

European [security] Union: from existential threat to ontological security

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Abstract

The past ten years have seen the steady escalation of attempts to securitise the EU which, for good or for bad, are now beginning to succeed. Across Europe the EU is fast becoming a convincing reason for groups to mobilise in protest and action - from Copenhagen to Nice to Gothenburg the EU has become a synonym for 'threat'. As this paper will explore, the securitisation of the EU is occurring as it begins to be represented as a threat to ontological security, and eventually existential security, in the lives of Europeans and non-Europeans. But how best to think about the European [security] Union as it attempts to balance the headline security concerns of conflicts on its border with the structural security concerns of its citizens. This thinking involves questioning the very nature of the security the EU is attempting to secure through a series of reflections on the many dimensions of security, the ontopolitical assumptions of differing metatheoretical positions, and finally arguing the need to desecuritize the EU.

I. Securitising the EU

For fifty years the ECSC/ECs/EC/EU institutions, policies, and politics have been for the many, broadly speaking, dull. The activities and study of the ECSC/ECs/EC/EU has been focus of 'faceless bureaucrats' and 'hidden academics' who are rarely seen, heard or read outside of *very* small circles.¹ During this time the activities of the EU have been understood by 'conventional wisdom' (read - hegemonic knowledge) as being boring, slow, bureaucratic and ineffectual. Even academics working in this field use a discourse rich in metaphors of 'opaqueness' (i.e. transparency), 'deficit' (i.e. democracy), 'rotten' (i.e. nepotism), and 'paralysis' (i.e. inaction). How many of us have been keen *not* to mention what we study when asked in polite social circles?

However, I intend to use this article to suggest that, again broadly speaking, the way in which much of what the EU does is seen to be of little interest has been one of its greatest assets. The EU has unsystematically, and with much luck, desecuritized most of the issues

¹ I will tend to use the term EU to describe the ECSC/ECs/EC/EU - a good idea of how *very* small these circles are can be achieved by asking who knows (and who cares) about the differences between these three abbreviations.

concerning European peoples and states which, prior to the 1950s, would have easily been securitised to the worst extent. Thus, by being uninteresting (read - apolitical) and uninspiring (read - lack of mobilisation) the EU has succeeded to a great extent in preventing large scale mobilisation on 'national' or 'class' lines which would have been expected in previous eras.

For the past ten years I have been keen not to have to write this paper on the European [security] Union - I have been grateful that the word 'security' has not needed to be inserted in the title European Union. Hence in this paper the word [security] is bracketed because I do not want, or need to insert it - it is and should be implicit. Despite embarking on research at the beginning of the 1990s to apply security complex theory (Buzan, 1991) to European integration, it soon became clear that the role of the EU was to desecurise whole areas of international policy cooperation including climate change, asylum, investment banking, enlargement, and interestingly, defence (see Manners, 1996 and 2000a). Yet the past ten years have seen the steady escalation of attempts to securitise the EU which, for good or for bad, are now beginning to succeed. Across Europe the EU is fast becoming a convincing reason for groups to mobilise in protest and action - from Copenhagen to Nice to Gothenburg the EU has become a synonym for 'threat'. As this paper will explore, the securitisation of the EU is occurring as it begins to be represented as a threat to ontological security, and eventually existential security, in the lives of Europeans and non-Europeans.

The securitisation of the EU is being achieved by four groups in European society - governments, nationalist movements, (un)civil society, and academics. Member state governments have unsystematically securitised the EU through the evolution of security policy from Maastricht (the first introduction of the word 'security') to Cologne and Helsinki (agreement on goals and timetable for security capabilities). In some respects this securitisation was unintentional as the aim of acquiring military capabilities was to facilitate the Petersberg Tasks incorporated into article 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty. The first half of the Petersberg tasks are quite innocuous and reinforce the humanitarian character of the Union: by referring to 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks ...', but it is the second half which causes greater concern by including 'tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking'. Thus member state governments had given their consent to UN-type tasks, but had allowed the

'Mogadishu line' to be crossed as had become necessary in the former Yugoslavia. In other respects this securitisation is quite intentional - the more federally minded, and anti-American forces, within the Union were keen to create room for autonomous 'peacemaking' capabilities when the US was unable or unwilling to act. Here we can see the 'difference engine' at work, for in order to create a European identity it becomes necessary for political entrepreneurs to create the basis for the construction of difference. And future EU peacemaking activities, potentially involving casualties, would draw a clear blue and gold line between EU and non-EU peoples, states and fears.

The second group active in securitising the EU is that of nationalist movements within member states. The extent of the success of the securitising moves can be seen particularly in Denmark, Britain and Sweden. The failure of two referenda on the TEU and EMU in Denmark, and in particular the mobilisation of leftwing and environmental groups in the service of nationalist discourse, serve as perfect examples of how the EU threatens the 'Danish way'. In Britain the keenness of the political classes and media for emphasising difference indicates the extent to which the implosion of Britishness can only be defended by emphasising non-Europeanness. The unsurprising collapse of the English nationalist Conservative party is not matched by the surprising popularity of the English nationalist press such as the rightwing *Daily* papers and *Telegraph*. One of the interesting inversions is the contrast between the securitisation of the EU in the name of nationalism by the social-democratic left and environmentalists in Denmark and Sweden (including the Greens in Britain), with the Conservative right in Britain (although similar patterns are to be found in Italy). It should be noted that nationalist movements do not necessarily equate to anti-EU, as the pro-European SNP and Plaid Cymru demonstrate in Britain.

The third, and most recent, group active in securitising the EU is that of (un)civil society. This is not to say that there is any such thing as one group (hence the bracket), but that the voices of uncivil society have dramatically drowned out civil society in the act of securitising the EU over the past three years. The EU was built on the notion of consultation and collaboration with what was then know as the 'social partners' - business groups, labour groups and professional groups. In the early 1990s the speed with which the Economic and Social Committee transformed itself from the meeting place for social Europe into the voice of civil society helps to demonstrate this rebranding of heritage.

However, the end of the convincing narrative of the Cold War brought the rise of new social movements disenfranchised and disillusioned with European politics in the 1990s. The new narrative was globalisation and the evil it can do to global society, and the new targets for direct political action were international meetings of any kind. From the WTO to the IMF to the World Bank to the EU, activists gathered to demonstrate about the threat which such multilateral institutions posed to rich western labours and poor southern peasants. This securitisation surprised EU leaders, though not European press, for the first time in Nice when then press corps were 'ATTACKed' by headline grabbing demonstrators. However, the most successful securitisation occurred during the Gothenburg European Council when the entire agenda was diverted by the actions of activist demonstrators and the desperate police response. Gothenburg represented the first time that the EU, committed to preserving peace and respect for human rights, was (in)directly responsible for the shooting of an unarmed demonstrator.

Surprisingly, we academics are playing a part in the securitisation of the EU - contrary to our intended goals or supposed objectivity. No scholar of the EU is unaware of its foundational goal to bring peace and security to Europe, but very little critical reflection is to be found on the extent to which the politicisation of difference - including internal and external security policies - is in itself threatening to Europeans. Hence the more borders are policed or others made foreign, the more that politicisation threatens the asecuriy of the EU. For example, the explosion of attention to the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) by academics has not been accompanied by the necessary critical reflection on the security implications. Volumes of work within untypical EU journals such as *Survival* or *International Affairs* are now dedicated to the study of the EU as a security actor with the beginnings of a 'strategic culture' (Cornish and Edwards, 2001). Thus academics have, inadvertently, played a role in the ongoing securitisation of the EU, the implications of which are yet to fully unfold but together with the three other securitisation discussed above will undoubtedly place the word 'security' in European security Union (EsU). But to what extent is this the right way or best way to study the EU and its role in European Security?

If one looks to the security concerns of Europe's political elite as found, for example, in the Commission's 1996 survey of 'top decision makers' (see appendix I) then the securitisation of the EU *is* necessary to help prevent and resolve 'the outbreak of violent nationalist movements

outside the borders of the European Union' (third most important threat to European interests out of a choice of eleven). As if to reinforce this reading, the most recent Eurobarometer survey from 2000 (see appendix II) convincingly demonstrates that 88% of those asked thought that 'maintaining peace and security in Europe' should be the most important priority of EU action. And unsurprisingly the recent research by the British Ministry of Defence (see appendix III) predicts that 'there is no sign that operational demands are likely to diminish. On the periphery of Europe (and in the Balkans) there are instabilities and tensions which are likely to remain potential sources of problems for European security' (MoD, 2001: point 99). The Commission's most recent public document confirms this reading - 'use of force is clearly always a matter of last resort' (Commission, 2001: 3). Thus we are all agreed that the EU needs to be securitised to maintain peace and security, as well as dealing with conflict on the borders of Europe.

However, if we look again at the same sources we get a very different story which requires the desecuritisation of the EU, not the securitisation. Of the eleven choices presented to 'top decision makers' in 1996, eight threats could not be resolved through securitisation (religious fundamentalism, heavy immigration, ethno-territorial conflict in the EU, nuclear accidents, China becoming world power, extreme nationalism, economic power of Japan, and economic power of USA). In addition, the remaining two threats could, possibly, only be resolved through extreme securitisation to involve extensive conventional and nuclear forces (development of other nuclear powers and remaining military might of Russia) - and in both these cases it must be argued that the best way to avoid them is to assist social, economic and democratic development within those countries implicated. Looking again at the opinions of those sampled in Eurobarometer, we see an even more striking story - although peace and security is the most important priority, the next five priorities (unemployment, drugs & crime, poverty, environment, consumer protection, and human rights) are security concerns best resolved through the EU desecuritising them.² And most surprisingly, the Ministry of Defence concludes that 'our re-assessment of the international security environment ... confirms that we have entered a period of rapid change which will bring new and more diverse risks, challenges and opportunities.... although there continues to be no direct

² Frustratingly for Europe's top decision makers the four main concerns of the current EU agenda (citizen's Europe, the Euro, institutional reform, and foreign policy) are not a priority, while enlargement is regarded as unimportant.

military threat to the UK itself' (MoD, 2001: point 98). A re-reading of the Commission's most recent public document reinforces this re-assessment that - 'this does not mean fighting wars or creating a European army' (Commission, 2001: 3).

So we are left with a dilemma - at a superficial level the EU needs to become the EsU to maintain peace and prevent violent conflict on its borders, but at a deeper level the security concerns of its citizens identifies a need to address 'new and more diverse risks, challenges and opportunities' including socio-economic issues from unemployment to human rights. Romano Prodi identifies this problem succinctly when he identifies the best way to achieve strategic security is to ensure sustainable global development:

We must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global development. After all, only by ensuring sustainable global development can Europe guarantee its own strategic security (Prodi, 2000: 3).

Here then is the dilemma which this paper attempts to address - how best to think about the European [security] Union as it attempts to balance the headline security concerns of conflicts on its border with the structural security concerns of its citizens. This thinking involves not simply looking at the strategic lift capacity, C³I, Military Committee, or other EsU capabilities, but questioning the very nature of the security the EU is attempting to secure through a series of reflections on the many dimensions of security (part II), the ontopolitical assumptions of differing metatheoretical positions (part III), the question of what is the referent object/subject of security (part IV), and finally arguing the need to desecuritize the EU (part V).

II. Security Dimensions

The first step towards gaining an understanding of the study of the European [security] Union is to try to come to terms with five dimensions in the study of security. I have borrowed the terms 'broadening' and 'deepening' from Keith Krause and Michael Williams (1996) and the notion of 'thickening' from Jef Huysmans (1998). I have invented the

terms 'vectoring' (meaning dynamics) to describe the Copenhagen Schools' typology of 'securitisation', and 'being' (meaning form and nature) to discuss subject/object and existential/ontological distinctions.

Broadening Security

The notion of broadening the agenda of those engaged in the study of security emerged during the 1980s in response to three related, but separate critiques from the 'peace movement', the 'post-positivist movement', and from within the 'academic community'.³ Growing out of the anti-nuclear, anti-war, then anti-arms race campaigns of the 1950s to 1980s the peace movement advanced the critique that the study of traditional or conventional security was part of the problem, not the solution (Gusterson, 1999). Over a similar period the post-positivist movement with its critiques of knowledge and scientism also led many to challenge the whole notion of security as being anything other than a discursive performance (Luke, 1989; Mowitt, 1999). Finally, parts of the academic community began to argue the need to broaden the research agenda, led by Buzan (1983) and Ullman (1983).

Broadly speaking, it is possible to identify four widths to the broadening of security - military security, new security, insecurity, and security performance. The traditional or conventional width of security is the focus on military force, as found in dominant in the 1980s. These old conventions included the study of 'national security', 'nuclear deterrence', 'security dilemmas', and 'military strategy' and are still found fiercely debated in leading U.S. journals such as *International Security*. The new width of security is now to be found in the new threats and studies of international security studies which became the new conventions in the 1990s. These new conventions now include '... broadening the agenda to new threats - adding economic, societal, political and environmental risks to the classically dominant military threats' (Huysmans, 1998: 227). The third width of study is that of insecurity - yet to find its way into 'mainstream' academic thinking, but is to be found in discussions of social insecurity, the role of globalisation and development, the 'rebirth' of nationalist movements, transnational terrorism, and other groups or collectivities which thrive on insecurity. The broadest width of security is that of arguing that security is best understood as a political performance of invoking and interpreting danger for self benefit.

³ I am obviously being overly reductionist when I use the terms 'movement' or 'community', but it seems clear there were several different sources of criticism to strategic studies in the 1980s.

Deepening Security

While the broadening of security focuses on debates over what threats and issues to study, the deepening of security is concerned with the units of analysis, as Huysmans puts it:

a deepening of the agenda by introducing new referent objects, that is, units receiving threats - adding individuals, ecological system, community, etc. to the traditional state-centric agenda (Huysmans, 1998: 227).

Although this deepening of security is confusing because it mixes analytical units, such as objects (physical) and subjects (human), it is a discussion which proceeds in three steps. Firstly, the traditional or conventional unit of analysis was primarily the 'nation-state' with the focus on discussions of national security. In parallel with this were discussions of how the nation-state could achieve security and order in conditions of 'international anarchy'. Thus prior to the 1990s, the traditional depth of security studies was the national/international with its focus on states and the inter-state system. The increasing depth of security studies in the 1990s was to look beyond the state/state system for sources of international threat. Most explicitly, the Copenhagen School introduced the idea that there were five depths to security: international systems, international subsystems, units, subunits, individuals (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 5-6). The deepest analyses of security are now seeking to go beyond security studies to focus instead on 'human security' and its concerns for economic and social issues including threats to health (such as the AIDS pandemic), food (such as famines in Sudan, and North Korea), and minimum economic wellbeing (such as poverty being the world's greatest source of insecurity).

Thickening Security

Although both broadening and deepening security calls into question the focus of both threat and threatened, the debate over the thickening of security raises the question of the methodology of analysis. Huysmans has argued that there are three methodological thicknesses to the analysis of security, with differing qualitative results:

...the difference between the three approaches demonstrates that there is a growing degree of sophistication if one moves

from definition to concept to thick signifier (Huysmans, 1998: 229).

His first thickness is that of using a 'security definition' approach synonymous with most of the study of security within the field - '[i]n a definition one attempts to sketch the general essence of a category, in this case the essentials of security' (Huysmans, 1998: 229). A greater thickness is to be found in approaches which engage in a 'conceptual analysis' involving both the study of security and the study of the field of security studies - '[i]t does not concentrate meaning in a single statement but explores more extensively what characterizes a security policy or debate' (Huysmans, 1998: 230). Huysmans' greatest thickness is to suggest that an approach which engages in an analysis of security as a 'thick signifier' yields the most sophisticated and qualitatively valuable methodology - 'interpreting security as a thick signifier brings us to an understanding of how the category 'security' articulates a particular way of organizing forms of life' (Huysmans, 1998: 231).

Vectoring Security

Breadth, depth and thickness are all important, yet static, dimensions of the study of security. The innovation of the Copenhagen School was to introduce the notions of motion, direction, or vectors to security (Wæver, 1995; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998; Diez and Joenniemi, 1999). What these three security vectors do is to reinforce the idea that security is not an objective condition or stasis - it is a subjective process or dynamic - security in this context is a movement. The first security movement is that of 'securitisation' - 'meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure' (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 23-24). If securitisation is a movement from normal politics to abnormal politics then 'desecuritisation' is a movement in the other direction - 'the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere' (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 4). The absence of movement from politicisation to securitisation (or vice-versa) has been described as 'asecurity', which does not necessarily imply an absence of movement - 'Asecurity can always take two forms: either it signifies the absence of securitizations, ...or it is asecurity only within a specific sector, such as the military one, and prompts the move of security into other fields' (Diez and Joenniemi, 1999: 5).

Being Security

The fifth security dimension is that of 'being' - whether we are discussing a form of life (i.e. a person) or an organisation of life (i.e. a state) and whether we are talking about the existence (i.e. life/death) or nature (i.e. understanding of life) of being. This discussion of being security is not as metaphysical as we might think for it involves distinguishing between the subjects or objects of security, as well as the type of security these subjects/objects experience. In terms of subject/object distinction studies in international relations tend refer to 'referent objects' understood as 'things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival' (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 36). In contrast, sociological studies prefer to refer to 'referent subjects' understood as 'the human individual, who is the proper focus, and can be the only subject, of security policy' (McSweeney, 1999: 87). This distinction is important because of the role of subjectivity and objectification in the study of security as Ken Booth (1991: 319-320), Rob Walker (1993:138-140), and Lene Hansen (2000: 288-290) have made clear.

Secondly, in terms of existential/ontological distinction studies in international relations tend to refer to 'existential security' understood as the survival of 'a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society)' (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 21). Again in contrast, sociological studies also refer to 'ontological security' understood as 'confidence or trust that the natural worlds are as they appear to be, including the basic existential parameters of self and social identity' (Giddens, 1984: 50 and 375). As before this distinction is important because although the existential security of referent subjects/objects may be achieved, the 'forces of liberalisation and modernisation [may] produce social and economic dislocation as well as personal uncertainty and insecurity' which could threaten ontological security thereby motivating violence and conflict (Kinnvall, 1999).⁴

III. Ontopolitical Assumptions

To help get a sense of the different and/or competing approaches to the study of security I will attempt to distinguish between differing

⁴ See also Jef Huymans (1998: 241-244) and Bill McSweeney (1999: 154-156) for discussions on ontological security as being the 'mediation of order and chaos' and 'a central condition for action'.

ontopolitical assumptions (Connolly: 1992 in Campbell, 1998: 226-227) of security studies. Inevitably this attempt to represent figuratively different phyla will do injustices to many of those involved or left out, but my intention is to try to make sense of the nature of difference and similarity involved here. I will use a two-step process of first talking about metatheoretical assumptions/conditions and how they relate to the study of social science, then I will attempt to locate security assumptions (groups, divisions, or schools of thought) within these metatheoretical environments.

The four broad metatheoretical conditions discussed here are those of positivism, Critical Theory, IR-variant Social Constructivism, and postmodernism. Positivist methodology is founded on the belief that there is a world out there which can be measured and analysed through scientific means. The positivist approach to the study of politics and international relations is thus based on the twin assumptions of an objective ontology ('there is a world out there') and an objective epistemology ('which can be measured and analysed'). IR-variant Social Constructivist⁵ methodology is constructed on the belief that the world is the product of our social interaction which can be measured and analysed through scientific means. This form of Social Constructivist approach to the study of politics and international relations is built on the assumptions of a subjective ontology ('the world is socially constructed') and an objective epistemology ('which can be measured and analysed').⁶ Critical Theory⁷ methodology is the product of the belief that there is a world out there which cannot be easily measured and analysed because of the contested nature of knowledge production. The Critical Theory approach to the study of politics and international relations is therefore based on the assumptions of an objective ontology ('there is a world out there') and a subjective epistemology ('the contested nature of knowledge production'). Finally, postmodern methodology is located in the belief that the world is the product of our social interaction or performance and which cannot be easily measured and analysed


⁵ IR-variant Social Constructivism appears to draw on three strands of social theory (interactionism, phenomenology, and linguistics) which many would argue are contradictory (see Palan, 2000: 577). Wendt, Campbell and Behnke prefer the term 'modernist constructivism' (Campbell, 1998: 219; Behnke, 2000: 53).

⁶ It might be appropriate to suggest that this epistemologically-constricted variation of social constructivism may be better described as 'constrictivism' – see Berger and Luckmann (1967), Austin (1961) and Bishop (1967).

⁷ Critical Theory (big 'C', big 'T') of the Frankfurt School variety, rather than the broader notion of 'critical social theory' or the even broader idea of being 'critical'.

because of the contested nature of knowledge production. The postmodern approach to the study of politics and international relations could be thought to be found in the assumptions of a subjective ontology ('the world is the product of our social interaction or performance') and a subjective epistemology ('the contested nature of knowledge production'). These four broad metatheoretical approaches may be represented figuratively through reference to their ontological and epistemological views, as figure one illustrates.

Figure One: Ontology, Epistemology and Theory⁸



[adapted from Manners, 2000b: 15]

The second step is for me to try to locate differing approaches to the study of security ('phyla') within these four broad metatheoretical assumptions/conditions. Again, I will focus on the four positions of positivism, IR-variant social constructivism, Critical Theory, and postmodernism, but this time I will introduce various writers whose approach serve as examples (no more, no less) in the study of security.

Positivism and Security

Working with the positivist approach to the study of security can be found two broad groups which may be described as the 'strategic studies' and

⁸ Note that there are no lines on the figure - the positions of positivist and post-positivist are relative to each other, not absolutes.

the 'security studies' phyla. Both are described as falling within the 'objectivist traditional of security studies' by Bill McSweeney because of their 'objective and unproblematic' approach to questions of ontology and epistemology in the definition of the object - security (McSweeney, 1999: 81). However, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver go further in order to distinguish between 'traditionalists' in strategic studies who take the 'old military and state-centred view' and 'wideners' in security studies who wish to 'widen the security agenda by claiming security status for issues and referent objects' beyond the military arena (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 1). The study of the European [security] Union (EsU) is primarily to be found within the positivist approach, although the absence of any military function has tended to ensure most writing occurs within the security studies phyla.

Strategic Studies

Much acknowledged by scholars of security is the objectivist and traditionalist position that strategic studies is about 'the study of the threat, use and control of military force' (Walt, 1991: 212 in Ayoob, 1997: 124; in Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 3; and in McSweeney, 1999: 34). Alongside Stephen Walt, John Chipman and Colin Gray are also much cited as representing and defending the security of the strategic studies discipline (Williams and Krause, 1997: ix-x; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 3-4; McSweeney, 1999: 32-440). Prior to the June 1999 Cologne Declaration on CEDSP strategic studies expressed no interest in examining the EsU because of its absence of military force. However since 1999 a number of studies have appeared in the strategic studies genre focussing on 'defence' and 'capability' in an EU context, including works from Kori Shake (1999), David Yost (2000), and Jolyon Howorth (2000).

Security Studies

In contrast are Richard Ullman's (1991) and Adrian Hyde-Price's (1991) attempts to re-examine post-Cold War European security from a broader perspective in the spirit of Buzan's 1991 call to widen the concept of security in creating an 'agenda for international security studies'. Although still positivist and objectivist in their approaches, the security studies scholars are committed to widening their analyses to include non-military and alternative security issues which may not place the state at the centre of the analysis. This broadening of security studies brought the EsU closer to the field of study, to the extent that it increasingly became a prerequisite to talk of the Western European

Union (WEU), if not the EU, as being a 'security actor' in the post Maastricht period. Thus security studies now 'introduce' (Dorman and Treacher, 1995), 'recast' (Sperling and Kirchner, 1997), 'rethink' (Park and Rees, 1998), 'enlarge' (Croft *et al*, 1999), and 'explore' (Aggestam and Hyde-Price, 2000) the EsU as a factor in the field of European security.

Constructivism and Security

Expressing dissatisfaction with positivist security studies, IR scholars with an interest in embracing post-positivist or inter-subjective ontologies have developed an IR-variant constructivist approach to the study of security. IR scholars have developed a unique variant of social constructivism (un)balanced in a paradoxical 'via media between positivist epistemology and post-positivist ontology' (Wendt, 1999: 91).⁹ It is not easy to identify phyla within the social constructivist approach, as James Der Derian has recently commented:

What is constructivism? In search for the answers some might venture only so far from the mainstream as the near-abroad, to the recently emergent 'schools' of constructivism clustered, not surprisingly, around a variety of universities which have expediently assembled over the last decade a critical mass of professors, graduate students, and fine scholarship, as demonstrated by the 'Minnesota', 'Copenhagen', 'Aberystwyth', and some might now add, 'Cornell' Schools (Der Derian, 2000: 80).

However, I have chosen to identify two groups - one broad, one narrow - which may be described as the 'constructivist security' and the 'Copenhagen School' phyla. Although I agree with Der Derian that both these groups are 'recently emergent', I will take care to differentiate between the broad group of 'constructivist security' using IR-variant constructivist methodologies in the study of security and the 'Copenhagen School' of security studies which relies on speech acts for its discursive construction of security. Der Derian's 'Minnesota' and

⁹ For a brief genealogy of IR-variant social constructivism see Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986), Kratochwil (1989), Onuf (1989), Wendt (1992), and Adler (1997).

'Aberystwyth' schools will be considered separately under 'post-structuralism' and 'Critical Theory' respectively (see pgs. 17 and 15).¹⁰

Constructivist Security

'Beware the Blob of Constructivism!' warns Der Derian (2000: 77) and so for constructivist security - it is far too easy to blob all constructivist security analysis together. The group I am referring to here are primarily interested in the observation, following Wendt, that 'security is what states make of it' - i.e. that security is intersubjectively constructed in international relations. Within this group *The Culture of National Security* edited by Peter Katzenstein (1996) is generally held up as an example of constructivist security analysis (see Campbell, 1998: 217-222), although the work of Adler and Barnett (1996, 1998), Lipschultz (1995; and Crawford, 1997), and Fierke (1997 and 1998) are also important here. The introduction of constructivist approaches to the study of the EU by Jørgensen (1997) and Christiansen, Jørgensen and Wiener (1999, 2000) has been only slightly mirrored in the study of the EsU by the work of Fierke and Wiener (1999, 2000), Glarbo Andersen (1999, 2000), McSweeney (1999), and Aggestam (2000). Thus constructivist security studies are now 'constructing' (Fierke and Wiener) a 'reconstruction' (Glarbo Andersen) of 'role conceptions' (Aggestam) in a 'sociology' (McSweeney) of the EsU as a factor in the field of European security.

Copenhagen School

In contrast the Copenhagen School of security studies¹¹ has grown out of the interesting compromises between two different metatheoretical positions - the (neorealist) positivism of Buzan with the (post-structuralist) post-positivism of Wæver, neatly captured here:

Although our philosophical position is in some sense more radically constructivist in holding security to be a political construction and not something the analyst can describe as it 'really' is, in our purposes we are closer to traditional security studies, which at its best attempted to grasp security

¹⁰ Such simple delineation of clear-cut schools is problematic as the 'mixed volumes' edited by Krause and Williams (1997) as well as Kelstrup and Williams (2000) illustrate.

¹¹ It is important not to confuse the 'Copenhagen School' of security studies (Buzan, Wæver, Lemaitre, Kelstrup *et al*) with the 'Copenhagen School' of integration studies (Jørgensen, Christiansen, Wiener, Risse *et al*). When coining the term 'Copenhagen School' McSweeney was explicitly referring to the former, while Moravcsik thought he was talking about the latter. Only Hansen and Diez have engaged in both Copenhagen Schools.

constellations and thereby steer them into benign interactions (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998: 35).

Thus, the idea that security is whatever somebody says is a fairly post-structural approach whereas the idea that existing security actors are the main focus is a fairly positivist approach. Over a period of fourteen years the Copenhagen School approach has evolved through a series of five core collaborative works (excluding Buzan and Wæver's individual contributions) - *European Security: Problems of Research on Non-Military Aspects* (Jahn, Lemaitre, and Wæver, 1987); *European Polyphony: Perspectives Beyond East-West Confrontation* (Wæver, Lemaitre, and Tromer, 1989); *The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for Post-Cold War Europe* (Buzan, Kelstrup, Lemaitre, Tromer, and Wæver, 1990); *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998); and *Regions and Powers in the Post-Cold War Security Order* (Buzan and Wæver, forthcoming). The impact and controversies which the Copenhagen School has had on the study of regional security, and European security in general, can be witnessed in the series of exchanges in Europe's leading IR journals: *Review of International Studies* - see McSweeney (1996, 1998), Buzan and Wæver (1997), Williams (1998); *European Journal of International Relations* - see Huysmans (1998a, 1998b); *Cooperation and Conflict* - see Eriksson (1999, 2000), Wæver (1999), Behnke (2000); *Millennium* - see Hansen (2000). Although the Copenhagen School has developed regional security complex theory for use in Asia, Europe and the rest of the world, the study of the EsU has not been its major focus of analysis. There have been a few examples of analysis of the EsU from a Copenhagen School perspective - in particular the work of Wæver (1996, 2000) and the brief case study in Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998: 179-189). However, as Werner (1998: 6) and Hansen (2000: 300) argue, the main reason why the EsU has not been a focus of the Copenhagen School is, as this paper suggests, because it has successfully desecuritized integration.

Critical Theory and Security

Like the IR constructivists, critical scholars with a dissatisfaction in positivist security studies, but a greater concern for the epistemological and emancipatory challenges presented by the study of security. More explicitly these scholars have drawn upon the post-marxist concerns of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, together with an overriding

concern with failure of security studies to develop a normative, moral and emancipatory approach in its work. Unlike IR constructivists, Critical Theory studies 'attempt to uncover some of the epistemological and conceptual foundations of the orthodox conception of security' (Krause and Williams, 1997: xvi).¹² Critical Theory scholars begin by rejecting 'the evolutionary and scientific knowledge that underlies neorealist [positivist] security studies' (Krause and Williams, 1997: 38) - in this respect they go further than most IR-variant forms of constructivism by displacing both 'a positivist epistemological formulation and a conception of the sovereign realm of domestic politics' (Krause and Williams, 1997: 39). Thus, the work I am referring to here are primarily interested in the observation, following Cox, that 'security is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose' - i.e. that security is generally produced to serve the purposes of certain people and states in international relations. It is relatively easy to identify to distinct phyla within the Critical Theory approaches to security as they are both fairly self-identifying - Critical Security Studies and Radical Security Studies.

Critical Security Studies

If Critical Security Studies takes place anywhere, then it is within Der Derian's 'Aberystwyth' school, although the landmark book, *Critical Security Studies*, edited by Keith Krause and Michael Williams was not a Aberystwyth production. Eric Herring clearly identifies Ken Booth (1991, 1997), Krause and Williams (1996, 1997), and Wyn Jones (1995, 1999) as providing the (anti)foundations of 'a sub-field of security studies is very much in its infancy.' (Herring, 1999a: 35). Additional contributions are also to be found in the work of Pinar Bilgin (1999) and Hélène Viau (1999). Described as 'the pioneer of this field' (Herring, 1999: 35 fn. 105), Booth's work in particular helps to illustrate the extent to which Critical Security Studies represents a group of scholars who are keen to move from objectivity to subjectivity in order to 'play a part in (re)forming the historical and recent facts of regional security as a necessary foundation for reforming regional security' (Booth and Vale, 1997: 354). Interestingly, there is very little work within Critical Security Studies which directly addresses the EsU - this is partially because of the small number of scholars within this group, but also because of interest elsewhere, such as Southern Africa (Booth) and the Middle East (Bilgin). Only Williams has worked on Europe and the EU - on 'the myths of Europe'

¹² For a brief genealogy of Critical Theory in IR see Cox (1981), Hoffman (1987), Linklater (1990), Neufeld (1993), and Wyn Jones (2000).

(Hansen and Williams, 1999) and 'integration and the politics of community in the New Europe' (Kelstrup and Williams, 2000).

Radical Security Studies

Whilst being sympathetic to the Copenhagen and Critical Security schools, Radical Security Studies scholars conceive of themselves as holding a far more ethical and radical perspective on Critical Security:

Radical security studies (RSS) involves radicalism in two senses: it has an empirical engagement in which it takes seriously the ways in which 'we' can be threats to security by looking in detail at uncomfortable cases, and it has an epistemology which rejects the claim that the facts speak for themselves (Herring, 1999a: 35).

Hence Radical Security Studies seeks to challenge epistemological claims made on our behalf by democratic states and liberal thinkers. Its two main protagonists, Eric Herring and Michael Sheehan, have sought to pursue a radical Security Studies agenda by examining claims about 'rogue states' (Herring, 2000), 'ethical foreign policy' (Herring, 1999b), and 'international security' (Sheehan, 2000). As Herring puts it, 'RSS combines the problematisation of knowledge with a serious engagement with the detail of policy in the service of common humanity rather than the national interest.' (Herring, 1999a: 36). Unsurprisingly, the critiques of Radical Security Studies have yet to be applied to the study of the EsU, but given its gradual securitisation, such an approach may soon be necessary as the recent Macedonian reception of non-American NATO forces illustrates.

Postmodernism and Security

More than any of the three metatheoretical approaches discussed postmodernist study of security is characterised by diversity. Simply to state what a postmodern approach to security is problematic - other than to generalise that security is a social/cultural/political performance, production, writing, representation, or imagination. As these six extracts from writers in this metatheoretical approach illustrate, 'security' is a cosmos-shifting notion:

Through the rituals of 'national security' it has become possible to link all forms of human insecurity to the military defence of the state, despite the fact that states have become increasingly

[S]ecurity turns-out to have a much wider register - has always and necessarily had a much wider register, something which modern international security studies have begun to register - than that of preserving our so-called basic values, or even our mutual

The dilemmas of reformulating security suggests that it is time to reconsider seriously the whole concept, its rise to political prominence with the origins of the Cold War, and

Should the state project of security be successful in the terms in which it is articulated, the state would cease to exist. Security, as the absence of movement would result in death via stasis. Ironically,

Security practices articulate the place of the political. By separating life and death, and consequently demanding a mediation between them, they define

[W]hereas modernist scholars (including constructivists) conceptualise security as referring to a pre-existing entity and its

The work of postmodernists (including post-structuralists) raises many questions about the role of positivism in the study of security from methodological, historiographical, epistemological, ontological, and normative viewpoints. The postmodernists share the concerns of IR constructivists regarding questions of positivist ontology and intersubjectivity in security studies. Similarly, postmodernists share the concerns of Critical Theorists for the epistemological and emancipatory challenges presented by the study of security. The radical difference for postmodern security studies is the combination of these two concerns in this approach. As the six quotation boxes above illustrate, the concerns of postmodern security scholars range from the critical reconsiderations of the poststructuralists such as Simon Dalby and Jef Huysmans to the radical critiques of postmodernists such as Michael Dillon and David Campbell. This observation overstates the extent to which it is possible to differentiate any distinct group within and between these approaches, but I will try to do so by differentiating between poststructural and postmodern security.¹³

¹³ 'In keeping with current conventions, I treat postmodernity as a broad term encompassing a complex historical condition, and poststructuralism as a reference to a more specific

Poststructural Security

For Dalby, 'poststructural dissidents in international relations also question the whole operation of security as a discourse for making sense of contemporary politics' (1997: 10). Campbell identifies a number of critical scholars working within constructivism who may sometimes be 'intellectually allied with poststructuralists' (1998: 222). It may be helpful to distinguish between two groups of scholars working within poststructural security studies - those poststructuralists associated with the research group on ethics and transnational politics at the London Centre of International Relations, and those using a 'critical constructivist approach' (Weldes *et al*, 1999: 9) associated with the University of Minnesota and its 'borderlines' book series - Der Derian's 'Minnesota' school. In the first case the poststructural work of Huysmans (1995, 1998, 2000) on security and migration, Jabri (1996, 1997) on conflict and violence, and Bigo (2000a, 2000b) on policing and security all contribute to generating critical perspectives around questions of ethics and the political in the 'Möbius ribbon' (Bigo, 2000a: 171) of Inside/outside discourses on security and violence. In the latter case the core of critical constructivist work by Jutta Weldes and Mark Laffey focus on the construction of national interest (Weldes, 1996, 1999), the role of ideas in foreign policy (Laffey and Weldes, 1997), and the cultural construction of insecurity (Weldes *et al*, 1999). Although the focus of the Minnesota 'school' has been outside of Europe, the work of Dalby on post-cold war security (1993) and Lene Hansen on security in the former Yugoslavia (1997, 2001), has been focused on European security. While the poststructural security studies of Huysmans and Bigo on migration, policing and security, have involved important discussions of the EsU.

Postmodern Security


For Campbell "postmodernism" can refer to an *interpretive analytic*, a critical attitude that attempts, contrary to contemporary forces, to 'think the present historically" (1998: 213). From this we might infer that postmodern security studies are an interpretive analytic method which seeks to think about the historical basis and practices of security. But Dillion's politics of security go further 'for security is a package which tell you what you are as it tells you what to die for; which tells you what to love as it tells you what to defend; and which tells you what is right as it tells you what is wrong' (Dillion, 1996: 33). From this we might infer that

response to philosophical dilemmas that have become especially pressing under postmodern conditions' (Walker, 1993: 188-189 fn. 8

postmodern security studies are a political philosophy which seeks to think about the historical basis and practice of the political through an analysis of security. Relying on self classification potentially places the work of Campbell (1998; and Dillon, 1993), Dillon (1996), Bradley Klein (1989, 1997), and Mathias Albert (1998) somewhere in area of postmodern security studies. In the study of the EsU there are three writers whose emerging work is of interest - that on 'the enemy inside' and 'postmodernising' security' by Andreas Behnke (1998, 1999, 2000) and that on 'security and political identity' by Thomas Diez and Pertti Joenippi (1999).

With much controversy, and potentially many mistakes, it might be able to locate the eight previous discussions of security onto figure two: security phyla below.

Figure Two: Security Phyla



What I hope this figure illustrates is the extent to which the study of security involves asking a wide variety of questions about methodological, ontological, and epistemological assumptions before engaging in analysis. The eight approaches interrogated here all have a different angle, a different ethos to their work, and all of which we need to be familiar with in the study of the EsU. However, the metatheoretical basis for analysis is only the second component of reaching a further understanding of what security the EU is attempting to secure and to suggest that this may be best achieved by desecuritisation.

IV. Desecuritising the EU

The debate over European security is thus preoccupied with which institutions or arrangements might be resuscitated or put in place to contain challenges, control ambiguity, and (ostensibly) provide security. The question is, though, can any inclusive security order be structured in such a way that its associated technologies of discipline do not specify exceptions and mandate exclusions? If Europe is any guide, then so long as the traditional conception of security is the terrain of the debate, the answer appears to be no.... As a consequence, and unless there is a rethinking of 'the political', the prospects of a liberal reformism on matters of European security or any 'post-cold war' internal structure producing a benign and nonexclusive order seem dim (Campbell, 1998: 197).

As I have suggested in this paper, securitising the EU into the EsU is likely to produce a malignant and exclusive order, to invert Campbell. Perhaps what we need to do in the study of the EsU is desecuritize it back to the EU through focussing our studies on its successful historical desecuritisations:

The European project will only remain credible if it responds to growing calls from its citizens for greater unity and more effective ways of building and defending peace, stability and prosperity on the European continent and throughout the world (Commission, 1997).

Thus, as far as the European Commission is concerned, the 'European project' must respond to the demands of its citizens by focusing on its three key desecuritisations on the European continent: peace (through democratisation), stability (through governance), and prosperity (through economic integration). I would further argue that if the EU is going to broaden this desecurity 'throughout the world' then it will need to normalise all three through its use of normative power. Finally, I would suggest that we really need to rethink the subject of security as a field of study. In particular, to what extent are we interested in studying the EsU in order to improve the security of Europeans, or to what extent are we doing so in order to security the study of security in Europe.

Desecuritisation through Democracy – the Pacific Union

The EU is first and foremost a pacific union built on the desire to prevent further war between its members. It has a pacific treaty base which spells out its basic principles in its the Common Provisions thus:

The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.
(TEU, article 6 (1))

As a result of its historical experience of the perils of totalitarianism, the EC/EU was founded upon notions of democratic peace, and has used them as the basis for membership ever since 1957.

However, the important of the principle of democracy come to the fore after the events of 1989 and became a touchstone of both internal and external policy from 1991 onwards. The Treaty of Amsterdam amending the TEU even went as far as including a 'punishment clause' in 1997 for cases of Member States who breach the principles of article 6:

The Council ... may determine the existence of a serious breach by a Member state of principles mentioned in Article 6 (1).... Where such a determination has been made, the Council ... may decide to suspend certain rights (TEU, article 7).

Thus, the EU was built on the principle of democracy, grew on the principle of democracy and now seeks to pursue that democracy in its

external relations. The commitment to democratic conditionality developed in 1995 and now required of all aid relationships illustrates this commitment perfectly (COM (95) 216 final).

Desecuritisation through Governance – the Political Community

DETERMINED to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe (TEC, Preamble, paragraph 1).

The EU is becoming a provider of political community, with implications both for its 'citizens' and for its role in a global context. The attainment of the holy grail of federalism – 'an ever closer union' remains the means by which many see security in Europe being truly achieved through political Union

If security is to be achieved in Europe then the strategy of basing it on a community of privileged European states needs to be questioned. The basis of conflict resolution between CEEC states is increasingly directed through dialogue associated with democratic institutions and cultures, as well as the EU itself. It is, however, an open question as to where the boundaries of this zone of peace and stability lies, and whether the reformulation of the European 'self' is appropriate for the post-Cold War conditions of Europe.

Desecuritisation through Integration – the Economic Community

RESOLVED by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty... (EC, Preamble, paragraph 8).

The EU is also an economic community based on the mutual benefits gained from the pooling of resources, beginning with coal and steel and ending with money. Indeed it was this economic function that led directly from the European Coal and Steel Community, avoiding the European Defence Community, to the European Communities in 1957. Despite the economic problems of the 1970s and 1980s this economic community has continued to bring benefits in terms of prosperity and welfare which has provided so much of the 'glue' for European states in the past fifty years.

It could be argued that as the economic community reaches its apex with the launch of the euro at the beginning of 2002 this gives a measure of

the degree to which EU states (with three notable exceptions) trust each other and are willing to pool not just their resources, but their futures as well. For some, however, the limits of security brought by the economic community were reached with the single market programme, and since that time believe that further integration actually threatens their peace and stability. For the states of Central and Eastern Europe the attainment of economic community still remains the end point in their return to Europe and their beginnings as 'normal' European states.

Desecuritisation through Normalisation – the normative power

The broad normative basis of the European Union has been developed over the past fifty years through a series of declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and conditions (Manners, 2000b: 32-34, 2002: 242-244).¹⁴ These norms are: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, human rights, social progress, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance. The central component of the normative power Europe is that it exists as being different to pre-existing political forms, and that this particular difference pre-disposes it to act in a normative way. Thus the security concerns of both member states and EU citizens become normalised as the foundations for EU politics and policies. However returning to Prodi again, security 'on the European continent' can only be achieved in a sustainable manner if its structural basis of peace, stability and prosperity is shared 'throughout the world', hence he is equally concerned that:

Europe needs to project its model of society into the wider world. We are not simply here to defend our own interests: we have a unique historic experience to offer. The experience of liberating people from poverty, war, oppression and intolerance. We have forged a model of development and continental integration based on the principles of democracy, freedom and solidarity - and it is a model that works. A model of a consensual pooling of sovereignty in which every one of us accepts to belong to a minority.

¹⁴ The Treaty Base is found in Article 6 of the TEU, Articles 2 of TEC and TEU, Articles 6 and 13 of TEC; the Copenhagen Criteria are in the conclusions of the June 1993 European Council; and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union reinforces Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Citizenship, and Justice.

Thus a sustainable European desecuritisation can only be achieved through a parallel sustainable global desecuritisation. By this I do not simply mean the absence of war and the achievement of peace. The very notion of national and international endorses the construction and mobilisation of difference which provides the engine for conflict. What I mean is that global desecuritisation can only be achieved through the global normalisation of the foundational norms of the EU, all nine of them. Thus the main security role of the EU must be to emphasise and exercise its normative power, not to replicate the violent narrative of 'the state' or 'the international'.

V. The Subject of Security and the Security of the Subject

Is the purpose of studying the EsU to understand European security, or to secure the continued viability of security studies as the EU threatens to desecuritize Europe? As Prodi and Campbell have emphasised, security studies appears unwilling to make the intellectual leap required to understand that any new European security order implies the reinvention of 'technologies of discipline' that lead to exclusion and reaction within and without the EU. I would argue that if the purpose of security studies is to understand and facilitate the achievement of security then...the focus (or referent subject) of that study must be human concerns, not the constitution of order.

We certainly need to be fluent in all metatheoretical positions and the implicit ontopolitical assumptions before we engage in security studies of the EU for three reasons:

- because to not do so does normative damage through securitisation;
- once we are fluent in all four languages we can then engage in dialogue and debate;
- we may settle on one position, but at least we will be familiar with its problems;
- or we may wish to engage in 'grand theorising' (Buzan, 1991: 481).

If our focus is human, or state, concerns (fears?) or constitution (survival strategy?) then we probably need to move beyond security, perhaps to post-security, in one of three ways:

- subsume security into a discussion of politics and politicisation;
- refocus on security involving direct violence (conflict studies) and structural violence (peace studies);

- we may need to consider a way of reconstituting the study of security by taking onboard the insights of the four ontopolitical approaches outlined above.

Finally, the study of security and the EU requires us to be aware of both existential (traditional) and ontological (non-traditional) security concerns. This involves the study of direct violence to humans and states, but it also demands the study of structural violence in human society (Galtung, 1969). Without both we will always have a partial understanding of the European [security] Union and its role in securing peace.

Appendix I - Top Decision Makers Survey, 1996

3. Threats to European interests

The development of religious fundamentalism and the development of certain countries into nuclear powers are found at the head of the list of those threats considered affecting the vital interests of Europe in the next ten years.

	<i>Mean Scores</i>
1. A possible progression of religious fundamentalism.	6.2
2. The possible development into nuclear powers of countries other than China, France, Great Britain, Russia and the USA.	6.2
3. The outbreak of violent nationalist movements outside the borders of the European Union.	5.9
4. Heavy immigration from non-European Union countries.	5.9
5. Increase in ethnic and/or territorial conflicts inside European countries.	5.8
6. A possible nuclear accident like that at Chernobyl inside European countries.	5.8
7. The development of China into a world power	5.4
8. The outbreak of extreme nationalists movements within the European Union.	5.4
9. The economic power of Japan.	5.1
10. The economic power of the USA.	5.1
11. The remaining military might of Russia.	4.8

An overall analysis of the number of threats felt by respondents indicates that those countries contiguous with the Mediterranean recorded higher levels of concern on most of the issues presented. Conversely low scores were found in Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands. Analysis by the five groups shows that the media group was likely to anticipate more threats than the other four groups.

[*Top Decision Makers Survey*, Summary Report September 1996, Fieldwork: 19 Feb. - 20 May 1996]

Appendix II - EU Actions: Priority or Not? 2001

Eurobarometer 54, Q. 5.2

	% Priority	% Not a Priority	Difference
1. Peace & security	88	7	81
2. Unemployment	88	8	80
3. Drugs & crime	87	8	79
4. Poverty	87	8	79
5. Environment	86	9	75
6. Consumers	81	14	67
7. Human rights	78	14	64
8. Citizens	70	21	49
9. The Euro	55	38	17
10. EU reform	49	34	15
11. Foreign policy	48	40	8
12. Enlargement	26	62	-36

Percentage "don't know" not shown

Eurobarometer 54 , Fieldwork Nov - Dec 2000

1. Maintaining peace and security in Europe [**Peace & security**]
 2. Fighting unemployment [**Unemployment**]
 3. Fighting organised crime and drug trafficking [**Drugs & crime**]
 4. Fighting poverty and social exclusion [**Poverty**]
 5. Protecting the environment [**Environment**]
 6. Protecting consumers and guaranteeing the quality of products [**Consumers**]

7. Guaranteeing the rights of the individual and respect for the principles of democracy in Europe [**Human rights**]
 8. Getting closer to European citizens, for example by giving them more information about the European Union, its policies and its institutions and bodies [**Citizens**]
 9. Successfully implementing the single European currency, the euro [**The euro**]
 10. Reforming the institutions of the European Union and the way they work [**EU reform**]

11. Asserting the political and diplomatic importance of the European Union around the world [**Foreign policy**]

12. Welcoming new member countries [**Enlargement**]

Appendix III - The Future Strategic Context for Defence, 2001 Summary Analysis

98. Our re-assessment of the international security environment and experience since the SDR confirms that we have entered a period of rapid change which will bring new and more diverse risks, challenges and opportunities. These are likely to give rise to a wide range of operational challenges, although there continues to be no direct military threat to the UK itself.

99. There is no sign that operational demands are likely to diminish. On the periphery of Europe (and in the Balkans) there are instabilities and tensions which are likely to remain potential sources of problems for European security. At the same time, environmental, demographic, economic and social changes will affect the security situation, potentially causing or aggravating conflict or giving rise to continuing and, quite likely, increasing pressures for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

100. The 'worst case' single military contingency for which we need to plan is the participation of British forces in high intensity warfighting operations in a regional conflict, requiring deployment of forces at a similar scale to the Gulf War. It is very unlikely that any potential adversary would risk a direct military confrontation with NATO provided that the Alliance maintains the effectiveness of its conventional forces as a deterrent, but we cannot rule out the possibility of such a conflict arising through miscalculation or accident.

101. We must therefore continue to structure our forces so that they are capable of being successful against all likely opponents in a single warfighting operation broadly on the scale of the Gulf War. In the light of increasing demands to contribute to peace support and humanitarian operations we need also to take account of the likely requirement to mount concurrent operations at smaller scales.

102. Forces engaged in peace support operations will need to be rapidly deployable, sustainable in theatre, and may sometimes need to have (or be backed up by) warfighting capabilities to do their job effectively. Some potential opponents, perhaps fielding individual Russian, Chinese or Western military

capabilities and developments in civil technology, could offer significant challenges to coalition intervention forces. Planning capabilities based on warfighting will give us the ability to contribute to other types of operation but the reverse is not true. Optimising the force structure for either a warfighting or non-warfighting role is not the way forward. Building a

force by planning for both will produce a more robust force structure with wider utility.

103. Against this background, Europe needs to improve its collective defence capability both to improve its contribution to NATO and to give the EU the capacity to act where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. Resource pressures are likely to place growing emphasis on effective multinational approaches and consideration of limited role specialisation.

104. We also need to work with other Government Departments and NGOs to alleviate the security risks we have identified, through measures which help prevent or resolve conflict, or which assist security sector reform. In particular, we must work to develop, build and maintain constructive relationships which strengthen European security. We must also work to maintain and improve relations with key players on the international stage, particularly Russia and China, seeking to work in partnership in responding to regional crises.

105. Our Armed Forces will need to be versatile, adaptable and deployable. Military concepts and doctrine will need to evolve to keep pace with trends in the future operating environment. Radical changes in the nature of threats will require matching changes in concepts and doctrine. Weapon systems and tactics will need to evolve to cope with limitations on rules of engagement caused by public, international and allied opinion, and by developments in international law. Preserving technological superiority will be vital to success, particularly through maintaining access to US military technology. In key technology areas, we must maintain the capabilities which will enable us to operate effectively alongside coalition partners.

106. Recruiting and retaining sufficient high quality people will be more than ever critical. Demographic and social factors will make this more difficult. It will become increasingly important to maintain the widest possible recruiting pool, by not excluding or deterring certain groups in society, and we will need to place even more emphasis on personnel issues, such as welfare and training, and elimination of unreasonable pressures on service personnel and their families. We also need to consider ways of reducing our requirements for military manpower, such as through equipment design and by greater use of the private sector and manpower substitution, while addressing the problem of augmentation in crises. This may require a shift of emphasis in investment from equipment to personnel, or towards technologies and procedures which enable us to make better use of people.

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