THE NEW SAINT PETERSBURG:
A CASE OF BORDER-MAKING OR BORDER-BREAKING?

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Introduction[1]

The naming of St Petersburg appears to form a distinct pattern. The city emerged in the context of early modern Russia and gained a name that signalled - by having Dutch and German rather than Russian connotations - some degree of mental openness. The choice was very much in line with the overall endeavour of breaking the isolation caused by Russia's somewhat peripheral location in view of the rest of Europe.

Petrograd, the name used for a short period since the First World War, represented a different logic. 'Burg' was translated into Russian 'grad', this change being spurred by the anti-German feelings that prevailed in 1914, and the religious connotations were dropped. Petrograd represented, with Peter the Great and Russia's own history as a point of departure, a step in the direction of national closure and Leningrad, the name assumed in 1924 five days after Lenin's death, strengthened this feature even further.

Naming obviously matters and the key concern here consists, thus, of how to interpret the recent re-emergence of the old name of St Petersburg, the one given originally by Tsar Peter I after his patron saint, the Apostle Peter. The questions is what such a renaming - passed through a popular referendum in

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September 1991 and compounded by the fact that the city was also administratively detached from the surrounding Leningrad region with its old Soviet-time name - means in the new Russia and more generally the post-wall Europe.

The paper probes, in endeavouring at addressing this question, into the process of re-naming, taking into account that city-names are often societally deep-rooted and quite sedimented. If changed, there has to exist rather profound reasons for such a move. The question thus reads what is behind the return of St Petersburg. What spurred such a change and what hides behind the city's radically different view of itself? Moreover, in what way have these changes in self-perception - signalling an ability to break with previous mental and political borders - been reflected in the policies pursued ***vis-à-vis*** the intra-Russian but above all the external environment? Are the changes merely symbolic or are they also visible as to their background and consequences in a more concrete fashion in the policies pursued?

The focusing on St Petersburg represents a deliberate strategy. It entails - among other things - looking away from Moscow, the Federal Government and the policies of the central authorities. In other words, the question is posed whether there is anything different and of interest taking place in the more peripheral parts of the country, in its northwestern region and in the vicinity of its EU-borders. And more particularly, does the applying of a constructivist approach and the focusing on the

boundary practices - both mental and real - of a regional actor such as St Petersburg add anything essential to previous research and a more centre-oriented approach? Could it be that also the policies of bordering and outlining political space pursued by a not-so-central actor warrant attention in having a constitutive impact not just on the unfolding of Russia at the turn of the millennium but also the way the EU-Russia relationship is being devised in the post-Cold War years? These are the main issues this paper aims at addressing.

Turning Back or Looking Forward?

There is no doubt as such that the abandoning of the Soviet-time name of Leningrad implies a repositioning of the city in both temporal and spatial terms. It does so in providing the St Petersburg with an old/new symbolic frame, distinguishing the city from the Leningrad Oblast and by lifting it out of a number of constraints implied by the city's posture in the context of the socialist project. And there is, at least in principle, much power involved in the move. The installing of such a 'lens' or a 'prism' allows the city to see itself - and perhaps also Russia at large - in a different perspective. It enables the emergence of new, more relativist and perhaps increasingly self-reflective visions. Moreover, the move has at least potentially a liberating impact with some elements reciding in the past being restored in order to provide for an altered sense of place and belonging.

A group of German scholars (Creuzberger et. al., 2000) have argued that St Petersburg is moving in a rather interesting direction. They think that the city is again in tune with time and able to cope with various aspects of change in being truly post-Soviet. A previous pattern of adaptation is once more confirmed with the renaming of St Petersburg having features of an eastern response to the postmodern challenge. The city is once again able to follow suit, the scholars assert. It mirrors the challenges of the current era, takes stock of its critical potential and reflects general trends in the development of political space far better than any other site in Russia due to an endeavour of combining the local with the global. However, their conclusion does not rest on any systematic study and the exploring of various alternatives. It merely stands out as a hint that St Petersburg constitutes a truly interesting case to explore and an invitation to pursue the theme further.

In order to do so the changes discernible have to be placed in perspective. Essential change is undoubtedly underway but does it point more in the direction of the future than the past? And what does the 'lens' used in interpreting time and space look like and is there, in principle, more than one option available?

As to this latter question, it appears that there are two main alternatives - or ontologies - and somewhat different 'prisms' at hand. Basically, there is a pre-modern one pointing in the

direction of an Empire-type of Russia and Europe. Such a figure allows, in having the shape of concentric rings, for rather flexible borders and it is not premised on any strict (modern) need of homogeneity. Matters seen as essential take place at the core but once this is secured there is also place for considerable plurality and a fading out of centrality and 'we'-ness towards the outer spheres. However, amidst this plurality the requirements of centralising power and forming a dense core prevails. Such a premodern move - important as such in shaping identities and reconfiguring political space - would in the case of St Petersburg basically stand for a turning back to 'authentic' and uncontaminated Russian values and imperial postures that are felt to be immutably stable even in the context of the current turmoil. The choice stands, if the ontology behind the renaming has a premodern character, for a kind back-to-the-past aspiration, i.e. an effort of narrowing down rather than opening up towards the new and changing environment.

The second and more forward-looking 'lens' would be postmodern in nature. It allows for de-bordering but tolerates - in contrast to the premodern one - also a considerable degree of de-centralisation. It would be in line with the formation of a rather multicentred Europe, one of Olympic Rings, with regionality as an essential constitutive principle. The adoption of the old name, one with roots in the past, would in such a context not stand for nostalgia and a longing back to the 'old good times' but rather testify to an ability of coping creatively with the new challenges that

resonate with globalisation. The re-deployment of symbolic resources located in the past would go hand in hand with partaking in a networking of cities, the implementation of various transborder and crossborder endeavours as well as engagement in region-building. One could also expect - along similar lines - to come across efforts of linking in to the re-emergence of northernness as a master-signifier of European political space and, more specifically, the EU's Northern Dimension.

All in all, the move of renaming would be part - as to its epistemological aspects - of endeavours aiming at a breaking down of the rigidity of the EU-Russia border, thereby also contributing to decentralisation of both Russia and the EU. Studying the policies of not-so-central actors yet having the capacity to influence borders and approaches to bordering would in that case be important for the overall unfolding of political space. Being mentally part of East and West as well as Russia and Europe, St Petersburg could contribute to the breaking down of the self-other divisions of the Cold War period - and the applying of a postmodern 'lens' might hence constitute an essential aspect of such a task.

It goes without saying that the two 'lenses' outlined here are not categorically distinct from each other, nor do they do not stand out as two totally different models, each with its own underlying logic. They are both related to the modern project and contain some similarities such as tolerance for plurality and

favouring flexible borders. What keeps them apart consists above all by the way centralisation/decentralisation is being viewed, with the postmodern model standing here in a category of its own. My aim is thus merely to treat them as heuristic tools helpful in illuminating essential aspect of the process of renaming and to trace the more ontological modes of thinking that might reside in the background. It would be futile to think that the deeply ingrained modern project - with an emphasis on homogeneity, centrality, clear external borders and statist security as a core constitutive argument for the formation of a distinct self-other relationship - has lost its grip altogether. It has not crumbled totally by being surpassed either by some premodern or postmodern alternatives.

Rather, what is at stake consists of tendencies. The tendencies of remaining with history and resisting too radical breaks as well as the effort of tuning in to the new are present simultaneously. The outcome is thus not one of absolute shifts, and yet one may expect that both models - each with their own ontology - presage changes such as a proliferation of identities, a pluralisation of histories as well as a destabilisation of authority in the context of St Petersburg. Above all, it is the renaming itself that gives cause to think in these broader terms on the level of ontology in exploring how the new St Petersburg relates to centrality, bordering and aspects of region-building as well as networking that reach beyond the ordinary modern and basically state-centred approaches.

Part of Soviet Avant-garde

It seems, to start with, that the abandoning Leningrad and the return to St Petersburg constitutes a rather fundamental move. It does not just stand for a re-naming of a major city. The switch may also be viewed as forming a key site in the discourse on the current-day Russia. Larger than Berlin, St Petersburg is a true metropolis (it has a dual position in being both a city and a separate subject as "a city of federal importance" together with Moscow) with some 4.6 million inhabitants located in Northern Europe. The features of being a city-state more than any other region located in Russia are rather strong. St Petersburg is, as the city forms a vast conglomerate of urban space, of considerable importance also for the broader environment. As the new name appears to stands for a profound move of identity transformation, the question emerges whether such a move in the sphere of naming has also been followed up in terms of social transformation, i.e. in terms of more tangible realities.

The very fact that St Petersburg has quite different connotations than Leningrad underlines that a considerable change has taken place. There are good reasons to argue that Leningrad was intentionally set up as something of an antithesis to St Petersburg, and that these two configurations represent rather opposite postures in the construction of political space. In any case, both the Soviet and the post-Soviet periods are labelled by

an active policy of naming. They both stand for a desire to arrest and outline place in a way of their own, thereby breaking with historical continuity.

Leningrad, for its part, was rather easy to categorise and place into perspective. It stood out as a provincial part of larger homogeneous and quite hierarchic whole dictated by the principle of statist sovereignty. Some plans to return to the position of a gateway existed but they never materialised (Helanterä, 2000: 18). The core was located elsewhere and Leningrad was, since the beginning of the 1930s, subjected to the overall plan of developing the Soviet Union, i.e. an object thinking taking place elsewhere. It was above all allotted with the task of producing industrial products to satisfy the needs of the Soviet Union - and later also to contribute to the trade with other socialist countries. Considerable parts of the Soviet heavy industry, including shipyards, production of nuclear plants, aircraft industry and space technology, was concentrated over time to Leningrad. The fact that most of this was related to military preparations made Leningrad particularly vulnerable to central planning and investments devised on that basis.

In 1931 a previously unified and functional region was divided into two by the split into the Leningrad city and the Leningrad Oblast. With the strict bordering towards the rest of Europe more generally, Leningrad lost its position as a centre for innovation and the role of mediating between the western world

and the rest of the country. The drying up of foreign trade further isolated the city and contributed to its peripherilisation.

Leningrad stood for something rather modern in the sense of being moulded to fit a Soviet lens of ***avant-garde***, i.e. exemplary and ahead of its time. The socialist project and the needs of the new core, that is Moscow, also dictated how Leningrad was staged - and it was hence depicted as a kind of "Potemkin village for the restaging of the revolution while Moscow was consolidating itself as the seat of Soviet power" (Boym, 2000: 315). Leningrad, relegated to a mere locality and yet constantly suspected (due to its potential more than any actual policies) of harbouring intentions of breaking with such a limited role and the principles underpinning the period of Soviet rule, had a ring of something closed and protective attached to it. The totalitarism of the period, with stress on continuous threat and grievance, forged it into a strictly bordered constellation of either-or. The city became unyielding to reforms and symbolised heroic resistance against invading foreign forces in defence of the fatherland. It was premised on a clear self-other distinction and allotted the function of serving as an outpost, one protecting the country against external influences from Finland, Scandinavia, Europe and the West in particular.

This Lenin's town had a firm and clearly defined position in Soviet ideology as well as a distinct hierarchy of influence and power within a rather monolith Soviet Union. The borderlines were

quite firm as the overall project was about socialism in a single country, one that represented progress and was destined to be carried forth by the force of history. There were no traces of autonomous development and the city hardly overspilled the boundaries set by statist - and Moscow-dominated - policies. On the contrary, it was firmly linked with various statist and rather modern concerns, above all those pertaining to defence. It was, on a more general note, embedded in a distinct geopolitical discourse, and based on rather firm border drawing. There was, in line with this, a strong military industry forming up to 80 percent of the city's overall industrial potential and a hard-working KGB, and in general the city was part and parcel of an anti-western stance. The strong Othering entailed in such a discourse led to perceptions of Russia and Europe being two worlds apart. This outlook severed the city not only from its nearby environment but also its own past with St Petersburg being understood as the Other of Leningrad.

Opening Up Towards Europe

The new St Petersburg, no longer Soviet but part of a Russian heritage, has a much more pluralist feel about it. It is far less easy to pin down in any categorical terms. The city is not just an effect of a statist arrangement as is already indicated by the religious connotations of its name, although a variety of state-related aspects are present as well. St Petersburg is often spoken of as the most Western, cosmopolitan and advanced of all Russian

cities (cf. Hedenskog, 2000: 62). St. Petersburg does not have connotations of being ***avant-garde,*** i.e. being destined to follow a fixed route and an externally given logic***.*** The new name does not point to the future or smack utopia but resides in history and aims, above all, at being in tune with its time. At the same time it may be noted that there is, contrary to many other border regions, no profound "periphery complex" inherited from the past present to be discerned in the case of St. Petersburg (Makarychev, 2000: 23). Being located at a distance from the core and close to an external border is not constitutive of St Petersburg. It has a distinct identity of its own and harbours the reputation of a democratic stronghold chiefly voting for reformist parties and politicians, although currently the liberals gain some third of the overall votes with another third going to communists and nationalists (Poulsen-Hansen, 2001: 187).

One of the limits consists of that many of the reformers have their roots in the Soviet ***nomenclature.*** The town of Apostle Peter has, in general, a standing of its own in the form of not bending easily to outside pressure. For example the gubernatorial elections in May 2000 with Vladimir Yakolev being elected despite some efforts of President Putin to secure a different outcome evidenced such an aspiration (Oldberg, 2000: 24, 37-39), albeit more recently a more conciliatory attitude appears to have carried the day.

Moreover, the Petersburgers actively nurture and

discuss their identity. Proposals to improve and elevate the city's status are frequent. Occasionally these proposals are about re-conquering the position of Russia's capital - i.e. the underlying logic is then one of competing with Moscow with statism and sovereignty as the core constitutive principles - although many of the proposal also reach beyond such a (modern or premodern) logic (cf. Hedenskog, 1999:74). For a while a movement advocating an autonomous position existed, but it seems to have died out more recently.

What appears to be crucial in the current discourse is that there are elements of metropolitanism, regionalism and re-linking to northernness to be traced, and more generally, the representational frame of St Petersburg appears to be city-centred rather than statist. The features of metropolitanism - to the extent that they really are present - imply that there are also seeds of de-territorialisation present. The city's character is expressed by labels such as 'the Northern Palmyra', 'the Northern Venice', 'the Northern Amsterdam' or 'the Northern Rome' - all modelled according to known foreign (mainly European) cities - although images such as 'the Northern Gate' or 'the Window to Europe' have been employed as well. The frequent usage of such labels testifies that there are some elements present in the discourse reminiscent of the double role that the city harboured historically. It ascended, by being simultaneously Russian and European, rapidly into one of the modern Europe's key centres of power and Russia's cradle of internationalisation (Eskelinen and Vartiainen, 1996: 231).

The process of naming also testifies, according to Svetlana Byom (1999: 149) that labelling it as "a city without memory" and the "first proto-postmodern city" is not without foundation. The first epitaph refers to the city's special nature in not having to be born out of some natural and gradual growth but having been established I 1703 'unnaturally' in a sweeping manner, without any integral relationship to its environs as well as by a political decision and an administrative plan. The latter one pertains to the strength of visions and images in the comprehension of what the city is basically about.

The features of being 'unnatural' and breaking with the past have been there from early on as the city grew out of an idea of a fresh start for Russia in the midst of a more common degeneration and inability to open up for some of the requirements of modernity. It represented an effort to leave behind Russia's past by mobilising the forces of the country into a gigantic endeavour - a pattern that has reoccurred in Russian history (cf. Shaw, 1999). The enormousness of the endeavour also led to rather brutal and repressive measures and gave the city features of an abstraction, a copy or a mere facade (and it has therefore - not least because of the considerable repression and suffering involved - been seen as having rather shaky and uncertain ground in being built on a previous marshland by a number of authors and writers). St Petersburg hence carries, in some of its apects, connotations of something unreal, artificial and voluntarist. It bends in many directions and does not lend itself, it seems, to any stable

interpretation. It is precisely the plurality, flexibility and an unsettled frame that also now constitutes a core reason why St Petersburg tends to be quite important for the new Russia, Europe and European politics more generally.

Furthermore, the re-emergence of St Petersburg (also the Russified version of Petrograd, a name used between 1914-24, would have been potentially available but was not chosen) represents an endeavour to strengthen the culturalization of political space. It provides a very different representational frame compared to the previous Leningrad. The re-naming that took place at the beginning of the 1990s coincided with a period when there was much stress on Russia's "return to Europe" or, indeed, a "return to civilisation". The effort was one of rapid change as well as linking up with key cultural and societal trends and to do away with the previous self-other distinction. Novgorod has, in some sense, followed suit by assuming the name 'Novgorod the Great' in its search for direction and meaning through the elevation of its past. Such moves allow for mobility, de-bordering and circulation within a wider sphere. They represent a direction that is less inclined than some of the other post-Soviet themes in the debate to trigger a sovereignty-related, statist and security-oriented discourse. Kaliningrad, also located around the Baltic Rim, served as an example of these latter tendencies. The discourse pertaining to this Russian exclave remained quite traditional, sovereignty-related and security-focused during most of the 1990s, although also the debate on Kaliningrad has more recently reflected themes

such as integration, de-bordering and networking (Joenniemi, 2000).

St Petersburg's re-naming aspires, one may think, at doing away with the bifurcated logic and the strictly state-based bordering of political space, i.e. a legacy that started already long time ago. The turning point consists of Finland's, Poland's and the Baltic counties' separation from Russia and Russia's isolation from Western Europe in the context of the events in 1917. The re-naming negates the whole period that followed, particularly the years of the Cold War, and is hence rather destabilising in its consequences. It opens up the broader questions of who are 'we' in the case of Russia. Such questions surfaced once the dominant ideology and systemic differences of the Cold War years and strict division into East and West no longer offered ground for staying aloof and required a refraining from linking up with broader European trends, including, region-building, urbanisation and the joining of networks of urban spaces.

Simultaneously Old and New

Yet the moves of opening up new departures have remained rather cautious. The traces of the previous period are not just to be abolished overnight. Expecting that moves of closure suddenly come to an end would be naïve taking into account the heavy structural legacy of the Soviet period but also the way the modern

symbols have been sedimented over time. This is so particularly in view of the wartime experiences as well as the heavy militarization and stalinization of the city during the Soviet years. A clear avoidance of breaking into something totally unexplored is there. Anxieties about being faced with an altogether new situation have to be alleviated. The name of St Petersburg diverts this dilemma, it appears, by being simultaneously old and new. It pertains to something familiar and is undoubtedly part of 'our' heritage, yet signalling that change has taking place in regard to the Soviet past.

Moreover, the move circumvents the Soviet period in temporal terms. It provides - by drawing on a different prism and resources available on historical grounds - a connection to Russia's past by offering strong links to the old Russian Empire while at the same time pointing to various possible futures. It articulates a future vision by calling upon the past in a way that transcends the recent isolationist and xenophobic period of Russian history. It aims, one may claim, at establishing a new identity, but does so without denying previous experiences (Kaliningrad/Königsberg is again much more of a dilemma in being largely void of historical linkages to Russianness and hence also deprived of the option of turning its past to a future). Above all, the image of St Petersburg introduces a self-understanding that is far more conducive to a tuning in to European integration than some other articulations present in the Russian politico-cultural discourse that also aim at influencing the course of future development.

This is not to say that the return to St Petersburg automatically strengthens images of an open and a rather Europe-oriented Russia or augurs measures such as the joining of a network of urban spaces, that is figuring as a global city being transnational - or perhaps even anti-national. The outcome is not necessarily an entity that is prepared to eagerly encounter region-formation around the Baltic Sea, engage oneself in European integration and, more generally, contribute to networking in the context of globalisation, and to do this without feeling its identity to be threatened and exposed to intolerable challenges.

This is not the argument here. The contention is rather that there are, in the struggle for the new Russia, at least some moves present that may potentially provide the departures needed. There are elements in the debate that could pave the way for a Russian actor to develop into one of the significant subjects in the context of the Baltic Sea area, the new Europe or - more specifically - within a network of urban spaces and postmodern politics more generally.

St Petersburg is, as such, a reminder of that it was once possible to adopt a posture that contained an identity sufficiently unique and yet open for the more general. It constituted a site where it was possible to be simultaneously Russian and European. For example, the city stood out as major Russian and European financial and banking centre with four times as much capital at its disposal than Moscow (Helanterä, 2000: 15). The city was able to

cope with some degree of openness and plurality without feeling threatened. It was not the external but rather the intra-Russian base that turned out to be the weak point as the post-revolution Soviet Union found the previous situation with relatively open borders and mixed identities unbearable. Russianness was increasingly defined in distinctive terms and difference. It became - within the way the modern paradigm was comprehended - something that required centralisation, a distance and clear bordering in relation to the nearby environment as well as the rest of Europe and the Western Other. The multifunctionalism of the city declined with the stress on homogeneity and a division into self-other. The city was related to a binary East-West divide in suppressing even further the historical connotations to northernness as an essential cartographic departure in the defining of political space (cf. Joenniemi and Serguinin, 2001). In consequence, there has been less emphasis on constituting a financial and cultural centre, although the element of industry has remained strong (Bater, 1976). Leningrad was firmly tied to the domestic - basically military - economy of the Soviet Union, and the recent changes have not radically changed this state of affairs.

In general, the heterogeneous both-and elements to some extent discernible in the essence of old St Petersburg were substituted by a far more categorical logic of either-or and inside-out. The Dutch/German and to some extent universal (religious) features of St Petersburg had to give in for more Russian and Soviet-oriented connotations and a Soviet-specific version of

modernity (sometimes called pseudo-modernity in being based on technological development without the appropriate institutional and civic basis). The re-naming was followed up by the city being deprived of its standing as a capital. Clearly, the Soviet Union was in need of a different approach than the one represented by the heritage of St Petersburg, and hence the more mundane and yet religious, folkish and Slavophile Moscow (cf. Vendina, 2000) became the dominant centre of the USSR. The evolving Russian 'we' was less in line with the rationality, extroversion and internationality, that is the hallmarks of St Petersburg, and better in tune with those of Moscow pertaining to ethnicity and Orthodoxy.

From Wall to Gate

The question is hence whether there is the will, interest and awareness to tap into the potential that was once left behind. Is it still possible to argue that St Petersburg constitutes a Russian site that has the ability to reflect and bend to the challenges of each era, including the current, more postmodern one? The question pertains, on the one hand, to the unfolding of the Russian 'we' in the post-Cold War period (cf. Morozov, 2001) and the ability of St Petersburg to utilise the options furnished by the new conditions on the other.

Some essential changes have undoubtedly taken place. As various military threats pertaining to inter-state relations have

receded, central political control has slackened. Such trends have then allowed for regionalization as well as linking up with the external environment. The growing eminence of northernness as a cartographic signifier, as indicated above all by the EU's Northern Dimension, enables a somewhat different positioning in time and place. Already President Yeltsin's penchant for divide-and-rule policy contributed to increased freedoms (Oldberg, 2001). Actors located in the vicinity of borders have gained in subjectivity and they are less automatically peripheralized than was the case previously. Various options of establishing foreign contacts, inviting investments and engaging in cross-border trade have been utilised. The external impulses have been considerable and have led, in the case of St Petersburg, to the formation of an extensive network of twin cities. Nowadays the city has 52 partner-cities in all continents except Africa. The most active partners consist of Turku, Hamburg, Manchester, Antwerp, Milan, Osaka, Rotterdam, Le Havre, Helsinki, Stockholm and Kotka (Suslov, 2000: 1). The network is extensive, although it may also be observed that the option of capitalising on the new openings has, in general, been used rather cautiously. Actually, St Petersburg's connections to foreign cities of its own rank have remained modest. For example the 'Baltic Bridge' with Hamburg has so far been rather light in content (Suslov, 2000).

The new constellations have also left their mark on the discourse concerning the essence of St Petersburg. The slogan 'St Petersburg - the Northern Gate' is again very much alive

(Governor Yakolev has launched an initiative 'Petersburg - European Door to Russia') and has been provided with substance in terms of trade, investments and services. A 'Strategic Plan' concerning the city's development - one that leans on the concept of a gateway not just towards Europe but also Asia due to St Petersburg's maritime nature - has been coined by the Leontiev Centre (a research centre closely linked with city-planning) and debated by various political bodies since 1997. The plan sets the target of developing St Petersburg into "a multifunctional city integrated in Russian and world economy". Moreover, it speaks of the city as an intermediary between these entities, including the turning into an economically important trade route between Russia and the EU (Strategic Plan of St Petersburg, 1998: 43, see Helanterä 2000). External relations are not seen as being only important; they are comprehended as a necessity for the city to promote its further development (Suslov, 2000:2). This implies endeavours of debordering and leaving the previous self-other comprehensions aside.

Aspiring for closer contacts with the EU implies that cooperation in the Baltic Sea region has grown in priority. This has been acknowledged by the city's administration (Suslov, 2000:5). 'The Baltic Initiative', launched in 1997 and supplemented each year, aspires - by comprising of eight projects of regional co-operation - at enhancing St Petersburg's position in the Baltic Sea region. The aim is one a turning into a gateway and, more particularly, of creating an integrated transborder space (Marin,

2000:41). The city's programme for its 300-year anniversary, with the program 'St Petersburg - European Cultural Capital 2003' aspires at placing the city among the greatest of not only the Baltic cities but also European cities more generally. The EU's Northern Dimension has been used as a vehicle for approaching the EU and seen as a link to the Union's Commission, although the positions taken have been strictly in line with those assumed by Russia in general. The moves have been 'mercantilist', i.e. utilitarian in nature rather than using the northern signifier and its symbolic power as such and capitalising on St Petersburg historical legacy as a northern actor in European affairs (Suslov, 2000: 13-14, 17). In addition to the more programmatic moves, the city has established a representation in Turku and a commercial representation in Kotka, both coastal cities in Finland. There is also the so-called 'Baltic Troika' involves regular meetings between the mayors of Helsinki, Stockholm and St Petersburg.

Clearly, the city has been among the most active Russian regions in establishing external relations (cf. Kuzmin, 1999, 109). It hosts altogether 35 consulates and representations of international organisations, including those of UNESCO and UNIDO as well as an information bureau of the Nordic Council of Ministers (Marin, 200:28). St Petersburg has been represented in the various Russian delegations to the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), it is an active participant in various regional cross-border co-operations as well as in the context of the Union of Baltic Cities (UBC). It has also has established links to the Congress of Local

and Regional Authorities of Europe. Some aspirations aim at taking stock of the increasingly co-operative city-relations that colour Northern Europe in particular. This latter aspect is exemplified by the Baltic Palette co-operation between the cities of Helsinki, Riga, Stockholm, Tallinn and St Petersburg. The Palette has been established recently and is still in its formative stage.

St Petersburg is - due to its plans, ambitions and endeavours - different from many other Russian regions. Most of them have an underdeveloped conceptualisation of their mission and future orientation, they lack a strategic vision and there is a heavy inertia of "old times". It seems, in general, that the agents of cross-border interaction and globalisation are in general weak (Makarychev, 2000:30). This is not the case with St Petersburg, although even here there is much to be hoped for as to long-term thinking and relevant future scenarios.

The strategies that have been developed have met with some success with St Petersburg having attracted a considerable amount of foreign investments. These have started to give relative effects since the end-1990s with some 13 percent of the overall production of the region originating from plants based of foreign capital (Poulsen-Hansen, 2001: 186). It may also be observed that the city has a leading role as an economic attraction among the Russian regions located in Northern Europe and Russian regions in general, although the overall sum of foreign investments is not as impressive as that of Moscow (Hedenskog, 2000:74). Moreover,

the Leningrad Oblast has often been seen as more attractive than St Petersburg. Russia's capital has gathered more than half of the overall foreign investments received by the country during the recent decade, but also St Petersburg has been able to harvest a considerable amount. One reason why the policy of creating specific 'investments corridors' like Moscow and St Petersburg to foster high-tech development, know-how and technical expertise has so far yielded only modest results consists of that Western countries have so far been mostly attracted by projects dealing with transportation and developing natural resources (Makarychev, 2000: 16). This may change, as to St Petersburg, in the near future. The city will be able to combine these two aspects in being furnished with new and significant harbour facilities. It may be argued that the loss of the previous port facilities for example in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has compelled St Petersburg to turn back to its former role of a gateway and mediating factor between the external and the intra-Russian. Yet it stands clear, as stated by Ingvar Oldberg (2000:27), that St Petersburg already now forms "an extrovert region", i.e. the border-transcending features have become considerable.

Limited Success

The city appears to be on the forefront among the Russian actors, but it also remains clear that the various images of an extensively outwards-reaching city have so far had rather limited currency.

Ideas such as the one of St Petersburg performing the role of a bridge between Russia and Northern Europe have not really struck home, and there is thus a certain discrepancy to be traced between identity transformation and more concrete social transformation. Or to put it differently: the city's new identity has been conceptualised in so restrictive terms that it tends to restrain rather than open up. Interpretations regarding 'Europe' are often coloured by the legacy of the Europe of Empires. Such comprehensions are conducive to anchoring St Petersburg temporally in a manner that does bring about a conflict with a Russia seen as a power-political state. However, such views are not conducive to the need of relating to an increasingly networked Baltic Sea region or a postmodern northern Europe at large.

This tension may have increased rather than decreased during the previous decade. Mayor Anatoli Sobchak had a number of thoughts, at the beginning of the 1990s, as to a following up of the changes introduced in the sphere of identity transformation. He clearly recognised that the city has to be opened up internationally. Consequently, he tried to turn St Petersburg rapidly into an international financial and trade centre with considerable stress on tourism. However, the plans were rather diffuse and poorly anchored in local realities - or mentalities for that matter. The idea of opening up was sound as such but it was not underpinned by a preparedness to do so for example in terms of having the infrastructure needed in terms of airports, roads or harbour capacity (cf. Oding, 1995: 33-35). The plans were not anchored in

any broader Russian development strategy but drafted in isolation - perhaps deliberately so in order stay free from the uncertain statist environment - from the rest of the country. It is also to be observed that the political turmoil as well as the lack of required legislation hampered any implementation of the plans. Moreover, Russia's banking stayed in the hands of Moscow, this implying that the Mayor's plans remained underfinanced. Among the 20 largest banks in Russia, only one is located outside Moscow (Promstroibank in St Petersburg ranking 17 on the list) (Helanterä, 2000: 71).

The international interests in contributing to Sobchak's scenario of increased openness formed a source of disappointment as well. One has to add, however, that also the ability of Sobchak himself (or that of the new power-holders more generally) to implement such ideas often remained limited (Orttung, 1995). The period of Vladimir Yakolev, elected Mayor after Sobchak, has been characterised by a more mundane and traditional agenda. Yakolev has, to some extent, purported himself as an anti-Sobchak in being above all a practitioner with "down-to-earth" ambitions. Instead of utilising and carrying on the leap into history performed during the period of Sobchak, Yakolev gives signals of returning to the standard policies of empirism and gradualism. There is less stress on liberal and unregulated development, and more emphasis on seeing St. Petersburg part of a certain division of labour within the Russian economy, for example in terms of producing equipment needed in the sphere of

oil and gas production.

It may also be observed that the city's leadership has in general been constrained by a certain resistance towards internationalisation (Mellor, 1997), although the idea of developing St Petersburg into a gateway, and more particularly a hub of transport in the context of the Baltic Sea, is still there. The national Russian discourse has displayed a variety of restraints felt also in the case of St Petersburg. The city has to take into account that with the prevailing of nationalistic sentiments and the emphasis on the genuinely Russian, suggestions pointing at a radical opening up towards Europe may fall flat. They risk being interpreted as anti-Russian and anti-national in essence. The self-other barrier is to some extent still there. This is due to the pre-eminence of a geopolitical way of comprehending international relations and the external environment as well as a tendency of contrasting Russia with Europe and of seeing these two in rather exclusive terms.

This is to say that to some extent the leadership appears to be burdened by experiences of the modern, state-centred period. It has also itself, on occasions, fallen into the same pattern by challenging Moscow with attempts to reverse the rank-order of these two cities in the national hierarchy. The approach chosen tends to be a rather competitive one, perhaps even revanchist. This might be understandable in a historical, pro-national perspective and against the background formed by the Soviet Union as a strictly centred space, but hardly conducive to an

opening up and stressing the significance of links with Europe. On the contrary, such an endeavour requires signals purporting St Petersburg as a truly Russian configuration and perhaps even part of the rebirth of the old imperial structures. Hence there is only a somewhat restrained eagerness to link up with the new Cupertino around the Baltic Rim. Particularly the relationship to the Baltic countries (which during the early Gorbachev years and the period of the Baltic national fronts was rather intense) remains cool, if not explicitly hostile. A transcending of these barriers would require further moves of de-securitisation and de-bordering in the sphere of identification (Morozov, 2001:17).

The need for aid that emerged due to the August 1998 economic crisis made it important to establish further contacts with Finland, Scandinavia and other parts of Europe. However, this aspiration has remained rather cautious as well. This is also partly due to the fact that it has taken time and effort to achieve sufficient authority on the local level, to the establishment a budget for the city, delimit its property, etc. The city's ageing infrastructure and its ecological problems call for considerable investments, this leaving limited amounts for any renewal of the city. The internal power struggle seems to have been so intense in St Petersburg that there has been a limited interest and energy left over to the establishing of a distinct foreign policy profile and providing the image of a gate towards Northern Europe with a real content. One has to add, of course, that also a number of international constraints exist. The western discourse on Russia has the rather enduring features of

treating Russia as West's Other, or at most an apprentice allowed to cross distinct dividing lines only in the longer perspective. As Iver Neumann and Michael Williams (2000) demonstrate, this discursive barrier and frame has been there for ages, and is still blocking rather effectively various Russian moves of trying to break with existing borderlines. Christopher Browning concludes, along similar lines, that in the dominant discourses Russia remains "constructed as the object to be acted upon, the diseased that needs to be cured" (Browning, 2001:5).

This is to say that some of the potential of internationalisation is bound to remain untapped. St Petersburg stands out as an unequal player on the international scene. It does so in lacking some of the options and the drive that is characteristic of many other cities of the same magnitude and historical proportions. Ingmar Oldberg (2000:48) provides one explanation to such a state of affairs. He concludes, on the basis of a survey, that "the city has played a leading role in regional policy across Russia, but remains hamstrung by the federal centre". This latter aspect appears (which may more recently have changed with the various initiatives that Putin has taken in order to develop St Petersburg into a mediating factor between Russia and Europe) to have continued during the first year of the reign of President Putin, although he has himself a background in St Petersburg as a former Deputy Mayor responsible for external contacts. In 1997 Putin defended his Ph.D. dissertation in economics on "Strategic Planning of the Reproduction of the Mineral Resources and Raw

Material Base of the Region Under Market Relations". Putin has, as the President of Russia, taken a number of initiatives that seem to favour St Petersburg (Suslov, 2000: 18) but has so far not been eagerly pushing for the implementation of these initiatives. A strongly pro-national St Petersburg, one that coincides but does not compete with the Federal core, would be to Putin's liking judging on the basis of the images he has occasionally been playing around with in taking foreign, high-level quests to St. Petersburg, coining ideas of the city becoming a site for the second chamber of the Duma and some ministries being transferred to St Petersburg.

Yet it may be concluded that St Petersburg appears to have gained - despite considerable obstacles - the profile and aspiration of a global city, an endeavour that also brings it occasionally into an alliance with (Luzhkov's) Moscow. The two cities are not, within such a framework to be viewed as competitors in a statist and pro-national context but seen as "potential gates to the global world" (Makarychev, 2000:34) or "oases of post-industrialism and quasi-Western lifestyle" (Medvedev, 2000: 95), although both tend to remain "islands of globalisation" within a political landscape still governed by sovereignty-related departures and a great power ideology. In other words, there are features pointing in a postmodern direction and St. Petersburg contributing to a Europe of Olympic Rings but these features tend to be rather weak. The strong requirement to preserve a distinct core and Russia as rather homogeneous political space rather speak for

modern or premodern preferences, this implying that future is still premised basically on statist departures or at most on the figure of a Europe of Empires.

Integral Part of Europe

This is so as there are still forceful voices in the debate both on the Russian side and abroad that operate within the context of a classical geopolitical analysis, thereby contributing to securitisation and bordering. They feel that it is important to speak about phenomena such as "vacuums" or "grey zones", i.e. properties that are thought to have resulted from the implosion of the previous setting. Likewise, they warn against the various dangers that may originate with the perceived "instabilities" in the relationship between Russia and the Baltic countries.

However, St Petersburg is there and it seems that the re-naming is yielding, albeit slowly, results as a discursive strategy and a new prism. The disappearance of the previous horizon of expectations has freed creativity and new thinking, although it has also paved the way for a serious amount of crime and corruption - and there appears to be a considerable amount of bureaucratic inertia as well (Mellor, 1997; Rytövuori, 1998). It endeavours at opening up what the more conventional, geopolitical and state-related stories often aim at freezing and keeping intact. The city is located in a part of Europe where borders are changing in nature

and regional endeavours blossom as indicated by the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), a considerable number of 'Euroregions' and the EU's Northern Dimension, an initiative that calls for dialogue, regionalisation and partnership across the Union's northern borders. Such trends tend to soften the more extreme voices, to tune down concerns operating within the context of a traditional security mode and departing from the concepts of survival and strict as well as divisive sovereignty**.** They bring the debate into the direction of identity politics and cultural self-defence, and more generally into pursuing questions on the meaning of ones being.

The challenge is rather formidable, and particularly requiring in the case of Russia. Viacheslav Morozov formulates it as follows: "A search for an alternative identity, not directly based on the idea of the Russian/Soviet statehood, would almost certainly require a dramatic break with the past". Russia has, he argues, to secede in a certain manner from itself, although he adds that the leap could perhaps be first made by some Russian region or city. St Petersburg occurs as one of the prime candidates on his list of decentralising agents. It could be easier for an entity like St. Petersburg, with the de-securitization that already there is the discourses on metropolitanism and regionalism, to establish links across previous divides. Schemes of co-operation may be introduced that run contrary to previously sacrosanct borderlines. The argument is that identity transformation and social transformation can be brought in line with each other in the context

of region-building around the Baltic Rim. Opening up is easier for an actor that does not remain trapped within the modernist discourse: "Russia cannot become a Baltic country, but St Petersburg and especially Kaliningrad can become Baltic cities" (Morozov, 2001: 30).

Conclusions

The re-naming of St Petersburg is a clear demonstration of that the city has been able to get rid of many of the constraints pertaining to the previous period. A liberation has taken place at least in the ideational sphere, although the legacy of the Soviet past still weighs heavy in many others. The resources available for example in the field of economy needed in tuning in to the challenges of glocalisation - i.e. a combination between the local and the global - have remained modest. Yet the re-naming constitutes an important move as such in being symbolically very powerful. It indicates that there are also other options available in Russia than just clinging to the remnants of a socialist past, including the holding on to the various ideas of progress and the final outcome of a promised land. It also goes beyond, in being anchored in Russia's own history, the often-used option of bluntly imitating Western models and practices. Opening various temporal and spatial frontiers by digging into one's own past offers, at best, alternatives to a freezing into historical immobility or, for that matter, the

deployment of themes pertaining to religion, nationalism or ethnicity.

The move of tapping into memory along the lines of St Petersburg helps to carve out a kind of 'local time' in regard to 'world time' - to apply a vocabulary coined by Zaki Laïdi (1998). The options unfolding are clearly preferable to a total staying at the sidelines, not to speak of engaging in various forms of escapism or - for that matter - endeavouring at the tackling various challenges of globalisation head on.

The re-discovery and obvious playing with elements reciding in the past singles out St Petersburg as a rather special site within Russian political space as Russia at large feels rather uncertain about its relation to 'world time'. Russia, as a wider framework of reference, lacks a strong integrative drive at the supra-national level (Makarychev, 2000: 12).

Moreover, the country tends to remain quite insecure in face of strong local expressions of identity. Space and time are still comprehended almost exclusively in state-centric as well as core-oriented terms and the unfolding of political space is measured predominantly in a modern and rather hierarchic manner. Instead of allowing for diversity, the use of region-specific resources and encouraging the emergence of local inroads into 'world time', the reaction has often been one of contesting the claim that such a time is a legitimate challenge in the first place. There is little

outright resistance but much reluctance (the image of 'West' representing a cultural offence in order to undermine 'Russia' is there) in embarking upon an avenue that tends to require an emphasis on diversity rather than homogeneity and de-bordering instead of bordering. The formation of linkages between the local and the global are - if taken too far - discouraged. They are perceived as encroachments on the power of the federal authorities and interpreted as efforts of circumventing the more state-centred and concentric ways of organising political space. The challenges are experienced, on a more general level, as enhancing a loss of a previous horizon. They are hence depicted as rather troubling in destabilising the unity between territory, history and the statist endeavour. This is to say that an ontology of fixity, stability and continuity tends to dominate the all-Russian approaches also around the Baltic Rim.

Obviously, there are elements of tension present in the policies pursued by St Petersburg and Russia as a whole, although the reading could also be that St Petersburg is ahead of most other parts of Russia. It is, at least in principle, able to mediate and show the way in constituting a kind of 'third', post-binary way between imitating the West or just staying put without shaking off the Soviet heritage. The move may, more generally, form an important building block in the post-socialist reconstruction of identities as well as social practices. The choices to be made are not just those of either-or. Also the option of both-and is there, and in this sense the re-appearance of St Petersburg contributes to the undermining

of any bifurcated, Huntingtonian type of conceptualisations concerning the post-Cold War political constellations. The city exemplifies - without explicitly pitting itself against any other direction except those represented by the former Leningrad and the Soviet project at large - that there are elements also in the Russian heritage to be re-deployed and re-invented once embarking upon a different route. The historically familiar may serve as an inroad to the new by nailing down that Russia is, in some of its aspects, firmly European. It re-claims lost ground and undermines more divisive discourses present both on the Russian and more broadly European scenes. It allows, at best, the question 'who are we' to be answered by de-bordering rather than bordering. Russia's repertoire of choices increases as the alternative selves are not just those of a truly foreign and a well-bordered domestic one.

Moreover, 'Europeanisation' gets a more familiar meaning as it does not require that Russia totally abandons its old self and becomes gradually, by moving closer to civilisational values, part of the new commonness. The transition from the previously rather firm self-other divide is not one of a student turning gradually into teacher in order to become one of 'us'. A strategy of remembrance allows Russia to gain a much more equal position as it is not only making claims about itself but also helping Europe reunite with some of its own heritage. The strategy enables Russia to turn from an apprentice to an actor furnished with the power of heal, and to do so by contributing to a restoration of

Europe's lost unity. By influencing the way the border unfolds, and by utilising the location being in the vicinity of the border, actors such as St Petersburg do not just yield power over themselves. They also gain subjectivity - by removing themselves from what is understood to be the utter edge to the systemic margins - power in the constitution of what Russia, the EU and the relationship between these two entities is about.

The move of turning towards one's own roots in the process of adapting to the circumstances that prevail after the rupture of the socialist project, the Cold War and, more broadly, the exhaustion of Enlightenment is thus, in this light, a rather powerful one.

The re-emergence of St Petersburg signals that the competence to use such influence is at least to some extent present. There appears to be some power present in Russia, albeit modest, over oneself in the sphere of naming. The move is not merely a backward-looking one. It may neither be regarded as an escape from being faced with formidable challenges, nor seen merely as an expression of nostalgia for a 'Golden past', a reflex of fear in the face of the current challenges or simply a move of resistance ***vis-à-vis*** globalisation. Rather to the contrary; the act may constitute - in some of its aspects - an interesting experiment in turning previously divisive borders into interfaces in order to pool local resources in face of the extensive challenges that easily peripheralize entities such as St Petersburg.

The re-naming stands out as such an experiment - according to a positive interpretation. This is so as it does not just constitute a limited aspiration of coping with existing realities; it also contains features of constructing a new horizon of meaning. The falling of a variety of barriers in the post-Cold War situation is not interpreted in terms of estrangement and exclusion. It is also comprehended as opening linkages to Russia's own past thereby allowing 'Europe' to be defined in a manner that locates an essential part of Russia on the inside of such a configuration from the very start. Europe-making thus gets a more profound meaning and has a more familiar cling to it. Russia may, due to a standing that allows it to regulate Europe's bordering and turning a previous edge and outer limit to a margin that signals continuity, purport itself as an actor conducive to a restoration of what has been lost over time. There is the prospect of "stitching back the Old Continent and enchancing prospects for greater Europe" (Trenin, 2000:20). Instead of aspiring for something totally new - perhaps in the form of an utopia that would, after the experiences of the socialist project, be viewed with utmost suspicion - there is a more modest and historically familiar choice available. The crisis of expectations that emerged after the fall of the Soviet project may be remedied by the usage of elements that originate with one's own past and became within reach as the previous Otherness of St Petersburg evaporated with the fall of the socialist project. The access route chosen in the case of the city seems at least identity-wise fit some of the needs of the situation.

Importantly enough, it has been St Petersburg itself and to some extent the citizens themselves that have been able to mark and carve out - by public referendum - a considerable part of the new path. The power of renaming has in St Petersburg been exercised to some extend in a top-down fashion, but in Russia as a whole the renaming stands for a bottom-up type of move in being based on a local initiative. The city has grasped the initiative without waiting for the dictates of the present 'world time' to impose themselves - either from abroad or through the federal authorities. It has outlined the necessary signposts that eventually may lead the way towards a much more inclusive relationship to the rest of Europe.

More generally, an important opening has seen the light of the day, but it also stands clear that St Petersburg has not yet reached very far in terms of the implementation of concrete policies. There is some discrepancy between the new and the old. The city appears to experience difficulties in catching up, in terms of regionalisation, with the dynamism of the Baltic Sea region as exemplified by projects such as the Øresund region. Identity transformation and social transformation are not in synchrony, and hence St. Petersburg has gained some rather hybrid features. The symbolic side appears to be stronger than the societal one, the situation thus being different from the one that prevails in the case of Moscow (a city with much societal change within a rather fixed image).

One of the underlying reasons might be a temporal one. The identities constructed in the case of the new St Petersburg often pertain, it seems, to the Imperial Europe of the past, and a Europe of power politics and geopolitical thinking. Such an anchoring is problematic as the difference between the era of the Russian Empire and the current, more postmodern one is particularly distinct in Europe's North and the Baltic Sea region. The policy of re-naming appears to be framed and premised by assuming that there is considerable continuity present in terms of great power politics. The move rests on conceptualisations of a rather securitised, state-centred and well-bordered Europe and one that still contains elements of Russia's Other, albeit in a less systematic manner than in the context of the bifurcated East-West divide of the Cold War years.

Assuming the name of St Petersburg disassociates the city from its previous essence as Leningrad. However, it does not go far enough by also offering a way out of various state-centred and centralising concerns and thereby provide for an entrance into a more the postmodern environment, i.e. the pursuance of politics in different keys. The re-naming is not utilised as a denouncement of the imperial and centralising elements contained in St Petersburg's legacy and as a way of installing new transnational or perhaps even anti-national elements into it, and this may go some way in explaining why it remains weak in configuring 'Europe' in postmodern terms, i.e. a 'Europe of Olympic Rings'.

It is therefore not surprising that slogans like "St Petersburg - the London of the North" remain absent from the discourse. The move of re-naming represents - one may argue - a return to a 'Europe', a premodern one that is no longer there (Morozov, 2001:25). The renaming of the city thus not been followed up, to any larger degree, by linking up to the nearby environment by moves debordering and various city-based networks. Likewise, the options opened by the increased prominence of the northern master-signifier in outlining political space in Europe have not been actively employed, and this may be seen as regrettable as St Petersburg has a rather strong historical legacy as a northern - and not an eastern or a western - entity on the European scene. The North as a post-binary signifier of political space, one that goes beyond the division into the East and the West, appears in some of the slogans attached to St Petersburg. However, there are no signs that it would have consciously been elevated to a deliberate strategy.

It may be concluded on a more general note that some of the preconditions for the old/new horizon really to set in are there, although also the obstacles to any extensive utilisation remain distinct. The' prism' or 'lens' installed by the move of renaming is too burdened by a historical legacy in containing considerable ingredients of statism, centralism and securitisation. The vision of a 'Europe of Empires' can be envisaged on the basis of the departures used - with President Putin and the local

leadership increasingly operating in tandem in order to devise linkages to the rest of Europe - but a 'Europe of Olympic Rings' and a more decentred configuration sounds more utopian and impossible.

This implies that St Petersburg's record in mediating and showing the way has remained modest. It offers a remedy, with the breakdown of previous discursive structures of self and other, to some of the dislocation caused by the eruption of contingency. However, the various openings that have emerged do not seem to be easy to catch. The constraints are numerous, and the liberating aspects of the re-naming have been challenged and marginalised by more traditional discourses. They reside in the dominant Western ones used in framing Russia as well as in the dominance of modern interpretations as to the way Russia frames itself. Some constraints are also ingrained in the way the new name, i.e. St Petersburg, has been comprehended and utilised. The avenues of metropolitanism and regionalization are there, albeit they remain limited and are not exploited in any decisive manner. The new St. Petersburg appears to be basically depicted as the return of a grand narrative, one resonating with the figure of a Europe of Empires, rather than an exercise in simulation and playing with names. The belief widely heralded after the end of the Cold War that territorial and mental barriers could be transcended, with 'Europe' reconstructed in a much more open way also along Russian borders, has not materialised in full. Yet metropolitanism and regionalism form the two most important inroads to a

community of belonging based on 'world time' available to St Petersburg - and Russia more broadly.

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