CIAO DATE: 02/01

Borders, Territoriality and the Military in the Third Millennium

Bjørn Møller _*

August 2000

Copenhagen Peace Research Institute

 

Preliminary Version.
Not for quotation.
Comments are welcome. _**

 

 

1. Preface

Under the contradictory impact of globalization, regionalism and nationalism, the importance of borders is both declining and increasing—but above all it is changing. In some cases, it is declining and borders are becoming more permeable as regions integrate. In others, the salience of borders is growing as a contribution to national identity and as a protection of scarce natural resources. Both regional and national borders are, moreover, increasingly challenged by the rapid growth of activities and forces which are, by their very nature, non-territorial, tendentially rendering borders irrelevant. All these developments have military implications which are explored in the paper, including the changing role of border and territorial defence, transnational military threats to national security and ‘non-territorial warfare’. A special emphasis is placed on the geopolitical implications of a defensive restructuring of the armed forces.

 

2. Geopolitics and Strategy

Geopolitics and military strategy are, and always have been, closely intertwined.

On the one hand, the classical geopolitical thinkers have treated military power as an important factor in their assessment of geopolitical strengths and weaknesses.

• Halford Mackinder thus attributed great weight to land power in general, and especially to the ‘pivot area’ (later re-named ‘the Heartland’) represented by Russia, replacing the Mongol empire of previous centuries. This would represent a threat to the rest of the world if it were to establish control of its periphery (thus ruling ‘the World Island’), as this would allow the unassailable land power to establish world dominance by means of naval power. ₁ .

• Karl Haushofer was an important source of inspiration for the National Socialist and their determined quest for Lebensraum and control of natural resources (e.g. the ‘Ukrainian grain chamber’)—both of which presupposed preponderant military strength, especially as far as land forces were concerned. ₂

• Nicolas Spykman attached paramount importance to the ‘rimlands’ (i.e. Mackinder's ‘inner marginal crescent’), because they were within military reach while the heartland as such was not—thereby laying the foundations of the Truman and Eisenhower doctrines. ₃

• Alfred Thayer Mahan, on the other hand, was more interested in trade which presupposed the freedom of navigation, which in turn, gave sea power a paramount importance, based on the possession of a superior military fleet, including battleships. ₄

On the other hand, spatial and geographical factors have preoccupied strategists for centuries.

• Already the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu (6th century BC—by many regarded as the greatest strategist of all times) was fully aware of the importance of terrain for military operations—distinguishing between dispersive, light, contentious, traversable, focal, heavy, entrapping, encircled and fatal terrain. ₅

• The Indian strategist Kautilya (4th century, BC), likewise, distinguished between different forms of terrain and warned against the dangers flowing from conquering too much territory. ₆

• Antoine de Jomini underlined the importance of ‘interior lines’, benefiting a defender on his own territory, and elaborated on the importance of topograhical variables, pointing to the advantages accruing from mountains and large forests. ₇

• Carl von Clausewitz was, likewise, mindful of the importance of terrain both for attack and defence. As far as the latter was concerned, he emphasized ‘the assistance of the theatre of war’. He further listed the following spatial preconditions for success in a ‘people's war’: that it takes place in the heart of the country, that the theatre of war covers a large part of the country, and that the country is of a broken and difficult nature. ₈

While all of the above authors treated territory as ‘concrete’, in conformity with their approach to strategy as an ‘art’ (Jomini constituting a partial exception), others with more ‘scientific’ leanings have been preoccupied with the ‘geometry’ of strategy, where space is treated in abstracto .

Such an approach has appealed particularly to naval strategists (at least in the age of ‘blue water navies’) because of the ‘abstract’ nature of the oceans. Other strategic writers have found particular forms of land territory to possess a similarly abstract character, as was the case of the Arabian deserts described by T.E. Lawrence (of Arabia) who likened the camels to the ships, the caravans to the convoys and fleets and the desert to the ocean. ₉

In the age of artillery, fortifications and sieges, a distinctly geometrical approach to strategy gained ground, even as far as land warfare was concerned, spearheaded by strategic thinkers such as Marshal Vauban, Henry Lloyd and Adam Bülow. ₁₀ In modern times strategists such as Richard Simpkin have tended towards a similarly geometrical approach to warfare, as one aspect of their belief in ‘perennial verities’ of strategy and war. ₁₁ This tendency may well become even more pronounced, the more warfare moves into the most ‘abstract’ of all domains, i.e. those of space and cyberspace ( vide infra ).

Geostrategic factors continue to influence land warfare planning, if only because of the need to defend borders as well as the rear. Important parameters are thus the so-called ‘force-to-space ratios’, which come in two main varieties: Either as the ratio of the armed forces to the total territory they have to cover, or as the ratio of forward deployed forces to the length of the total border, or merely to that part which needs defending, because it faces enemies and/or is not otherwise blocked (by mountains, for instance).

While analysts have usually focused on force-to-space minima—e.g. as an argument against arms reductions— ₁₂ force-to-space maxima may also be important. There are thus limits to the amount of force that can be brought to bear on a kilometre of frontage, both for a defender and an aggressor ₁₃ —the so-called ‘crossing-the-T’ phenomenon. Above a certain force-to-space ratio invading forces tend to clot up and have to be echeloned, which makes them vulnerable to long-range interdiction. Furthermore, only a fraction of the attacking forces' firepower can be brought to bear against the defender, whereas defending forces using long-range indirect fire weapons from shielded positions are able to cover a large frontage plus interdict follow-on forces without being deployed at the FEBA (forward edge of battle area) at all—as, for instance, envisioned under NATO's FOFA (Follow-On Forces Attack) doctrine. ₁₆

Just as strategy has thus been determined by spatial factors, its opposite (or, some would say, ‘siamese twin’ ₁₇ ) arms control is to a large extent spatial. Quantitative limits thus tend to be geographically defined, for instance in the form of zones, such as those of the CFE Treaty, ₁₈ or the numerous actual or proposed nuclear-weapons-free zones. ₁₉

 

3. Deterritorialization (?)

There has been much speculation about a possible trend towards ‘deterritorialization’, both in the military and civilian domains, especially from thinkers belonging to the ‘postmodern’ tradition. ₂₀ The term itself is, of course, a neologism which might be defined as ‘a trend towards a point where spatial location and distance have lost their meaning’.

3.1 Globalization and/or Deterritorialization

In the civilian field, many developments would seem to point towards a progressive deterritorialization, which are often subsumed under the (rather ill-defined) term ‘globalization’. ₂₁

In the field of communications, distance surely matters less and less. Jules Verne's vision of being able to traverse the globe in eighty days ₂₂ today seems totally obsolete, as it is now possible to do so (at a very leasurely pace) in less than eighty hours. We can communicate by phone and fax with every place on earth in ‘real time’, as we can by means of e-mail at minimal costs. With little effort we have access to the news media of most countries, both via satellite TV and through the internet, etc.

Trade has also expanded radically, to the point where virtually all ‘exotic’ commodities are readily available in the local supermarket all year round and at affordable prices. Money flows even more freely than goods, as recent years' currency crises have demonstrated. A blink of an eye on Wall Street can create havock at the stock exchange in Tokyo and make a country's economy collapse within a few weeks or even days. ₂₃

In this sense, the globe is clearly shrinking, which also has implications for identification. While many people (this author, for instance) do not know their next-door neighbour, they can have family, friends and collaborators scattered across the globe and remain in regular contact with them. This makes it much less obvious that identification (‘we feeling’) is a function of distance, as it was for our ancestors. A genuinely cosmopolitan attitude thus becomes psychologically viable, as does an identification with a group that may be distant and/or widely scattered.

Location also matters less, as several important ingredients of this globalized world are non-material and non-spatial. The World Wide Web is just one example of an entity or phenomenon of tremendous importance, but without any spatial coordinates. Tendentially it will allow a growing number of people to do what they are doing from any spot on the globe, and firms to be home-based whereever they please (e.g. were taxes are the low), regardless of where their actual production or other activities take place.

These developments also tend to reduce the importance of frontiers, which are easily transversable, hence in some respect more permeable and less important than previously. In certain parts of the world, such as the EU, this development is promoted politically, the goal being a totally unified market. ₂₄

It nevertheless seems premature to proclaim territoriality with its distances, locations, and borders obsolete, for several reasons.

• Most of the above phenomena are confined the developed world, i.e. the global North. In most of the rest of the world, i.e. the home of the vast majority of the world's six billion inhabitants, the trend is rather towards strengthening the state, ₂₅ as well as local communities.

• Even in Europe the post-Cold War period has seen an unprecedented tidal wave of state creation, involving the creation of new borders—above all related to the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. ₂₆

• The trend towards globalization is contravened by a simultaneous strengthening of regional ties, perhaps even as a shield against the hazards of globalization. ₂₇ While the grouping of countries, e.g. for purposes of economic collaboration or defence, does not logically presuppose contiguity, it remains an empirical fact that it tends to follow geographical lines. While Singapore might align itself with, e.g., Switzerland because of their similar role in the global economy, it does not, but prefers its neigbours in ASEAN.

3.2 Military Deterritorialization (?)

The 1990s saw a profusion of speculations about a ‘deterritorialization of war’. In this respect, avowed postmodernists such as James Der Derian or the Tofflers ₂₈ and mainstream military planners have thought along similar lines. Both distance, location and borders appeared to lose their saliency, perhaps to the point that concepts such as battleground, forward defence, or theatre of operations might become irrelevant, thus severing the link between strategy and geopolitics. Several developments seemed to point in this direction, even though none of them were really new. They just might have reached the point where quantity is transformed into qualitative change, however.

• Distances have come to matter less and less, as both the range, speed and accuracy of weapons has increased exponentially over the ages—to the point that it is today (in principle at least) possible to target any spot on the globe from any other, e.g. by means of ballistic or cruise missiles, and to do so within minutes. ₂₉ Even the most heavily fortified borders thus afford no impenetrable shield against attack.

• Location has become less of a safeguard against war consequences, as the lethality and radius of destruction of weapons has increased to the point where the entire globe could, in principle, be destroyed in a nuclear war, as argued in studies released in the early 1980s— ₃₀ or perhaps in a global epidemic caused by biological weapons, which appeared to be the fashionable nightmare scenario of the fin de siecle . ₃₁

• The very notion of ‘deterrence’ arguably represented a certain deterritorialization. Under the ‘massive retaliation’ doctrine of the Eisenhower administration the United States envisaged deterring the USSR from transgressions anywhere on the globe, not by being present everywhere, but by means of a general threat of retaliatory nuclear strikes. The shift to ‘flexible response’ in the 1960s thus represented a certain re-territorialization spurred by doubts about the credibility of the former threats. ₃₂

• Declaratorily at least, NATO in the new millennium seems to have swung back towards deterritoriality, yet not quite as far as the USA apparently had wanted. The clearly US-inspired ‘Roth Report’ of October 1998 on NATO in the 21st Century had argued that ’NATO's purpose is to defend values and interests, not just territory’ and envisioned that ’The Allies at the Washington Summit in April 1999 must strongly reaffirm that the North Atlantic Treaty provides an unequivocal mandate for the collective defense of common values and interests as well as the defense of territory.’ However, the documents adopted by the summit contained no such open-ended commitments, but merely significantly vaguer commitments to ‘take into account the global context’. ₃₃

Furthermore, over the ages warfare has increasingly moved into what one might call ‘abstract space’, i.e. space without contours and where spatial coordinates matter little.

• The first such domain was the high seas (‘blue waters’)—as opposed to the more concrete ‘green’ or ‘brown waters’ (coastal and inland waters, respectively). Warships roaming the high seas (or the sub-surface domain in the case of submarines) are both out of sight and touch of the ‘real’ (i.e. concrete) environment of the land, and the more so the more independently of supplies they became—with the nuclear-powered submarine or surface vessel as the culmination. ₃₄

• The second domain was the airspace that was taken into possesion in the beginning of the 20th century, almost simultaneously by the airship and the fixed-wing aircraft, followed by the helicopter. ₃₅

 

Table 1:

Military Domains	Land	High Seas	Airspace	Space	Cyberspace
Character	Concrete, varied	Abstract, varied	Abstract, uniform	Abstract, uniform	Nonspatial Uniform
Population	Inhabited	Uninhabited	Uninhabited	Uninhabited	n.a.
Economic value	Agriculture, mining, etc.	Fisheri (Mining, drilling)	None	None	None
Property status	Sovereign domain	Common heritage	Common heritage	n.a.	n.a.
Legal status	Highly regulated	UNCLOS	Limited regulation	Very limited regulation	No regulation
Military use	Battleground Stationing area Supply routes	‘Battlegroun’d SLOCs	‘Battleground’	Communications Potential ‘battleground’	Communications Potential ‘battleground’
Weapons platforms	MBT, APC, Artillery, etc.	Warships Submarines	Aircraft Helicopters Airships Missiles	Rockets Satellites	Computers
Typical weapons	Guns, mortars, missiles, small arms	Guns, torpedos, mines	Missiles, bombs, guns	Antisatellite weapons (laser guns)	Computer vira
Form of combat	Positional or manoeuvre warfare	Manoeuvre warfare	Manoeuvre warfare	Manoeuvre warfare	‘Manoeuvre warfare’
Warriors	Regular soldiers Guerillas	Marines (Pirates)	Pilots, gunners, bombers Support staff	Astronauts ?	Computer wizzards Information officers Hackers

 

• Third came space, which was believed to be ‘the final frontier’. It was, until recently, regarded as the most abstract domain, and has so far only been used for such purposes as surveillance. A ‘weaponization’ of space, however, remains an entirely conceivable prospect for the future. ₃₆

• The fourth domain is cyperspace, which is not spatial in the literal sense as it lacks coordinates. In this realm of the computer and its possible successors weaponization is not yet far advanced, but clearly moving ahead, featuring such ‘weapons’ as computer vira and (mis)information. ₃₇

• One might even argue that there is a fifth ‘dimension’, namely that of the imagination. This is where completely imaginary wars might take place, as in the movie Wag the Dog , describing a U.S. war against Albania which only takes place on TV.

All four ‘abstract domains’, and especially the most recently discovered ones (air, space and cyberspace) excert a growing attraction on military planners. The so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is thus supposed to derive from the integration of all ‘dimensions’ into warfare, but with a special emphasis on air, space and cyberspace ₃₈ and with a special focus on ‘information warfare’. ₃₉

The distinguishing features of these five military domains are set out in Table 1.

 

4. Continued Relevance of Geopolitics

Despite the trend towards deterritorialization that would, in the fullness of time, render geopolitics obsolete, geopolitics appears to have experienced something of a renaissance in recent years, both in its ‘traditional’ form and in the shape of ‘critical’ geopolitics. ₄₀ While traditionalists have tended to focus on the material aspects of space, critical geopoliticians have focused on its symbolic features.

4.1 Territory and Resources

One explanation for the renaissance of traditional geopolitics may be the recognition that wars over natural (and increasingly scarce) resources are likely, hence that strategists need to take geographical factors into account. ₄₁ Politicians also have an additional reason to concern themselves with such a traditional value as ‘territorial integrity’, which has become increasingly complex in many cases.

• Maritime territories and exclusive economic zones have long been contested, and the entry into force in 1994 of UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) has not really helped. ₄₂ It has given states an incentive to expand the sea area to which they lay claim, which can bring them into conflict with other states with similar (but incompatible) aspirations ( vide infra ). Moreover, it forces states without blue-water ambitions to increase their naval reach considerably in order to patrol their enlarged territorial seas and exclusive economic zones (EEZ). ₄₃

• Fresh water resources are becoming very scare in large parts of the Third World (inter alia because of population growth), ₄₄ e.g. in the Middle East. ₄₅ For instance, the (presently discontinued) negotiations between Israel and Syria over the Golan Hights have just as much to do with the control over the area's aquifiers as with the possible use of the heights for military purposes. ₄₆ It is entirely conceivable that wars could be fought over issues such as these, just as one could imagine wars over Turkey's GAP (Southeast Anatolia Development Project) involving the construction of a system of dams in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin. ₄₇ Similar ‘upstream vs. downstream’ conflicts could develop elsewhere over issues such as pollution.

• Oil has long (and especially since the 1973 ‘oil crisis’) been an obvious casus belli . Control of the Rumaila oilfield was thus the main (if not the only) cause of the Iraqi attack against Kuwait in 1990, just as oil was one of the causes of the preceding Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). ₄₈ Likewise, speculations continue over China's possible plans for the Spratley Islands in the South China Sea (related to likely oil resources) which may cause conflict with the ASEAN states. ₄₉

It is also conceivable that sheer poverty and starvation (e.g. stemming from a combination of deforestation, desertification and population growth) may cause wars for areable land. Even though a few authors from the North have speculated about a future war of the poor against the rich (i.e. South versus North) ₅₀ , such fears are probably illusory, as this kind of resource wars could only be fought against next-door neighbours. The countries of the South simply do not possess the power projection capabilities to threaten the North.

4.2 Borders and Nationalism

However important material factors such as the above may be, territory is not merely a ‘container’ of material resources, but also possesses sentimental and symbolic value. It is thus impossible to comprehend the dynamics of the ‘new’ wars over ethnicity, nationalism and religion without reference to territorial aspects.

Both primordialist (or objectivist) and constructivist students of ethnicity and nationalism acknowledge this linkage. ₅₁ The very definition of an ethnie by one of the most prominent objectivists, Anthony Smith, thus includes a territorial aspect, albeit a vague one, as ‘a named culture-community whose members have a myth of common origins, shared memories and cultural characteristics, a link with a homeland and a measure of solidarity’. This definition forms the point of departure for his more problematic definition of a nation as ‘a named community occupying a recognized homeland and possessing shared myths and memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and uniform legal rights and duties‘. ₅₂ Nations are thus ‘ethnies occupying their homeland’, ruling out the category of ‘diaspora nations’ by definition, which seems rather absurd. ₅₃

The ‘link with a homeland’ is, however, central to ethnicity, making territoriality an integral part of an ethnic group's identity, as in the case of the Jews and Serbs. While this sentimental ‘link’ need not be exclusive in the sense of being incompatible with another ethnie's link to the same territory, it very often is, especially when ethnicity becomes merged with aspirations for statehood. This is the very essence of nationalism, which might be defined as a set of ideas about the proper relationship between nation/ethnie and state, i.e. as an ideology demanding that states should be ethnically and nationally homogeneous as well as all-inclusive. There should thus be an overlap between ‘the sentimental nation [and] the functional state’, as aptly put by Charles Kupchan. ₅₄

Unfortunately, however, nation and state are far from always conterminous:

• Some states are multinational, i.e. they comprise several nations, which entails the risk that some of them will attempt secession to form their own state. ₅₅

• Other states are ‘divided’ in either of two different senses: In the historical sense of having been divided (as was the case of Germany and Vietnam and remains the case of China and Korea) and longing for reunification; or in the more ‘metaphysical’ sense of being ‘incomplete’, for whatever reason, which is usually manifested in irredentism. ₅₆

• The two may, of course, be combined in the sense of multinational states comprising parts of nations, who not only demand secession but also (re)unifiaction with their national kin in other states. Serbia is an obvious case in point, comprising Kosovo, whose inhabitants demand secession, but who are also suspected of irridentism because of their dream of a greater Albania. ₅₇

In all of these cases, fronties will be contested, not merely militarily and materially, but also for their symbolic value. A secessionist group, for instance, may attach inordinate weight to the possession of particular pieces of land because its very identity demands so—and the multinational mother state may feel the same way (as was the case of Kosovo). That such a dispute can be protracted and almost insoluble has been demonstrated by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (especially as far as the ‘symbolic assets’ are concerned in the form of holy places on the West Bank ₅₈ and, even more so, Jerusalem) ₅₉ or the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir. ₆₀ Models exist, e.g. for ‘shared sovereignty’ and several varieties of autonomy ₆₁ that might help accomodate mutually incompatible demands, but they are rarely applied.

4.3 Empires, Regions and Civilizations

Empires can be, but are not automatically different. While the Soviet ‘empire’ dissolved peacefully, the remnants of the (much older) Russian empire shows few signs of such peaceful breakup, as illustrated by the war against the Chechnyan separatists. Other empires have been almost borderless, with the degree of dominance declining (or ‘fading out’) with distance from the centre, perhaps even overlapping in the periphery with the suzerainty of an adjacent empire. ₆₂ Some of these empires have had heavily fortified borders, with the wall of Hadrian and the Chinese Great Wall as conspicuous examples ₆₃ , while others have had more fluid and porous borders, conceived as meeting places (as in the limes of the Roman republic). ₆₄

Some have, for instance, seen tendencies in Turkey to attempt a resuccitation of the former Ottoman empire, or a new one comprising adjacent states with ethnically Turkish populations. This might, but need not, be incompatible with Russian interests. ₆₅ One might also see the Russian concerns about its ‘near abroad’ as a similar quest for suzerainty, i.e. of regaining some control over its former subjects. ₆₆ One could even see modern China as having embarked upon a similar course, of granting considerable autonomy to its provinces (especially the coastal ones) in enonomic and related matters, while stubbornly holding on the political power. ₆₇ It may thus develop into an ‘old-fashioned’ empire that would also demand a certain suzerainty over its ‘near abroad’.

Regions resemble most empires in their lack of solid borders. Even though there is neither any generally accepted definition of regionness, nor unanimity about the criteria thereof, there seems to be a growing recognition of the fluidity of regional borders. Manifestations thereof are the European Union's (and to some extent NATO's) vacillations over which countries (or parts of countries) to accept as ‘European’; and the growth of regions such as Southern Africa and Southeast Asia, manifested in the membership of their respective regional organizations, SADC (Southern African Development Community) and ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations). ₆₈ This fluidity could probably be taken as evidence that we have to abandon the quest for objective criteria in favour of criteria such as self-identification and recognition.

This brings ‘subjective’ and cultural factors into play, which may point in different directions. Either one may focus (as do constructivists such as Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett) on security communities based on feelings of commonality and shared identity or on ‘peace zones’; ₆₉ or one may focus on the potential for inter-civilizational conflict, as does Samuel Huntington with his unfortunate prophecy of a coming ‘clash of civilizations’. ₇₀

In reality future conflicts are likely to be situated within, rather than taking place between, regions and civilizations—albeit in some cases with some intervention by global powers such as the United States. One of the explanations of this apparent regionalization of conflict patterns is simply that it is what is left after the disappearance of the global, systemic conflict. Another one is that intraregional ‘ties of amity and enmity’ are bound to exert a greater influence, once the bipolar ‘overlay’ has been lifted. ₇₁ Several states (such as India, China, Russia) are re-orienting their military power towards regional power projection, as a means to regional great power status. Finally, to the extent that it is true that the conflicts of the future are intrastate rather than between states, then it must also be acknowledged that several of these intrastate wars have a propensity to become internationalized on a regional scale, i.e. that ethnic conflict in one state may draw in states hosting the kin of one (or several) of the warring ethnies. ₇₂

 

5. Geopolitics and the Military Today

5.1 The Military Role In State Building

Kenneth Boulding's wonderful definition of the system of war as consisting of ‘men throwing things at each other with malicious intent’ ₇₃ indicates that distance matters in military affairs. He has aptly formulated a ‘the further the weaker’ principle, according to which power declines with distance. Just how much it declines is function of the ‘loss of strength gradient’ (LSG), defined as ‘the amount by which the competitive power of a party diminishes per mile movement away from home’. This LSG differs with the logistical requirements as well as with military technology. ₇₄ However, this ‘power projection capability’, as it would be called today, is also a function of immaterial factors such as morale. The extreme casualty-scaredness of the United States, for instance, dramatically reduces its effective power projection capacity—as opposed to the ability to launch ineffective air strikes at distant targets. ₇₅

While many other authors have pointed to the central role of the armed forces in state-building ₇₆ , Kenneth Boulding was one of the first to acknowledge the importance of military power for the drawing of state borders. Wars make previously fixed borders fluid, thereby opening up other opportunities for revisions than does diplomacy. ₇₇ Furthermore, the ‘critical boundaries’ of a state, within which intrusion causes severe disorganization, are important, and defined, among other things, by the range of the typical ’projectiles’ (in the broadest sense, ranging from rocks to aircraft). He defines the precondition of stability as one where states can defend their critical boundaries without threatening those of their neighbours, i.e. as the geopolitical manifestation of what others have called ‘mutual defensive superiority’. ₇₈

Others have argued that this perennial tug-of-war between offensive and defensive strength is the reason why the world has any borders at all, i.e. the explanation why it consists of a plurality of states rather than having developed into one world state. If states are presumed to be inherently expansionist, it is only the strength of the defensive that explains why this expansion has been contained. Without military power there might thus have been no inside/outside dichotomy at all. ₇₉ If this is true we may have to acknowledge that the (probably beneficial) plurality presupposes war, at least in the sense that war should remain conceivable enough to warrant the label ‘virtual war’, and that at least some of these (actual or virtual) wars should be about territory.

That wars used to be fought over territory, and that territory was a central casus belli , in previous centuries is well-documented. ₈₀ Some authors have also indentified quite a strong correlation between contiguity and war-proneness, which lends additional plausibility to the thesis that territoriality will remain an important factor in war. ₈₁ As argued above, moreover, there are quite enough contested territorial values in the world of today to make it plausible that territorial wars will remain possible well into the 21st century.

5.2 Defensiveness and Geopolitical Stability

If we accept the argument that territorial wars will remain a genuine risk in the foreseeable future, but that they should be prevented as far as possible, we are left with the question how to devise geopolitically stable configurations of states, especially as far as the military dimension is concerned.

According to the theory of non-offensive defence, a conflict can be mitigated, and its eruption into war prevented, by means of a defensive restructuring of the armed forces—preferably by both sides, but under certain circumstances also by unilateral moves in this direction. ₈₂ The aim-point is for each side to possess sufficient defensive strength to safeguard its national territory combined with a minimum of such offensive capability as might threaten those of its neighbours—which should produce an amelioration of the well-known ‘security dilemma’. ₈₃ The formula for a stable balance-of-strength is the aforementioned one of ‘mutual defensive superiority’, where that side stands to prevail which stays on the defensive. See table 2 on the possible distinctions between offensive and defensive at different levels of analysis.

 

Table 2:

Offence vs. Defence Distinctions	Offensive	Defensive
Grand Strategy	‘Compellence’ Attack	Deterrence National defence
Strategy	Pre-emptive attack Border-crossing counter-offensives
Operational art	Breakthrough operations Deep strikes ‘Deep operations’	Envelopments
Tactics	Counter-attack	Counter-attack Reactive defence
Posture	Long reach Strategic mobility Mobile logistics	Short reach Tactical and operational mobility Dispersed depots
Weapons	No distinction of universal validity is possible

 

How easily achievable such ‘defensive stability’ will be depends, among other things, on geography. Not in the sense that geography determines stability, but it may provide a permissive or (almost) prohibitive environment for a defensive strategic orientation. Other relevant factors include the following, which are in the following bracketed as ‘ ceteris paribus ’.

• The aggregate balance of strength—both in narrow military terms and in a wider sense that also takes into account economic power, alliance ‘drawing rights’, etc. There is no way that a country the size of, e.g. the United States or Russia, could be rendered incapable of attacking much smaller neighbours. It may nevertheless be possible to reduce their offensive capabilities.

• The technological balance—which is usually less important than commonly assumed, but which may nevertheless matter. Even though most of the above-mentioned fashionable ‘theory’ about the (alleged) RMA is ill-founded, even erroneous beliefs matter. Should the rest of the world believe that, for instance, the United States possesses a ‘wonder weapon’ that would make it invincible, the importance of its presumed technological lead may never be put to the test.

• The ‘balance of determination’, measuring factors such as morale and motivation, which nearly always benefit the defender. The morale factor may go a long way to neutralize material disparities, as shown by the defeats suffered by the US against Vietnam, or the Soviet Union against Afghanistan and (nearly) Chechnya. ₈₄

When analyzing the various geopolitical settings, it makes sense to distinguish between the maritime and terrestrial environments, even though several states, of course, belong to both.

5.3 The Sea Environment

The most permisive geopolitical setting is that of two island states separated by a wide stretch of international waters (see Fig. 1). Presupposing that both seek security rather than power, i.e. that neither is a ‘predator’, ₈₅ neither of these two states has anything to fear from the other, and the security dilemma would probably not become operative at all.

Even if one of these states should develop predatory tendencies, the other need not be particularly alarmed, as a predator's options would be limited and the defender's responses rather obvious and effective:

• An invasion of the other side's territory would be very demanding, both because of the aforementioned LSG, and because of the particular complexities of amphibious operations. The obvious counter would be mines and coastal artillery, combined with a territorial defence.

• Stealing the other side's maritime resources within its EEZ would be easier, but also less rewarding. If conducted on a small scale, diplomatic means of ‘defence’ would probably suffice to contain such predation. Large scale plunder would be quite demanding logistically, as well as quite easy to interdict by military means.

• Severing the other side's sea lines of communication would be quite demanding, and could easily be countered by the rest of the international community. At worst the victim could resort to a convoy-with-escorts system that would exact a heavy toll on attacking vessels. ₈₆

 

Fig. 1. Island States: Stable Configuration

 

The situation is more complicated in Fig. 2, depicting two island states whose outer defence perimeters (for instance defined by their EEZs) overlap, as will be the case in a growing number of cases as a consequence of the new UNCLOS rules ( vide supra ).

 

Fig. 2. Island States: Unstable Configuration

 

In this instance, both states would have to regard the patrolling of their respective defence perimeter as a security imperative—and the more so, the more the respective other does the same. The warships of the two sides could thereby easily come into confrontation for strictly defensive reasons—a clear instance of the workings of the security dilemma.

The situation would be further exacerbated if one state (or even both) is a genuine predator or, even perhaps worse, a state which sincerely believes it has ‘global responsibilities’ and feels obliged to ‘defend’ its own interests and values whereever it perceived them to be in jeopardy (any resemblance with the United States is entirely intentional). Such a state automatically has a ‘defence’ perimeter covering the entire circumference of the earth, which is a recipe for instability—especially if more than one state harbours such ambitions, and if both have military means to match their ambitions. ₈₇ This was close to being the case during the Cold War, where the only consolation may have been that the Soviet Union's ambitions (e.g. in terms of promoting revolution) tended to decline in parallel with its acquisition of a blue-water navy. ₈₈

5.4 The Land Environment

On land, the situation is more complicated, if only because states tend to border on each other. On the other hand, borders are better demarcated on land, making the definition of defensiveness more simple: It is defensive to defend one's own territory, but constitutes aggression to attack that of other states.

In some cases, it is rather simple to realize this, as in Fig. 3, where two states are divided by a ‘natural’ border, such as a mountain range, river, desert or jungle. Such natural obstacles not only demarcate the border, but also help defending it by blocking the way for an aggressor.

 

Fig. 3. Terrestrial States: Stable Configuration

 

A forward defence is entirely possible in such a setting, and not particularly demanding. As both sides are well protected, they need not worry much about the other side's military activities, not even in his forward defence zone. The security dilemma is thus mitigated considerably.

 

Fig. 4: Bastion Defence

 

Without any such natural obstacles, however, the situation becomes more complicated, as a country may have reason to fear an easy penetration of its forward defence line by an aggressor. This need not be tantamount to defeat, as some countries are in a position to opt for a ‘ reduit ’ or bastion defence, i.e. they may withdraw to an unassailable bastion such as the Alps—as was part of Swiss defence planning for several decades. ₈₉ ‘Territorial integrity’ is thus something which may be sacrificed for the higher goal of national sovereignty within what Boulding called the ‘critical territory’, at least temporarily, as in Fig. 4.

Countries lacking in ‘strategic depth’ cannot afford such luxury, but have to defend every inch of their national territory, as is the case of states such as Israel or Singapore. A static linear defence along the border would be unsatisfactory, as any such forward defence can be penetrated—or circumvented unless it covers the entire border (as was the case of the French Maginot Line). ₉₀

Hence the attraction of manoeuvre warfare in general, and of being able to ‘take the war to the enemy’ in particular, as has been Israel's strategy for most of its existence. ₉₁ This implies offensive (and border-crossing) capabilities. Paradoxically, only a country which is above suspicion of harbouring expansionist ambitions can possess such capabilities without causing its neighbours' concern, thus activating the security dilemma. The only situation that bodes worse for stability than this is one where two neighbouring countries view their strategic options in this way—as illustrated in the (hypothetical) Fig. 5, which does not seem to have any real-life manifestations. ₉₂

In such situations, a possible remedy is the creation of a demilitarized zone along the border—or rather, a zone where either side's deployments are constrained, as a vacuum may be unstable. The constrains may either pertain to all types of armed forces, or merely to such as posses border-crossing capabilties. In fact, it may be preferable (from a stability point of view) allow for (even a ‘thick’) deployment of blocking forces and/or weapons in the forward zone, as this would provide both sides with ample warning, thereby reducing incentives for pre-emption. ₉₃ An often used means to this end is the deployment of presumable neutral forces, most often UN peacekeepers, in the ‘demilitarized’ zone. Their presence will provide each side with insurance against the respective other side's filing the thus created vacuum. ₉₄

 

Fig. 5. Terrestrial states: Very unstable configuration

 

6. Conclusion

We have thus seen that the fashionable talk about deterritorialization has some truth to it, but that it would be quite premature to claim that territory has lost its importance and that we have entered the ‘post-territorial era’. While the world may be moving in this direction, there are also countervailing trends towards a strengthening of territorial bonds and increasing the saliency of territory. This is not only true in general but also, more specifically, for the military domain, where territorial factors continue to play an important role.

 

Endnotes:

*: The author holds an MA in History and a Ph.D. in International Relations, both from the University of Copenhagen. Since 1985, he has been (senior) research fellow, subsequently programme director and board member at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI, formerly Centre for Peace and Conflict Research), where he is also editor of the international research newsletter NOD and Conversion . He is further Secretary General of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), and External Lecturer at the Institute of Political Studies, University of Copenhagen. In addition to being the author of numerous articles and editor of six anthologies, he is the author of three books: Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence (1991); Common Security and Nonoffensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective (1992); and Dictionary of Alternative Defense (1995).  Back.

**: Previous versions have been presented at the Conference on Rethinking Boundaries. Geopolitics, Identities and Sustainability , 21-23 February 2000, Panjab University, Chandiharh, India; and at the workshop on Globalization and Armed Conflict at the ECPR 2000 Conference, 14-19 April 2000, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Due to conference preparations, I only had time for a very incomplete revision.  Back.

Note 1: Mackinder, Halford J.: ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’ (1904), excerpted in Geraóid Tuathail, Simon Dalby & Paul Routledge (eds.): The Geopolitics Reader (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 27-31. See also Sloan, Geoffrey: ‘Sir Halford Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now’, The Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 22, no. 2/3 (Special Issue on Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy, editors: Colin S. Gray & Geoffrey Sloan, June/September 1999), pp. 15-38. For a critical analysis of the traditional reading of Mackinder see Tuathail, Gearóid Ó.: Critical Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 75-110.  Back.

Note 2: Haushofer, Karl: ‘Why Geopolitik?’, in Tuathail & al. (eds.): op. cit. (note 1), pp. 33-35; and idem: ‘Defense of German Geopolitics’, ibid. , pp. 40-43. On Hitler's geopolitical views see the excerpts from Mein Kampf , ibid. , pp. 36-39; or from Hitler's Secret Conversations, 1941-44 and his speech at the Berliner Sportspalast, in Chaliand, Gerard (ed.): The Art of War in World History. From Antiquity to the Nuclear Age (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 943-948. See also Herwig, Holger H.: ‘ Geopolitik , Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum’, The Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 22, no. 2/3 (June/Sept. 1999), pp. 218-241. For a more sceptical account of Haushofer's influence on Hitler see Tuathail: op. cit. (note 1), pp. 111-140.  Back.

Note 3: Spykman, Nicholas J.: ‘Geography and Foreign Policy’, in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (ed.): Politics and the International System , second edition (Philadelphia: J.P. Lippincott Co., 1972), pp. 372-377. Examples of similar readings of Russian/Soviet grand strategies as geopolitically expansionist are Luttwak, Edward N.: The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 75-80 & passim ; and Pipes, Richard: Survival is Not Enough. Soviet Realities and America's Future (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), pp. 37-44. On the Truman and Eisenhower doctrines and the associated ‘domino theory’ which were based on a similar geopolitical view see MacDonald, Douglas J.: ‘The Truman Administration and Global Responsibilities: The Birth of the Falling Domino Principle’, in Robert Jervis & Jack Snyder (eds.): Dominoes and Bandwagons. Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 112-144. See also Jervis, Robert: ‘Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behaviour’, ibid. , pp. 20-50; Bowie, Robert R. & Richard H. Immerman: Waging Peace. How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 137-174. For a critique of the domino image, based on an analysis of Soviet perceptions, see Hopf, Ted: Peripheral Visions. Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994).  Back.

Note 4: Sun Tzu: The Art of War , in The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China . Translation and Commentary by Ralph D. Sawyer, with Mei-chün Sawyer (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 157-186, especially chapter 11 on ‘Nine Terrains’ (pp. 178-183). The other ancient Chinese strategic writings in this volume, likewise, emphasized the importance of terrain, e.g. ‘T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings’, dating from the 11th century B.C., ibid. , pp. 40-195)  Back.

Note 5: Kautilia: ‘Arthashastra’, in Chaliand (ed.): op. cit. (note 2), pp. 287-332, especially the chapters on ‘Agreement of Peace for the Acquisition of Land’ and ‘Considerations about an Enemy in the Rear’ (pp. 310-315).  Back.

Note 6: Jomini, Antoine-Henri de: Traité des grandes operations militaires , second edition (Paris: Magimel, 1811), vol. 4, pp. 275-286. See also Shy, John: ‘Jomini’, in Peter Paret (ed.): Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 143-185; Reichel, Daniel: ‘Jomini, ein ‘‘Anti-Clausewitz’’?’, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift , vol. 26, no. 3 (May-June 1988), pp. 241-247; Gat, Azar: The Origins of Military Thought From the Enligtenment to Clausewitz (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), pp. 106-135.  Back.

Note 7: Jomini, Antoine-Henri de: Traité des grandes operations militaires , second edition (Paris: Magimel, 1811), vol. 4, pp. 275-286. See also Shy, John: ‘Jomini’, in Peter Paret (ed.): Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 143-185; Reichel, Daniel: ‘Jomini, ein ‘‘Anti-Clausewitz’’?’, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift , vol. 26, no. 3 (May-June 1988), pp. 241-247; Gat, Azar: The Origins of Military Thought From the Enligtenment to Clausewitz (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), pp. 106-135.  Back.

Note 8: Clausewitz, Carl von (1832): Vom Kriege , Ungekürzter Text nach der Erstauflage (1832-1834) (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1980), pp. 369 (Book VI.3) and 521-528 (Book VI.26). See also Hahlweg, Werner: ‘Clausewitz and Guerilla Warfare’, Journal of Strategic Studies , vol 9, no. 2 (1986), pp. 127-133; Gat, Azar: ‘Clausewitz on Defence and Attack’, ibid. , vol. 11, no. 1 (1988), pp. 20-26.  Back.

Note 9: Lawrence, Thomas Edward: The Seven Pillars of Wisdom. A Triumph (London: Cape, 1935), p. 337; idem (1929): ‘The Lessons of Arabia’, in Walter Laqueur (ed.): The Guerilla Reader. A Historical Anthology (London: Wildwood, 1978), pp. 130 and 136.  Back.

Note 10: Vauban, Sebastian de: ‘ De l'attaque et de la défense des places ’, excerpted and translated in Chaliand: op. cit. (note 2), pp. 560-565. See also Guerlac, Henry: ‘Vauban: The Impact of Science on War’, in Paret (ed.): op. cit. (note 7), pp. 64-90; Gat: op. cit. (note 7), pp. 67-94. On the predecessors, see also Rogers, Clifford (ed.): The Military Revolution Debate. Reading on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), e.g. Lynn, John A.: ‘The Trace Italienne and the Growth of Armies: The French Case’ (pp. 169-199); and Arnold, Thomas F.: ‘Fortifications and the Military Revolution: The Gonzaga Experience, 1530-1630’ (pp. 201-226).  Back.

Note 11: Simpkin, Richard E.: Race to the Swift. Thoughts on 21st Century Warfare . (London: Brassey's, 1986), pp. 57-77 & passim ; Jones, Archer: The Art of War in the Western World (London: Harrap, 1988), pp. 666-668 & passim ; Bellamy, Christopher: The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare. Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 10-28 & passim . See also Gupta, Raj: Defense Positioning and Geometry. Rules for a World with Low Force Levels (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993).  Back.

Note 12: Thomson, James A. & Nanette C. Ganz: ‘Conventional Arms Control Revisited: Objectives in the New Phase’, in Uwe Nehrlich & James A. Thomson (eds.): Conventional Arms Control and the Security of Europe (Boulder: Westview, 1988), pp. 108-120.  Back.

Note 13: Mearsheimer, John J.: ‘Manoeuvre, Mobile Defense, and the NATO Central Front’, International Security , vol. 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981-82), pp. 104-122; idem: ‘Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe’, ibid. , vol. 7, no. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 3-39; idem: ‘Numbers, Strategy, and the European Balance’, ibid. , vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 174-185. For a comparable analysis of the problems facing a stipulated North Korean attack on the South see Masaki, Stuart K.: ‘The Korean Question: Assessing the Military Balance’, Security Studies , vol. 4, no. 2 (Winter 1994-95), pp. 365-425. See also Kang, David C.: ‘Preventive War and North Korea’, ibid. , pp. 330-364.  Back.

Note 14: On FOFA, see e.g. Rogers, Bernard: ‘Sword and Shield: ACE Attack of Warsaw Pact Follow-On Forces’, NATO's Sixteen Nations , vol. 28, no. 1 (January 1983), pp. 16-26; Office of Technology Assessment: New Technology for NATO. Implementing Follow-On Forces Attack , (Washington D.C.: Congress of the United States, 1988); Sutton, Boyd D., John R. Landry, Malcolm B. Armstrong, Howell M. Esles III & Wesley K. Clark: ‘Deep Attack Concepts and the Defence of Central Europe’, Survival , vol. 26, no. 2 (1984), pp. 50-78; Burgess, John A.: ‘Emerging Technologies and the Security of Western Europe’, in Stephen J. Flanagan & Fen Osler Hampson (eds.): Securing Europe's Future. A Research Volume from the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 64-84; Flanagan, Stephen J.: ‘NATO's Conventional Defense Choices in the 1980s’, ibid ., pp. 85-112. On NATO's continued adherence to FoFA after the end of the Cold War, see Sharfman, Peter: ‘The Future of FOFA’, in Brian Holden Reid & Michael Dewar (eds.): Military Strategy in a Changing Europe (London: Brassey's, 1991), pp. 143-160; Mackenzie, J.J.G.: ‘The Counter-Offensive’, ibid. , pp. 161-180; Skingsley, Anthony: ‘Interdiction and Follow-on Forces Attack’, ibid. , pp. 207-218.  Back.

Note 15: Arguments in favour of treating strategy and arms control as two sides of the same coin include Bull, Hedley: ‘The Objectives of Arms Control’ (1965), in Robert J. Art & Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.): The Use of Force. International Politics and Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971), pp. 349-365; idem: ‘The Classical Approach to Arms Control Twenty Three Years After’, in Hedley Bull on Arms Control , Selected and Introduced by Robert O'Neill and David N. Schwartz (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 119-128; Schelling, Thomas C.: ‘What Went Wrong With Arms Control’, in Øyvind Østerud (ed.): Studies of War and Peace (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1986), pp. 90-109; Blechman, Barry M.: ‘Do Negotiated Arms Limitations Have a Future’, in John F. Reichart & Steven R. Sturm (eds.): American Defense Policy , Fifth Edition (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1983), pp. 408-419.  Back.

Note 16: Sharp, Jane M.O.: ‘Conventional Arms Control in Europe’, in SIPRI Yearbook 1991 , pp. 407-474 (with appendices, including the treaty itself); Kelleher, Catherine McArdle, Jane M.O. Sharp and Lawrence Freedman (eds.): The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe: The Politics of Post-Wall Arms Control (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1996); Koulik, Sergey & Richard Kokoski: Conventional Arms Control. Perspectives on Verification (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Hartmann, Rüdiger, Wolfgang Heydrich & Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut: Der Vertrag über konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa. Vertragswerk, Verhandlungsgeschichte, Kommentar, Dokumentation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1994); Falkenrath, Richard A.: Shaping Europe's Military Order. The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994).  Back.

Note 17: Redick, John R.: ‘Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones’, in Richard Dean Burns (ed.): Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament , vols. 1-3 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), vol. II, pp. 1079-1091; Alves, Péricles Gasparini & Daiana Belilnda Cipollone (eds.): Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the 21st Century , UNIDIR/97/37 (New York/Geneva: United Nations/UNIDIR, 1997); Robles, Alfonso Garcia: ‘The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)’, SIPRI Yearbook 1969/70 , pp. 218-256; Fry, Greg E.: ‘The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone’, SIPRI Yearbook 1986 , pp. 499-522; Simpson, John: ‘The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime after the NPT Review and Extension Conference’, SIPRI Yearbook 1996 , pp. 561-608; ‘Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone’, Strategic Digest , vol. 26, no. 3 (New Delhi: IDDS, 1996), pp. 320-328; Acharya, Amitav & J.D. Kenneth Boutin: ‘The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty’, Security Dialogue , vol. 29, no. 2 (June 1998), pp. 219-230.  Back.

Note 18: A good introduction to this tradition is George, Jim: Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994). See also Smith, Steve, Ken Booth & Marysia Zalewski (eds.): International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), passim .  Back.

Note 19: See, for instance, Hirst, Paul & Grahame Thompson: Globalization in Question. The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997); Waters, Malcolm: Globalization (London: Routledge, 1995); Scholte, Jaan Art: Globalisation: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); Robertson, Roland: Globalization. Social Theory and Global Culture (London: Sage, 1992); Clark, Ian: Globalization and Fragmentation. International Relations in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 16-32; Keith, Nelson W.: Reframing International Development. Globalism, Postmodernity, and Difference (London: Sage, 1997), pp. 21-54; Mittelman, Jammes H.: ‘The Dynamics of Globalization’ in idem (ed.): Globalization. Critical Reflections (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 1-20; Cox, Robert: ‘A Perspective of Globalization’, ibid. , pp. 21-30; McGrew, Anthony G.: ‘Conceptualizing Global Politics’, in idem & Paul G. Lewis et al.: Global Politics. Globalization and the Nation State (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 1-30; idem: ‘World Order and Political Space’, in James Anderson, Chris Brook & Allan Cochrane (eds.): A Global World? Reordering Political Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 11-64; Kofman, Eleonore & Gillian Youngs (eds.): Globalization. Theory and Practice (London: Pinter, 1996); Palan, Ronen & Barry Gills (eds.): Transcending the State-Global Divide: A Neostructuralist Agenda in International Relations (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994); Rosenau, James N.: Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier. Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 78-98; Falk, Richard: Predatory Globalization. A Critique (Oxford: Polity Press, 1999); Holm, Hans-Henrik & Georg Sørensen (eds.): Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).  Back.

Note 20: Verne, Jules: Around the World in Eighty Days (New York: Signet Classics, 1991).  Back.

Note 21: Buchs, Thierry & Anne-Rachel Schehr: ‘Financial Globalization and Policy Making: Issues and Prospects’, in Laurent Goetschel (ed.): Security in a Globalized World: Risks and Opportunities. Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), pp. 39-52.  Back.

Note 22: The Single European Act of 1986 thus entered into force on 1 January 1993. See ‘Chronology of the European Union: The Single Market’ at http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/chrono/en/them6.htm. See also Nelsen, Brent & Alexander C.D. Stubb (eds.): The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), passim ; Hufbauer, Gary Clyde (ed.): Europe 1992. An American Perspective (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990).  Back.

Note 23: See, for instance, Clapham, Christopher: Africa and the International System. The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Ayittey, George B.N.: Africa in Chaos (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Ayoob, Mohammed: The Third World Security Predicament. State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Holsti, Kalevi J.: The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Reno, William: Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998); Du Toit, Pierre: State Building and Democracy in Southern Africa. Botswana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1995).  Back.

Note 24: Müllerson, Rein: International Law, Rights and Politics. Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS (London: Routledge, 1994). On the breakup of Yugoslavia see Ramet, Sabrina P.: Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991 , 2nd edition (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992); idem: Balkan Babel. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War . Second Edition (Boulder: Westview, 1996); Mojzes, Paul: Yugoslav Inferno. Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans (New York: Continuum Press, 1994); Woodward, Susan L.: Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Cohen, Lenard J.: Broken Bonds. Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition . 2nd Edition (Boulder: Westview, 1995); Bianchini, Stefano & Paul Shoup (eds.): The Yugoslav War, Europe and the Balkans: How to Achieve Security? (Ravenna: Longo Editore Ravenna, 1995); Akhavan, Payam & Robert Howse (eds.): Yugoslavia, the Former and Future. Reflections by Scholars from the Region (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution and The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva, 1995); Carter, F.W. & H.T. Norris (eds.): The Changing Shape of the Balkans (London: UCL Press, 1996). On the dissolution of of the USSR see Forsberg, Tuomas (ed.): Contested Territory. Border Disputes at the Edge of the Former Soviet Empire (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995), passim; Arbatov, Alexei, Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes & Lara Olson (eds.): Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Stavrakis, Peter J., John DeBardeleben & Larry Black (eds.): Beyond the Monolith. The Emergence of Regionalism in Post-Soviet Russia (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997); Carlton, David & Paul Ingram (eds.): The Search for Stability in Russia and the Former Soviet Bloc (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997); Ehrhart, Hans-Georg, Anna Kreikemeyer & Andrei V. Zagorski (eds.): The Former Soviet Union and European Security: Between Integration and Re-Nationalization (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993); Tishkov, Valery: Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union (London: Sage, 1997); Allison, Roy & Christoph Bluth (eds.): Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998); Baranovsky, Vladimir (ed.): Russia and Europe. The Emerging Security Agenda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Dawisha, Karen & Bruce Parrott: Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). On secessions from Russia itself see Baev, Pavel: ‘Russia's Stance against Secessions: From Chechnya to Kosovo’, International Peacekeeping , vol. 6, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 73-94; Nicholson, Martin: ‘Towards a Russia of the Regions’, Adelphi Papers , no. 330 (1999); Sergounin, Alexander A.: ‘The Process of Regionalization and the Future of the Russian Federation’, Working Papers , no. 9 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1999); Dunlop, John B.: Russia Confronts Chechnya. Roots of a Separatist Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Lieven, Anatol: Chechnya. Tombstone of Russian Power. New Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).  Back.

Note 25: Recent studies of regionalism include Wriggins, Howard (ed.): Dynamics of Regional Politics. Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Daase, Christopher, Susanne Feske, Bernhard Moltmann & Claudia Schmid (eds.): Regionalisierung der Sicherheitspolitik. Tendenzen in den internationalen Beziehungen nach dem Ost-West-Konflikt (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993); Lawrence, Robert Z.: Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996); Holm & Sørensen (eds.): op. cit. (note 19); Tow, William T.: Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990); Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde: The New Security Studies: A Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 9-20, 42-45 & passim ; Fawcett, Louise & Andrew Hurrell (eds.): Regionalism in World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), passim ; Lake, David A. & Patrick M. Morgan (eds.): Regional Orders. Building Security in a New World (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Keating, Michael & John Loughlin (eds.): The Political Economy of Regionalism (Newbury Park: Frank Cass, 1997); Coleman, William D. & Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds.): Regionalism and Global Economic Integration (London: Routledge, 1998); Fukasaku, Kiichiro, Fukanari Kimura & Shujiro Urata (eds.): Asia and Europe. Beyond Competing Regionalism (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1998); Grugel, Jean & Wil Hout (eds.): Regionalism across the North/South Divide. State Strategies in the Semi-Periphery (London: Routledge, 1999); Kanet, Roger (ed.): Resolving Regional Conflicts (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998); Solingen, Etel: Regional Orders at Century's Dawn. Global and Domestic Influences on Grand Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Storper, Michael: The Regional World. Territorial Development in a Global Economy (New York & London: The Guilford Press, 1997).  Back.

Note 26: Der Derian, James: Antidiplomacy. Spies, Terror, Speed and War (Oxford: Polity Press, 1992); Toffler, Alvin & Heidi Toffler: War and Antiwar: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1993). See also Norris, Christopher: Uncritical Theory. Postmodernism, Intellectuals, and the Gulf War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992); Gray, Chris Hables: Postmodern War. The New Politics of Conflict (London: Routledge, 1997).  Back.

Note 27: Good surveys are Dupuy, Trevor N.: The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (London: Jane's, 1980); Warner, Philip: Firepower. From Slings to Star Wars (London: Grafton Books, 1988); Creveld, Martin Van: Technology and War. From 2000 B.C. to the Present (New York: The Free Press, 1989).  Back.

Note 28: The worst nightmare scenario in this respect was that of the destruction of the entire biosphere resulting from a medium-sized nuclear war. See Crutzen, P.J. & J.W. Birks: ‘Atmosphere After a Nuclear War: Twilight at Dawn’, Ambio , no. 11 (1982), pp. 114-125; Sagan, Carl: ‘Nuclear War and Climatic Catastrophe’, in William P. Bundy (ed.): The Nuclear Controversy. A Foreign Affairs Reader (New York: New American Library, 1985), pp. 117-152; Ehrlich, Paul, Carl Sagan, Donald Kennedy & Walter Orr Roberts: The Cold and the Dark. The World After Nuclear War (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984). For a critique see Wohlstetter, Albert: ‘Between an Unfree World and None’, Foreign Affairs , vol. 63, no. 5 (Summer 1985), pp. 962-994; or Thompson, Stabley L. & Stephen H. Schneider: ‘Nuclear Winter Reappraised’, ibid. , vol. 64, no. 5 (Summer 1986), pp. 981-1005.  Back.

Note 29: On biological weapons see Zilinskas, Raymond A. (ed.): Biological Warfare. Modern Offense and Defense (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000); Lederberg, Joshua (ed.): Biological Weapons. Limiting the Threat (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999); Falkenrath, Richard A., Robert D. Newman & Bradley A. Thayer: America's Achilles' Heel. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).  Back.

Note 30: Stromseth, Jane E.: The Origins of Flexible Response. NATO's Debate Over Strategy in the 1960's. (New York 1988: St. Martin's Press); Daalder, Ivo H.: The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response. NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces Since 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).  Back.

Note 31: The Roth report is available at http://www.naa.be/publications/special/ar5gen-e.html. The documents from the summit, especially ‘The Alliance's Strategic Concept’ are found in NATO Review , vol. 47, no. 2 (Summer 1999). The formulation is ‘Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance.’  Back.

Note 32: Good analyses of sea power include Till, Geoffrey: Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age (London: Macmillan, 1982); idem: ‘Maritime Strategy and the Twenty-First Century’, The Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 17, no. 1 (March 1994), pp. 176-199; Grove, Eric: Maritime Strategy and European Security (London: Brassey's, 1990); idem: The Future of Sea Power (London: Routledge, 1990); Lautenschläger, Karl: ‘Technology and the Evolution of Naval Warfare’, in Steven E. Miller & Stephen Van Evera (eds.): Naval Strategy and National Security. An International Security Reader , (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 173-221; Friedman, Norman: The US Maritime Strategy (London: Jane's, 1988); Kearsley, Harold J.: Maritime Power and the Twenty-First Century (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishers, 1992); Jordan, Robert S.: Alliance Strategy and Navies. The Evolution and Scope of NATO's Maritime Dimension (London: Pinter 1990); Coutau-Bégarie, Hervé (ed.): L'Évolution de la pensé navale, I-II (Paris: Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, 1991-1992); Crickard, F.W., Paul T. Mitchell & Katherine D. Orr (eds.): Multinational Naval Co-operation and Foreign Policy into the 21st Century (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998); Nooy, Gert de (ed.): The Role of European Naval Forces after the Cold War (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996); Gray, Colin S.: The Leverage of Sea Power. The Strategic Advantages of Navies in War (New York: Free Press, 1992); Gray, Colin S.: The Navy in the Post-Cold War World (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994).  Back.

Note 33: Armitage, M. J. & R. A. Mason: Air Power in the Nuclear Age, 1945-82 (London: Macmillan, 1983); Stokesbury, James L.: A Short History of Air Power , (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1986); Brown, Neville: The Future of Air Power (London: Croom Helm, 1986). On classical air power theory see Douhet, Giulio: The Command of the Air (New York: Coward-McCann, 1942); Warner, Edward: ‘Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare’, in Earle (ed.): op. cit. (note 4), pp. 485-503; MacIsaac, David: ‘Voices From the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists’, in Paret (ed.): op. cit. (note 7), pp. 624-647; Cohen, Eliot A.: ‘The Meaning and Future of Air Power’, Orbis , vol. 39, no. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 189-200; Builder, Carl H.: The Icarus Syndrome. The Role of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1996); Pape, Robert A.: Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Mey, Holger H. (ed.): Offensive Luftmacht zur Verteidigung und Friedenssicherung (Bonn: Report Verlag, 1995).  Back.

Note 34: Lee, Christopher: War in Space (London: Sphere, 1987); Karas, Thomas: The New High Ground. Strategies and Weapons for Space Age War (London: New English Library, 1984); Jasani, Bhupendra & Christopher Lee: Countdown to Space War (London: Taylor & Francis/SIPRI, 1984). On the Star Wars controversy see Tirman, John (ed.): The Fallacy of Star Wars (New York: Vintage, 1984): idem (ed.): Empty Promise. The Growing Case Against Star Wars (Boston: Beacon, 1986); Snyder, Craig (ed.): The Strategic Defense Debate. Can "Star Wars" Make Us Safe? (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 1986); Steven E. Miller & Stephen Van Evera (eds.): The Star Wars Controversy. An International Security Reader (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Bowman, Robert M.: Star Wars. A Defense Insider's Case Against the Strategic Defense Initiative (Los Angele: Tarcher, 1986); Barnaby, Frank: What on Earth is Star Wars? (London: Fourth Estate, 1986).  Back.

Note 35: A (not particularly good) work with a title that says it all is Adams, James: The Next World War: Computers Are the Weapon and the Front Line Is Everywhere (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998). See also Lonsdale, David J.: ‘Information Power: Strategy, Geopolitics and the Fifth Dimension’, The Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 22, no. 2/3 (June/Sept. 1999), pp. 137-160.  Back.

Note 36: On the RMA see, for instance, Cohen, Eliot A.: ‘A Revolution in Warfare’, Foreign Affairs , vol. 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996), pp. 37-54; Keaney, Thomas A. & idem: Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995); Cushman, John H.: ‘Implications of the Gulf War for Future Military Strategy’, in L. Benjamin Ederington & Michael J. Mazarr (eds.): Turning Point. The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 79-101; McKitrick, Jeffrey et al.: ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs’, in Barry R. Schneider & Lawrence E. Grinter (eds.): Battlefield of the Future. 21st Century Warfare Issues (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1995), pp. 65-94; Arquilla, John & David Ronfeldt: ‘Cyberwar Is Coming!’, in idem & idem (eds): In Athena's Camp. Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), pp. 23-60; Blank, Stephen J.: ‘Preparing for the Next War: Reflections on the Revolution in Military Affairs’, ibid. , pp. 61-78; Cooper, Jeffrey: ‘Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs’, ibid. , pp. 99-140. For a comparison of the various theories see Biddle, Stephen: ‘The Past as Prologue: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare’, Security Studies , vol. 8, no. 1 (Autumn 1998), pp. 1-74.  Back.

Note 37: On information warfare see, for instance: Allard, C. Kenneth: ‘The Future of Command and Control: Toward a Paradigm of Information Warfare’, in Ederington & Mazarr (eds.): op. cit. (note 36), pp. 161-192; Davis, Norman C.: ‘An Information-Based Revolution in Military Affairs’, in Arquilla & Ronfeldt (eds.): op. cit. (note 36), pp. 79-98; Arquila, John & David Ronfeld: ‘Information, Power, and Grand Strategy: In Athena's Camp—Section 1’, ibid ., pp. 141-171; idem & idem: ‘Information, Power, and Grand Strategy: In Athena's Camp—Section 2’, ibid ., pp. 417-438; idem & idem: ‘Looking Ahead: Preparing for Information-Age Conflict’, ibid. , pp. 439-501; idem & idem: ‘The Advent of Netwar’, ibid. , pp. 275-294; Berkowitz, Bruce D.: ‘Warfare in the Information Age’, ibid. , pp. 175-190; Rothrock, John: ‘Information Warfare: Time for some Constructive Scepticism?’, ibid ., pp. 217-230; Stein, George J.: ‘Information War—Cyberwar—Netwar’, in Schneider & Grinter (eds.): op. cit. (note 36), pp. 153-170; McLendon, James W.: ‘Information Warfare: Impacts of Concerns’, ibid. , pp. 171-199; Brown, Frederic J.: The U.S. Army in Transition II: Landpower in the Information Age (Washington: Brassey's, US, 1992); Spiszer, John M.: ‘FM 100-5: Information Age Warfare’, Military Review , vol. 77, no. 5 (Sept-Oct 1997), pp. 15-18; Clemmons, Byards Q.: ‘Cyberwarfare: Ways, Warriors and Weapons of Mass Destruction’, ibid. , vol. 79, no. 5 (Sept-Oct. 1999), pp. 35-45; Thomas, Timothy L.: ‘Infosphere Threats’, ibid. , pp. 46-51; Bunker, Robert J.: ‘Higher-Dimensional Warfighting’, ibid. , pp. 53-62; Henry, Ryan & C,. Edward Peartree: ‘Military Theory and Information Warfare’, in idem & idem (eds.): The Information Revolution and International Security (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1998), pp. 105-127; Bowdish, Randall G.: ‘Information-Age Psychological Operations’, ibid. , vol. 78, no. 6 (Dec. 1998/Jan-Febr. 1999). pp. 29-37; Feaver, Peter D.: ‘Blowback: Information Warfare and the Dynamics of Coercion’, Security Studies , vol. 7, no. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 88-120; Habermeyer, Helmut: ‘Information Warfare—die neue Dimension’, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift , vol. 36, no. 5 (Sept-Oct. 1998), pp. 559-566; Robins, Bill: ‘Implications of Information Age Operations’, RUSI Journal , vol. 142, no. 5 (October 1997), pp. 32-39. For an Indian view see Singh, Ajay: ‘Information Warfare: Organisational Paradigm’, Strategic Analysis , vol. 21, no. 10 (Delhi: IDSA, January 1998), pp. 1509-1518; idem: ‘Information Warfare: Reshaping National Perceptions’, ibid. , no. 12 (March 1998), pp. 1793-1804. On the various problems see also Geiger, Gebhard, Burkhardt J. Huck & Dieter Ziß (eds.): ‘Information War/Informationskrieg. Gefährdung und Schutz kritischer Infrastrukturen’, Aktuelle SWP-Dokumentation , no. 18 (August 1998) vol. 1: ‘Analysen und Materialien’, vol. 2: ‘Literaturverzeichnis und Volltexte’ (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1998); Jacobsen, Mark R.: ‘War in the Information Age: International Law, Self-Defense and the Problem of ‘‘Non-Armed’’ Attacks’, Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 21, no. 3 (September 1998), pp. 1-23; Bendrath, Ralf: ‘Der Kosovo-Krieg im Cyberspace’, Antimilitarismus Information , vol. 29, no. 7 (1999), pp. 82-91; Cimbala, Stephen J.: ‘Accidental/Inadvertent Nuclear War and Information Warfare’, Armed Forces and Society , vol. 25, no. 4 (Summer 1999), pp. 653-676; Libicki, Martin C.: ‘Military Revolutions and the Information Systems that Would Power Them’, in Reiner K. Huber & Hans W. Hofmann (eds.): Defense Analysis for the 21st Century: Issues, Approaches, Models (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999), pp. 179-197.  Back.

Note 38: Ward, Michael Don (ed.): The New Geopolitics (Philadelphia & Reading: Gordon and Breach, 1992); Parker, Geoffrey: Geopolitics. Past, Present and Future (London: Pinter, 1998); Anderson, Malcolm: Frontiers. Territory and State in the Modern World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); idem & Eberhard Bort (eds.): The Frontiers of Europe (London: Pinter, 1998). A consistent advocate of ‘hardnosed’ geopolitics has been Colin S. Gray. See his The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1977); Gray, Colin S.: ‘Inescapable Geography’, The Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 22, no. 2/3 (June/Sept. 1999), pp. 161-177; Sloan, Geoffrey & idem: ‘Why Geopolitics?’, ibid. , pp. 1-14. See also Brzezinski, Zbigniew: The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997); idem: ‘A Geostrategy for Asia’, Foreign Affairs , vol. 76, no. 5 (Sept-Oct. 1997), pp. 50-64. A German advocate of geostrategy is Heinz Brill. See his ‘Geopolitische/geostrategische Leitlinien deutscher Sicherheitspolitik’, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift , vol. 32, no. 6 (November-December 1994), pp. 601-608; idem: ‘Die Bedeutung des Begriffs ‘‘Geostrategie’’’, ibid. , vol. 34, no. 3 (May-June 1996), pp. 301-306; idem: ‘Die NATO-Osterweiterung und die geopolitische Interessen der Mächte’, ibid. , vol. 36, no. 6 (Nov-Dec. 1998), pp. 637-648. Critical geopolitical writings include Agnew, John: Geopolitics. Re-visioning World Politics (London: Routledge, 1998); Tuathail: op. cit. (note 1); idem: ‘Understanding Critical Geopolitics: Geopolitics and Risk Security’, The Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 22, no. 2/3 (June/Sept. 1999), pp. 107-124; Tunander, Ola, Pavel Baev & Victoria Ingrid Einagel (eds.): Geopolitics in Post-Wal Europe. Security, Territory and Identity (London: Sage, 1997); Newman, David (ed.): Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity (London: Frank Cass, 1999). Another sign of the growing interest is the new journal Geopolitics (formerly Geopolitics and International Boundaries ), published by Frank Cass since 1996.  Back.

Note 39: See, for instance, Homer-Dixon, Thomas F.: Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Percival, Val & Thomas Homer-Dixon: ‘Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of South Africa’, Journal of Peace Research , vol. 35, no. 3 (May 1998), pp. 278-298.  Back.

Note 40: On UNCLOS see Oxman, Bernad H.: ‘The Law of the Sea’, in Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner (eds.): United Nations Legal Order (Cambridge: Grotius Publishers, 1995), vol. 2, pp. 671-713. The treaty text is available at www.un.org/Depts/los/unclos/closindx.htm.  Back.

Note 41: See, e.g. Mills, Greg (ed.): Maritime Policy for Developing Nations (Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1995). On South(ern) Africa see Edmonds, Martin & Greg Mills: Uncharted Waters. A Review of South Africa's Naval Options (Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1996); Edmonds, Martin & Greg Mills: Beyond the Horizon. Defence, Dipolomacy and South Africa's Maritime Opportunities (Braamfontein: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1998).  Back.

Note 42: Elhance, Arun P.: Hydropolitics in the 3rd World. Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999).  Back.

Note 43: Morris, Mary E.: ‘Water Scarcity and Security Concerns in the Middle East’, The Emirates Occasional Papers , no. 14 (1998); Rouyer, Alwyn R.: ‘The Water Issue in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process’, Survival , vol. 39, no. 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 57-81.  Back.

Note 44: Bar-Joseph, Uri: ‘Israel's Northern Eyes and Shield: The Strategic Value of the Golan Heights Revisited’, Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 21, no. 3 (September 1998), pp. 46-66; Lemke, Hans-Dieter, Volker Peres & Annette van Edig: ‘Der Golan und der israelisch-syrische Friedensprozess. Politische, militärische und wirtschaftliche Aspekte’, SWP-AP (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1996), no. 2958.  Back.

Note 45: Kemp, Geoffrey & Robert E. Harkavy: Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Brooking Institution Press, 1997), pp. 101-108; Elhance: op. cit. (note 42), pp. 148-151.  Back.

Note 46: On the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border dispute see Rahman, H.: The Making of the Gulf War. Origin's of Kuwait's Long-standing Territorial Dispute with Iraq (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1997). On the oil issue see Nakhjavani, Mehran: ‘Resources, Wealth and Security: The Case of Kuwait’, in Baghat Korany, Paul Noble & Rex Brynan (eds.): The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 185-204; Chatelus, Michael: ‘Iraq and its Oil: Sixty-five Years of Ambition and Frustration’, in Derek Hopwood, Habib Ishow & Thomas Koszinowski (eds.): Iraq. Power and Society (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993), pp. 141-169; Ishow, Habib: ‘Relations between Iraq and Kuwait’, ibid. , pp. 303-318; Kemp & Harkavy: op. cit. (note 45), pp. 109-131.  Back.

Note 47: Valencia, Mark J.: ‘China and the South China Sea Disputes’, Adelphi Paper , no. 298 (1995); Salameh, Mamdouh G.: ‘China, Oil and the Risk of Regional Conflict’, Survival , vol. 37, no. 4 (Winter 1995-96), pp. 133-146; Leifer, Michael: ‘Chinese Economic Reform and Security Policy: The South China Sea Connection’, ibid. , vol. 37, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 44-59.  Back.

Note 48: Lellouche, Pierre: Le nouveau monde. De l'Ordre de Yalta au désordre des nations (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1992), pp. 261-413.  Back.

Note 49: The terminology is adapted from Hutchinson, John & Anthony D. Smith (eds.): Ethnicity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 8-9, but I prefer the term ‘constructivism’ to ‘instrumentalism’, as it does not carry any connocation of ethnicity being less than real, merely because it is constructed. For a similar argument see Anderson, Benedict: Imagined Communities . Revised edition (London: Verso, 1991), pp. 6-7.  Back.

Note 50: Smith, Anthony D.: ‘Ethnie and Nation in the Modern World’, Millennium , vol. 14, no. 2 (1985), pp. 127-142, quote from pp. 133 and 135.  Back.

Note 51: A good theoretical and empirical study of diasporas is Cohen, Robin: Global Diasporas. An Introduction (London: UCL Press, 1997). Especially relevant is the chapter on ‘Diasporas and their homeland’, pp. 105-126.  Back.

Note 52: Kupchan, Charles: ‘Introduction: Nationalism Resurgent’, in idem (ed.): Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 1-14, definition on p. 2.  Back.

Note 53: On secession see Halperin, Morton & David J. Scheffer: Self-Determination in the New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Books, 1992); Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W.: ‘Self-Determination’, in Schachter & Joyner (eds.): op. cit. (note 40), vol. 1, pp. 349-389; Cassese, Antonio: Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Sellers, Mortimer (ed.): The New World Order. Sovereignty, Human Rights and the Self-Determination of Peoples (Oxford: Berg, 1996), passim ; Crawford, Neta: ‘Decolonization as an International Norm; The Evolution of Practices, Arguments, and Beliefs’, in Laura W. Reed & Carl Kaysen (eds.): Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention. A Collection of Essays from a Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Commitee on International Security Studies, AASS, 1993), pp. 37-62; Meadwell, Hudson: ‘Secession, States and International Society’, Review of International Studies , vol. 25, no. 3 (1999), pp. 371-387.  Back.

Note 54: See Møller, Bjørn: ‘The Unification of Divided States and Defence Restructuring. China-Taiwan in a Comparative Perspective’, Working Papers , no. 9 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, COPRI, 1996); shortened version published as idem: ‘Unification of Divided States in East Asia’, in idem (ed.): Security, Arms Control and Defence Restructuring in East Asia (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 161-201; Wiberg, Håkan: ‘Divided States and Divided Nations as a Security Problem: The Case of Yugoslavia’, Working Papers , no. 14 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1992). On China/Taiwan see also Hughes, Christopher: Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism. National Identity and Status in International Society (London: Routledge, 1997); Dittmer, Lowell & Samuel S. Kim (eds.): China's Quest for National Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), passim ; Cheng, Tun-jen, Chi Huang & Samuel S.G. Wu (eds.): Inherited Rivalry. Conflict Across the Taiwan Straits (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). On Yemen see Braun, Ursula: ‘Yemen: Another Case of Unification’, Aussenpolitik , vol. 43, no. 2 (2nd Quarter 1992), pp. 174-184. On Germany and Korea, the literature is enormous. For comparisons of the two cases see, for instance, Schmidt, Helmut: ‘Lessons of the German Reunification for Korea’, Security Dialogue , vol. 24, no. 44 (December 1993), pp. 397-408; Yang, Sung-Chul: ‘The Lessons of United Germany for Divided Korea’, in Young Whan Kihl (ed.): Korea and the World. Beyond the Cold War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 261-278; Flassbeck, Heiner & Gustav A. Horn (eds.): German Unification: an Example for Korea? (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996).  Back.

Note 55: See, e.g. Malcolm, Noel: Kosovo. A Short History (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998); Veremis, Thanos & Evangeloss Kofos (eds.): Kosovo: Avoiding Another Balkan War (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1998); Veremis, Thanos M. & Dimitrios Triataphyllou (eds.): Kosovo and the Albanian Dimension in Southern Europe: The Need for Regional Security and Conflict Prevention (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1999); Campbell, Greg: The Road to Kosovo. A Balkan Diary (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999). Hedges, Chris: ‘Kosovo's Next Masters’, Foreign Affairs , vol. 78, no. 3 (May-June 1999), pp. 24-42; Rodman, Peter W.: ‘The Fallout from Kosovo’, ibid. , vol. 78, no. 4 (July-August 1999), pp. 45-51.Cabada, Ladislav & Martin Ehl: ‘The Kosovi Crisis and the Prospects for the Balkans’, Perspectives , no. 13 (Prague: Institute of International Relations, 1999), pp. 21-30.  Back.

Note 56: Frisch, Hillel: ‘Ethnicity, Territorial Integrity, and Regional Order: Palestinian Identity in Jordan and Israel’, Journal of Peace Research , vol. 34, no. 3 (August 1997), pp. 257-269; Sandler, Shmuel: The State of Israel, the Land of Israel. The Statist and Ethnonational Dimensions of Foreign Policy (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993); Evron, Boas: Jewish State or Israeli Nation? (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). On Palestinian identity see Khalidi, Rashid: Palestinian Identity. The Construction of Modern National Consciousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). See also Frisch, Hillel: ‘Ethnicity, Territorial Integrity, and Regional Order: Palestinian Identity in Jordan and Israel’, Journal of Peace Research , vol. 34, no. 3 (August 1997), pp. 257-269. See also Lustick, Ian S.: Unsettled States, Disputed Lands. Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 7-25, 352-438; Guyatt, Nicholas: The Absence of Peace. Understanding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (London: Zed Books, 1998).  Back.

Note 57: Karmi, Ghada (ed.): Jerusalem Today. What Future for the Peace Process? (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1996); Albin, Cecilia: ‘Negotiating Intractable Conflicts. On the Future of Jerusalem’, Cooperation and Conflict , vol. 32, no. 1 (March 1997), pp. 29-77; Emmett, Chad F.: ‘The Status Quo Solution for Jerusalem’, Journal of Palestine Studies , vol. 36, no. 2 (Winter 1997), pp. 16-28; Odeh, Adnan Abu: ‘Two Capitals in an Undivided Jerusalem’, Foreign Affairs , vol. 71, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 183-188; Hassassian, Manuel: ‘Models of Sovereignty and the Question of Jerusalem: Towards a Comprehensive Perspective’, available as a special report on the PNA's official website at www.pna.net/reports/Jerusalem_sovereignty_hassassian.html.  Back.

Note 58: Bose, Sumantra: The Challenge in Kashmir. Democracy, Self-Determination and a Just Peace (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997); Ganguly, Sumit: The Origins of War in South Asia. Indo-Pakistani Conflicts Since 1947 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Harrison, Selig, Paul H. Kreisberg & Dennis Kux (eds.): India and Pakistan. The First Fifty Years (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Groves, Denise: ‘India and Pakistan: A Clash of Civilizations?’, The Washington Quarterly , vol. 21, no. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 17-20; Tremblay, Reeta Chowdhari: ‘Nation, Identity and the Intervening Role of the State: A Study of the Secessionist Movement in Kashmir’, Security Dialogue , vol. 28, no. 2 (June 1997), pp. 471-497; Cloughly, Brian: ‘Violence in Kashmir’, ibid. , vol. 30, no. 2 (June 1999), pp. 225-238; Bose, Sumantra: ‘Kashmir: Sources of Conflict, Dimensions of Peace’, Survival , vol. 41, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 149-171; Sharma, Sangeeta: ‘Protracted Conflict and Enduring Rivalry: India, Pakistan and the Dynamics of Stalemate over Kashmir’, in Harvey Starr (ed.): The Understanding and Management of Global Violence. New Approaches to Theory and Research on Protracted Conflict (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 225-253.  Back.

Note 59: Lapidoth, Ruth: Autonomy. Flexible Solutions to Intrastate Conflicts (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996). See also Prawitz, Jan: ‘A Vatican Solution for Jerusalem’, Security Dialogue , vol. 25, no. 3 (1994), pp. 355-356; Coakley, John (ed.): The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 1993); Chisholm, Michael & David M. Smith (eds.): Shared Space, Divided Space. Essays on Conflict and Territorial Organization (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990).  Back.

Note 60: Wæver, Ole: ‘Imperial Metaphors: Emerging European Analogies to Pre-Nation-State Imperial Systems’, in Ola Tunander, Pavel Baev & Victoria Einagel (eds.): Geopolitics in Post-Wall Europe (London: Sage, 1997), pp. 59-93; idem: ‘Europe's Three Empires: A Watsonian Interpretation of Post-Wall European Security’, in Rick Fawn & Jeremy Larkins (eds.): International Society after the Cold War. Anarchy and Order Reconsidered (Houndsmills, Basingstroke: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 220-260. See also Watson, Adam: The Evolution of International Society (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 3-4 & passim .  Back.

Note 61: On the progressive fortification of the Roman limes, see ‘Limes’ in the Encyclopædia Britannica Online ; or Dudley, Donald: Roman Society (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 157-170 and 200-209, especially pp. 208-209; Luttwak, Edward N.: The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. From the First Century A.D. to the Third (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976), passim . On the Great Wall see Nathan, Andrew J. & Robert S. Ross: The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997), pp. 24-26.  Back.

Note 62: Hedeager, Lotte & Henrik Tvarnø: Romerne og Germanerne (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1991), pp. 77-82. For a similar view of a possible Turkish geopolitical strategy see Hunter, Shireen: ‘Bridge or Frontier? Turkey's Post-Cold War Geopolitical Posture’, The International Spectator , vol. 34, no. 1 (Jan-March 1999), pp. 63-78.  Back.

Note 63: Barkey, Henri J.: Reluctant Neighbour. Turkey's Role in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996); Mastiny, Vojzech & R. Craig Nation (eds.): Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996); Winrow, Gareth: Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia (London Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995); Clover, Charles: ‘Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland. The Reemergence of Geopolitics’, Foreign Affairs , vol. 78, no. 2 (March-April 1999), pp. 9-13; Brill, Heinz: ‘Die geopolitische Lage der Türkei im Wandel’, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift , vol. 36, no. 2 (March-April 1998), pp. 113-120; Criss, Nur Bilge & Serdar Güner: ‘Geopolitical Configurations: The Russia-Turkey-Iran Triangle’, Security Dialogue , vol. 30, no. 3 (September 1999), pp. 365-376.  Back.

Note 64: Danilovich, A.A.: ‘On New Military Doctrines of the CIS and Russia’, The Journal of Soviet Military Studies , vol. 5, no. 4 (December 1992), pp. 517-538; Dick, Charles J.: ‘The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’, ibid. , vol. 7, no. 3 (September 1994), pp. 481-506; Fitzgerald, Mary C.: ‘Russia's New Military Doctrine’, The RUSI Journal , vol. 137, no. 5 (October 1992), pp. 40-48; Kartha, Tara: ‘Russia's Military Doctrine’, Asian Strategic Review 1993-94 (New Delhi: IDSA, 1994), pp. 99-161; Lepingwell, John W.R.: ‘The Russian Military and Security Policy in the ‘‘Near Abroad’’’, Survival , vol. 36, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 70-92; Shashenkov, Maxim: ‘Russian Peacekeeping in the ‘‘Near Abroad’’’, ibid. , pp. 46-69; Arbatov, Alexei & Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova: ‘Russia in the Black Sea Region’, Eurobalkans , no. 19 (Summer 1995), pp. 30-35; Dawisha, Karen & Bruce Parrott: Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 231-257 & passim ; Buszinski, Leszek: Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Press, 1996), pp. 127-168; Iivonen, Jyrki: ‘Expansionism and the Russian Imperial Tradition’, in Tuomas Forsberg (ed.): Contested Territory. Border Disputes at the Edge of the Former Soviet Empire (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 62-85; Baev, Pavel K.: ‘Old and New Border Problems in Russia's Security Policy’, ibid. , pp. 86-103; Litera, Bohuslav: ‘The Kozyrev Doctrine—a Russian Variation on the Monroe Doctrine’, Perspectives , no. 4 (Prague: Institute of International Relations, Winter 94/95), pp. 45-52Erickson, John: ‘‘‘Russia Will Not Be Trifled With’’: Geopolitical Facts and Fantasies’, The Journal of Strategic Studies , vol. 22, no. 2/3 (Special Issue on Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy, editors: Colin S. Gray & Geoffrey Sloan, June/September 1999), pp. 242-268. Forsberg, Thomas (ed.): Contested Territory. Border Disputes at the Edge of the Former Soviet Empire (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995); Hopf, Ted: ‘Managing the Post-Soviet Security Space: A Continuing Demand for Behavioral Regimes’, Security Studies , vol. 4, no. 2 (Winter 1994-95), pp. 281-329.  Back.

Note 65: White, Lynn & Li Cheng: ‘China Coast Identities’, in Dittmer & Kim (eds.): op. cit. (note 54), pp. 154-193; Segal, Gerald: ‘China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy’, Adelphi Paper , no. 287 (1994); Goodman, David S.G. & idem (eds.): China Deconstructs. Politics, Trade and Regionalism (London: Routledge, 1994).  Back.

Note 66: On SADC see Honwana, Joao Bernardo: ‘Between Hope and Despair: Southern Africa's Security’. in Gavin Cawthra & Bjørn Møller (eds.): Defensive Restructuring of the Armed Forces in Southern Africa (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), pp. 33-44; Cawthra, Gavin: ‘Prospects for Common Security in Southern Africa’, ibid. , pp. 145-162; idem: ‘Subregional Security: The Southern African Development Community’, Security Dialogue , vol. 28, no. 2 (June 1997), pp. 207-218; Vale, Peter: ‘Regional Security in Southern Africa’, Alternatives , vol. 21, no. 3 (July-Sept. 1996), pp. 363-391; Cilliers, Jakkie & Mark Malan: ‘SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security: Future Development’, Strategic Analysis , vol. 20, no. 2. Special Issue: South Africa-India Strategic Partnership Dialogue (New Delhi: IDSA, May 1997), pp. 201-222; Aardt, M. van: ‘The Emerging Security Framework in Southern Africa: Regime or Community’, Strategic Review for Southern Africa , vol. 19, no. 1 (May 1997), pp. 1-30. On ASEAN see, for instance, Acharya, Amitav: ‘A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post-Cold War Era’, Adelphi Paper , no. 279 (1993); Leifer, Michael: ‘The ASEAN Regional Forum. Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional Security’, ibid. , no. 302 (1996); Cunha, Derek da (ed.): The Evolving Pacific Power Structure (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996). See also the annuals Southeast Asian Affairs 19xx and Regional Outlook. Southeast Asia 19xx-xx , both published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.  Back.

Note 67: Adler, Emmanuel & Michael Barnett (eds.): Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Kacowicz, Arie M.: Zones of Peace in the Third World. South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998); Kacowicz, Arie M.: ‘Third World Zones of Peace’, Peace Review , vol. 9, no. 2 (June 1997), pp. 169-176; Kacowicz, Arie M.: ‘Explaining Zones of Peace: Democracies as Satisfied Powers’, Journal of Peace Research , vol. 32, no. 3 (August 1995), pp. 265-276.  Back.

Note 68: Huntington, Samuel: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); idem: ‘‘‘The Clash of Civilizations’’—a Response’, Millennium , vol. 26, no. 1 (1997), pp. 141-142. For a critique of the Huntington thesis see Chan, Stephen: ‘Too Neat and Under-thought a World Order: Huntington and Civilizations’, ibid. , pp. 137-140; Hunter, Shireen: The Future of Islam and the West. Clash of Civilizations or Peaceful Coexistence? (Westport: Praeger, 1998); Weeks, Albert L.: ‘Do Civilizations Hold?’, Foreign Affairs , vol. 72, no. 4 (1993), pp. 24-25; Welch, David A.: ‘The ‘‘Clash of Civilizations’’ Thesis as an Argument and as a Phenomenon’, Security Studies , vol. 6, no. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 197-216; Buzan, Barry: ‘Review Essay: Civilisational Realpolitik as the New World Order?’, Survival , vol. 39, no. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 180-183. Other versions of the ‘cultural approach’ are Eckhardt, William: ‘Civilizations, Empires, and Wars’, Journal of Peace Research , vol. 27, no. 1 (1990), pp. 9-24; Elmandjra, Mahdi: Premiere guerre civilisationelle. Le Passé du Futur et le Futur du Passé (Casablanca: Editions 'Ouyoun, 1991); Wallerstein, Immanuel: Geopolitics and Geoculture. Essays on the Changing World-System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 139-237; Senghaas, Dieter: Zivilisierung wider Willen. Der Konflikt der Kulturen mit sich selbst (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998); Galtung, Johan: ‘Peace and the World as Inter-Civilizational Interaction’, in Raimo Väyrynen, Dieter Senghaas & Christian Schmidt (ed.): The Quest for Peace. Transcending Collective Violence and War Among Societies, Cultures and States (London: Sage, 1987), pp. 330-347; Brill, Heinz: ‘Geokultur—ein neuer Faktor der Weltpolitik? Samuel P. Huntington und seine Kritiker’, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift , vol. 35, no. 5 (Sept-Oct. 1997), pp. 499-506.  Back.

Note 69: Buzan, Barry, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Elzbieta Tromer & Ole Wæver: The European Security Order Recast. Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era (London: Pinter, 1990)idem & al. 1990, pp. 15-16, 36-41.  Back.

Note 70: Midlarsky, Manus I. (ed.): The Internationalization of Communal Strife (London: Routledge, 1992); Lake, David A. & Donald Rothchild (eds.): The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict. Fear, Diffusion and Escalation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Brown, Michael E. (ed.): The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Brown, Michael E. & Sumit Ganguly (eds.): Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Carment, David & Patrick James (eds.): Wars in the Midst of Peace. The International Politics of Ethnic Conflict (Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburg Press, 1997).  Back.

Note 71: Boulding, Kenneth: Conflict and Defense. A General Theory (Lanham: University Press of America, 1988), p. 266.  Back.

Note 72: Boulding: op. cit. (note 71), pp. 79 (where he calls it the ‘loss-of- power gradient’), pp. 228-247 (where he develops the mathematical formulae for the LSG) and pp. 259-264 (where he relates this to the predominance of offensive or defensive weapons).  Back.

Note 73: Luttwak, Edward N.: ‘A Post-Heroic Military Policy’, Foreign Affairs , vol. 75, no. 4 (July-August 1996), pp. 33-44; Gentry, John A.: ‘Military Force in an Age of National Cowardice’, The Washington Quarterly , vol. 21, no. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 179-191; Walt, Stephen M.: ‘Musclebound: The Limits of U.S. Power’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , vol. 55, no. 2 (March-April 1999), pp. 44-48.  Back.

Note 74: See, for instance, Mann, Michael: The Sources of Social Power. Volume I. A history of power from the beginning to A.D. 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); idem: The Sources of Social Power. Volume II. The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993); idem: States, War and Capitalism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1988); Giddens, Anthony: The Nation-State and Violence (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995); Tilly, Charles: Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Krippendorff, Ekkehardt: Staat und Krieg. Die historische Logik politischer Unvernunft (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1984); Porter, Bruce: War and the Rise of the State (New York: The Free Press, 1994); Spruyt, Hendrik: The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Holsti: Kalevi J.: The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  Back.

Note 75: Boulding: op. cit. (note 71), pp. 264-265.  Back.

Note 76: ibid. , pp. 267-268. On mutual defensive superiority see Boserup, Anders: ‘Non-offensive Defence in Europe’, in Derek Paul (ed.): Defending Europe. Options for Security (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985), pp. 194-209; Møller, Bjørn: Common Security and Nonoffensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 84-89.  Back.

Note 77: Kaspersen, Lars Bo: War, State, Sovereignty and Citizenship (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, 1997). On the inside vs. outside dichotomy see Walker, R.B.J.: Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).  Back.

Note 78: See, for instance, Holsti, Kalevi J.: Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International order 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). In the period 1648-1713, he thus finds territory to be decisive in 55 percent of all wars (p. 50), while the figure for the period 1714-1815 was 67 percent (p. 89), that for 1815-1914 was 42 percent (p. 145) and that for 1914-1941 was 47 percent (p. 219). On the world beyond Europe, see idem: op. cit. 1996 (note 74), passim .  Back.

Note 79: Siverson, Randolph & Harvey Starr: The Diffusion of War. A Study of Opportunity and Willingness (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991); Most, Benjamin A., Harvey Starr & Randolph M. Siverson: ‘The Logic and Study of the Diffusion of International Conflict’, in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.): Handbook of War Studies (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1993), pp. 111-139; Marshall, Monty G.: Third World War. System, Process and Conflict Dynamics (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), pp. 131-144; Geller, Daniel S. & J. David Singer: Nations at War. A Scientific Study of International Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 76-78, 131-133; Vasquez, John A.: The War Puzzle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 123-152; idem: ‘Why Do Neighbours Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality’, Journal of Peace Research , vol. 32, no. 3 (August 1995), pp. 277-293; Starr, Harvey & Randolph M. Siverson: ‘Cumulation, Evaluation and the Research Process: Investigating the Diffusion of Conflict’, ibid. , vol. 35, no. 2 (March 1998), pp. 231-237; Simowitz, Roslyn: ‘Evaluating Conflict Research on the Diffusion of War’, ibid. , pp. 211-230; . For a critical view see Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin: ‘Beyond Territorial Contiguity: Issues at Stake in Democratic Militarized Interstate Disputes’, International Studies Quarterly , vol. 43, no. 1 (March 1999), pp. 169-183. See also Henderson, Errol A.: ‘Culture or Contiguity: Ethnic Conflict, the Similarity of States, and the Onset of War, 1820-1989’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution , vol. 41, no. 5 (October 1997), pp. 649-668; Kadera, Kelly M.: ‘Transmission, Barriers, and Constraints. A Dynamic Model of the Spread of War’, ibid. , vol. 42, no. 3 (June 1998), pp. 367-387.  Back.

Note 80: Møller, Bjørn: Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1991); idem: op. cit. 1992 (note 76); idem: Dictionary of Alternative Defence (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995). See also Evera, Stephen Van: Causes of War. Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 117-192 & passim .  Back.

Note 81: On the security dilemma see Collins, Alan: The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War (Edinburg: Keele University Press, 1997).  Back.

Note 82: Borer, Douglas A.: Superpowers Defeated. A Comparison of Vietnam and Afghanistan (London: Frank Cass, 1999); Arquilla, John: Dubious Battles. Aggression, Defeat, and the International System (Washington, D.C.: Crane Russak, 1992). On Vietnam see, for instance, Gibson, James William: The Perfect War. The War We Couldn't Lose and How We Did (New York: Vintage Books, 1988); Clodfelter, Mark: The Limits of Air Power. The American Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1989); Pape: op. cit. (note 33); Record, Jeffrey: The Wrong War. Why We Lost in Vietnam (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998); Logevall, Fredrik: Choosing War. The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). On the Soviet war in Afghanistan see Urban, Mark: War in Afghanistan. (New York 1988: St. Martin's Press); Halliday, Fred: ‘Soviet Foreign Policymaking and the Afghanistan War: From ‘‘Second Mongolia’’ to ‘‘Bleeding Wound’’’, Review of International Studies , vol. 25, no. 4 (October 1999), pp. 675-691; Reuveny, Rafael & Aseem Prakash: ‘The Afghanistan War and the Breakdown of the Soviet Union’, ibid. , pp. 693-708. On Chechnya see Dunlop: op. cit. (note 24); Lieven: op. cit. (note 24); Baev, Pavel K.: ‘Russia's Airpower in the Chechen War: Denial, Punishment and Defeat’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies , vol. 10, no. 2 (June 1997), pp. 1-18.  Back.

Note 83: The terminology is that of Wendt, Alexander: ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization , vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.  Back.

Note 84: See Grove: op. cit. (note 32), pp. 21-27.  Back.

Note 85: I have elaborated on this in Møller, Bjørn: ‘The United States and the ‘‘New World Order’’: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?’, Working Papers , no. 12 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1997); shortened version published in Indian Journal of Asian Affairs , vol. 11, no. 1-2 (June & December 1998), pp. 77-118.  Back.

Note 86: The main work pleading for a global approach was, of course, Gorshkov, S.G.: The Sea Power of the State (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979). In reality, Soviet naval strategy rather resembled those of previous continental powers. See Ropp Theodore: ‘Continental Doctrines of Sea Power’, in Earle (ed.). op. cit. (note 4), pp. 446-456. On the actual Soviet naval activities and strategy see Skogan, Johan K. & Arne Brundtland (eds.): Soviet Sea Power in Northern Waters Facts, Motivation, Impact and Responses (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990); Gillette, Philip S. & William C. Frank, Jr. (eds.): The Sources of Soviet Naval Conduct (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1990); Langdon, Frank C. & Douglas A. Ross (eds.): Superpower Maritime Strategy in the Pacific , (London: Routledge, 1990); Pay, John & Geoffrey Till 1990: East-West Relations in the 1990s. The Naval Dimension (London: Pinter, 1990). See also MccGwire, Michael & James McConnel (eds.): Soviet Naval Influence. Domestic and Foreign Dimensions (New York: Praeger, 1977); MccGwire, Michael: ‘Soviet Naval Doctrine and Strategy’, in Derek Leebaert (ed.): Soviet Military Thinking (London: George Allan & Unwin, 1981), pp. 125-184; idem: ‘Naval Power and Soviet Global Strategy’, in Miller, Steven E. & Stephen van Evera (eds.): op. cit. 1988 (note 32), pp. 115-170; idem: Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987).  Back.

Note 87: Cramer, Benedict: ‘Dissuassion infra-nucleaire. L'armée de milice suisse: mythes et réalités stratégiques’, Cahiers d'études stratégiques , no. 4 (Paris: CIRPES, 1984); Däniker, Gustav: Dissuasion. Schweizerische Abhaltestrategie Heute und Morgen (Frauenfeld: Huber, 1987); Milivojevic, Marko & Pierre Maurer: Swiss Neutrality and Security (Munich: Berg, 1992).  Back.

Note 88: Gibson, Irving M.: ‘Maginot and Liddell Hart: The Doctrine of Defense’, in Earle (ed.): op. cit. (note 4), pp. 365-387.  Back.

Note 89: Levite, Ariel: Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine (Boulder: Westview, 1990); Beres, Louis René: ‘Striking Preemptively: Israel's Post-Gulf War Options Under International Law’, in Avi Beker (ed.): Arms Control Without Glasnost: Building Confidence in the Middle East (Jerusalem: Israeli Council of Foreign Relations, 1993), pp. 129-160; Naveh, Simon: ‘The Cult of Offensive Preemption and Future Challenges for Israeli Operational Thought’, in Efraim Karsh (ed.): Peace in the Middle East. The Challenge for Israel (London: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 168-187; Levran, Aharon: Israeli Strategy After Desert Storm. Lessons of the Second Gulf War (London: Frank Cass, 1997); Marcus, Jonathan: ‘Israel's Defense Policy at a Strategic Crossroads’, The Washington Quarterly , vol. 22, no. 1 (Winter 1999), pp. 33-48.  Back.

Note 90: During a 1994 conference in Buenos Aires, however, the author witnessed a debate between Argentinian and Chilean participants, both of whom claimed that their only reliable defence was retaliatory border-crossing offensive capabilities (which is probably plain wrong). A reductio ad absurdum of these military doctrines would be a war between the two countries, where Argentina conquers a piece of Chilean territory in retaliation of a Chilean attack (or vice versa), whereupon Chile retaliates by snatching a piece of Argentinean territory, etc.—until the Chilean army has conquered all of Argentina, and the Argentinean army all of Chile!  Back.

Note 91: Examples of such disengagement models are Afheldt, Eckhardt: ‘Verteidigung ohne Selbstmord. Vorschlag für den Einsatz einer leichten Infanterie’, in Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (ed.): Die Praxis der defensiven Verteidigung (Hameln: Sponholz, 1984), pp. 41-88; Bülow, Andreas: ‘Defensive Entanglement: An Alternative Strategy for NATO’, in Andrew J. Pierre (ed.): The Conventional Defense of Europe: New Technologies and New Strategies (New York: Council on Foreign Relations), pp. 112-151; idem: ‘Vorschlag für eine Bundeswehrstruktur der 90er Jahre. Auf dem Weg zur konventionellen Stabilität’, in idem, Helmut Funk & Albrecht A.C. von Müller: Sicherheit für Europa (Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1988), pp. 95-110; Müller, Albrecht A.C. von: ‘Integrated Forward Defence. Outline of a Modified Conventional Defence for Central Europe’, in Hylke W. Tromp (ed.): Non-Nuclear War in Europe. Alternatives for Nuclear Defence (Groningen: Polemological Institute, 1986), pp. 201-224; Lodgaard, Sverre & Per Berg: ‘Disengagement in Central Europe’, in Joseph Rotblat & Sven Hellman (eds.): Nuclear Strategy and World Security. The Annals of Pugwash 1984 (London: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 242-259.  Back.

Note 92: Otis, Pauletta & Joseph C. Bebel: ‘Borders and Boundaries: Drawing Lines Which Keep the Peace’, International Peacekeeping , vol. 6, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 31-53. Good comparative analyses of such traditional peacekeeping deployments are Durch, William J. (ed.): The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); Diehl, Paul F.: International Peacekeeping (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press, 1993).  Back.