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CIAO DATE: 7/99
U.S. Foreign Policy And The Kaliningrad Question
Mary Washington College, Virginia
1998
(Work In Progress)
Abstract
After the implosion of the Soviet Union, Kaliningrad became an exclave and foreign policy analysts saw it against the backdrop of two prospects: That it could become a flashpoint of conflict, or a gateway to Europe. In the first case, Moscow expressed concerns about claims that Kaliningrad’s legal status remained problematic, that it might bolt from the Russian Federation, and later that the Oblast would become encircled by NATO. Meanwhile Kaliningrad’s neighbors expressed concerns about the heavy concentration of Russian troops there while authorities in Vilnius balked at Moscow’s demands for a corridor through Lithuania to Kaliningrad. But the latent points of conflict—preoccupying both Russia and Kaliningrad’s neighbors—have not become manifest. The second prospect, that Kaliningrad might serve as gateway to Europe has received new interest in the West. This idea is associated with the specter that Kaliningrad will become a black hole in the heart of Europe. To avoid it from becoming a source of instability, some Kaliningrad watchers are calling for the EU to provide substantial assistance to the Oblast and help develop its economy and resolve its social and ecological problems. Officials in Kaliningrad believe such outside assistance is required but those in Moscow remain wary of the idea. This paper explores what policy options the United States can consider in addressing the Kaliningrad Question, assuming Moscow welcomes U.S. participation in such an enterprise. Under existing circumstances American policy makers see U.S. involvement in an international effort to help Kaliningrad as secondary—i.e. working through the EU and/or Conference of Baltic Sea States—with the focus on non-security issues. Some believe Kaliningrad may serve as a test case demonstrating how the West can help Moscow build a free market economy and open society throughout Russia.
During the Spring 1998 Senate debate over NATO enlargement, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, a leading opponent of the initiative, pointed to a map over his shoulder and warned that if Poland became a member, NATO’s border would extend to Russian territory. As the TV cameras zoomed-in for a close-up, the former Harvard professor pointed to Kaliningrad, Russia’s westernmost Oblast which shares a border with Poland and Lithuania—another state seeking NATO membership. Kaliningrad would be surrounded by NATO forces if that small Baltic democracy joined the alliance. Under such circumstances, Moynihan said that Russia would have to defend itself by deploying nuclear weapons there.
He did not share with the Senate, nor the TV audience, how he reached this conclusion although Russian opponents of NATO enlargement had issued a similar warning for several years. Maybe that was his source. Or, perhaps one of his aides discovered a paper published by the CATO Institute early in the year. It claimed once Lithuania joined Poland in NATO, Russia would have to rely upon nuclear weapons and adopt a first-use policy to safeguard its security. 1
For most Americans, this was the first time they ever heard of Kaliningrad. That was not surprising; most foreign policy experts in Washington know little about this Russian administered territory and the issues associated with it. Meanwhile, governments which have reasons to have some interest in Kaliningrad have been relatively silent about it. Yet in private, diplomats from all of the relevant capitals, Moscow, Vilnius, Warsaw and Washington have indicated that in spite of their government’s silence, the Kaliningrad Question should be addressed. 2
Soon after the Soviet Empire imploded in 1991 and Kaliningrad became an exclave, students of the Baltic Sea region were considering how this legacy of World War Two might become a source of instability there. Later, proponents of enlargement anticipated that once former Soviet satellites were welcomed into NATO, Kaliningrad’s status could become a point of friction between the West and Russia.
Kaliningrad’s neighbors were concerned about the heavy concentration of Russian troops in the exclave; Poles feared Moscow would demand adjustments in the Oblast’s force structure once Warsaw joined NATO; and the Lithuanian’s worried that Russia henceforth would demand a corridor through their country. Simultaneously Russian officials expressed anxiety that Western proposals to “demilitarize” and “internationalize” Kaliningrad were designed to deny Moscow control of its western most region. And American analysts worried that for all of the above reasons, the Kaliningrad Question could thwart American-Russian efforts to complete the START process and build a new security architecture in Europe.
The purpose of this paper is to take stock of the “Kaliningrad Question.” In assessing it, existing and potential flashpoints of conflict need to be addressed. But the focus should not be on conflict alone. Kaliningrad may serve as a bridge linking Russia with Europe. Some EU economic experts see it in such terms. American policy makers should consider—given its small size—how Kaliningrad could serve as a test case to determine how the U.S. can help Moscow make the daunting transition from communism to an open society.
Both the conflictual and cooperative elements of the Kaliningrad Question need to be evaluated and fundamental questions associated with it answered. Currently what is the status of the points of friction associated with Kaliningrad’ What are the potential areas of cooperation associated with the Kaliningrad Question? How does the EU view the status of Kaliningrad? What is Moscow’s policy toward the Oblast and what do Russian authorities think about international cooperation there? Answers to all of these questions provide a frame work for American policy makers who must address two pivotal questions. What importance does Kaliningrad have for U.S. policy goals in Europe? And what role can, or should, the U.S. play in multilateral efforts to resolve many of the territory’s problems?
Background
At the 1945 Potsdam Conference, the Western allies acceded to Stalin’s demand that a large part of East Prussia be placed under Soviet administration. The Soviet leader provided two justifications for this transfer of territory which would be renamed Kaliningrad: the USSR needed an ice-free port on the Baltic and through annexation, the Germans would compensate the Soviet peoples for the millions of lives they lost at the hands of the Nazi invaders. In the Potsdam Protocol, the American President and the British Prime Minister “declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.” 3
By the end of the war, most of the 1.2 million people living in the Konigsberg Region fled the advancing Red Army. Those who remained there when the Soviets arrived, henceforth were killed or expelled from the area. They were replaced by 600,000 Russian-speaking settlers from Russia, Belarussia and Ukraine; so today only a small number of Lithuanians and Germans live there. During Perestroika, Germans who resided elsewhere in the former Soviet Union did not emigrate to the oblast as had been expected. Today, about half of the Oblast’s residents live in the capital city, Kaliningrad, where few structures from Konigsberg’s German golden age remain standing.
During the Soviet era, it became an outpost for crack Soviet air, land and naval units—some armed with nuclear weapons—numbering a quarter-million personnel. As communism collapsed in the satellite states, large numbers of Soviet (and later Russian) troops passed through Kaliningrad from their former bases in East Germany, Lithuania and Poland. At one point, as many as 250,000 troops were located in the closed region—which is a little larger than Northern Ireland—along with retired military personnel.
Kaliningrad’s economy has suffered with the difficult transition from a command to a free market system and has been stricken by Moscow’s inability to maintain the heavy defense burden which existed during the Soviet era. Kaliningrad is the smallest of Russia’s regions with a population of 932,000 and the only one separated from the rest of the Federation. Its isolation has compounded the Oblast’s economic difficulties.
It is against this troubled back drop that potential flashpoints of conflict associated with the Kaliningrad Question must be evaluated.
Flashpoints of Conflict
Russia’s Concerns
With the USSR’s implosion, Kaliningrad became an exclave and henceforth Moscow’s concerns about the Kaliningrad Question were threefold:
Kaliningrad’s Legal Status
The Problem: Kaliningrad’s legal status remains problematic in the minds of some commentators. Their case rests on the following facts. With the September 12, 1990 treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic—Germany surrendered control of the former Konigsberg region but, “...it did not transfer its sovereignty over the Kaliningrad Territory to the Soviet Union or to any other country.” 4 Moreover, the four WW II allies did not settle the issue at the time of German reunification so the Soviet Union never enjoyed sovereignty over Kaliningrad. Consequently after the USSR imploded, Russia could not legally acquire the territory.
The official U.S. government position is not clear-cut and may be cited to support the case of those who question Moscow’s claim that Kaliningrad belongs to Russia. It is that Kaliningrad is under Russian administration but stops short of stating that Moscow enjoys de jure control of the territory.
Questions concerning Russia’s de jure control of Kaliningrad has prompted recommendations that the Oblast’s ultimate fate be determined by an international body. This was the thrust of a 1995 resolution proposed by U. S. Congressman Christopher Cox. Later, the Gilman Amendment excised that provision from the proposed bill. It was never enacted—but the Russian Foreign Ministry reacted with heat to it saying in effect. “How would the U.S. Congress like it if some foreign parliament suggested Texas be handed over to an international body to determine its future?” Moscow also was unhappy about the Gilman Amendment’s linking the establishment of a free trade zone in Kaliningrad with demilitarization.
Finally Russians never ever lived in the region but over the centuries many Lithuanians did in what was called Lithuanian Minor; consequently, some nationalists in Vilnius have argued that Lithuania is justified in claiming part of the Kaliningrad territory. 5 With the collapse of the USSR, the status of Kaliningrad became a raw nerve in Lithuanian-Russian relations. In the 1993 presidential campaign, Stasys Lozoraitis—Lithuania’s Ambassador to the United States—said Kaliningrad belonged to Lithuania and then retracted what most political commentators in Vilnius deemed a faux pas. But in the summer of 1997, Lithuanian Parliamentary Chairman, the conservative, Vytautas Landsbergis, said that the status of Kaliningrad remained to be settled. He said afterwards that his words had been taken out of context, but they prompted the Oblast’s governor, Leonid Gorbenko, to respond that Klaipeda—called Memel when it was controlled by Germany—had been unlawfully incorporated into Lithuania. 6
Within Kaliningrad itself, local scholars have argued that the Oblast’s residents possess the legal authority to decide it’s fate. Through a referendum, they can choose the status quo; choose to remain within the Federation but with the enhanced powers enjoyed by republics like Tatarstan; or, choose to become an independent Fourth Baltic Republic. 7
The Legal Question Today: The Russian position is that “The Potsdam accord on Konigsberg was as fundamental and irreversible as the Potsdam decisions on Poland’s frontier along the Oder and Neisse.” 8 In the 1970 Moscow Treaty, Germany surrendered any claim to Kaliningrad. What’s more, the Helsinki Agreement of 1975—which settled all of Europe’s outstanding post-World War II border questions— justified Russia’s control of Kaliningrad. And Moscow claims that with the signing of the 1990 treaty of German reunification by France, Great Britain, Russia and the United States, the “Big Four”, in effect, signed the final peace settlement to World War II which was mentioned at Potsdam.
Whatever the legal situation the political picture is clear. Neither Germany nor Poland have made claims on Kaliningrad, nor has any other government. Moreover, Lithuania’s first popularly elected post-Soviet president, Algirdas Brazauskas, has stated categorically that Kaliningrad belongs to Russia and the 1991 and 1997 border agreements between Lithuania and Russia acknowledge that declaration. Valdas Adamkus, the Lithuanian-American who replaced Brazauskas in 1998, has taken the same position.
In June 1998, Russian Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, visited Vilnius to acknowledge—among other things—that he was favorably impressed with Lithuania’s cooperation with Kaliningrad.
Russia’s Fears About Separatism In Kaliningrad
The Problem: After Kaliningrad became an exclave in 1991, there were some intellectuals in Kaliningrad who openly discussed the Oblast’s separating from Russia proper. The exclave’s legal status, they said, remained to be determined feeding talk about a “fourth Baltic state.” There was no grass-roots secessionist movement but officials in Kaliningrad made public statements which abetted fears in Moscow about the centrifugal forces of separatism. Yuri Matochkin, the Oblast’s post-1991 appointed governor, said in 1994 that he favored a special relationship between the EU and Kaliningrad. A year later he warned, “Unless Moscow pays heed to Kaliningrad’s resident’s views, a referendum on secession from Russia may be held in the Oblast.” 9 And the present popularly elected governor, Leonid Gorbenko, has remarked “it makes no sense to go to Moscow. There is no money (there) the goal is therefore to become self-sufficient. We have no other option.” 10
The Separatist Issue Today: The remarks of authorities in Kaliningrad about Moscow’s inability to address the Oblast’s problems represent a factual statement and should not be interpreted as support for Kaliningrad bolting from the Russian Federation. Neither Governor Gorbenko, nor his opposition in the Kaliningrad Duma, led by Matochkin, favor this radical move. 11 Fears along these line are fed by objective circumstances most specifically Kaliningrad’s location; it is the only region that exists outside of Russia and therefore is singularly susceptible to foreign influence. 12
Furthermore, the central government in Russia is weak and has experienced difficulty securing cooperation from the regions. The struggle between authorities in Moscow and those in the Russian Far East over taxes, energy and commerce exemplify tense relations between the Center and the regions. Yeltsin has blamed regional authorities for not working with Moscow in promoting economic reforms and has chided them for not providing back-pay to workers in their jurisdictions. Of course, the war in Chechnya has given velocity to real and imagined fears that Russia will be Balkanized.
Kaliningrad’s exposed geographical location, and separatist tendencies elsewhere in Russia, explain why Moscow bridles at outsiders referring to Kaliningrad as “a problem” even though no foreign government challenges Russia’s control of the Oblast. What’s more, the fear of losing de facto if not de jure control of the regions explains, in part, why Moscow has mixed feeling about extensive foreign investment in Kaliningrad.
Encirclement By NATO
The Problem: Prior to the May 1997 enlargement announcement, Russian officials predicted dire consequences were Poland to join NATO. Aleksandr Shokhin, the Russian Duma’s First-Deputy Chairman warned, “We want to demilitarize Kaliningrad, but (we) will have to deploy even more troops there once Poland becomes a member of NATO.” 13
Even after Moscow’s campaign to block Poland’s accession to NATO failed, commentators in Moscow persisted in claiming that enlargement placed Russia’s security at risk. NATO was neither a political club nor a cultural forum, it was a military alliance so Russia has reason to be concerned about Poland’s membership in it. And as the infrastructure of Poland’s armed forces were upgraded and integrated into NATO’s air, ground and naval systems, Moscow would have even greater reason to worry about this “ill-conceived move.”
The Issue Today: NATO officials assert that such claims are unjustified. Moscow tacitly accepted the first round of enlargement after it was given military and political concessions. First, NATO pledged it has no plans to deploy nuclear weapons or non-indigenous troops in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Most of Poland’s forces will remain in the western part of Poland just as they were deployed when Poland belonged to the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, while Poland’s air, sea, and land units will be linked to Western installations, their mission will be defensive in nature. Finally, under the Conventional Forces In Europe (CFE) Treaty’s inspection regime, Russian inspectors will be able to assess NATO’s assets in the three new member states.
Second, to meet Moscow’s objection that Russia did not have a voice in a major security initiative in Europe, the NATO-Russian Council was formed in May 1997. While membership in the Council does not allow Moscow to veto NATO decisions, it clearly provides Russia with a forum to discuss security issues which are pertinent to all parts of Europe.
One cannot make any definitive statement about Russian reaction to Poland’s becoming an active member of NATO. Russia and NATO are likely to argue over the small number of non-Polish troops that will be required to link Poland’s security infrastructure with installations to its west. NATO will interpret their presence as benign while Moscow may cite them as evidence that the West is acting in bad faith. A redeployment of Russian troops in Kaliningrad is unlikely but Moscow may demand the CFE Treaty be renegotiated. Hard-liners in the Duma may respond by refusing to implement START II.
Yet relations between Poland and Russia are good. Like Russia the Poles at Potsdam were awarded the western part of Prussia. The USSR and Poland signed a border agreement in 1945 which was renewed in 1990. And there are no outstanding territorial disputes between Poland and Russia today although Poland would like the Baltiysk Straits to be internationalized. This would facilitate shipping from its port at Elblag to the Gulf of Gdansk and beyond. Any concerns Moscow might have had about the Poles reacting with hostility toward Russia after almost 50 years of Russian occupation, have not materialized. The Polish government has made it very clear that it welcomes close and harmonious relations with Russia. Polish commercial activities and investments in Kaliningrad are especially critical to the Oblast’s residents. Poland’s north-eastern provinces have developed close relations with neighboring jurisdictions in Kaliningrad and shuttle-trading across their common border has been brisk.
The Kaliningrad Question and the Concerns of Russia’s Neighbors
There have been two major points of conflict associated with Kaliningrad which have concerned Russia’s neighbors:
The Specter Of A Militarized Zone
The Problem: During the Soviet era, Kaliningrad was a closed territory and a base for the Baltic Fleet—located in the port of Baltijsk—and the 11th Guards Army. Naval and ground air wings were attached to both organizations. The Soviet military units in Kaliningrad served as command headquarters and maintained pre-positioned weapons—including nukes— to allow large numbers of troops to be sent there in event of war. Their mission was to strike targets in Denmark and southern Norway, and to land assault troops on the shores of Sweden while denying enemy air, ground and sea assets access to Soviet targets in the Baltic Sea region and western Russia. 14
In the early 1990s, after the Soviet Union collapsed, an estimated 120,000 to 200,000 troops remained in the Oblast. It is conceivable that even a larger number of troops were located there as they returned from bases in Germany, Eastern Europe and the newly established Baltic democracies. When the Cox Resolution was authored in 1995, about 200,000 to 250,000 Russian troops were stationed in Kaliningrad. This concentration of air, ground and naval forces concerned all of Kaliningrad’s neighbors, not only Lithuania and Poland but the Nordic countries as well. It explained why all of Kaliningrad’s Baltic Sea neighbors demanded the Oblast be “demilitarized.”
The Issue Today: Over the past three years there have been a dramatic decline in the number of Russian troops in Kaliningrad with estimates ranging from a low of 24,000 to a high of 40,000. 15 However, a large inventory of weapons and other military assets, originally located there or redeployed after Soviet-Russian forces left Germany, Lithuania and Poland, remain in the exclave. In keeping with the status of military hardware located in other parts of Russia, much of it has not been warehoused or maintained and is inoperative. Still what remains in working order is not military insignificant. In January 1996 Moscow claimed there were 24,560 troops in Kaliningrad with 853 tanks, 930 armored combat vehicles and 426 artillery pieces. Naval personnel were not included in these estimates but a spokesman for the Russian Baltic Fleet stated in March 1998 that there was a total of approximately 30,000 military personnel in Kaliningrad and by the year’s end the number would dip to 20,000 16
Today, all of the forces in the region are under the Command of the Baltic Fleet Admiral. By themselves the troops in Kaliningrad do not represent a lethal military threat to Poland. The same cannot be said for Lithuania, which occupies a gray area between NATO and Russia, and has about 22,000 men under arms in an active or reserved capacity. The Lithuanians remember that Russian troops were used in Moldova to wrest control of territory from that country early in this decade and eventhough the Russian army was humiliated in Chechnya an estimated 40,000 people were killed in that war. The fact that the Russian army did not fight well there, and many of its members are living in squalid conditions throughout the Federation, explains why so many officers and soldiers alike are demoralized, angry and despondent. Their plight feed fears in many former Soviet republics—including Lithuania—that as Russia continues to be wracked by revolutionary upheaval rogue elements in the military may engage in provocative and unauthorized actions.
Russian officials have responded to charges of “militarization” by asserting that Kaliningrad is sovereign territory and Russia has a right to station troops there. Furthermore, as President Yeltsin indicated in a December 1997 visit to Sweden, his government intended to reduce the number of Russian troops in the region by 40 percent and now even Western defense analysts agree that significant downsizing has occurred. Contrary to the view of Western defense analysts, the troop reduction in Kaliningrad has not been driven by economic considerations alone. According to one Russian defense analyst, the Oblast cannot be defended and only a small contingent of air, ground and naval units need to be stationed there primarily for air and sea surveillance and local defense. 17
Yeltsin’s pledge to drawdown troops in the region is consistent with a reversal in what was a previous tough line toward Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In the second half of 1997, Russian foreign policy officials scrapped harsh talk toward the Baltics in favor of more reasonable words. (But early in 1998, Moscow resumed verbal attacks upon the Estonian and Latvian governments and threatened both with economic sanctions for not adopting more liberal citizenship laws for their Russian speakers.) Yeltsin publicly offered to guarantee their security. But with the 1939 security pact—which Stalin imposed upon them before occupying their countries in 1940—deeply imprinted upon their psyches, the Balts rejected the offer and stated that they wished instead to join NATO and the EU. It was not a source of comfort to them that Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov persisted in making it.
Publicly both the Lithuanian and Polish governments no longer dwell upon the presence of Russian troops in Kaliningrad. Like most Western military analysts, they argue that Kaliningrad itself is of little military value. They cannot totally ignore the fact, however, that some of their Russian colleagues do not feel the same way. Clearly, Russia’s military situation in the Baltic Sea region in contrast to that of the Soviet Union has dramatically declined. “The Russian Federation today controls about one-fifteenth of the Batlic Sea coast, whereas the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies used to control one-third.” Furthermore: “Russia lost approximately 80% of its naval bases and basing facilities, a considerable part of airfields, air defense and radar facilities, and 60% of its shipbuilding and overhaul factories. Since 1996, the strength of the Baltic fleet has decreased by half, the number of ships and naval aviation aircraft by three times.” 18 Consequently, the naval assets in Kaliningrad today are even more critical to Russian naval operations in the Baltic Sea than they were prior to the USSR’s demise. And as indicated early, some Russian defense analysts continue to warn that NATO enlargement may necessitate the deployment of tactical nukes in the Oblast. This may be an exercise in scare tactics but some Russian army and air force commanders, who have been unable to prevent the diminution of their military assets there, no doubt hope to reverse this trend with the enthusiastic support of a post-Yeltsin government comprised of its current opposition. It is by no means implausible that the revolutionary upheaval afflicting Russia today may thrust into political dominance leaders who still believe Kaliningrad is of military value to Russia. This prospect concerns many of Kaliningrad’s neighbors in the Baltic Sea area eventhough they may not openly say so.
Russian Demands Upon Lithuania For Access To Kaliningrad
The Issue: With the collapse of the USSR, Kaliningrad became an exclave cut off from the rest of Russia and its status became an impediment in Lithuanian-Russian relations. Even as Moscow was withdrawing Russian troops from Lithuania, officials in Vilnius were uneasy that most of them were relocating in Kaliningrad where, for Lithuania, an ominously large number of Russian troops were already deployed.
Moscow demanded that Vilnius sign a formal agreement to facilitate the transit of Russian troops and equipment to and from Kaliningrad. The Lithuanian government, jealous of its sovereignty and wary of Russian troops moving about its territory, refused to sign a formal agreement. It did agree in 1993 to rules by which Russian troops and material would be moved from Germany through Kaliningrad and Lithuania. After the agreement expired in late December 1994, Moscow was dissatisfied with the “German rules” and wanted formal long-term transit rights. Even though the Russian government responded by withholding favorable trade status from Lithuania, the Lithuanians refused to budge. 19
The Issue Today: At present, the “German rules” continue to govern the transit of Russia troops and material through Lithuania to and from Kaliningrad. With the drawdown of forces in the Oblast, the number of troops and amount of material moving through Lithuania has declined. Today, both Lithuanian and Russian authorities claim to be happy with the status quo. Yet from time to time, Russian politicians such as Gennadi Seleznev, the Speaker of the Russian Duma, continue to ask for a formal transit agreement. 20
Meanwhile, the Russian Duma, dominated by communist and chauvinistic deputies who covet the Baltic democracies, have not endorsed the 1997 border treaty. Unlike their moderate colleagues, who have used border disputes with the Baltic democracies to keep them out of NATO, some communists and ultra-nationalists persist in claiming Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are part of Russia’s patrimony. There are elements in Kaliningrad, driven by like-minded ambitions, who are encouraging them not to endorse the treaty. In his June 1998 visit to Vilnius, however, Prime Minister Primakov indicated by his person and through his words that relations between Lithuania and Russia were harmonious. Primakov’s visit was meant to underscore the fact that while Lithuania had liberal citizenship requirements, making it possible for all Russians there to become citizens, the same was not true of the Russians living in neighboring Estonia and Latvia. It is also likely that he was sending a message to Lithuania’s supporters in the United States that given the warm relations between Moscow and Vilnius there was no reason for Lithuania to seek membership in NATO.
The Crisis in Kaliningrad as the Basis for Cooperation
The points of conflict over the Kaliningrad Question, which concern both Russia and Kaliningrad’s neighbors, have diminished in importance for the reasons mentioned above. They, of course, may flare-up again; for example, were the Yeltsinites to be replaced by hard-liners in Moscow. Presently, however, all the countries interested in Kaliningrad share a concern about its dire economic situation and related problems, such as Mafia control of the economy, crime, drug abuse and AIDS, not to mention serious ecological degradation.
EU experts in Kaliningrad, for example, warn that if the economic and social situation in Kaliningrad deteriorates further, while conditions continue to improve in Poland and Lithuania, the Oblast may become a “black hole” and a source of instability in the Baltic Sea region.
During the Soviet era, Kaliningrad functioned as a military enclave whose economic activities were primarily associated with meeting the needs of the Soviet forces stationed there. For example, shipbuilding and repair and machine works, operated primarily to serve the military not the civilian economy. The most prominent commercial operations were associated with fishing and fish processing, wood pulp manufacture, oil extraction and amber mining. The Oblast’s land, sea and air transportation links were integrated with the rest of the USSR, primarily through Lithuania, with the authorities there taking responsibility for air traffic control to and from Kaliningrad. Lithuania also provided Kaliningrad with 80% of its electricity as well as a considerable amount of foodstuffs.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and after Lithuania became a sovereign state, Kaliningrad became an exclave isolated from its political, economic and cultural center.
Today, like other exclaves, Kaliningrad’s road, rail and waterway transportation systems are not integrated into the infrastructure of the mainland territory. Separated from Russia by a distance of 520 kilometers, it’s isolation is a political and administrative burden. It complicates relations with Moscow and requires close cooperation with foreign political authorities. Consequently, if officials in Kaliningrad decide to build a network of roadways to upgrade the Oblast’s underdeveloped infrastructure, and provide overland connections with neighboring states, they first need the permission and funds from Moscow. Then they must secure the cooperation of authorities in Warsaw and Vilnius less the new roads are not adequately calibrated to neighboring highways. Poland, for example, has refused to build a road through its Suwalki district—the Suwalki Corridor—which would link ground traffic from Kaliningrad through Poland to Belarus.
Kaliningrad has been stricken by the same economic and social problems that have ravaged the Russian Federation. In some instances it has suffered even greater hardships; e.g., in 1995, industrial output there was 39% of what it was in 1990 while comparable figures for the Russian Federation were 49%. That year the average personnel income index was 83 in Kaliningrad and 100 in Russia. From 1995 until the end of 1996 real personal income declined by 9 % and unemployed was over 10%. All indications are that the economy will continue to slip and not rebound any time soon. 21
There are three major explanations for the Oblast’s economic decline. The large enterprises which operated during the Soviet era are now not economically viable and many have not survived the transition to a market economy or need subsidies to operate. Also, an estimated 35% to 40% of the Oblast’s economy had been linked to the Soviet military-industrial complex but now defense related activities have been dramatically curtailed by cuts in the Federation’s defense budget. Finally, Kaliningrad now must rely upon local-generated revenue and not just funding from the Russian Federation but its revenue based has shrunk along with the local economy. A short-fall in taxes explains why the Oblast’s pensioners—representing 21.2% of the population—must wait months to receive their pensions or the government offers them in-kind “income” such as deferring apartment-related costs.
The prospect that the Germans would invest heavily in the Oblast and large numbers of ethnic Germans would move from other areas of the former Soviet Union to Kaliningrad—prospects which some people in Kaliningrad and Moscow welcomed and others feared—never materialized. Prior to the USSR’s demise, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Mikhail Gorbachev thought about creating an “autonomous German” republic in Kaliningrad but nothing came of the idea. After Yeltsin became the dominant figure in Russia, he estimated that as many as 200,000 ethnic Russians might relocate in Kaliningrad but about 10%, or less, of that number actually have done so. Poverty, a predominant Slavic population, and the pull of more congenial prospects in Germany, explains why ethnic Germans from elsewhere in Russia have not relocated in the Oblast. 22
Both German investors and the German government have adopted a low-profile in the Oblast. This is in recognition that after the USSR’s implosion, authorities in Vilnius and Warsaw, not just Moscow, harbored fears that Germany would once again become a dominant political and economic force in the area.
Currently both Poland and Lithuania are vital to the daily lives of Kaliningraders. Products from both countries—foodstuffs but also textiles and furniture—are prominent in the Oblast’s stores and kiosks. Daily, at all of Kaliningrad’s border points with Lithuania (and until early in 1998, Poland) shuttle-traders buy and sell their goods. And Lithuanian and Polish investors have become increasingly important to Kaliningrad. For example, a Lithuanian meat processor, Klaipedos Maistas, has invested $ 5 million dollars in a meat processing plant there and by the end of 1998, it will provide 120 jobs. Local entrepreneurs, who favor a system of virtual fixed prices, do not relish this competition but it is welcome by consumers in the Oblast. Owners of the Lithuanian meat-packing operation have indicated that they will not accept what are fixed prices for their products, a practice which apparently prevails throughout Kaliningrad’s economy. 23
But large-scale foreign investment which the Kaliningraders hoped for and expected has not been forthcoming. During the last years of the Cold War, Soviet economic planners hoped to attract foreign investment, trade, and technological and managerial know-how to Kaliningrad—and indirectly the USSR—by establishing a free economic zone there. In 1990, a Free Economic Zone (FEZ) was created in Kaliningrad which gave investors—foreign and domestic—tax breaks and other incentives to create joint ventures in the Oblast. In 1995, however, the Yantar (the Old Slavic name for amber) Free Zone was eliminated. The authorities in Moscow complained that the FEZ contributed to massive smuggling and tax dodging while lobbyists for St. Petersburg help deep-six it to eliminate competition. One positive feature of the zone was a dramatic reduction in prices for Kaliningrad consumers; after it was scrapped prices soared by 20% to 30%. 24
Under pressure from Governor Matochkin, Yeltsin created a new Special Economic Zone in 1996. Once again foreign investors would be given tax breaks and other advantages to attract them to the Oblast: e.g. there is no duty on materials imported into Kaliningrad if there is a 30% increase in their value within the Oblast—even if they are then reexported. The initial reports were that this new effort had helped resurrect the economy. By the end of 1996, over 1,000 joint ventures had been created, about one third of them fully owned by foreigners. “Free trade status led to a sevenfold increase in the Kaliningrad region’s foreign trade since 1992, reaching a total of $1.3 billion in 1996.” 25
But since then the economic news in the Oblast has been bad in most instances. A decline in production has occurred in fishing, petroleum, metallurgy, wood production and agriculture and like elsewhere in the Russian Federation there has been growing polarization in wealth. Because of South Korea’s economic crisis, the KIA-Motors pledge to invest one billion dollars to renovate Kaliningrad’s Yantar shipyards has not materialized. Kaliningrad authorities had cited it as evidence that their claims the Oblast could become another Hong Kong was not an exercise in hyperbole.
The Oblast’s economic problems have contributed to Kaliningrad’s serious social problems. It has the highest incidence of AIDS in the Russian Federation, the second highest rate of drug related crimes, and is first in Europe in confiscated drugs. Death by alcohol poisoning is an unbelievable 70% higher than the Russian average. From 1971 until 1997 life expectancy dropped by 8 years and more people are dying there than being born. The population has grown slowly, however, because of immigration. 26 About 80% of Kaliningrad’s residents are ethnic Russians and most of the remainder are Ukrainians or Belarussians.
The Mafia operates openly and extensively and according to JANE’S SENTINEL: “The demoralization of the large military garrison means that many gangs are either run by or allied with criminal officers. As a result, weapons are freely available and military transport links routinely misused for smuggling.” 27 Heavily-armed, well organized criminal gangs capable of transporting drugs, arms and nuclear materials beyond the shores of the Baltic Sea, represent a serious international security problem and are a disincentive to outside investment and regional economic cooperation.
As the economic and social situation in Kaliningrad deteriorates, the Oblast’s immediate neighbors— Poland and Lithuania, the Nordic states and experts in the EU— fear that a black hole is emerging in the Baltic Sea Region. Among other things, they have reason to fear that criminal gangs there may grow in power and operate much like the drug cartels do in many parts of Latin America. The United States has cause for concern because instability there could hamper Washington’s efforts to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic community. It is against this backdrop that Kaliningrad-watchers propose Russia and the Western democracies adopt joint efforts to resolve the Oblast’s many problems and reduce the prospects that at some point they become sources of serious friction.
Europe’s Activities
Although it was expected that Germany would reassert its influence in Kaliningrad after the collapse of the USSR, Chancellor Kohl was reluctant to take any measures that might be interpreted as a reassertion of German dominance in the region. Soon after the Soviet Empire imploded, this wariness was given an edge by pronouncements of spokespersons for “Prussian” organizations which made claims upon their former homeland. Their revanchist bark has been louder than their political bite as most of them are elderly and their numbers are declining rapidly; those Germans who have returned to the land of their youth (nostalgia tourism) are so appalled by present conditions in Kaliningrad that their first trip there is often their last one. Virtually nothing is left of the churches, castles and other majestic buildings that the Germans constructed over the centuries. In their wake, one observes the absolutely dreadful structures that were popular during the Soviet era and today most of them are in advanced stages of decay.
When German diplomats are asked about Germany’s policy toward Kaliningrad they advise their questioners to speak to EU officials to whom Bonn defers on the issue. Indeed, unlike Poland and Lithuania, which have diplomatic representation there, the Germans have not opened a Consulate in Kaliningrad although they plan to do so in the near future. But only after one of the Nordic countries precedes them.
The Scandinavian countries have provided economic and technical assistance to Kaliningrad; with the end of the Cold War, they see dramatically improved prospects for more extensive development in the Baltic Region than was previously possible. They have taken the lead intellectually in exploring how, through regional and sub-regional cooperation, Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg might become productive members of the Baltic Region. 28 The focus of the Nordic countries has been largely restricted to non-security programs that can address the Kaliningrad Question although the Danes believe security issues associated with the Oblast cannot be long neglected.
Immediately after Kaliningrad became an exclave, EC officials began to consider ways in which it might be integrated into the region. As two German writers noted in 1993, “...increased engagement in Kaliningrad on the part of the EC (together with Russia and other interested states) could be an important factor in preventing a potentially dangerous source of international conflict and could help involve the district in regional cooperation.” 29
The fact that Kaliningrad was a heavily militarized zone was cited as a deterrent to significant foreign investment in the area. Nonetheless, analysts and policy makers in Brussels deemed efforts to help the Oblast cope with its many problems a necessary and proper mission for the EU. It has developed an action plan for Kaliningrad and today through its TACIS program (the acronym stands for Technical Assistance to the CIS states) the EU has funded a number of projects to help the Oblast deal with its daunting problems such as upgrading Kaliningrad’s airport and seaports, and studying ways to enhance the Special Economic Zone’s performance.
In the spring of 1998, against the backdrop of a deteriorating situation, EU experts in Kaliningrad, warned the European Commission that conditions had deteriorated so rapidly, that the EU had to provide capital development funds to stem the economic and social crisis in the Oblast. 30 But even assuming the European Commission successfully lobbies the EU and a significant amount of capital investment funds are earmarked for Kaliningrad two big question-marks remain. First, what will be the response of the authorities in Kaliningrad and second how will the authorities in Moscow respond to the initiative?
Political Turmoil in Kaliningrad
Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yuri Matochkin—a university professor—was selected by Moscow to serve as the Oblast’s governor. Matochkin enjoyed good relations with the Yeltsin administration and other influential policy-makers in Moscow, but in the first Gubernatorial election held in October 1996, he was defeated by Leonid Gorbenko, the former manager of the Kaliningrad fishing port. Gorbenko received support from economic interests in Moscow associated with the city’s powerful Mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, and military groups associated with General Aleksandr Lebed. Matochkin was the candidate of the Yeltsinites. Although Yeltsin had won a majority of Kaliningrad’s presidential votes in 1996, Matochkin lost the election largely because the people were unhappy with their economic lot and they hoped Gorbenko would alleviate their plight.
Gorbenko found many doors closed to him in Moscow and back home was opposed by Matochkin’s supporters in the Kaliningrad Duma. After Gorbenko sought to replace the speaker of that body, relations between the legislature and administration took a turn for the worse. Gorbenko’s critics claim he entered office believing that Kaliningrad could function much as it had in the past and without substantial foreign investment. He openly disparaged the Special Economic Zone and not a supporter of a real free market, he did not attempt to breathe new life into it. They contend he appointed advisors without technical expertise or governing skills, and he did not established good relations with Moscow. Consequently, under his administration, the fortunes of the Oblast have suffered.
Gorbenko’s defenders accuse the opposition of being obstructionist and assert the Oblast’s deteriorating economic situation is linked to the economic crisis which has afflicted all areas of Russia. And the Oblast is being asked to rely upon its own revenue base and not funds from Moscow while the local economy deteriorates. And even his opponents in the Duma concede that Moscow does not have a coherent policy toward Kaliningrad and the Special Economic Zone cannot really work until the Russian Duma enacts necessary enabling legislation.
Perhaps a truly significant EU economic development program could induce the Governor and his opponents in the Kaliningrad Duma to resolve their differences. Both have a strong incentive for developing a more cooperative relationship; the situation in the Oblast is getting worse and could promote truly serious social unrest and political upheaval.
Solomon Ginzburg, a close associate of Matochkin, says that as the economic situation declines support for separatism increases. A looming economic collapse of catastrophic dimensions, he claims, cannot be avoided without extensive assistance from outside of Russia. 31
The View from Moscow
Since the Kaliningrad Question emerged, three policy initiatives have dominated the thinking in Moscow.
The Hard-liners: The neo-Soviets and ultranationalists comprise the hard-liners’ faction which dominates the Russia Duma. They see the Kaliningrad Question in very clear-cut terms. In considering the choice of “a free market or tanks” they choose the latter. In 1994, Russian Deputy Prime Minister, Sergei Shakhrai, warned about “The ‘creeping’ expansion of foreign countries into (Kaliningrad’s) economic and ethnic sphere...” And concluded: “We have again to declare clearly the priority of Russia’s military-strategic interests in the Kaliningrad region.” 32 The Oblast belongs to Russia and its control is vital to the country’s security. Following the Nazi’s example during World War II, foreign aggressors could use it as a corridor to facilitate attacks on St. Petersburg and Moscow. Intent upon incorporating most if not all of the territory which once was controlled by the Soviet Union into a new Russian Empire, the hard-liners contend the issue is not demilitarization but the remilitarization of Kaliningrad.
They felt this way even prior to NATO’s enlargement. They welcome Russia’s union with Belarus as a step toward the resurrection of a new Russian imperium and see a strong Russian military presence in Kaliningrad and Belarus as assets to intimidate the Balts and the Poles. The Baltic states in particular, “are regarded as a lost part of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. Baltic independence during the period between the two World Wars, as well as today, is considered the result of a temporary weakness of Russia...” 33 The communists reject outright efforts to build a free economy in the Oblast and the ultra-nationalists are inclined to see it’s economic future in neo-mercantalist terms where there is little if any room for cooperation with foreign interests.
The Kaliningrad Elites: Most want both “a free market and tanks” although they may favor reducing the exclave’s military profile to secure Western investment. This apparently reflects the thinking of Kaliningrad’s residents. Polls indicate that while 64 percent of them favor Kaliningrad serving as a bridge to Europe, 55 percent support the existing level of troops and equipment there. 34 Russian moderates contend that without direct links to supply lines and reinforcements from Russia, the troops in Kaliningrad cannot mount offensive operations. Therefore foreign proponents of “demilitarization” are exploiting the troops issue to foster tensions in the region and not reduce them.
The moderates concede, however, that the status of the Oblast may have to be changed; the appropriate model may be one where Kaliningrad gains the same control over domestic affairs that Tatarstan presently enjoys, while conceding foreign affairs to Moscow; it in other words becomes a region of the Federation with far more prerogatives than an Oblast enjoys. Unlike the hard-liners and many officials in the Russian government, most of the authorities in Kaliningrad now recognize that without significant outside help and commerce, the Oblast’s future is bleak.
Playing The Kaliningrad Card: It is clear that the Yeltsin government has seen utility in playing the Kaliningrad Card; that is, use Kaliningrad to check Western initiatives Moscow opposes or to advance policies its favors. For example, as indicated earlier, during the first round of enlargement allegations were made that Russia would have to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad were Poland to enter NATO. In 1997, Yeltsin and the Belarus President, Alexsandr Lukashenko, approached Warsaw with the idea of establishing a corridor from Belarus through Poland to Kaliningrad. The Poles rejected the proposal.
The U.S.-Baltic Charter caused some concern in Moscow but threats against Lithuania have subsided, in part, because many Russian analysts do not believe the Lithuanian’s prospects for NATO membership are good. However, should a second round occur, with Lithuania’s prospects for entering the alliance improved, it can be anticipated that the Kaliningrad Card will be played again. Putting aside the threats of fringe elements, which have advocated an attack on Lithuania were it invited to join NATO, even moderate members of the Russian political elite would resurrect the transit issue and threaten Vilnius with economic reprisals if it did not provide Russia with a formal corridor through Lithuania to Kaliningrad. Members of the Kaliningrad City Council wrote Yeltsin a letter after he signed the border treaty with President Brazauskas in 1997. “This treaty should be considered alongside the treaty on the transit of cargo and passengers to the Kaliningrad region, taking into account Russian security, which means ensuring that Lithuania will not join NATO.” 35
Proponents of the Kaliningrad Card have mixed feelings about foreign initiatives to help resolve Kaliningrad’s problems. They welcome foreign investments and grants that may have a positive impact upon Kaliningrad but fear the cost would be Moscow’s losing control over the Oblast. Also, as indicated earlier, they might revisit the Kaliningrad Question after Poland becomes an active member of NATO. Even if only a small number of non-indigenous troops enter Poland to establish infrastructure linkages with NATO forces in the West, Moscow may balk and threaten to take counter actions.
Finally, as long as Moscow seeks to replace NATO with a Euro-Atlantic Security System in which Russia is a prominent member, it may see some utility in playing the card.
But Russia’s economic plight, the disintegration of its Army, the fact that Russia’s security problems are internal and to its south and east, and strong indications that the Lithuanians and Poles desire good relations with Moscow, strengthens the case of pragmatists who advocate Moscow accept any outside help it can get to revitalize Kaliningrad. There are several compelling reasons why authorities in the Federation should follow this advice.
U.S. Policy Options
The importance of the Kaliningrad Question to the United States must be considered in terms of two major American foreign policy objectives. First, as President Clinton has indicated, safeguarding the zone of democracy in Europe, which has appeared with the collapse of the Soviet Empire, is a vital U.S. interest. By empowering people who endorse the cherished values of liberal democracy and a free market economy, a political framework is established which enhances the prospects of democracies throughout Europe. NATO enlargement is an important element of this policy of democratic solidarity since the principal threat to Europe in the post-Cold War world is the revolutionary upheaval ravaging vast stretches of the European continent which has accompanied the transition from communism to democracy. This threat, and not the prospect that a new military force capable of waging a full-scale assault on Western Europe will appear, explains why NATO must provide fledgling democracies with security guarantees.
What’s more, it is in Russia’s vital interest to have stable democracies on its Western borders as it deals with daunting security problems in the Caucasus, the former Soviet Central Asian Republics, and braces for the mounting presence of China in Russia’s Far East. Democratic-minded Russian officials and intellectuals have been reminded of this truism as President Lukashenko builds a Soviet-style dictatorship on their border and arrests Russian journalists for publishing the truth about developments in Minsk. And sober-minded hard-liners cannot long ignore the fact that Russia has limited resources to deal with its real security problems in other parts of the old empire and not imagined ones in the Baltic region.
A second major U.S. policy objective is to help integrate Russia into Europe and through cooperation with NATO build a new security architecture there. Progress on this front will help the U.S. achieve other vital objectives, including the reduction of nuclear weapons through the START process, and curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Disputes and instability associated with the Kaliningrad Question, currently latent, could become manifest and hamper U.S. efforts to achieve all of these important objectives. By working with Russia and the Europeans to resolve Kaliningrad’s problems, Washington may promote a climate that facilitates American-Russian cooperation on a range of issues. Presently, there are many areas of dispute between Washington and Moscow which are not likely to disappear soon: differences over arms transfers, relations with pariah states like Iraq and Iran, and efforts to resolve the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.
Joint American-Russian programs which ameliorate Kaliningrad’s problems can serve as a positive counterpoint to such protracted differences. Also, Western developmental efforts in Kaliningrad may provide answers to the pivotal question: how can the West help Russia address the daunting problems which threaten the creation of both a democratic polity and free market economy there?
Under present circumstances, European and American observers alike believe the U.S. should be guided by two principles in approaching the Kaliningrad Question.
First, the American profile should be low; that is Washington’s role must be secondary and supportive. Moscow continues to interpret American interest in the Oblast in negative, not positive terms. Some political elites in Moscow have interpreted the U.S.-Baltic Charter as concrete evidence that the “Americans” are bent on playing a prominent role in the Baltic Sea region and balk at that prospect. Russia may no longer dominate the region as it did during the Cold War but the Americans have no business operating in Russia’s back yard. Also, some in Moscow may reject any inference that by helping out in Kaliningrad, the Americans will conclude that they have the right to open NATO’s door to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
But concerns about a heavy U.S. presence in the region is not only resented by Moscow, but by Bonn as well, and some of the Nordic Countries. The Germans supported NATO enlargement to remove Germany as a “front line” state but they are unsettled by the Clinton Administrations promising the Baltics eventual NATO membership. When Helmut Kohl was Chancellor he feared this promise would place his special relationship with Yeltsin’s Russia at risk. So Bonn preferred that the U.S. not make its presence felt in the Baltic Sea region.
This is the preference of Scandinavian analysts who believe a Baltic rim identity can be established, along with functional regional organizations, which promote the interests of the region’s residents—the Balts, Germans, Poles, Russians and the Scandinavians. The Cold War served as a barrier to both, and a massive American presence could place them at risk; it would spook the Russians and diminish the prospects that they would cooperate in accomplishing regional priorities—such as regional economic development, cleaning-up the Baltic sea, fighting crime and curbing illegal immigration.
In their discussion of a Northern-European Initiative, American diplomats and officials have indicated that they see American involvement in the Baltic Sea region in the same modest terms. 36 Working with various non-governmental organizations—such as the Soros Foundation—the U.S. government is helping to build civil societies, promote regional energy programs, curb crime and address ecological problems in the Baltic countries and northwest Russia. 37
Second, in extending Western and U.S. assistance to Kaliningrad, the focus at this point should be upon non-security issues. Baltic and Nordic commentators, who otherwise welcome a U.S. presence in the region, worry that the Americans are inclined to dwell upon the security implications of most issues. And even when they do not, given their awesome military might, it is difficult not to think of hard security issues when the Americans are present.
Here too the American role must be supportive not primary. Since the task of revitalizing Kaliningrad and addressing other problems in the Baltic Sea region are daunting and involve large sums of money and sophisticated technical expertise, the Lithuanians, Poles and Scandinavians welcome American help. Governments in the region have responded favorably to the idea that ecological security and restoration models, developed to address environmental problems in the Great Lakes, may be applied in the Baltic Sea. EPA officials are involved in deliberations with Lithuania about cleaning-up parts of the Nemunas River which serves at some point as border between Lithuania and Kaliningrad and flows into the Baltic Sea.
The authorities in Kaliningrad, who desperately need help from any source, also welcome American assistance although they may be overly optimistic about the magnitude of the help that Washington is prepared to provide. The same, however, does not yet appear to be true of Moscow. Eventhough members of the Russian Foreign Ministry indicate they welcome American help for Kaliningrad, influential politicians in Moscow remain wary of an American presence in the Oblast even if it is a modest one. Given Kaliningrad’s desperate situation, this impulse is driven more by emotional than practical considerations.
American officials are aware of Moscow’s sensitivity on this matter and they believe Russia’s concerns may be ameliorated by channeling U.S. assistance through programs administered by the EU or the Council of Baltic Sea States. The EU will logically play a major role as Russia’s partner in developing and managing major Western programs earmarked to revitalize Kaliningrad’s economy. Although the U.S. is not an EU member it can cooperate with that body as an associate partner. In the same fashion, Washington can work closely with the Council of Baltic Sea States which may address less ambitious and more geographically focused problems than the EU; e.g. border regulation, and ecological and crime prevention programs.
Moscow’s paranoia over U.S. involvement in Kaliningrad-related activities might be alleviated if Russian officials considered the following. President Yeltsin and his economic advisers have complained for some time that the United States must be more forthcoming in helping Russia make the transition from a command to a market-driven economy. Yet on Capital Hill, American legislators have balked at suggestions that Washington provide Russia with massive economic assistance. Their response has been Russia is so vast, its economic problems so daunting, there is no way that the U.S. can provide the level of economic assistance necessary to place the Russian economy on a firm and sustained track of growth. In the final analysis, Russia must put its economic house in order; this means forcing the oligarchs and rich enterprises to pay taxes, while adopting a less confiscatory tax system, striking a balance between revenues and expenditures, ending corruption and adopting laws that protect both Russian and foreign entrepreneurs from ill-considered policies or illegal threats to their investments.
But in the meantime, Kaliningrad may be used to develop a culture of cooperation between Russia and Kaliningrad and the Oblast’s neighbors and NATO. It may serve as test case to determine how the West can work with Russia in helping it build a viable free market economy. With a population of less than one million in an area about the size of Northern Ireland and surrounded by former communist lands which are demonstrating significant economic progress, Kaliningrad may serve as a demonstration project. And unlike other parts of the former Soviet Union, the states in the Baltic region are free of violence and political upheaval and they enjoy democratic governments capable of cooperating with Russia. The Lithuanians and Poles have already convinced Moscow that they are ready and willing to cooperate with Russia in developing Kaliningrad.
Also, the Russian elites cannot ignore the fact that it is West Europe and not the former Soviet republics which is most critical to Russia’s economic well being. “Today countries in the European Union account for two-fifths of Russian foreign trade, a figure nearly twice as great as the CIS countries.” 38 Ever since Kaliningrad became an exclave Russian-based analysts and politicians have spoken with favor about its becoming a gate-way to Europe. But absent a Kaliningrad policy, and without enabling legislation from Moscow, that dream will never become a reality.
Of course, it is naive not to acknowledge that the hard-liners and some of Russia’s economic clans will actively oppose international efforts to help Kaliningrad resolve many of its most pressing problems. The status quo continues to serve the interests of those political elites who do not yet possess the power to replace Yeltsin while it is in the economic interests of the Russian Mafia and their associates to operate in an environment which has made them rich.
Opposition from reactionary and criminal circles, as well as other daunting problems which serve as road-blocs to Western-Russian cooperation, suggest that even if Moscow gives the green-light, international assistance may not prove to be as helpful as proponents of such help hope it will be. Nonetheless, substantial Western assistance to Kaliningrad, and other concrete measures, need to be taken to demonstrate to the Russian political elite that the West is not intent upon isolating their country.
In keeping with American efforts to placate fears in Moscow about isolating Russia, perhaps the time has come for Washington to consider a change in its position on Kaliningrad’s legal status. The existing one is that Kaliningrad is under “the legal administration of Russia” but it stops short of acknowledging Russia’s de jure control over the territory. Since no government has claims on Kaliningrad (and the prospect of absorbing almost one-million Russian speakers is unappealing to Kaliningrad’s neighbors) why not state categorically that it is sovereign Russian territory? Washington’s present position, only reinforces fears in Moscow that the U.S. is disingenuous about helping Russia develop Kaliningrad and talk about integrating Russia into Europe is mere propaganda.
Presumably the American position rests on the desire not to foreclose a future change in Kaliningrad’s status or to secure some concession from Moscow in exchange for recognizing Russian sovereignty over the Oblast. But any change in Kaliningrad’s status must be accepted by Moscow so there is no reason not to acknowledge that Kaliningrad belongs to Russia. Unlike the U.S. pledge not to recognize Stalin’s annexation of the Baltic countries, the people residing in Kaliningrad are Russians and Russian-speakers and they do not claim that a foreign government has been imposed upon them. Should they ever try to bolt from the Russian Federation, they will be unable to accomplish that objective without Moscow’s cooperation.
Also, concessions that can be wrested from Russia, in exchange for recognizing its de jure rights in Kaliningrad, may be less substantial than the benefits that can be derived from demonstrating in a concrete fashion that the West does not wish to isolate Russia.
Finally, while American, European and Russian analysts are in agreement that U.S. involvement in any international effort to aid Kaliningrad must be low-keyed and restricted to issues unrelated to security, future circumstances may change both the focus and involvement of the U.S. in the Baltic Region. At some point in the near future, the Kaliningrad Question may once again become entangled with hard security issues which may create tensions in the region. Such points of potential discord must be anticipated and measures taken to prevent them from becoming serious sources of friction.
For example:
The political future of Russia is unclear. What is clear is that concerns about security questions associated with the Kaliningrad Question may remain latent and not manifest if both sides anticipate them, and take measures to prevent them from becoming future points of friction. Under existing circumstances, Russian fears that their security will be jeopardized with NATO enlargement and the fears of Moscow’s neighbors about Russian troops remaining in Kaliningrad can be assuaged by time honored arms control principles: transparency, the provision of information about military assets, and the creation of inspection regimes to verify troops movement. What’s more, cooperative Russian-Western efforts to address non-security issues may serve as confidence building measures and facilitate the resolution of thorny security issues which may emerge in the future.
Of course if hard security issues do reemerge in the Baltic Sea region, commentators in Bonn, Moscow, the Nordic capitals and certainly Poland and Lithuania are uniformly in agreement that the American role in addressing them will be primary and not secondary.
Endnotes
Note 1: Stanley Kober, “NATO Expansion Flashpoints No. 3 Kaliningrad.” A paper (No. 46) published by the CATO Institute, February 11, 1998. In the mid-1990’s, Russian defense analysts warned that if Poland and the Baltic countries were included in NATO, Russia would have to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad and occupy Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. See, Alexandr Lyasko, “Although the Doctrine is New, It Resembles the Old One,” Pravda, October 29, 1995, p. 2. Back.
Note 2: In the Summer of 1997 and the Spring and Summer of 1998, the author conducted interviews in both Europe and America with officials and diplomats from Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Sweden and the United States. Back.
Note 3: For a discussion of Kaliningrad’s legal status see, Raymond A. Smith, “The Status of the Kaliningrad Oblast under International Law,” Lituanus, Vol. 38, No. 1, 1992, pp. 7-52. Back.
Note 4: Algimantas P. Gureckas, “Lithuania’s Boundaries And Territorial Claims Between Lithuania and Neighboring States,” New York Law School Journal of Internationaland Comparative Law, Vol. 12, No. 1 and 2, 1991, p. 114. Back.
Note 5: For a discussion of Lithuania’s legal case see Gureckas above, pp. 112-113. Back.
Note 6: Memel was part of East Prussia for centuries until after World War I when it was placed under French trusteeship. On February 23, 1923 it was seized by Lithuanian volunteers and a year later the allied Conference of Ambassadors agreed that Memel-Klaipeda should be given to Lithuania. In face of Hitler’s military threats, the Lithuanians ceded the city and surrounding territory back to Germany in March 1939. After World War II, when considering how Germany would be divided into temporary zones of occupation, the allies agreed that Germany’s boundaries as of December 31, 1937 would be used as the point of reference. Consequently, the Klaipeda territory was returned to Lithuania. Back.
Note 7: On July 17, 1998, Vladimir Shumeiko, a former Russian deputy prime minister, said he favored upgrading Kaliningrad to an autonomous republic. Because of the dire economic and social situation there, he warned it might “become a protectorate of a neighboring country or even an area managed by the Council of Europe.” See Paul Goble, “A Fourth Baltic Republic,” in THE BALTIC TIMES, July 23-29, 1998, p. 23. Back.
Note 8: Valentin Romanov, “Kaliningrad as an Integral Part of Russia,” International Affairs (Moscow), No. 6, 1995, pp. 42-49. Back.
Note 9: Kaliningradskaya Pravda, September 2, 1994. Back.
Note 10: Steven Main, “The Prospects Posed By The Kaliningrad Oblast And Possible Solutions For The Future,” unpublished paper, June 1997, p. 22. Back.
Note 11: Interview, Solomon Ginzburg, Spring 1998. Back.
Note 12: Interview, Dmitri Trenin, Spring 1998. Back.
Note 13: Main, cited above, p. 12. Back.
Note 14: E. Nordberg, The Baltic Republics: A Strategic Survey (Helsinki: National Defense College, 1994), pp. 82-93. Back.
Note 15: These are the estimates made by American, Lithuanian and Polish officials during interviews conducted in the Spring of 1998. Back.
Note 16: Steven Woehrel, “The Baltic States: U.S. Policy Concerns,” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service Report For Congress, updated June 12, 1998), p. 19. Back.
Note 17: Interview, Arkady Moshes, Spring 1998. But Moshes indicates that this is not necessarily the view of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Back.
Note 18: Dmitri Trenin, Baltic Chance (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 1997), p. 22. Back.
Note 19: For a discussion of the transit issue see, Ceslovas V. Stankevicius, “Enhancing Security Of Lithuania And Other Baltic States In 1992-1994 And Future Guidelines,” (Vilnius, NATO Individual Fellowship Programme, May 1996), pp. 51-56. Back.
Note 20: Gennadi Seleznev, RFE/FL, Newsline, April 22, 1998. Back.
Note 21: Discussion Paper On Kaliningrad District, unpublished paper produced by Lithuanian Ministry of Defense, October 29, 1996, p. 7. See also, Biuletyn Kaliningradzki (Warsaw), No. 2 (43), February 1997, pp. 36-37. Back.
Note 22: For a discussion of German migration to Kaliningrad see, Christian Wellmann, “Russia’s Kaliningrad Exclave at the Crossroads,” Cooperation And Conflict, 1996, pp. 171-173. Back.
Note 23: Interview in the Spring of 1988 with David Eppelfeld, the Russian partner in the joint-venture with Klaipedos Maistas. Back.
Note 24: Main citation above, p. 6. Back.
Note 25: Fyodor I. Kushnirksky, “Post-Soviet Attempts To Establish Free Economic Zone,” in Post-Soviet Geography And Economics, No. 3, Vol. 38, 1997, p. 147. Back.
Note 26: Biuletyn Kaliningradzki (Warsaw) No 2 (43) February 1997, p. 11. Back.
Note 27: JAne’s Sentinel, “Russia And The CIS,” July 1996. Back.
Note 28: For example, see Anders Bjurner, “European Security At The End Of The Twentieth Century: The Subregional Contribution,” (Stockholm: The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997), pp. 9-21. Back.
Note 29: Magdalene Hoff and Heinz Timmerman, “Kaliningrad: Russia’s Future Gateway To Europe?” RFE/RL Research Report, No. 36, September 1993, pp. 37-43. Back.
Note 30: Interview in the Spring of 1998 with EU economists working in the Kaliningrad TACIS program. Back.
Note 31: Interview with Solomon Ginzburg (Spring 1998) who claims that in 1992 support for separatism among the population amounted to 1.5% but by 1998 it has reached 12% to 15% according to a poll conducted by the Kaliningrad Center of Sociology. Back.
Note 32: Trenin, Baltic Chance, p. 13. Back.
Note 34: Phillip A.Petersen, “Kaliningrad: The Transition From Garrison State,” ( McLean, Virginia: Potomac Foundation, 1944), p. 5. Back.
Note 35: “Kaliningrad Against New Border,” The Baltic Times, November 20-26, 1997, p. 6. Back.
Note 36: Interviews with U.S. diplomats in Moscow, Spring 1998. Back.
Note 37: Testimony of Marc Grossman, Assistance Secretary of State For European And Canadian Affairs, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 15, 1998. Back.
Note 39: See, for example, Jeffrey D. McCausland, Conventional Arms Control, Adelphi Paper 301 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996). Under CFE, Kaliningrad is allotted more weapons than are presently deployed there but should the Baltic countries become signatories to the treaty some of those weapons—which were allocated to the Baltic countries during the Cold War—will be drawn down. Russian demands for renegotiating the treaty, therefore, are unlikely to pertain to Kaliningrad but to Russia’s southern flank where Moscow argues its security concerns necessitate more weapons than are presently allowed under CFE. Back.
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