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CIAO DATE: 03/04

Securing Outer Space for the Future Strategic Considerations for Pugwash

Rebecca Johnson

Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs

July 17-21, 2003

This paper builds on the Pugwash workshop on Preserving the Non-Weaponization of Space, held in Castellón, Spain, May 22-24, 2003 and discusses strategic approaches for addressing space security threats. It argues that preventing the weaponisation of space has become an urgent international priority and that Pugwash has an important role to play in developing and implementing national and international strategies for promoting security in outer space.

Space Security is an Urgent Priority

As Philip Coyle and John Rhinelander acknowledged in their paper, faced with the war on terrorism, Iraq, and crises in the Middle East and with North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship, the weaponisation of space is not currently perceived as a major public concern. Coyle and Rhinelander present a persuasive case that the popular assumption that the weaponisation of space is many years away is wrong: "to the contrary, new funding for space weapons and for missile defence in the United States, along with a new military procurement approach, called capability-based acquisition, is creating an urgent need for an arms control regime for attack weapons in space."1 Speaking for the generation that will have to live with the decisions being made now, members of student Pugwash argued that the future of space security and the risk of an arms race in space may be "the single most important security debate" for 21st century.2

The urgency of the need for international organisations and states to take up the challenge of preventing the weaponisation of space came through all the papers presented at the Pugwash meeting in Castellón and in further contributions to Halifax. In particular, concerns were raised about the space-weapons-push intrinsic to the multi-tiered and layered ballistic missile defence (BMD) "system of systems" promoted by the Bush administration, to utilise "all available technologies and basing modes for effective missile defenses that could protect the United States, our deployed forces, our friends and allies".3

The initial stage of Bush's BMD architecture, already underway, requires the deployment of ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely in Alaska and Vandenberg Airforce Base in California, which will try to hit and 'kill' ballistic missiles during their midcourse phase in space. In parallel with this ground-based system, however, the US is pushing for a space-based intercept capability which would require weapons to be placed in outer space for the first time in history. Many of the "friends and allies" whose support the US wants are already committed to preventing an arms race in outer space and have voted for numerous United Nations resolutions calling for space to be used only for peaceful purposes.4 Though the space-weapons thrust of BMD is frequently played down by these governments, the Bush administration has not attempted to conceal its intentions. Supporting Pentagon budget requests for space-related missile defence research in FY 2004, Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, Director of the Missile Defence Agency told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he envisaged some 300 or more space-based interceptors, with a time-line of 2008-2012. Questioned about why the Pentagon wanted to put weapons in space when they were also considering airborne lasers, Kadish argued that "space solves your geography problem… because you can use those weapons more effectively from the high ground of space."5

US weapons occupying the High Ground would be perceived as a serious threat by a number of other countries. The likelihood is that some if not all these governments would seek to deploy their own, probably asymmetric, responses to disable or destroy US weapons—and in the process risk disabling or destroying satellites used for a multitude of peace-supporting purposes, including surveillance for confidence-building, arms control and verification, navigation and positioning, communications, banking and entertainment.

Student Pugwash noted that the US and Russia have the capability to deploy advanced space weapons within years. Moreover, within that same period, other states could launch less sophisticated space weaponry.6 Laura Grego (Union of Concerned Scientists) and Richard Garwin (Council on Foreign Relations) noted that the Bush administration is increasing funding to new launch and propulsion technologies, development of lightweight sensors and kill-vehicles, improved tracking of space objects, high energy laser technology and microsatellites that could 'parasitically' manoeuvre closely to other satellites, operating as space mines/anti-satellite weapons.7 Though sceptical that by its target date of 2008 any space weapons testbed would have a reliable military utility, Grego noted that "the deployment of this testbed would mark the first stationing of a dedicated destructive weapon in space".8 Garwin likewise argued that "US deployment of space weapons will encourage and demand the development and deployment of space weapons by others."9

Outer space has become an important economic and military growth area—a "centre of gravity", in US military parlance—with revenues exceeding $80 billion. There are some 600 active military and commercial satellites in space. Some 10 nations or regional groupings have space programmes with independent access to outer space, secure launch sites and space launch vehicles.

The Castellón workshop heard a range of different perspectives on the technical and policy considerations associated with space weapons, but they all pointed to the same core conclusion, as summarised by the Student Pugwash rapporteurs: "the challenge (and opportunity) of space weapons is to prevent them from being deployed in the first place and to maintain the non-weaponised status of space."10

Strategic Considerations for Preventing Space Weaponisation

Enshrining the principles of peaceful use and exploration, and that outer space should be available for the benefit of all (not subject to national appropriation or sovereignty claims), the major treaty governing the uses of space is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), which has 102 parties, including the US, Russia, China, France, Britain, India, Israel and Pakistan.12 It prohibits the stationing of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, in space orbit or on celestial bodies. It does not cover the transit of nuclear weapons (on ICBM, for example) through space or prohibit nuclear weapons launched from Earth into space for the purposes of destroying space based targets or incoming missiles.13 It says nothing about ASATs, micro-satellites, space mines, or the placement of weapons in space based on conventional technologies, such as kinetic-kill (e.g. brilliant pebbles or space-strike weapons), directed energy (e.g. laser), or particle beam weapons.14

Important prohibitions on interfering with national technical means (NTM) with observation and verification functions were enshrined in the 1972 ABM Treaty—now deemed void following US withdrawal in June 2002.15 The principle of non-interference with national technical means and verification satellites was also enshrined in the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). START I prohibits the production, testing and deployment of "systems, including missiles, for placing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction into Earth orbit or a fraction of an Earth orbit". It also contains transparency and confidence-building provisions, and reinforced the provisions of the 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement, providing for advance launch notification of ballistic missiles used as boosters to put objects into the upper atmosphere or space.16 START's non-interference obligation was made multilateral in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which has thirty NATO and East European participants and is of unlimited duration.

The 1979 Moon Agreement confirms many of the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty, with specific reference to the Moon. It also prohibits the threat or use of force on the Moon or the use of the Moon to commit hostile acts in relation to the Earth or space assets, although the placing of conventional weapons in orbit around the Moon is not prohibited.17

There is plenty of evidence for high level support for space control and weaponisation in Rumsfeld's Pentagon, US Strategic Command and some defence industries for the weaponisation of space, but a more complex, pluralistic range of attitudes and approaches prevail among the military, government, Congressional and commercial constituencies in the United States as a whole.18

It is not surprising that the United States, which spends around 64% of world expenditure on the commercial uses of space and 95% of world expenditure on military space assets, would be concerned about their potential vulnerability. As noted above, US advocates of space weaponisation rest their case on three assumptions: inevitability, vulnerability and control. The higher the level of reliance on space assets for military purposes, the greater the vulnerabilities. As first demonstrated in the strikes on Former Yugoslavia over Kosovo and then in Afghanistan, the US now depends on an array of 'smart' weaponry that needs very sophisticated data and guidance systems, telemetry, and electronic communications. This 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA), in turn, depends on satellites.19 In January 2001, the Commission to Assess US National Security Space Management and Organisation, chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, published a report that powerfully evoked the image of a potential 'Space Pearl Harbor', making the case that weapons in space would be needed to counter perceived US vulnerabilities.20

The Commission's political rationale for space weapons rests on three assumptions: vulnerability, inevitability, and control. Militarily this translates into: "defensive counterspace", to reduce US space vulnerability; "offensive counterspace, to deny the use of space and space assets to adversaries, and "rapid and global power projection to earth".21 Looking at the US scene, Colonel Peter Hays 22 of the USAF identified four types of attitude that are of relevance when developing a strategy to prevent space weaponisation:

Space Hawks: Donald Rumsfeld is the quintessential example of those who believe the US should weaponise space at all costs, to control and dominate, achieve 'full spectrum dominance' and enable unfettered development of US commercial, political and military interests. Space Hawks are the driving force behind space weaponisation. Though wrapped in defence terms, their motivation is ideological: like missile defence, space control is viewed as an essential component of neoconservative objectives of US power projection.

Inevitable Weaponisers believe that it is only a matter of time before someone deploys weapons in space, and therefore the US must get there first. They tend to evoke the 'flag follows trade' analogy of sea and air power, relating military development to the promotion and safeguarding of commercial expansion. They also argue that whoever weaponises first will enjoy a significant advantage. This group is less ideological than the space hawks. They are most concerned about the vulnerability of US military and commercial interests in space, and may be open to reasoned arguments showing that its assets could be equally or better protected by other means. Though seductive, the analogies on which the inevitable weaponisers rely are flawed. History abounds with examples showing that the security advantage enjoyed by the leader in innovative military technology is soon narrowed. Nuclear weapons, for example, demonstrate how any benefit from being the first to deploy a new type of weapon is quickly eroded, leading to greater national and international insecurity in the longer run. The weaponisation of space is only inevitable if the US itself drives a race to do so.

Militarisation Realists argue that the weaponisation of space would be detrimental to US interests and the security of its military and commercial satellites and would be likely to erode the US' conventional superiority. Contending that the US would have most to lose from weaponising space, militarisation realists—which include senior military officials and analysts—use alternative analogies to show how co-operative international action can be successful in preventing military competition and deployments from threatening a potentially strategic area of international and scientific importance, as in the case of Antarctica. While largely sharing the inevitable weaponisers' desire to safeguard US military and commercial dominance, they argue that 'space sanctuary' policies, allowing for non-weaponised military uses, would be safer and more effective in the long term. Some may advocate a broader 'space security' approach, limiting the military uses of space to surveillance, location and verification.23

Space Doves advocate that space should be used solely for peaceful purposes. In addition to opposing the weaponisation of space, some would like to see a roll-back of at least some of the current military uses of space, while others take a more fundamentalist, environmental position, seeking to ban the use of nuclear-fuelled rockets and to drastically limit, if not close down, satellite launches and traffic in general. Many space doves, however, would support some continuing military uses of space for surveillance, verification, confidence-building and arms control.

Strategically, there is little point in attempting to convert the space hawks. We need to focus on converting the inevitable weaponisers into militarisation realists, and promote the practical (and pragmatic) cause of space security rather than the more limited space sanctuary approach among both the militarisation realists and the space doves.

While all at Castellón agreed that the testing and deployment of space weapons would provoke a destabilising offence-defence arms spiral, several papers from American participants, notably from Grego, Coyle and Rhinelander, and Hitchens, emphasised the serious technological hurdles and heavy financial burden, both of which would have to be overcome before space weaponisation provided any military or security utility for the United States.

Garwin tabulated the potential threats to space assets as follows (ordered from most to least likely): denial and deception; electronic warfare; attack on ground stations; sensor blinding; microsatellites; direct-ascent interceptors; and nuclear detonation in space. He noted that "for most of these threats, space weapons do not help to reduce vulnerability". Instead of space weaponisation, Garwin suggested that to deal with offensive counterspace, the US could jam uplinks or downlinks (from ground or space), attack ground stations and obscure line of sight by screens in space. For defensive counterspace, the US could attack ground systems which might be threatening or disabling satellites, interdict ASAT in powered flight, deter by threat of retaliation (not against an adversary's satellites, but against political and military assets).24

Several papers also noted the growing threat from debris in space.25 Li Bin and Johnson strongly argued that weapons use in space would almost certainly result in a significant increase in hazardous space debris, indiscriminately threatening the civilian and military assets of friends and foes alike.

Hitchens reported that in wargames trialed in the US the use of ASAT weapons invariably led to nuclear war on Earth. The trials were classified, but the assumed explanation was that if the 'eyes' of one or more major nations were blinded through the use of ASATs, the ensuing heightened fear/anxiety/vulnerability would provoke decisions to unleash the major weapons in a military's arsenal, leading to nuclear weapons use.

On paper, the vast majority of countries oppose the weaponisation of space, as illustrated by the votes on successive UN General Assembly resolutions relating to 'prevention of an arms race in outer space' (PAROS).26 However, as recognised by the Castellón participants, this does not translate into concrete or effective action. The Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) has long been deadlocked, in large part over the issues of PAROS, with the US holding that there is 'no need for new outer space arms control agreements',27 and the fissile materials ban, which China has linked to action on PAROS.28 Similarly, if canvassed, public opinion in many countries, including the United States, would view weapons in space with trepidation and concern, but the issue does not yet have enough salience for international public action.

Because the levels of issue salience and civil-society engagement are still quite low, consciousness of the foreseeable consequences needs to be raised. The debate risks becoming bogged down, however, if it focuses too much on the arguments for or against certain types of weapons or technologies.

Since the US military and neocons are driving the international push towards the weaponisation of space, engaging other sections of US policy and influence is imperative. For this, the issue needs to be framed in terms of future security. Broadly, we must focus on the following strategies:

Options for Progress: a Vital Role for Pugwash

The Castellón workshop discussed a range of national, regional and multilateral options, spanning incremental steps to comprehensive treaty negotiations.29 In view of the strategic considerations noted above, and building on with Pugwash's history, principles and special resources and skills, and especially its constituency within the international scientific community, the following areas for future work should be seriously considered and, if feasible, undertaken, individually or in partnership with like-minded NGOs or governments30 :

More research needs to be undertaken on a range of technical, strategic, environmental, economic and security implications and to assess the likely architecture (numbers and types of weapons) if one or more countries were to deploy space-based directed energy or kinetic kill weapons or an ASAT array. Canada, together with the Eisenhower Institute and others, is undertaking a 'space security index', to track technological, military and policy developments relating to space use.

Links need to be fostered between national scientific (especially space-related) commercial and military communities at all levels. Pugwash can play a role through its publications and meetings and by supporting the work of Student Pugwash and the Space Generation Advisory Council. In particular, Pugwash should support publication of a book drawing together the major themes and papers from Castellón and Halifax, and shorter targeted briefings for scientists, media, space users/consumers and policymakers on these issues, which could be translated and used by national Pugwash groups.

In addition to the kind of very useful workshop meetings of experts, such as Castellón, Pugwash could explore more avenues for reaching out to non-expert or 'unconverted' constituencies through a variety of follow up strategy and information-disseminating meetings, which could be nationally or regionally based, expert and public. Resources permitting (subject to fundraising), Pugwash would also be well placed to take the lead, in partnership perhaps with other NGOs and some governments, for sponsoring a high level 'International Space Security Summit' for 2004 or 2005.

While the Castellón participants agreed that the ultimate objective should be a comprehensive treaty banning the weaponisation of space and ASATs and regulating the uses and exploitation of outer space, it was recognised that much had still to be done to create the conditions for such negotiations to be feasible.31 In the interim, there were useful confidence-building, legal, technical and awareness raising initiatives that could contribute to developing constraints and regulations for the non-aggressive (peace-supporting) uses of space.32

While the Castellón participants differed in their views on the utility, feasibility and priority of some initiatives, there was general agreement that Pugwash should

For the longer term, there was support for Pugwash to play a leading and/or supportive role in developing government-NGO partnerships to create the conditions for negotiating either a protocol to the OST or a new legal instrument to ban the testing and deployment of all weapons in and from space and to codify a set of peace supporting, peace enforcing rules of the road to underpin space security.

Conclusion

With its national and international networks of scientists and high reputation, the constructive and effective engagement of Pugwash in preventing the weaponisation of space will be vital to building a future space security regime.