946***. 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1994). Good historical accounts include Crockatt, Richard: ***The Fifty Years War. The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991*** (London: Routledge, 1995); Rodman, Peter W.: ***More Precious Than Peace. The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World*** (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994). For various interpretations see Wohlforth, William Curti: ***The Elusive Balance. Power and Perception During the Cold War*** (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Gaddis, John Lewis: ***We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History*** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Hunter, Allen (ed.): ***Rethinking the Cold War*** (Philadelphia: Temple Press, 1998); Lebow, Richard Ned & Janice Gross Stein: ***We All Lost the Cold War*** (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[16] On the evolution of the U.S. "containment" strategy see Gaddis, John Lewis: ***Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 237-273. For a critique of the underlying assumptions see Jervis, Robert: "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behaviour", in idem & Jack Snyder (eds.): ***Dominoes and Bandwagons. Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland*** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 20-50.

[17] On the exaggerated threat perceptions see Gervasi, Tom: ***The Myth of Soviet Militart Supremacy*** (New York: Harper & Row, 1986); Prados, John: ***The Soviet Estimate. U.S. Intellligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength*** (New York: The

Dial Press, 1982).

[18] On alliances in general see Snyder, Glenn: ***Alliance Politics*** (Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press, 1997).

[19] Riker, William H.: ***The Theory of Political Coalitions*** (New Haven, NJ: Yale University Press, 1962); Liska, George: ***Nations in Alliance. The Limits of Interdependence*** (Baltimore, ML: John Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 27; Aron, Raymond: ***Paix et guerre entre les nations***, 8th ed. (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1984), p. 56; Waltz, Kenneth N.: ***Theory of International Politics*** (Reading, MA.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 197-199, 203; Trevorton, Gregory: ***Making the Alliance Work. The United States and Western Europe*** (London: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 17-21; Christensen & Snyder: ***loc. cit***.; Snyder: ***op. cit.*** (note 18).

[20] Perkins, Bradford: "The Creation of a Republic Empire, 1776-1865", ***Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations***, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 147-169.

[21] See Koistinen, Paul I.: ***Beating Plowshares into Swords: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1606-1865*** (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1997); idem: ***Mobilizing for Modern War: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1865-1919*** (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1997); idem: ***Planning War, Pursuiing Peace. The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1919-1945*** (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998); Cohen, Eliot A.: "The Strategy of Innocence? The United States, 1920-1945", in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox & Alvin Bernstein (eds.): ***The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War*** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 428-465.

[22] On this perennial dilemma in US history see Ruggie: ***op. cit.*** 1996 (note 13).

[23] On deployments see Duke, Simon: ***United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[24] On nuclear deployments see Arkin, William M. & Richard Fieldhouse: ***Nuclear Battlefields. Global Links in the Arms Race*** (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1985). On the underlying strategy see Freedman, Lawrence: ***Evolution of Nuclear Strategy.*** 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1989); Williamson, Samuel R. & Steven L. Rearden: ***The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953*** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); Jervis, Robert: ***The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*** (Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press, 1984); idem: ***The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Statecraft and the Prospects of Armageddon*** (Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press, 1989); Sigal, Leon V.: ***Nuclear Forces in Europe. Enduring Dilemmas, Present Prospects*** (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1983).

[25] Stromseth, Jane E.: ***The Origins of Flexible Response. NATO's Debate over Strategy in the 1960's*** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988); Daalder, Ivo H.: ***The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response. NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces since 1967*** (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Haftendorn, Helga: ***NATO and the Nuclear Revolution. A Crisis of Credibility, 1966-1967*** (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). On the conventional aspects of flexible response see Duffield, John S.: ***Power Rules. The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture*** (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 194-232. On the INF decision, see Holm, Hans Henrik & Nikolai Petersen (eds.): ***The European Missile Crisis: Nuclear Weapons and Security Policy*** (London: Pinter, 1983),

[26] On limited nuclear war see Kissinger, Henry A.: ***Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy***, abridged edition (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969); Martin, Laurence: "Limited Nuclear War", in Michael Howard (ed.): ***Restraints on War. Studies in the Limitation***

of Armed Conflict, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 103-122; Clark, Ian: ***Limited Nuclear War. Political Theory and War Conventions*** (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982); Mlyn, Eric: ***The State, Society, and Limited Nuclear War*** (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995). On the effects see Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich von (ed.): ***Kriegsfolgen und Kriegsverhütung***, 2nd ed. (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1971); Kendall, Henry: "The Effects of a Nuclear War", in Hylke W. Tromp (ed.): ***War in Europe. Nuclear and Conventional Perspectives*** (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Group, 1989), pp. 35-44.

[27] Calleo, David P.: ***Beyond American Hegemony. The Future of the Western Alliance*** (New York: Basic Books, 1987), pp. 109-126 & ***passim***; Holst, Johan Jørgen: "Lilliputs and Gullilver: Small States in a Great-Power Alliance", in Gregory Flynn (ed.): ***NATO's Northern Allies. The National Security Policies of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway*** (London: Rowman & Allanhead, 1985), pp. 258-286; Trevorton, Gregory: ***Making the Alliance Work. The United States and Western Europe*** (London: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 10-21, 123-155; Sloan, Stanley: ***NATO's Future. Towards a New Transatlantic Bargain*** (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 113-120

[28] Tanner, Fred: "Versailles: German Disarmament After World War I", in idem (ed.): ***From Versailles to Baghdad: Post-War Armament Control of Defeated States*** (Geneva: UNIDIR, 1992), pp- 5-26.

[29] Wettig, Gerhard: ***Entmilitarisierung und Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland 1943-1955. Internationale Aus-einandersetzungen um die Rolle der Deutschen in Europa*** (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1967); Schubert, Klaus von: ***Wiederbewaffnung und Westintegration. Die innere Auseinandersetzung um die militärische und au_enpolitische Orientierung der Bundesrepublik 1950-1952*** (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970); Steininger, Rolf: ***Wiederbewaffnung. Die Entscheidung für einen westdeutschen Verteidigungsbeitrag: Adenauer und die Westmächte 1950*** (Erlangen: Straube Verlag, 1989).

[30] On NATO's "layer-cake" deployment during the Cold War see Löser, Jochen: ***Weder rot noch tot. Überleben ohne Atomkrieg: Eine Sicherheitspolitische Alternative*** (München: Olzog Verlag, 1981), pp. 259-266; Mech-tersheimer, Alfred 1 & Peter Barth: ***Militarisierungsatas der Bundesrepublik. Streitkräfte, Waffen und Standorte. Kosten und Risiken*** (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1986), p. 65. See also Mearsheimer, John J.: "Manoeuvre, Mobile Defense, and the NATO Central Front", ***International Security***, vol. 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981-82), pp. 104-122; idem: "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe", ***ibid***., vol. 7, no. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3-39; idem: "Numbers, Strategy, and the European Balance", ***ibid.***, vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 174-185.

[31] Cogan, Charles G.: ***Forced to Choose: France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO—Then and Now*** (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1997); Gordon, Philip H.: ***France, Germany and the Western Alliance*** (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995); Kaiser, Karl & Pierre Lellouche (eds.): ***Deutsch-Französiche Sicherheitspolitik. Auf dem Wege zur Gemeinsamkeit?*** (Bonn: Europa Union, 1986); Grant, Robert P.: "France's New Relationship with NATO", ***Survival***, vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 58-80; Schmidt, Burkard: "France's Alliance Policy in a Changing World", ***Aussenpolitik. English Edition***, vol. 47, no. 4 (4th Quarter 1996), pp. 348-358; Le Prestre, Philippe G. (ed.): ***French Security Policy in a Disarming World. Domestic Challenges and International Constraints*** (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989); Maull, Hanns W., Micheal Meimeth & Christoph Neßhöver (eds.): ***Die verhinderte Großmacht.***

Frankreichs Sicherheitspolitik nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1997); Rynning, Sten: ***Changing Military Doctrine: Presidents and Military Power in 5th Repuplic France, 1985-2000*** (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).

[32] This question hinges on that of Soviet intentions. For attempted reconstructions of these see Mastny, Vojtech: ***The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity. The Stalin Years*** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); idem: "Did NATO Win the Cold War. Looking Over the Wall", ***Foreign Affairs***, vol. 78, no. 3 (May-June 1999), pp. 176-189; Garthoff, Raymond L.: ***Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine*** (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1990); MccGwire, Michael: ***Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy*** (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986); idem: ***The Genesis of Soviet Threat Perceptions*** (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1989).

[33] Albrecht, Ulrich: ***Die Abwicklung der DDR. Die "2+4-Verhandlungen". Ein Insider-Bericht*** (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1992); Rotfeld & Stützle (eds.): ***op. cit.*** (note 10), pp. 182-187. On the dissolution of the East Germany military (NVA), see e.g. Schönbohm, Jörg: ***Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland. Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee*** (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1992); Gie_man, Hans-Joachim: ***Das unliebsame Erbe. Die Auflösung der Miilitärstruktur der DDR*** (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1992); Klein, Paul & Rolf P. Zimmermann (eds.): ***Beispielhaft? Eine Zwischenbilanz zur Eingliederung der Nationalen Volksarmee in die Bundeswehr*** (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993). On the allied presence in the FRG, see Haglung, David G. & Olaf Mager (eds.): ***Homeward Bound? Allied Forces in the New Germany*** (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).

[34] Bebler, Anton A. (ed.): ***The Challenge of NATO Expansion*** (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999); Carpenter, Ted Galen & Barbara Conry (ed.) ***NATO Enlargement. Illusions and Reality*** (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1997); Dutkiewicz, Piotr & Robert J. Jackson (eds.): ***NATO Looks East*** (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 1998); Solomon, Gerald B.: ***The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997*** (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998); Haglund, S. Neil MacFarlane & Joel S. Sokolsky (eds.): ***NATO's Eastern Dilemmas*** (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994); Haglund, David G. (ed.): ***Will NATO Go East? The Debate over Enlarging the Atlantic Alliance*** (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1996); idem: "NATO Expansion and European Security after the Washington Summit—What Next?", ***European Security***, vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 1-15; Asmus, Ronald D., Richard L. Kugler & F. Stephen Larrabee: "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps", ***Survival***, vol. 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 7-33; Asmus, Ronald D. & F. Stephen Larrabee: "NATO and the Have-Nots. Reassurance After Enlargement", ***Foreign Affairs***, vol. 75, no. 6 (Nov-Dec. 1996), pp. 13-20; Austin, Daniel F.C.: "NATO Expansion to Northern Europe", ***European Security***, vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 79-90. On the Russian response see Black, J.L.: ***Russia Faces NATO Expansion. Bearing Gifts or Bearing Arms?*** (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); Averre, Derek: "NATO Expansion and Russian National Interests", ***European Security***, vol. 7, no. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 10-54; Fierke, K.M.: "Dialogues of Manoeuvre and Entanglement: NATO, Russia, and the CEECs", ***Millennium***, vol. 28, no. 1 (1999), pp. 27-52. For a critique of expansion see Brown, Michael E.: "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion", ***Survival***, vol. 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 34-52.

[35] Gerosa, Guido: "The North Atlantic Cooperation Council", ***European Security***, vol. 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1992), pp. 273-294.

[36] Borawski, John: "Partnership for Peace and Beyond", ***International Affairs***, vol. 71,

no. 2 (April 1995), pp. 233-246; Williams, Nick: "Partnership for Peace: Permanent Fixture or Declining Asset?", ***Survival***, vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 98-110; Santis, Hugh De: "Romancing NATO: Partnership for Peace and East European Stability", ***Journal of Strategic Studies***, vol. 17, no. 4 (December 1994), pp. 61-81; Sanz, Timothy: "NATO's Partnership for Peace Program: Published Literature", ***European Security***, vol. 4, no. 4 (Winter 1995), pp. 676-696; Scofield, P.J.F.: "Partnership for Peace: The NATO Initiative of January 1994. A View from the Partner-ship Coordination Cell", ***RUSI Journal***, vol. 141, no. 2 (April 1996), pp. 8-15; Rynning, Sten: "A Balancing Act: Russia and the Partnership for Peace", ***Cooperation and Conflict***, vol. 31, no. 2 (June 1996), pp. 211-234.

[37] The document is reprinted in Yost, David: ***NATO Transformed. The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*** (Washington, DC: The United States Institute for Peace Press, 1998), pp. 313-323 (quote from p. 315). On NATO's threats and use of force over Bosnia and Kosovo see below. On Russia's use of force against Chechnya (formally not a state) see Baev, Pavel K.: "Russia's Airpower in the Chechen War: Denial, Punish-ment and Defeat", ***Journal of Slavic Military Studies***, vol. 10, no. 2 (June 1997), pp. 1-18.Dunlop, John B.: ***Russia Confronts Chechnya. Roots of a Separatist Conflict*** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Lieven, Anatol: ***Chechnya. Tombstone of Russian Power.*** 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

[38] Kuzio, Taras: "Ukraine and NATO: The Evolving Strategic Partnership", ***The Journal of Strategic Studies***, vol. 21, no. 2 (June 1998), pp. 1-30.

[39] Carlton, James R.: "NATO Standardization: An Organizational Analysis", in Lawrence S. Kaplan & Robert W. Clawson (eds.): ***NATO after Thirty Years*** (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981), pp. 199-213; Taylor, Trevor: "The Development of European Defence Cooperation", in Michael Clarke & Rod Hague (eds.): ***European Defence Co-Operation. America, Britain and NATO*** (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), pp. 45-54.

[40] Kiss, Yudit: ***The Defence Industry in East-Central Europe. Restructuring and Conversion*** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Cooper, Julian: "Defence Industry Conversion in NATO Partner Countries", ***NATO's Sixteen Nations***, vol. 38, no. 5/6 (1993), pp. 21-28.

[41] Collective defence is mentioned in the UN Charter, art. 51. On collective security see, for instance, Kupchan, Charles A. & Clifford A. Kupchan: "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe", ***International Security***, vol. 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; idem & idem: "The Promise of Collective Security", ***ibid.***, vol. 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Weiss, Thomas G. (ed.): ***Collective Security in a Changing World*** (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Butfoy, Andrew: "Themes Within the Collective Security Idea", ***The Journal of Strategic Studies***, vol. 16, no. 4 (December 1993), pp. 490-510; Cusack, Thomas R. & Richard J. Stoll: "Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System", ***International Studies Quarterly***, vol. 38, no. 1 (March 1994), pp. 33-59; Downs, George W. (ed.): ***Collective Security Beyond the Cold War*** (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1994). For a more sceptical view, see Betts, Richard K.: "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe", ***International Security***, vol. 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43; Clark, Mark T.: "The Trouble with Collective Security", ***Orbis***, vol. 39, no. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 237-258.

[42] Sergounin, Alexander: "Russian Domestic Debate on NATO Enlargement: From Phobia to Damage Limitation", ***European Security***, vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 1997), pp. 55-

71; Alexandrova, Olga: “Divergent Russian Foreign Policy Concepts”, ***Aussenpolitik. English Edition***, vol. 44, no. 4 (Fall 1993), pp. 363-372; Allison, Roy & Christoph Bluth (eds.): ***Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia*** (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998); Aron, Leon & Kenneth M. Jensen (eds.): ***The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy*** (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1994); Baranovsky, Vladimir (ed.): ***Russia and Europe. The Emerging Security Agenda*** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Black: ***op. cit.*** (note 34); Blackwill, Robert D. & Sergei A. Karaganov (eds.): ***Damage Limitation or Crisis? Russia and the Outside World*** (London: Brassey's, 1994); Buszinski, Leszek: ***Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War*** (Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1996); idem: “Russia and the West: Towards Renewed Geopolitical Rivalry?”, ***Survival***, vol. 37, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), pp. 104-125; Dawisha, Karen & Bruce Parrott: ***Russia and the New States of Eurasia*** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Holden, Gerard: ***Russia and the Post-Cold War World. History and the Nation in Post-Soviet Security Politics*** (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994); Likhotal, Alexander: “The New Russia and Eurasia”, ***Security Dialogue***, vol. 23, no. 3 (September 1992), pp. 9-18; Tsipko, Alexander: “A New Russian Identity or Old Russia's Reintegration?", ***ibid.***, vol. 25, no. 4 (December 1994), pp. 443-456; Mandelbaum, Michael: “Westernizing Russia and China”, ***Foreign Affairs***, vol. 76, no. 3 (May-June 1997), pp. 80-95; McFaul, Michael: “A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy”, ***International Security***, vol. 22, no. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 5-35; Mikoyan, Sergo A.: “Russia, the US and Regional Conflict in Eurasia”, ***Survival***, vol. 40, no. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 112-126; Petrov, Yuri: “Russia in Geopolitical Space”, ***Eurobalkans***, no. 19 (Summer 1995), pp. 26-29; Rubinstein, Alvin Z.: “The Geopolitical Pull on Russia”, ***Orbis***, vol. 38, no. 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 567-583; Simon, Gerhard: “La Russia: un hégémonie eurasienne?”, ***Politique Étrangère***, vol. 59, no. 1 (1st Quarter 1994), pp. 29-48; idem: “Russia's Identity and International Politics”, ***Aussenpolitik***, vol. 48, no. 3 (3rd Quarter 1997), pp. 245-256; Stavrakis, Peter J., John DeBardeleben & Larry Black (eds.): ***Beyond the Monolith. The Emergence of Regionalism in Post-Soviet Russia*** (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997); Trofiemenko, Henry: ***Russian National Interests and the Current Crisis in Russia*** (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999); Wallander, Celste A. (ed.): ***The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War*** (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996).

[43] Haglund, David G. & Olaf Mager (eds.): ***Homeward Bound? Allied Forces in the New Germany*** (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992). .

[44] www.naa.be/docu/1998/argen-e.html. See also Sloan, Stanley R.: "US Perspectives on NATO's Future", ***International Affairs***, vol. 71, no. 2 (April 1995), pp. 217-232.

[45] Kay, Sean: “After Kosovo: NATO's Credibility Dilemma”, ***Security Dialogue***, vol. 31, no. 1 (March 2000), pp. 71-84. On the (in)efficiency of the chosen military strategy see, for instance, Byman, Daniel A. & Matthew C. Waxman: “Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate”, ***International Security***, vol. 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 5-38; Posen, Barry R.: “The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy”, ***ibid.***, pp. 39-84; Daalder, Ivo H. & Michael E. O'Hanlon: ***Winning Ugly. NATO's War to Save Kosovo*** (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Mandelbaum, Michael: “A Perfect Failure. NATO's War Against Yugoslavia”, ***Foreign Affairs***, vol. 78, no. 5 (Sept-Oct. 1999), pp. 2-8; Cordesman, Anthony: ***The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo*** (8 July 1999), at www.csis.org/kosovo/Lessons.html; Rieks, Ansgar & Dieter Weigold: “Der Kosovo-Konflikt—eine militär-

politische Auswertung", in Joachim Krause (ed.): ***Kosovo. Humani-täre Intervention und Kooperative Sicherheit in Europa*** (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2000), pp. 13-54; Møller, Bjørn: "Military Options in the Pursuit of Political Goals. Kosovo and the Just War Tradition", in Jörg Calliess (ed.): ***Vom gebrauch des "traurigen Notmittels" Kieg. Welche militärischen Operationen können welche politi-sche Zwecke fördern?*** (Loccum: Evangelische Akademie Loccum, 2001), pp. 121-143; idem: "National, Societal and Human Security—a General Discussion with a Case Study from the Balkans", in ***What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century*** (Paris: UNESCO, 2001), pp. 36-57; idem: "The Nordic Countries: Whither the West's Conscience", in Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur (eds.): ***Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention. Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship*** (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000), pp. 151-165.

[46] www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-063e.htm.

[47] www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm.

[48] On the debate on NATO's new roles see, for instance, the following; Cambone, Stephen A. (ed.): ***NATO's Role in European Stability*** (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995); Goldstein, Walter (ed.): ***Security in Europe. The Role of NATO after the Cold War*** (London: Brassey's, 1994); Gordon, Philip H. (ed.): ***NATO's Transformation. The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance*** (Lanham, ML: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997); Papacosma, S. Victor & Mary Ann Heiss (eds.): ***NATO in the Post-Cold War Era: Does It Have a Future?*** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Varwick, Johannes & Wichard Woyke: ***NATO 2000*** (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1999); Yost: ***op. cit.*** (note 37); Carpenter, Ted Galen: "Conflicting Agendas and the Furure of NATO", ***Journal of Strategic Studies***, vol. 17, no. 4 (December 1994), pp. 143-164; Clemens, Clay (ed.): ***NATO and the Quest for Post-Cold War Security*** (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1997); Asmus, Ronald D., Richard L. Kugler & F. Stephen Larrabee: "Building a New NATO", ***Foreign Affairs***, vol. 72, no. 4 (September-October 1993), pp. 28-40; Bailes, Alyson J.K.: "NATO: Towards a New Synthesis", ***Survival***, vol. 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 27-40; Eyal, Jonathan: "NATO and European Security", ***Perspectives*** (Prague: Institute of International Relations), no. 6-7 (1996), pp. 17-27; Haglund, David G.: "Must NATO Fail? Theories, Myths and Policy Dilemmas", ***Centre for International Relations Occasional Paper***, no. 51 (Kingston Ontario: Queen's University, 1995); Lepgold, Joseph: "NATO's Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem", ***International Security***, vol. 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 78-106; McCalla, Robert B.: "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War", ***International Organization***, vol. 50, no. 3 (Summer 1996), pp. 445-475; Roper, John: "NATO's New Role in Crisis Management", ***The International Spectator***, vol. 34, no. 2 (April-June 1999), pp. 51-62.

[49] Barry, Charles: "NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice", ***Survival***, vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 81-97; Bensahel, Nora: "Separable but not Separate Forces: NATO's Development of the Combined Joint Task Force", ***European Security***, vol. 8, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 52-72. For a general overview see Duffield: ***op. cit.*** (note 25). On the European element see O'Hanlon, Michael: "Transforming NATO: The Role of European Forces", ***Survival***, vol. 39, no. 3 (Autumn 1997), pp. 5-15.

[50] IFOR and SFOR are described by NATO at www.nato.int/ifor/ifor.htm and www.nato.int/sfor/index.htm, and KFOR at www.kforonline.com/.

[51] According to the official spokesman, Brigadier Barney White-Spunner (26

september 2001) at www.nato.int/ fyrom/tfh/2001/t010926a.htm.
[52] ***SIPRI Yearbook 2002***, pp. 266-267.
[53] ***Statement by the North Atlantic Council***, Press Release (2001)124 (12 September 2001) at www.nato.int/ docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm.
[54] On flexible response see note 25. On AirLand Battle see Flanagan, Stephen J.: "NATO's Conventional Defense Choices in the 1980s", in Stephen J. Flanagan & Fen Osler Hampson (eds.): ***Securing Europe's Future*** (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 85-112; Mackenzie, J.J.G.: "The Counter-Offensive", in Brian Holden Reid & Michael Dewar (eds.): ***Military Strategy in a Changing Europe*** (London: Brassey's, 1991), pp. 161-180; Sutton, Boyd D., John R. Landry, Malcolm B. Armstrong, Howell M. Esles III & Wesley K. Clark: "Deep Attack Concepts and the Defence of Central Europe", ***Survival***, vol. 26, no. 2 (1984), pp. 50-78.
[55] On the RMA see Biddle, Stephen: "The Past as Prologue: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare", ***Security Studies***, vol. 8, no. 1 (Autumn 1998), pp. 1-74; Adams, James: ***The Next World War: Computers Are the Weapon and the Front Line Is Everywhere*** (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998); Arquilla, John & David Ronfeldt (eds.): ***In Athena's Camp. Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*** (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997); McKitrick, Jeffrey et al.: "The Revolution in Military Affairs", in Barry R. Schneider & Lawrence E. Grinter (eds.): ***Battlefield of the Future. 21st Century Warfare Issues*** (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1995), pp. 65-94; Khalilzad, Zalmay M. & John P. White (eds.): ***The Changing Role of Information in Warfare*** (Santa Monica: Rand, Project Air Force, 1999); Rattray, Gregory J.: ***Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace*** (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
[56] For an elaboration on this theme, accompanied by suggestions for a solution to the problem see Møller, Bjørn: "Defensive Restructuring in Sub-Saharan Africa", forthcoming in Geoff Harris (ed.): ***Demilitarising sub-Saharan Africa***.
[57] Oyebade, Adebayo: "African Security and Nuclear Weapons", in idem & Abiodun Alao (eds.): ***Africa after the Cold War*** (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1998), pp. 91-115; Ogunbanwo, Sola: "History of the Efforts to Establish an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone", ***Disarmament***, vol. 19, no. 1 (1996), pp. 13-20; idem: "The Treaty of Pelindaba: Africa is Nuclear-Weapon-Free", ***Security Dialogue***, vol. 27, no. 2 (June 1996), pp. 185-200; "The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (The Treaty of Pelindaba)", ***ibid.***, pp. 233-240.
[58] While the rationale for the nuclear weapons arsenal of apartheid South Africa was unclear, it was surely not intended to protect any other states. See Reiss, Mitchell: ***Bridled Ambitions. Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities*** (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 7-44; Fig, David: "Apartheid's Nuclear Arsenal: Deviation from Development", in Jacklyn Cock & Penny Mckenzie (eds.): ***From Defence to Development. Redirecting Military Resources in South Africa*** (Cape Town: David Philip, 1998), pp. 163-180; Fischer, David: "Reversing Nuclear Proliferation: South Africa", ***Security Dialogue***, vol. 24, no. 3 (1993), pp. 273-286; Howlett, Darryl & John Simpson: "Nuclearisation and Denuclearisation in South Africa", ***Survival***, vol. 35, no. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 154-173; Muller, Marie: "South Africa Crisscrosses the Nuclear Threshold", in William Gutteridge (ed.): ***South Africa's Defence and Security into the 21st Century*** (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996), pp. 29-48.
[59] Schuman, Robert: "The Schuman Declaration", in Brent F. Nelsen & Alexander C-G. Stubb (eds.): ***The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*** (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 11-12. See also Mitrany, David: "A Working Peace System", ***ibid.***, pp. 77-97.

[60] Haas, Ernst B.: ***International Political Communities*** (New York: Anchor Books, 1966); idem: "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing", in Richard A. Falk & Saul Mendlowitz (eds.): ***Regional Politics and World Order*** (San Francisco: Freeman, 1973), pp. 103-130; idem: "War, Interdependence and Functionalism", in Raimo Väyrynen (ed.): ***The Quest for Peace. Transcending Collective Violence and War Among Societies, Cultures and States*** (London: Sage, 1987), pp. 108-127. See also Hansen, Roger: "Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical Efforts", in Michael Hodges (ed.): ***European Integration*** (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 184-199; Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe: "Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC", ***Millennium: Journal of International Studies***, vol. 20, no. 1, 1991, pp. 1-22; Kelstrup, Morten: "Integration Theories: History, Competing Approaches and New Perspectives," in Anders Wivel (ed.) ***Explaining European Integration*** (Copenhagen: Forlaget Politiske Studier, 1998), pp. 15-55.

[61] .Moravcsik, Andrew: "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," in S. Bulmer and A. Scott (eds.): ***Economic and Political Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamics and Global Context*** (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), pp. 29-80. An intermediate position is occupied by Marks, Hooghe, Liesbet Hooghe og Kermit Blank: "European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multilevel Governance," ***Journal of Common Market Studies***, vol. 34, no 3 (September 1996), pp. 341-378.

[62] See, for instance, Wæver, Ole: "Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community", in Adler & Barnett (eds.): ***op. cit.*** (note 4), pp. 69-118; idem: "Integration as Security: Constructing a Europe at Peace", in Charles Kupchan (ed.): ***Atlantic Security: Contending Visions*** (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1998), pp. 45-63; Bellamy, R. & D. Castiglione: "Building the Union: The Nature of Sovereignty in the Political Architecture of Europe," ***Law and Philosophy***, vol. 16, no. 4 (1997), pp. 421-445; Schmitter, P.: "Imaging the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New Concepts," in G. Marks, F. Scharpf, P. Schmitter & W. Streeck (eds.): ***Governance in the European Union*** (London: Sage Publications, 1996), pp. 121-150; Wallace, William (1996) "Government Without Statehood: The Unstable Equilibrium," in Helen Wallace & idem (eds.): ***Policy-Making in the European Union*** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 439-460.

[63] The yes majority in the Irish referendum of the 20th of October 2002 finally paved the way for an Irish ratification which will allow the Nice Treaty to enter into force.

[64] Light, Margot, Stephen White & John Loewenhardt: "A Wider Europe:: the Vierw from Moscow and Kiev", ***International Affairs***, vol. 76, no. 1 (January 2000), pp. 77-88; Wallace, William: "From the Atlantic to the Bug, from the Arctic to the Tigris? The Transformation of the EU", ***ibid.***, no. 3 (July 2000), pp. 475-494; Friis, Lykke (ed.): ***An Ever Larger Union? EU Enlargement and European Integration*** (Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1999).

[65] Haggard, Stephan, Marc A. Levy, Andrew Moravcsik & Kalypso Nicolaïdis: "Integrating the Two Halves of Europe: Theories of Interests, Bargaining, and Institutions", in Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye & Stanley Hoffman (eds.): ***After the Cold War. International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991*** (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 173-195. On Turkey see "Parliament Begins Debate on EU Reforms", ***Turkish Daily News***. Electronic Edition (2 August 2002), at www.turkishdailynews.com/old_ editions/08_02_02/dom.htm

[66] Caplan, Richard: "The European Community's Recognition of New States in

Yugoslavia: The Strategic Implication", ***Journal of Strategic Studies***, vol. 21, no. 3 (September 1998), pp. 24-45. On the problems associated with the (perhaps premature) recognition of Croatia and Slovenia see Woodward, Susan L.: ***Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*** (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Zucconi, Mario: "The European Union in the Former Yugoslavia", in Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes (eds.): ***Preventing Conflicts in the Post-Communist World*** (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996), pp. 237-278.

[67] See, for instance, Nørgaard, Ole, Thomas Pedersen & Nikolaj Petersen (eds.): ***The European Community in World Politics*** (London: Pinter, 1993).

[68] http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm.

[69] Sæter, Martin: "Stabilitetspakt for Europa: EUs sikkerhetspolitiske profilering i det større Europa", ***International Politikk***, vol. 52, no. 2 (1994), pp. 199-214.

[70] www.summit-sarajevo-99.ba/documents.htm. See also Warwick, Johannes: "Die EU nach dem Kosovo-Krieg: Ein überforderter Stabilitätsanker?", in Krause: ***op. cit.*** (note 45), pp. 185-200.

[71] This is elabrated upon in Møller, Bjørn: ***A Cooperative Structure for Israel-Palestine Relations. The Contours of A Post-Conflict Peace Order,*** in print for the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels. See also "The Barcelona Declaration", in Richard Gillespie (ed.): ***The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Political and Economic Perspectives*** (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp.177-187; Gillespie, Richard: "Introduction: The Europe-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative", ***ibid.***, pp. 1-11; Calabrese, John: "Beyond Barcelona: The Politics of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", ***European Security***, vol. 6, no. 4 (Winter 1997), pp. 86-110.

[72] Africa-Europe Summit under the Aegis of the OAU and the EU, Cairo- 3-4 April 2000: "Declaration of Cairo" and "Cairo Plan of Action", ***Press Releases***, nos. 106/4/00 and 107/4/00.

[73] Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict: ***Preventing Deadly Conflict. Final Report*** (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1997), pp. 39-102. See also Cross, Peter & Guenola Rasamoelina (eds.): ***Conflict Prevention Policy of the European Union. Recent Engagements, Future Instruments. Yearbook 1998/99*** (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999).

[74] http://europe.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/programconventarms.htm

[75] http://europe.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/conclusions-1998.htm.

[76] http://europe.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/codecondarmsexp.htm

[77] http://europe.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/jointaction.pdf

[78] http://europe.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/councres-smarms.htm

[79] COM(199)240 final, at http://europe.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/cm-communicat.pdf.

[80] http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2001/com2001_0153en01.pdf

[81] http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/news/com2001_211_en.pdf. On implementation see "One Year On: the Commission's Conflict Prevention Policy" (March 2002) at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ external_relations/cpcm/cp/rep.htm.

[82] http://www.eu2001.se/static/eng/pdf/violent.PDF.

[83] At http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cp/list.htm.

[84] http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/news/com2001_211_en.pdf.

[85] On the WEU see Hintermann, Eric: "European Defence: A Role for the Western European Union", ***European Affairs***, vol. 2, no. 3 (1988), pp. 31-38; Schmidt, Peter (ed.): ***In the Midst of Change: On the Development of West European Security and Defence Cooperation*** (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1992); Rees, G.

Wyn: ***The Western European Union at the Crossroads. Between Trans-Atlantic Solidarity and European Integration*** (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998); Varwick, Johannes: ***Sicherheit und Integration in Europa. Zur Renaissance der Westeuropäischen Union*** (Opladen: Leske + Budrich Verlag, 1998); McKenzie, Mary M. & Peter H. Loedel (eds.): ***The Promise and Reality of European Security Cooperation*** (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998). On Franco-German collaboration see Kaiser & Lellouche (eds.): ***op. cit.*** (note 31); Manfraß, Klaus (ed.): ***Paris-Bonn. Eine dauerhafte Bindung schwieriger Partner*** (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1984).

[86] Western European Union Council of Ministers: ***Petersberg Declaration*** (19 June 1002), at www.weu.int/ documents/920619naen.pdf, Chapter II, art. 5

[87] On US perspectives on European defence cooperation see Gärtner, Heinz: "European Security, NATO and the Transatlantic Link: Crisis Management", ***European Security***, vol. 7, no. 3 (Autumn 1998), pp. 1-13; Kupchan, Charles A.: "In Defence of European Defence; An American Perspective", ***Survival***, vol. 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 16-32; Lansford, Tom: "The Triumph of Transatlanticism: NATO and the Evolution of European Security after the Cold War", ***Journal of Strategic Studies***, vol. 22, no. 1 (March 1999), pp. 1-28; Whalen, Edward: "EuroNATO: An Alliance for the Future", ***European Security***, vol. 3, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 441-462.

[88] Cogan. ***op. cit.*** (note 31); Rynning: ***op. cit.*** (note 31).

[89] For the background see Harden, Sheila (ed.): ***Neutral States and the European Community*** (London: Brassey's, UK, 1994). On Finland's abandonment of neutrality constraints see Arter, David: "Finland: From Neutrality to NATO?", ***European Security***, vol. 5, no. 4 (Winter 1996), pp. 614-632.

[90] Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut: ***Udviklingen i EU siden 1992 på de områder, der er omfattet af de danske forbehold*** (Copenhagen: DUPI, 2000), pp. 89-144, 242-249.

[91] Heisbourg, François: "Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity", ***Survival***, vol. 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000), pp. 5-15; Howorth, Jolyon: "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative", ***ibid.***, pp. 33-55; Maull, Hanns W.: "Germany and the Use of Force: Still a 'Civilian Power'?", ***ibid.***, pp. 56-80; Andréani, Gilles: "Why Institutions Matter", ***ibid.***, pp. 81-95. See also Ham, Peter Van: "The Prospects for a European Security and Defence Identity", ***European Security***, vol. 4, no. 4 (Winter 1995), pp. 523-545; idem: "Europe's Precarious Centre: France-German Co-operation and the CFSP", ***ibid.***, vol. 8, no. 4 (Winter 1999), pp. 1-26; Howorth, Jolyon & Anand Menon: ***The European Union and National Defence Policy*** (London: Routledge, 1997). See also Sharp, Jane M.O. (ed.): ***About Turn, Forward March with Europe. New Direction for Defence and Security Policy*** (London: Rivers Oram Press, 1996); Bailes, Alyson J.K.: "European Defence and Security. The Role of NATO, WEU and EU", ***Security Dialogue***, vol. 27, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 55-64; Bonvicini, Gianni, Murizio Cremasco, Reinhardt Rummel & Peter Schmidt (eds.): ***A Renewed Partnership for Europe. Tackling European Security Challenges by EU-NATO Interaction*** (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996); Taylor, Trevor (ed.): ***Reshaping European Defence*** (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994); McKenzie, Mary M. & Peter H. Loedel (eds.): ***The Promise and Reality of European Security Cooperation*** (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998). All the relevant documents are contained in in Rutten, Maartje (ed.): "From St-Malo to Nice: European Defence: Core Documents", ***Challiot Paper***, no. 41 (Brussels: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 2001).

[92] From ***ibid.***, pp. 168-211.

[93] On the need for rapid deloyment see the "Brahimi Report", the official title of which

is ***Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations*** (A/55/305, S/2000/809). It is available at www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/

[94] Feil, Scott R.: ***Preventing Genocide. How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda*** (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1998). See also the OAU report on Rwanda at www.oau-oua.org/ Document/ipep/report/Rwanda-e/EN-III-T.htm.

[95] On détente see Davy, Richard (ed.): ***European Détente: A Reappraisal*** (London: SAGE, 1992); Kaldor, Mary, Gerard Holden & Richard Falk, eds.: ***The New Detente. Rethinking East-West Relations*** (London: Verso, 1989).

[96] See Schramm, Friedrich-Karl, Wolfram-Georg Riggert & Alois Friedel (eds.): ***Sicherheitskonf-renz in Europa. Dokumentation 1954-1972. Die Bemühungen um Entspannung und Annäherung im politischen, militärischen, wirtschaftlichen, wissenscahftlich-technologischen und kulturellen Bereich*** (Frankfurt: Metzner, 1972).

[97] For an overview see ***OSCE Handbook*** (Vienna: OSCE, 2000), pp. 6-19. The various documents adopted along the way are all available at www.osce.org/docs/english/chronos.htm. On the CSCE process see also Lucas, Michael R. (ed.): ***The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation*** (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993); Bredow, Wilfred von: ***Der KSZE-Prozeß. Von der Zähmung zur Auflösung des Ost-West-Konflikts*** (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1992); Schlotter, Peter, Norbert Ropers & Berthold Meyer: ***Die neue KSZE. Zukunftsperspektiven einer regionalen Friedensstrategie*** (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1994); Kornblum, John C.: "Security in Cooperation—The CSCE", ***NATO's Sixteen Nations***, vol. 38, no. 3 (1993), pp. 20-23; Dean, Jonathan: ***Ending Europe's Wars. The Continuing Search for Peace and Security*** (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Books, 1994), ***passim***.

[98] Available at www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/helfa75e.htm.

[99] ***OSCE Handbook*** (***op. cit.***, note 97), p. 10.

[100] On the general theory of CBMs see Alford, Jonathan: "Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects", ***Adelphi Papers***, no. 149 (1979), pp. 4-13; Holst, Johan Jørgen: "Confidence anmd Security Building in Europe. Achievements and Lessons", ***NUPI Paper***, no. 436 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1990). See also Borawski, John: ***From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference*** (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1988); idem: ***Security for a New Europe. The Vienna Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures 1989-90 and Beyond*** (London: Brassey's, 1992); Freeman, John: ***Security and the CSCE Process. The Stockholm Conference and Beyond*** (London: Macmillan, 1991); Brauch, Hans Günter (ed.): ***Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen und Europäische Abrüstungskonferenz. Ana-lysen, Dokumente und Vorschläge*** (Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag, 1987); Lutz, Dieter S. & Erwin Müller (eds.): ***Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen. Zur Theorie und Praxis einer sicherheitspolitischen Strategie*** (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1982); Desjardin, Marie-France: "Rethinking Confidence-Building Measures", ***Adelphi Papers***, no. 397 (1996); Ghébaldi, Victor-Yves: "Confidence-Building Measures within the CSCE Process: Paragraph-by-Paragraph Analysis of the Helsinki and Stockholm Regimes", ***Research Paper***, no. 3 (Geneva: UNIDIR, 1989); idem: "Les négotiations de Vienne sur les forces armées conventionelles et les mésures de confiance", ***Arès***, vol. 12, 1990/91, pp. 32-63; Rittberger, Volker, Manfred Efinger & Martin Mendler: "Toward and East-West Security Regime: The Case of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures", ***Journal of Peace Research***, vol. 27, no. 1 (1990), pp. 55-74.

[101] Lachowski, Zdzislaw: "The Vienna Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in 1992", ***SIPRI Yearbook 1993***, pp. 618-631. The Vienna Document itself is appended ***ibid.***, pp. 635-653

[102] Krohn, Axel: "The Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar", ***SIPRI Yearbook 1991***, pp. 501-511; Lachowski, Zdzislaw: "The Second Vienna Seminar on Military Doctrine", ***SIPRI Yearbook 1992***, pp. 496-505. See also Hamm, Manfred R. & Hartmut Pohlman: "Military Strategy and Doctrine: Why They Matter to Conventional Arms Control", ***The Washington Quarterly***, vol. 13, no. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 185-198.

[103] Dean, Jonathan: "The INF Treaty Negotiations", in ***SIPRI Yearbook 1988***, pp. 375-394. The treaty itself, along with a Memorandum of Understanding and two protocols, are included as appendices 13A-13D, ***ibid.***, pp. 395-485; Kokoski, Richard & Sergey Koulik (eds.): ***Verification of Conventional Arms Control. Technological Constraints and Opportunities*** (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990); Kokoyev, Mikhail & Andrei Androsov: ***Verification: The Soviet Stance. Its Past, Present and Future*** (Geneva: UNIDIR, 1990); Grin, John & Henny van der Graf (eds.): ***Unconventional Approaches to Conventional Arms Control Verification. An Exploratory Assessment*** (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1990); Kunzendorff, Volker: "Verification in Conventional Arms Control", ***Adelphi Papers***, no. 245; Lederman, Itshak: "Verification of Conventional Arms Control as a Stabilizing Tool of a New Security System in Europe", ***Bulletin of Peace Proposal***, vol. 22, no. 3 (September 1991), pp. 291-302.

[104] Figures from Sharp, Jane M. O.: "Conventional Arms Control in Europe", ***SIPRI Yearbook 1993***, pp. 591-617.

[105] Kelleher, Catherine McArdle, Jane M.O. Sharp and Lawrence Freedman (eds.): ***The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: The Politics of Post-Wall Arms Control*** (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996); Koulik, Sergey & Richard Kokoski: ***Conventional Arms Control. Perspectives on Verification*** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Hartmann, Rüdiger, Wolfgang Heydrich & Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut: ***Der Ver-trag über konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa. Vertragswerk, Ver-handlungsgeschichte, Kommentar, Doku-mentation*** (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlags-gesellschaft, 1994); Zellner, Wolfgang: ***Die Verhandlungen über Kon-ventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa. Konventionelle Rüstungskontrolle, die neue politische Lage in Europa und die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*** (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1994); Croft, Stuart (ed.): ***The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. The Cold War Endgame*** (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994); Akçapar, Burak: ***The International Law of Conventional Arms Control in Europe*** (Baden-Baden: Nomos Ver-lagsgesellschaft, 1996); Falkenrath, Richard A.: ***Shaping Europe's Military Order. The Origins and Conse-quences of the CFE Treaty*** (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994).

[106] On regional organisations in the UN sense see Weiss, Thomas G., David P. Forsythe & Rogert A. Coate: ***The United Nations and Changing World Politics*** (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 33-36.

[107] ***OSCE Handbook*** (***op. cit***., note 97), pp. 21-39. See also Ganser, Helmut W.: "Auf dem Weg zur hand-lungsfähigen internationalen Organisation: Die KSZE", ***Europäische Sicherheit***, vol. 43, no. 5 (May 1994), pp. 246-248; Plate, Bernard von: "Die KSZE—Baustelle, nicht Ruine", ***Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik***, vol. 39, no. 4 (April 1994), pp. 457-462; Flynn, Gregory & Henry Farrell: "Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE and the 'Construction' of Security in Post-Cold War Europe", ***International Organization***, vol. 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999), pp. 505-536.

[108] See note 41 above..

[109] ***OSCE Handbook*** (***op. cit.***, note 97), pp. 116-131. See also Kuglitsch, Franz Josef: "Das KSZE-Forum für Sicherheitskooperation", ***Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift***, vol. 30, no. 6 (Nov-Dec. 1992), pp. 485-490; Ghébaldi, Victor-Yves: "The CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation: the Opening Gambits", ***NATO Review***, vol. 41, no. 3 (June 1993), pp. 23-27; Sauerwein, Brigitte: "CSCE Vienna Document 1992. A New Dimension in Arms Control", ***International Defence Review***, vol. 25, no. 6 (June 1992), pp. 511-512.

[110] On the Dayton Agreement see Borden, Anthony & Richard Caplan: "The Former Yugoslavia: the War and the Peace Process", ***SIPRI Yearbook 1996***, pp. 203-231, with the Dayton Peace Agreement appended on pp. 232-250; Neville-Jones, Pauline: "Dayton, IFOR and Alliance Relations in Bosnia", ***Survival***, vol. 38, no. 4 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 45-65; Chandler, David: ***Bosnia. Faking Democracy after Dayton***. 2nd ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2000); Oudraat, Chantal de Jonge: "Bosnia", in Daniel, Hayes & Ouddraat: ***op. cit.*** (note 14), pp. 41-78; Hippel, Karin von: ***Democracy by Force. US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 127-167; Economides, Spyros & Paul Taylor: "Former Yugoslavia", in James Mayall (ed.): ***The New Interventionism 1991-1994. United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia*** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 59-93.

[111] Kokoski, Richard: "The Treaty on Open Skies", ***SIPRI Yearbook 1993***, pp. 632-634. The treaty itself is appended ***ibid.***, pp. 653-671

[112] Dean, Jonathan: ***Meeting Gorbachev's Challenge. How to Build Down the NATO-Warsaw Pact Confrontation*** (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 242-248; idem: "Immer noch vonnöten: ein gemeinsames Zentrum zur Risiko-minderung von NATO und Warschauer Pakt", in Erwin Müller & Götz Neuneck (eds.): ***Abrüstung und Konventionelle Stabilität in Europa*** (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990), pp. 135-146; Twining, David T.: "An East-West Center for Military Cooperation", in John Borawski (ed.): ***Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age. Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability*** (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986), pp. 173-183.

[113] See ***OSCE Handbook*** (***op. cit.***, note 97), pp. 44-84 and, for a continuous update, www.osce.org/field_ activities/field_activities.htm

[114] See Lund, Michael S.: ***Preventing Violent Conflicts. A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*** (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1996).

[115] ***OSCE Handbook*** (***op. cit***., note 97), pp. 86-91.

[116] See Troebst, Stefan: "The Kosovo Conflict", ***SIPRI Yearbook 1999***, pp. 47-62.

[117] Schimmelfennig, Frank: "The CSCE as a Model for the Third World? The Middle East and African Cases", in Lucas (ed.): ***op. cit.*** (note 97), pp. 319-334; Ferdowski, Mir A.: "Die KSZE als Modell? Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Anwendung in der Dritten Welt", ***Europa-Archiv***, vol. 47, no. 3 (10.02.92), pp. 76-84; Nathan, Laurie: "Towards a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-Operation in Southern Africa", ***Southern African Perspectives***, no. 13 (Bellville: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1992). On the global applicability of CBMs and CSBMs see Krepon, Michael, Michael Newbill, Khurshid Khoja & Jenny S. Drezin (eds.): ***Global Confidence Building. New Tools for Troubled Regions*** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999); Nkiwane, Solomon M.: "Regional Security and Confidence-Building Processes: The Case of Southern Africa in the 1990s", ***Research Paper***, no. 16 (Geneva: UNIDIR, 1993).

[118] Cilliers, Jakkie: "Peace, Security and Democracy in Africa? A Summary of

Outcomes from the 2002 OAU/AU Summits in Durban", ***ISS Paper***, no. 60 (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2002).

[119] Gomes, Solomon: "The OAU, State Sovereignty, and Regional Security", in Edmond J. Keller & Donald Rothchild (eds.): ***Africa in the New World Order*** (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 37-51.

[120] Salim, Salim Ahmed: "The OAU Role in Conflict Management", in Olara A. Otunnu & Michael W. Doyle (eds.): ***Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century*** (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 233-244; Olonisakin, 'Fummi: "Conflict Management in Africa: The Role of the OAU and Subregional Organi-sations", in Jakkie Cilliers & Annika Hilding-Nordberg (eds.): ***Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the New Millennium***. ISS Monograph Series, no. 46 ((Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2000), pp. 83-96.

[121] ***Declaration and Treaty of SADC,*** at www.sadc.int/english/protocols/ declaration_and_treaty_of_sadc.html.

[122] ***Agreement Amending the Treaty of the Southern African Development Community***, at www.sadc.int/english/ protocols/agreement_amending_ the_treaty_ of_the_sadc.html. See also Isaksen, Jan & Elling N. Tjønneland: ***Assessing the Restructuring of SADC—Positions, Policies and Progress*** (Bergen, Norway: Christian Michelsen Institute, December 2001).

[123] See the ***Communique*** from the Summit of the Heads of State and Government, Gaborone, 28 June 1996, at www.sadc.int/english/archive/communiques/ summit96.html. See also Cilliers, Jakkie & Mark Malan: "SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Future Development", ***Strategic Analysis***, vol. 20, no. 2 (New Delhi: IDSA, May 1997), pp. 201-222; Osei-Heide, Bertha Z.: "The Quest for Peace and Security: The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security", in Dominic Milazi, Munyae Mulinge & Elizabeth Mukamaambo (eds.): ***Democracy, Human Rights and Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa*** (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2002), pp. 154-172.