EUROPE AND THE CRISES IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

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Prelimary version. **Not for quotation** **Comments welcome**

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1 PREFACE

The paper is devoted to the possible role of the European states and the European Union (EU) in the Great Lakes Region and its several interlocking crises and violent conflicts.

As a preliminary to this, however, a framework for regional analysis is provided as a tool for understanding how the various crises and conflicts interact with each other and how the Great Lakes Region fits into the larger frameworks of Africa or at least Sub-Saharan Africa. This is followed by a brief account of the historical background of the current crises, from pre-colonial times via colonization to liberation—or rather: a few glimpses into this history are offered, as an exhaustive account would both be beyond the author's expertise and the scope of the present paper.

A tentative analyses of the causes and dynamics of the various crisis follows, highlighting the roles of ethnicity, state-building and resource scarcity. Having thus identified (some of) the root causes of both actual and possible future conflicts, the next question becomes what Europe can do, premised on the assumption that Europe is both obliged to and actually willing to become involved. In the analysis thereof the main emphasis is placed on the recent initiatives of the European Union, which are assessed as promising, even though some proposals for improvement are offered.

2 A FRAMEWORK OF REGIONAL ANALYSIS

2.1 Regions, Security Complexes and Conflict Systems

The first question one must ask is whether "the Great Lakes Region" is in fact a meaningful and useful frame of analysis.

The definition and delimitation of regions are always controversial, both theoretically and politically. What is clear is that a region is a subset of the global international system, but how to delimitate such a subset is debatable because several criteria might be applied, each yielding a different result, as described below. None of them is, of course, more "correct" than the others.[1] Moreover, for analytical (and sometimes also political) purposes it may be useful with a further subdivision to the level of subregions or even smaller groupings. If one treats "Africa" as the region, then sub-Saharan Africa is automatically relegated to the status of a sub-region and the Great Lakes countries can then, at most, constitute a "sub-sub-region". We would then need additional "sub-prefixes" to label any subset within it, such as parts of states (provinces,

for instance) or "regions" which straddle state borders but comprise only parts of these states.

Among the possible criteria for delimitation the first that springs to mind is the simple geographical (or geopolitical) one of proximity, as a region is usually held to consist of contiguous states. For instance, one would never label the Commonwealth a region, simply because it comprises non-contiguous states. This contiguity criterion, however, begs the question of where to draw the outer limit, unless there happen to be clear natural boundaries. While the African continent happens to be fairly clearly delimited (with the exception of the Sinai Peninsula), it is not obvious that countries like Egypt or the rest of the Maghreb really "belong" to Africa rather than to the Middle East. Moreover, in relations between peoples, societies and states, "proximity" is not merely a matter of distance, but also a function of topography, infrastructure, technology and economic factors. For instance, the fastest route of travel between several African capitals happens to be via Europe (*sic!*), simply because intra-African transport networks are so under-developed, partly as a legacy of colonialism.

Secondly, we have a variation on the geographical criterion, focusing on ecosystems, for instance defined by shared rivers and or other sources of water supplies.[2] In several cases, belonging to such an ecosystem creates a certain commonality, at least in the sense of mutual dependency and shared interests—as well as, alas, the basis for conflicts over the "shared" naturual resources. Arguably, the very term "Great Lakes Region" is based on such a criterion—even though the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) would then have to be excluded from it, and Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi included.

Thirdly, there is the criterion of cultural affinity—which unfortunately happens to almost coincide with that of "civilizations" as used by Samuel Huntington, who predicts a clash between some of the world's (alleged) nine great civilizations.[3] Apart from this unfortunate coincidence, the criterion may be unweildy as cultural homogeneity is usually more pronounced when seen from the outside (where it is viewed as "otherness") than from the inside.[4] Furthermore, "culture" has many aspects (e.g. religious, ideological, and ethnic) which do not automatically yield the same delimitation. A variation on this theme is the notion of regions as "imagined communities", in analogy with nations. Like the latter regions may be constituted as such by the members "imagining" themselves as belonging together, and the rest of the world acknowledging them as such, regardless of whether either has any "objective" foundation.[5]

Fourthly, the latter variation brings us into the sphere of politics, where a convenient political or legal criterion of delimitation might be membership of institutions or organisations defined as "regional", e.g. by the UN.[6] Unfortunately, however, most African organisations as so weak as to appear unsuitable for this purpose—and large parts of Africa are almost devoid of organisations, as is the case of the Great Lakes countries (*vide infra*).

Fifthly, we have the "scientific" or empirical criterion of interaction, according to which regions may be identified as such by a greater-than-average intensity of interaction. Most analyses have focused on trade and other forms of economic interaction, but this would yield rather meagre results in all of Africa because of the low level of intra-African trade, at least as far as the formal economy is concerned. However, one might also look at phenomena such as labour migration and other cross-border human interaction which might arguably also form the basis of regionalization.[7]

Finally, as a variation of the above, we might define regions as having an above-average intensity of interaction and interdepence in the field of security. Barry Buzan has thus suggested the term "security complex" for "a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another".[8] For all its merits, however, this concept seems to need some modification in order to be analytically useful when applied to Africa.

First of all, it should be able to accomodate a conception of security which goes beyond the state to also include societal groups and invididuals as "refererent objects" (i.e. the entities which are secure or insecure) and which encompasses dimensions such as the economy and the environment.[9] If this makes the edges of security complexes more blurred than the author would prefer them, then so be it. The borders of a security complex may be variable, depending on which issues are "securitized",[10] and this may differ from region to region as well as over time within the same region. For instance, it is conceivable that water shortage could be securitized in the Great Lakes Region, which would make the Congo and Nile basins of vital importance. This, in turn, might make new states (e.g. Sudan or even Egypt) parties to the Great Lakes security complex, while others might drop out if other issues are simultaneously "desecuritized".

Secondly, the theory will have to allow for an overlap among security complexes, i.e. take into due account that some states may have to be reckoned as parts of more than one security complex. While this may

make the concept less neat, and the theory less parsimonious, it would surely make them both more useful tools for dealing with the real world.

A related notion is that of "conflict systems" (in analogy with weather systems such as fronts or hurricanes). Over times their borders may change and their epicentres may shift, sometimes producing an overlap between systems. This conceptualization has been suggested by Bethuel Kiplagat, according to whom Africa is presently host to three, partly overlapping conflict systems: In West Africa with the epicentre presently in Sierra Leone, but previously in Liberia; in the Horn of Africa with the epicentre presently in Sudan; and in the Great Lakes Region where the epicentre was previously in Rwanda but presently in the DRC (See Fig. 1).[11]


Fig. 1: African Conflict Systems

Whilst acknowledging that the entire African continent may be the appropriate level of analysis in some cases, I have thus nevertheless chosen in the following to treat sub-Saharan Africa as the "real region" and the Great Lakes as a sub-regional security complex (or conflict system)—while nevertheless, for pure convenience, applying the term "region" to it. In the following I shall thus use the term "Great Lakes Region" (GLR) as comprising the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, formerly Zaïre or Congo Kinshasa), Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. I have opted against the closely related term "Central Africa" which would also comprise the several other states (Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroun, Gabon and Angola, with its Cabinda exclave).


Fig. 2: Regions and Sub-regions
AFRICA

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

East Africa

Great Lakes Region

The overlap between the GLR and adjacent regions such as East Africa and Southern Africa, is illustrated in Figure 2. East Africa overlaps because of Uganda, and Southern Africa does so by virtue of the DRC's membership (since 1998) of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well as because of the involvement of other SADC member states (Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia) in the war in the DRC.

2.2 Relevant Actors

It will be obvious to area specialists that it makes little sense to focus eclusively on states, and I have therefore chosen to disregard the predictable objections from International Relations "realists" such as Kenneth Waltz[12] to the somewhat eclectic approach applied in the following.[13] The relevant *dramatis personae* fall into various categories which are summarised in Table 1.

First there are the states, i.e. the states of the GLR itself, other states adjacent to the GLR (especially Tanzania, Angola and Sudan) and genuinely external powers. To the latter category belong, *inter alia*, the former colonial powers (UK, France, Belgium), the United States (e..g. with its African Crisis Response Initiative, ACRI)[14] and a plethora of small and medium powers, mainly in their roles as donors,[15] but also as contributors to UN missions. None of these states can even reasonably be treated as "unitary actors", however much "realists" would like to do so.

Secondly there are various international (i.e. intergovernmental) organisations consisting of states, either of a subregional, regional or global scope. However, the closest approximations to real sub-regional organisations for the GLR or Central Africa (CEPGL and CEEAC, respectively) are so weak and functionally narrow as to be almost negligible, as least as far as security and conflict matters are concerned. Among the adjacent or overlapping subregional organisations only IGAD (of East Africa) and, even more so, SADC (of Southern Africa) are strong and functionally wide enough to play a significant role in the GLR crises.[16] The all-regional OAU has certainly also been a significant actor, even though its conflict prevention and management "Mechanism" has never played much of a role in the GLR.[17] The importance of the new African

Union, which entred into force in May 2001, and which was confirmed by the Lusaka Summit in July 2001 is impossible to predict.[18]

Among the non-African and global organisations, the most important ones are surely the United Nations and its several affiliates (e.g. UNHCR and UNDP)[19] and the two Bretton Woods organisations (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund)[20], but the OECD is also seeking a role in Africa.[21] The Non-Aliagned Movement played a certain role during the Cold War, but can at best play a marginal one today.[22] The EU, however, is likely to play an increasingly central role, as will become apparent from chapter 6 of the present paper.

Table 1: Relevant Actors	In the GLR	Adjacent/ Overlapping	Rest of Africa	Rest of the world
States	RoC DRC Rwanda Burundi Uganda	Tanzania Sudan Angola	Zimbabwe Namibia Chad	France Belgium United States Donor countries (e.g. Denmark)
International Organisations[23]	CEEAC CEPGL	IGAD SADC EABD BDEAC UDEAC COMESA	OAU/AU AfDB ECA	UN (with subsidiaries) World Bank/IMF EU OECD ACP Group NAM
Non-state actors	Ethnic groups Guerillas/Militias PMCs Media	Refugees Migrants		NGOs International Capital Media

Thirdly there is a wealth of non-state actors of different kinds. Some are parties to the conflict(s), as is the case of the various guerilla movements and militas[24] as well as of the mercanaries and PMCs of which the GLR has seen more that its fair share.[25]

NGOs come in several varieties. Some (e.g. the Red Cross, Oxfam, or Médicins sans Frontiers) are involved in the provision and distribution of humanitarian aid, while others (e.g. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International or the International Crisis Group) are involved in observing and reporting. Still others such as International Alert, Search for Common Ground and the Community of Sant'Egidio have been directly involved in conflict resolution activities such as mediation and reconciliation, both at the national and local levels, interacting closely with national and local NGOs.[26]

While "respectable" private business enterprises have long been disengaging from the GLR (with the exception of Uganda), more "sleezy" ones (e.g. in the diamond sector) have continued or even stepped up their activities in countries in crisis.[27] A final actor impacting on conflicts in the GLR is the category of the news media, ranging from "hate radios" such as the Rwandan RTLMC[28] to the "reconiciliation" radio station ("Studio Jambo") run in Burundi by Search for Common Ground[29]—and the international media which have often been instrumental in attracting the attention of the "international community", albeit often too late.[30]

The activities and interaction of these multiple actors will be analysed below after a brief and very superficial account of (or rather: a few scattered glimpses into) the history of the GLR.

3 Colonialism and Its Legacy

Even though the Europeans viewed the Great Lakes Region, as well as Africa in general, as a no-man's land ("*terra nullius*") which was "up for grabs", pre-colonial Africa was home to quite sophisticated societies, in some cases even with fairly well-developed forms of governance—even though most were not European-style state structures. This was. e.g. the case of the Zande "empire" north of the Congo, the Kongo of the 16th Century, Rwanda in the 18th century, the Luba and Lunda empires west of Lake Tanganyika and the kingdom of Nkore in Western Uganda.[31]

The exploration of the Congo was undertaken by Henry Stanley, first on his own behalf and subsequently as an egent of King Leopold II of Belgium—one of the worst villains in European colonial history. He treated the Congo "Free State" as his private estate and was responsible for perhaps the most brutal exploitation of any African country, featuring forced (i.e. slave) labour, an incredibly brutal treatment of the indigenous population and a complete disregard for the needs of the population (e.g. manifested in the neglect of the infrastructure, except for what was required for the exploitation). It was all undertaken in the guise of a phony "humanitarianism", claiming the "moral high ground" with reference to the need to combat the Zanzibari slave traders.[32] Leopold had his claims on the Congo accepted at the infamous Berlin Conference of 1884-85 where the European powers reached agreement on the division of large trackts of Africa among themselves, with virtually no regard for the inhabitants.[33]

Like was the case of most other colonialists, the bulk of the troops used by Leopold to conquer and subsequently rule "his" Congo were black African. His *Force Publique* thus numbered a mere 200 whites to 6,000 blacks—mostly mercenaries from other parts of Africa. Leopold even seems to have had a perverse preference for such African forces as had a reputation for ferociousness and even cannibalism (*sic!*). In several cases the African troops were drawn predominantly from particular ethnic groups, thereby promoting "martial tribes" and laying the foundations for later ethnic strife, e.g. between Hutus and Tutsis in the Great Lakes Region. Such methods were first instituted by the Portuguese, but also used by the other colonial powers[34]

Both the UK, France and Germany thus established colonies in Central Africa—the UK in the present Uganda, France in the present Congo-Brazzaville, Germany in the present Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi, and Belgium in the present DRC, i.e. King Leopold's private colony which was handed over to the Belgian state in 1908.[35]

As in Southwest Africa (present Namibia), the German rulers were

ruthless and brutal, deliberately using famine as a weapon (killing maybe 250,000-300,000 Africans). As a result they experienced, resistance in 1888-91,[36] followed by the Maji-Maji rebellion of 1905-06. The uprising was eventually defeated, inter alia because of the poor (clan-based) organization of the Maji-Maji and their (weapons) technologial inferiority.[37] After the defeat of Germany in the First World War, its colonies (Tanganyika and Rwanda-Burundi) were taken over by the UK and Belgium, respectively.[38]

The former did not matter much for the Great Lakes Region—except perhaps for laying the groundworks for a fairly stable present Tanzania. Belgian colonialism, on the other hand, did not do much for future stability. By privileging the Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi until the very eve of liberation (when they swapped preferences) they aggrevated mutual resentments between the two closely intermingled ethnic groups in the densely populated areas. Upon the achievement of independence, the legacy thereof became a perennial struggle between the two peoples cohabiting the same geographical space

When the states of the GLR achieved independence they did so within the borders defined by the Europeans. As a result, several borders were completely artificial and hotly contested for several reasons:[39] Some borders cut across ethnic and national boundaries, thereby creating exposed national minorities as well as "divided nations", in their turn providing the basis for secessionist and/or irridentist claims (*vide infra*). Moreover, borders often did not follow geographical or topographical lines, hence might present obstacles to the effective exploitation of natural resources—in addition to which they may have produced states with sizes and/or shapes that are not viable. Some countries (e.g. the DRC) may simply be too large to be governable, while others (e.g. Rwanda and Burundi) may be too small and densely populated to be viable economic and political entities.

Nevertheless, the OAU in 1964 decided (probably wisely) that the best had to be made out of existing borders, rather than allowing for border revisions, perhaps by force—as had been the case in Europe for centuries. While this policy has been remarkably successful in preventing wars among states, it has also made weak state structures almost inevitable, whence have developed a multitude of intra-state armed conflicts of various kinds, more about which shortly. Among the other legacies of colonialism one could mention:

• Weak state structures, both in terms of (lack of) legitimacy and in an terms of inadequate administrative capacities as well as, contrary to widespread assumptions, with quite insufficient military capabilities.

Africa and the GLR are thus arguably under- rather than over-militarised.

- Economic structures with an excessive dependency on a narrow range of export commodities (monoculture) producing serious vulnerability to fluctuations in world market prices.
- An extremely uneven distribution of land, capital and wealth and widespread poverty, often to the point of starvation (*vide infra*).

These are exactly the conditions from which violent conflict often springs. Hence it should come as no surprise that the GLR has seen more than its fair share of such crises and armed struggles, some of which have reached geocidal proportions.

4 NARRATIVE: THE CRISES OF THE GREAT LAKES REGION

It is debatable whether the GLR is experiences a sequence of crises, or whether to view them all as one big crisis, with reverberrations across borders, spreading from one county to the next.[40] Before analysing the root causes of these conflicts, however, I shall provide a brief historical account of them, with the main focus placed on the three closely interlocking crises in the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi—inevitably implying an almost total neglect of Congo-Brazzaville and Uganda.

4.1 Congo—Zaïre—DRC

The Congo has been ridden with crisis ever since independence, some of which has spilled over into neighbouring states.

When the Belgians belatedly realised that they had to set their colony free, they left abruptly and without preparations, thereby making instability and internecine war well nigh inevitable. The first years of independence thus saw a series of coups and counter-coups involving President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba, combined with an attempted secession of the Katanga province—and with massive involvement of the UN and with the US (mainly represented by the CIA) clandestinely "pulling strings" in the background.[41] Out of this came the reign of Mobuto, at first seemingly heralding much-needed stability and national unity, but soon destabilising the country as a consequence of an ill-advised "Zaïrisation" which produced widespread corruption and economic inefficiency. Gradually Zaïre developed into a veritable "kleptocracy", where the State was little more than a "money-making machine" for the president and his entourage.[42] The system nevertheless enjoyed the unwavering support of the US who needed it as a presumed

bulwark against "communism" in general, and as an intermediary in its intervention in Angola in support of the FNLA and UNITA against the Soviet-backed MPLA.[43]

What spurred the rebellion by the AFDL (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaïre), and the resultant accession to power of Laurent Kabila in the new DRC was the 1994 Rwandan genocide (*vide infra*) which produced a massive flow of refugees into the Kivu province in Eastern Zaïre.[44] While Kabila certainly enjoyed some domestic support (e.g. from the "new ethnie", the Banyamulenge[45]), the main instigators of the change were Rwanda and Uganda, the former because of the urgent need to combat the genocidal Hutu militias (e.g. the *Interahamwe*) hiding in, and operating out of, the refugee camps just across the border.

Paradoxically, howewer, both Uganda and Rwanda subsequenly supported the rebellion against Kabila, when he had asked the Rwandan troops to leave without doing enough to contain the "Hutu threat" to its security.[46] Having been internationally recognized as the legitimate ruler of the DRC, and having been granted membership of SADC, however, the Kabila regime was able to muster the military support of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe as well as, periodically, Chad and Sudan—thus pitting nine African states against each other in what has aptly been called "Africa's first great war".[47] As documented in a recent UN report, the war was exploited by all site for extensive looting of the riches of the DRC—which also explained the paradoxical spectacle in the summer of 1999 of the two former allies, Rwanda and Uganda, figting each other on DRC soil.[48]

After the assassination of Kabila senior and the accession to power of his son, however, there have recently been signs of a more accomodating attitude. A ceasefire agreement had already been signed in Lusaka on 10 July 1999,[49] calling for a withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of the DRC and the deployment of a small contingent of UN observers and a protection force (i.e. MONUC).[50] Most of the obstacles to its implementation did, by the time of writing, seem to have been removed, even though the Lusaka agreement had not yet been fully implemented.[51]

4.2 Rwanda

Not only was the 1994 Rwandan genocide a trigger of unrest in reghbouring countries, above all in Zaïre. It was also one of the gravest tragedies in world history, with casualty figures not known exactly, but probably around 800,000 according to most estimates. The genocide

was perpetrated by extremist groupings among the country's Hutu majority against its Tutsi minority (but also against moderate Hutus, mainly from the southern parts of the country)—and in a "hands-on" and incredibly savage and brutal manner which brought to mind the famous last words of Joseph Conrad's Mr. Kurtz: *"The horror! The horror!"*.[52]

As a protracted prelude to the dramatic events of 1994 the country had experienced decades of conflict between the Tutsi minority (which had been favoured by the Belgian colonial authorities until the very eve of independence) and the Hutu majority, which was handed the reigns of power in 1962.[53] The country was thus ruled by a Hutu president—last by Juvénal Habyarinama whose plane-crash on the 6th of April started the genocide—and the Hutus controlled the security sector, including the FAR (*Forces Armees de Rwanda*). Struggling for greater rights for the Tutsi minority out of bases in Uganda was the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) of the present president Paul Kagame. [54]

In preparation of the genocide, the rather small security sector was expanded with quite massive purchases of arms, including machetes, with the assistance of, e.g. United States and France, which also provided military training for the would-be *genocidaires* of the FAR and did not lift an eyebrow over their training and equipment of the *Interahamwe* militia.[55] When the genocide commenced, the proverbial "international community" turned a blind eye and refused to intervene, even though estimates have it that a small force (2,500-5,000 troops) could actually have prevented most of the killlings.[56] What did bring them to a halt was the swift and determed offensive by the RPA, i.e. the armed forces of the RPF, which even ventured a hot pursuit into Zaïre, where the fleeing FAR and Interahamwe (and other militias) has fled to seek refuge among the civilian Hutu refugees.

After the victory of the RPF, a demanding reconstruction programme has been undertaken, involving both economic and social reconstruction and attempts at both reconciliation and retriubution, the latter both at the international tribunal established in Arusha and at community-level *gacaca* tribunals.[57]

4.3 Burundi

The conflict in Burundi has been closely intertwined with, and has the same origins as that in Rwanda. It likewise pits Hutus and Tutsis against each other, and it has seen genocides of comparable proportions, most dramatically in 1972, when an estimated 200,000 were killed.[58] Since then there has been a contiuous armed confrontation between the a succession of Tutsi (civilian and/or military) governments and various

Hutu rebels, producing an estimated 200,000 casualties through the 1990s.[59]

The conflict has probably been tempered by peace talks in Arusha and and various efforts at mediation, both by NGOs and the OAU, first represented by Julius Nyerere and subsequently by former president Nelson Mandela of South Africa.[60] In 2001, agreement was reached on a power-sharing formula according to which the presidency would alternate between the two ethnic groups (with the present Tutsi president Buyoya to serve for another year and a half, to be suceeded by a Hutu) and the security forces divided fifty-fifty between the two ethnies. Whether this agreement will be implemented satisfactorily, however, remains to be seen, but by the time of writing the signs were quite promising, as several countries had offered to contribute to international force to oversee the transition period and a peace summit had been convened for the 23rd of July in Arusha.[61]

4.4 The Republic of Congo (Brazzaville)

The conflict in the smaller Congo also has some ethnic elements, but is mainly a struggle for political power, partly driven by economic motives. Unfortunately, the three competing parties have mainly waged their struggle by means of armed militias (the Cocoye, Cobra and Ninja militias, respecively) and the struggle in 1997 assumed civil war proportions, with at least 10,000 casualties and around 800,000 displaced persons as the result.[62] However, the RoC has largely escaped the spread of conflict from the rest of the region even though, at one stage, some of the Rwandan soldiers fighting in Zaïre/the DRC also appeared across the river in the other Congo. Angola has, likewise, operated in the RoC, mainly in order to crush UNITA forces and secessionist rebels in its Cabinda enclave.

4.5 Uganda

Uganda was ridden with civil war during the reigns of Milton Obote (1962-69, 1980-85), Idi Amin (1969-79),and Tito Okello (1985-86), mixed with atrocities of genocidal proportions, especially under Amin[63]—and with a Tanzanian invasion and subsequent occupation 1979-1981.[64] However, the country has been relatively stable since the armed victory in 1986 of the National Resistance Army under the present president Museweni.[65] The victory was followed by a fairly succesful demilitarisation, and economic growth rates have generally been higher than in neighbouring states.[66]

However, even though most of the guerillas of the past have been defeated and/or pacified by political means, an armed rebellion continues in the north of the country, mainly waged by the Lord's Resistance Army, which operates partly out of bases in southern Sudan—which, in its turn, is partly in retalilation for Uganda's support for Sudanese rebel groups. In the eastern parts of the country, rebels have been infiltrating from Rwanda and the DRC, in their turn providing some (but perhaps not sufficient) justification for the Ugandas intervention in the DRC.[67]

5 ANALYSIS: CAUSES AND DYNAMICS OF THE CRISES

As the above account has, hopefully, demonstrated, the Great Lakes Region has been haunted by several crisis, most of which have been closely interlocking, both geographically and topically, constituting the region as a veritable conflict system (*vide supra*).

The least constructive approach to such a conflict system is to put it down to "chaos", implying that it is both incomprehensible and intractable, hence something in which one had better not get involved.[68] In actual fact, for all their complexity the interlocking crises are susceptible to rational analysis which may even yield some clues to their management and resolution. In the following I shall venture a very tentative sketch of such an analysis, which is presumably able to grasp at least some of the main features of the crises. These are understood as the products of three sets of factors: Sociological problems of identity and nation-building, political and military problems with statebuilding in general and the deformed character of the security sector in particular, and economic problems stemming from an unfortunate combination of resource scarcity and abundance.

5.1 Ethnicity and Nation-building

On the face of it the conflicts in at least Rwanda and Burundi are profoundly ethnic, pitting Hutus and Tutsis against each other. Even if we accept this view at face value, however, it matters which of the following three alternative approaches to ethnicity we accept as our analytical point of departure, as their implications for conflict resolution are quite different.[69]

Primordialist theory accepts ethnic and national distinctions as reflecting objective facts such as differences in race, language or culture.[70] The prevailing view that "Tutsis are tall and thin-nosed" while "Hutus are short and broad-nosed" falls into this category. This theory is profoundly pessimistic as it seems to imply that ethnic divisions have to

be accepted as constant; hence that the best one can hope for is to prevent them from becoming violent. If not, separation (e.g. in the form of ethnic cleansing) may be the most realistic option—and surely a lesser evil than genocide.[71]

"Critical theory" (or at least some versions thereof) views ethnicity as mainly an instrument used by unscrupulous political leaders for their own ends—e.g. as a form of "false consciousness" of t.he masses, created by the leaders.[72] According to this theory, the Belgians caused the problem in the first place, e.g. with their 1933 census which divided people into Tutsis and Hutus;[73] and the Hutu politicians in Rwanda and the Tutsi leaders in Burundi perpetuated this division after independence. Compared with primordialism, critical theory seems to err in the opposite direction of excessive optimism, as it seems to imply that if only the people realize the machinations or their leaders and elect better ones, ethnic divisions will vanish into thin air and all will live in harmony ever after.

Constructivist theory occupies a middle ground between the two, as it regards ethnic identities as social constructs, developed over time.[74] While they may well be based on objective distingushing features, the singling out of some and disregard of others are products of social interaction—as the history of Rwanda and Burindi seems to illustrate with the frequent inter-marriage of the two groups and the long periods of fairly peaceful coexistence. This theory refuses to acknowledge ethnic distinctions and divisions as objective and immutable facts, but it does view them as social and durable facts which have to be taken seriously. They can be changed, but only in the long term, perhaps over generations.[75] Moreover, to transcend ethnic divides (e.g. to become Rwandans or Bundundis rather than Hutus or Tutsis) becomes all the more difficult and time-consuming the more violent the preceding conflict has been and the longer it has lasted. Conflicts simply have their own dynamics, as violence begets violence, creates desires for revenge, cements "enemy images", etc.[76]

One of these conflict dynamics at work is (a variety of) the "security dilemma". When two parties view each other as potential (but not actual) threats they tend to respond to each other's actions in a manner which increases mutual hostility in a "spiralling mode". For fear of the other, one side arms itself and/or assumes control of the State as an instrument of protection, but thereby actually excluding and oppressing the other side. Hence, when Tutsis are in power the Hutus fear for their security and vice versa. The response of the powerless often assumes violent forms, thereby convincing those in power that they had better cling to it and "forcing them" to use it, often brutally. This in turn reinforces the belief in

the powerless that their only salvation is to be found in gaining power by whatever means may be required.

In its most diabolical form the security dilemma may lead both opposing sides to seek the actual extermination of the respective other, as in a genocide spurred by "kill or be killed" motives.[77] Moreover, for each "round" of such mailign interaction, mutual perception become less and less amenable to change as reciprocal enemy images are confirmed by actual behaviour. In the case of the Great Lakes Region, this dynamic even transcended national borders, as the 1972 (Tutsi) genocide in Burundi (and its smaller-scale sequels) confirmed Hutu fears of the Tutsis in Rwanda, thereby paving the way for the 1994 (Hutu) genocide in Rwanda, in its turn cementing Tutsi fears of Hutus in Burundi, etc.[78]

5.2 Nation- and State-building

Ethnicity has implications for state-building, as states need both legitimacy and administrative capacity in order to be viable. When either (or both) of the two is missing, the State qualifies as a "weak state", which can all too easily degenerate further to become a "failed state".[79]

An indispensable element in the legitimacy of a state is that its citizens accept its very essence, usually as the appropriate political counterpart of the nation. Ethnicity is not automatically incompatible with nation-building, as some nations are either ethnically homogenous (e.g. Japan) or non-ethnic, i.e. constructed in political ("citizen") terms, as in France or the United States. Very often, however, ethnic identities go against the identification with nations. If so, ethnicity weakens both the nation and the State, motivating claims for secession and/or irredentism—e.g. in the form of claims for reunification with ethnic kin across the border.[80]

Figure 3 illustrates the problems and opportuinities. In the perfect nation state, the problems do not exist as the state and nation are almost contiguous. In the multinational state, however, which is home to several ethnic groups and/or nations, some of these tend to feel entrapped. Some may be able to solve their problems through autonomy or secession, provided the political will is there. A, B and D could, for instance secede to become independent states or be granted autonomy within their respective territories, but the secession option is ruled out for C, which can at most hope for autonomy.[81]

For groups of such multinational states, the problems are compounded, as ethnic groups and nations are often divided by state borders. Oppressed ethnic groups in one country therefore often receive

the support of their ethnic kin across the border, producing a spill-over of the conflict.

Fig. 3: States and Nations

When ethnies are closely intermingled rather than "clustering" in separate parts of the state territory, problems are further compounded, as some of the above solutions (territorially defined autonomy, for instance) become inapplicable. The Tutsis cannot secede from Burundi, as they constitute a minority all over the country, and only a majority in small and discontinuous spots. Hence the need for innovative and non-territorial power-sharing schemes, the purpose of which should be to make all citizens view the State as "theirs", regardless of their ethnic identity. Whether the attempted "de-ethnification" of the State in Rwanda under Paul Kagame, or the "Mandela Plan" for Burundi will succeed in these respects remains to be seen.

The other element in state-building has to do with its capacity as a State, which should be able to ensure, as a minimum, law and order, lest the citizens resort to self-help, thereby actually furthering lawlessness. The State should furthermore provide at least a minimum of "economic order" in the sense of a stable and generally accepted currency, customs controls, etc. Ideally it should also perform "welfare functions" such as ensuring decent educational and health system, and it should take care of the infrastructure. As a precondition for performing these tasks, the State should be able to collect taxes to finance its other functions.

To accomplish this is quite a tall order, and certainly calls for a "strong state", which has often been at odds with the legitimacy requirement. There is nothing particularly African about failures in this

respect. In fact, state-making has everywhere and always been violent and nasty, in Europe aptly described as "organised crime" which often lasted for decades or even centuries.[82] That certain African States have thus regressed to "vampire states"[83] should thus come as no surprise, as the African states have effectively been asked to accomplish in decades what their European states took centuries to achieve, i.e. to combine state capacity with good governance and legitimacy, including democracy and respects for human rights.[84]

The above explanation of state-building fauilures should not, of course, serve to absolve state leaders in the Great Lakes Regions such as Mobuto or Idi Amin from responsibility. In the final analysis it is the African nations who must "put their houses in order" and live up to the commitments to which they have signed up in several internationally binding conventions.

5.3 The Deformed Security Sector

One of the main problems with the states in the GLR is the nature of their security sector in general and their armed forces in particular. This is not a matter of excessive military spending, as it is often claimed. Contrary to widespread assumptions (in the North) the GLR countries are far from heavily militarised. In fact a comparison with European countries shows the exact opposite to be the case.

Both in absolute and per capita terms, the GLR states are almost desperately *under*-militarised (or their European counterparts ridiculously *over*militarised), especially in view of the different threat environments. All four European states included in Table 2 openly acknowledge to have no enemies and to foresee no military threats within, at least, the next decade—an enviable situation that the GLR states hardly enjoy. Nevertheless, the military expenditures of the Europeans are, by several orders of magnitude, higher than those of the GLR countries. The only yardstick according to which the GLR states are overmilitarized in that of the percentage of their GDP. They simply cannot afford even the minuscule military expenditures, which thus constitute a severe drain on societal resources and, perhaps even more so, on those available for the State (see Table 2).

Table 2: "Comparative Militarisation" I[85]	Military Expenditure (1999)		
	Mill. US$	Per capita	Pct. of GDP
RoC	73	24	3.4

DRC	411	9	7.8
Rwanda	135	20	6.2
Burundi	69	10	6.4
Uganda	199	9	2.5
For comparison			
UK	36,876	628	2.6
France	37,893	640	2.7
Germany	31,117	379	1.6
Denmark	2,682	510	1.6

This impression is only reinforced by a glance at the armed forces, which clearly shows that the territories and borders of the GLR states are much more thinly defended than the European ones—even though the neighbours of each GLR states are surely much less confidence-inspiring than those of, say, Germany. Just compare France, Denmark or Switzerland to Rwanda, the DRC or Sudan in Table 3.

Table 3: "Comparative Militarisation" II[86]										
Country	*Armed Forces (000)*				*Terr.*	*Borders*	*Pop.*	*AF/popu*	*AF/sq.*	*AF/km.*
	Reg.	*Res.*	*Par.*	*Total*	*Land*	*Land*	*(000)*	*-lation*	*km.*	*border*
RoC	10.0	n.a.	5.0	15.0	341,500	5,504	2,831	0.53%	0.04	2.73
DRC	55.9	n.a.	37.0	92.9	2,267,600	10,744	51,965	0.18%	0.04	8.65
Rwanda	47.0	n.a.	7.0	54.0	24,948	893	7,229	0.75%	2.16	60.47
Burundi	40.0	n.a.	5.5	45.5	25,650	974	6,055	0.75%	1.77	46.71
Uganda	40.0	n.a.	1.5	41.5	199,710	2,698	23,318	0.18%	0.21	15.38
For comparison										
UK	212.4	254.3	n.a.	466.7	241,590	360	59,511	0.78%	1.93	1,296.39
France	317.3	419.0	94.3	830.6	545,630	2,889	59,330	1.40%	1.52	287.50
Germany	332.8	344.7	n.a.	677.5	349,223	3,621	82,797	0.82%	1.94	187.10
Denmark	24.3	81.2	n.a.	105.5	42,394	68	5,336	1.98%	2.49	1,551.47
Legend: Reg.: Regular; Res.: Reserves; Par.: Paramilitary; Terr.: Territory, Pop.: Population AF: Armed Forces										

We thus seem to have the baroque and profoundly unstable situation that none of the GLR countries is capable of defending itself, but all have at least some means of attacking the others.[87] The general inadequacy of defensive capabilities even produces motives (other than simple agression) for such attacks or military interventions across state borders. If one state is, for instance, unable to patrol all of its borders and territory, guerillas can all too easily establish bases here from where they can launch cross-border raids into neighbouring countries. This tends to become even more tempting within the above-mentioned groupings of multinational states where ethnically constituted rebels may receive support from their ethnic kin. This in turn provides the state under attack from the rebels with motives for extending its counter-insurgency

operations into the territory of its neighbours—as was. e.g. the case for the Rwandan intervention into Zaïre and subsequently the DRC.

Table 4: The Security Sector	External security	Internal security	
Europe			
Mission	National defence	Domestic order	
State agencies	Army, Navy, Air Force Military and foreign inteligence service(s)	Police Internal intelligence service(s)	
Non-state agencies	None	Relatively few and insignificant	
Africa			
Mission	National defence	Counter-insurgency	Domestic order
State agencies	Army, Navy, Air Force Military and foreign inteligence service(s)	Army Internal intelligence	Police Army
Non-state agencies	Private Military Companies	Private Military Companies	Private security firms Neighbourhood watch/ vigilante groups

Quite a strong case can thus be made for strengthening defensive capabilities across the region, in accordance with the logic that "strong fences make good neighbours". While this may open up long-term opportinities for disarmament (by virtue of improved state-to-state relations) it may well call for increased defence expenditures in the short term. Even more importantly, however, it may call for a reform of the entire security sector, with the aim of making the state a provider of security for its citizens rather than a threat to them, as has all too often been the case.[88]

While security sector reform in Africa has become increasingly fashionable among the donor countries, it is a very demanding and complex venture, also because the typical security sector in Africa differs a lot from that in, e.g., Europe, as illustrated in Table 4.

In the North, both domestic security ("law and order") and national security (i.e. freedom from attack by other states) are the (almost) exclusive domain of the State, which enjoys a weberian "monopoly on the legitimate use of force" within its sovereign domain.[89] Moreover, the external and internal aspects of security are rather clearly separated both conceptually and structurally with the armed forces being in charge or national and the police of domestic security.

Not so in Africa (or elsewhere in the global South) where the distinctions between external and internal functions are more blurred, and where non-state agents play significant roles.

- Armies often have domestic security as their primary goal, e.g. in the form of counter-insurgency warfare or constabulary duties.
- The distinction between domestic and exernal is frequently blurred because insurgents often operate out of bases in neighbouring countries, calling for cross-border raids by the security forces of the state—producing a partial internationalisation of internal conflicts.
- A major part of the "policing" tasks are performed by either neighbourhood watch groups, vigilante groups or private security companies (PSCs)—both because of a proliferation of crime (in its turn a consequence of poverty) and accompanying need for protection, and because of the inadeaquacy of the national police forces—in its turn partly a result of insufficient resources vailable to the State. Hence the tendency for "security" to become privatised, which may be a short-term solution to urgent problems, but in the longer term tends to exacerbate the problem [90]
- Private military companies (PMCs) Mercenary companies such as the (now dismantled) Executive Outcomes and Sandline have been involved in all forms of "security", e.g. in Angola, Sierra Leone and Zaïre
- The security sector as a whole is traditionally expected to work for "the public good". In several African states, however, armies have sometimes appeared as economic actors in their own right—both as involved in productive activities and as predators, as seems to be the case of both the Ugandan, Rwandan and Zimbabwean forces operating (on opposing sides) in the war in the DRC. When one adds the phenomenon of widespread corruption within police forces, sometimes collaborating with crime syndicates, the emerging picture is one of a "commercialisation of security".

In comparison with the North, the boundaries between security and non-security functions are thus just as blurred as are those between state and non-state actors in a rather amorphous security sector.

As a consequence, security sector reform is inevitably also a multidimensional task, involving a restructuring and reorganisation of both the armed forces, the police and the judicial system as well as regulation of their relations to the private sector and to the rest of the State, including the political authorities vested with overall responsibility.[91]

As far as the armed forces are concerned, a number of tasks are involved with security sector reform. They are not only especially complicated in the case of countries coming out of (often protracted and very destructive) armed conflicts, or otherwise undergoing profound transformation. They are also of paramount importance as a safeguard against the conflict flaring up in violence again, hence indispensable elements in post-conflict peace-building.

While there is no question that some former combatants need to be disarmed and demobilised upon the termination of the armed struggle, how and to which extent to do so depends, inter alia, on the mode of conflict termination.

- When armed conflicts end with the defeat of one side (as it did in the struggle between the Rwandan FAR and the RPA), it is usually mainly the vanquished party that is disarmed and demobilised. But even in such cases, extreme care must be taken to integrate the former combatants in society, lest they are alienated and take up arms at a later stage, or resort to crime.
- In cases of compromise, where a cease-fire has been negotiated between two armed parties, the "calibration" of disarmament and demobilisation becomes critical, as each party at each stage of the process risks finding itself confronted by the other side in arms. This will, for instance, be one of the strumbling blocks in the peace process in Burundi, where the Tutsis have to share control of the armed forces with the Hutus. The presence of impartial forces—be they UN forces or those of a regional organisation—may help in this process as they will provide each party with a safeguard against the respective other's non-compliance with the disarmament and demobilisation stipulations of the agreement.
- Next comes the task of integrating demobilised soldiers in society. Depending on the duration of the preceding struggle, many soldiers will have no professional experience outside the armed forces, hence will need extensive vocational training in order to qualify for jobs in the civilian sector—lest they resort to other "professions of arms" such as

those as security guards, mercenaries or criminals. Alternatively, they may be provided with financial support.[92]

5.4 Resource Scarcity and Abundance

The colonial past has left its economic legacy on the states of the GLR, just as one those in the rest of the "Third World", relegating them to a position of dependency in the periphery of the global economic system[93]—and the present surge of globalisation does not make matters any easier.[94]

It is no exaggeration to claim that life in the GLR is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short".[95] In fact, the GLR countries are at, or close to, the bottom of the scale in the UNDP's human development index, combining such indicators as life expectance, adult literacy and per capita GDP, intended to measure "three basic dimensions of human development—a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living" (see Table 5).[96]

Table 5: Human development	Life expectancy	Adult literacy	GDP p.c.	HDI	HDI Rank 1999	HDI Trend 1995- 1999
Burundi	40.6	46.9	578	0.309	160	down
DRC	51.0	60.3	801	0.429	142	n.a.
RoC	51.1	79.5	727	0.502	126	down
Rwanda	39.9	65.8	885	0.395	152	up
Uganda	43.2	66.1	1,167	0.435	141	up

As it would be quite beyond the scope of the present paper to attempt an explanation of these economic problems, I shall limit myself to explaining their consequences in terms of the propensity for violent conflict. There are, indeed causal paths from a scarcity of resource to conflict as illustrated in Fig. 4. The intervening variable seems to be demographic pressure stemming from high birth rates, producing what might be called a "Malthusian squeeze", manifested in a growing number of mouths to feed with limited resources (e.g. in the shape of areable land).[97]

Fig. 4: Causal Paths of "Resource Conflicts"

Limited
resources

"Malthusian squeeze"

Violent conflict and genocide

Paradoxically, "islands of plenty" in the midst of a "sea of scarcity" may also produce problems, e.g. when otherwise poor countries contain diamond mines, oil deposits or the like.

- In some cases, this stimulates secessionist movements where potentially rich provinses seek to shed the "burden" of the rest of the country in order to avoid sharing "their" resources with others—as was arguably the case of Katanga in the early 1960s.
- In other cases, a guerilla movement (or a warlord) operating in a part of the country generously endowed with easily accessible and marketable resources such as diamonds or gold can contuínue their struggle indefinitely. The resources not only provide motives for the struggle, but can also finance it, e.g. through "diamonds-for-arms" deals—as has been the case for UNITA in Angola for decades.
- Finally, one country's riches may be seen by neighbouring countries as a prize to be looted, as may be a partial explanation of the foreign involvement in the civil war in Zaïre and the DRC.[98]

5.5 Summary

As the analysis above has, hopefully, shown quite a lot of the conflict can thus be explained with reference to three sets of problems, namely ethnicity, state-building and the combination of resource scarcity and occasional plenty. All of these are certainly complex enough when seen in isolation, and when combined, total complexity is compounded. This easily makes the problems of the GLR seem intractable, thereby contributing to the impression that Africa is a "lost continent" (and the GLR probably even more so than the rest) from which one had better disengage.

This attitude is further reinforced by some obvious economic and other material facts, namely that the strategic importance of Africa has

disappeared with the end of the Cold War, and that the economic significance is steadily being eroded by the development of synthetic substitutes for former natural raw materials.

Africa is thus becoming increasingly marginalized and will therefore inevitably have to shoulder the burden of preventing or managing and resolving its conflicts by indigenous means, as external assistance will in all likelihood continue to decline—or rather: While the prospects for the long-term may be for almost complete disengagement, in the short-to-medium term assistance will increasingly aim at enhancing African capacities for conflict prevention, management and resolution.

Before proceeding to the confluding chapters on Europe, I shall therefore venture some suggestions for indigenous initiatives.

6 CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION

Africa in general, and the countries of the GLR in particular, can actually do quite a lot themselves to prevent future armed conflicts or at least to manage them better if they should nevertheless erupt.

One way of analysing this matter is to take the evolution of a "typical" crisis as the point of departure. As illustrated in Fig. 5 conflicts tend to evolve in a cyclical pattern, often with several vicious circles closely intertwined.

Fig. 5: The Conflict Cycle

6.1 Before Violence Starts

Before a conflict erupts there must have been a **latent phase** where it was still dormant and where conflicting views may barely have been expressed by the conflicting sides who may not even be conscious of their conflicting interests or values. In principle this is the phase where a conflict can still be "nipped in the bud" through preventative action on the basis of early warning

Unfortunately, however, latent conflicts are difficult to detect with any degree of certainty—and their presence or absence may be hard to verify. Still, several indicators of incipient conflicts can be identified, such as growing poverty, inequality, frustrated expectations, a growing tendency to view problems in "us versus them-terms", etc. For Africa to further develop the existing early warning mechanism (henceforth under the auspices of the AU)[99] would thus be valuable as the early warning could be used for preparations for subsequent action.[100] However, to expect any preventative action at this stage beyond various forms of mediation initiatives would probably be unrealistic—also because even succesful intervention would be hard to justify. Its success would be to have prevented something from happening, which might not have happened anyway. Justification thus has to be counterfactual.

When the conflict enters its **manifest phase** the conflicting parties express their demands and grievances openly, but mainly through legal political channels. At this stage is is easier to identify both problems and contestants, and the time for preventative action has not passed yet—but time is running short as conflicting sides exihibit conflict behaviour and tend to regroup themselves in opposing camps, often (but not always) defined in ethnic terms. As long as no violence has occurred, however, mediation efforts pointing towards compromise solutions still stand a reasonable chance of success—as shown by the diplomatic efforts of especially Nelson Mandela in Burundi.

If the African states were to adopt a less "dogmatic" approach to state sovereignty which would allow them to intervene at this stage into the "internal matters" of other states, this would be the best stage at which to do so. In fact, the *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, in art. 4 mentioned "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity"—but whether it will actually be prepared to thus interfere in the international affairs of a member state in the form of a humanitarian intervention remains to be seen. They are very unlikely to do so preventatively, i.e. in order to avoid "war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity", and more likely to take action when there is incontrovertible evidence of such activities. Moreover, even if the African states should be able to agree on what needs to be done, their military capacities are generally insufficient for a large-scale intervention.[101]

6.2 The Violent Stages

If and when the conflict is allowed to reach the **violent phase** it becomes

much easier to justify action, but taking action also becomes more complicated and militarily demanding. The "spilling of blood" produces additional motives in the opposing sides for continuing the struggle, if only to "get even" or escape retribution for crimes and atrocities already committed. Moreover, in this phase leadership is often usurped by people having their various private agendas and often personally profiting from the continuing struggle.

While all African states can surely play a diplomatic role in this stage (e.g. by providing third-party mediation)[102] their economic capacities and mutual economic dependency are insufficient to make economic sanctions a promising instrument. Moreover, military capacities are generally quite inadequate for forceful intervention. The only exception to this general rule may be when regional great powers such as Nigeria or South Africa decide to intervene (either unilaterally or within a multinational framework) in small countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone or Lesotho.[103] In the Great Lakes Region this does not seem to be an option, and the involvement of three SADC countries plus Uganda and Rwanda on opposing sides in the DRC is hardly an example for emulation.

The same is the case for the **escalation phase**, only even more so, as violence at this stage breeds further violence, producing an escalatory momentum. Moreover, the longer the struggle has lasted, and the more destructive it has been, the more the warring parties (and especially their leaders) have to lose by laying down their arms. Only victory can justify the preceding bloodshed, hence the proclivity to struggle on as long as there is even a slight hope of prevailing, thereby attaining the power to set the terms of a peace treaty. Neither the violent nor the escalation phase therefore leave much scope for peaceful intervention, mediation or negotiations. On the other hand, such military intervention as might make a difference would be a risky enterprise, hence is rarely undertaken—at least not by genunine "third parties" whose national (or other vital) interests are not at stake. That determined military intervention can sometimes succeed was, however, aptly demonstrated by the offensive of the RPA in 1994 to bring the Rwandan genocide to a halt. It is also conceivable that military capacities would suffice for minor military interventions, e.g. with the purpose of establishing "safe havens" for refugees and internally displaced persons.

Even without intervention the escalation nevertheless in most case comes to a halt sooner or later, perhaps simply because the two sides have temporarily exhausted their supply of weaponry. The conflict then enters its **contained phase**, where the struggle continues, but its intensity abates—as seems to have been the case of the DRC conflict.

At this stage, some scope usually appears for negotiations and mediation efforts, aiming towards a truce, such as was actually accomplished through the Lusaka Treaty. Perhaps even more importantly, the abating violence provides scope for other leaders, more inclined towards compromise and with concern for the population.

In many cases, peacekeeping forces can also be introduced, which will protect each side against the respective other's possible breaches of the truce. Unfortunately, however, peacekeepers seem to be rapidly approaching the status of an "endangered species", as the willingness of the global North to provide forces for UN operations has declined substantially (in addition to being increasingly concentrated on the Balkans). The only countries likely to provide substantial contributions to multinational peacekeeping operations anywhere in Africa are thus the African countries themselves—but here as well capacities are quite inadequate and success thus preconditioned on the participation of the regional great powers.

While African peacekeepers are generally better in terms of "morale" (i.e. less casualty-scared than the Europeans and much more so than the Americans), they are clearly inferior in terms of equipment, logistics and training.[104] While they may thus be able to field the forces required for a "traditional" peacekeeping operation in a small country (e.g. Burundi), they will neither have the capacity for large-scale missions in countries the size of the DRC nor for handling the "mission creep" that is likely to characterize such missions.[105]

6.3 From Mitigation to Resolution

From the contained plase the conflict may gradually evolve into its **mitigated phase**, where the basic causes of conflict remain in place, but where conflict behaviour has been significantly altered—with less violence and more political mobilisation and negotation. If the previous conflict has taken the form of a real civil war, a truce will probably be signed during this stage, but because of the plurality of actor it is unlikely to be fully implementable. In this stage, the prospects of post-conflict recovery begin to loom large in the minds of political leaders on opposing sides, and external actors may thus gain new leverage.

Finally comes **resolution phase** which is arguably the most critical of them all, as success or failure of "post-conflict peace-building" will determine whether the conflict will flare up again.[106] The truce signed in the previous stage will have to be transformed into a real peace agreement which will have to be satisfactory to all parties—at least in the sense of opening up prospects for the future which seem preferable to a

resumption of the struggle. Success at this stage presupposes that both the underlying causes of the conflict and its immediate consequences are addressed.

This requires, as a minimum, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, demining, and economic post-war reconstruction. But it usually often requires a reordering of power relationships, e.g. in the form of power-sharing as envisoned by the "Mandela Plan" for Burundi. Some justice will also have to be done by bringing some of those responsible for the preceding bloodshed to trial. The aim, however, would have to be reconciliation between the opposing sides as a precondition of future coexistence, as is the case of the *Gacaca* courts in Rwanda.

7   THE ROLE OF EUROPE

As the account in chapter 6, hopefully, shown African countries have actually taken numerous initiatives to come to grips with the continent's conflicts. However, both military and economic resources are insufficient for this to be enough. Nevertheless, Africa is likely to be on its own in the not so distant future, as argued above. What matters is therefore to channel what little foreign assistance is still obtainable, e.g. from Europe, into the construction of indigenous capacities.

7.1   Is Europe Responsible?

As chapter 3 has, hopefully, made clear, there can be no disputing the fact that European states have committed many "sins" in the past. It is also clear that colonial rule left a legacy on the new independent states of the GLR and the rest of Africa, e.g. in the form of weak state structures, exacerbated ethnic tensions and ineffective economies.[107] Which conclusions to draw from these facts is, however, more debatable.

- First of all, not all the current problems of Africa can be attributed to the past as African states have afterall had a period of several decades since independence in which to make adjustments. While it certainly contains more than just a grain of truth, the discourse on "post-colonialism" thus risks absolving African governments from responsibility for African problems by providing them with a welcome excuse.
- Secondly, for how many generations do responsibilities and entitlements survive? While it may seem obvious that the person who illegitimately (but not illegally) deprived another of values must

compensate the victim, it is much less obvious that his grandchildren have to do so for the victim's grandchildren, etc.

- Thirdly, to the extent that some responsibility is acknowledged it is not clear how to share it: First of all, are entire countries or nations accountable for past actions, even though none (or very few) of their present citizens were even born at the time of the "crime". Secondly, are only the actual colonial powers responsible for their past behaviour, or is the responsibility shared with all the indirect beneficiaries of the colonial system—arguably the entire "North".

Regardless of the answer to these ethical and philosophical questions, most European states happen to acknowledge at least a partial responsibility for the current predicament of Africa, albeit without accepting the full blame for all the present problems. Hence they also do acknowledge an obligation to provide assistance, even though the extent and modalities of this remain controversial.

One could actually reach the same conclusion from different premises. Not only according to a cosmopolitan ethics, but also to international law (e.g. the UN Charter and the Human Rights Conventions) all states are committeed to promote human rights (including the economic and social ones) and similar values.[108] Contrary to widespread opinion, moreover, this obligation is not at all a function of distance, but universal. Denmark is thus equally committed to help Rwanda and Kosovo—even though this is not adequately reflected in, e.g. the distribution of development aid.

7.2 The Role of Europe in the Recent Past

Since independence European powers have been involved in African conflicts in several capacities, and for both good and bad.

During the Cold War, the European NATO members participated (but only as secondary actors) in the US policy of containing the Soviet Union everywhere. While Africa was merely a secondary (or even tertiary) arena for this global contest, the Cold War nevertheless had an impact on some African conflicts, e.g. those in Angola and Mozambique and to some extent also on the Horn of Africa—where the USSR first supported Somalia and the US (and its allies) Ethiopia only to subsequently "swap allies".[109] In the Great Lakes Region, the US assistance in removing Patrice Lumumba from office in Congo and the subsequent support for Mobuto was partly mirrored in the policies of its European allies. To all practical intents and purposes, however, the European states had no independent policy on Africa—with the former

colonial powers as the only exception.

The UK thus tended to support their former colonies or, to be precise, the ruling governments in these newly independent states, even when they were in blatant violation of the human rights conventions—even though the Commonwealth was sometimes used as a forum to "shame" particularly bad leaders.[110] The French did the same in the attempt at forging and keeping together a Francophone "bloc" in Africa[111]—hence, for instance, their consistent support for the Mobuto regime in Zaïre.[112] The rivalry between to two former colonial powers has also sometimes presented an obstacle, even to collaboration among adjacent states, e.g. in West Africa. Both countries did, moreover, show a somewhat greater preparedness to get militarily involved in Africa, especially within "their own" blocs—as the Brits have been in Sierra Leone and the French in Rwanda with their "*Operation Turquoise*" (technically both a UN operations).[113]

European countries have also been indirectly involved in African armed conflicts, e.g. as suppliers of arms. While this is not automatically objectionable, there have been several instances where this supply has exacerbated conflicts.[114] The worst instance thereof was, of course, the provision of arms by France, Belgium and others for (as well as training of) the Rwandan armed forces prior to the 1994 genocide.[115] However, as the total volume of arms imported by sub-Saharan African countries is small (in the year 2000 a mere 438 out of a total of 15,333 million US dollars)[116] arms sales are unlikely to be a major driving force behind European policies towards the continent.

On a more positive note one could mention the participation of European countries in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa ever since the beginning, as shown in Table 6. Most European countries have consistently accepted the obligation to contribute to these missions—and certainly much more so than the United States. However, in most cases the European contributions have been rather small.

Table 6: European Contributions to PKOs in Africa	
Country/Mission	**European Contributors**
Completed Missions[117]	
Angola UNAVEM I (1988-91)	Czechoslovakia, Norway, Spain, Yugoslavia
UNAVEM II (1991-95)	Czechoslovokia/Slovak Rep., Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Yugoslavia
UNAVEM III (1995-97)	France, Hungary, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Rep., Sweden, Ukraine
MONUA (1997-99)	Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia
Central African Republic	France, Portugal

MINURCA (1998-2000)	
Congo ONUC (1960-64)	Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Yugoslavia
Liberia UNOMIL (1993-97)	Austria, Belgium, Czech R., Hungary, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Slovak R., Sweden
Mozambique UNOMOZ (1992-94)	Austria, Czech R., Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland
Namibia UNTAG (1989-90)	Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, FRG, Finland, France, GDR, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USSR, UK, Yugoslavia
Rwanda UNAMIR (1993-96)	Austria, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak R., Spain, Switzerland, UK
Sierra Leone UNOMSIL (1998-99)	Croatia, Czech R., Denmark, France, Norway, Russia, Slovak R., Sweden, United Kingdom
Somalia UNOSOM I (1992-93)	Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom
UNOSOM II (1993-95)	Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Romania, Sweden
## Ongoing Missions[118]	
DRC MONUC (1999-)	Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
Ethiopia/Eritrea UNMEE (2000-)	Austria, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech R., Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak R., Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine
Sierra Leone UNAMSIL (1999-)	Croatia, Czech R., Denmark, France, Russian Federation, Slovak R., Sweden, Ukraine, UK
Western Sahara MINURSO (1991-)	Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Russia

Another positive element is the consistent, albeit unmistakably declining, provision of development aid, of which Africa remains the main recipient (see Table 7). The European countries are certainly ahead of the US and Japan in terms of overall ODA (official development assistance) in per capita terms and as a share of their GNI (gross national income).[119]

Such aid can arguably do harm, e.g. by creating dependencies of the recipients on the donors, or by allowing for a postponement of urgent economic adjustments, or by schewing the economy in a particular direction that may be unsustainable. A strong argument can also be made that aid is a poor substitute for trade, i.e. for a greater opening of European markets to imports from Africa. Through its impact on national economies, including distributional effects, aid may also have implications for conflict propensities, some of which may be negative—to say nothing of those instances where aid and humanitarian assistance have (inadvertently) strengthened guerillas, or even former *genocidaires* as in Rwanda.[120]

DAC Member	$ mill. 1994	$ mill. 1999	% of GNI 1994	% of GNI 1999	Per capita 1994	Per capita 1999
Australia	1,091	982	0.34	0.26	55	50
Austria	655	527	0.33	0.26	80	67
Belgium	727	760	0.32	0.30	70	77
Canada	2,250	1,699	0.43	0.28	74	55
Denmark	1,446	1,733	1.03	1.01	285	331
Finland	290	416	0.31	0.33	61	84
France	8,466	5,637	0.64	0.39	145	99
Germany	6,818	5,515	0.33	0.26	81	69
Greece	n.a.	194	na	0.15	n.a.	19
Ireland	109	245	0.25	0.31	34	66
Italy	2,705	1,806	0.27	0.15	52	33
Japan	13,239	15,323	0.29	0.35	81	108
Luxembourg	59	119	0.40	0.66	143	281
Netherlands	2,517	3,134	0.76	0.79	161	203
New Zealand	110	134	0.24	0.27	29	36
Norway	1,137	1,370	1.05	0.91	269	298
Portugal	303	276	0.34	0.26	33	28
Spain	1,305	1,363	0.28	0.23	34	35
Sweden	1,819	1,630	0.96	0.70	216	190
Switzerland	982	969	0.36	0.35	134	140
United Kingdom	3,197	3,401	0.31	0.23	66	57
United States	9,927	9,145	0.14	0.10	41	33
Total DAC	59152	56378	0.29	0.24	71	66

Table 7: Net official development assistance from DAC members[121]

On the other hand, ODA can also be used wisely as a contribution to post-conflict peace-building and/or for conflict prevention. For instance, even though aid recipients may resent the notion of "conditionality" (which has, admittedly, often been abused by donors), there is no escaping the basic facts, i.e. that donors decide whom to support and therefore are in a position to attach conditions. If these conditionalities are couched in terms of good governance, human rights observance, strengthening of civil society, poverty alleviation, environmental protection and the like they can indeed be used to promote an environment where armed conflict is less likely.[122]

How powerful a means of "intervention" such conditionality with regard to aid will be depends, among other things, on the recipient's aid dependency. In the GLR this dependency has been very substantial, but it has subsequently declined considerably, mainly as a result of a decline in the total volume of aid. This may be due to the impression that the GLR countries (with the exception of Uganda) are "lost causes". For figures see Table 8.

Table 8: Aid dependency of GLR Countries[123]						
	Net ODA ($ mill.)		Per capita ($)		% of GNI	
	1994	1999	1994	1999	1994	1999
Burundi	312	74	52	11	34.2	10.5
DRC	245	132	6	3	4.8	na.
ROC	362	140	145	49	23.9	8.4
Rwanda	714	373	115	45	95.3	19.2
Uganda	750	590	40	27	19.0	9.2

Moreover, with the partial exception of France in the ROC and the UK and others in Uganda, the Europeans seem to have lost interest in the GLR, as their shares of total ODA to these countries are far from impressive, as shown by Table 9.

Table 9: Distribution of net aid (mill. $ 1999)[124]					
	Burundi	DRC	ROC	Rwanda	Uganda
Total aid	52.0	87.0	121.4	180.5	357.5
Japan	1.1	0.1	0.0	8.0	28.2
US	15.8	11.2	0.6	39.8	47.4
Germ.	1.7	12.2	3.8	18.8	28.6
France	4.3	9.6	20.7	5.4	1.6
UK	0.8	2.4	5.2	26.5	96.4
NL	4.3	2.5	2.9	20.3	26.5
Can.	2.0	2.6	3.2	6.2	2.6
Sweden	3.7	9.3	0.9	13.1	20.3
Denmark	na	na.	na.	1.4	58.9
Norway	6.4	2.2	1.5	4.8	25.5
Other DAC	12.1	35	82.6	36.1	21.6

7.3 EU Plans for the Conflict Prevention and Peace-building

In Europe-African relations, the EU is becoming an actor of growing importance, both directly and indirectly.

The indirect impact may be the most important. Under the auspices of the Lomé agreements and its successors, the ACP (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific) Partnership Agreements (now re-named "Cotenu"), the EU also impacts on economic, and thereby also social and political conditions in African countries, including their propensity for violent conflict. In recognition of these linkages, conflict prevention and resolution considerations are increasingly being integrated into the general concepts of development.

Directly, the EU has produced a number of documents on conflict management and resolution (see Box 1) which may be tantamount to an actual strategy. As a corollary of this it has, e.g., adopted common

guidelines for arms exports and for dealings with countries engaged in violent conflicts or international wars.

Box 1: Recent EU documents on African conflicts

- *Preventive Diplomacy, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa* (1995)[125]
- *The EU and the Issue of Conflicts in Africa: Peace-building, Conflict prevention and Beyond* (1996)[126]
- *Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa* (1997)[127]
- *Resolution on Coherence* (1997)[128]
- *EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms* (1997)[129]
- *The Role of Development Cooperation in Strengthening Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution* (1998)[130]
- *EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export*, adopted on 8 June 1998[131]
- *The European Union's Contribution to Combating the Destabilising Accumulation and Spread of Small arms and Light weapons (1998)*[132]
- *Council Resolution on Small Arms* (1999)[133]
- *Co-operation with ACP Countries Involved in Armed Conflicts* (1999)[134]
- *Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development–An Assessment* (2001)[135]
- *Conflict Prevention* (2001)[136]

Parts of this strategy (if so it is) has been formulated in close consultation with the African counterparts. The *Cairo Declaration* and *Cairo Plan of Action*, adopted jointly by the EU and the OAU in April 2000, thus emphasized that "further efforts are needed to prevent violent conflict at the earliest stages by addressing their root-causes in a targeted manner and with an adequate combination of all available instruments". It further stressed "the need to strengthen the international capacity for early response and the ability of regional and international organisations to take immediate action to prevent further conflicts when noting signs of rising tensions". As means to these ends, the EU pledged to support the OAU's conflict prevention endeavours, and to "collaborate in developing and providing our financial support for programmes of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; in particular, to provide vocational training to former and demobilised combatants. This could be associated with the development of programmes for the effective management and the eventual destruction of accumulated small arms and light weapons". The EU further promised to take steps to stem the illicit trade in "conflict diamonds", as well as to assist with the clearing of land-mines.[137]

In the communication from the Commission on *Conflict Prevention* of 2001 a long list of recommendations for conflict prevention was contained. Under the heading of "long-term prevention" it expressed the intention to

> (...) give higher priority to its support for regional integration and in particular regional organisations with a clear conflict prevention mandate;

(...) ensure that its development policy and other co-operation programmes are more clearly focused on addressing root causes of conflict in an integrated way (....)

(...) implement, for countries showing conflict potential, more targeted actions, where appropriate, to open the way to a more favourable democratic environment....

(...) play an increasingly active role in the security sector area. This will take the form of activities aiming at improving police services, promoting conversion, disarmament and non-proliferation both as regards weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons. ...

(...) in post-conflict situations, concentrate EC assistance on the consolidation of peace and the prevention of future conflicts, in particular through rehabilitation programmes, child-related rehabilitation measures and DDR programmes as well as programmes supporting reconciliation processes. (...)

(...) give higher priority to its support aimed at controlling the spread of small arms. (...)

Under the heading of "short term prevention" it mentioned regular reviews of potential conflict zones, including the establishment of early warning mechanisms, the use of preventive sanctions, systematic use of the political dialogue where a crisis appears imminent, the use of special representatives for mediation and training initiatives in the fields of rule of law and civil administration for personnel to be deployed in international missions.[138]

All this sounds very promising even though it remains to be seen whether the actual implementation will be satisfactory. If so, it could do quite a lot to help in both conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building.

In addition to these concrete activities, the EU also plays an important role as a model of successful conflict prevention, by virtue of having transformed a previously war-prone region into a solid "security community", mainly by indirect means such as furthering interdependence and a gradual relinquishment of sovereign rights in favour of supranational political authority. However, its obvious attractions notwithstanding, it is questionable whether this example can be emulated by African states because of their lower level of development and lesser degree of interdependence.[139] The decisions taken at the Lusaka Summit on the African Unit, however, seem to indicate that the African states are determined to try. Good luck with this!

7.4 A Military Role for the EU?

While there can be no doubt that preventative action by non-military means is much preferable to military intervention when a conflict has already turned violent, it would be highly premature to rule out the use of military force to bring a raging conflict or a genocide in progress to an end, or to dismiss the need for military forces to monitor and safeguard a truce, thereby paving the way for a lasting peace. This raises the

question whether the European Union could (and should) play a military role in Africa in the future.

With the development of a Common Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), the formulation of the "Petersberg principles", and their operational corrolary in the form of a rapid reaction force envisioned to number 50-60,000 troops by 2003,[140] the EU will soon possess the means to intervene militarily in violent conflicts. (See Box 2 for extracts from the "Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration").

In the *Presidency Report on the European Security and Defence Policy*, presented to the European Council Nice, 7-9 December 2000, the following assessment and predictions were included:[141]

> "In developing this autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises, the European Union will be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks as defined in the Treaty on European Union: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. This does not involve the establishment of a European army. The commitment of national resources by Member States to such operations will be based on their sovereign decisions. (...) The development of the European Security and Defence Policy strengthens the Union's contribution to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The European Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for maintaining peace and international security."

It was further mentioned that discussions were underway on the "implementation of the specific goal regarding police capabilities, whereby Member States should be able to provide 5,000 officers by 2003 for international missions, 1,000 of whom could be deployed within less than 30 days," which would indeed be a valuable contribution if dispatched to countries in, or just coming out of, violent conflict.

Box 2: The EU's *Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration* (extracts)

In the field of military capabilities, which will complement the other instruments available to the Union, at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 the Member States set themselves the headline goal of being able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year forces up to corps level (60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. (...)

In quantitative terms, the voluntary contributions announced by Member States make it possible to achieve in full the headline goal established in Helsinki (60 000 persons available for deployment within 60 days for a mission of at least a year). These contributions, set out in the 'Force Catalogue', constitute a pool of more than 100 000 persons and approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels, making it possible

fully to satisfy the needs identified to carry out the different types of crisis management missions within the headline goal.

By 2003, once the appropriate European Union political and military bodies are in a position to exercise political control and strategic management of EU-led operations, under the authority of the Council, the Union will gradually be able to undertake Petersberg tasks in line with its increasing military capabilities. The need to further improve the availability, deployability, sustainability and interoperability of forces has, however, been identified if the requirements of the most demanding Petersberg tasks are to be fully satisfied. Efforts also need to be made in specific areas such as military equipment, including weapons and munitions, support services, including medical services, prevention of operational risks and protection of forces.

Whether the EU member states will be able to agree on whether, when and where to dispatch these forces remains to be seen. It seems highly likely that that Europe will make Europe its first priority, and entirely conceivable that this will exhaust its ability and will to intervene, say in another genocide in progress, for instance in Burundi or the DRC. One is allowed to hope, however.

8 RECOMMENDATIONS

Having thus, hopefully, shown that the European countries as well as the European Union is prepared to shoulder at least part of the burden of preventing, managing and resolving African conflicts, including those in the Great Lakes Region, I shall conclude with a set of recommendations for further improvement.

Realising that Europe has often played a negative role in the past and may well do so again in the future, these recommendations are divided into two groups: "Do no harm" and "Do good", both subdivided into military and non.military measures. From the category of "Do No Harm"-measures the following military caveats would seem relevant:

- Do *not* provide military support (neither in the form of training or equipment) to governments or insurgents facing imminent violent conflict or genocide—and improve the intelligence services in order to be able to better predict this.
- Do *not* rely on airpower, but use ground troops (with the requisite air support) for any military intervention.
- Do *not* embark on "threat diplomacy" by issuing threats that will have to be carried out in order to maintain "credibility", even though actual implementation will be counterproductive.
- Do *not* allow the United States to take the lead in any operation (as they almost always get it wrong), but consult closely with Washington.

From the non-military "Do No Harm"-category one could mention the following:

- Do *not* insist on "IMF-style" structural adjustment programmes, but allow for flexible transitions to market economies that will avoid rispuptions of the social fabric in African countries.
- Do *not* use conditionality to enforce particular forms of government, but do insist on "good governance" and human rights conditionalities.
- Do *not* use "blunt" economic sanctions as a means of putting pressure on African government (but actually harming the populations), but explore the opportunities of "smart santions".

In the category of "Do Good"-initiatives would fall both military and non-military measures. The latter will probably be least controversial, and the former will only apply to member states participating fully in the CSFP (common security and foreign policy) of the EU, i.e. not the author's home country, Denmark, which has excluded itself from this. Relevant military measures would include the following:

- Create a genuine rapid deployment force, which could be dispatched to conflict spots around the globe in no more than thirty days, preferably even faster. Force planning should take the recommendations of the "Brahimi Report" closely into account.[142] The forces will need to be fully inter-operable, both in terms of equipment, logistics and tactical and operational principles and ROE (rules of engagement).
- Develop a joint military doctrine for "Petersberg tasks", followed by adjustments of the national military plans in member states.
- Develop contingency plans for interventions in conflicts in the GLR and elsewhere in Africa—premised on a UN or OAU/AU mandate and preferably in collaboration with regional or sub-regional forces (e.g. forces from ECOWAS or SADC).
- Support the traning of (sub-) regional forces for peace-keeping and enforcement operations, e.g. along the lines of the RPTC (Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre) in Harare.
- Establish a joint EU pool (e.g. in the form of "earmarking" of equipment along with technical staff) for the rapid provision of support for regional military operations, including transport aircraft, helicopters and armoured personnel carriers.

Relevant non-military measures might include:

- Open up of European markets to African exports, thereby substituting trade for aid.
- Adopt a common European policy of providing, as a minimum 0.7 percent of GDP for development aid and "shame" member states that do not meet the target.
- Ensure a clear eparation of development aid from emergency relief measures.
- Improve and accelerate the implementation of decisions taken, including the dispersement of grants, e.g. for conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstriction.
- Support regional integration measures, e.g. by co-funding of AU initiatives, and support for ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD and a possible puture "GLRC" (Great Lakes Regional Community).

None of these proposals is particularly radical, but all of them would presumably help Europe to meet its cosmopolitan obligation to promote peace, development, human rights and good governance in Africa.

9 ENDNOTES

[1] Recent studies include Fawcett, Louise & Andrew Hurrell (eds.): *Regionalism in World Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), *passim*; Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde: *The New Security Studies: A Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 9-20, 42-45 *& passim*; Lake, David A. & Patrick M. Morgan (eds.): *Regional Orders. Building Security in a New World* (University Park, PA Pennsyl-ania State University Press, 1997); Wriggins, Howard (ed.): *Dynamics of Regional Politics. Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Daase, Christopher, Susanne Feske, Bernhard Moltmann & Claudia Schmid (eds.): *Regionalisierung der Sicherheitspolitik. Tendenzen in den internationalen Beziehungen nach dem Ost-West-Konflikt* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993); Tow, William T.: *Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990); Adler, Emmanuel & Michael Barnett (eds.): *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Keating, Michael & John Loughlin (eds.): *The Political Economy of Regionalism* (London: Frank Cass, 1997).
[2] Boulding, Elise: "States, Boundaries and Environmental Security", in Dennis J.D. Sandole & Hugo van der Merwe (eds.): *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice. Integration and Application* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 194-208. See also the chapter on the Nile Basin in Elhance, Arun P.: *Hydropolitics in the 3rd World. Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), pp. 53-84.
[3] Huntington, Samuel: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 26-27 *& passim*. The nine civilizations are

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[4] Neumann, Iver B.: "Self and Other in International Relations", *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 2, no. 2 (June 1996), pp. 139-175. See also Lapid, Yosef & Friedrich Kratochwill (eds.): *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

[5] Adler, Emanuel: "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations", *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, vol. 26, no. 2 (1997), pp. 249-278; idem & Barnett (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 1), *passim*.

[6] On the role of regional organizations within the UN, see Weiss, Thomas G., David P. Forsythe & Rogert A. Coate (eds.): *The United Nations and Changing World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 33-36.

[7] See, for instance, Bach, Daniel C.: "Regionalism versus Regional Integration: The Emergence of a New Paradigm in Africa", in Jean Grugel & Will Hout (eds.): *Regionalism across the North-South Divide. State Strategies and Globalization* (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 152-166.

[8] Buzan, Barry: *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2nd Edition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 186-229, quotation from p. 190. The delimitation of security complexes is illustrated by the map on p. 210. For an update see idem, Wæver & de Wilde: *op. cit.* (note 1), pp. 15-19 & *passim*.

[9] On the expansion of the security concept see Fischer, Dietrich: *Nonmilitary Aspects of Security. A Systems Approach* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993); Buzan: *op. cit.* 1991 (note 8); idem, Wæver & De Wilde: *op. cit.* (note 1); Wæver, Ole, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre: *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993); Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (ed.): *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Fierke, K.M.: *Changing Games, Changing Strategies. Critical Investigations in Security* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998); McSweeney, Bill: *Security, Identity and Interests. A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Krause, Keith & Michael C. Williams (ed.): *Critical Security Studies. Concepts and Cases* (London: UCL Press, 1997); Ayoob, Mohammed: *The Third World Security Predicament. State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995). For an overview see Møller, Bjørn: "National, Societal and Human Security. A General Discussion with a Case Study from the Balkans", forthcoming in a UNESCO publication, but also available as *Working Paper*, no. 37 (Copenhagen: COPRI, 2000) or at www.copri.dk/copri/ downloads/37-2000.doc. A collection of central writings on security is Sheehan, Michael (ed.): *National and International Security* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 2000).

[10] The term is coined by Wæver, Ole. See, for instance, his "Securitization and Desecuritization", in Lipschutz (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 9), pp. 46-86; idem: *Concepts of Security* (Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science, 1997); or Buzan & al.: *op. cit.* 1997 (note 1), *passim*.

[11] Oral presentation on "Regional Cooperation in Africa" to the Danida conference on *Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in Africa*, Maputo, 28-29 June 2001.

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