CIAO DATE: 2/99

Russia’s national security policy:  conceptions and realities

Vassily Krivokhizha

Edited and Translated by
Richard Weitz

The "Whither Russia" Project

Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project
John F. Kennedy School of Government

September 1998

Preface

This monograph represents part of a series of publications of the "Whither Russia?" project of the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, based at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Vassily Krivokhizha is First Deputy Director of Russia’s Institute for Strategic Studies in Moscow. Dr. Krivokhizha’s monograph deals with a topic of fundamental importance: how does a country identify its national interests and develop a strategy to pursue them. Here at BCSIA we have jointly sought with other U.S. research centers to establish a framework for classifying the international interests of the United States. Krivokhizha’s fascinating manuscript poses comparable questions when he reviews how Russians over the last decade have sought to develop a widely accepted National Security Concept for their new country. He correctly notes that the process reveals the images that Russians hold of their state, their interpretation of what Russia’s status as a "Great Power" means in the post–Cold War world, and their hierarchy of national priorities—all issues of central concern for the "Whither Russia?" project.

Dr. Krivokhizha draws an interesting distinction between a National Security Strategy and a National Security Concept. He argues that the latter should encompass a broader range of issues, including society’s consensus on such fundamental topics as the proper division of power among both the various branches of government and the diverse levels of federal authority. It also should contain a philosophical dimension relating to the country’s past, present, and future role in international affairs. For this reason, several pages of his analysis discuss whether Russia has been undergoing evolution, reform, or a revolution.

In presenting his own list of Russia’s vital interests, Dr. Krivokhizha draws a sharp distinction between the country’s interests during its current period of social crisis, and those Russia would have in what he describes as a period of social stability. He also contrasts two types of foreign policy strategies. The first approach is a "linear" strategy, which involves a state’s attempt to improve its position vis–à–vis a rival through the use of a traditional military–technological approach (i.e., building better weapons than the other side). The second, "nonlinear," strategy involves the use of non–military means in an effort to transform either the adversary or the world in which it operates (e.g., by undermining its citizens faith in their political system or by changing the constellation of alliances in a multipolar international system).

Dr. Krivokhizha’s manuscript highlights the difficulties that Russians have had in reaching a consensus about their country’s proper role in the post–Cold War era. In this, they differ little from the citizens of the United States, the various states of Europe, or the other nations of the world. Since the Gorbachev years, international developments have not dealt kindly with simple paradigms of how the world works. Politicians, scholars, and interested citizens will undoubtedly continue to grapple with the challenging issue of identifying and ranking national interests for many years to come.

Dr. Richard Weitz, who until recently was a Fellow in BCSIA’s International Security Program, translated and edited this monograph, which derives from a revision of parts of Dr. Krivokhizha’s book on Rossiya v novom mire: Vremya Reshenii [Russia in a New World: The Time for a Decision]. Dr. Weitz is currently a Research Analyst of the Policy, Strategy, and Forces Division at the Center for Naval Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia. Funding for the "Whither Russia?" project has been provided by Carnegie Corporation of New York.

In our efforts to present Western scholars and policy makers with the broadest range of views within Russia, we have solicited a range of opinions on highly controversial topics. The opinions expressed in the monographs are those of the authors and do not represent the views of Harvard University, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, Carnegie Corporation of New York, or the translators and editors.

Graham Allison, Director
Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project

Introduction

One can state with certainty that in contemporary Russian society there is not an issue that in one form or another would not concern the long–standing and acute discussion in the country regarding the development of a Concept of National Security. One can also confidently assert that all the intellectual and organizational efforts that have been expended in this connection have not justified the hopes of those who have followed this debate. The question about the practical paths of escaping from the systemic crisis of Russian society still remains open and an object of acute political struggle. Therefore, for any author it would be presumptuous to aspire to offer a correct representation of a very complex, dynamic, and multidimensional reality. Rather than the comprehensive and realistic "Flemish style of painting," the reader must in this case be satisfied with an "impressionistic" view of the current situation that is more or less accurate in its depiction of the general picture of Russian realities, but which does not necessarily address every detail.

The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (RF) was approved on December 17, 1997, by a Decree of the President (No. 1300), "For the Purposes of Consolidating the Efforts of the Federal Organs of State Power, the Organs of State Power of the Subjects of the Russian Federation, and the Organizations and Citizens of the Russian Federation Regarding the Ensuring of the National Interests and Security of the Russian Federation," and published several days later. The burning ideological passions that had accompanied the preparation of numerous versions of the Concept by groups and organizations of diverse political orientations over a stretch of nearly ten years (starting back in the Soviet period, when at the end of the 1980s this issue began to be perceived by society as a priority for the successful reform of the state, society, and the economy) permitted one to expect that the Concept would at last set the basic reference points and main paths of withdrawing from the systemic crisis of society in which Russia finds itself at the end of the century.

Behind the familiar problem of resolving the diverse interpretations regarding the text’s terminology (what is a "national interest," a "challenge," a "threat to our national security," "a security system," etc.?), the Concept is worthy of study because it shows the specific features of the Russian world view. The struggle of opinions concerning the Concept gives one a more or less integrated idea about the system of priorities in Russia, the approaches towards their solution, and about the moods of the politically active part of Russian society in general. Not having understood why Russia set as its task the creation of a National Security Concept, and not the well–known option of a National Security Strategy (despite the fact that the idea itself and the official form of its implementation were directly borrowed from the U.S.), it is also impossible to understand why the role of a Concept of National Security cannot be reduced exclusively to its immediate, applied aspects, as is appropriate with a National Security Strategy. In other words, under present Russian realities, it is easier to understand the meaning of this document as a concept reflecting not so much applied policy as applied history. One could cite as an illustration F. M. Dostoevsky, in whose works the world was described through the eyes and state of mind of his characters. Such a world can differ from the real one, but people, like many of Dostoevsky’s characters, are nevertheless guided by their feelings and in turn, regardless of whether their perceptions are correct or not, modify the real world through their actions.

Thus, what kind of idea can one form about historical experience or about the current state and future condition of Russia’s domestic political elite, which composed the Concept, based on the experience of its preparation and approval? As has been noted, the struggle of opinions and the changes in emphasis associated with the Concept (for example, the increased weight the final version correctly gives to internal security factors) allows one, possibly, to make a more accurate assessment of contemporary Russian realities than do the provisions of the Concept itself. On the whole, it is a correct, systematic, and balanced document. However, it is of such a general character that it can hardly serve as the concrete program needed to escape from the crisis by consolidating the diverse political forces of society, which also explains the extremely modest role it has in practice played in this regard.

The complexity of this subject and the broad diversity of opinions and interpretations even of the cardinal problems associated with the issue of Russia’s security require us to stop and consider parts of the conceptual apparatus associated with it. There is no great need to prove that, from the strictly scientific point of view, such diverse epithets as "national" or "state" security, by virtue of the multiethnic composition of Russian society and recent historical experience, cannot be identical. At the same time, at the level of public consciousness, they are considered practically identical, and one ought to keep this understanding in mind. In many respects a similar situation also has emerged regarding such definitions as a "strategy" and a "concept" of national security. In the media their demarcation is not presented as significant, and frequently is not even realized. But, from the point of view of developing a political policy regarding society’s exit from its crisis, these issues involve fundamental differences, which will be explained below.

(1) The Political And Historical
Context Of The New Views On Security

In examining the state of affairs concerning the development of Russia’s National Security Concept (NSC), certain lessons of our recent past are pertinent to our analysis. These are primarily the precipitous collapse of the Soviet Union, which brought to life a diversity of views regarding the current condition and prospects of development of the system of international relations and the place a renewed Russia occupies and aspires to occupy in it. The diversity of opinions in this regard can be compared to that which existed in the periods of global perturbations following the First and especially the Second World Wars. It is now the custom to say that in the late 1940s, the USSR, having won the war, lost the postwar settlement. For some, the collapse of the USSR and its consequences engendered a conceptual vacuum regarding the structural reorganization of the system of international relations, whereas for others "unprecedented opportunities" for building a "new world order" emerged.

The rapidity, spontaneity, and depth of the changes of many aspects of interstate relations are sufficiently obvious. The popularity of the idea of a "new world order" is also understandable, as are the reasons that have evoked a wide spectrum of opinions in different countries regarding its contents. Less understandable for Western experts is the fact that the traditional problem of our misperceiving each other because of our different historical experiences and differing degrees of change has acquired, in our countries’ relations with each other, fundamentally new features. We do not simply look at the world and ourselves differently (which is natural). We live in different times. It is true that such a situation will not last long in view of the obvious fact that after the Cold War the world has become uncontrollable. In this case, the author does not have in mind the appearance of nostalgic reflections concerning the habitual stability of the Cold War period, which was quite comfortable for the United States, Britain, France, China, and other countries. With the exception primarily of Germany, the brilliant strategic policies whose reliability during the last fifty years professionals found impossible to challenge have lost their certainty in a world in which, for example, the United States finds it difficult to establish stability in the former Yugoslavia, or in which India and Pakistan have taken the liberty of challenging the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Something else is important: the constantly increasing realization of the depth and radical nature of the changes. In these conditions, public thinking is addressing the fundamental issues concerning a new conceptualization of interstate relations, three of which have been formulated by the famous American public figure Henry Kissinger: What is now the main structural unit of international relations? How do the primary objects of this system interact? How do they cooperate for the sake of achieving their goals?

In general, the prevailing opinion, which forms the general context of the search for the answers to the above questions and numerous others, is that the static and more or less predictable bipolar model of the world has been replaced by a much more complicated multipolar one. However, we must mention that, strictly speaking, assertions about bipolarity always have been and still remain extremely politicized.

Thus, in the Cold War period it was understood that the Soviet–American relationship embodied the confrontation of two hostile and allegedly sufficiently monolithic socioeconomic systems. The criteria for polarity were nevertheless different: the basis for the USSR’s global influence was predominately ideological; the United States’ polarity rested on its economic potential. The nuclear potential of the two countries was generally accepted to be comparable. But one must bear in mind that, first, their approximate nuclear equilibrium emerged only in the early 1970s and was reflected in the bilateral negotiations that began at that time which were aimed first at limiting and then rolling back the arms race between the two countries. Secondly, by that time the nuclear arsenals of Great Britain and France had attained parameters that allowed one to consider that their use could inflict if not "unacceptable" then at least significant damage on the USSR, calling into doubt the thesis about the predominantly nuclear character of their bipolarity. Finally, the weakening of the USSR’s global position occurred during a period when its armed forces—in particular, its strategic nuclear force—were at the zenith of their power. One can in this connection mention once again that mathematical modeling based on objective statistical indicators, which during the 1950s and 1960s particularly fascinated the primarily American scientists of the so–called modernistic orientation, never could confirm the existence of a bipolar world on the basis of an aggregate qualitative appraisal of the diverse components of the national power of the relevant states.

The question of what elements constitute the main attributes of the still emerging multipolar world has again arisen on the agenda of world politics today. In a natural fashion, there is a continuing formulation and elaboration of such fundamental conceptions as geopolitical stability, the balance of forces, arms race stability, nonmilitary forms of cooperation, the stability of deterrence, crisis stability, stability under the conditions of the latent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other issues. It is quite obvious that as soon as a discussion begins about these "general" things, we immediately come up against the inanity of many of the discussions, which do not take into account the systemic differences within the entire complex of conceptions regarding the national security of our country and the definitions of its national interests.

Let us consider, however, what Kissinger the politician, as opposed to Kissinger the scientist, means when he talks about "the main structural units of the system of international relations." Indeed, if the changes that are taking place in world politics were the main factor connected with the USSR’s collapse and the strategic ambiguity of Russia’s position, then it would be difficult to reject the idea that, among other things, the use of the term "structural units" could signify doubts regarding the maintenance of the Russian Federation’s unity and, correspondingly, the expediency of carrying out a policy that contributes to the integrity of the Russian state. The grounds for such a conclusion, unfortunately, are more than sufficient. And they are caused predominantly by internal social, political, economic, and regional problems that have become visible in the conflict over Chechnya.

Against the background of the incessant crisis in the country and the absence of the positive results that should be associated with the policy of reform, to count on everything taking shape by itself is rather naïve. The essence of a systemic crisis—or, as it used to be called, a "time of troubles"—consists in the absence within society of fundamental and, at the same time, concrete goals and guidelines for development. (Such periods are also typically characterized by the absence of charismatic public leaders.) It is not accidental that the open question about an unambiguous "division of powers" among the various state organs, the appropriate territorial–administrative entities, and so forth, represents the initial step in defining and formulating Russia’s national interests. It is evident that without a real solution it is simply an illusion to talk about all the conceivable human rights that are written in our Constitution, which the Russian public associates with the building of a democratic state.

A recognition of the reality of the threats to our country that originate from different sources, which precisely explains the revival, especially in the first half of the 1990s, of the discussion regarding the NSC, has led to almost messianic expectations regarding its appearance. In practice, however, the texts proposed for discussion by experts were in fact based on the format used by the U.S. National Security Strategy, which in recent years has been published annually by the American administration as a declaration of its political policies based on an analysis of the opportunities and threats ("challenges") confronting the country. However, the purpose and function of a Concept of National Security in today’s Russia has to be broader and more fundamental. This is because the formulation of national interests creates a basis for the search for consensus within the country and the coming into being of a civil society, which has never existed in Russia. At the same time, public servants wanted the NSC to provide a collection of directives and instructions that in difficult situations would allow them to minimize their personal responsibility for the consequences of their actions, and evade in a larger number of cases complicated independent decisions.

What has been said above allows one to understand the point of view of many of the researchers who believe that a genuine recognition of the basis of our national interests and the parameters of our security is impossible under the conditions of a "transition period," and will only become attainable after we achieve some degree of stability. (On the other hand, it is true that other experts defend the thesis that interests and parameters have a permanent character, and that a basis for the development of a NSC exists irrespective of the historical period.) The extreme points of view in essence boil down to the argument that our present–day state is allegedly a kind of "historical chimera"–therefore, to relate, for example, national and state interests and to formulate today a NSC is possible only as a propagandistic "soap bubble" and for the sake of the aspirations of a distinct political group. De facto, this conclusion logically follows from references to the immanent imperial ambitions of the Russian state system, which is popular among a certain part of our political elite. It is customary for understandable reasons to keep silent about the recommendations that follow from such plans.

In all the philosophical and theoretical approaches that exist in the world towards the construction of a NSC—more precisely, of a system of security—the dyad "the state–the external political environment" is usually used. In Russia itself, because of the circumstances that are now taking shape, the emphasis is indisputably put on those domestic factors that during the development of the NSC were directly or indirectly predominant. The task of ensuring the survival of our society in today’s crisis conditions demands that the number of internal threats to national security is seen as infinite. When discussing all the threats to Russia’s security, it is impossible not to take into account the fact that, with the ending of the Cold War, the character of the development of our country’s interstate relations has undergone a profound change. This is connected not only with the idea, which is fashionable today, of the substitution of geoeconomics for geopolitics as the defining factor of international politics, but also with the problem of combining the foreign and domestic geopolitical factors of development.

(2) Certain Methodological Bases Fordeveloping A Russian National Security Concept

From the point of view of methodology, a Russian NSC must incorporate not only officially formulated views on the problem of ensuring Russia’s security, but also a system of criteria for developing and evaluating the effectiveness of the policies in this area. These criteria should be prepared taking into account the character of domestic and foreign threats, which are determined by means of exposure and through the prism of Russia’s vital interests, the formulation of the main directions of counteracting the threats to our security, and the creation of a political–legal mechanism for ensuring our security. Moreover, one of the characteristic features of the crisis Russia is experiencing is the intensification of the mood of historical pessimism among a significant part of society. In this regard, and it is essential once again to emphasize this, it is quite obvious that the Russian Federation (RF) NSC at this historical stage must be constructed in a way that takes into account the distinctive features of the current moment and its characteristic peculiarities. Among the latter one could name the following:

• The number, scale, and dynamic of factors that determine the security of the country under the conditions of a systemic crisis; their relative significance, including the role of factors of a subjective nature (for example, the psychology of "favoritism" and the related phenomenon of the high level of corruption of government officials); and especially society’s perception of being subject to rapid changes.
• The structure of state and society interests and their level of priority also bear a distinctive imprint (it is sufficiently obvious that state policy cannot express the interests of the entire divided society and thereby also receive the corresponding support).
• The formation of the goals and preferred means of ensuring our security differs considerably from that of a period of stable development. It is indicative, for example, that while preference is given to long–term strategic analysis in the search for stable reference points, the recommendations that are being given in fact amount to tactical steps, which are designed to achieve instant results.
• Under acute social and ideological confrontation in which the old social, political, and ideological reference points have been devalued and new ones have not been accepted by many layers of society, we are witnessing the restructuring of all mechanisms of support for the security of the country, beginning with the state apparatus and ending at the level of social ties.
• The process of decision–making in any state is a process of working out compromises, and its final result at times is very remote from the initial arrangements. The framework for the search for a compromise and the taking of decisions is usually quite narrow, insofar as it is predetermined by the search for optimal and rational decisions. Under the conditions of a systemic crisis of society, these limits are frequently absent creating the impression that all variants are possible in the search for decisions. It is in the course of a crisis, however, when the search for optimal decisions really can proceed in extremely narrow limits. In other words, the spectrum of alternatives, by virtue of the diverse number of causes, can turn out to be much narrower than the same spectrum during periods of the stable development of society.
• In the decision–making process, the role of accidental and relatively insignificant but still relevant "trigger" factors is growing; one can distinguish elements of subjectivism in the procedures for developing decisions themselves (take for instance several provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, and the discussion with respect to the right of President Boris Yeltsin to participate in the election campaign in the year 2000).
• The transition to a new, stable condition is proceeding along trajectories that are difficult to predict, and in this respect factors of strategic planing and "link–ups" between certain tactical steps and long–term interests are often absent, as a result of which most decisions are reactions to the prior actions of politicians and to the often unfavorable course of events.
• The weakening of the levers of state power for ensuring state security (the Ministry of Internal Affairs, for example) leaves the state apparatus, which is in a process of constant restructuring owing to its ungovernability, incapable of taking and even more fully implementing complex, integrated, and multi–staged decisions.
• There is an ideological vacuum, caused by the rejection of any theory, and an erosion (in many cases, the active rejection on the part of a significant part of the population) of new social reference points.

(3) The Problem Of Security: The Search For Conceptual Solutions

In discussing the national security of Russia, it is essential to sort out the differences between a concept and a strategy of national security. A concept of national security is primarily a philosophical view of the position of the country in the system of global politics of the past, present, and future. A concept of national security considers the accumulated experiences and generalizations of a variety of factors that determine the adequacy of the vital functions of state and society and the changing domestic and international environment. Strictly speaking, from the methodological point of view, a NSC should theoretically substantiate the ways of achieving the most preferable place for the country in the paradigm of global security on the basis of a strict consideration of its own interests and its opportunities in a particular historical period. Proceeding from this understanding, one can see that what is often identified as a strategy of national security is in fact a set of tactical views on the preferable variants of ensuring the country’s interests from a one–to–several–year perspective. In fact, in this case the issue concerns the substantiation of a concrete policy course. Its temporary framework can be defined by diverse circumstances and can vary in different directions within extremely broad limits. Much depends on external dynamics and the contents of internal developments, including the orientation of the government in power. Only when the adjustment of these variants becomes minimal over time, and the fundamental long–term goals and means of their achievement no longer change, can one also speak about the effective implementation of a strategy of national security. True, in real life (owing to the internal and international dynamics inherent in it) one ought not to identify a strategy of national security with a precise definition of goals, steps, and final tasks. Rather, the issue concerns general reference points within whose framework the achievement of these or other goals is planned.

That which has been said above gives one an idea about how the development of a NSC clashed with those conditions in which Russia found itself in the 1990s and with the unprecedented tasks then facing the country that were aggravated by a number of objective and subjective causes. That is why, for a number of years, among Russian experts the NSC has been bound up with the systematization of an approach towards solving the country’s urgent domestic and foreign tasks, the coordination of the actions of diverse departments, and, finally, a reduction of the gap between theory and practice, between rhetoric and deeds.

It is not surprising that there exist not only different interpretations, but also numerous definitions of the terms "concept," "strategy," and "national security policy," and that these are sometimes mutually exclusive. For instance, in accordance with the Russian Federation Law "On Security" (1992), the Concept of National Security constitutes the aggregate of the officially accepted views on ensuring the "security of the vital interests of the individual, the society, and the state from domestic and foreign threats." This definition bears the imprint of the distinctiveness of that moment and environment in which the law was accepted, as well as an imprint of that historical experience with which Russia approached the early 1990s. In general, the meaning of this definition and formulation was carried over to the interpretation of the official version of the NSC that was laid out in 1997. According to contemporary legislation in the Russian Federation, the NSC is a "political document that reflects the totality of the officially accepted views on the goals and state strategy in the sphere of ensuring the security of the individual, the society, and the state from foreign and domestic threats of a political, economic, social, military, technological, informational and other nature, taking into account the existing resources and possibilities."

It is obvious that such an approach allows one to move away from the previously narrow interpretation of security, that concerned itself exclusively with the security of the state and in many respects ignored the interests of the private individual and civil society on the whole. The current approach discusses what should take precedence: the interests of the state, the society, a class (group), or the individual. However, it is obvious enough that the individual and society should be classified as the main objects of defense, while the main responsibility for ensuring security and citizens’ rights should be the state’s.

Yet another widespread definition of the term NSC interprets it as the aggregate of the officially accepted views on the problem of ensuring a country’s security and on the criteria for developing practical policies in this area. Such a definition allows one to consider the Russian Federation’s NSC primarily as a concept of state security. One can cite numerous other definitions. All the definitions in the final analysis are aimed at the search for that system’s coordinates, which are essential as reference points for escaping from our very profound social–economic crisis, and therefore logically include the domestic preconditions of our foreign actions.

As has been noted, one of the natural results of a systemic crisis of society is that interest in the search for universal and rapid solutions to all accumulated problems hypertrophies. On the other hand, the devaluation of general reference points, the confusion of concepts, and the replacement of theses and logical frameworks is so strong that one is compelled to answer vaguely even such a seemingly simple question as: how can one classify what is happening in Russia in the 1990s—is it the reforms that so many people are arguing about, or is it a revolution? If one takes as a basis the change in property relations, and retrospectively looks at the process, then it seems entirely possible to talk about a revolution or even a counterrevolution. If one judges by political rhetoric, including that used by officials, then the debate concerns more the course of reform, which can be semantically identified, and is being identified, as an administrative revolution. By revolution, however, analysts essentially mean unexpected changes, i.e., an element of spontaneity. Indirect confirmation of this conclusion is the fact that in the beginning of the 1990s, when our expectations in connection with the social–economic policies of the government of Yegor Gaidar were not met, the thesis began to be propagated that the rapid creation of a new class (and a new society) that must ensure the irreversibility of the transformations and other progressive developments was the essential first step on the reform path. It supposedly was more important than the maintenance of this or that economic indicator, particularly given our widespread use of ineffective and ecologically harmful technologies, and more important than the fair redistribution of public properties in the course of privatization.

This point of view, which represented a subject of political debate even a few years ago, today in essence has received a different official appraisal. "The stabilization program presented by the government in essence signifies a change of economic policy," Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko declared on July 10, 1998, while presenting his program on escaping from the crisis to the Federation Council. He explained (and this is important from the point of view of confirming what was said above) that "earlier the task was set of creating a liberal system. Now a new stage is beginning. It is necessary to bring order to the development of the real sector of the economy and raise the effectiveness of the work of the state." Considering the monetary basis of the policy carried out by the Gaidar government, one more summary appraisal, given by Kirienko, is worthy of attention: "In Russia today there is practically no financial market."

The point of view of the new Prime Minister that was prescribed for "the continuation of the course of reforms" is extremely significant. First, one can hardly say that Russia can simply allow herself to "continue the course." Second, it is indicative that as a matter of fact the different opinions of Kirienko and the opposition concern not an appraisal of "the attainable" and the inevitable, and even less the catastrophic consequences if "the previous course" is continued, but the political forces, forms, and means of exiting from the crisis regardless of what is included in the concept "the course of reforms" and whether it is used at all.

It makes sense in this connection also to briefly mention that there are quite considerable if not principle differences between the words revolution, evolution, and reform. Reform (be it of a political institution or of the functioning of some kind of system) for a number of specialists in essence means recognition of the fact that the previous experiment has exhausted itself and is not giving the expected results. To reform means to change the vision, ideology, and approach to solving urgent tasks, and to consciously change the previous approaches that have lost their original effectiveness. Unlike revolution, reform presupposes planning, an agreement or at least an attempt at compromise, mutual concessions, and definite social support for the reform course. From this point of view, taking into account the schism in Russian society, it is extremely difficult unequivocally to identify, say, the period of the beginning of the 1990s with a period of reform. At the same time, evolution presumes a spontaneity of development as distinct from the conscientiously planned steps of a strategic policy of reform. The essence of reform is an active, planned, and frequently fundamental change of many bases of the organization of society, production, etc.

Earlier we talked about the issue of the alignment of political variables and the peculiarities of the transition period, which in their totality define many of the parameters and ideas that are encapsulated in the concept of a country’s security. In its most simple form, it can imply two conceptions: one for the peculiar transitional period in which Russia now finds itself, and another for the period of stable development of a society that has already gotten out of its crisis.

For example, the distinctiveness of the first consists in the fact that, under the conditions of a transition period, a clear understanding is lacking even of what the object that determines the concept of Russian security is. For some political forces in the country, it is primarily Russia; for others, it is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); for a third group, it is that group of CIS countries that most realistically can proceed in the future to a higher level of integration. Political forces also exist that do not rule out the reintegration and creation of a new state entity within the borders of the former USSR, which accordingly changes their structural view of the concept of security.

The specific features of a transition period, and the functional differences between a concept and a strategy of national security, are especially clear in their relation to the idea of "national interests." In the context of stable social development, a strategy of security is secondary with respect to the process of developing national policies and with respect to a country’s tentatively formulated and generally accepted national interests. With a bit of generalization, one can say that national interests set general tasks, and a strategy determines the forms, means, methods, and stages of the attainment of the generally accepted national interests formulated and proclaimed in advance by the political leadership. As far as a concept is concerned, if it is needed at all, then to a certain degree it must also be secondary with respect to national interests. However, the real formulation of our national interests and the development of our NSC represent one and the same process, and national interests are a most important and integrated component of the concept. An analysis of practically all the domestic variants known to us demonstrates precisely this.

If one looks attentively at the numerous publications and speeches on the subject of a NSC, then still another point directly or indirectly manifests itself that complicates its development in Russia under current conditions. It consists in the fact that very often Russia is primarily considered a result of the historical development of the Russian nation, which, in this respect—in association with the numerous ethnic groups and formations that populate the country—created a multiethnic entity. The structure of the Russian Federation usually implies an institutional and political context and is considered in many respects a result of the assertion of sovereignty in a definite territory. This is important for us in that the territorial division and ethnic map of the nations of the former Soviet Union to a significant degree complicate the situation as compared with other countries.

All that has been said above in turn explains those complications confronting the political forces of Russia in developing and adopting a Russian NSC, as well as the relationship to that which has already been formally accepted. Certain stages of the work that has been carried out in this direction well illustrate the situation.

In the context of the restructuring of Soviet society, the first attempts to create a security concept for the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, which initially was called a "Concept of a System of RSFSR Security," occurred in 1990, when under the influence of a number of political forces the idea began to prevail in society of constructing a new state formation (a renovated Union) on the basis of extensive independence ("complete sovereignty?") for the republics that entered into it. As far as is known, no decisions at all were taken regarding that project, and after the well–known events of August 1991 and the Belovezhskaya conference, the groups that were preparing this draft ceased their work.

The next stage is associated with the summer of 1992, when the Secretary of the recently created Security Council (SC), Yuri Skokov, at its first meeting raised the issue of developing a "new concept of Russian security." A draft that had been prepared by this time, which as usual required further work, was accepted. The draft itself was not published, and in the maelstrom of subsequent events it was simply forgotten. A year later, in the summer of 1993, the new SC Secretary, Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, promulgated the main principles of a version of a security concept that had been prepared by this time, and declared the beginning of its realization. After the dramatic events of October 1993, no one returned to this version of the draft.

The next efforts with respect to the creation of a security concept occurred at the beginning of 1994, when a decision was taken about a thorough academic review of the process of developing a NSC within the SC of the Russian Federation. This process was supposed to have been ensured by a specially created Scientific Council in the SC under the leadership of V. S. Pirumov. The council, having united the resources of various academic and departmental research centers and diverse public and political organizations, undertook great efforts. A huge amount of material was accumulated, containing different approaches and methods of working out a NSC. Within the context of carrying out this scientific research and information program, a series of seminars and conferences were held, one of the results of which was the publication in 1995 of the book, Problems of Global Security. However, the coordinated draft of a functioning NSC itself was not prepared. It is possible that one of the main problems consisted of the fact that the material presented to the Scientific Council differed very strongly in its ideological views, methods, initial premises, political views, and so forth. It is therefore not accidental that in October 1995, the then Assistant to the President on National Security Issues, Yu. Baturin, made a speech in which he stated that the concept would probably not appear in the near future because of the absence of a general national consensus regarding a number of fundamental questions. It was expected that the next stage in the process perhaps would be taken after the 1996 Presidential elections.

Baturin’s statement is very noteworthy as an official confirmation of the fact that, in working out a Russian security concept (the NSC that was approved by the President in December 1997 confirms this), there was a clear desire to make a document that was acceptable to all sides and political parties, to attain public consent in the course of its preparation, and to succeed in creating something that could at the same time guarantee our national security and be perceived as a reflection of the personal political will of the President.

As has been noted, a NSC for a transitional period has a number of characteristic peculiarities and complex interconnections between domestic and foreign factors. It is therefore not surprising that the preparation of the draft of the Russian Federation concept always lagged behind the dynamic of the development of events inside the country and the situation in the international arena. This was especially true as it did not include in its dynamic the change in this or that stereotype which, as is well–known, entails considerable adjustments in one’s appraisal of emerging realities. In this respect it is pertinent to cite the following paradigms, identified by I. A. Nikolaichuk, that appeared to govern the various stages of the drafting process: "the fight for the priority of public values and individual rights" (the stage of the struggle of the "democratic" Russian leadership with the "communist" center in the form of the leadership of the USSR); "the renaissance of Russia" (the stage of the political dismantling of the USSR and the communist system after the events of August 1991); "the democratic reform of society" (the stage of the launching of radical economic reforms); "the preservation of the integrity of the Russian state" (the stage of the confrontation of the center and the regions, which ended with the catastrophe of October 1993); "the achievement of consent" (the stage of the attempts at the political stabilization of society); "the strengthening of the Russian statehood" (the stage of the attempts at consolidating Russian society against the background of the measures aimed at the restoration of constitutional order in Chechnya); and "the acceleration of the integration processes within the CIS framework (the stage of the cautious attempts at joint exiting from the crisis).

After December 1997, the situation with respect to the search for a "paradigm" for the NSC did not significantly change. In this connection, one can cite the "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation," which was published by a group of authors in the series, "Scientific Reports" (no. 6, 1998), of the Moscow Public Scientific Foundation. In this text, priority is again given to the interests of the individual, but the question again remains open of who would guarantee them.

As an indicator of the burdens borne by those drafting a NSC, one can also note the public importance during the last three months (May–July 1998) of the struggle over the issue of burying the remains of the family of the last Russian emperor. The discussion and clash of political interests were accompanied by polemics with respect to the national idea, the symbols of national reconciliation (the mysticism of national salvation through this act), and many other interesting considerations from an exclusively intellectual point of view.

Thus, given the absence of a high–level systematic comprehension of the foreign and domestic threats—be it in the form of a concept or a strategy—to our national security, which represents a comprehension of the complex conditions and factors that create a danger to our vital economic, political, and other interests, the conceptual approach itself towards the ensuring of Russia’s security for now remains in a rather amorphous state.

On the other hand, the extensive desire to construct a system of security in Russia is acquiring cosmological contours and is complicating and replacing the search for effective and pragmatic solutions to the most acute and explosive problems on the current agenda of Russian politics. The boundary that divides the struggle with "windmills" from a scrupulous, systematic, and practically oriented working through of a complex of national security problems for the time being frequently turns out to be imperceptible.

(4) The Mechanisms Of A System Of Security

In discussing a system of security, it is impossible not to mention briefly its mechanisms.

The coordination of policies, as is well–known, proceeds along two basic directions: first, forming appropriate mechanisms for the development and implementation of coordinated decisions by all the interested agencies, and, second, on the basis of a single vision of the international situation, the trends of its development, its general reference points, and the approach to solving problems. If as an example one turns to the original meaning of the creation of such institutions as councils on national security, and for an example takes the Security Council of the Russian Federation and those functions that in the final analysis are consolidated in it, then many things for now remain not completely clear with respect to the real and even the formal state of affairs in the mechanisms of the security system. For instance, according to the Russian Federation law "On Security," the SC is responsible to the legislative branch "for the defense of the vital interests of the individual, society, and the state from foreign and domestic threats." At the same time, from the practical point of view, the SC is mainly allotted the right of preparing recommendations and proposals for the executive branch: "the Security Council of the Russian Federation is the constitutional organ that carries out the preparation of the decisions of the President of the Russian Federation in the field of ensuring security" (see articles 13 and14 of the law).

Such fundamental issues for the system of national security of any country such as the coordination of the activities of the various departments, the control over their implementation, the updating of the tasks and activities regarding their fulfillment, etc., requires further development. In this case, a number of points and provisions about interdepartmental commissions and the apparatus of the SC (articles 17, 18, 19) from a practical point of view remain open. Moreover, a number of statutes that concern, for example, coordination in the sphere of foreign policy, can only additionally complicate the understanding of the situation. In this context, one can recall the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation "On the Coordinating Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in the Conducting of a Single Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation."

For the sake of fairness, it is necessary to note that such a situation is typical for practically all countries. The role and status of the NSC in the United States in each period is determined by the political inclinations of the President and certain other circumstances. But the point of what has been said is not to demonstrate the imperfection of this or that legislation. The issue is something else: the activities of the state and society have acquired so complex a character that they require a systematic view of the situation and appropriate organizational decisions for the purposes of coordinating the positions of the various departments, influence groups, and so forth. During a social crisis, the difficulty of this task is realized most acutely, but the necessity of its solution also becomes more obvious as compared with periods of social stability.

In this context, the organizational dimension manifests itself as yet another important aspect of the current Russian situation. In the summer of 1997, at the same time that he assumed the duties of Secretary of the Defense Council, Andrei Kokoshin was also appointed state military inspector. The function of the State Military Inspectorate (SMI) was extremely broad and on the whole amounted to the task of ensuring "a single state policy in the area of defense." (Putting it more simply, it was to control the activities of the "power ministries," that is, those government bodies that can participate in decisions involving the use of force, including the ministries of defense, foreign policy, and internal security.) The additional division of the system of security between the Security Council and the Defense Council had its own internal logic, most likely comparable to that which existed when in the course of a number of years the positions of the SC Secretary and the Assistant to the President on National Security Issues were separated. Now, after the dissolution of the Defense Council, the functions of the SMI were transferred to the Security Council. Time will show how the powers of the SMI and the activities of the SC, a part of whose activities concerns the power ministries, can be combined in an official who is directly subordinate to the President.

(5) Russian Unity As A Target Of Geopolitcal Aspirations

The models of future world order that are being propounded today in the West almost inevitably consider the possibility, which is unpopular among us, of the "disintegration" and—to call a spade a spade—collapse of our state. The question is topical because a crisis of our state system, which traditionally has found its expression in the secessionist aspirations of Russia’s "territories" even in the context of a more or less normal political process, is taking place (which is most graphically demonstrated by the chain of events that led to the war in Chechnya). In order for the art of compromise to be really effective, it is necessary to have a suitable political culture, which takes shape over decades. Besides that, political methods of domestic stability turn out to be insufficient when the issue concerns the struggle over not the details but the fundamental principles of statehood. As far as the external dimensions of security are concerned, which concerns not least the Russian NSC, they can assist extremely effectively or, on the contrary, counter the disintegration processes.

The principle of "divide and rule" was not invented in our century, and therefore the attempts, for example, of the United States, on its path to becoming a world leader, to rid itself of potentially powerful adversaries is from the point of view of history natural. In this connection, it would be not only stupid but also counterproductive, from the point of view of the interests of Russian public in the formation of stable and healthy relations with the United States, to gloss over the well–known dangers on this score. The defeat of the USSR in the Cold War, despite all the assurances of the West, turned into a defeat of Russia. Therefore, the attempt of a number of states to stimulate processes leading to the emergence of newly independent states on the territory of the former USSR is not surprising.

Indeed, irrespective of the specifics of the contemporary situation, what can be the attitude of the surrounding (above all Western) countries, which de facto have great influence on Russian realities, towards the preservation of the unity of such a highly integrated formation as the Russian Federation? Whether we like it or not, the prose of international life is such that all those heroic events which form the pride of a country and which shape a healthy sense of patriotism are a subject of concern for others. From an historical point of view, it is not fully obvious that the break–up of Russia, with its periods of domestic instability and its attempts of various kinds at external expansion, would solve the problem for many of its neighbors.

Another fundamental issue—whether the interested countries are prepared to manifest their largely negative philosophical–historical attitude toward the unity of Russia (the "Russian Empire," as it is usually described) in active, consistent, and purposeful policies aimed at the RF’s disintegration—is more complex. For example, for most European countries, the answer would most likely be negative. The costs of the destructive "waves" from the inevitably attendant disintegration process would be substantial, including the re–division of historically shaped but artificial borders, armed conflicts, massive emigration, etc., the enormous scale of which would be capable of undermining Europe’s extremely fragile prosperity, especially if these processes were accompanied by another economic crisis, and these countries’ ethnic harmony. It is also difficult to believe that the disintegration of the USSR and the other socialist states has had only positive consequences for the West. Under the current conditions of uncertainty regarding the supremacy of certain fundamental principles of the European security system (the "inviolability of frontiers" or "the right of nations to self–determination"), ethnic minorities have reached certain conclusions from the experience of the East European countries. Incidentally, for the United States, too, the situation in this regard is not irreproachable, though hardly anyone considers such a possibility as a threat today.

Thus, to summarize the existing views on this issue, all the "enlightened countries" would be satisfied with the transformation of the Russian state into a sufficiently stable but very free confederative system with numerous economic zones that would fall under the sphere of the economic interests and influence of this or that group of countries, which would objectively promote the internal economic break up of Russia. In this, perhaps, lies the hidden essence of the conflict of Russia with the outside world. And it is possible to solve this from the point of view of Russia’s interests only through a higher level of economic integration among the countries that existed in the USSR.

In the meantime, today the Far East and Eastern Siberia are becoming economically more and more tied to the United States, the PRC, Japan, and certain other countries by virtue of the increasingly high cost of exchanging freight with the European part of Russia. The diverse status (in law and in fact) of the subjects of the Russian Federation gives ever new manifestations to the "parade of sovereignties." Therefore, our close and distant neighbors do not need to waste resources conducting a coordinated and massive strategy to achieve the collapse of the Russian Federation; they only need to consistently pursue their own economic interests.

Recently, many of the states are "cultivating the virgin soil" of our periphery. From the point of view of the broad Russian public, this would look like quite a noble task if it were not accompanied in a number of cases by an intensification of centrifugal tendencies. Some of these result from the effects of the rules of the game of the world market that Russia is striving to enter. In this regard, it is impossible not to note the alarming fact that many in the West and elsewhere believe that Russia’s decentralization and geographic consolidation promotes its democratization.

From the point of view of understanding how to conduct foreign affairs today, and how we ourselves ought to conduct it, the integration of the strategy of the United States with respect to Russia is worthy of consideration, including in the sphere of economic relations, though the United States’ real volume of economic and trade ties with Russia is minimal and inferior according to many indicators to that of a number of European countries. A clearly expressed regional bent is visible in the general economic strategy of the United States towards Russia, including in the area of investments. In the first half of the 1990s, the regions and zones of the Russian Federation that earlier had been closed to foreigners for reasons of national security—including many areas in the North, Siberia, the Far East, the Urals, and the Middle Volga—were a special interest for American capital. In recent years, a process of creating infrastructure that assists American business (official trade representations, business centers, scientific centers, branches of consulting and law firms, advisors, etc.) has been occurring in various regions of Russia. Representatives of such U.S. governmental organizations as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency actively work there.

The great attention that, for example, the United States grants to the "human factor" at the regional level shows the farsightedness and long–term character of Western capital in Russia. In this respect the issue concerns not only representatives of local administrations and business groups, but also a generation of a kind of Russian business class. Investments in "human capital," i.e., expenditures on instruction, training, and foreign apprenticeships for the new Russian entrepreneurs and bureaucrats—even of representatives of the old management corps, many of whom in the process of privatization had demonstrated a rapid and at times extremely distinctive, bordering on criminal, assimilation of market skills—is still considered in the West to be an important element in the improvement of the investment climate in the regions, in the reduction of political risk, and, most importantly, in the creation of such personnel who could understand and relate to the interests of the businesses of the developed countries. Great hopes were laid in the United States, for example, on the Nizhnii Novgorod region, where the local political and economic elite (including former Prime Minister Kiriyenko and the incumbent Vice Premier, Boris Nemtsov), in the assessment of American experts, rapidly assimilated contemporary economic thought. Considering the growing independence of the economic interests of the various parts of Russia, the tactic of directly working with the leading personnel in the regions is logical and justified from the point of view of American or West European business. However, in the context of the growth of separatist sentiments in the Russian Federation at the regional level, this can in the future lead to results that are far from expected by the politicians in the center and the regions. We are of course not talking about prohibitive measures of an administrative character. On the contrary, it is necessary to develop diverse forms of cooperation, but also to regulate them, taking into account the experience of other countries and our own, so that the results would be predictable and would correspond to Russia’s interests. In this regard, one ought not to confuse "criminal intent" against Russia with the laws of the world market, as if the latter stood far apart from our own ideas, which have been inherited from the epoch of proletarian internationalism.

(6) The Nature Of The Threats
And The Structure Of The Vital Interests Of The Russian Federation
In The Realm Of Security

A consideration of the opportunities and threats facing Russia suggest two rather different approaches to our country’s security. In an international context in which Russia in essence occupies a "defensive" position, the priority should consist in threat–based planning, though it is understood that it would be extremely problematic to get out of our current crisis without the maximum exploitation of our opportunities.

An assessment of threats is obligatory for different kinds of activity in the planning and the making of decisions at all levels of state administration within the framework of the powers fixed by legislation. The Russian Federation NSC consequently takes into account the nature of current and potential threats, and also the fact that they are not static. It is not accidental that in the NSC approved by the President, section III is formulated as, "Threats to the National Security of the Russian Federation." And these "threats" are not identical to the widespread American political science concept of "challenges." Such threats can appear and disappear, grow and diminish, and change in their significance and in the perception of a country’s various political groups. Considering the diverse nature of the threats, in order to conduct an analysis of them from a practical point of view, it is expedient to develop and confirm at the highest level of the state beforehand a conception of the state’s goals and priorities, including in the areas of domestic and foreign policy, insofar as precisely such a system of priorities determines in the final analysis the concrete criteria for appraising a threat and ensuring the development of practical solutions to counter it.

The next step in structuring the problem of state security could be to begin working out, by means of conducting an analysis of the threats, a kind of "scale of security priorities," i.e., a classification and ranking of threats according to their origin, nature, and degree of danger they present. In such a classification, one could use such diverse indicators as:

• their sphere of activity (political, economic, social, military, international, ecological, demographic, scientific, technological, informational, etc.);
• the origin of the source of the threat (domestic/internal or foreign/external);
• the probability and time of their realization (real/actual or potential/latent);
• their consequences (universal, affecting the entire Federation or most of its components, or local; in the circumstances of the current transition period, partial consequences, which formally affect the interests only of individual statesmen, parties, or movements, also can plan a significant role).

Such a "scale of security priorities" is not once and forever fixed, and it can experience significant changes depending on the exact situation, and the character and degree of the threat. For instance, at present, in the context of a profound systemic crisis of society, the main threats to the security of the Russian Federation usually are associated with the domestic sphere and the emerging socioeconomic, political–military, ethnic, ecological, managerial, and other problems, but they possibly are also associated, and primarily so, with the "confusion of minds."

Considering what has been said above with respect to the specific features of a NSC for a transitional and consequently evolutionary society and the necessity of adaptive mechanisms, it is proposed to divide the vital interests of the Russian Federation into two lists relating to the provision of security in a "special" (transitional) period.

The scope of the present publication does not permit one to provide a detailed (and even less a hierarchical) system of the diverse categories of Russia’s interests. Therefore, it is necessary to consider that which follows to be an illustration of the idea, which, in the opinion of the author, should express the point, and functions of a NSC. For example:

The Russian Federation’s Vital Long–Term Security Interests:

• ensuring the independence and the free choice of the development path of the country, and preserving its territorial integrity and the conditions for the construction of a democratic and law–governed state;
• preventing foreign aggression and regional conflicts in Russia and on the territory of the former USSR;
• stabilizing economic development and providing a fitting standard of living for the population;
• guaranteeing public order and the social protection of the population;
• defending the rights and freedoms, guaranteed by the Constitution, of the citizens of the Russian Federation and of persons beyond its borders who culturally or ethnically identify themselves with the RF;
• improving the ecological situation and the mechanisms of developing natural resources;
• maintaining the stability of international relations and finding a worthy place for the country in the new structure of world politics and international economic relations;
• solving such global security problems as the spread of terrorism, narcotics, and weapons of mass destruction.

The Russian Federation’s Vital Interests in the "Special" (Transitional) Period:

• overcoming the sociopolitical and economic crisis while maintaining a policy of constructing a democratic society and a law–governed state;
• forming a culture of political opposition within a democratic society;
• creating a system of the effective administration of the various spheres of public life, and defining the place and function of state administration in this system;
• solving the problems in the agrarian sphere relating to the issue of food security;
• carrying out a rapid restructuring of industry and renovating its material–technical and technological bases;
• converting enterprises in the military–industrial sector along with preserving and modernizing the core of this complex;
• creating new economic relationships with the CIS countries;
• putting our cooperative relations with the industrially developed countries on an equal footing;
• developing a new basis for multilateral ties with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe;
• preventing the RF’s disintegration;
• settling international conflicts, especially those involving armed conflicts among ethnic or sectarian groups;
• preventing organized crime and corruption;
• ensuring a favorable international climate for carrying out reforms in the Russian Federation;
• liquidating the most dangerous sources of ecological catastrophe.

One can further work out and systematize threats in other areas, including those in the political, social, military, scientific–technical, ethnic, ecological, and informational spheres. The solution for each of these must take note of Russian peculiarities. For example, an enumeration of the threats in the social sphere almost inevitably would be associated with some populist slogans, and with the motives and assessments of the dynamics of situations and ideological orientations.

Thus, for instance, according to a number of assessments, the first signs of recovery of the Russian economy appeared in 1997. This gave the World Bank reason to predict a resumption of economic growth in the country in 1998 of up to 6% (Reuters, March 17, 1998). At the end of 1997, according to official statistics, inflation fell to the lowest level since the beginning of economic reform. A trend towards a reduction in interest rates may be observed, a growth of production in some branches of industry has begun, and many experts believe that the Russian economy has entered into a period of moderate ascent.

In the spring of 1998, however, a crisis of state finances emerged in the country that exerted a negative influence on the markets for corporate securities. This in turn affected the prospects for economic growth. In combination with the consequences of the financial crisis in Asia, the reduction of the price for energy products, and the collapse of the tax policy within the country, all this led to a still greater worsening of the economic situation and a growing mood among the public of impending doom and collapse.

In the context of an acute political struggle, one could use the public illnesses for the attainment of a concrete group of objectives. But, not having made a correct diagnosis, it is impossible to cure them. In this regard, it is essential to take into account the social category of service workers—this is not only to a significant degree the bureaucracy (civilian or military), the reduction of which could optimize managerial and other structures. It is also the stabilizing basis of the state system, the sharp and rapid reduction (or pauperization) of which in the Russian tradition is attended by a threat of the destruction of many foundations of public organization in general. This is especially characteristic of current conditions, when one and the same factors are considered by various public forces as threatening or, on the contrary, as stabilizing. This focuses attention on the necessity of establishing a system, fixed by legislation, of state priorities and vital interests within the framework of a policy aimed at getting out of the current crisis and, no matter how complicated it may be, at securing a consensus on its behalf.

(7) The Issue Of Military Security

It is evident that the theme that is being considered demands a discussion of the issue of military security, which traditionally, though not always precisely, is frequently accompanied by the term, "balance of power." Now it has already become clear that the global "rivalry" of the USSR and the USA, which from the beginning contained within itself a serious internal contradiction, presented great danger for the existence of one of the opposing states. The specific features of this confrontation consisted in the fact that it in practice always proceeded under the conditions of an extremely complicated balance or correlation of forces. Its important component was strategic parity, which at first was conditioned on the mutual capacity of both sides to inflict considerable (though not symmetrical) damage on each other in the case of a nuclear war. (Later, after the equalization of both sides’ nuclear potential, the criterion became their capacity to inflict an unacceptable level of damage on each other.) This fact, as has been noted more than once, turned any attempt at the large–scale use of nuclear forces in the course of a possible conflict of the two superpowers into an obviously pointless activity fraught with guaranteed mutual annihilation.

In forming a new system of national security, however, Russia ought to consider the question: Does parity entail something more than a translation of strategic rivalry into an obvious "stalemate" situation? Is the recognition of "absolute" stability in the strategic sphere an obvious good for the guaranteeing of national security, or is it better to direct one’s efforts at the search for "breakthroughs" that allow one to escape from the strategic deadlock? In the latter case, the possibility exists of using a "linear" approach, i.e., an attempt to acquire some kind of decisive unilateral military advantages as a result of the creation of "absolute weapons" (a new Manhattan project) or other large–scale and very expensive but traditional military–technical measures and an attendant military–economic plan. Or is it better to try to approach the problem "nonlinearly," i.e., to find new nonmilitary variants of solving the problem that are aimed at transforming the apparent "bipolar (or, more precisely, military–bipolar) world" into a unipolar one with a single superpower?

However, the "initial positions" that were taken in the confrontation and, more importantly, the perception of threats that conditioned both sides’ foreign activities, were far from equivalent. Today many scholars are prepared acknowledge that after the Second World War, perhaps for the first time in its history, Russia ensured for itself practically total ("100%") military security. It was acquired by the possibility not only of repulsing military aggression from any coalition of states, but also of obviously averting this aggression. The euphoria from the results of the victory in the war, and the sense of having a self–sufficient defense, in fact equalized military and national security, which was a mistake.

The then leadership of the USSR possessed sufficient information about the direction in which U.S. strategic thought was moving in its attempts to change the bilateral correlation of forces. Already in its first directives, the U.S. National Security Council with all clarity stated that the presence of an approximate parity with the USSR in aggregate military means represented a threat to U.S. national interests. The idea is extremely noteworthy, and is above all still another demonstration of the asymmetry of the views of the existence and the forms of the threats to the national security of the two countries.

In later documents of the United States’ National Security Council, one finds the same concern about the threat from bipolarity, and a recognition that the existence of parity (even before the Soviet Union possessed a nuclear arsenal) limited the range and types of actions the United States could employ against the USSR. Under these conditions, it is natural that in its effort at transforming the world in a unipolar (American) direction, U.S. strategy adopted a "nonlinear," approach, i.e., one aimed at transforming the opposing Soviet system rather than at overturning the balance of forces (though such attempts in one form or another took place).

The question arises: did the Soviet government work out an analogous document that contained a strategy for the USSR with respect to America as one of the two global centers of power? One can make the supposition that bipolarity turned out to be "comfortable" for the USSR. The goal of world domination, which bore at different time periods different names (for example, the victory of communism), was considered inevitable, but this was a separate, long–term perspective whose achievement was associated in Soviet public consciousness more with evolutionary changes in the outside world than with the extremes of the historical experience of civil war in Russia. To all appearances, the Soviet leadership was content with the fact that it had succeeded in carrying out the centuries–long task of the Russian state—guaranteeing the military security of its national territory.

Perhaps the most important consequence of the "bipolar world," which was historically realized in the form of the Cold War, was the fact that the significance of military force in peacetime grew excessively and acquired a fundamentally new character that had never been seen before in history. Military strategy became an integral part of political strategy, and military power became one of the defining factors of international relations. A new situation arose in which professional military and senior military officials joined the ranks of civilian officials in influencing the taking of major political and economic decisions because the concepts of "military security" and "national security," at least in the USSR, became practically synonyms. As has already been noted, these concepts in many respects coincide, but they are far from identical. This of course does not mean that military vulnerability (as distinct from parity) is good. The issue is something else: Military security issues must occupy the center of attention, but it is dangerous to underestimate the importance of the two components of national power in intrastate relations. That is why today, when the geopolitical situation has changed in a radical manner, one question is extremely important: What place should be allotted to military aspects in the general structure of national security?

Here one should pay attention to one very significant fact. The awareness of the new foreign threats to Russia by the political leadership and other experts is far from complete, but the public repudiation of "excessive military potential" much surpasses not so much the rapid pace of the reduction of the intensity of military threats to the country as the process of correlating the NSC with probable challenges to the military security of Russia in the future. This is all the more curious in that in both houses of the current parliament, the interests of the military departments are very broad. However, a more integral, systematic change in the perception of the problems of national security (in something close to grand strategy, i.e., the correlation of military and nonmilitary means of conducting policy) is occurring in parallel.

How will the current "transition period" end? With the classical strategy of "peacetime," as in 1927, when Stalin drafted the resolution, "Red Militarism" after General M. Tukhachevsky wrote about the necessity of taking quite reasonable and timely measures regarding the strengthening and modernization of the army? Or will the country, as it has already done many times before in its history, be forced to create a surplus reserve of military strength? The answer to this question is far from simple, and does not amount to correlating the military budgets of various countries, or to determining the purchasing power parity in dollars of the products of the Russian military–industrial complex. The main thing, the adequate correlation of the military policy of the Russian leadership with the real processes that are determining the spectrum of military threats to our state in the near and distant future, is one of the most important tasks associated with ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation. But it is impossible to solve this task without coordinating the search for a solution—this objectively complicates the task even more—with the parameters of the entire system of national security. It is not difficult to understand that Russia cannot permit itself expenditures on military needs comparable to those borne by the USSR. No less mistaken would be orienting our military policy and, to a significant degree, our national security exclusively on the basis of today’s financial considerations. It also ought to be recognized that the Russian armed forces still play a stabilizing role within the country and preserve for Russia a certain place in world affairs. It seems that this dilemma in many respects also explains the "slippage" of military reform, which can hardly give the necessary results without being correlated with a structured and realistic NSC and with a stabilization of domestic life.

On August 1, 1998, President Yeltsin signed the document, "The Principles (Concepts) of State Policy of the Russian Federation Regarding the Development of the Military for the Period until 2005." One will now be able to judge the course of military reform in Russia according to its results. Representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the State Duma, and other state agencies concerned with the use of force actively participated in the development of this concept. As Kokoshin declared in this connection: "The principle provisions of the policy of Russia regarding the development of the military were set forth. The principles determine the goal, main tasks, and the direction of joint action of the federal organs of state power, the organs of state power of the subjects of the Russian Federation, and of public organizations and citizens regarding the ensuring of the defense and security of the state by military methods."

A definition of the military organization of the Russian Federation was given in the document that was signed. In particular, it was said to include the armed forces, other troops, military formations, and organs that in accordance with federal laws and other Russian Federation statutes are intended to fulfill tasks in the area of the defense of the country and the security of the state by military methods, and also the organs for managing them.

President Yeltsin established a single military–administrative system of dividing the territory of the Russian Federation on the basis of strategic directions: North–Western—within the boundaries of the Leningrad military district; Western—within the boundaries of the Moscow military district; South–Western—within the boundaries of the Northern Caucasus military district; Central Asian—within the boundaries of the Volga–Urals military district; Siberian—within the boundaries of the Siberian military district; and Far Eastern—within the boundaries of the Far Eastern military district.

Kokoshin noted that in the USSR there were 200 divisions, which at that time was considered normal, that were arranged within the framework of what was necessary to wage a war. Today in Russia we have 10 deployed divisions that will engage exclusively in preparing for combat. They will be stationed in different regions of the country.

The more than thousand–year experience of the Russian state and elementary common sense demonstrate that geopolitical constants exist. One of these is the fact that stability inside Russia leads to her "augmentation," whereas instability leads to her neighbor’s seizing her territory, and even to centrifugal inclinations on the part of a number of her territories. This means that, in order to consolidate the CIS in one form or another, after having in parallel strengthened Russia, it is necessary in the first place to solve the problems inside Russia itself and to create international conditions that are favorable for the achievement of these goals. That is why any kind of isolationism in our relations with our close and distant neighbors is undesirable. But it is better to solve this task by means of the promotion of global or, at a minimum, of regional initiatives. Painstaking and daily work is needed with countries that are of key interest to Russia. A NSC would serve as a reference point of such "special" relationships and of integration–promoting policies that express the coordinated efforts of diverse forces and state structures.

(8) Concluding Remarks

In one of the first Russian manuscripts, which serves as the basis of the Norman theory of Russian history, the following phrase appears: "Our land is great and abundant, but there is no order in it." This phrase sounds topical even after more than a thousand years of Russian statehood (otherwise, this manuscript would have been forgotten a long time ago). The issue concerns the organization of power and mechanisms of administration at the state level or, more precisely, their unsatisfactory condition.

The question of the formation of reliable mechanisms for the taking and implementation of decisions is, as has repeatedly happened, on the agenda of today’s Russia in all its acuteness. And if there is a common denominator for solving the most complex tasks of public and state life, then it is linked to the creation of a system of administration adequate to Russian realities.

This is the main task of solving the national security problems of contemporary Russia, beginning with an unambiguous division of the authority of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches (this reconsideration of the constitution of the Russian Federation is constantly mentioned in speeches in the Duma), and ending with a solution to the organizational and technical problems associated with the process of taking, fulfilling, and supervising the implementation of decisions. In short, the task of solving the problems of Russian national security can, without any stretch, lead to the application of the enormous intellectual capital that has been accumulated to the development of a concrete program of exiting the current crisis that would have the support of most of the politically active part of society. The gap between the contemporary theory and practice of national security would thereby be closed, and not only by the traditional use of a strong hand, but also with the aid of the more reliable, though new for our country, means of the conscious organization of civil society. Otherwise, the cycle that has characterized the last twenty centuries of Russian life will almost inevitably continue.

The "Whither Russia?" Project

The goal of the "Whither Russia?" project is to illuminate for the international community the ongoing debate in Russia about the country’s identity, security, and interests. Our central question is: what will emerge as the dominant conception of Russian identity, Russian security, and Russian greatness? More specifically, we hope this project can help clarify: competing images of Russia across the political spectrum; how these competing images are reflected in policy; the shape of the debate in specific arenas; the views of the political elite and the public about the debate; differences between views in the regions and those at the center; common threads in the competing images of Russia; and, based on the conclusions drawn, Russia’s fundamental geopolitical and national interests.

As part of the project, we are publishing important works by leading Russian policymakers and academics addressing a set of three broad questions:

1. Who are the Russians? Authors are examining competing ideas and components of the Russian nation, Russian nationalism, and Russian national identity.
2. What is the nature of the Russian state? Monographs are analyzing competing images of the state, Russia’s status as a "Great Power," Russia’s national interests, and conceptions of Russia’s friends and enemies.
3. What is Russia’s Mission? Looking at Russia’s relations with the outside world: specifically with the Newly Independent States, the coalition of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the West, and its orientation toward action, including its stated foreign policy and general international conduct.

In our efforts to present Western scholars and policy makers with the broadest range of views within Russia, we have solicited a range of opinions on highly controversial topics. The opinions expressed in the monographs are those of the authors and do not represent the views of Harvard University, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, or the translators and editors.

Graham Allison, Director
Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project