TURKEY AND EUROPE:

Ongoing Hypocrisy?

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Preface

This article is the expression of a certain tiredness with a particular kind of security-related discourse between Turkey and the EU. It has not been written as an “attack on Turkey or the Turks”, but as a rebuke for the hypocrites amongst both certain circles within Turkey’s Kemalist establishment and some European politicians. While the former want to have their Europeanness confirmed without shaping a pluralistic and democratic Turkey, the latter are happy to hide their cultural and religious prejudice behind formal accession criteria.

To make it clear: this author considered the 1997 Luxembourg decision to reject Turkey’s candidacy as utterly disgraceful and he strongly supports the correction that took place at the EU’s Helsinki summit. But to support Turkey’s candidacy for EU full-membership does not mean paying Ankara lip service. The author lived and worked for a year as a welcomed foreigner in Turkey and enjoyed the experience of Turkey’s outstanding hospitality. Therefore, this article is written with a sincere and friendly intention. Its critique is intended to contribute to an open discussion that might serve Turkey’s way into the EU more than the hymns of praise some of Turkey’s “friends” frequently sing.

The recent dispute between ANAP leader Mezud Yilmaz and the Turkish military has again highlighted the role of security issues in Turkish-European relations. On the occasion of the ANAP convention in August 2001, Deputy Prime Minister Mezud Yilmaz stated that Turkey was suffering from a “national security syndrome” and that national security issues are used to block necessary democratic reforms.[1] The harsh reaction against Yilmaz from within both the military and the political establishment indicates that the leader of ANAP had indeed hit a sore point. It is this sore point and its historical and social construction in Turkish-European relations to which the main argument of the following article is related.

This recent row between Yilmaz and the military also suggests that the argument of this article is not as wrong as two reviewers previously claimed. It was submitted to a policy-oriented journal in the spring of 2001. However, the subsequent review process

ultimately evaluated the article negatively, with two out of three reviewers rejecting its publication altogether. Therefore, a re-submission actually would have meant basing the article on an entirely new argument. Considering the fact that the author is still convinced that his original argument makes sense, he decided to publish the text as a working-paper. Thus, the article should be seen as a piece of work in progress, and, in this way, invite readers to further comments and criticism.

1. Emulating European Civilization

> ***"There is only one way to escape these dangers, which is to emulate the progress of the Europeans in science, industry and military and legal organization, in other words to equal them in civilization. And the only way to do this is to enter European civilization completely" (Ziya Gökalp 1876-1924).[2]***

These words of Ziya Gökalp, the most prominent nationalist intellectual of the late Ottoman Empire, whom Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself called the "intellectual father of the new Republic",[3] nicely reveal the historical paradox behind Turkish-European relations. They are an expression of both Turkey's desire to be acknowledged as a European state and the deeply rooted Turkish mistrust vis-à-vis the intentions of Europe. The victim of European power politics wants to be equal to its victimizers. On the basis of this paradox, this article claims that the mutual suspicions that have marred Turkish-EU relations cannot be understood without taking the historical legacies of Ottoman-European relations into account. In particular, it presents a critique of the flawed strategy of some circles that try to facilitate Turkey's EU accession by exploiting the country's geo-strategic assets. In putting the focus on security issues, the article will unmask the contradictions in this strategy, which rather contributes to maintaining the historically caused, distorted and sometimes hypocritical communication between Turkey and the EU.[4]

Against the political and cultural dangers with which European Imperialism confronted the Muslim world, the Turkish national movement adopted a strategy of defending the integrity of the country in emulating its foes. In the foundational phase of the Turkish Republic, President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1923-1938)

implemented a program of cultural mimesis by rushing through a series of iconoclast reforms. Ingrained in the six Kemalist principles of nationalism, republicanism, reformism, etatism, populism, and secularism, the emulation of European civilization developed into dogmatic tenets of Kemalist ideology and has largely molded the political worldview of Turkey's establishment until now.

Regarding Turkey's EU-relations, the historical legacy behind Gökalp's words is twofold. Firstly, there is the historically constructed perception of Europe as a threat to the integrity and sovereignty of the Turkish state as it is still visible in the so-called "Sèvres Syndrome".[5] Turkish nationalism inherited this threat perception from the destructive Ottoman entanglement in the European power struggle and related to it an obsession with matters of military security. The unequal political involvement in a competitive system of European states, the unfavorable integration into the rising world market, and the dissemination of European political and scientific thoughts undermined the very social foundations on which the Empire had rested for centuries. Driven by severe security concerns, the nineteenth century's Ottoman reforms were basically a futile attempt to safeguard the integrity and sovereignty of a patrimonial state by means of coercive modernization from the top down. In this way, Ottoman-European relations were almost exclusively viewed in terms of military competition, and the "Eastern Question", i.e. the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, left the new republican elite a political atmosphere of outside conspiracy and inside betrayal.

Secondly, the Ottoman-Turkish adaptation to Western civilization was a means of expediency rather than conviction. Similar to the character of the Ottoman reforms, the Kemalist emulation of Western civilization has been of a strongly instrumental nature. In Gökalp's reading, Westernization did not mean full Europeanization. Based on his crucial differentiation between civilization and culture, Gökalp envisaged a harmonization of modern Western civilization with indigenous patterns of Turkish-Islamic culture.[6] It was due to the course of political events that his distinction was rendered obsolete, although never entirely, as the conclusion of this article will show.

To a certain extent, this legacy of Ottoman-European relations is still visible in some strains of the current relationship between

Turkey and the EU. For example, the reportetly widespread suspicion among Turks that the "EU is not so much an ally closely identified with, but a hostile foe that has to be vanquished",[7] strongly resembles the worldview of the Ottoman-Turkish elite that inaugurated Turkey's defensive Westernization. In response, European observers often raise doubts about the sincerity of the Turkish EU-oriented reform promises. The German Turkey correspondent Wolfgang Koydl, for instance, concluded after more than four years observing Turkish politics that "in Turkey not even the political elite has understood what Europe means and how the EU functions".[8] Apparently, both sides sense a certain hypocrisy in the way the other side is dealing with Turkish-EU relations.[9]

I will analyze this mutual sense of mistrust in four steps. In a recent article, Meltem Müftüler-Bac concluded that the Helsinki decision to grant Turkey candidacy status was largely due to "the potential benefits of Turkey's inclusion into the EU's Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) and the costs entailed by its exclusion".[10] Taking this argument as its exemplary starting point, the first section puts the alleged security bargain between Turkey and the EU into a critical, historical perspective.[11] The second step will analyze the EU as a security community. This sketch claims that Müfüler-Bac's conclusion misses the essential transformation that the mere concept of security has undergone in the course of European integration. In looking more closely at Turkey's role in Europe's southeastern periphery, the third section comes to the conclusion that the country could rather become an insecurity provider than a security partner from the perspective of EU policies. The article then concludes with a brief glance at ways in which both sides display a certain sign of hypocrisy in dealing with each other. The conclusions should be read as a call for ending the vicious circle of mutual suspicions and replacing the state-centered and sometimes hypocritical Turkish-European "security dialogue" by a serious discussion on equal footing about the necessary steps for Turkey's integration into the political, economic and cultural realities of the EU.

2. Turkey as a European Security Provider

The strategy of selling Turkey's EU membership by stressing the country's role as a security provider is neither new nor very original. On the contrary, this strategy dully reflects the historical environment in which Turkish-Western relations have unfolded. After a short period of neutrality between the two World Wars, the emerging Cold War pushed the Turkish Republic back into a role comparable to that the Ottoman Empire had played in the nineteenth century. Turkey inherited the Ottoman task of counterbalancing Russia's power in the eastern Mediterranean, and under Prime Minister Adnan Menderes (1950-60), the Turkish Republic assumed a key role in the US-containment policy against the USSR. For this reason, the country became an important regional player in promoting rather ill-fated British and American Middle Eastern defense schemes that have been designed according to Western security interests. Displaying the profile of a dedicated "cold war warrior",[12] Menderes was able to acquire substantial Western aid and to establish a system of political patronage in order to strengthen the position of his ruling Democratic Party.[13] In this way, Turkey's integration in NATO and other Western institutions was essentially based on the geo-strategic assets that the country could offer in the light of Western security concerns. Under the impact of the Cold War, Turkey's foreign policy reflected the strategy of a political rent seeker whose bargaining chip was Western military security interests.

While Turkey's geo-strategic position substantially changed with the end of the Cold War, its political elite has partly continued to follow this mode of interaction with the West. A case in point was President Turgut Özal's single-handed decision to join the anti-Iraq coalition in 1990. Coinciding with the end of the Cold War, the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait gave Özal a chance to show that Turkey could still play the role of a geo-strategic heavyweight in US foreign policy. Demonstrating Turkey's continuing importance for Western interests in the region, Özal re-directed Turkish foreign policy and "simply brushed aside Ankara's longstanding policy of non-interference in Middle East disputes".[14] At first critical to Özal's decisions, the Turkish armed forces and large parts of the Kemalist establishment soon adapted to this course. In shifting the threat perception of the

Turkish security discourse from Communism to the perils of Turkey's regional environment, they are today themselves proponents of this new pattern of activism in Turkish foreign policy.

In addressing the National Defense University in 1997, the then Deputy Chief of Turkey's General Staff, General Cevik Bir, gave a fine example of this new security discourse. In accusing European politicians of having a "fairly narrow-minded strategic concept" and a rather "short-sighted approach when determining the new security borders of Europe", Bir pointed at the significant role that Turkey plays in the maintenance of peace and stability for Europe. In particular, the Turkish general stressed Turkey's geo-strategic location at "the epicenter of tension, unresolved conflicts and wars" of an area comprising the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East.[15] In line with this view, Hikmet Cetin, a former foreign minister and speaker of parliament, stated that "Turkey is in the neighbourhood of the most unstable, uncertain and unpredictable region of the world" and that since the end of the Cold War the country "has turned into a frontline state faced with multiple fronts."[16] Even more drastic was the picture painted by Turkey's former Minister of Defense, Hikmet Sami Turk: "In the midst of destruction and reconstruction, Turkey stood and continues to stand as an anchor of stability in its region. Geographic destiny placed Turkey in the virtual epicenter of a 'Bermuda Triangle' of post-Cold War volatility and uncertainty, with the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East encircling us."[17]

With its emphasis on military security, the analysis by Meltem Müftüler-Bac merely follows this trajectory. Like the Turkish generals and politicians, she presents Turkey as an indispensable security partner for the EU with a major role in Europe's southeastern periphery. In particular, she mentions three of Turkey's assets for the EU's CESDP: Turkey's "membership in NATO, its military capabilities, and its geostrategic position".[18] This assessment brings Müftüler-Bac to the conclusion that "Turkey's incorporation into the EU becomes essential" and that this "inclusion would enhance European military capabilities and allow the EU to exploit Turkey's geopolitical value".[19] Yet the idea of exploiting the military capabilities and the geopolitical assets of a country in exchange for EU-membership essentially misses the core rationale behind the process of European integration. Apparently, the proponents of this idea have not yet noticed that the mechanisms for establishing

peace and security in Europe have drastically changed. Moreover, they still view the EU through the classical lenses of an alliance of states. Sticking to the geopolitics of the late nineteenth century[20], Müftüler-Bac's analysis only echoes the military-focused security discourse that has characterized Turkish-European relations for so long. Even worse, her argument of a security bargain in the light of external threats simply reproduces the rent-seeking strategies that Turkish politics has pursued vis-à-vis the West since the end of the Second World War. Yet in order to discuss Turkey's role in EU security policies, it is first of all necessary to understand how the EU functions as a security community.

3. The EU as a Security Community

There is a lively debate about the causal determinants behind the process of European integration. Realists, functionalists, and constructivists dispute the dominant motivations and structural determinants that provide a plausible explanation for the emergence of the EU. According to their respective readings, the dynamics driving European integration can either be found in "***realpolitik***",[21] in "commercial motivations"[22], or in the "crucial variables of ideas and institutions"[23]. However, although divided in their theoretical approaches, the overwhelming majority of them agree on the fact that as a supranational phenomenon the EU challenges classical reasoning about the formation of alliances and international organizations. Moreover, although the EU's most ambitious projects, the single market and the monetary union, are in the economic field, political questions such as those "of principled organization, membership, norms and values" have been visibly brought back onto the agenda by the Treaty of Amsterdam in October 1997.[24] It is against this background that the general discussion about the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), so far the weakest pillar of EU policies, has gained a momentum that may "enable the Union to enter the new millennium with a more effective CFSP".[25]

The notion of the relative weaknesses of European security and foreign policies is partly a result of the fact that, so far, CFSP has concerned only non-military aspects of security. As an international actor, the EU has provided a kind of "soft security", "but has not

developed a credible military capability to support its diplomacy".[26] The creation of a CESDP is a direct consequence of this fact, and right at this point the Turkish security bargain comes in. On the one hand, the Turkish establishment offers the country's strong military capabilities for its participation in the CESDP. Turkish politicians are at pains to emphasize the beneficial role that Turkey could play as a EU member because of its military power. On the other hand, some Turkish officials threaten to obstruct the CESDP, in particular the building-up of the so-called rapid action force, through the NATO Council in the case of Turkey's exclusion from the EU.[27] Yet the indubitable difficulties of the EU to act as a military force on the international stage are not only a result of lacking capabilities and diverging interests among its member states. On the contrary, they are strongly bound to the collective identity of the Union as a security community whose internal security discourse largely builds on matters of non-military security and in which most "security concerns were in post-sovereign patterns pushed towards referents other than state-to-state relations".[28] In this respect European security has moved away from the classical meaning of security, i.e. "the field where states threaten each other, challenge each other's sovereignty, try to impose their will on each other, defend their independence, and so on".[29] In misinterpreting this specific feature of the EU as a security community, any Turkish strategy to offer military security in exchange for full-membership is doomed to fail.

The historical logic of the emergence of the EU as a security community makes the incompatibility of this strategy with EU realities particularly apparent. In coining the term "integration as security", Ole Wæver has convincingly argued that peace and stability in Europe is not the outcome, but the very process of European integration in itself. In discursive terms, an effective process of desecuritization among its members has accompanied the evolution of European institutions. Theoretically, securitization is an extreme version of politicization, and it presents a discursive process through which an issue is transformed into an existential threat. To securitize an issue means a move to require emergency measures and the application of extraordinary means. In contrast to this elevation of an issue to an existential threat, desecuritization means "to move issues out from the threat-defense discourse into the ordinary public sphere".[30]

Essential for the argumentation of this article is now the specific mechanism through which the EU does not only produce security, but also transforms its very conceptual sense. In replacing a Europe of many centers with a Europe of a single center, the EU does not only act "as a magnet, pulling Europe's periphery toward its center, but it also induces the periphery to resolve preemptively issues that would otherwise be likely to produce security competition". Consequently, the EU exercises a disciplining function in its periphery, "without resort to the traditional instrument of security policy – the use (or threat of use) of military force".[31] In the EU context, security is built on internal affinities, as well as on shared norms and values, rather than on external threats, and it is this conceptual transformation of security that is reflected in the political demands of the Copenhagen Criteria.[32] Contrary to the often-lamented weaknesses of military capacity and strategy in CFSP, the impact of this internal security logic of the EU on its periphery should actually be perceived as an asset. The disciplining function without military force is one of the features that make the EU particularly attractive as a cooperative partner. This does not only apply to the candidates for full-membership but also to Europe's southern and southeastern periphery.

4. Turkey as an Insecurity Provider

The Barcelona Declaration of November 1995 provides a good example of the non-military disciplining function that the EU exerts on neighboring regions.[33] In establishing a EuroMediterranean partnership with the EU, utterly authoritarian Arab states such as Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Syria or Tunisia agreed to principles on the rule of law, human rights, freedom of thought, respect for diversity and pluralism, protection of minority rights, equality, self-determination, and territorial integrity.[34] In the Barcelona Process, the EU conducts foreign and security policies with a combination of economic incentives and the normative power of its own democratic principles. This promotion of "soft security" reflects the EU's particular security concerns in its immediate periphery. In stark contrast to US Middle East policies, oriented towards military security and revolving around the two often contradictory key issues of energy supply and Israel, the EU is more concerned about

migration, environmental issues and the spill-over of regional conflicts, such as those surrounding the Kurdish question. In the light of this divide of both Western interests and Western threat perceptions, Turkey's military stance certainly is able to support US strategies, but it could increasingly clash with European foreign policies.

In particular, Turkey's more assertive foreign policy towards the Middle East stands in contradiction to the Barcelona Process. Turkey's frequent military incursions in northern Iraq, its political tension with Armenia and Iran, as well as the Turkish-Syrian crisis of October 1998, are just some cases in point.[35] As a matter of fact, the demise of the Ottoman Empire left a legacy of territorial grievances, historic resentments, political tensions and mutual suspicions that neither Turkey nor its neighbors have so far overcome. Although the historical accuracy of Turkish and Arab narratives of mutual conspiracy and betrayal seems highly questionable,[36] they have been reinforced by the political experiences of the post-Second World War period. Therefore the negative Arab response to Turkish military support during the Second Gulf War was no surprise. While accepting the military assistance of countries such as the United States, Britain, France, Pakistan, Egypt and Syria, Saudi Arabia gave a cool reception to a similar offer from Turkey.[37] Given the prevalent atmosphere of mutual suspicions between Arabs and Turks, the idea that Turkey can play the role of a peace promoter between Israel and the Arab world because of its military cooperation with Israel sounds almost grotesque.[38] Since the collapse of the Oslo Process, the precarious character of the Turkish-Israeli alignment has become self-evident – even its Turkish architects have now realized that they subordinated Turkey's regional politics to the imponderabilities of the volatile Arab-Israeli relationship.[39]

A brief glance at Turkey's domestic problems and how they have become intertwined with regional inter-state disputes underlines that in the 1990s, Turkey was more often a problem for than an answer to European security concerns. In particular the Kurdish question renders the mere idea nonsensical that a Turkey in its current condition would be an ideal partner to "help the EU to deal with such security challenges as ethnic conflict, the rise of political Islam, immigration, and instability in the Middle East".[40] Viewing the Kurdish reality almost exclusively as a problem of terrorism,

Ankara's military solution created a major predicament for Turkey's society. According to US statistics, between 1984 and 1998 more than 34,000 people were killed, an estimated number of 3,000 villages depopulated, and between 350,000 and two million people were forcibly evacuated from the war zone.[41] Fifteen years of war destroyed vast parts of southeastern Anatolia, spurred waves of migration, shattered popular confidence in the Turkish state, and aggravated religious and ethnic cleavages within the populace. The strategy of securing the integrity and sovereignty of the Turkish state by military means swung to the other extreme. In distributing arms among an estimated number of 70,000 village guards,[42] Kurdish loyalist vigilantes enrolled by Turkish authorities, the state partly passed on its monopoly of physical force to tribal leaders and kinship groups. These irregular forces, the PKK, and special police units (***özel tim***) – which had been raised to fight Kurdish separatism and fell under control of Turkey's extreme right – entered into fierce competition about drug profits.[43]

In the aftermath of the 1980 military coup a complex scenario of authoritarian rule, economic liberalism, guerrilla war, counter-insurgency, corruption, and organized crime developed in Turkey. In this political climate, popular dissatisfaction with state institutions, as well as economic and political grievances, were increasingly articulated in Islamist and Kurdish nationalist terms. In sharp contrast to these findings, however, the Kemalist state elite has persistently denounced political Islam and Kurdish nationalism as being spurred by external forces. Attributing the Kurdish insurgency and the rise of religious parties to conspiracies from outside, it confuses domestic conflicts caused by social change with alleged attempts of foreign political interference. This inevitably provokes stresses between Turkey and its immediate neighbors.[44]

During the 1990s, the Turkish sense of encirclement turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Kemalist policies of securitization explain how perceived threats develop into real ones and even fields of possible cooperation turn into areas of conflict. Thereby the Turkish security concept is at the same time narrow and wide. It is narrow in its strict military notion, having the nation-sate and its ruling elite as exclusive referents, and it is wide in the sense that various internal and external conflicts are immediately viewed as a matter of national security. Accordingly, Ankara displays a marked propensity to

securitize nearly every single issue that challenges its power position or its worldview.

To be sure, Turkey is located in a volatile regional environment where military security cannot be disregarded. While EU security policies might increasingly rely on credible military deterrence, NATO will certainly also in future represent the major instrument of Western military security, in which Turkey continues to play an important role. From an EU perspective, there is then no necessity for Turkey to perform this military role from within the EU. On the contrary, it has been argued that Turkey as a "security insulator" between the EU and the Middle East can perform this role best as a non-member state.[45] In stark contrast to Müftüler-Bac's argumentation, the particular strategic interest that the EU has vis-à-vis Turkey rather speaks against Turkey's full-membership in the EU. In military terms, a classical alliance with the Turkish state, as already established in NATO, would perfectly serve European needs. Even more important, neither the narrow and nationalist notion in which Ankara conceives security nor its tendency to confuse internal and external conflicts suit the political realities of the Union. The Turkish discourse of securitization essentially contradicts the internal logic and the cohesion of the EU as a "post-modern" security community. Instead of being an "anchor of stability", as a EU member-state in its present condition Turkey could rather turn into a pronounced insecurity provider.

5. Helsinki: Hypocrisy or Turning Point?

In the light of the argumentation presented so far, Müftüler-Bac's analysis makes no sense. There is no way that Turkey will achieve the desired EU membership via a security bargain. Becoming a full-member of the Union is essentially bound to the implementation of the Copenhagen Criteria. If the Helsinki summit had granted Turkey candidacy status in aiming at the exploitation of the country's geo-strategic assets, this only could be conceived as a treacherous and hypocritical strategy, hiding Brussels' expectation that Turkey will never be able to live up to the criteria that the EU demands from is future members. In this hypocritical logic, the EU would then try to secure the alleged benefits of Turkey's military capacities while

hiding its real intention of holding the country at bay. It is precisely this suspicion that some in Ankara have and which is inseparably bound to the paradoxical historical legacy of Turkish-European relations.[46] In this way, the unhealthy security discourse of some Turkish politicians, generals and academics only contributes to maintaining the vicious circle of mutual suspicions between Turkey and the EU.

In order to grasp this "ongoing hypocrisy" from a Turkish point of view, we should again take up the historical legacy of Ottoman-European relations with which this article set out. On 18 February 1856, the Ottoman Sultan Abdülmecid promulgated a new reform edict only eighteen days after Russia had accepted preliminary terms to end the Crimean War. This reform edict confirmed general features of the Ottoman reforms, however, with a strong emphasis on religious liberty and equality for non-Muslim subjects. Religious freedom, equal rights for admission to public employment and public schools, generally applicable tax regulations and property laws, as well as laws against corruption, extortion, and torture, were major features of the edict. Additionally, the decree dealt with the individual rights of non-Muslim communities and their leadership, with necessary steps to improve the infrastructure of the Empire, and with regulations to guarantee unimpeded commerce and trade.[47]

Against the historical experience of Sultan Abdülmecid's ***Hatt-i Hümayun***, the demands of the EU might for some Turks come as a kind of ***déjà vu***. The reform edict was designed to facilitate the admittance of the Ottoman Empire to the "Concert of Europe" at the Paris Peace Conference. This is documented in article seven of the Paris Peace Treaty containing the clause that "the Sublime Port is admitted to participate in the advantages of the public law and system (***concert***) of Europe" and that the signatories respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.[48] In retrospect, this assurance of the great European powers sounds quite cynical. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that documents such as the Ankara declaration of 1963, concluding Turkey's association with the European Community, or the candidacy decision of Helsinki raise suspicions in Turkish minds. Against this particular historical background, Turkish impressions of double standards in the communication with the EU are not entirely ungrounded. A simple example is provided by the ongoing debate about the introduction of a bilingual system of education in Turkey.

Ankara's warnings that the establishment of parallel education in Kurdish language in a predominantly Turkish-speaking society would be factually discriminating against the Kurds have frequently fallen on deaf ears. Yet the very same European politicians who raise this subject vis-à-vis Turkey do not hesitate to demand from their minorities the adjustment to the national culture and language of their respective majority population.[49]

It is this kind of distorted communication that rings the alarm bell on the Turkish side and that reactivates the historical threat perceptions which were ingrained in Ziya Gökalp's call to emulate European civilization. From the Turkish perspective, the Turkish-European discourse sometimes still displays the asymmetric Imperialist power relations of the past, thus somehow contradicting the internal democratic and egalitarian discourse among EU member-states. However, although Turkish accusations of double standards are not without substance, Ankara's policies towards Brussels are by no means free from signs of inconsistencies, if not a certain kind of hypocrisy. A case in point that confirm European suspicions is the attitude – "EU-membership yes, but to our conditions" – that since Helsinki has become increasingly popular among generals and politicians in Ankara.[50] As a matter of fact, this attitude is part and parcel of the security discourse between Turkey and the EU discussed here. Turkey's security bargain resembles a futile attempt to negotiate the factually non-negotiable, the political demands of the Copenhagen Criteria.[51] If this is true, some parts of the Turkish elite want to be a member of the EU without seriously sharing the essential tenets of what has become European identity.

This particular kind of Turkish hypocrisy in its approach to EU membership can be traced back to Gökalp's idea to emulate European civilization without sacrificing Turkish-Islamic culture. Yet, whereas the Kemalist project has forcibly suppressed the cultural heritage of Islam, it has maintained the elitist and patriarchal political culture of the Ottoman state. Behind the smoke screen of the Atatürk Revolution, the authoritarian character of the Ottoman-Turkish state and its ruling elite has survived. It is this undemocratic political culture of Kemalism that parts of the Turkish establishment now intend to harmonize with European civilization. This oxymoron finds its expression in the instrumental way in which Turkey's democracy works. Since the introduction of multi-party politics, it has been characterized by a notable gap between formal democratic

provisions and strongly undemocratic practices.[52] The discourse of encirclement and military security tries to compensate for the deficiencies of this mimetic approach to European civilization. In this way, the "security dialogue" between Turkey and the EU perpetuates the historical predicaments of Turkish-European relations and heavily constrains Turkey's full-integration in the Union. It could be read as the expression of a hypocritical trade-off in which some European politicians hide their reservation concerning the prospect of Turkey's full-membership and parts of the Turkish establishment disguise their unwillingness to live up to the Copenhagen Criteria.

The future will show us whether Helsinki will enter the history books as just another symbol of an ongoing hypocrisy or as a real turning point in Turkish-EU relations. In order to prevent the first, the EU has to overcome its own, historically distorted perception of Turkey. From within the EU, Turkey's accession process should not be seen as a tiresome obligation imposed by Cold War politics, but as an opportunity to revitalize the unfortunately lost spirit of the political vision of European integration. Indeed, Turkey could provide the Union with a unique cultural and historical dimension,[53] thus bringing back in patterns of Turkish and Islamic culture. However, this does not only imply that Turkey is able to shake away the dogmas of Kemalist historiography. While the EU should take the Turkish anti-Imperialist reflexes into account, the Turkish side must support this necessary change of discourse by reforming its society in both rules and practice. Ankara clearly has to show that it is willing to share the essentials of the new European identity that it is willing to build a pluralist Turkish society based on the democratic standards that are given by the Copenhagen Criteria.[54] A first and necessary step in this direction would be to put an end to the misplaced strategy of prostituting Turkey to the West as a security pawn.

Notes

[1] Turkish Daily News, 9 August 2001.

[2] Ziya Gökalp ***The Principles of Turkism***, translated by Robert Devereux, (Leiden: Brill, 1968), pp. 45-46.

[3] M.T. Özelli, 'The Evolution of the Formal Educational System and Its Relation to Economic Growth Policies in the First Turkish Republic', ***International Journal of Middle East Studies***, no. 5, 1974, pp. 77-92, p. 81.

[4] In this regard, the focus of the article is put on a particular part of the Turkish elite and their obsession with security issues concerning Turkish-European relations. Collective singulars such as Turkey, the Turks, the Turkish establishment are used in relation to this limitation and should not be interpreted as standpoints that "all Turks" share.

[5] Although never implemented, the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), calling for a territorial division of Turkey, became the incarnation of both the Ottoman defeat and the Turkish national resistance. This historical legacy has been activated with regard to the Kurdish question and is still alive in the so-called "Sèvres Syndrome", the conviction that there is an international conspiracy to weaken and to divide Turkey. See also Dietrich Jung, 'The Sèvres Syndrome: Turkish Foreign Policy and Its Historical Legacy', in Bjørn Møller (ed.) ***Oil and Water: Cooperative Security in the Persian Gulf***, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), pp.131-159.

[6] Cf. Niyazi Berekes, 'Ziya Gökalp: His Contribution to Turkish Nationalism', ***The Middle East Journal***, vol. 8, no. 4, 1954, pp. 375-390.

[7] John Gorvett, 'A Berlin Wall at the Bosphorus', ***The Middle East***, January 2001, pp. 38-39, p. 39.

[8] Wolfgang Koydl (2001) 'Die grosse Lüge der Kinder Atatürks', ***Süddeutsche Zeitung***, 13/14 January.

[9] Concerning this atmosphere of mutal suspicions, see also the interview between Mehmet Ali Birand and Günther Verheugen on CNN-Turk (February 2001), under http://www.eureptr.org.tr.

[10] Meltem Müftüler-Bac, 'Turkey's Role in the EU's Security and Foreign Policies', ***Security Dialogue***, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 489-502, p. 489.

[11] It goes without saying that the author does not support this argument and that he is fully aware about the complexities behind the Helsinki decision.

[12] Ramazan Gözen, 'The Turkish-Iraqi relations: from cooperation to uncertainty', ***Foreign Policy*** (Ankara), vol. 19, no. 3-4, 1995, pp. 49-98, p. 74.

[13] According to Hale, the Western economic assistance to Turkey was in the 1960s "equivalent to over half of Turkey's foreign exchange earnings from trade and other sources", William Hale, ***Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000***, (London: Frank Cass, 2000) p. 152. The policies of US assistance to Turkey during the Menderes period

are covered by G.S. Harris, ***Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspectives, 1945-1971***, (Stanford: Hoover Institutions Studies 33, 1972). About clientelism and patronage in Turkish politics, see Ergun Özbudun, 'Turkey: the Politics of Political Clientelism', in S.N. Eisenstadt and R. Lemarchand (eds.) ***Political Clientelism, Patronage, and Development***, (London: Sage, 1981), pp. 249-268, and Sabri Sayari, 'Political Patronage in Turkey', in E. Gellner and J. Watebury (eds.) ***Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies***, (London: Duckworth, 1977), pp. 103-14.

[14] Alan Makovsky, 'The new activism in Turkish foreign policy', ***SAIS Review***, no. 19, 1999, pp. 92-113, p. 92.

[15] Cefik Bir, 'Turkey's Role in the New World Order', ***Strategic Forum***, no. 135, February 1998, http://www.ndu.edu./inss/strforum/disclaim/html.

[16] Quotation from Malik Mufti, 'Daring and caution in Turkish foreign policy', ***Middle East Journal***, vol. 52, no. 1, 1998, pp. 32-50, p. 33.

[17] Hikmet Sami Turk in a speech given at the Washington Institute in March 1999, see http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/samiturk.htm.

[18] Müfülter-Bac (note ten above), p. 490.

[19] Ibid. pp. 492-493.

[20] Cf. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, ***Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space***, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

[21] Thomas Pedersen, ***Germany, France and the Integration of Europe. A realist interpretation***, (London and New York: Pinter, 1998), p. 2.

[22] Andrew Moravcsik, 'The Future of European Integration Studies: Social Science or Social Theory? ***Millennium***, vol. 28, no. 2, 1999, pp. 371-391, p. 373.

[23] Thomas Diez, 'Riding the AM-track through Europe; or, The Pitfalls of a Rationalist Journey through European Integration', ***Millennium***, vol. 28, no. 2, 1999, 355-369, p. 359.

[24] Antje Wiener and Karlheinz Neureither, 'Introduction: Amsterdam and Beyond', in Karlheinz Neureither and Antje Wiener (eds.), ***European Integration after Amsterdam: Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy***, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 1-11, p. 4.

[25] Fraser Cameron, ***The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Past, Present and Future***, (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), p. 110.

[26] Ibid., p. 13.

[27] Cf. Müftüler-Bac (note six above), pp. 494-495.

[28] Ole Wæver, 'Insecurity, Security, and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community', in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds.), ***Security Communities***, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 69-118, p. 104.

[29] Ole Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', in Ronnie D. Libschutz (ed.) ***On Securtity***, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) pp. 46-86, p. 50.

[30] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, ***Security: A New Framework for Analysis***, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1998) pp. 23-29.

[31] Ibid., pp. 55-56.

[32] According to the decision of the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993, membership requires from the candidates that they have achieved "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities", see http//:www.europtr.org.tr.

[33] I refer to the Final Version 2 Rev. 1 of the Barcelona Declaration from 27 and 28 November 1995 that can be found under: http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg1b/en/den-barc.htm.

[34] Given the authoritarian nature of these regimes, it comes as no surprise that the formal acceptance of these principles has not yet been transformed into political practice. But they increasingly become points of reference for a growing and more demanding civil society in Arab states.

[35] According to official Turkish accounts, the Turkish army intervened during its war with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) no less than 57 times in northern Iraq, see Michael Gunter, 'Turkey and Iran Face off in Kurdistan', ***Middle East Quarterly***, vol. 5 no. 1, 1998, pp. 33-40, p. 40.

[36] For a critical account on Turkish-Arab relations during the last decade of the Ottoman Empire, see Hasan Kayali, ***Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918***, (Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997).

[37] Mehmet Ali Birand, 'Is there a new role for Turkey in the Middle East?' in Henry J. Barkey, ***Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East***, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp. 171-178, p. 172.

[38] Cf. Müftüler-Bac (note ten above), pp. 496-497.

[39] See Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, 'The Turkish-Israeli Alignment: Paranoia or Pragmatism', ***Security Dialogue***, vol. 31, no. 1, 2000, 91-104.

[40] Müftüler-Bac (note six above), pp. 497.

[41] US State Department, ***Turkey Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998***, (Washington: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 1999), p. 13.

[42] Ayse Kilic, 'Democratization, human rights and ethnic policies in Turkey', ***Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs***, vol. 18, no. 1, 1998, pp. 91-110, p. 102.

[43] Cf. Werner Seufert, 'Das Gewaltpotential im türkischen Kulturkampf', in Heiner Bielefeldt and Wilhelm Heitmeyer (Eds), ***Politisierte Religion***, (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1998), pp. 360-392, p. 390.

[44] For a more elaborated argumentation on this issue, see Dietrich Jung with Wolfango Piccoli, ***Turkey at the Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies and a Greater Middle East***, (London: ZED Books, 2001).

[45] Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, 'The European Union and Turkey', ***Survival***, vol. 41, no. 1, 1999, pp. 41-57, p. 52.

[46] This suspicion, for example, has been confirmed by events such as the meeting of the leaders of European Christian Democratic parties in Brussels (1997) at which they claimed that the EU is a civilisational project in which Turkey has no place. Hale (note 13 above) p. 239.

[47] Cf. J.C. Hurewitz, ***Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, a Documentary Record: 1535-1914, Volume I***, (Princeton: D. van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), pp. 149-153.

[48] Ibid., pp. 153-154.

[49]It has to be noted that this idea of bilingual education is not a part of the EU's official demands. In its report on the accession partnership between Turkey and the EU from November 2000, the Commission was very moderate concerning minority rights and did only demand the free use of Kurdish language in the media.

[50] Cf. Rainer Hermann, 'Die Türkei will nicht um jeden Preis in die Europäische Union, ***Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung***, 25 January 2001.

[51] In a recent column in the Turkish daily ***Milliyet***, for example, Sami Kohen listed a number of political reform issues that the European Parliament demands from Turkey and comes to the conclusion that these are "nonsensical claims", in ***Turkish Press Review***, 8 February 2001.

[52] A well-known Turkish political scientist therefore applied the concept of a non-consolidated "delegative democracy" to the Turkish system; see Ergun Özbudun, ***Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation***, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2000).

[53] See the Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, 'Turkey and Europe: Looking to the Future from a Historical Perspective', ***Perceptions***, June-August 2000, 5-11.

[54] In fact, there is a vivid civil society developing in Turkey, yet it still is in the grip of Kemalist nationalism, see Yerasimos Stefanos, Günther Seufert and Karin Vorhoff (eds.) ***Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism. Studies on Political Culture in Contemporary Turkey***, (Istanbul: Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft & Institut Francais D'Études Anatoliennes, 2000).