The United States and the 'New World Order': Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution *
COPRI Working Paper
2. America and the World
2.1. Isolationism and Internationalism
2.2. Exceptionalism and the 'Goodness Theme'
6. Reality Check 3: Disarmament?
6.1. The Bottom Up Review
6.2. The Two Faces of Counter-proliferation
6.3. Constraints on Arms Sales?
The 1991 Gulf War was accompanied by talk of a 'New World Order', not least in the USA. The implied promise was one of a greater respect for international law, a strengthening of the United Nations and a determined effort for arms control and disarmament, both globally and regionally. The paper evaluates developments since then, with a special focus on the accomplishments in the military sphere. In particular, it assesses the contribution of the United States to the creation of this new world (military) order. In conclusion, the US is found to be both part of the problem, because of its excessive military spending and penchant for unilateralism, and an indispensable part of the solution.
In his message to a joint session of the US Congress, 11 September 1990 (i.e. during the 'Desert Shield' phase of the Gulf conflict), President George Bush described the 'new world order' in the following words:
Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective-a new world order-can emerge: a new era, free from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. 1
This vision was further elaborated in a similar presidential statement to Congress after the victorious operation Desert Storm, 6 March 1991:
Now we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is a very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a 'world order', in which 'the new principles of justice and fair play .. protect the weak against the strong...' A World where the United Nations, freed from the Cold War stalemate, is poised to fulfil the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations 2
Few would disagree with these lofty goals: freedom, justice, peace, human rights, rule of law, etc. In fact the vision is couched in terms that command consent. Even though one may disagree on what the terms imply, one cannot be against 'justice' or 'freedom'.
The questions to which the present paper will venture a tentative answer are more down-to-earth, namely:
In order to answer the first question, I shall take a brief, and inevitably superficial, glance at US history.
According to most accounts, US history has been characterized by a greater-than-average impact of moral values on foreign policy as well as by a vacillation between isolationism and internationalism, unilateralism and multilateralism. 4
2.1. Isolationism and Internationalism
The most fundamental reason for this vacillation is, of course, that the United States, contrary to most of the world's nations, has a choice: It is secure enough geopolitically to stand aloof of wars and conflicts in the rest of the world, with only two exceptions: the very hypothetical case of another state establishing complete domination over the Eurasian landmass and developing naval capacities allowing it to reach the shores of the United States; and that of a hostile state in possession of nuclear weapons and suitable means of delivery with a 'strategic range' that allow it to strike at CONUS (Continental United States).
The US is also strong enough for unilateralism to be a feasible option, at least for the attainment of limited goals such as the defence of its sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as a wide range of 'interests' elsewhere. It is only when these 'interests' become global that a real need for multilateralism emerges, such as was the case with 'containment' during the coldest period of the Cold War (vide infra).
One of the first manifestations of the isolationist impulse was the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, according to which the United States would, on the one hand, tolerate no European interference in matters in the Americas--especially no resurgent European colonialism. On the other hand, the US would refrain from mingling in European affairs, i.e. remain neutral. 5 In perfect conformity with this doctrine, the United States stood largely aloof of the European race for colonies and spheres of influence in the latter part of the 19th century, but established its domination over the Americas through a war with Spain and various instances of 'gunboat diplomacy' in its 'near abroad' under the Theodore Roosewelt administration. 6
The 'Wilsonian liberalism' that flourished immediately after the turn of the century first entangled the USA in the First World War, albeit only in its final stages. Secondly, it manifested itself in a quest for a 'new world order', featuring national self-determination, free trade and collective security. 7 However, as a reminder of the continuing strength of isolationist sentiments, the so-called 'peace progressives' and others stubbornly opposed Wilson's plans with the result that the US Congress failed to give its consent to membership of the League of Nations. 8 This was a major setback for both internationalism and multilateralism as well as for the very idea of collective security. Whether this system would have worked, had the US lent the League its support, we shall never know. 9
Against this background, it required a determined effort by Franklin D. Roosewelt and others to persuade the United States to join the allies in the war against Nazi Germany and Japan. That FDR succeeded may, in fact, have been a stroke of 'luck': Had Japan not attacked Pearl Harbor, and had Hitler not declared war on America, the US might not have gone to war at all, or have done so much later, with possibly disastrous results. 10 It might also not have supported the plans for creating the United Nations-or have chosen to remain outside this organization.
It took a foe the size and strength of the Soviet Union, cast against the background of still vivid memories of a world war, to affect an abandonment of isolationism, as was manifested in the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, the Vandenberg resolution and the subsequent creation of NATO. 11 Spurred by (a misreading of) George Kennan's 'Long Telegram', 12 'containment' henceforth became the slogan for an almost boundless expansion of the notion of 'vital interests' that had to be defended at all costs. 13 'Deterrence' came to be seen as the most cost-effective means of defending these global interests. 14 However, as it was (probably erroneously) assumed that 'deterrence is difficult', whatever savings might have been achievable were squandered by the quest for a reputation of 'firmness'. 15
This enforced but boundless 'internationalism' necessitated an embrace of multilateralism, as not even the US military power sufficed for defending anything and anybody anywhere. Moreover, the stalemating of the United Nations by Soviet vetoes made it necessary to opt for the second best form of multilateralism, namely alliances, several of which were founded during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations: NATO, SEATO, CENTO, etc. 16
While this was an expression of an unprecedented internationalism, it was viewed (especially by critics) as one that was enforced upon the United States rather than a matter of free political choice. Moreover, the isolationist mood never vanished completely, and it was reinforced by the American debacle and eventual defeat in Vietnam that produced a 'Vietnam syndrome'. In a semi-isolationist vein the Nixon administration launched the 'Nixon doctrine', entailing a quest for disengagement via a strengthening (by means of arms sales and other military support) of regional 'hegemons' such as South Vietnam, Nicaragua, Iran, Zaire and (more sotto voce) South Africa. 17 Another expression of semi-isolationism was the attempt by Congress to 'tie the President's hand' by means of the War Powers Act that should prevent the Executive from plunging the nation into overseas engagements without the consent of the legislature. 18
Not only did 'traditional isolationists' continue to play a certain role, 19 but more 'mainstream' critics of the United Nations, NATO and other multilateral fora also exhibited neo-isolationist traits: by calling for disengagement, for US withdrawal from Europe or other regions, or merely for a more equitable 'burden-sharing'. 20 One might even count the recent 'imperial overstretch' debate as a manifestation of neo-isolationism as it depicts internationalism as a recipe for imperial overstretch that will precipitate imperial decline. 21
Traditionally, it has been the Democrats who have waved the internationalist banner, while the Republicans have tended more towards isolationism, if only because of their penchant for 'balanced budgets' and low taxes which militates against costly overseas commitments and excessive military expenditures. However, an equation of Republicans with isolationists and Democrats with internationalists is much too simplistic. For instance, several 'containment alliances' were forged by Eisenhower; the 'Reagan Doctrine' envisioned the promotion of democracy abroad; 22 and the 'new world order' was proclaimed by George Bush--all of them Republicans pursuing an internationalist agenda. Also military expenditures sky-rocketed not only during the (Democratic) Kennedy but also during the (Republican) Nixon and, even more so, Reagan administrations. 23 A more accurate description may thus be that both parties contain internationalists and isolationists, even though there are more of the former among the Democrats and more of the latter among the Republicans--the difference remains small enough for external impulses to be able to tip the balance. 24
It may also be the case that the real divide is not so much between isolationists and internationalist as between unilateralists and multilateralists-the former abhorring the 'tying of America's hands' that commitments to international organizations imply, the latter being more comfortable with such constraints if only they also provide benefits. 25 Here we find the same difference between Democrats and Republicans as above, the latter tending more towards unilateralism than the former. For instance, even though both Democrats and Republicans have engaged in 'UN bashing', the latter have excelled considerably more in this than the latter.
2.2. Exceptionalism and the 'Goodness Theme'
An even more consistent trait of American foreign policy opinion than isolationism and/or unilateralism may be what has aptly been called 'exceptionalism', 26 i.e. the belief that America is special, hence that special rules apply to the United States. Such a view may not only point directly towards isolationism and unilateralism; it is also a blatant contradiction of the aforementioned 'golden rule', the main tenet of which is precisely that there should be no exceptions and that all states are bound by the same set of rules.
The exceptionalist mood partly reflects exceptional circumstances. What is exceptional about the United States is, among other things, the fact that it is so secure: No enemies on either side, hence no danger of having a war enforced upon it. Of course, the Japanese did attack Pearl Harbor, but among national disasters this surely scores rather low. 27 Should the US thus become embroiled in war is will be in one of its own choosing, a privileged position that few states enjoy.
Democracies tend to be more pacific than non-democracies, at least in the sense that they rarely, if ever, attack or are attacked by other non-democracies. 28 Hence, if a democratic state is so fortunate as to have a choice between going to war or not, it had better be worth it: Either the war must serve the national interest, or it must be a moral imperative. However, few wars promise net benefits for 'trading states' such as the USA, with a plentiful supply of land and natural resources. Hence the need for a moral justification of war, which must be fought for (what is held to be) the good of mankind. This was, for instance, the case of the war against Nazi Germany and of the (Cold) war against the Soviet 'evil Empire'--just as of the war (fought on behalf of the UN) against Adolf Hitler's alleged modern counterpart, Saddan Hussein. 29 Indeed, according to President Bush (in the above mentioned speech to Congress, 6 March 1991), Operation Desert Storm was a reflection of goodness and kindness of heart:
Americans are a caring people. We are a good people, a generous people. Let us always be caring and good and generous in all we do. ... We went halfway around the world to do what is moral and just and right. We fought hard and -with others-we won the war. We lifted the yoke of aggression and tyranny from a small country that many Americans had never even heard of, and we ask nothing in return. 30
It would be obviously wrong to let anything stand in the way of such untarnished goodness, be it the constraints of a bureaucratic and inefficient United Nations, or the limitations of international law. Good people do good deeds, and whoever doubts this must be wrong, not only logically and factually, but also morally.
Lest there be any misunderstanding, the present author also holds the Gulf War to have been a 'good deed' or even 'a blessed war', as a Danish newspaper editor put it. By and large, it was fought for a good cause ('to right a wrong') and in conformity with international law, the laws of war or the tenets of 'just war' theory, both as far as jus ad bellum and jus in bello provisions were concerned. 31 However, self-congratulatory expressions such as found in the above quote smack of 'exceptionalism' in the sense of describing a country to which the usual rules do not apply. If good people do (only) good deeds; and if the American people are good; then whatever the USA does, and the American people condones, must be good (quod erat demonstrandum). However, not only is this a classical logical fallacy, it also bodes rather ill for international stability. A country that does not regard itself as bound by the rules applying to the rest of international society is, in a certain (in this case benign) sense, a 'rogue state'. 32
On the other hand, this 'goodness theme' may well be an authentic expression of deep-rooted American sentiments. The new world order, with its many 'good' qualities is probably seen as merely a manifestation of the inherent American goodness, i.e. an America projected onto the world as a whole. This lends some prima facie plausibility to the 'new world order' discourse as sincere. Not in the sense that whoever talks about the new/good world order may not have a hidden agenda (e.g. by trying to justify a selfish endeavour with reference to unselfish objectives) but in the sense that the reason s/he succeeds is that the theme resonates well in the American public. 33
Having thus established that the 'new (or good) world order' may well be a genuine expression of American ideology, rather than empty rhetoric, we are left with the question whether the United States has actually promoted such a new and better world order by its deeds.
For all their beauty, the descriptions of the new world order contained in the above quotations from President Bush are not sufficiently precise to allow for a closer analysis. Subsequent speeches along with scholarly analyses, however, seem to allow for an interpretation according to which the envisioned new world order would exhibit the following characteristics 34 :
These goals are believed by their (neo-liberalist and/or neo-institutionalist) advocates to be mutually reinforcing and to promote world peace. It remains disputed whether democracy begets peace or vice versa; or whether a market economy promotes democracy, thereby strengthening peace, or whether it furthers peaceful international relations in and of itself. 38 However, with the exception of die-hard neo- and structural realists, 39 there is little dispute about the general positive correlation between all these factors. If all states, as well as the international system as a whole, were lawful, democratic, market-oriented and respectful of human rights, the world would not 'only' be a better, but also a more peaceful place.
The new world order would also entail an enhanced role for the multilateralism, personified in the United Nations as well as in regional organizations--even though it is disputed whether to give priority to one or the other. Regardless of their scope, however, multilateral solutions should be given priority over unilateralist ones, both with regard to peacekeeping and enforcement, conflict prevention and resolution.
Finally, and in recognition of the prospects of a more peaceful world, the new world order should be less heavily armed that the old one. Hence the implicit goal of preventing arms races by moving beyond mere arms control to actual disarmament. As a guideline for how low to go the criterion has sometimes been mentioned that states should have the ability to defend themselves but not to attack others. 40 More particularly, the talk of the new world order has included suggestions to regulate the international arms trade--according to the same 'defence only' criterion (vide infra).
This description appears to capture most of the distinguishing features of the new world order. If it does not, the author apologizes to George Bush, Bill Clinton and others, as a loyal representation of whose views the above is intended. It is certainly not a caricature but the description of a world order that would not only be different from, but also far preferable to, the one in which we presently live. This leaves us with the question what the United States has done to make it a reality, i.e. with the need to perform a number of 'reality checks'.
The legality theme is central to the 'new world order discourse'. But has the US actions really promoted respect for international law? The past US record of compliance with international law is not impressive.
First of all, the United States has a long history of interventions, dating back to Theodore Roosewelt. Since the unambiguous proscription of aggressive war with the 1928 Briand-Kellogg pact and the 1945 UN Charter, 41 there have also been several instances of, now clearly unlawful, armed interventions. Recent instances have included those in the Dominican Republic 1965, Lebanon 1982, Grenada 1983, Libya 1986, and Panama 1989, to which should be added the 1984 mining of the harbour of Managua, and the repeated bombardments of Iraq since the 1991 ceasefire. 42 In some cases the United States has sought and received United Nations endorsement ex post facto, but there is little to indicate that this has always been a conditio sine qua non of intervention. As a last resort option, the US would have been protected by its veto in the Security Council against any reprisals.
Secondly, the US also has a long history of 'covert interventions', falling into two main categories: Instigation of coups (by means of the CIA and other agencies, as in Iran 1953, Guatemala 1954, Cuba 1961 or Chile 1973); and military and other support for subversive guerilla movements such as the Nicaraguan Contras--i.e. what has aptly been called 'paramilitary intervention'. 43 Both interventions and subversive activities are in clear violation of the UN Charter and other tenets of international law, according to which states have no right to interfere in each other's internal affairs. However, such interference may occasionally appear justified according to other standards, e.g. in cases of 'brutal wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilizing society', as formulated in the 'Roosewelt corollary' to the Monroe Doctrine. 44 These criteria would, for instance, seem entirely applicable to Haiti, as well as perhaps to Panama under the rule of Noriega. However, they would have been equally applicable to Nicaragua under the Somoza regime (which enjoyed US support)--and certainly much more so than to the same country under the rule of the Sandinastas whom the US sought to depose. 45
The problem is not so much the selectivity with regard to interventions (which is probably inevitable), nor is it the fact that some interventions have taken place that were not only unlawful but also wrong according to ethical criteria. Rather, the main problem is that the United States does not seem to regard itself as bound by the same rules as the rest of the world's states: Another instance of the exceptionalism flowing from the above--mentioned 'goodness syndrome'. A recent, and otherwise excellent, study of interventions (by Richard Haas) seems representative of this view: Rather than analysing how the United States might contribute to a strengthening of the United Nations, e.g. by empowering it to undertake whatever interventions the author deems required, he compares the United Nations as an instrument of US foreign policy with the unilateral US use of force. 46 To paraphrase JFK, the question thus posed is 'what the UN can do for your country', rather than 'what your country can do for the UN', as it rightly should be, and as most other nations see it.
Another example of the same exceptionalism is the view of the former president of the American Society of International Law, professor emeritus Myres McDougal, of the ruling by the International Court of Justice in the 'Nicaragua case'. The ruling in favour of Nicaragua led him to conclude that it 'most unhappily, raises grave questions about the capabilities of a judicial body, under the contemporary circumstances of contending world public orders, to make rational decisions in the common interest about the regulation of major coercion and violence', an assessment that the distinguished author supported with a number of classical tu quoque arguments: that the USSR had also violated international law, etc. 47 However, international law is all about respect for the decisions of legitimate legal institutions, even when they hold views different from one's own--and it is surely incompatible with the popular view that 'two wrongs make a right'.
Despite the expressed hope and implied promise to finally make the United Nations function as it was envisioned by its founders (including the USA), the United States has been less than helpful in this respect.
First of all, successive administrations have accumulated a huge dept to the world organization that has been a major contributory cause of the financial crisis of the UN. 48 Another cause has, of course, been the expansion of UN activities, not least in the realm of peacekeeping and the even more demanding new types of military operations described in the 1992 Agenda for Peace. 49 As a result, the UN came close to bankruptcy, a plight that also made the organization vulnerable, hence susceptible to the blackmail-like bargaining of the United States with regard to the choice of secretary General. Upon having defeated the detested Boutros-Ghali, however, the Clinton administration has pledged to gradually pay its arrears to the UN 50 -which may point in the direction of a more UN-friendly policy.
Secondly, contrary to several smaller nations (including the present author's), the United States has been less than helpful in providing the required military forces for UN operations. While everybody else agreed that what mattered in Croatia and subsequently in Bosnia was the provision of ground forces, the US initially limited its contribution to air forces--and even threatened to 'go it alone' with air strikes against Serbian targets and a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo on all parties to the conflict in order to provide the Bosnian muslims with weapons. 51 While the arming of one side may occasionally help bring about peace, in other cases it may have the opposite effect of prolonging war. 52 However, it invariably compromises impartiality, thereby hampering peace-keeping missions--and for a great power to (threaten to) go it alone does little to enhance the UN's or the OSCE's authority.
The US participation in IFOR (Implementation Force) and subsequently in SFOR was a welcome innovation, also because the US was now willing to place its troops under multinational command (something most other nations do on a routine basis, to be sure). 53 In the words of US ambassador (ret.) James F. Leonard:
...The United States must not arrogate to itself an exceptional status. We should be as willing as others to see our forces under a commander of another nationality, insisting of course that the commander be competent. And we should not adopt the offensive notion that our forces should not get mud on their boots, confining our contribution to naval, air, or logistic units. It is repugnant and even racist to argue that UN forces should come from countries where wages are low and 'life is cheap' 54
On the other hand, because of their almost complete lack of experience with such 'peace support' missions, the performance of US forces has left a lot to be desired, according to many observers: They have generally shown insufficient comprehension of the political complexities of the peace-keeping task and an unfortunate propensity to look for 'quick fixes'. Only belatedly did the US planning staffs provide manuals of peacekeeping (and other peace support operations) which were, not entirely fortunately, lumped together with other 'operations other than war' such as unilateral anti-terrorist or anti-narcotics operations. 55 The propensity for quick fixes was underpinned by the Clinton administration's ludicrously short envisaged time span for IFOR that mirrored the--likewise less than realistic and certainly not at all helpful--time perspective for the Somali operation. 56 Eventually, however, the Clinton administration came around to pledge support for SFOR, something which was also a most welcome step in the right direction.
Finally, the US use of its veto powers--especially to shield Israel against condemnation of, and reprisals for, actions in unequivocal violation of international law 57 -does little to facilitate a much needed legitimacy--enhancing UN reform: Among several proposals for a reformed UN Security Council, the most realistic one seems to be the cooptation of new permanent members (Germany, Japan, India, Brazil and a major African state), yet without veto powers--as a corollary of which the present permanent members should pledge to only use their veto in rare cases of extreme national emergencies. 58 This has hardly been the case of the recent US vetoes.
All considered, US actions have thus done little to enhance the UN's authority, which it has even tried to undermine by means of a vociferous criticism (on the part of the administration, Congress and the media) of the UN for inefficiency. It is not, of course, that there is no truth in such allegations, 59 but to a significant extent the deficiencies are caused by the behaviour and attitude of the great powers within the organization, including the United States itself.
Generally, the United States has had a more favourable attitude to regional organizations--albeit with a distinct preference for those in which it enjoys a satisfactory degree of influence. The US was thus very supportive of the very founding of (what we today know as) the European Communities as well as of the OAS, OAU, ASEAN, GCC and other regional organizations around the world. It was, understandably, less favourably inclined towards such organizations as Comecon, the Warsaw Pact, OPEC or the Non-Aligned Movement. Also, to the extent that the US has seen some, otherwise entirely respectable, organizations as possible rivals to preferred ones, its support has been rather lukewarm-as has, for instance been the case of the OSCE and its predecessor, the CSCE (which was, of course, a process and an institution rather than an organization). 60 Finally, one might surmise that the US support has presupposed a leading position, even in the favourite organizations. For instance, the US would probably not have lent its support to a non-American supreme allied commander in NATO (SACEUR)--perhaps not even in exchange for the position as Secretary General of the alliance, as has been suggested. 61
Declaratorily at least, the Clinton administration seems to have a firmer commitment multilateralism, albeit not so much in the sense of support for the UN as of alliances--and without relinquishing the unilateralist option, as illustrated by the following formulations from the 1996 report:
[T]he only responsible strategy for the United States is one of international engagement. Isolationism in any form would reduce U.S. security by undercutting the United States' ability to influence events abroad that can affect the well-being of Americans.... The United States will always retain the capability to intervene unilaterally when its interests are threatened
The United States seems to have disregarded the Hamiltonian admonition that 'Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security'. 62 The implied over-armament is, however, a fairly recent phenomenon.
Before the First World War, for instance, the United States had only very most armed forces. As a result, the entry into the war necessitated a mobilization that was accomplished with impressive speed. Following the termination of hostilities, moreover, the US underwent a far-reaching demobilization that was only reversed after the start of the Second World War--once again with impressive results. In continuity with this 'strategy of unreadiness', the defeat of first Germany and subsequently Japan was soon followed by yet another demobilization. 63
Preparedness is thus a distinctly Cold War phenomenon. It appeared justified by several new factors, including the magnitude of the threat, personified by the Soviet Union, and the anticipated lead times for major weapons, determined by developments in military technology. As a consequence, the Cold War was accompanied by an unprecedented degree of US military preparedness, visible also in the high peacetime military expenditures and an arms industry that remained on a virtual 'war footing'. 64
6.1. The Bottom Up Review
The end of the Cold War obviously removed the rationale for this arrangement and thus necessitated a review of US defence planning. Realizing that in this endeavour the Administration was up against the powerful factor of bureaucratic inertia, a so-called 'Bottom Up Review' was undertaken. The proclaimed intention was, as had previously been suggested by independent analysts, 65 to undertake an unbiased assessment of military needs: What threats might the US be up against, which military requirements did this entail; and what type of forces, in what numbers, would be needed to meet these requirements. The findings of the BUR, how ever, were rather disappointing, as it came up with recommendations for slightly less of the same kind of military power as had previously been fielded against the USSR. 66
What did the 'trick' was the expansion of the very notion of security-once again something that had been proposed by peace researchers and others. 67 According to the Department of Defence's 1996 Annual Defence Report, the following constitute 'threats to the interests of the United States, its allies, and its friends':
Attempts by regional powers hostile to U.S. interests to gain hegemony in their regions through aggression or intimidation; Internal conflicts among ethnic, national, religious, or tribal groups that threaten innocent lives, force mass migration, and undermine stability and international order; Threats by potential adversaries to acquire or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery; Threats to democracy and reform in the former Soviet Union, Central and Eastern Europe, and elsewhere; Subversion and lawlessness that undermine friendly governments; Terrorism; Threats to U.S. prosperity and economic growth; Global environmental degradation; The illegal drug trade; International crime.
As far as threat analysis was concerned, a new term was coined, namely that of 'rogue states' that were unruly and unpredictable--with Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea as the most obvious candidates. 68 Hence the need to be able to defend the United States' 'interests' against such states, or rather (because of their smallness, compared with the USSR) against a couple of such states simultaneously. The ambition was thus to be able to fight and win two 'nearly simultaneous' MRCs (major regional conflicts), the rationale being that one rogue might otherwise take advantage of the US being engaged in a war with another. In the 1996 Defence Report this was formulated thusly:
U.S. forces must be able to offset the military power of regional states with interests opposed to those of the United States and its allies. To do this, the United States must be able to credibly deter and, if required, decisively defeat aggression, in concert with regional allies, by projecting and sustaining U.S. power in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs).
The superficial similarity notwithstanding, this is actually quite different from the requirement to fight a two-front war that many other nations have accepted. While Germany had to reckon with the worst case of a simultaneous Russian and French attack, and the USSR had to plan for a war against China as well as NATO, 69 the two wars the United States has in mind are, in the final analysis, of its own choosing; none of them features any attack against CONUS; and both are to be waged offensively with a view to achieving a swift and decisive victory.
This 'two war doctrine' is in obvious breach of the golden rule, as the world would be an extremely unstable place if more than one power had such a level of ambition-to say nothing of the hypothetical case where all states did. Fortunately, however, no other nation has a level of ambition even remotely comparable to this. Considering that it does not even mention to strategic objective of defence of the national territory, but only defence of 'interests', the two-MRC doctrine may well be the most offensive military doctrine ever devised by any nation--at least comparable to that of the Mongols under Genghis Khan! 70
This may be a rather surprising assessment, and it should be emphasized that 'offensive' is not the same as 'aggressive'. It implies no desire for war, but only the intention to wage a war offensively. It is probably self-evident to most Americans, plausible to the present author, and certainly entirely possible that this formidable military power would never be used for aggressive purposes. However, the United States might be well-advised not to take for granted that its defensive intentions are equally self-evident to others as they are to itself, particularly not to states that are ostracized as 'rogues'.
In all fairness, it must be said that US military expenditures have declined since the end of the Cold War-by 40 percent compared with the 1985 level. However, they did so from a very high level and have yet to come down to anywhere near the traditional peacetime level. Yet the United States is officially very concerned about the 'excessive' armament of other countries, including China, India or Iran. However, the comparisons in the table above clearly reveal allegations as reflecting double standards, as none of these countries are anywhere near the level of US military expenditures in absolute or per capita terms, nor comparable with regard to the degree of 'relative militarization'--measured in the percentage of the population under arms or the share of GDP used for military purposes. 71
US military expenditures appear even more excessive when viewed as a percentage of global military spending (34 percent), and further considering that Americans represent a mere five percent of the world's population. Also, the fact should be taken into account that most of the other 'big spenders' are US allies or friends against whom there is surely no need for a defence.
6.2. The Two Faces of Counter-proliferation
One of the most prominent missions of the US military is 'counterproliferation'. 72 In the 1996 report, the implications of 'counter-proliferation' were summed up in the following formulations:
... a balanced, multitiered approach to counterproliferation, including enhancing U.S. capabilities in the following areas: Deterrence. ... Intelligence ... Ballistic and cruise missile defense. ... Passive defenses. ... Counterforce. Capabilities to seize, disable, or destroy WMD arsenals and their delivery means prior to their use without unacceptable collateral effects. Effective power projection. ... Defense against covert threats.
Much as one may sympathize (as does the present author) with the goal of non- and counter-proliferation, 73 some of these envisioned missions raise a number of questions:
Finally, one may doubt the US impartiality in the assessment of the alleged 'WMD threat'.
6.3. Constraints on Arms Sales?
In connection with the proclamations on the new world order, President Bush also announced new efforts to regulate and curtail the international arms sales. This resulted, inter alia, in the 'P5 Initiative' of 1991, wherein it was stated that
... the transfer of conventional weapons, conducted in a responsible manner, should contribute to the ability of states to meet their legitimate defence, security and national sovereignty requirements .... They recognized that indiscriminate transfers of military weapons and technology contribute to regional instability ... They also recognize that a long term solution to this problem should be found in close consultation with the recipient countries.
In the subsequent communique from the meeting in London, 18 October 1991, the Five singled out the following categories of weapons as requiring mutual information: tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, military aircraft and helicopters, naval vessels and certain missile systems. More generally, they pledged to 'avoid transfers which would be likely to ...be used other than for the legitimate defence and security needs of the recipient state'. 75
Not much has come of this, however-in fact the United States has significantly strengthened its position as the world's leading arms exporting country. Its share of the world's arms export has risen from 24 percent in 1984, through 33 percent in 1990 to 56 percent in 1994 according to ACDA figures. The US share of regional arms exports was 80 percent in Oceania, 75 percent in Western Europe's, 53 percent in the Middle East (including the Persian Gulf) and 49 percent in East Asia. 76
There is, of course, nothing 'wrong' with arms sales as such-in fact the creation of a new world order may require some states to enhance their defensive capabilities as well as their ability to contribute to collective security and peace support operation-both of which may call for arms imports. A possible explanation of the US arms export may thus be an endeavour stabilize otherwise conflict-prone regions and make the world a safer place.
It is also conceivable that the US may have drawn the conclusion from the Gulf War 77 that the world is witnessing a fully-fledged 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), also labelled the Military-Technological Revolution (MTR). 78 Theories to this effect are based on the following beliefs, which the present authors regards as myths, even though they certainly contain a grain of truth:
If the United States really believes in the RMA/MTR, it would have to conclude that several of its friends and allies are ill-equipped to meet its challenges, hence that their armed forces need a thorough overhaul requiring major arms purchases.
One should, however, bear in mind that there are strong vested interests in the dissemination of the myth (if so it is) of the RMA/MTR. One might, however, also suspect that economic motives have played a role, for instance that the United States is trying to salvage most of its military industry despite a decline in domestic orders. If everybody believes that 'the best weapons win', and that the best are those that are 'Made in the USA', the United States will ensure its dominance of the (rapidly shrinking) global arms market, thereby securing the survival of at least most of the US arms industry. 79
The Clinton administration came to power with the promise to reduce military expenditures with a view to strengthening the US economy. Part of the explanation was the 'imperial overstretch' debate, but the 'Japan syndrome' may also have played a role:
With military expenditures around one percent of its GDP, Japan apparently did much better than the United States with its around 4 percent. Moreover, this was not merely because Japan ignored security for the sake of prosperity but because Japan understood security in a more comprehensive way that the US traditionally did. 80 Hence the need to emulate Japan, both by limiting military spending and by a greater emphasis on 'dual use' in order to benefit from 'spin on' rather than the spin-off effects that had proved illusory in the past. Rather than focusing on military R&D in the hope that something of civilian utility would come out of it, it might be better to prioritize civilian R&D, out of which would spring basic technologies that would also have military use. Not much has become of this plan, however. 81
Nor has much been achieved with regard to conversion, the establishment of a National Commission notwithstanding. 82 Part of the explanation may have been an, partly ideologically founded, belief in the power of the market mechanisms. According to some analysts the best strategy was to simply reduce military expenditures and procurement and let the market do the rest. It would allow for an elimination of the public debt that would bring interest rates down, thereby stimulating the economy, presumably sufficiently to generate enough jobs to absorb the workforce made redundant by the inevitable closures of some major arms producers. 83 Another partial explanation may have been the above-mentioned export drive that has surely kept arms firms in business that would otherwise have went bankrupt--even though the declining global demand for weapons means that exports will not be able to salvage all the arms industry. The more so the better, however.
We have thus seen that the United States has, in some respects, helped bring along the new world order but that it has also hampered its realization: By the continuing high level of armaments and the drive for arms exports; by its insufficient respect for international law; by its vacillation between unilateralism and multilateralism manifested in a lack of support for the United Nations that was a major cause of the impotence of the UN. The United States is thus definitely 'part of the problem'. However, as it is inconceivable that the UN could function properly without the active support of the United States, the USA will clearly also have to be 'part of the solution'.
*: Paper for the joint conference of PSA (Peace Studies Association) and COPRED (Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development); New Directions in Peace Studies, Washington, DC, 5-8 June 1997. Preliminary version. Not for quotation. Comments welcome. Back.
**: The author is Ph.D. & MA, Senior Research Fellow, project director and board member at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI, formerly Centre for Peace and Conflict Research); Project director of the Global Non-Offensive Defence Network (funded by the Ford Foundation); editor of NOD and Conversion; Associate professor of International Relations, Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen; and Secretary General (elect) of the International Peace Research Association. He is the author of the following books: Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence (1991); Common Security and Nonoffensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective (1992); and Dictionary of Alternative Defense (1995). Back.
Note 3: Kant, Immanuel: Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788, reprint Stuttgart: Reclam, 1963), p. 53. See also Donaldson, Thomas: 'Kant's Global Rationalism', in Terry Nardin & David R. Mapel (eds.): Traditions in International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 136-157; Bonanate, Luigi: Ethics and International Politics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); Brown, Chris: International Relations Theory. New Normative Approaches (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), pp. 28-41; Linklater, Andrew: 'What Is a Good International Citizen?', in Paul Keal (ed.): Ethics and Foreign Policy (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1992), pp. 21-43; McElroy, Robert W.: Morality and American Foreign Policy. The Role of Ethics in International Affairs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 3-56. Back.
Note 4: Ruggie, John Gerard: Winning the Peace. America and World Order in the New Era (New York: Columbia University Press and Twentieth Century Fund, 1996). For a somewhat comparable analysis see McDougall, Walter A.: 'Back to Bedrock. The Eight Traditions of American Statecraft', Foreign Affairs, vol. 76, no. 2 (March-April 1997), pp. 134-146. Back.
Note 5: Perkins, Bradford: 'The Creation of a Republic Empire, 1776-1865', Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 147-169; Morison, Samuel Eliot, Henry Steele Commanger & William E. Leuchtenburg: A Concise History of the American Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 181. Back.
Note 7: Knock, Thomas J.: To End All Wars. Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995, paperback edition 1995); Iriye, Akira: 'The Globalising of America, 1913-1945', Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 45-72. Back.
Note 9: Carr, Edward Hallett: The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 2nd ed. (1946, reprint New York: Harper, 1964); Claude, Inis L.: Swords into Plowshares. The Problems and Progress of International Organization. 4th edition (New York: Random House, 1984), pp. 21-40; Bennett, A. LeRoy: International Organizations. Principles and Issues. 6th edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995), pp. 8-14; Downs, George W.: 'Beyond the Debate on Collective Security', in idem (ed.): Collective Security Beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp. 1-13; Lipson, Charles: 'Is the Future of Collective Security Like the Past?', ibid., pp. 105-131. Back.
Note 10: Ruggie: op. cit. (note 4), pp. 15-27. See also Calvocoressi, Peter & Guy Wint: Total War. Causes and Courses of the Second World War (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 185-207; Iriye: op. cit. (note 7), pp. 170-216. Back.
Note 11: Cohen, Warren I: 'America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-1991', Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, vol. 4 (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 21-57; Calleo, David P.: Beyond American Hegemony. The Future of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: Basic Books, 1987), pp. 27-43; Barnett, Richard J.: The Alliance. America, Europe, Japan. Makers of the Postwar World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), pp. 15-146; Dulles, Allen W.: The Marshall Plan (Providence: Berg Publishers, 1993). Back.
Note 12: The 'Long Telegram' of 22 February 1946 is reprinted in Etzold, Thomas H. & John Lewis Gaddis (eds.): Containment. Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 50-63. See also Jensen, Kenneth M. (ed.): Origins of the Cold War. The Novikov, Kennan and Roberts 'Long Telegrams' of 1946. Revised edition (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1994); and the chapter on 'American Diplomacy and the Military', in Kennan, George F.: American Diplomacy, Expanded Edition (Chicago 1984: University of Chicago Press), pp. 168-179. The article on 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct' (Foreign Affairs, vol. 25, July 1947) is reprinted ibid., pp. 107-128. Back.
Note 13: On the birth of 'containment' see Thompson, Kenneth W.: Cold War Theories. Volume I: World Polarization, 1943-1953 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), pp. 119-154; Etzold & Gaddis (eds.): op. cit. (note 12, pp. 71-84. For a comprehensive and critical history of containment see Gaddis, John Lewis: Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), passim. For a critique (by the person who is usually reckoned as the 'father of containment') see Kennan, George F.: 'Reflections on Containment', in Terry L. Deibel & John Lewis Gaddis (eds.): Containing the Soviet Union. A Critique of US Policy (London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987), pp. 15-19. On the implications for Europe see also Allin, Dana H.: Cold War Illusions. America, Europe and Soviet Power, 1969-1989 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994). On the military implications see Ross, Steven (ed.): American War Plans 1945-1950. Revised Edition (London: Frank Cass, 1996). Back.
Note 14: Rosenberg, David Alan: '''A Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours'': Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War with the Soviet Union, 1954-55', International Security, vol. 6, no. 3 (Winter 1981/82), pp. 3-38; idem: 'The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960', ibid., vol. 7, no. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 3-71. Back.
Note 15: For a critique see Mercer, Jonathan: Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Hopf, Ted: Peripheral Visions. Deterrence Theory and American Foreign Policy in the Third World, 1965-1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994). On the 'easy or difficult' distinction with regard to deterrence see Buzan, Barry: An Introduction to Strategic Studies. Military Technology and International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 167-172. Back.
Note 16: Deibel, Terry L.: 'Alliances for Containment', in idem & Gaddis (eds.): op. cit. (note 13, pp. 100-119; MacDonald, Douglas J.: 'The Truman Administration and Global Responsibilities: The Birth of the Falling Domino Principle', in Robert Jervis & Jack Snyder (eds.): Dominoes and Bandwagons. Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 112-144. See also Jervis, Robert: 'Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behaviour', ibid., pp. 20-50. For a critique of the domino image, based on an analysis of Soviet perceptions, see Hopf, Ted: 'Soviet Inferences from the Victories in the Periphery: Visions of Resistance or Cumulating Gains', ibid., pp. 145-189; and idem: op. cit. (note 15, passim; Johnson, Robert H.: Improbable Dangers. U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 155-178. Back.
Note 17: On the Vietnam syndrome see Rodman, Peter W.: More Precious Than Peace. The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994), pp. 128-140. On the Nixon Doctrine see also Garthoff, Raymond: Detente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 74-75; Sherry, Michael S.: In the Shadow of War. The United States Since the 1930s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 307-334. On its application to the Persian Gulf see Chubin, Shahram: Security in the Persian Gulf, vol. 4: The Role of Outside Powers (London: IISS and Aldershot: Gower, 1982), pp. 9-36; Rubin, Barry: Paved With Good Intentions. The American Experience and Iran (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981), pp. 124-189 & passim; Hooglund, Eric: 'Iran', in Peter J. Schraeder (ed.): Intervention into the 1990s. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World. 2nd Edition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 303-320; idem: 'The Persian Gulf', ibid. pp. 321-342. Back.
Note 18: Ely, John Hart: War and Responsibility. Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Lindsay, James M.: 'Congress and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era', in Aspen Strategy Study Group: The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era (Queenstown, Maryland: The Aspen Institute, 1995), pp. 71-110. Back.
Note 19: A very radical recent example is Ebeling, Richard M. & Jacob G. Hornberger (eds.): The Failure of America's Foreign Wars (Fairfax: The Future of Freedom Foundation, 1996). Much more sensible is Nordlinger, Eric A.: Isolationism Reconfigured. American Foreign Policy for a New Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). Back.
Note 20: A proponent of disengagement is Ravenal, Earl C.: Never Again. Learning from America's Foreign Policy Failures (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978). More radical is Krauss, Melvyn: How NATO Weakens the West (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986). On burden-sharing see Kelleher, Catherine McArdle: 'America Looks at Europe', in Lawrence Freedman (ed.): The Troubled Alliance. Atlantic Relations in the 1980s (London: Heinemann, 1983), pp. 44-66; Roth, William R.: 'After the Nunn-Roth Amendment', NATO's Sixteen Nations, vol. 30, no. 3 (July 1985), pp. 15-23. Back.
Note 21: The debate was launched with the monumental work by Kennedy, Paul: The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Unwin Hymann, 1988), pp. 514-535. Another example is Kupchan, Charles A.: The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 418-485; Snyder, Jack: Myths of Empire. Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 1-64, 255-304; Petras, James & Morris Morley: Empire or Republic? American Global Power and Domestic Decay (London: Routledge, 1995). For a political-economy theory pointing in the same direction see Gilpin, Robert G.: War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Back.
Note 22: On the Reagan doctrine see Rodman, Peter W.: More Precious Than Peace. The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994), pp. 259-288; Smith, Tony: America's Mission. The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 266-307. Back.
Note 23: Korb, Lawrence J. & Landa P. Brady: 'Rearming America. The Reagan Administration Defense Program' (International Security, vol. 9, no. 3, Winter 1984/85), in Steven E. Miller (ed.): Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy. An International Security Reader (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 3-18; Posen, Barry R. & Stephen Van Evera: 'Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration. Departure from Containment' (International Security, vol. 8, no. 1, Summer 1983), ibid., pp. 19-78; Scott, Robert Travis (ed.): The Race for Security. Arms and Arms Control in the Reagan Years (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1987), passim. Back.
Note 24: Ornstein, Norman J.: 'Foreign Policy and the 1992 Election', Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 3 (Summer 1992), pp. 1-16; Omestad, Thomas: 'Foreign Policy and Campaign '96', Foreign Policy, no. 105 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 37-54. On the Republican positions see Leach, James A.: 'A Republican Looks at Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 3 (Summer 1992), pp. 17-31; Kristol, William & Robert Kagan: 'Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy', ibid., vol. 75, no. 4 (July-August 1996), pp. 18-33; Greenberger, Robert S.: 'Dateline Capitol Hill: The New Majority's Foreign Policy', Foreign Policy, no. 101 (Winter 1995-96), pp. 159-169. On the Democratic positions see Hamilton, Lee H.: 'A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 3 (Summer 1992), pp. 30-51; Hendrickson, David C.: 'The Recovery of Internationalism', ibid., vol. 73, no. 5 (Sept-Oct. 1994), pp. 26-43; Christopher, Warren: 'America's Leadership, America's Opportunity', Foreign Policy, no. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 6-28; Dole, Bob: 'Shaping America's Global Future', ibid., pp. 29-43. Back.
Note 26: For a rather extreme version of this theory see Galtung, Johan: Hitlerism, Stalinism, Reaganism. Three Variations on a Theme by Orwell (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1984). A more moderate is Lipset, Seymour Martin: American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996); for a critique see Lind, Michael: 'The American Creed. Does It Matter? Should It Change?', Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 (March-April 1996), pp. 135-139. Back.
Note 28: On the democracy-peace linkage see Russett, Bruce: Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Brown, Michael E., Sean Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller (eds.): Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996). A more pessimistic analysis is Mansfield, Edward D. & Jack Snyder: 'Democratization and War', Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), pp. 79-97. Back.
Note 29: On the 'evil empire' see Talbott, Strobe: Deadly Gambits. The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control (London: Pan Books, 1985), pp. 227, 322; Scheer, Robert: With Enough Shovels. Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War (New York: Random House, 1982), passim; Garthoff: op. cit. (note 17, pp. 1010-1014; idem: The Great Transition. American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 8-15. Theoretical analyses of such enemy images include Frei, Daniel: Perceived Images. U.S. and Soviet Assumptions and Perceptions in Disarmament (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanhead, 1986); and Shimko, Keith L.: Images and Arms Control. Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan Administration (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), pp. 101-120 & passim. On the Hitler-Saddam analogy see Wayne, Stephen J.: 'President Bush Goes to War: A Psychological Interpretation from a Distance', in Stanley A. Renshon (ed.): The Political Psychology of the Gulf War. Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), pp. 29-48; Campbell, David: Politics Without Principle. Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 21-30. Back.
Note 31: Roberts, Adam: 'The Laws of War in the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict', International Security, vol. 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993-94), pp. 134-181. For a critique see Graubard, Stephen R.: Mr. Bush's War. Adventures in the Politics of Illusion (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992). On the ethical foundations of just war theory see, e.g., Walzer, Michael: Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977); Johnson, James Turner: Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War. A Moral and Political Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); idem: The Quest for Peace. Three Moral Traditions in Western Cultural History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Elshtain, Jean Bethke (ed.): Just War Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Nardin, Terry (ed.): The Ethics of War and Peace. Religious and Secular Perspectives (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); idem & David R. Mapel (eds.): Traditions in International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Smock, David R. (ed.): Religious Perspectives on War. Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Attitudes Toward Force After the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1992); Christopher, Paul: The Ethics of War and Peace. An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1994). On the laws of war see Best, Geoffrey: Humanity in Warfare. The Modern History of the International Law of Armed Conflicts (London: Methuen, 1980); De Lupis, Ingrid Detter: The Law of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Green, L.C.: The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); Howard, Michael, George J. Andreopolous & Mark R. Schulman (eds.): The Laws of War. Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); McCoubrey, H. & N.D. White: International Law and Armed Conflict (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992); Dinstein, Yoram: War, Aggression and Self-Defence. Second Edition (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, Cambridge University Press, 1994). Back.
Note 32: On the US characterization of other states as 'rogues', see Klare, Michael: Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. America's Search for a New Foreign Policy (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), pp. 130-168. On the norms of 'international society' see Bull, Hedley: The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics. Second Edition (Houndsmills, Basingstroke: Macmillan, 1995), passim. Back.
Note 33: Weigel, George: American Interests, American Purpose. Moral Reasoning and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1989); Thompson, Kenneth W. (ed.): Moral Dimensions of American Foreign Policy (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994); McElroy: op. cit. (note 3), passim; Brilmayer, Lea: American Hegemony. Political Morality in a One-Superpower World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Gaddis, John Lewis: 'Morality and the American Experience in the Cold War', in idem: The United States and the End of the Cold War. Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 47-64. See also Goldstein, Judith & Robert O. Keohane (eds.): Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutional, and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). Back.
Note 34: Freedman, Lawrence: 'Order and Disorder in the New World', Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 1 (America and the World 1991/92), pp. 20-37; idem: 'The War and the New World Order', in James Gow (ed.): Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and the World Community (London: Brassey's/Centre for Defence Studies, 1993), pp. 183-200; Tucker, Robert W. & David C. Hendrickson: The Imperial Temptation. The New World Order and America's Response (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1992), pp. 29-69; Carpenter, Ted Galen: 'The New World Disorder', Foreign Policy, no. 84 (Fall 1991), pp. 24-39; Mead, Walter Russell: 'An American Grand Strategy. The Quest for Order in a Disordered World', World Policy Journal, vol. 10, no. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 9-38. Back.
Note 35: Good examples are Mendlowitz, Saul H. & R.B.J. Walker (eds.): Towards a Just World Peace (London: Butterworths, 1987); Walker, R.B.J.: One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988); Falk, Richard: On Humane Governance. Toward a New Global Politics (University Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 1995); Griffin, David Ray & idem (eds.): Postmodern Politics for a Planet in Crisis. Policy, Process, and Presidential Vision (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993). See also Lyons, Gene M. & Michael Mastanduno (eds.): Beyond Westphalia? National Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995); Linklater, Andrew: 'Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State', European Journal of International Relations, vol. 2, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 77-103; Archibugi, Daniele & David Held (eds.): Cosmopolitan Democracy: an Agenda for a New World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). Back.
Note 36: See, for instance, Barnaby, Frank (ed.): Building a More Democratic United Nations (London: Franc Cass, 1991); Archibugi, Daniele: 'The Reform of the UN and Cosmopolitican Democracy: A Critical Review', Journal of Peace Research, vol. 30, no. 3 (August 1993), pp. 301-315. Back.
Note 37: Rodley, Nigel (ed.): To Loose the Bands of Wickedness. International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1992); Muldoon, James P.: 'What Happened to Humanitarian Intervention?', The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 51, no. 2 (March-April 1995), pp. 60-61; Reed, Laura W. & Carl Kaysen (eds.): Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention. A Collection of Essays from a Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Cambridge, MA: Committee on International Security Studies, AASS, 1993); Lyons & Mastonduno (eds.): op. cit. (note 35), passim; Roberts, Adam: 'Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights', International Affairs, vol. 69, no. 3 (July 1993), pp. 429-450; Weiss, Thomas G.: 'Triage. Humanitarian Interventions in a New Era', World Policy Journal, vol. 11, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 59-68; Morris, Justin: 'The United Nations: Collective Security and Human Rights', in Jane M. Davis (ed.): Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), pp. 113-135. Back.
Note 39: A good example is Mearsheimer, John J.: 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', International Security, vol. 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-52; idem: 'The False Promise of International Institutions', ibid., vol. 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5-49; idem: 'A Realist Reply', ibid., vol. 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 82-93. See also Baldwin, David A. (ed.): Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Kegley, Charles W.: Controversies in International Relations: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995). Back.
Note 40: The UN has recommended such an approach, e.g. in Resolution 45/58 O: 'Defensive Security Concepts and Policies', passed by the 45th Session of the General Assembly 4.12.90; and in its 'Guidelines and Recommendations for Regional Approaches to Disarmament within the Context of Global Security', passed by UNDC in 1993. See Mason, Peggy: 'The United Nations Guidelines for Regional Approaches to Disarmament', Disarmament, vol. 18, no. 2 (1995), pp. 49-71. This corresponds closely to the recommendations of advocates of 'non-offensive defence'. See Møller, Bjørn: Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence (London: Brassey's, 1991); idem: Common Security and Non-Offensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner/London: UCL Press, 1992); idem: Dictionary of Alternative Defence (Boulder: Lynne Rienner and London: Adamantine Press, 1995). Back.
Note 41: Baratta, Joseph Preston: 'The Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Outlawry of War', in Richard Dean Burns (ed.): Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, vols. I-III (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), vol. II, pp. 695-705. Back.
Note 42: For a historical account see Blechman, Barry M. & Steven S. Kaplan: Force Without War. U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978). On the more recent cases see Haas, Richard N.: Intervention. The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War Period (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), pp. 19-48; Carpenter, Ted Galen: 'Direct Military Intervention', in Peter J. Schraeder (ed.): Intervention into the 1990s. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World. 2nd Edition (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 153-172; Scranton, Margaret E.: 'Panama', ibid., pp. 343-360; Kornbluh, Peter: 'Nicaragua', ibid., pp. 285-301, especially p. 293. On the implications for the countries in the Caribbean see Griffith, Ivelaw L.: 'Security Perceptions of English Caribbean Elites', in idem (ed.): Strategy and Security in the Caribbean (New York: Praeger, 1991), pp. 3-26; and Clifford E. Griffin: 'Postinvasion Political Security in the Eastern Caribbean', ibid., pp. 76-97. On Libya see also Kaldor, Mary & Paul Anderson (eds.): Mad Dogs. The US Raids on Libya (London: Pluto Press, 1986). Back.
Note 43: Ransom, Harry Howe: 'Covert Intervention', in Schraeder (ed.): op. cit. (note 42), pp. 113-129; Schraeder, Peter J.: 'Paramilitary Intervention', ibid., pp. 131-151; Prados, John: Presidents' Secret Wars. CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1986); Ranelagh, John: The Agency. The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), pp. 260-269, 358-376, 516-520, 678-681, 710-727; Woodward, Bob: Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), passim. On Iran see also Rubin: op. cit. (note 17), pp. 54-90. Back.
Note 45: On Haiti see Fauriol, Georges A. (ed.): Haitian Frustrations. Dilemmas of U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995); Acevedo, Domingo E.: 'The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of Effectiveness in Protecting Democracy', in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.): Enforcing Restraint. Collective Intervention in International Conflicts (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1994), pp. 119-156; Preeg, Ernest H.: The Haitian Dilemma. A Case Study in Demographics, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy. Significant Issues Series, Vol. 18, no. 1 (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1996).On Nicaragua see Black, George: Triumph of the People. The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, (London: Zed Press, 1981). Back.
Note 47: McDougal, Myres S.: 'Law and Peace', in W. Scott Thompson & Kenneth M. Jensen (eds.): Approaches to Peace. An Intellectual Map (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1991), pp. 131-172 (quotation from p. 147). For a much less 'creative' reading of international law see Schacter, Oscar: 'The Role of International Law in Maintaining Peace', ibid., pp. 67-127; or Murphy, John F.: 'Force and Arms', in Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner (eds.): United Nations Legal Order, Vols. 1-2 (American Society for International Law and Cambridge: Grotius Publications/Cambridge University Press, 1995), vol. 1, pp. 247-317, especially pp. 261-265. Back.
Note 48: Boutros-Ghali, Boutros: 'Global Prospects for the United Nations', Aussenpolitik. English Edition, vol. 46, no. 2 (2nd Quarter 1995), pp. 107-114; Gordon, Wendell: The United Nations at the Crossroads of Reform (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 99-113; Mingst, Karen A. & Margaret P.Karns: The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 32-34, 148-154. Back.
Note 49: Boutros-Ghali, Boutros: 'An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992', in Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury (eds.): United Nations, Divided World. The UN's Role in International Relations, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 468-498; idem: 'Supplement to An Agenda For Peace. Report of the Secretary-general on the Work of the Organization', in SIPRI Yearbook 1996, pp. 91-100. General analyses of 'new peace-keeping', include Roper, John, Masashi Nishihara, Olara A. Ottunu & Enid C.B. Schoettle: Keeping the Peace in the Post-Cold War Era: Strengthening Multilateral Peacekeeping. A Report to the Trilateral Commission (New York: The Trilateral Commission, 1993); Ratner, Steven R.: The New UN Peacekeeping. Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's Press and Council of Foreign Relations, 1995); Warner, Daniel (ed.): New Dimensions of Peacekeeping (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995); Berdal, Mats R.: 'Whither UN Peacekeeping. An Analysis of the Changing Military Requirements of UN Peacekeeping With Proposals for Its Enhancement', Adelphi Papers, no. 281 (London: IISS/Brassey's, 1993). Back.
Note 50: 'Remarks by The President and Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan', White House Press Release, 23 January 1997. On the changing US policy towards the UN see Gregg, Robert W.: About Face? The United States and the United Nations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Coate, Roger (ed.): United States Policy and the Future of the United Nations (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994); Rochester, J. Martin: Waiting for the Millennium. The United Nations and the Future of World Order (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993), pp. 70-88. Back.
Note 51: Durch, William J. & James A. Schear: 'Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia', in William J. Durch (ed.): UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 194-274, especially p. 246. Back.
Note 52: This is the, rather vague, conclusion of Brzoska, Michael & Frederic S. Pearson: Arms and Warfare. Escalation, De-escalation and Negotiation (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994). Back.
Note 53: Daalder, Ivo D.: 'Knowing When to Say No: The Development of US Policy for Peacekeeping', in Durch (ed.): op. cit. (note 51), pp. 35-67. On IFOR in general see Solana, Javier: 'NATO's Role in Bosnia: Charting a New Course for the Alliance', NATO Review, vol. 44, no. 2 (March 1996), pp. 3-6; Julwan, George A.: 'SHAPE and IFOR: Adapting to the Needs of Tomorrow', ibid., pp. 6-9; Lightburn, David: 'NATO and the Challenge of Multifunctional Peacekeeping', ibid., pp. 10-14; Eide, Espen Barth & Per Erik Solli: 'From Blue to Green. The Transition from UNPROFOR to IFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina', Working Papers, no. 539 (Oslo: NUPI, 1995); Nicholls, D.V.: 'Bosnia: UN and NATO', RUSI Journal, vol. 141, no. 1 (February 1996), pp. 31-36; Portillo, Michael: 'Bosnia-Implementing the Peace Agreement', ibid., pp. 27-30; Borden, Anthony & Richard Caplan: 'The Former Yugoslavia: the War and the Peace Process', SIPRI Yearbook 1996, pp. 203-231. Back.
Note 55: Field Manual 100-23: Peace Operations (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1994); Field Manual 100-20: Operations Other Than War (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 1995). See also Taw, Jennifer Morrison & Bruce Hoffman: 'Operations Other Than War', in Paul K. Davis (ed.): New Challenges for Defense Planning. Rethinking How Much is Enough (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), pp. 223-250; Berdal, Mats R.: 'Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping', Survival, vol. 36, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 30-50. Back.
Note 56: Hirsch, John L. & Robert B. Oakley: Somalia and Operation Restore Hope. Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 1995); Lyons, Terrence & Ahmed I. Samatar: Somalia. State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction. Brookings Occasional Papers. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Sahnoun, Mohamed: Somalia. The Missed Opportunities (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1994); Clark, Jeffrey: 'Debacle in Somalia: Failure of Collective Response', in Damrosch (ed.): op. cit. (note 45), pp. 205-240; Sapir, Debarati G. & Hedwig Deconick: 'The Paradox of Humanitarian Assistance and Military Intervention in Somalia', in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.): The United Nations and Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), pp. 127-150; Baynham, Simon: 'Somalia-UN at the Crossroads', in African Defence Review. A Working Paper Series, no. 15 (Halfway House, RSA: Institute for Defence Policy, 1994); Lalande, Serge: 'Somalia: Major Issues for Future UN Peacekeeping', in Warner (ed.): op. cit. (note 49), pp. 69-99; Durch, William J.: 'Introduction to Anarchy: Humanitarian Intervention and ''State-Building'' in Somalia', in idem (ed.): op. cit. (note 51), pp. 311-366. Back.
Note 57: While the USSR has used more vetoes during the entire life of the United Nations, the United States has clearly surpassed it in recent years. In the period 1986-92, for instance, the USA used its veto 23 times, but the USSR not at all. See Roberts, Adam & Benedict Kingsbury: 'Introduction: The UN's Roles in International Society since 1945', in idem & idem (eds.): op. cit. (note 49), pp.1-62, especially p. 10. Back.
Note 58: Wilenski, Peter: 'The Structure of the UN in the Post-Cold War Period', in Roberts & Kingsbury (eds.): op. cit. (note 49), pp. 437-467, especially p. 442; Commission on Global Governance: Our Global Neighbourhood. Report of the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 240-241. See also Kennedy, Paul & Bruce Russett: 'Reforming the United Nations', Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 5 (September-October 1995), pp. 56-71. Back.
Note 60: Miko, Francis T.: 'American Perspectives on the Helsinki Review Conference and the Future Role of the CSCE', in Michael R. Lucas (ed.): The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1993), pp. 61-81; Mlyn, Eric: 'The OSCE, the United States and European Security', European Security, vol. 5, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 426-447. Back.
Note 61: Kissinger, Henry: 'A Plan to Reshape NATO', Time Magazine, 5 March 1984, pp. 20-24; Schmidt, Helmut: Eine Strategie für den Westen (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1986), pp. 176-177; Calleo: op. cit. (note 11), pp. 162-163. Back.
Note 63: Betts, Richard K.: Military Readiness. Concepts, Choices, Consequences (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 3-19; Cohen, Eliot A.: 'The Strategy of Innocence? The United States, 1920-1945', in Williamsen Murray, MacGregor Knox & Alvin Bernstein (eds.): The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 428-465. See also Porter, Bruce D.: War and the Rise of the State. The Military Foundations of Modern Politics (New York: Free Press, 1994), pp. 243-296; Friedberg, Aaron L.: 'Why Didn't the United States Become a Garrison State?', International Security, vol. 16, no. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 109-142. For a contrary interpretation, that traces the birth of 'militarization' back to the 1930s, see Sherry, Michael S.: In the Shadow of War. The United States Since the 1930s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); for a critique of the 'militarism' thesis see Tuyll, Hubert P. Van: 'Militarism, The United States, and the Cold War', Armed Forces and Society, vol. 20, no. 4 (Summer 1994), pp. 519-530. Back.
Note 64: Cohen, Richard & Peter A. Wilson: Superpowers in Economic Decline. U.S. Strategy for the Transcentury Era (New York: Crane Russak, 1990), pp. 102-206; Mintz, Alex (ed.): The Political Economy of Military Spending in the United States (London: Routledge, 1992). Back.
Note 66: See the various contributions to Davis (ed.): op. cit. (note 55), especially Davis, Paul: 'Planning Under Uncertainty Then and Now: Paradigms Lost and Paradigms Emerging', pp. 15-58; Cimbala, Stephen J.: Collective Insecurity. U.S. Defense Policy and the New World Disorder (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1995), pp. 34-58; Bowen, Wyn Q. & David H. Dunn: American Security Policy in the 1990s. Beyond Containment (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996), pp. 37-186; Blair, David: 'Criteria for Planning the Transition to Lower Defense Spending', in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (ed.): 'New Directions in U.S. Defense Policy', The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 517 (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, September 1991), pp. 146-156; Pohling-Brown, Pamela & Barbara Starr: 'Aspin's Game Plan. Pentagon Ponders Roles and Missions', International Defense Review, vol. 26, no. 7 (July 1993), pp. 547-551; Zakheim, Dov S.: 'A Top-Down Plan for the Pentagon', Orbis, vol. 39, no. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 173-187; Sarkesian, Sam C., John Allen Williams & Fred B. Bryant: Soldiers, Society, and National Security (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 29-72. For a moderate critique see Kaufmann, William W.: Assessing the Base Force. How Much Is Too Much? (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992); O'Hanlon, Michael: Defense Planning for the Late 1990s. Beyond the Desert Storm Framework (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Korb, Lawrence J.: 'Our Overstuffed Armed Forces', Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 6 (November-December 1995), pp. 22-34; Klare: op. cit. (note 32), pp. 97-129. Back.
Note 67: See, for instance, Ullman, Richard: 'Redefining Security', International Security, vol. 8, no. 1 (Summer 1983), pp. 162-177; Nye, Joseph E. & Sean M. Lynn-Jones: 'International Security Studies: A Report of a Conference on the State of the Field', International Security, vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 5-27; Lynn-Jones, Sean M.: 'The Future of International Security Studies', in Desmond Ball & David Horner (eds.): Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives, Series 'Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence', vol. 89, (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, 1992), pp. 71-107; Mangold, Peter: National Security and International Relations (London: Routledge, 1990); Booth, Ken (ed.): New Thinking About Strategy and International Security (London: Harper Collins, 1991); Klare, Michael & Daniel C. Thomas (eds.): World Security. Trends and Challenges at Century's End (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); Clarke, Michael (ed.): New Perspectives on Security (London: Brassey's, UK, 1993); Rees, G. Wyn (ed.): International Politics in Europe. The New Agenda (London: Routledge, 1993); Fischer, Dietrich: Nonmilitary Aspects of Security. A Systems Approach (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993); Haftendorn, Helga: 'Das Sicherheitspuzzle: Die Suche nach einem tragfähigen Konzept Internationaler Sicherheit', in Christopher Daas, Susanne Feske, Bernhard Moltmann & Claudia Schmid (eds.): Regionalisierung der Sicherheitspolitik. Tendenzen in den internationalen Beziehungen nach dem Ost-West-Konflikt (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1993), pp. 13-38; Møller, Bjørn: 'Security Concepts: New Challenges and Risks', Working Papers, no. 18, (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1993). Barry Buzan and his collaborators at the Centre for Peace and Conflict in Copenhagen belong to theoretical vanguard with their analyses of national and 'societal' security. See Buzan, Barry: People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Wæver, Ole, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre et al.: Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993).Good examples of 'expanded strategic studies' are Brown, Neville: The Strategic Revolution. Thoughts for the Twenty-First Century (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1992); Souchon, Lennart: Neue deutsche Sicherheitspolitik (Herford: Mittler Verlag, 1990); Lellouche, Pierre: Le nouveau monde. De l'ordre de Yalta au désorde des nations (Paris: Grasset, 1992). Excessive expansion is also criticized from quite a different vantage point by Wæver, Ole: 'Security, the Speech Act. Analysing the Politics of a Word', Working Papers, no. 19 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1989); and idem: 'Securitization and Desecuritization', ibid., no. 5, 1993. Back.
Note 69: On the German Schlieffen Plan, see Wallach, Jehuda L. 1967: Das Dogma der Vernichtungsschlacht. Die Lehren von Clausewitz and Schlieffen and ihre Wirkungen in zwei Weltkriegen (Frankfurt: Bernard & Graefe, 1967); Howard, Michael: 'Men Against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914' (International Security, vol. 9, no. 1), in Steven E. Miller (ed.) 1985: Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War. An International Security Reader (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 41-57; Rothenberg, Günther E.: 'Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment', in Peter Paret (ed.): Makers of Modern Strategy. From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 296-325. On the USSR see MccGwire, Michael: Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), passim. Back.
Note 72: The Counterproliferation Initiative was contained in Les Aspin's 'Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress 1994', reprinted in Bowen & Dunn: op. cit. (note 66), pp. 163-169. See also Spector, Leonard S.: 'Neo-Nonproliferation', Survival, vol. 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 66-85; Goldring, Nathalie J.: 'Skittish on Counterproliferation', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 50, no. 2 (March-April 1994), pp. 12-14; Neuneck, Götz & Jörg Wallner: 'Nonproliferation und Counterproliferation', S+F. Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden, vol. 13, no. 3 (1995), pp. 141-148. Back.
Note 73: Good recent works on proliferation include: Mitchell Reiss & Robert S. Litwak: Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994); Barnaby, Frank: How Nuclear Weapons Spread. Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation in the 1990s (London: Routledge, 1993); Fischer, David: Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. The Past of the Prospects (London: Routledge, 1992); idem, Wolfgang Köttner & Harald Müller: Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Bailey, Kathleen C.: Strengthening Nuclear Nonproliferation (Boulder: Westview, 1993). Back.
Note 75: 'Big Five Initiative on Arms Transfer and Proliferation Restraints (1991)', in Burns (ed.) op.cit. (note 41), vol. 3, pp. 1481-1483; Harvey, Mark: 'Arms Export Control: An Analysis of Developments Since the Gulf War', RUSI Journal, vol. 137, no. 1 (February 1992), pp. 35-41. Back.
Note 77: More or less official US accounts of the war include Aspin, Les & William Dickinson: Defense for a New Era. Lessons of the Persian Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's US, 1992); Friedman, Norman: Desert Victory. The War for Kuwait (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991); Scales, Robert S. Jr.: Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, US, 1994); Keaney, Thomas A. & Eliot A. Cohen: Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995); Vuono, Carl E.: 'Desert Storm and the Future of Conventional Forces', Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 49-68; For a critique see Mueller, John: 'The Perfect Enemy: Assessing the Gulf War', Security Studies, vol. 5, no. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 77-117; Posen, Barry R.: 'Military Mobilization in the Persian Gulf Conflict', SIPRI Yearbook 1991, pp. 640-654; idem: 'Military Lessons of the Gulf War- Implications for Middle East Arms Control', in Shai Feldman & Ariel Levite (eds.): Arms Control and the New Middle East Security Environment (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 61-77; Lebovic, James H.: Foregone Conclusions. U.S. Weapons Acquisition in the Post-Cold War Transition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 80-87; Biddle, Stephen: 'Victory Misunderstood. What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflicts', International Security, vol. 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139-179; Record, Jeffrey: Hollow Victory. A Contrary View of the Gulf War (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, US, 1993), pp. 133-153; Ganyard, Stephen T.: 'Strategic Air Power Didn't Work', US Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 121, no. 8 (August 1995), pp. 31-35. See also the monumental analysis by Cordesman, Anthony & Abraham R. Wagner: The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. 4: The Gulf War (Boulder: Westview, 1996), especially pp. 1-32, 98-102, 209-210, 266-270, 352-359, 432-433, 539-542, 762-764, 829-830, 940-964. Back.
Note 78: See, for instance, Cohen, Eliot A.: 'A Revolution in Warfare', Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996), pp. 37-54; Allard, C. Kenneth: 'The Future of Command and Control: Toward a Paradigm of Information Warfare', in L. Benjamin Ederington & Michael J. Mazarr (eds.): Turning Point. The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 161-192; Cushman, John H.: 'Implications of the Gulf War for Future Military Strategy', ibid., pp. 79-101; McKitrick, Jeffrey et al.: 'The Revolution in Military Affairs', in Barry R. Schneider & Lawrence E. Grinter (eds.): Battlefield of the Future. 21st Century Warfare Issues. Air War College Studies in National Security, No. 3 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1995), pp. 65-97; Stein, George: 'Information War-Cyberwar- Netwar', ibid., pp. 153-179; Davis, Paul (ed.): New Challenges for Defense Planning. Rethinking How Much is Enough (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994). The ideas are inspired by Toffler, Alvin & Heidi Toffler: War and Antiwar: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1993). On the new forms of war see also Møller, Bjørn: 'Ethnic Conflict and Postmodern Warfare. What Is the Problem? What Could Be Done?', Working Papers, no. 12 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, COPRI, 1996). Back.
Note 79: For an excellent analysis of these dynamics in the field of aircraft exports see Forsberg, Randall (ed.): The Arms Production Dilemma. Contraction and Restraint in the World Aircraft Industry (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994). Back.
Note 80: For a comparison of the two states see Bienen, Henry (ed.): Power, Economics, and Security. The United States and Japan in Focus (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1992). On Japan's defence economics see further Samuels, Richard J.: 'Rich Nation, Strong Army'. National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Chinworth, Michael W.: Inside Japan's Defense. Technology, Economics and Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1992). Back.
Note 81: Alic, John A., Lewis M. Branscomb, Harvey Brooks, Ashton B. Carter & Gerald L. Epstein: Beyond Spinoff. Military and Commercial Technologies in a Changing World (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992); Gottlieb, Sanford: Defense Addiction. Can America Kick the Habit? (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 137-148. Back.