Globalisation and the Eroding
State Monopoly of Legitimate Violence

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This paper is an attempt to trace the link between processes which are usually bundled under the label "globalisation" and the eroding state monopoly of legitimate violence. In a nutshell, I will claim that globalisation has the dual effect of displacing politics and of diffusing authority, thereby diminishing the state's legitimacy and capacity to monopolize violence respectively.

The displacement of politics undermines the *legitimacy* on the basis of which the state claims a monopoly of legitimate violence. An increasingly transnational definition of the boundaries of the political and of who is part of the political process, combined with the privatisation of formerly public regulation, have diminished the centrality of state sponsored processes in the determination of public affairs. And as state sponsored political processes seem decreasingly adequate, the claim that the state is legitimately monopolizing violence for the sake of these processes is correspondingly weakened.

At the same time, a diffusion of authority is undermining the state *capacity* for legitimate violence. Globalisation creates new sources of authority both for states and those contesting states. And since state control continues to be quintessential, there is growing competition for the control over the state. The run on the state results in a portioning up (or privatisation/feudalization) of public

authority by the groups or individuals struggling to control it. As political processes are controlled, or taken over, by non-state authorities, they also challenge the capacity of public authorities to preserve and use the state's monopoly of violence.

This claim has important intellectual and political implications. If globalisation and its pivotal actors can partly explain the erosion of state monopoly of legitimate violence, then they have to be given serious consideration when we think about where and with whom we locate the responsibility for violence, and hence for where diplomatic efforts should be directed. Yet, with a few notable exceptions[2], work on war and violence goes on fairly much as usual. The prevailing attitude seems to be that if globalisation there is, it has no significant impact on the centrality of the state and the state system in the regulation of violence. It is as if the argument that states are still important actors, something which needs not be denied, forestalls any serious consideration of the changes that happened. For instance, in his recent "Social theory of international politics", Alexander Wendt justifies his state centrism – and his total neglect of transnational phenomena – with the argument that the control of violence is the precondition for all other social activities and "states are still the primary medium through which the effects of other actors on the regulation of violence are channelled into the world system" (Wendt 1999: 9). But clearly, this argument is untenable if, as this paper argues, a growing share of the regulation of violence escapes the state and state actors. Stubbornly confining the study of international politics to states will then merely lead to misconstrued and incomplete understanding of current international political processes, including war and peace.

The argument proceeds in three steps. First, I will argue that a central characteristic of "new wars" is the erosion of the state monopoly of legitimate violence. Then, I draw the links between globalisation and this erosion focusing

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[2] For example, the "Copenhagen school" provides a framework for analyzing securitization which encompasses non-state security and makes it possible to account for why the kind of processes developed below may be translated into violent conflict (Buzan, Wæver et al. 1998). Similarly, in peace research more generally there is a long standing and well alive tradition for taking non-state (and economic) factors into account (Balázs and Wiberg 1993; Wiberg and Scherrer 1999).

first on the diminishing *legitimacy* and then on the eroding *monopoly* of the state control over violence.

1. Three conceptual caveats on "globalisation", "state" and "violence"

Before getting on with the details of this argument, I need to introduce three important caveats on each of the central concepts respectively.

The first concerns the use of globalisation. Globalisation is used here to indicate a process by which transnational social space is created. This space can be thought of either in terms of how actors subjectively define the social space in which they act, or in terms of social relations actually becoming transnational.[3] Projects and ideologies clearly have an important place in this process, but should not be confused with the process itself. It is still open to investigation and debate how much any specific set of social relations are "globalised", what the implications and causes of globalisation are, how novel globalisation is and how it can best be studied.[4]

Consequently, "globalisation" cannot be used without further specifications, whether it is about justifying political choices or explaining social developments. Contrary to the impression left by much of the literature on the subject and by the important and interesting political debates surrounding it, "globalisation" is not a *deus-ex-machina* which can be invoked to explain just about everything. Therefore, in what follows I will be as specific as possible in saying what precisely it is about globalisation I refer to, and how that is undermining the state monopoly of legitimate violence.

In addition to this, I will construct the argument largely around the economic processes which underpin globalisation. This does not mean that other forms of globalisation are unimportant. On the contrary, there is excellent work on e.g. the

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[3] Obviously these two definitions are those given by Beck (2000) and by Held and his associates (1999).

[4] I have elaborated the reasons for which I think this is the most useful way of thinking about globalisation in Leander (2001).

role of globalisation in creating and sustaining various forms of identity politics and on the role of identity politics in shifting the dynamic and nature of violent conflicts (Castells 1996; Appadurai 1998). The point is simply that I have chosen to unravel one thread, and deal with others only when and where they are directly relevant to the argument.

The second caveat to put in place has to do with "the state". Independently of how one defines them[5], states are obviously very diverse creatures and it is hence not surprising that their relation to "legitimate violence" and/or globalisation should be equally diverse. Consequently, one should not expect that any argument linking these things should be equally applicable to, or interesting for, all states. As the creation of transnational polities and the dislocation of politics are fundamental aspects of globalisation (Leander 2001), it seems likely that "globalisation" is affecting the state monopoly of legitimate violence everywhere. Moreover, economic globalisation, the development of private military companies (Shearer 1998) and the criminalisation of economic activity (and of the state (Bayart, Ellis et al. 1997) in many parts of the world is also likely to undermine the monopoly of the state on legitimate violence. But precisely because states are so varied, it is impossible to generalise about the impact of globalisation on the legitimacy and monopoly of the state control on violence.[6] Consequently, in this paper I will limit myself to lines of argument which refers to the states outside the developed world, usually referred to as "quasi", "fragile" or even "failed" (Jackson 1990; Clapham 1996) states. That is, this argument is not primarily about legitimate violence in Sweden or the USA. There may be–and I tend to believe are–family resemblances and parts of the argument may become more relevant in the future. However, for the time being the argument

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[5] This is no place to get into the discussion about how to define the state. Generally though I tend to favour functional definitions. For excellent and relevant discussions I recommend (Jessop 1990; Buzan 1991; Evans 1995: chap 1; Clapham 1996: chap. 1).

[6] There are some distinctions on which to build such generalisations in the literature as that e.g. of Buzan (1995) who draws a distinction between peripheral and central state with regard to how they are affected by the post-cold-war security problematique. For centre states, the key issue is what to do with the great power. For peripheral states the problem is how to resist an invasive and all pervasive international system with weak states structures. The question is how pertinent they are for the analysis of the state monopoly of legitimate violence.

concerns mainly states outside the developed "Western" market economies.

Moreover, in relation to the varieties of states it is important to signal that the paper does not claim that there is anything inherently good about any state monopoly (and use of) on violence. On the one hand, one does not have to read Norbert Elias to see that the control of legitimate violence is crucial for order in political, economic and social life. And it is therefore important that there be some monopolization of the use of legitimate violence. On the other hand, this immediately prompts the question what is legitimate, and according to whom. One can chose to answer this question in a very narrow (legitimacy derived exclusively from democracy) or broad (the Weberian type legitimacy which can also be based on religion, tradition, efficiency, charismatic leadership). Independently of how one answers it, though, there is a conservative bias to order which makes it questionable to what extent it is really "good" and for whom.[7] In addition to this, it is obvious that in present day politics there is much state violence around that cannot be termed legitimate by any standards.

Finally, it is necessary to place a third caveat which has to do with violence. In this paper, violence is used restrictively to refer to the instrumental use of physical force. This restrictive usage excludes many things. Symbolic or structural "violence", or deaths caused by the social management of AIDS or traffic accidents are not part of violence on this account. This is not to deny that all these phenomena can in some contexts be subsumed under violence. Nor does it imply that the sufferings might be necessarily less intense as those caused by the use of physical force, or that the victims of these forms of violence may not find them as bad or even worse than physical violence. It is simply because I do not see any good reason to lump these things together under one and the same heading for the purpose of the present paper.[8]

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[7] This is why it is so attractive to have some other reason for arguing that the control over violence is good. On of the most persuasive arguments to this effect is that of Hannah Arendt (1969) who claims that violence destroys the capacity to act together (her definition of power) on which government necessarily rests.

[8] One could also add a stronger argument against lumping together. Although these things may fill similar functions and may have similar result this is no *a priori* reason for giving them the same name. Doing that is committing the same error as calling a shoe which is used to drive a nail into the wall a hammer (Arendt 1958: 102).

In sum, the use of physical force differs from symbolic or structural oppression, state control of violence is not necessarily good or legitimate, and globalisation cannot be used without clarification.

2. The erosion of the state monopoly of legitimate violence

The first task of the paper is to show that we are indeed witnessing an erosion of the state monopoly of legitimate violence. This section will argue that the legitimacy of the state as the ultimate regulator of violence is increasingly contested both internally and externally. As a result, organised violence is taking on new forms where the state is just one actor among many. The role of the state in "new wars" is decisively diminished and altered, partly because the state monopoly of legitimate violence is a fundamental part of the conflicts. This makes an unqualified references to a state monopoly of legitimate violence inappropriate. The section will finally deal with some of the main objections that this general claim provokes. Arguments to the effect that "new" wars are not all that novel and that the state monopoly over violence that is eroding is not "legitimate" are misplaced. Similarly, the claim that the erosion of the state monopoly of legitimate violence only touches "marginal" cases hinges on an exceedingly narrow definition of international politics combined with an overly generous definition of marginal.

The state monopoly of legitimate violence is contested both internally and externally literally every day. Our news are filled with stories of armed movements of various kinds and with varying objectives who try – and sometimes succeed – to take over control of portions of a territory. One need only think of the parts of Georgia run by an quasi-autonomous Abkhaz government, the parts of Columbia run by the FARC, the carving up of Mozambique or the running of parts of South Eastern Turkey by the PKK as notorious examples (Bozarslan 1993; Labrousse 1993; Weissman 1993). As is often pointed out, a central part of the activity of the insurgent movements is to attack the state symbolically. The contesting movements impose their own taxes, issuing their own passports/ identification documents and often require foreigners to obtain visas with them.

They provide alternative social structures (schools, hospitals, credit systems). They also impose alternative controls over organised violence. They have alternative "police" forces and alternative "drafts" for their own armies. And beyond the clichés, this trend to contest the state monopoly of legitimate violence is well born out in the studies of armed conflicts around the world. "Intra-state" conflicts account for a disproportionately large share of all armed conflicts: 129 of 196 conflicts between 1945 and 1996; they lasted longer than inter state conflicts and they cost greater number of casualties (Jung and Schlichte 1999: 37-41).

State monopoly of legitimate violence is contested also from "without". Other states and international organisations, but also private actors such as NGOs, human rights movements or firms are increasingly prone to directly deny states their monopoly of legitimate violence. One expression of this is the tendency to talk with and recognise the claims of insurgent movements as legitimate. One may think for example of the international recognition and dealings with the East Timorese, the Palestinians or the Taiwanese as states. These extensive relations take place in violation of the principles of "non-interference" in internal affairs as well as straight against the state's attempt to affirm its own monopoly of legitimate violence. Even in cases where there is no clear insurgent movement to deal with states may see their monopoly of legitimate violence denied by the international community, usually because they are considered to go too far in their violation of human rights. This has been the case for example of Myramar (Burma), Haiti or Somalia. And the legitimacy of this kind of non-recognition has become enshrined in the new military humanism of "humanitarian interventions" of the UN (Beck 1999; Chomsky 1999; Habermas 1999). The point, for the time being, is not to discuss whether this kind of international denial of the legitimacy of the state monopoly over legitimate violence is good or bad. It is more banal. It is to point out that the state monopoly of legitimate violence is contested both internally and externally literally every day.

The perhaps clearest expression of this trend is the emergence, and increasing frequency, of so called "new wars" (Kaldor 1999) or "wars of the third kind" (Holsti 1996) where the role of the state is drastically altered and diminished. The table below is copied from Mary Kaldor who has coined the expression and done much to encourage thinking about the changing forms of violence. In fact,

	National or bloc wars	**New Wars**
Actors	National armies or bloc alliances	Paramilitary groups, organised crime groups, mercenaries, parts of national armies
Goals	National or bloc interest	identity politics, ethnic exclusion
Mode of warfare	Vertical, hierarchical command; importance of battle, extremist tendencies; advanced military technology	dispersed, fragmented, directed against civilians, use of atrocities: rape, famine, sieges, use of light weapons, communications, land mines
War economy	Centralizing, autarkic, totalizing, full employment, high production	open, decentralized, low participation, humanitarian assistance, underground economy, high unemployment low production
External support	allies, imperialism, superpower patrons	diaspora, transnational mafia, mercenaries, regional powers
Source: Kaldor, Mary (1998) 'Reconceptualizing Organized Violence', in Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Köhler, eds, *Re-Imagining Political Community. Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 97.		

her definition of new wars is that they are opposed to national wars where the state has a central position. New wars are waged by non-state actors, the goals are to contest the legitimacy of the state, the mode of warfare is not centred on a national, hierarchically controlled army and the economic and political support of the waring factions is transnational rather than state based.

What has been said so far might seem to be fairly uncontroversial. However, a variety of arguments are usually employed to show that this does not amount to any significant undermining of the state monopoly of legitimate violence. The first of these is to make the argument that all of this is not very new and that the allegedly new wars are in fact very old. Ultimately therefore the "Westphalian" system is not challenged, and is not undergoing any significant change which would warrant a shift of attention away from the "state system" to a transnational system (where non-state actors play and important role).[9] As will be argued in greater detail below, this underestimates the role of "globalisation" in bringing about the current situation. But for the time being, it is enough to stress that this

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[9] For very explicit statements of this position see Waltz (2000) and Wendt (1999: 8-11).

"nothing new" argument is not particularly relevant. It may well be that the situation is less novel than it is made out to be. In fact, it probably is true that the world order has not been radically altered over the past twenty years. One needs only think of Braudel's (1979) account of the role of financial houses, commercial firms and mercenaries in deciding the outcomes of wars and the establishment of states to realise that it is exceedingly shortsighted to think that trans-national actors have begun to play a role in the determination of violence only yesterday. But this may be a pointer to the need of reconsidering the extent to which the "Westphalian" system was ever more than a construction which allowed states to constitute themselves as autonomous sovereigns with un-contested control over violence (Walker 1993; Strange 1999). In that case it is certainly high time to revisit the state monopoly of legitimate violence.

A second objection, is that the argument only concerns states where the state monopoly of violence is indeed not legitimate and that therefore what is being undermined is not a *legitimate* state monopoly of violence but simply state *violence*.[10] And it is undeniable that many of the states whose "monopoly of legitimate violence" is eroding are indeed illegitimate by any measure and standard one can come up with. However, stopping here is not enough. The objection easily becomes tautological. If there is an increasing number of states where state organised violence is considered illegitimate, then this begs the question WHY? One obvious answer often given, is that the problem is "weak state structures" or some equivalent (Holsti 1996). The argument is that the key reason for the diffusion of violence is that the states most concerned are states in the making. In that sense it is not a problem of *eroding* a state monopoly of legitimate violence, but one of *establishing* such a monopoly. The views then diverge on the extent to which this establishment is likely to succeed or not. Some (e.g. Cohen, Brown et al. 1981) argue that the spread of violence is signalling precisely the establishment of a state monopoly of legitimate violence. Others are content to point out that the weakness of internal structures is the

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[10] This objection is obviously most relevant in the context of the democratic peace theory discussions where a sharp distinction is drawn between democratic and non-democratic states to the effect that rules that apply among democratic states in terms of mutual respect on the basis of a common acceptance of a "cosmopolitan norms".

origin of the difficulties.[11] It would be foolish to deny that the states under discussion here have difficulties with state building and that this is closely tied up with the erosion of (or, in some cases, difficulties of establishing) a state monopoly of legitimate violence.

The problem with this objection is that it posits these difficulties as "internal". The state building process is constructed as taking place internally, somehow prior to and unaffected by international interactions. This version of things simply takes what Ian Clark calls the great divide between inside and outside (1999: chap. 1) to be unproblematic for state building processes in general and the establishment of a state monopoly of legitimate violence in particular. This runs straight against most contemporary work on state building in the developing world, be it within political economy or within the English school (e.g. Bull and Watson 1989/1984; Jackson 1990; Evans 1995; Clapham 1996). It also runs against plain common sense. Whether or not they find globalisation an adequate name for it, few people are prepared to deny that there is a high level of inter-action and exchange at all levels in the world today. In these conditions it is difficult to imagine that states would somehow be constructed without an "external" impact. The question is rather what the impact of the pervasive and intrusive presence of "the external" is on state building and the establishment/ maintenance of a state monopoly of legitimate violence and if it is really analytically useful to uphold the great divide in studying it. Much speaks against it. And even if one does not side with Buzan in arguing that "it is not clear how states develop under these conditions [a very strong and penetrating international system], or even whether they can" (1995: 195), it is impossible to dismiss the problem out of hand and simply posit that the issue of state structures is an "internal" matter.

A last obvious objection that comes to mind is that the state monopoly of legitimate violence is eroding only in "marginal" cases and therefore can be

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[11] Holsti repeatedly stresses that third kinds of war are "internal" and caused by internal weak structures. His discussion of external influences on these processes is reduced to a chapter on foreign (state) intervention which like everyone else he finds out has decreased and on a chapter regarding "political-economy approaches" where his two only references are articles by Ted Moran and Johan Galtung from the 1970s (Holsti 1996: chap. 7, pp. 136-141 for the political economy part).

argued to have a limited bearing on the international politics overall. However, this claim is rests on a very encompassing definition of marginal. It is of course true that the state monopoly of legitimate violence is not equally contested in all places. Not many people would think it is a serious and pressing issue in Denmark, the US or Switzerland. Even the contestation of the state monopoly of legitimate violence by environmentalists, or anti-globalisation movements (viz. the Gothenburg summit or the transports of nuclear waste in Germany) has very ambiguous effects. It is of course a contestation of the state monopoly of legitimate violence but it also provokes counter reactions which demand a reaffirmation of the state monopoly of legitimate violence among the majority of the population.[12]

But, this does not make the issue "marginal". It is one of the most pressing issues for a very large number of countries and in particular those where "state building" processes are still ongoing. Virtually in all so called "third world countries" the state monopoly of legitimate violence is questioned. The same is true of many of the states that have been created through the end of communism. And even in developed market economies the state monopoly of legitimate violence is sometimes contested as expressed by longstanding conflicts such as that over Northern Ireland, Corsica or territorial control over Sicily. To think of a phenomenon which touches the bulk of the world's states as "marginal" can only be seen as the reflection of a skewed view on what is central and what is marginal. To then proceed and claim that "world politics" is not affected seems to reflect an extremely narrow view of what world politics are about. In discussions about the new world order after the cold war, the issue of how much intervention should (not) take place in the countries that are torn apart by internal wars, and in particular how far to go in extending humanitarian interventions, has became one focal point. In this sense it is easy to follow Acharya (1997) in arguing that the situation in the so called "periphery" has actually become central

[12] The reactions to the Gothenburg summit is interesting in this regard. The local paper *Göteborgs Posten* published two pages a day with reader reactions to the events where the vast majority went in the direction of asking for harder measures against the demonstrators (generally identified as illegitimate hooligans) and expressing sadness about "the rape" on the city. Persson's popularity reached an ever high while that of ATTAC was greatly harmed by the lack of clear distancing from the violent protestors.

to international politics.

The claim that the state monopoly of legitimate violence is eroding is not a denial of the fact that states continue to be an important – and in many questions the most important – international actor. Nor does it imply that the passing away of the state is in sight.[13] Rather, the only purpose this claim serves here, is to underline that the state monopoly of legitimate violence is increasingly problematic. More broadly, an implication of this is that if we try to understand international politics in general and violence, war and peace in particular (the classical IR topics), we had better not define away the non state actors and non-state realm from the outset. This is likely to blind us to the many important questions deriving from the changing boundaries of the political, but also to make it hard to adequately analyse traditional questions of international politics since it is not the case that the state system somehow continues unaffected by what is happening in other spheres of international politics.[14] But this is the topic for another paper.[15] For the time being I want to move on with this one where the next relevant question is what role (if any) "globalisation" has in bringing about the erosion of the state monopoly of legitimate violence.

3. Globalisation, the displacement of politics and violence

The first way in which globalisation contributes to the erosion of the state monopoly of legitimate violence is through its impact on political processes and more precisely through its displacement of politics. This section argues that globalisation contributes to weaken the grip of the state over political processes. It displaces the boundaries of the political in a way that makes the most salient issues seem to be issues that are ill captured and dealt with through conventional

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[13] On these more general issues I would tend to side with the many authors who argue, with varying emphasis, that state forms are changing (e.g. Mann 1993; Strange 1996; Evans 1997). The relevant question is how and with what implications.

[14] For a forceful statement of the point that many of the most important issues in contemporary international politics are precisely created by the tensions between the international (state) system and the transnational (non state) society, see Hassner (1998).

[15] I have written on this in Leander (2001) and (2001).

state sponsored political processes. Moreover, it changes the relative importance of actors, so that actors, in particular international business and financial operators and NGOs, who have no guaranteed place in national political processes increasingly important in determining the outcome of politics. And finally, globalisation ultimately displaces a share of politics beyond the borders of the state, by "externalising" political accountability and economic management.[16]

This displacing of state sponsored political processes is relevant not because it directly causes the state monopoly of (legitimate) violence to erode. Its relevance is indirect. It creates conditions where there often is no satisfactory political state sponsored political process to turn to. Of course, one could imagine that the outcome of this would be new forms of politics. And indeed, there are signs that non state forms of politics are emerging (Archibugi, Held et al. 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; O'Brien, Goetz et al. 2000). However, there are also signs that this displacement of politics is making the turn to violence by non state actors more likely and is undermining the monopoly of the state on the use of violence.

3.1. Expanding agendas

"Globalisation"[17] is displacing politics by placing an increasing number of political issues beyond the borders of the state and hence state-sponsored political processes. In part, this is because the number of political issues that span borders is increased by a redefinition of the political. "Previously de-politicized areas of decision-making now find themselves politicized" (Beck 2000: 99). Ecology, science, and the gender relations have become political and they do not stop at the border of the state. Moreover, there has been an expansion of the polity, people see themselves part of. Since the defeat of fascism after the second world war there is an attachment to human rights and democracy and a belief that these are principles which demand universal respect (Habermas 1998: 71-9).

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[16] These are the titles of chap 7.3 and 8 of Clapham's (1996) absolutely remarkable book.
[17] Repetition: I refer to globalisation as a process of creating transnational social space, see above p. 4.

And it is not only those who advocate universal rights, but also those who try to carve out space for their own identities who increasingly define their politics in relation to a transnational sphere (Badie, Coulon et al. 1987; Castells 1996; Göle 1998).

But it is not only changing self-definitions and universal values that drive the displacement of politics. It is just as often imposed. As the links between societies are intensified, it becomes clear that there is a discrepancy between the polity concerned by a (political) decision or a development and the location of the authority making that decision or setting the development in motion.[18] The decision about what to do with Bulgaria's nuclear plants regards not only the Bulgarian population. A change in US interests rates influences financial markets and the cost of debt across the world. A change in the car industry affects everyone linked to it directly or indirectly. And the development of a vocal issue centred movement (e.g. environmentalists, feminists, or ATTAC) influences not only those who created it but everyone concerned since the movements alter the image of the issue, the politics surrounding it and the regulation of it.[19] The result is that often there is no opting out. A country cannot simply declare that it does not want to be affected by e.g. a nuclear disaster, developments in international financial markets or reconceptualizations of civil rights or that its polity should not feel concerned by these questions. And since countries are very unequal when it comes to their capacity to spark off and resist these events, the expansion of politics which "is a free choice for some descends as cruel fate upon others" (Bauman 1998).

3.2. The changing boundaries of the polity

Globalisation is also altering the relative weight of actors in determining political outcomes. Actors which are not part of the normal political process are increasingly important. The classical illustration of the role of outsiders is that of

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[18] This is the point David Held has been driving for the past twenty years to call for a rethinking of political theory in cosmopolitan terms (Held 1991).

[19] For elaboration on this point see e.g. Finnemore (1998).

diasporas and/or migrants which play a crucial role in organising, financing and conceiving politics from the "outside" (Angoustures and Pascal 1993; Bozarslan 1993). The role of this kind of involvement is however growing not only as a consequence of the increasing number of diasporas/migrants, but also because of the growing possibilities (created by the transformations usually referred to as globalisation) of using these communities to organise (illegal) trade to finance political movements (Labrousse 1993), raise "taxes" [viz. the PKK or the UCK in Germany], disseminate propaganda, or even simply to get votes in regular elections.[20] More generally, the unease of fitting diasporas and not to talk about stateless migrants into political processes poses with extreme clarity the tension between nationally conceived politics and the need for a state which can effectively organise and defend rights in a polity on the one hand and the need for larger cosmopolitan rights and political communities (Arendt 1979/1951; Hassner 1998).

In addition to the classical case of diasporas and refugees, many other actors without clear roots in the polity have become increasingly important. The most discussed example is no doubt international organisations. Much of the protest against new forms of imperialism or globalisation tends to be focused on institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO. And their impact on policy-making has grown rapidly. From the early 1980s onwards the growing importance of "conditionality" has made international organisations and in particular the World Bank and the IMF prime judges of the outcomes of political processes. As persuasively argued by Clapham (1996), the adoption first of economic "structural adjustment" conditionality and then (following the end of the cold war) of political, or "good governance" conditionality have fundamentally reshaped the rules of the game of indebted states.[21] It has played a crucial role in weakening and wreaking fragile state structures which rested on the neo-patrimonial and clientelist practices conditionality was designed to eliminate. The result is that international institutions have become increasingly aware –

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[20] Political parities in countries of emigration do their best to organise the emigrant vote. The religious Refah/Virtue party in Turkey e.g. has organised transport back to Turkey for voting for its supporters on a large scale.

[21] Clapham is concerned with African states but clearly the argument has a more general bearing.

which is not to say that there is much in terms of critical reflexivity – of their role in politics and are at present struggling to develop a better understanding of their role in fostering/preventing armed conflict (Stevenson 2000).

Far less attention has been given to the influence of private actors such as business, banks, rating agencies, accountants or financial market operators. Yet it is certainly growing at least as quickly. Opening up to attract private lenders and investors is generally considered fundamental for development, because it is the since qua non for obtaining the necessary technology and credits (Leander 2001).[22] And this in itself gives business actors an enormous indirect leverage on policy making. At the same time, the partial dismantling of state structures through the "privatization" and liberalisation strategies pursued by international organisations have pushed business into taking a more active role in politics. Business (foreign and national) is no less dependent on a semblance of order for doing business and hence increasingly involved in various forms of negotiations about conditions and general policies with states. This "private conditionality" gives them considerable political clout (Friedman 1983) and may even pull them into taking sides in armed conflicts, as for instance, the role of Lundin Oil in Sudan or the role of diamond and oil firms in Angola.

The growing clout of private business actors is probably even more damaging to the legitimacy of states and state sponsored political processes than is the impact of international organisations. It can be argued that international organisations are subject to some form of accountability. States are usually members. They can negotiate with these organisations. To some extent these negotiations are transparent and the organisations can be asked to stand up for their decisions in public discussions.[23] None of this holds for private actors. They can mostly not be identified and rarely held responsible for their choices. Their impact is that of an impersonal effect on structures and the conditions of choice which is clearly no more profound for being difficult to pin down. It is through the often

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[22] Of course, the conditions and extent of opening up as well as the role of the state is very important (Evans 1995; Weiss 1998; Woo-Cumings 1999).

[23] I would be careful to push this line of argument to hard. Both the actual practice of country–IO relations (e.g. the issue of transparency and de facto choice of countries) and their theory (e.g. that voting in the IMF is weighted by contributions which gives the US an easy majority) are far from ideal, democratically speaking.

indirect pressure on countries to provide a "positive business environment" that the impact of business is felt above all (Oman 2000). Private actors thus have what Gill refers to a constitutional powers, that is the possibility of setting the boundaries and the rules of the game within which politics is taking place (Gill 1995). The question is indeed "who elected the bankers?" (Pauly 1997).

Finally, there has been a spectacular "NGOization" of politics since the late 1980s. The end of the Cold War and decreasing willingness of outside (state) allies to finance and get deeply involved in conflicts is part of the explanation for this. In this situation, states have increasingly withdrawn both financially and politically and instead tended to channel increasing amounts of their aid and involvement through NGOs which have become correspondingly more influential. Relying on NGOs has also reflect a wish to circumvent and avoid supporting crippled and discredited state structures. Intervening through NGOs has often been seen as a way of "re-internalising" conflicts with the possibility of buying neutrality in extremely complex situations (while still intervening directly) is at least as important (Rufin 1993; Duffield 1994). The mirror side is the growing activism of the NGOs themselves who impose themselves as the specialists and informers on the terrain of conflicts. They are increasingly capable of setting the agenda for negotiation and conditions of bargaining in different areas. One need only picture the role of Amnesty International in placing Human Rights on the agenda, or the role of Global Witness in getting the present "Kimberley Process" to create a system for certifying diamonds to diminish their role in fuelling conflict (*Financial Times*, 25.06.2001).

It would be particularly short-sighted to claim that private actors are new to the international scene. It is certainly true that conditionality is not a new phenomenon and that private actors, business and NGOs have always played a larger role in international politics than IR scholars would like to acknowledge (Kiray 1990; Strange 1991). However, this is no reason to deny that international politics and diplomacy has been privatised (Clapham 1996: title of chap. 10) over the past two decades. It merely confirms Clapham's general argument that the idea that international politics is mainly about interactions between states which somehow pre-exist this interaction has been and remains a fiction for large part of the world.

For the argument here, this matters because it clarifies the dynamics which

make state-sponsored political processes increasingly inadequate. If state-sponsored processes are inadequate to deal with key political issues, if political and economic accountability is largely directed outwards to private actors, if state structures are increasingly crippled, and if the outcome of the process is largely determined by actors that are not really part of the process, it should come as no surprise that there is an overwhelming sense that the relevant political processes are taking place elsewhere.

Although this does not cause violence, it does deprive state-sponsored political processes of their efficiency, attractiveness and legitimacy. The "global-isation" literature has many nice ways of putting this. Strange talks about the "hollowing" out of states (1995); Beck about "politization through the depolitization of states" (2000) and Guehenno about the "disintermediation of politics" (1998-99: 9). The point is fairly straightforward: the adequacy of state-sponsored political processes is increasingly problematic in a "post-national constellation" (Habermas 1998). One could even argue that the fact that politics is increasingly settled by Nobody visible and accountable, it is becoming increasingly tyrannical: "If, in accord with traditional political thought, we identify tyranny as government that is not held to give account of itself, rule by Nobody is clearly the most tyrannical of all since there is no one left who could even be asked to answer for what is being done..." (Arendt 1969: 39).

Violence need not be the only response to this. One can imagine alternative non-state-sponsored political processes (though there are few around) or a reform of the state and the international system which would increase the legitimacy of state sponsored political procedures. However, in the uncertainty about such transformations the turn to violence is one alternative way of dealing with political problems which are increasingly difficult to curb as long as political processes are overall inadequate. This is all the more the case as it seems that violence often pays off. New states are established, guerilla movements are treated as defacto sovereign rulers and in the wake of the Gothenburg summit protest movements are called into a dialogue at the world economic forum in Salzburg. That states try to reaffirm their efficiency and legitimacy in these conditions is of little consolation. Rather, "if we inquire historically into the causes likely to transform *engagés* into *enragés*, it is not injustice but hypocrisy" (Arendt 1969: 65). Moreover, the pressure on the state

monopoly of legitimate violence is all the more intense since it is not only the legitimacy the state monopoly of violence which is problematic, but also its monopoly tout court.

4. Globalisation, the diffusion of authority and violence

It is not only the legitimacy of the state monopoly of violence which is changing, but also its capacity to monopolize violence. This is first and foremost due to an emerging world of competing authorities where the state monopoly of violence is no longer taken for granted. This is not to say that some other actor is replacing the state. On the contrary, a further reason for which the state monopoly of legitimate violence is increasingly difficult to defend is that, paradoxically, the continued centrality of the state leads to competition for controlling it and this often results in a "parcelling up" of the state which further adds to the difficulty of the state to monopolize the control over violence by making it less capable of acting as a unity. And finally taken together the increasing complexity of competing authorities and the capture of the state often produces vicious circles of violence: the attempt by the state to regain control over violence by repression and force feeds reactions on the same terms. The result is an amplification of the trends which place the state monopoly of legitimate violence under strain.

4.1. Competing authorities

The most tangible effect of globalisation on the state capacity to defend a monopoly of legitimate violence is that it has made many activities and relations less subject and less amenable to state control.[24] The result is a ferment of authorities rooted in these activities. This section will focus on the three central aspects of this transnationalization of activities. It will show that the liberal-isation of international and national economic relations has weakened control

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[24] Some authors (e.g. Beck 2000) define globalisation as the undermining of states and the denationalisation of politics.

over economic activity and resources. The expansion of international media and communications is making state control on information considerably weaker. And the expansion of an international market in arms and in private military services and policing is directly challenging state capacity to control the means of violence. These developments do not necessarily play against states. On the contrary, also states use them extensively. However, they also empower alternative authorities. And the overall result is therefore often a trend towards a greater number of competing authorities.

First, liberalisation by design and definition means reduced state control and politization of economic activity. And this is a welcome move by anyone who wishes to establish an authority alternative to that of the state as reflected in Abdullah Öcalan's remark: "this so called market economy has been very useful for us. If you have money you can find anything on the market" (quoted in Bozarslan 1993: 137). Indeed, liberalisation opens the economy to those who have previously been excluded for political reasons. This does not automatically spell a weakening of the state (or of its monopoly of violence). It may have the opposite effect: increasing the number of authorities in the economy and opening up to international firms may allow the government to "divide and rule" and hence to strengthen its real capacity to control the economy. This seems to have been an initial effects of liberalisation strategies in for example Turkey during the early 1980s and in some Brazil and Argentina in the 1990s (Leander 1997; Phillips 1998). The more long term trends is more ambiguous since it seems that the divide and rule strategy has been limited in time as economic groups have managed to re-conquer their influence over politics.

This said, it remains true that often no such divide and rule strategy is available. Liberalisation is simply used by various groups, including groups within the state, such as politicians, administrators, or the army, to seize control over economic resources and to base their own activities and clientelist networks on this control. Thus, the pattern of a political and economic elites using "privatisation" to siphon out resources for their own benefits is sadly familiar from most regions in the world (Hibou 1997; Frydman, Murphy et al. 1998). Similarly, liberalisation has opened new fields of economic activity. The great profits that can be made on various international illegal trades such as arms, drugs, human organs, or people (immigrants, slaves, or prostitutes) are

unrivalled in the legal economy. And their emergence is closely tied to the existence of a demand and regulation on the receiving side[25], it is clear that the illegal trades also thrive on the incapacity of the state to impose controls to prevent them or – as is often the case – on the active involvement of parts of the state apparatus in the trade. Illustrations would include a refinery using smuggled Iraqi oil run jointly it seems by the PKK and parts of the army in south eastern Turkey; or the role of the Burmese Army in trading drugs.

The perhaps most important effect of liberalisation is that it has facilitated access to largely unregulated international financial system. It has created enormous possibilities to make large profits on investments.[26] But more significantly, the international financial system plays a fundamental role in facilitating money laundering and in making it more difficult to pursue organised crime (be it in the public or private sphere). The mushrooming of tax heavens (Palan 1998) and the abuse of more traditional bank secrecy makes it very difficult for public authorities to trace illegal activities and it makes it relatively easy to for movements to organise their financing far from public authorities (Strange 1998; OECD 1999). Although there are efforts at remedying this and reaffirming state control (Helleiner 1999), the continued (and growing) attention the problem receives is the clearest indication that they are not particularly successful.[27]

Second, the "globalisation" of media and of culture more broadly has become a very important resource in the establishment of political authority (both for states and non-state actors). The media plays a crucial role in opinion formation and information spread among the parties to conflicts. The role of the radio in the

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[25] The argument is usually made for the drugs trade, but it also holds for regulation of immigrants, salaries, sanctions, embargoes and the like which create opportunities for profitable illegal trade (Kopp 1993).

[26] According to some observers, the trends whereby the Italian mafia is transforming itself into a business organisation are to be found also among other groups (Kopp 1993). Illegal earnings are invested and recycled in the financial system and it is often hard to discern which share of the earnings is more important. This shift in activities goes in pair with fundamental shifts in the way that the mafia is organised.

[27] For a study applied to South Africa, see Ellis (1997: 102). For more general information see the information provided by the OCDE sponsored *Financial Action Task Force* (www.oecd.org/fatf/index.htm) or by *Transparency International* (www. transparency.org/ documents/work-papers/index.html).

Rwandan genocide, or of cassettes in the spread of Islamic propaganda or of the Kurdish (Belgian based) TV channel are already legion. Moreover, through media attention it becomes possible to gain or lose international support and sympathy or more simply to raise awareness of a conflict and the positions in it. Indeed, it seems that many "internal conflicts" – the standard example is Tigray (Rufin 1993; Duffield, Macrae et al. 1994: 227; Clapham 1996: 229) – have been brought to the attention of the world by NGOs operating in the area through the media. In a radical formulation one can argue that political conflicts and wars become increasingly virtual to the point of losing "their spatial location, and, through their telegeneic (re-)presentation, become *political crises* in which questions of justice and intervention must also be publicly discussed and decided in the far-off centres of global civil society" (Shaw 1996; Ignatieff 2000). Awareness and sympathy of course matter both because they determine political attitudes of outsiders, their position on conflicts, potential interventions and their ideas about the way conflicts should be solved and to whom resources should be challenged on what conditions. The "*pompe médiatique*" has become a crucial political and economic resource in political and violent conflicts around the world (Rufin 1993).

Finally, globalisation has been important in reshaping the conditions on which military means are available to the parties in armed conflict. With the end of the Cold War, state–and particular great power--interest and efforts to control the trade in arms have drastically declined. With the development of trade and financial facilities it has become easier to organise the trade practically. But perhaps more important than this is the rapid development of private military companies in the 1990s. The existence of private military (or mercenary) activity is as old as warfare itself. However, in the 1990s a spectacular expansion by all accounts has taken place. In part it has been fuelled by shifting strategic priorities, withdrawal of bi-lateral and multi-lateral interventions and the increased willingness of governments to use private military companies (for involvement from the outside or for combatting the own war[28]) to save money and men in the wake of the cold war. In part it has depended on the deregulation

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[28] For an attempt to document who hired what private military company in what conflict (in Africa) see appendix 1 in Musah (2000).

of finance and of foreign direct investments which make joint ventures and adequate organisation of finance possible.[29]

The result is that military force is definitely no longer the preserve of government controlled armies. Private military companies provide a full range of military "services" ranging from training, and protection of persons and premises to actual involvement in war.[30] The companies themselves are eager to defend their respectability and tend to underline that they offer these services exclusively to "legitimate" governments. But what legitimate government means is particularly hazy and contested in civil war situations. Typically all parties to the conflict make claims to be legitimate holders of power – and indeed military companies typically offer their services to all sides.

Moreover, there is ample evidence that services are provided also to firms operating in conflict areas for defence against kidnapping and even outright policing or army operations (Coker 1998). Two of the main military companies (Sandline International and Executive Outcomes) have grown as part and parcel of the Brach Heritage Group; largely to secure mineral concessions Heritage Oil&Gas Inc. The idea has been to secure concessions for the firm in exchange for guaranteeing the governments continues revenues by making sure that conflict and civil war do not prevent the mines from operating (O'Brien 2000: 64-71, table p. 1 in book). And there are any number of examples of firms hiring PMCs to secure their operations in unstable areas. In view of this, the attempt to justify involvement with firm security by reference to a distinction between Private Security and Private Military Operations (Vines 2000) rings rather hollow. In fact, the linkages between the PMCs and business are so extensive that O'Brien concludes that "EO and its alliance with the Branch-Heritage group is the strongest manifestation of the rise in power of the late twentieth-century version of the great colonial exploration companies of the nineteenth century" (O'Brien 2000: 64).

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[29] Although it is hard to find comprehensive data on the phenomenon it seems that joint ventures are becoming an increasingly common form of involvement. Angola had 80 private security firms in 1998 most of which were joint ventures (Shearer 1998: 78).

[30] For an overall survey of the privatisation of the military see the papers collected in the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* vol XIII/ 1, (autumn/winter 1999); Isenberg (1997).

Finally, it is often argued that the presence of military companies by itself tends to prolong, aggravate and deepen military conflicts, especially when the private military companies–some times one and the same, e.g. EO in Angola--are involved on both sides of a conflict.[31] Consequently, even if private military companies often do play a role in assisting governments, NGOs and International Organisations (Musah and Fayemi 2000: appendix 1) in conflict areas their expansion carries a very real risk of producing a proliferation of violence. The argument advanced by the PMCs themselves and by their apologists that we should "give war a chance" as a tool of in imposing settlements in armed conflicts (Shearer 1998: 79-80) deserves all the scepticism it spontaneously provokes.

Taken together, the impact of economic liberalisation, of the growing media presence and of the privatisation of military force do not inevitably and by themselves cause the emergence of competing authorities. However, they certainly make it possible for these authorities to draw on resources and activities that were previously the preserve of the state in their struggle to establish and affirm themselves. With liberalisation "the political economic variable of foreign firms and clandestine opportunities have assumed autonomous importance as causal variables [for determining the outcome of political and economic conflicts], as rulers (and strongmen) have radically quickened their pace of innovation" (Reno 1998: 224). At the same time conflicts have to be fought out not only in traditional political settings but increasingly through an international media which escapes the control of the state. And finally, the privatisation of military force is a wild card in conflicts which may or may not serve states, but which certainly does point to the increasingly strained nature of the state monopoly of legitimate violence as an increasing number of competing authorities are emerging.

The effect of the increasing numbers and complexity of the competing authorities should not be read in a simple zero sum fashion. On the one hand, it

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[31] (Olonisakin 2000). For more general info. see (UN 1997). For a critique of the Western attitude in general and of the hypocrisy visible in the failure to get the *1990 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries* to enter into force because only 7 states (out of 22 required) have signed it, see (Arnold 1999: 163).

is clear that it does fundamentally alter the logic of establishing and maintaining state authority in general, and a state monopoly of legitimate violence in particular. As argued in the conclusion of a brilliant analysis of Sierra Leone's "transition to warlord politics": "The dog that does not bark in Weber's analysis of the character of individual states is the expansion both of military services by nonstate actors and of global economic opportunities that favour those actors. Both forms of expansion have consequences that bear heavily on the recon-stitution of political authority in places such as Sierra Leone" (Reno 1998: 140). On the other hand, what is being challenged, and possibly lost by, the state is not necessarily gained by some other actors. It is not the case that the IMF, Branch Mining, Charles Taylor or Executive Outcomes have gained the authority lost by the government to rule Sierra Leone. Rather "the diffusion of authority away from national governments has left a yawning hole of non-authority. Ungovern-ance it might be called" (Strange 1996: 14).

4.2. Capturing the state

The hole of ungovernance is often deepened by the rush of particularistic interest groups striving to control specific areas of state politics. Much like Gulliver, the state may well become tied down by a multitude of (often not so small) Lilliputians each intent on blocking one of its members.[32] The result may well be to deprive the state of its capacity to defend and use its monopoly of legitimate violence.

So first, to state the obvious: globalisation has not made the state disappear. It is not only in IR theory that the state is alive and well. States continue to carry the symbolic weight of a legitimacy project which indicates the collective aims and values of communities, i.e. of what Buzan terms the "idea of the state" (1991). States are also practically important since they can make the claim to be

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[32] As Beck puts it with his usual sense for captivating images: "where the dominant political image of modernity was Leviathan, the moral standing of 'national' powers and superpowers will, for the future, be captured in the picture of Lemuel Gulliver, waking from an unthinking sleep to find himself tethered by innumerable tiny bonds" (Beck 2000: 72).

"sovereign". They are the members of multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO or the UN, as parties to international treaties. States are considered as representing the population in their territories and as organising politics and administration within. They organise how and on what terms the territory over which they are sovereign should be linked up to the rest of the world and how it should be regulated internally. This is of fundamental importance literally to everyone. How the market is operating is of course crucial to everyone in it, independently of whether they offer corporate banking services or sell drugs. Consequently, "far from lessening the role of domestic politics, the growing interdependency of the world economy has put new pressure on the national political authority. The essence of the change is that the intermediating function between social and economic forces is no longer one that a government can renounce or let go by default" (Stopford and Strange 1991: 54).

It is therefore less of a paradox than it might at first seem that, *pace globalisation*, the competition for control over the state is as intense as ever. From the "inside" there is a proliferation of movements claiming the right to parcel up states and set up a smaller one of their own and/or to impose their own particular view on politics and society. One of the most obvious characteristics of these movements is that it is mostly framed in terms of identities and ethnicity. The point, though, is not to sort out the complex and contextual cause of why things become framed in ethnic terms and to what extent this framing is actually seperable from motives pertaining to the control over resources or the establishment of networks alternative to those of the state.[33] Rather it is to signal that (independently of why conflicts are framed in ethnic terms) control over the state is at the centre of the ethnic conflicts.[34]

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[33] My personal inclination (which I will not develop here) is to agree with Lipschutz that explanations of ethnic conflict in terms of biological, primordial, imagined, defensive or instrumental drives or strategies raise the question why it has become so important at this specific point in time (Lipschutz 2000: 110-113). Therefore I would tend to favour explanations which stress the combined importance of uncertainty about identities and their boundaries and the struggle for control over resources. And globalisation plays a fundamental role creating uncertainty about identities and in reshaping the competition of resources (Appadurai 1998; Kaldor 1999).

[34] This underscores the general relevance of the concluding remarks of a study of ethnic strife in SubSaharan Africa: "The preoccupation with the ethnic component in contemp-

The rush to control the state also comes from all those who have an interest in controlling portions of the state without necessarily dismantling it. There is a rush to capture the state or more specifically state functions. In most countries the "grey zone" between private and public is growing rapidly as public policy functions are privatised and self-regulated.[35] In its legal version this development is the expression of legal delegation of public functions to private actors. Textile producers associations (in for example the Hong-Kong) regulate the industry internally and is responsible for the negotiation externally. Most stock-markets are self-regulated by bodies established by the industry itself (Coleman 1994). But there is of course also the very numerous cases where delegation is the expression of a clientelist exchange which may or may not be illegal, but which certainly is problematic in that it portions up state authority. The result is that any practical understanding of the state has to take this development into account and rest on a conceptualisation of the clientelist exchanges; "feudalisation" of the state; the role of "networks" and the links between the real and the legal social system (expressions used respectively by Clapham 1982; O'Donnell 1993; Bayart, Ellis et al. 1997; Stark and Bruszt 1998).

The implementation of liberal economic policies has accentuated the trend towards state capture. Indeed, part and parcel of these policies has been a neo-utilitarian understanding of the state. The role of the state in providing the necessary legal and political conditions for market have been downplayed while its tendency to obstruct the functioning of markets and burden budgets has been accentuated. The result is reflected in the type of policies favoured by inter-national institutions and the business community: slimming and streamlining of administration and limitation of salary growth. As persuasively argued by many the result has been a self-fulfilling prophecy (Evans 1997): qualified and motiv-ated bureaucrats leave or never enter a public service riddled by an abysmally low social status, quickly deteriorating working conditions and rapidly dwindl-ing salaries. Those who remain may well (in some cases have little choice but to)

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orary SubSaharan civil wars leads to the neglect of other crucial variables that are important in accounting for civil wars everywhere [...] civil wars in SubSaharan Afica are modern expressions of the struggle for economic and political power as it evolves around the state (Braaten, Bøås et al. 2000: 19; also Lipschutz 2000).

[35] For an important early discussion of this, see Streeck (1985).

use their office to extract resources .

Overall these trends constitute a serious challenges to unity of state authority and hence to its capacity to effectively monopolize violence. Although there is no automatic link between the portioning up of state authority and the erosion of the state monopoly of legitimate violence, in some circumstances it can contribute to it. Taking here a historical example from the core, one might refer to Norbert Elias's (1996: 214-223) study of the break-down of the Weimar Republic. Here, the state was paralysed, being parcelled up by competing and increasingly violent forces which prevented it from mobilizing and using its monopoly of legitimate violence. This paralysis that paved the way for the "break down of civilization."

4.3. Vicious circles of violence

The state capacity to defend and/or establish a monopoly of violence is under-mined by the emergence of vicious circles of violence – violence that feeds violence. These vicious circles result in a pervasiveness of physical violence which has become a permanent feature of the political landscape in many places and which make it very hard for the state to claim that there is something like a state monopoly of legitimate violence and even harder for it to effectively enforce such a thing.

An obvious and classical reason for the spread of these vicious circles of violence is the risk of mutual escalation in the attempt of governments threatened in their authority and legitimacy threatened to defend themselves with violent means and repression. Since globalisation is weakening both the legitimacy of state authority and more broadly its capacity to defend authority, this supposed defense can more easily have an escalating and eventually counter-productive effect.

But the economic processes of globalisation has also reinforced a second, less obvious, reason for the is more directly connected to economic processes of globalisation: the evolving political economy of wars which has led to a radicalisation of violence, as violence becomes an important means of social control and an economic resource in and by itself.

Most specialists who study the development of intra-state wars concur that their political economy has changed since the end of the 1980s. They tend to become more of a "social condition" as Kaldor (1999) would have it, or of "complex emergencies" as Duffield (1994) would put it. With the end of the cold war, the external alliances and sources that provided resources for the parties in intra-state conflicts have dried up. The immediate effect of this is that the movements have had to find alternative sources of finance. This has involved the replacement of a "top-bottom economy with a bottom-up one" (Rufin 1993: 53). Concretely, this "bottom-up" economy has entailed a larger degree of predatory behaviour directed primarily at the civilian population and a growing criminalisation.

The predatory behaviour is directed first and foremost at the civilian populations who are looted and deprived of their resources often to a degree where this produces a "humanitarian crisis". In extreme cases, it seems that the humanitarian crisis is purposefully provoked (by the government as in Soudan or by opponents as in Mozambique) because it is the one way open for attracting external resources in the form of humanitarian aid (Rufin 1993). The aid is used in various ways ranging from the relatively legal use of the discrepancy between official and black market exchange rates or speculating/manipulating shifts in food prices, to outright extortions including demands for protection money and the levy taxes on humanitarian aid.[36] Thus, because of its importance in attracting humanitarian aid, "violence has emerged as a strategy to secure economic and political power and survival under these unstable conditions" (Duffield, Macrae et al. 1994: 224).

The growing criminalisation is another effect of the new bottom-up political economy of wars which also tends to accentuate the spread of violence for its own sake. Attracted by the relatively high gains from illegal, often transnational activities, the boundaries between political action and organised crime get blurred. As the development of FARC in Columbia testifies, at some point a symbiosis between the two occurs where illegal activities become both political and economic capital. Fueled by economic crises and decline, the dependence upon criminal economic activity makes compromise difficult. Bringing actors

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[36] For a detailed and very well informed account see Duffield (1994: 60-63).

back to legality or "into society" not only involves some economic changes, but undermines fundamental power positions, which, in turn, fuels into the need to pursue the civil war. Once again the Duffield team expresses it very neatly when they argue that: "The emergence of proactive war economies in response to economic decline is an important aspect of the crisis. These economies, and the predatory and autonomous political movements they support, suggest that attempts simply to mediate between protagonists or impose parliamentary elections are destined for failure. A long-standing solution must encompass reform of the global economy" (Duffield, Macrae et al. 1994: 230).

At their worst the vicious circles of violence fuelled by state repression and the altered political economy of wars lead to a situation where violence becomes the dominant form of social relations. In these situations the prospect of a reestablished state monopoly of legitimate violence seems very attractive even if the state is repressive and/or illegitimate. The problem is of course that very often repressive states have undermined their capacity of resetablishing a state monopoly of legitimate violence by their role in spreading violence and undermining the basis of support for their policies. As pointed out by Arendt: the "rule by sheer violence comes into play where power is being lost [...] To substitute violence for power can bring victory, but the price is very high; for it is not only paid by the vanquished, it is also paid by the victor in terms of his own power" (1969: 53).

Conclusion

The contention of this paper is that globalisation does alter the conditions of establishing and sustaining a state monopoly of legitimate violence. It does so first by diminishing the capacity of conventional political processes to effectively to solve political problems and hence the *legitimacy* of the state. Second, it does so by diffusing authority and hence undermining the *capacity* of the state to preserve and use its monopoly of legitimate violence.

The implications for IR theory should be clear: unless theoretical IR is to lose its practical relevance, it has to move beyond theories of International Politics that focus only and exclusively on what states do to each other. Otherwise many

of the most pressing political questions at present, including those pertaining to war and peace, are excluded. This means that state-centrism is a valid objection to theory of international politics. It can not be fended off with a simple statement to the effect that accusing a theory of international politics of state-centrism "is like accusing a theory of forests for being tree centric" (Wendt 1999: 9; Wendt 2000: 174). To stick with the analogy, the obvious answer is that if a forest is dying because of acid rains or the greenhouse effect or if its eco-system, including the tree species growing there, is altered by plantations or deforestation, looking exclusively at trees will not be particularly illuminating. Similarly, if states are only one of many actors and forces shaping and conducting peace and war and if their nature is evolving, then clearly we need to have a wider view to understand peace and war. Behnke (2001) is right in his argument that the main problem in with Wendt (as with many other IR theories) is that he tries to come up with a single Grand Theory covering all of International Politics which has become (has always been) impossible.

Now what about the more practical "solutions" to the challenge to the state monopoly of legitimate violence? What shape can diplomacy take and how can responsibility be attributed? The first part of the answer must be that there can be no standardised solutions. The paper repeatedly stressed the importance of recognising the very complex nature of the strains on the state monopoly of legitimate violence. Any deeper argument about specific developments of the state monopoly of legitimate violence has to be rooted in social context–which obviously means that local histories, conditions and terms have to be part and parcel of thinking. The practical implication is that standardised solutions (such as economic liberalisation, political reforms, elections, conventional mediation among warring factions) need to be refined and adjusted to the context where they are implemented. The second part of the answer though is that the paper has pointed to the general structural changes at play here. So the question arises what if anything can be done to affect these impact they have. One thing that obviously can be done is to consider them when thinking about political practice (as increasingly done[37]). In terms of more concrete action, calls for "reform of

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[37] Viz. the many examples above both of the practical involvement of private actors in politics and of the visibility of this at the level of the actions of states and IOs.

the global economy" is justified, but vague and staggeringly difficult to give practicable content. The most common direction of thought here is to move toward some form of cosmopolitan democracy (Held 1995; Hassner 1998; Köhler 1998; Kaldor 1999; Leander 2001). And, indeed, some form of cosmopolitanism indeed seems like a precondition if the present "time for peace" is to become more than a Western self understanding of international relations (Vedby-Rasmussen 2000). But more elaborate thinking about what form and substance such a cosmopolitan civil society might take would clearly take the present discussion far beyond its boundaries.

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