On the encounter between the Nordic and the northern: torn apart but meeting again?

Pertti Joenniemi & **Marko Lehti**
Copri **Political History**
University of Turku

pjoenniemi@copri.dk malehti@utu.fi

Contents:

Abstract:

The North is no longer as immobile and sedimented as before. It does not just mark something local and extremely peripheral but has turned into an increasingly legitimate marker of Europeanness in the form of the EU's Northern Dimension Initiative. The marker is not just used to frame some space in the margins of the European configuration; it is also used as an umbrella in co-ordinating the relationships between specific regional formations such as Nordic, Baltic, Barents and Arctic co-operation. This added centrality of the North raises a host of questions about the unfolding of political space in the northern part of Europe. Our aim here is to tackle some of them by exploring in particular the encounter that is now unfolding between the new North and the more traditional Norden, two configurations that to some extent compete for the same space. Essential relationships are being re-negotiated, this enforcing various actors to choose between different representational frames, each with their own specific identities and spatial coverage. Above all, we seek to provide the encounter with a temporal background in viewing both of them as discursive constructs that are condusive to change.

Introduction

The northern part of Europe has been quick to capitalize on the new openness of the post-Cold War years. Numerous region-building projects have been instigated across the previous East-West divide, and borders appear to have become rather malleable. Indeed, one could say that over the last few years, the region has turned into a veritable laboratory of spatial politics.(1) One of the moves challenging long-established constellations and markers of political space consists of the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI), launched by Finland in 1997 and subsequently approved by the European Union. Integral to the NDI has been talk of a new northern Europe comprising not only the Nordic countries but also the Baltic States and north-west Russia as well as parts of Germany and Poland. The resulting tension between the new northernness and more traditional markers (West, East, but more especially Nordic) brings forth a host of questions to be sorted out both conceptually and concretely in terms of spatial practices.
Looking at today's northern Europe, it also appears that the influence of the traditional logic of ***Realpolitik*** – involving divisive, statist borders clearly indicating who is 'inside' and who is 'outside' – has declined in importance. The categories of 'us' and 'them' are no longer as strictly separated from each other as they used to be, and it may also be observed that the needs of the former do not automatically take priority over the latter. Such a hierarchy has now become far less distinct, as exemplified by an increasing number of trans-border projects or the fact that the Finnish-Russian border has turned into an EU-border where various freedoms are supposed to carry the day.(2) The hierarchy that used to be there is sidelined by approaches featuring more equality and parity between 'us' and 'them' as previous divisions are replaced by a multiplicity of overlapping jurisdictions.

One may recall, however, that these recent challenges are not altogether novel. The Cold War constellation was not entirely divisive; it left some room for formations that deviated from the prevailing bi-polarity. The most essential exception in this regard was undoubtedly Nordic co-operation. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden were never fully in line with the rules of the Cold War period and instead followed what might be termed a ***Sonderweg.*** This is to say

that the logic of ***Realpolitik*** was partly set aside in not being applicable to intra-Nordic relations and the sphere of the joint Nordic 'we'. By forming a grouping of their own, the Nordic countries injected variety into the political landscape as early as the 1950s.

Our purpose in what follows is to use ***Norden*** and nordicity as signposts for tackling recent changes in the unfolding of political space in Europe's North. The aim is to subject both the old and the new to critical reflection. How do the various representations evoked during recent years relate to the already established ones?(3) More particularly, one can ask how Nordic co-operation ties in with the other regional vehicles that have emerged since the end of the Cold War. Are the current moves of de-bordering to be seen as an extension and a follow-up of earlier moves present already in nordicity, or do they contain some entirely new elements, thereby profoundly altering the political landscape in the European North?

The two concepts ***nordicity*** and ***northernness*** are clearly related (***Norden*** means literally 'the North') and have a certain symbolic and historical affinity. Both originated from the North-South division of the world that dominated European spatial imagination from Antiquity up until the gradual emergence of a new East-West division during the early modern period. In ancient Greece and Rome, and for centuries thereafter, the North denoted a veritable cultural and economic backwater, a sphere inhabited by uncivilized barbarians. This image of extreme peripherality was challenged during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the North acquired a more positive aspect and became a resource in the identity-building processes of realms and nations. In the nineteenth century, however, it ceased to function as a master-signifier of Europeanness and again assumed a connotation of remoteness and peripherality. Into the space vacated moved nordicity, which has pushed northernness further to the fringes in the course of the past 200 years.

Today, the re-imagining and return of the North is unsettling the position of nordicity. A certain rapprochement seems to be underway between two markers that have over time drifted apart, yet is their relationship complementary or competitive? What will happen to the Nordic 'we' now that communality in a specific part of Europe is increasingly grounded on the cardinal marker of northernness, as

seems to be the case? Nordicity and northernness each coin a rather different ‘we’, although they are obviously not strict opposites. Our analysis explores the encounter between the two representations of political space, tracing the ‘we’-identities that follow and relating them to each other. More generally, it outlines the contours of the political landscape that unfolds due to the new relationship between the two markers.

In our view, nordicity and northernness should be treated as historically constituted narratives. The words used to define regional constellations are in fact more than words, for ‘with words we create and share views of reality’.(4) Individuals as well as societies use narratives for anchoring their identities in time and space. ‘We’ can exist and be somebody only through such stories, which define ***who*** we are, ***what*** we are and ***where*** we are.(5) The encounter between the Nordic and the northern can thus be regarded as an ongoing negotiation about such a ‘we’. Both narratives endeavour, in their own way, to define an identity. When talking about major cartographic markers such as the North, the East, the Orient or areas such as the Balkans, it should be remembered that these are cultural constructs which lack objective geographical definitions. Their meaning is not constant but contingent. Although such labels have been around more or less constantly, the meaning attached to them has differed over time.

Edward Said has shown this to be the case in his classic study of the Orient. Said coined the term ***orientalization*** to refer to the process by which this marker has been provided with connotations of Europe’s ‘other’. Heavily shaped by romantic mysticism, orientalization yields a certain image, leading to spatial discourses and, ultimately, social action.(6) It is an historically contingent process showing displaying elements of continuity as well as interruptions and variations. By the same token, one can point to the existence of varying narratives on the location and meaning of ‘the North’ and ‘northernness’. It seems possible, for instance, to talk of a process of ***northernization***, whereby the cartographic extent of the North was progressively narrowed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Northernization imbued the North with connotations of considerable peripherality somewhere at the margins - if not outside - of Europe. Attempts to give this marker greater centrality could be described under the label of

Europeanization, whilst the space denoted by this marker in the twentieth century was also progressively ***nordicized***. Attempts to build linkages with the former socialist countries (above all Russia) could be termed an ***Easternization*** of the North. Furthermore, it is possible to distinguish between nationally-delimited forms of the North as well as unifying constructions that provide space for larger communities. The former operate in terms of exclusion and the latter with inclusion as the basic move, although the borderlines often tend to be somewhat diffuse. Nordicization in particular has brought about discourses and spatial practises that mix rather easily and overlap with nationally based configurations.

If the North is to be viewed as a contingent construct, any definition of it requires one to outline the genealogy of the North and northernness. Only in this way can one uncover the variety of meanings attached to the term and pinpoint continuums and interruptions in the northern tradition. In this chapter we first probe the relationship between nordicity and northernness as two related narratives and chart the unfolding of the contest between them, particularly in the post-Cold War years. Secondly, the recent broadening and return of the North, evidenced above all by the European Union's Northern Dimension, is explored. Finally, by examining the genealogy of the northern marker, we place the contest between nordicity and northernness in a European perspective.

Norden: a Community of Destiny

The Nordic configuration has an established history and has, over time, assumed distinct institutional forms. It is, however, often depicted in terms of ***sui generis***, a case in a category of its own. The presuppositions behind such a marker are rarely explored. The Nordic case is obviously there and yet it remains somewhat evasive, an entity and a set of spatial practices which are quite hard to pin down conceptually and locate in a broader context.(7)

In essence, political ***Norden*** has constituted an effort to keep German influence at bay. Its history can be traced at least as far back as the

days of the ***Kalmar*** Union from 1397 to 1523, although one may stretch it even further back in time.(8) In the 1830s, nordicity assumed the form of Scandinavianism, a mainly student and academic-led movement which sought to establish a unified Scandinavian polity. The futility of this aim was demonstrated when Sweden-Norway refused to extend help to Denmark during the Schleswig-Holstein war of 1864, at which point the relevant state-actors largely lost interest in the Nordic option. With their withdrawal, however, various non-statist forces and interpretations gained ground, a development which ultimately provided ***Norden*** with features of a rather horizontal 'bottom-up' type of entity. A rich network of Nordic Associations, for instance, has furnished nordicity with features of a popular movement.

Amongst the milestones of nordicity, one can also cite the efforts to form a neutral group at the beginning of the 1930s and, more recently, the founding of the interparliamentary Nordic Council by Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 1952. Finland and Iceland joined this body some years later. The establishment of this institutional framework paved the way for an active period of Nordic co-operation which gave rise to a common labour market (1954), common social security provision (1955) and a passport union (1957) allowing Nordic citizens to travel freely within the Nordic area. Plans to develop integration through the establishment of an economic area were discussed throughout the 1960s, but these efforts failed. By way of compensation, a Nordic Council of Ministers was established in 1972.(9)

With the foundation of the Council of Ministers, the state-to-state nature of Nordic co-operation became more apparent. In essence, this co-operation is comprehended as a quite intense but informal pattern of social and cultural interaction as well as a we-feeling among Nordic citizens. The latter aspects amount to a transnational 'we', a joint identity and a kind of second order nationalism that extends beyond the usual confines of the respective nation-states. Iver Neumann articulates the relationship by arguing that 'the Nordics are liminars to one another. They are neither simply "us" nor "them", they are something in between, something grey area-like'.(10) Neumann also stresses that borders are constantly reproduced between the Nordic societies. Enmity has not given way to a complete and uncomplicated picture of amity, and yet the Nordics still tend to feel 'at home' with

each other. This feeling of forming a close-knit community is not dependent on the formal structures of Nordic co-operation, but rather constitutes something that envelops these structures. Although less visible, it is nonetheless an important, if not the most important, part of nordicity.

Norden has assumed, in a number of ways, a kind of domestic quality; on occasions there exist almost no borders at all in cultural and institutional terms. Due partly to the fact that it has stayed aloof from Europeanness, the Nordic configuration has been able to establish a constructive and harmonious relationship to nationhood in each of the countries concerned. Civil servants, for instance, can pick up the phone and talk to their counterparts in other Nordic countries almost as easily as they communicate with their own co-nationals. In this respect, the Nordic configuration clearly stands out as a deviation from the ordinary, sovereignty-geared forms of political space. It has been able to achieve quite permeable internal borders, although one should add that this applies first and foremost to the sphere of mental and identity-related borders. The Nordic 'we' that extends, as an idea and identity, across national borders has not been particularly conducive to economic integration, cross-border regionalization or other spatial practices. In other words, its transactional borders have not been very malleable.

In as much as the Nordic configuration has no explicit centre, its external borders also display a degree of openness. It is, however, possible to argue – as Sverre Jervell does – that the Nordic sphere has historically been delimited by the German and the Russian spheres.(11) Uffe Østergård follows the same reasoning when he claims that the idea of the Nordic group has been largely based on defining a space of its own in relation to Germany and Central Europe.(12) Øystein Sørensen and Bo Stråth follow a related pattern of thought, but apply a less geographical departure and approach to the delineation of borders. In their view, the Nordic 'model' represents a particular variant of Enlightenment modernization. They depict ***Norden*** as being part of a larger civilizational sphere, although it is linked up on terms of its own. In particular, they emphasize ***Norden***'s success in avoiding the extremes of Fascism and Bolshevism, noting

that ‘in Scandinavia the tension between freedom and equality was better contained than elsewhere’.(13)

Such an approach explains why the word ‘model’ is so frequently used to describe the essence of ***Norden*** and nordicity.(14) The labeling and delineation of ***Norden*** within the modern project is part and parcel of the view that it represents a particularly successful variant of modernity, consistent with high levels of growth and welfare, planning and other forms of rationality. It has been depicted as being ***avant garde***, an exemplary vehicle for delivering progress and a kind of ‘third way’ between hard-core capitalism and eastern socialism.(15) This in turn implies that the East and the West function as key co-ordinates upon which the definition and anchoring of the Nordic case rest. ***Norden*** is not seen as a negation but an improved version of the other variants of modernity.

In Stråth’s view, nordicity is not an element that is there ***in addition*** to the (primary) national identities. Rather, it is ***built into*** what it means to be a Dane, Swede, Norwegian, Finn or Icelander. In this regard, argues Stråth, ***Norden*** functions ‘as a demarcation from Europe, a democratic, Protestant and egalitarian North against a Catholic, conservative and capitalistic Europe’.(16) This move of singling out Nordic specificity and portraying it as something distinct from Russian, German or more general European ‘otherness’ corresponds to commonly held views. The idea of ***Norden*** as a ‘third’, a separate entity neither part of this nor that, is deeply embedded in the debates on the basic meaning of nordicity.(17) ***Norden*** is thus singled out as a rather special group of small, highly developed and peaceful nation-states with a detached relationship to the ***Realpolitik*** logic as well as the dominant European centres of power. This image of ***Norden*** as a kind of ‘anti-Europe’, a sphere beyond the ordinary rules of inter-state relations, was strengthened during the years of the Cold War.(18) The bifurcated setting of that period allowed the Nordic actors to depict themselves as a neutral or semi-neutral group of countries with a somewhat detached relationship to the blocs and major areas of East-West tension.

In sum, therefore, ***Norden*** has to a large degree been pitted against neighbouring countries and Europe more generally. The argumentation varies, but the effort has invariably been one of singling out an outside

and an inside. It is the depiction of ***Norden*** as distinct from its environs which has allowed it to turn into a dominant spatial representation and a set of temporal and spatial practices in Europe's North. Its internal closeness and coherence are a function of an external environment perceived in terms of 'them', a sphere quite different from the Nordic one.

Linking Up With a New Environment

The upkeep of the Nordic configuration has become increasingly problematic in an era where Europeanness and nordicity are no longer so easily identifiable as two distinct spheres. Danish, Finnish and Swedish membership of the European Union already indicate clearly that the relationship can no longer be comprehended in basically exclusive terms. A majority of the Nordic states now apply strategies of participation instead of trying to stay aloof, although the establishment of a negotiated relationship still appears to entail a number of difficulties. In some of the campaigns against EU-membership, ***Norden*** may still be represented as a alternative sphere to be kept separate from the 'inferior' EU and continuously developed on terms of its own. It may be observed, however, that these conceptualizations of ***Norden*** are not broadly shared, and generally fail to find a positive echo on the part of the respective Nordic establishments.

The question nevertheless remains: what is ***Norden*** now that the confrontation in Central Europe has ended and the key concepts underpinning the formation of political space in Europe at large are those of democracy, human rights and a market economy? One of the major issues to clarify here is whether ***Norden's*** status as a separate sphere of co-operation was premised on the Cold War. If so, can the marker of nordicity endure now that the rigidity of that period has given way to co-operative constellations on a broader European scale? Are there elements in the Nordic configuration that will allow it to adapt to the new, less bounded conditions, or is 'the land of the future' destined either to shrink into something rather insignificant or perhaps to disappear altogether?

Various Nordic actors have recently been forced to ponder these questions. In this regard, opinions have frequently appeared more polarized in the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish debates than they have in Finland and Iceland. This is perhaps because nordicity has occupied a more central and bordered place as part of the national 'self' within the former grouping than it has in the latter. Although the differences are not very systematic, there nevertheless seems to be some grounds to argue that the three Scandinavian peoples are more prone to think in categories of 'either-or'. They are inclined to feel that nordicity has to be traded for Europeanness – or preserved as a separate sphere of its own – if ***Norden*** is to have a future, whereas the two categories are not so sharply distinguishable as opposites when viewed through Finnish or Icelandic eyes. Rather, the Finnish or Icelandic approach appears to be one of 'both-and'. The Finnish ***Norden*** has not been as strictly bordered as the Scandinavian one.(19) This has made it possible to perceive Finland's membership of the European Union as the next step - or another route - on the road towards Europe. In other words, membership is not comprehended as implying the abandonment of ***Norden***, but as a continuation and a follow-up of earlier moves of integration. It represents, in the Finnish case, a fulfilment of something that started with Finland becoming part of Nordic co-operation.

The Icelandic ***Norden*** is also less bounded, or, at least, bordered in a different manner. Nordic affiliation provides Iceland – for reasons of history – with an important anchorage. It operates, above all, as a counter-weight to a heavy dose of Atlanticism. The relationship to Europe, and the European Union in particular, remains somewhat detached, but this does not imply that Iceland would feel the need to preserve – for the sake of nordicity – barriers against European influences to the same extent as the Scandinavians-proper. This is because Europeanness and nordicity are basically seen as complementary representations of political space.(20)

Norden has been called upon to accept that it is no longer as hegemonic and detached as it used to be. It stands profoundly challenged in having to compete for space with representations that are explicitly intended to lower the borders around the Baltic and Barents Seas and in Europe more generally. One aspect of the

process of adaptation and de-bordering consists of reducing ***Norden***'s internal orientation. Change along these lines has already come about without much effort, as intra-Nordic co-operation has been significantly crowded out by an increased emphasis on the EU.(21) To compensate for this decline, co-operation with the external environment has been increased. Nordic co-operation and European integration have been taken to be complementary in character, as indicated for example by the efforts to square the tension between the Schengen agreement and the Nordic passport union. Here, the aim has been one of including Norway, a non-member of the Union, among the Schengen countries. More generally, the task has been comprehended as one of linking the Nordic entity with a contemporary European governance made up of a three-level game between regions, national governments and European institutions.(22)

Whilst some successes have been scored, attempts to forge a co-ordinated Nordic approach in relation to the Baltic countries and the EU have often been less than successful. The Nordic group has managed to achieve some degree of joint co-operation with the Baltic States since the early 1990s, mainly in the form of regular joint meetings of foreign ministers. Previously known as 5+3, this forum has recently been renamed, and is now known simply as the group of eight. However, the November 2000 meeting of the Nordic Council set clear limits to this process of integration and de-bordering by rejecting a proposal to admit the Baltic States to full membership of the organization.

The reforming and de-bordering of the Nordic constellation is not only apparent in the sphere of inter-state relations, but applies also to some societal and non-statist spheres. This is clearly evidenced in the changes introduced by the Nordic Associations. New associations have recently been established in the Baltic countries and Russia (St. Petersburg, Murmansk and Kaliningrad). Interestingly enough, these newcomers have been allowed to join the already existing associations, and have done so on basically equal terms. They have thus been comprehended as being quite close to the Nordic 'family'. The emergence of these new associations bears witness to something rather important. Namely, that nordicity is moving beyond its previous boundaries, be they cultural, legal or institutional. ***Norden*** has thus

availed itself of the possibility to reach out and compete for space outside the borders of the Nordic countries themselves. These borders no longer stand as outer limits, but operate as zones of contact enabling ***Norden*** to reach out and link up with other actors. The changes introduced are truly profound in that they deprive the Nordic configuration of its previous modern clarity and unambiguous character (to the extent that it possessed one in the first place). With the demise of its previous well-bounded essence, the Nordic configuration increasingly turns into one constellation among many. Rather than being 'half-in and half-out' as it used to be, it now nuzzles up rather close to 'Europe'.(23)

The reforms introduced and the re-orientation of Nordic co-operation may have given the configuration some new life, but has it been rescued for good and provided with a durable position within an increasingly pluralist setting? This is hardly the case. Much of the evidence points towards an uncertain future, for whilst nordicity is in high value and continues to occupy an essential part of the various national 'selfs' in the Nordic countries, the efforts of translating these strengths into operative political clout seemingly leave much to be desired. A considerable number of voices have argued that ***Norden*** has become redundant and the word 'crisis' keeps echoing around.(24) Having been better than Europe, ***Norden*** is now quite often comprehended as being inferior. No longer so obviously 'the land of future', ***Norden*** is frequently called to compete with new initiatives that have seen the light of the day in northern Europe, such as Baltic Sea or Barents co-operation. It thus remains uncertain whether the Nordic configuration will be able to pass the test of time.

The return of Northernness

The re-invention of the North is, in part, rooted in other contemporary spatial and temporal discourses. The unifying approach to tackling the Baltic Sea region and the establishment of the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) provided a good starting point for the reconfiguration of political space in northern Europe. The Norwegian initiative concerning

a Barents-Euro Arctic Region (BEAR) contributed further to these challenges by coining a new northern North, which, although premised on a restrictive reading of northernness, is a distinctly European configuration with a rather flexible eastern border. Moreover, the discourse on a far broader and more co-operative Arctic region constitutes part of the same pattern, although it severs – in the first place – borderlines that have been running across the Arctic itself. It is the NDI, however, which constitutes the single principal effort to introduce a wider vision of the European North. It does not only comprise the old Nordic grouping, but also incorporates parts of Russia and the Baltic States. In some visions, the southern shore of the Baltic and even Scotland are included. However, it is the enrollment of northwestern Russia within such a neo-North, thereby binding parts of Russia to an EU-Europe, which stands at the core of the initiative.

One has to refrain from too far-reaching conclusions, since the NDI is still in its infancy. An abstraction has been turned into a diplomatic initiative, which has successfully evolved into a set of discourses. The concept landed officially on the EU's agenda in December 1997, when the Luxembourg Council obliged the Commission to prepare a report on the Northern Dimension. A year later, such a report was introduced at the Vienna European Council, which decided that the European Union now had a Northern Dimension requiring further development by the Commission. The European Parliament, meanwhile, prepared a report of its own. It stressed, to some extent in contrast to the views of the Commission, that the Northern Dimension should have a regional role, for example in creating and strengthening cross-border co-operation in line with the Euroregions in central Europe.(25)

A ministerial conference, uniting representatives from the Nordic EU member states, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Russia and the Baltic countries, was held in Helsinki in November 1999. A variety of functional issues pertaining to energy, raw materials, the environment, border controls, employment, transport and infrastructure provided much of the substance of the meeting. The EU Summit in Helsinki in December 1999 took stock of the results, and the Commission then charted out an Action Plan, subsequently approved at the Feira summit in June 2000.(26) Sweden organized, during its presidency, another meeting of foreign ministers in Luxemburg in May 2001 in order to

review the results and Denmark hosted a meeting on the question of Kaliningrad during spring 2000 in Copenhagen. The EU Commission issued a communication entitled ***The EU and Kaliningrad*** in January 2001.

Northernness has thus been proposed and accepted as a means of qualifying some aspects of the European Union. Round one has brought northernness onto the EU's agenda, albeit so far in a rather diffuse manner. The North figures both as a northern North encompassing the Barents and Arctic dimensions, and as a wider vision extending to the Baltic Sea region. Some further steps will be taken, and it remains to be seen how far they will carry. The initiative is still far from having reached any self-conscious status or identity of its own. There is a set of discourses but no clear-cut region, polity or budget line within the Union that would affirm and delineate it in a factual sense. Northernness may still turn out to be one of the ideas coined and launched into the debate that in the end amount to very little in terms of spatial practices. The impact will perhaps not reach beyond some local effects. The 'otherness' of the North and the way in which the marker has been traditionally comprehended may remain so prominent that no firm and positive linkage to Europe will emerge.(27)

Nonetheless, it can be observed that what used to be a blank spot on the Union's mental map is getting contours of its own following the entry of Finland and Sweden in 1995.(28) It has been accepted that northernness is a sphere of its own and one that requires specific policies. The cardinal representation utilized is not – as might be expected on the basis of previous constellations – that of westernness. The discourse is not about the West occupying new ground by pushing easternness further towards the East and northernness to the North. It is also notable that the alternative chosen has not been nordicity, a concept which has traditionally been exclusive rather than inclusive in essence.(29) Nordicity has not been on level with the other cardinal markers on the compass. It would also be more political and would not serve as a platform for linking simultaneously up with 'Europe' and the East, since nordicity is limited to the traditional co-operation between the Nordic countries. Instead, the new discourse makes use of a marker that has long been at the fringes of a system dominated by

East-West rivalry. The new reinvented northernness is broader, less political, more differentiated and, most importantly, European.

The launch of the NDI indicates that Finland, at least, believes in the potential inherent in the old/new image of northernness and feels at home with a certain marginality.(30) The initiative embraces the idea of a multiperspectival Europe and feeds, more broadly, on the contemporary conditions of globalization and regionalization. The diplomatic process now set in motion also resonates with a broader discourse. Edward James Crockford, editor of the new business journal ***Northern Enterprises*** argues that 'northern Europe is pop'.(31) He is confident that the label of northernness – with its underlying claim of a commonly shared culture and heritage – will carry a commercial publication. Further proof is offered by Yngve Bergquist, who runs a hotel built from ice in Jukkasjärvi in northernmost Sweden. In an interview to ***Scanorama***, Bergquist states that the building of the hotel has changed the character of a previously rather quiet place: 'Winter used to be a problematic time here. Now it is our main attraction'.(32)

The emergence of northernness in a European context entails a considerable dose of discursive power. It allows 'Europe' to be defined from yet another perspective. It is hence not surprising that this endeavour is also to some extent controversial. The NDI, for instance, downgrades both the Barents and the Baltic Sea vehicles of co-operation into sub-categories of a broader and clearly European northernness. This move is not entirely in harmony with the Danish and Swedish efforts – apparent since the start of the 1990s – to elevate Balticism into a central departure for region-building in northern Europe.(33)

Norden, for its part, is vulnerable to the return of northernness. Its aspiration for (relative) exclusivity means that it needs to stay apart, yet how can it do so if ***Norden*** also becomes a sub-category of a broader northern constellation? The challenge is a difficult one, since efforts to stay aloof or, for that matter, too harsh rebuttals of the invitation to merge with northernness would render nordicity open to accusations of denying its own roots. Northernness operates in terms of both-and. It aims to reach out and re-link to 'Europe', rather than restricting itself in the way that ***Norden*** used to do. Northernness aims at drawing on shared experiences rather than being constructed against some

category of ‘otherness’. It can embrace markers such as ***Norden*** and operate as a very wide policy framework that also encompasses the Baltic Sea, Barents and Arctic vehicles of regional co-operation. In this situation, it does not follow that nordicity will be able to insulate itself. Indeed, the return of northernness as a concept that both aims to restore lost unity and calls for a negotiated relationship with ‘Europe’ leaves ***Norden*** with little option but to link up and to accept a symbiotic ‘both-and’ relationship with the new marker. This is despite the fact that such an ‘outside-in’ type of move (if seen from a Nordic perspective) appears to deprive ***Norden*** of much that previously justified its existence.

The more general reason for ***Norden***’s decline lies in the fact that it is quite border-dependent and closely attached – despite of being in some ways a countermove – to the logic of ***Realpolitik***. It has been feeding on the existence of quite distinct divisions - those of the East and the West, NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as capitalism versus socialism. ***Norden*** thus encounters difficulties when faced by a graded political landscape with rather vague borders and a new cardinal marker aspiring to shape Europe’s North in spatial terms. ***Norden*** has suffered from the post-Cold War situation, which has brought neither the replacement of old divisions nor the emergence of new ones. Northernness, for its part, operates on different premises. It aims at undermining previous borderlines, including those essential for the old ***Norden***. Northernness is clearly premised on inclusive moves in endeavouring at reaching out, in form of the NDI, both in a southern (central Europe) and eastern (Russia) direction. The initiative is tantamount to de-bordering as it aspires for a softening of the external borders of the European Union. It is part and parcel of recent debates on a new Europe with flexible and transparent borders and merges with spaces that are both ‘in‘ and ‘out‘.(34) Above all, northernness does not aspire for a distinct sphere of its own but forms an integral part of a broader European setting.

A contest in the margins

The return of the North can be comprehended as the revival of an image that used to label a considerable area of Europe prior to the Napoleonic wars. This development raises interesting question as to the relationship between the current neo-North and its ancient predecessor. In order to clarify this relationship, it is necessary to review some of the northern narratives used in the past and to expose the continuums and interruptions in the genealogy of the North. How has the northern image been used to outline various temporal and spatial co-ordinates? What kind of political spaces have been carved out on the basis of the northern marker during past centuries?

Back in the mid-seventeenth century, the North was imagined as a political arena – a kind of sub-playground of power politics. The prime actors in the game were Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Poland and Russia, at that time all major European powers in their own right. The usage of the North to outline political space formed an integral part of the then dominant discourse on international relations, one premised on a balance of power between empires and other major actors. International relations were understood as a kind of Newtonian system with its own mechanical equilibrium. This perspective was applied to Europe as a whole but included also a number of subsystems, among them the northern one.(35) The North thus had a role in outlining some aspects of Europe. This usage of the North as a marker dominated the political language of the entire eighteenth century, before fading out during the mid-nineteenth century. In the eyes of contemporaries, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Copenhagen and Stockholm were all more or less part of the same political scene. For example, when Alexander I intervened in order to help Europe subdue Napoleon, he was seen as arriving from the North rather than the East.(36)

This image was blurred and downgraded during the Enlightenment, which bolstered and extended the position of easternness at the expense of the North. As Larry Wolff has demonstrated, Eastern Europe was invented during the late eighteenth century, when a variety of travelers and academics of the Enlightenment found and defined a space between the Occident (West) and the Orient - a space carrying characteristics of both Europe and Asia. The co-ordinates of this eastern Europe consisted of St. Petersburg in the North and Crimea, the Balkans and Azov in the South.(37) It covered Russia, Poland,

Hungary and the Balkans, although it was understood as a cultural zone rather than a political sphere. For westerners, Eastern Europe represented – as is still the case today – a backward society whose existence allowed them to prove discursively their own superiority whilst locating an ‘other’ to be patronized. Since easternness was loaded with rather negative connotations, it could not serve as a basis for positive identification for those who fell into this newly defined sphere.

The transition from the dominance of the North to the broadening of the East spanned many decades. Given the choice between belonging to the North or the East, a considerable number of people still saw themselves as northern European at the start of the nineteenth century. The North also continued to dominate the writing of history, which remained quite state-centric up until this period.(38) Despite entering the discourse as an attribute of Europe, easternness did not immediately turn into a cardinal signifier outlining political space. The East and the North were initially not exclusive poles and the boundary between them remained vague. Whilst recognizing that these two markers overlapped, Larry Wolff claims that the North retreated rather quickly.(39) Robin Okey, on the other hand, maintains that the transition period was in fact much longer. The Crimean War, it seems, strengthened perceptions of Russia as an eastern rather than a northern actor, although the process remained incomplete at least until 1917, when Soviet Russia was excluded – and excluded itself - from the rest of Europe.(40) Although the Second World War did blur the picture to some extent, the Cold War re-confirmed the easternness of the Soviet Union. The imagining of a separate eastern Europe and the drawing of lines between Slavic and non-Slavic lands contributed to a relocation of the North.(41)

As Berndt Henningsen has demonstrated, northernness has had a further use as an identity marker. This can be traced all the way back to the sixteenth century, when the idea of the North was adopted to outline essential features of Sweden (then basically a state) and Swedish identity. This understanding flourished further during the late seventeenth century. Olof Rudbeck, a professor of Uppsala University, is singled out as a key myth-builder by virtue of his four-volume work ***Atlantica,*** which did much to attach the new northern attribute to

Sweden. In the words of Henningsen, Rudbeck's goal 'was to prove the political and moral superiority and the superior civilization of the North in general and of Sweden in particular'. In order to justify such claims, he devised a new creation story which located Paradise in the North. Rudbeck also applied familiar images from classical literature, for example by identifying the North with Plato's legendary sunken ***Atlantis***. The claim that Sweden was the original home of all the Goths and that they had emigrated further to the South, the East and the West after having inhabited Swedish soil, added to the story. Sweden was thus depicted in terms of a ***vagina gentium***, or cradle of humanity.(42)

These Rudbeckian moves were quite successful in the sense that Gothicism figured among the Swedish foundational myths for centuries. The Gothic theory also claimed that the Scandinavians and the Germans shared common origins.(43) The North was also provided with connotations of a true centre in the context of Europe-making – in the other words, the North was Europeanized. The Rudbeckian North had the function of legitimating the power of the ruling dynasty and was therefore political in essence.

The background for the emergence of such narratives is obvious. Sweden had achieved the status of a European great power during the Thirty Years War and practically dominated the Baltic World. The accrued posture called for the coining of myths providing meaning to the policies pursued. The task was not simply to justify Sweden's role in the Baltic region, but also to stress values relevant ***vis-à-vis*** central Europe. The Rudbeckian version of the Creation Story corresponded to the needs of the situation. In his book, Rudbeck laid the ground for a new foundational myth, and invented new mega-narratives that bolstered the position and meaning of Sweden. These narratives contained several elements defining what Sweden was basically about. For example, the metaphor of Louis XIV as the Sun King was reproduced by depicting Charles XI of Sweden as the King of the North Star.(44)

After the battle of Poltava in 1708, Sweden lost its position as a great power. This not only impacted on the political map but also left similar marks in the minds of people. The northern myth, however, remained part of the discourse, receiving yet another emphasis. The Gothic myth

continued to battle with claims concerning the eminence of the North, or the employment of Sweden in that context, but beside Europeanization of the North also features of northernization the North appeared to Swedish discourse. Northernness was seen as carving out a sphere located in the northernmost North, whereby ‘the experience of nature and the mysticism of the northern lands became a major element and an expression of the political and social self-concept’.(45) Northern nature was provided with transcendental features, the duality of eternal light and eternal darkness being employed to underline its divine characteristics. According to Montesquieu‘s famous theory, nature and climate do not only mould the characteristics of people, but also the essence of the political system. The wild northern scenery was thus depicted as the source of Gothic values, that is freedom but also religious innocence and piety. In the minds of contemporary observers, all these features made the North - with Sweden as its prime representation - superior in relation to the South. Despite the decline in political status, claims of moral superiority survived, providing a breeding-ground for a variety of Swedish foundational myths. One variant of this can clearly be seen in the Nordic discourse about the superiority of the welfare state model.

In any case, northernness remained an important aspect of the Swedish state identity. It provided connotations of naturalness in legitimizing dynastic power, whilst also signaling qualities that were seen as making Sweden politically and morally superior to other realms. A whole variety of northern qualities were also invoked to define the Swedish people, although not yet in the form of laying the ground for the construction of a national identity. Whilst it was primarily used to bolster Sweden’s character as a state, the northern marker did also function as a source of bonds and unifying elements with some nearby nations and states. This is to say that the application of northernness was not just restrained to the northern North. It reached further out in both southern and western directions, although Sweden obviously remained the point of gravity. What northernness did seem to lack was any eastern dimension. No common sphere was outlined to link Scandinavia, the Gothic lands, and Russia.

Romantic Gaze Towards the North

The North apparently underwent a considerable decline in status due to the increasing prominence given to the East during the second half of the nineteenth century. (45) This decline in status left the North available for other purposes during the era of Romanticism, and a new northern myth was employed constructing as part of the construction of national identities in Scandinavia as well as in Germany and Britain.(46)

Jöran Mjöberg distinguishes between three different phases in this usage of northern myths. Initially, during the first half of the nineteenth century, the myths were mostly nostalgic and romantic and were used to construct Scandinavian or German unity. In the second half of the century, the myths were used to support a more liberal and utopian dimension of national identities. Finally, during the early twentieth century, northern myths were increasingly used for populist, sometimes even racist purposes. The clearest example of the latter was the Nazi use of selected northern themes to support claims of racial superiority. As a result, the northern myths were pushed aside after the Second World War.(47) They fell into disrepute and held their ground only in Scandinavia, although even there in a much altered form. Northern motifs thus became exclusively Nordic in the aftermath of the Second World War.

The early nineteenth-century romantic myth of the North invoked images of a misty land full of mythical heroes. The basic tenets were much the same in all cases, although in Britain Celtic poems were at the centre of the new narrative whereas in the German world it was the Gothic heroes that fulfilled this role. In Scandinavia, the Old Norse of the Viking era grew in reputation through the medium of heroic stories like the ***Edda*** Saga. This nostalgia for a past glory assumed numerous expressions in the literature and fine arts of the nineteenth century. Helmeted Viking soldiers, with their swords and spears, and mythic northern gods were seen through a new romantic prism.(48) The roots of Scandinavian identity were no longer linked to the Christian tradition; instead, the old pagan past was elevated. The Gothic past had already been present prior to this new twist, but the barbaric past had then been regarded as something shameful in the context of the classical

and Christian traditions. The new representation was about a glorious past, a superiority of the North in relation to the South, with the Gothic period having stood out as the then centre of civilization.

The new usage did not only aspire to add some Nordic cultural motifs to established representations but was also aimed at laying the ground for new identities. A distinctly political dimension was added to the alleged return of the North's lost golden past. The respective movements seeking to construct a unified Germany and a unified Scandinavia were riding on the same foundational myths. The new Nordic one was equated with the ancient spirit of freedom, fostering courage and preserving national independence, all of which can be seen as representing patriotic values.(49) This discourse on northernness contained a kind of double move; as well as narrowing down the North to ***Norden***, it still also represented a kind of Europeanization of the North, through the argument that the North constituted a true Europe.

More particularly, the North was used for the first time to create bonds between the Scandinavian kingdoms. According to Henningsen, the old Gothic myth did not disappear, despite now having looser linkages to Sweden; it was just de-Swedicised with Swedish Gothicism being turned into Nordic Scandinavianism.(50) In view of the scant success achieved in this regard, the same Nordic myths later came to function as a source of distinct national identities - particularly in Sweden - during the second half of the nineteenth century. Although the Scandinavian emphasis did not entirely disappear during this latter period, the discourse pertaining to northernness was again primarily restricted to the national scene.

There are several examples of the North being employed in order to define Sweden: the Swedish national anthem ***Du fjällhöga Nord*** (You Mountainous North) from 1844; ***Nordiska Museet*** as a label for the Swedish national museum in 1873; and the so-called Nordic games of 1901-1926, which portrayed winter sports as an expression of Scandinavian identity at its best.(51) Another remarkable expression of the use of northernness in national narratives can be found in the school of Scandinavian painting called 'The Northern light', which elevated the image of northern nature with its white nights into a symbol of the nation. The movement also idealized and stereotyped

the picture of country life, which was purported to represent the nation's soul. The aim of such an idealization was to narrow down the high North and make it available for nationalist purposes.(52)

The employment of the high North within a national and Nordic context has been a recurrent feature ever since. The 'true' northernness has thus provided the ground for a variety of images used in a spatially differentiated manner. The Nordic configuration has subsequently lost most of its nationalistic features but also some of its links to the old Nordic myths. It can hence be comprehended as an increasingly post-nationalist construction.(53) As argued earlier, the welfare state model has stood out as the main attribute of ***Norden*** during the post-Second World War years. A relationship loaded with tensions can be traced between ***Norden*** and the North, although the strains have been less explicit over time. ***Norden***'s civilizational claims have allowed it to be distinguished from the North as well, a move that has contributed to northernness being severed from its previous linkages to 'Europe'. The North has, in this context, been provided with connotations of extreme peripherality - darkness, winter and barren, primitive conditions. The emergence of ***Norden*** thus contributed to the northernization of the North, which has been transformed into a liminal marker and relegated to a sphere outside the Enlightenment in order to serve as ***Norden***'s other.

Norden has therefore been quite dependent on border-drawing vis-à-vis the North. As Brit Bergreen has observed in the Swedish context, the features associated with ***Norden*** have been more frequently found south of the ***limes norrlandicus***, a symbolic, cultural and to some extent also economic line that divides Northern Europe into two different spheres: a truly northern one and another more to the south.(54) The features most commonly associated with the northern side of this divide have been suppressed, whereas those located to the south have been elevated and utilized in representations depicting what ***Norden*** is basically about.

Northernizing the North

The Northern motifs have not only been used in grounding Scandinavian identities, but have also had a role in the cases of Russia

and Finland. Russia was depicted as a northern realm already during the early modern period. However, the myth of the North really only emerged in Russia during the era of Romanticism. In this regard, the defeat of the Napoleonic Grand Army in 1812 gave rise to the metaphor of winter as a particularly Russian season. A ‘poetry of winter’ subsequently flourished in Russian literature. Around this time, St. Petersburg was often referred to as the Northern Palmyra, a name derived from the mythical Syrian city of the same name. This Russian North was clearly identified with winter, darkness and a cold climate; in this respect, it differed from the tales of Scandinavian romanticism.(55) Even during the Soviet period, some remnants of this romantic image of the North - and particularly the northernmost North - survived. Under Stalin, for instance, the myth of a heroic Soviet Union challenging the extreme conditions of the North was constructed, with the scene of the drama depicted as the ‘Red Arctic’.(56) These features of the Soviet-Russian discourse represented northenization as well an easternization of the North, in which northernness also acquired some positive connotations.

Finland constitutes a case of its own as far as narratives on the North are concerned, although some influences from the Scandinavian discourse can be traced. Northernization of the North has been an integral part of Finnish identity politics since the Swedish era, although Finland hardly had an identity of its own prior to the partition of Sweden in 1809. From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, northernness assumed a dual role in the construction of a Finnish national identity. Nordic and Scandinavian bonds were kept open, but nothing similar to the Swedish ***limes norrlandicus*** can be traced. This is because in the Finnish case, the elevation of northernness was not there in order to assert the superiority of a state or nation in relation to the South. Rather, it had the function of expressing the true nature of Finland as a nation (the state emerged in an unambiguous form only in 1917). In this regard, a myth of a pioneering people, one feeling at ease with northernness, was constructed. It did not struggle with any outside actor but sought purpose and meaning in its northern location. According to the constitutive myth, the Finns have - despite a cold climate, persistent crop failure and widespread poverty - succeeded in overcoming their difficulties. They have managed - the story goes - to remain a proud and honest nation in the North. This kind of narrative

resonates with an early nationalistic rhetoric that idealized the common people. The harsh environment, it was claimed, hardened the nature of the Finns, fostering both humility and persistence, whilst also giving scope to claim the moral high ground.(57)

Northernness has kept its place in Finnish identity, where it remains associated with idealized images of a wild and untouched nature. The endeavour has not been one of drawing lines and attempting to deny the peripherality of the country. Instead, a certain detachment and wilderness has continued to define the Finnish relationship to the rest of Europe. Although some details have changed, the late nineteenth-century image of a land of never-ending forests and lakes still provides the country with a certain specificity.(58) The foundational myth was based on the view that nature shapes the people. The northern location is thus seen as distinguishing the Finns from other European peoples, perhaps most especially the Swedes. Swedish influences are depicted as having introduced features of western civilization to Finland, yet the national movement obviously sought to construct Finnishness as something distinct from Swedishness. Northernness offered good ground for such a border-drawing. Although mystification of northern nature has clearly been a feature of Swedish identity-building, this aspiration has been far more pronounced in the case of Finland.

If, on the one hand, a northern location implied standing aloof from civilized Europe, the uncivilized and wild North nevertheless stood for something dynamic and respectable. The constitutive rhetoric assumed a clearly racial dimension during the inter-war period, when, to take one example, the success of Finnish athletics was interpreted as demonstrating some of the qualities of the Finnish race rather than resulting from training or other factors.(59) These racist interpretations vanished entirely in the post-Second World War years. At the same time, moreover, narratives increasingly escaped official control and took a turn of their own, finding expression for example in pop songs, movies and anecdotes. These people-oriented interpretations turned poverty, hard drinking and taciturnity into national virtues.(60) Finland’s economic success – particularly visible in the 1980s and more recently – undermined many previously central elements in the national story and paved the way for new ones. The end of the Cold War and the

new linkages to Europe, mainly in the form of the EU-membership, have further fuelled this process.

Nordicity has also been long been part of narratives on Finnish identity. The Finnish Swedes in particular associated themselves strongly with Scandinavianism during the nineteenth century. However, nordicity appears to have assumed a somewhat different, less bordered meaning in Finland. Unlike in Scandinavia, Nordic elements were used primarily to link Finland up with the West and separate it from the East - i.e. the function of border-drawing against the South or the West was not so apparent.(61) Although the Nordic welfare model has been part of the Finnish self-definition during the last few decades, nordicity has lost some of its value in Finnish narratives following the end of the Cold War. This is because membership of the EU anchors Finland firmly in the West and does the job of border-drawing towards the East even more convincingly than affiliation to ***Norden***. The growing salience of rightist values and emphasis on integration, as well as the importance of global markets, implies that the Nordic welfare model is now held in lower esteem.(62)

In its place, new elements have been added to the national story, with ***Nokia*** and success on global markets providing essential building blocks. The ***Nokia*** story represents, in this perspective, a very different move. It too is a success story, but not in relation to the challenges posed by a northern location. The northern landscape has lost its key constitutive posture and been redefined as a base for high technology production aimed at conquering European and other markets. In this way, the North is opened up and serves as a frame and a site for departures of self-fulfilment in a rather broad international context. The demise of the Nordic identity has thus left Finland open to new interpretations, whilst the decline of previous border-drawing has paved the way also for new depictions of northernness.

Northern in the Plural

As the preceding analysis demonstrates, there have been several variations on the northern theme during the last four centuries. These variations share a number of common elements, yet also display

important differences. The more historical narratives on northernness, most notably the Gothic myth, implied participation in the contest for centrality in Europe. In this regard, they seem to have been relatively successful in turning the North into a broadly recognized marker of European political space. The northernization of the North, by contrast, implied a withdrawal from the European scene. The first moves along these lines date back at least to the eighteenth century. In this connection, northernness was employed as a move of exclusion and detachment during the construction of national identities. A tendency towards northernization is clearly discernible in the Finnish and Russian narratives and traces of it could be found from the Swedish narratives too, although in all cases peripherality was given some positive connotations. Leaning on northernness implied assuming a relatively favorable position in the semi-periphery. Consequently, it meant staying aloof from any notions concerning barbarism or a totally backward location.

All these of these narratives can be seen as identity stories employed in order to define the spatial and temporal co-ordinates of a state or a nation. However, they have varied considerably in terms of their articulation of the past, and it is hard to discern any clear unifying elements. The oldest Rudbeckian narrative, for instance, was based on the Bible, whereas the romantic North emphasized the mythical Norsemen (although the Gothic myth did link the two stories to some extent). The Nordic narrative has carried at least some echoes of such a distant past, but has basically been anchored in the recent era of social democracy, economic success and peaceful development. Images of a distant past are especially vague in the case of the Finnish foundational narratives, although some influences may be traced to the ***Kalevala*** mythology (Finno-Ugric myth) and the stories elevating the pioneering spirit of Finnish peasants.(63) In sum, a clear difference exists between the Europeanizing and northernizing discourses on the North; the northernized North appears to lack a distinct past narrative, and possesses nothing comparable to the Gothic myths of the Europeanized North.

What are the spatial dimensions of the narratives employed? It appears that most of them are political in essence and thus used in order to define a state or a political nation. The question arises,

however, as to whether they just had the function of defining a territorial state or pertained to a much wider North. In this respect, it seems that there was some discrepancy in the case of the eighteenth-century discourse. The North – if comprehended in a strict cartographic sense - was devoid of images of a northern nature; northernness, on the other hand, defined mostly Sweden but it also vaguely gave shape to a larger community of peoples sharing a Gothic past. In the nineteenth century, northernness defined a much larger political community - that of Scandinavia – although it was simultaneously used to define nations, individual states and a community of emerging nation-states. Although elements of the northern rhetoric were also present in Germany and Britain at this time, it can nonetheless be argued that the North was not yet altogether clearly delineated as a political space. In the case of twentieth-century ***Norden***, a distinct relationship is rather obvious. The emergence of a clearly defined Nordic grouping necessarily implied a more exclusive conception of northernness. Whereas the North of the heroic Norsemen was in many ways a fuzzy and open project, the Nordic variation emerged through closure. This conception of ***Norden*** as an exclusive space has prevailed until recent years.

How does the post-Cold War rhetoric on the North and northernness resonate with previous narratives premised on such a marker? It seems that nordicity and northernness increasingly appear in tandem, although some distinctions prevail. With the position of both the East and the West having been to some extent undermined following the end of the Cold War, northernness has been offered an opportunity to enhance its position. It neither aspires for a separate existence at some remote corner of Europe, nor aims at locating itself in a Europe that is already defined and fixed. Instead the northern marker has become a vehicle for partaking in a struggle for political space now that the standing of the two previously dominant coordinates and cartographic signs has diminished. Northernness aims to conquer space at the expense of East and West and aspires for the position of a cardinal marker of Europeanness. As such, it increasingly defines the meaning and position of a number of other representations, including the Nordic one.

This confrontation, however, tends to be rather soft and indirect. This is because northernness - particularly when purported to be something essentially European - operates in a rather smooth manner. It has certainly not achieved the position of a firmly grounded and well established representation. On the contrary, it is in many ways less real than ***Norden***. A Europe with northernness as one of its core constituents remains uncertain, visionary and at best in the making, although these ‘weaknesses‘ do not seem to play into the hands of nordicity. Northernness can to some extent lean on its history of having once competed for centrality, but above all, it purports itself as something new and exciting. ***Norden***, by contrast, is increasingly perceived as belonging to a Europe of the past.(64)

Pirjo Jukarainen has confirmed the existence of a broader discourse underpinning the Northern Dimension. Reviewing the debates in a Nordic scholarly journal, she concludes that ***Norden*** appears to have fewer and fewer advocates and summarises the discourse with the claim ‘***Norden*** is Dead - Long Live the Eastwards Faced Euro-North’.(65) ***Norden*** no longer seems to be equipped with the power to ***nordicize*** northernness and use border-drawing as a means of carving out a distinct place for itself. It thus appears that ***Norden*** will ultimately turn into something of a sub-category of a broader northern configuration. It may become far less distinct and statist than previously; indeed, it might have to adapt itself to a (neo)regional pattern of co-operation. Ideas along these lines have recently been presented by a group of ‘wise men’ established by the Nordic Council of Ministers in order to stake out a future for Nordic co-operation.

Conclusion

A comparison between past and present discourses on the North helps to shed light on the current, often parallel use of the Nordic and the northern markers and the encounter that follows. If the Nordic marker has remained largely unaltered until recently, it is increasingly challenged talk of a Northern Dimension and, more broadly, of a new northern Europe. The boundaries of the new region are somewhat diffuse, but that is not the crux of the issue. What the NDI rhetoric constructs and outlines is a neo-North, a regional construction that is spatially perhaps even more open and flexible than most of the other

new post-Cold War regional vehicles. Thus, whereas the Nordic spatial discourse has been exclusive and to some extent closed, the new North displays very different qualities.

It seems fairly obvious that the marker of northernness is being reinterpreted. The aim here is not just one of claiming a linkage to Europe, but also of turning northernness into one of the cardinal signs outlining Europeanness at large. The North aspires to a certain inclusive standing, although without fully abandoning its traditional peripherality and its 'real' self. Such aspirations are clearly embedded in the Northern Dimension Initiative as well as the more general discourse on the role of northernness in a European context. The neo-North coined during recent years expands in a variety of directions, and does so without explicitly leaning on the 'otherness' of the South. Instead, the North and the South are usually purported as being co-constitutive. Both are seen as defining their respective mega-regions, although the encounter is not very explicit as southernness has not (yet) reached out in the same way as northernness.

In general, one can say that the growing eminence of northernness does not contribute to any clear constellation premised on a bifurcated relationship between 'us' and 'them'. What is underway is not a process in which a configuration based on the North and the South as its cardinal markers would substitute the one premised on the centrality of the East and the West. The past is not returning in the sense that the constellations that were there prior to the Napoleonic wars would be on their way back. What seems to be there is simply the formation of a less crystallized and bifurcated constellation, with northernness adding to the plurality of Europeanness.

A fundamental problem pertaining to the current NDI is that it impacts upon spatial practices grounded largely in a functional and utilitarian reasoning and the identity-related aspects remain quite hidden. This is to say that the region-builders leaning on such a marker tend to appeal to joint problems such as pollution, crime or health on the one hand, and on the possibilities of utilising the rich resources of northern Russia on the other. No narrative has been coined in the context of the NDI that would aim at reconfiguring the past and linking into earlier historical experiences. There is nothing like the ***Hanse*** of the Baltic Sea-related discourse or the elevation of the ***Pomor*** period when

imagining a Barents region. Since there is no oviously identity-related rhetoric present in the discourse on the NDI, people do not feel that the matter is one of considerable urgency and relevance in relation to who ‘we’ are in the post-Cold War period. The top-down quality of the initiative further strengthens such impressions.

Moreover, there is no easily recognizable ‘otherness’ present in the discourse, since it is basically about inclusion and far less about exclusion. It resonates with broader discourses concerning globalization and localization and feeds on the need to re-draw the customary maps. The North has been seen as offering a tempting vision and providing anchorage for a set of discourses that is gradually becoming part of concrete spatial practices. Yet a number of linkages remain rather loose. This also applies to the relation between the North and the South as well as the relationship between the Nordic and the northern configuration but goes equally, for example, for the position of northernness in the Finnish identity project. There are still many that think of Finland as having finally found its way ‘home’ in being now part of the western camp, and northernness has not been brought in – despite the Northern Dimension initiative – as a marker that also defines Finland’s own position in the new EU-related constellation.

Northernness itself seems to harbor some plurality. There are certainly different views present as to its meaning and location, and in this sense northernness forms a forum and platform for different interpretations that clash and re-construct each other. The vigour that can to some extent be traced in the recent discourse on northernness may be explained by the fact that each of the participating states and nations can employ and project their own images. They may claim, in the context of the northern marker, that there is certain continuity. The marker allows them the utilization of their own national narratives and, in that sense, a nationalization of the North. All essential actors may upgrade and inject their own story pertaining to some age-old aspects of Scandinavia, Finland, or Russia, and the same goes for the actors around the Baltic rim, including Britain. There is, in additional to the nationally-grounded usages, also a post-national North in the discourse, although it appears to lack clear temporal and spatial coordinates. It hence remains a rather vague image if compared to the nationalized North. Usually the North has been either northernized or

Europeanized, but in the current discourse both dimensions are present simultaneously. The relationship is no longer one of either-or. The North does not remain, in the current discourse, separate from Europe. It appears that the European marker has been opened up for influences originally produced in the context of a rather northernized North, and now the two seem to co-exist without one giving in for the other. No doubt, the discourse on northernness also includes some inconsistencies but this state of affairs primarily contributes to northernness being open to different alternative interpretations.

Thus, the current discussion does not merely consist of one or two ways of using the North and northernness. There are, in fact, several interpretations at play. A plurality of concepts is applicable in re-defining one's one's own position in the new Europe. The unifying element present in all these discourses consists of the claim for a position based on the equality, or in the some cases perhaps even the superiority of the North ***vis-à-vis*** the South. On the one hand, the definitions concerning the spatial scene differ significantly not only in a cartographic sense but also in principle. The same goes for northernness as an identity narrative. Various mixtures of the northern narratives seem to coexist. Northernness is clearly in a state of ferment, and it is difficult to forecast whether a more unified and comprehensive understanding will see the light of day in the near future. In any case, previously hegemonic discourses have lost most of their centrality, and nordicity - in opposition to the North - appears to be one of the markers that have clearly lost in standing.

Essential relationships are thus on their way to being re-negotiated. Some previously distinct and firm concepts such as the Nordic one have turned more uncertain and have to struggle and relate to a number of at least partly competing departures such as the Baltic, Barents and Northern narratives. We are clearly in the midst an era of naming, as new myths and narratives are invented for constructing a new Europe. 'It is possible to draw a circle on a map and define this circle as a new and await the events' says Sverre Jervell, one of the 'founding fathers' of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region.(66) Northernness seems to be part of exploiting the new openness in furnishing time and space with meaning. The northern narratives offer an alternative option in a Europe where the general trend has seemingly been one of

swapping easterness for westernness. This latter approach raises the obvious question of whether everyone in Europe can be 'western'. Whereas easterness has lost ground and is no longer available for a positive usage, northernness seems to offer nations the potential for gaining centrality in the new Europe without prejudicing one's own uniqueness.

The contest between the Nordic and the northern is a rather open one engaging a broad variety of actors and it indicates more clearly than during stable periods that geography is much more than mere 'geography'. The latter is not given, but an act of 'earth writing' that contains relations of power and identity. Some avenues are opened up whereas some remain closed, with northern Europe currently displaying a rather dynamic and turbulous pattern.

References

1) A. Bailes, 'The Role of Subregional Co-operation in Post-Cold War Europe: Integration, Security, Democracy', in A. Cottey (ed.), ***Subregional Co-operation in Post-Cold War Europe*** (London: Macmillan, 1998), p. 183.
2) T. Christiansen and P. Joenniemi, 'Politics on the Edge: On the Restructuring of Borders in the North of Europe', in J. Eskelinen, I. Liikanen and J. Oksa (eds.), ***Curtains of Iron and Gold. Reconstructing Borders and Scales of Interaction*** (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999).
3) For previous efforts along similar lines, see I.B. Neumann, 'Den Østelige EU-utvidelse fra Norden till Nordeuropa', in ***EU's udvidelse mod Øst og Norden – fra prestigepolitik til brobyggning*** (Copenhagen: Nordic Council, 1992); O. Wæver, 'Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War', ***International Affairs*** 68:1 (1992) and O. Wæver, 'Between Balts and Brussels: The Nordic Countries after the Cold War', ***Current History*** 93: 586 (1994). Neumann focuses on the Nordic case and Wæver on the possible move from Nordism to Balticism.
4) K. Hacker, 'Political Linguistic Discourse Analysis', in M.E. Stuckey (ed.), ***The Theory and Practice of Political Communication research*** (New York: New York Press, 1996), p. 33.

5) E. Ringmar, Identity, Interest and Action. A Cultural Eof Sweden's Intervention in the Thirty Years War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), pp. 75-8.
6) E. W. Said, ***Orientalism*** (Penguin books, 1978).
7) L. Rerup, 'Nationalisme og skandinavisme intill første verdenskrigs udbrud', ***De Nordiske Fælleskaber. Den Jyske Historiker***, 69-70, (1994).
8) H. Gustafsson, ***Nordens historia. En europeisk region under 1200 år*** (Studentlitteratur: Lund, 1997).
9) S. Jervell, 'Norden og samarbeid mellom nordiske land', in Norden i det nye Europa. En rapport fra det danske og svenske utenrikspolitiske institut og universitetet i Reykjavik (Oslo: Europa-programmet, 1991), p. 35.
10) I.B. Neumann, 'State to Region: How to Save Formal Nordic Co-operation, in L. Hedegaard and B. Lindström (eds.), ***NEBI Yearbook 2000. Yearbook on Northern and Baltic Sea Integration*** (Berlin: Springer Verlag International, 2000), p. 245.
11) Jervell, 'Norden og samarbeid mellom nordiske land, p. 15.
12) U. Østergård, 'The Geopolitics of Nordic Identity – From Composite States to Nation States', in Ø. Sørensen & B. Stråth (eds.), ***The Cultural Construction of Norden*** (Oslo: Scandinavian Univerisity Press, 1997), p. 29.
13) Ø. Sørensen and B. Stråth, 'Introduction: The Cultural Construction of Norden', in ***The Cultural Construction of Norden***, p. 3..
14) L. Mjøset, ***Norden dagen derpå*** (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget: Samfundslitteratur, 1986).
15) P. Joenniemi, 'Norden as a Post-Nationalist Construction', in P. Joenniemi (ed.), ***Neo-Nationalism or Regionality? The Restructuring of Political Space around the Baltic Rim*** (Stockholm: NordREFO, 1997:5).
16) B. Stråth, 'Nordiska Rådet och nordiskt samarbete, ***De Nordiska Fællesskaper. Den Jyske Historiker*** 69-70 (1994), p. 208.
17) S. Jervell, 'Norden og samarbeid mellom nordiske land'; Rerup, 'Nationalisme og skandinavisme intill første verdenskrigs udbrud'; Østergård, 'The Geopolitics of Nordic Identity'.
18) Wæver, 'Between Balts and Brussels'.

19) M. Engman, 'Är Finland ett nordiskt land?', ***De Nordiske Fællesskaber. Den Jyske Historiker*** 69-70 (1994).
20) Cf. F. Magnússon, Finnur, 'Nation, lokalsamhälle och klass. Om isländska identitetsuppfattningar 1880-1940', in A. Linde-Laursen and J. Nilsson (eds), ***Nationella identiteter i Norden - ett fullbordat projekt?*** (Stockhom: Nordiska Rådet, 1991), p. 26; V. Wåhlin, 'Island, Færøerne, Grønland og det nordiske', ***De Nordiske Fællesskaber. Den Jyske Historiker*** 69-70 (1994).
21) H. Mouritzen, 'The Nordic Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument: Its Rise and Fall' ***Journal of Peace Research***, 32 (1), 1995.
22) P. Stenbäck, 'The Nordic Community and Nordic Co-operation in Light of the Development of European Integration', in ***The Nordic Countries and the New Europe*** (Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, TemaNord 1997), p.553.
23) See "Öppet för världens vindar. Nordiska ministerrådet, Köpenhamn (NORD 2000), p.15. This report from the Nordic Council of Ministers on the future of Nordic co-operation adds to dimensionalism in the sense that it operates with two concepts - the Nordic Dimension and the Northern Dimension - without specifying the relationship between these two in any detail.
24) P. Joenniemi, 'Norden - en europeisk megaregion?', in ***Norden är död. Länge leve Norden!*** (Stockhom: Nordiska Rådet, 1994); P. Jukarainen, 'Norden is Dead - Long Live the Eastwards Faced Euro-North', ***Co-operation and Conflict*** 34(4), 2000; Mouritzen, 'The Nordic Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument'; Neumann, 'State to Region'; Wæver, 'Nordic Nostalgia'; Wæver, 'Between Balts and Brussels'.
25) H. Haukkala, 'Introduction', in H. Haukkala (ed.), ***Dynamic Aspects of the Northern Dimension*** (Turku: Jean Monnet Unit, 1999), p.14; S. Moisio, 'Pohjoisen ulottuvuuden geopolitiikka: pohjoinen periferia ja uuden euroopan alueellinen rakentaminen (On the Geopolitics of the Northern Dimension: the Northern periphery and the Construction of a New Europe)', ***Terra*** 112(3), 2000, p.125.
26) T. Forsberg, 'Soft Means to Hard Security: Finland and the Northern Dimension of the European Union', paper presented at a seminar 'Regional Security and in Border Areas of Northern and Eastern Europe', Pskov, 6-8 July 1999; H. Ojanen, 'How to Customise Your Union: Finland and the Northern Dimension of the

EU', in ***Yearbook of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs*** (Forssa 1999), pp. 14-16.

27) Cf. Y. Haila, 'Pohjoisen toiseus (The Otherness of the North)', in M. Seppälä (ed.), ***Muukalaisia arktiksessa*** (Porin taidemuseon julkaisuja nr. 34. Painohäme Oy, 1996); S. Sörlin, 'Framtidslandet. Norrland och det nordliga i svenskt och europeiskt medvetande', in I. Karlsson (ed.), ***I kontinentens utkant. Forskningsnämnden*** (Uppsaöa: FRN-Framtidsstudier, 1986), p. 111.

28) W. Jann, 'Common Security in the Baltic Sea region: A View from the German Länder', in ***Common Security in Northern Europe after the Cold War - The Baltic Sea region and the Barents Region*** (Stockholm: The Olof Palme International Centre, 1994) p. 182.

29) B. Henningsen, 'The Swedish Construction of Nordic Identity', in ***The Cultural Construction of Norden***, p. 97.

30) Cf. N. Parker and B. Armstrong, ***Margins in European Integration*** (London: Macmillan, 2000).

31) E.J. Crockford, 'A Historic Shift in Europe's Centre of Gravity', ***Northern Enterprise*** Autumn 1999, p. 5.

32) ***Scanorama*** 2000:22.

33) See the chapter by Lehti in the current volume, and also D. Arter, 'Small State Influence within the EU: The Case of Finland's "Northern Dimension Initiative"', ***Journal of Common Market Studies*** 38, 5(2000), p. 687.

34) T. Christiansen etc., 'Fuzzy Politics Around Fuzzy Borders: The European Union's Near Abroad', ***Cooperation and Conflict*** 33, 4 (2000). The United States made a similar move by introducing its Northern European Initiative in 1998. See P. Van Ham, ' Testing Cooperative Security in Europe's North: American perspectives and Policies', in D. Trenini and P. van Ham, ***Russia and the United States in Northern European security*** (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Programme of the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, vol. 5, 2000).

35) J. Black, ***The Rise of the European Powers 1679-1793*** (Edward Arnold, 1990), p. 158; M. Lehti, 'Competing or Complementary Images: The North and the Baltic World from the Historical perspective', in ***Dynamic Aspects of the Northern Dimension,*** p. 32.

36) R. Okey, 'Central Europe/Eastern Europe: Behind the definitions', ***Past & Present*** 137 (1992), pp.110-1; M. Kivikoski, 'Onko Itä-

Eurooppaa enää olemassa?', in P. Kettunen, A. Kultanen & T. Soikkanen (eds.), ***Jäljillä. Kirjoituksia historian ongelmista. Osa 2.*** (Turku: Kirja-Aurora, 2000), pp. 165-6.

37) L. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).

38) This is indicated for example by A.L. Schlözer's ***Allgemeine nordische Geshichte*** published in 1771. The book dealt with the history of Sweden, Denmark, Prussia and Russia (Kivikoski, 'Onko Itä-Eurooppaa enää olemassa?', p. 166).

39) Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, p. 5.

40) Okey, 'Central Europe/Eastern Europe', pp. 110-1.

41) D. Kirby, The Baltic World 1772-1993. Europe's Northern Periphery in an Age of Change (Longman, 1995), p.2.

42) Henningsen, 'The Swedish Construction of Nordic Identity', pp. 97-101.

43) O. Petri, 'Ruotsin kronikka' and O. Rudbeck, 'Atland eli Manheim', in ***Skandinavian kirjallisuuden kultainen kirja*** (Helsinki: WSOY, 1930); P. Hall, ***The Social Construction of Nationalism. Sweden as an Example*** (Lund: Lund University Press, 1998), p.254. There also existed alternative interpretations. For example, Olaus Petri, a sixteenth-century historian, took a contrary view by arguing that the Goths had immigrated to Sweden and never left. On Gothicism in Europe more generally, see C. Kidd, ***British Identities before Nationalism. Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Atlantic World, 1600-1800*** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ,1999.), pp. 211-49.

44) Henningsen, 'The Swedish Construction of Nordic Identity', p. 110.

45) Ibid, pp. 107-12.

46) It has to be remembered, however, that Gothicism has a longer tradition in Germany and in England. Already during the era of the Enlightenment a variety of terms like "the northern nations", "all the nations lived under the Gothic polity" and "the legal kingdoms of the North" we used for coining a larger 'we', a Gothic Europe, in England. Kidd***, British Identities before Nationalism***, pp. 211-16.

47) J. Mjöberg, 'Romanticism and Revival', in D. M. Wilson (ed.), ***The Northern World. The History and Heritage of Northern Europe AD 400 - 1100*** (London: Thames and Hudson, 1980). This negative

burden of the past pose an obstacle to the reawakening of the northern narratives in Germany.

48) Ibid.; U. Østergaard, 'The Nordic Countries in the Baltic region', in P. Joenniemi (ed.), ***Neo-Nationalism or Regionality? The Reconstruction of Political Space around the Baltic Rim*** (Stockhom: NordREFO, 1997:5), pp. 33-6.

49) Cf. Hall, The Social Construction of Nationalism, pp. 174-8.

50) Henningsen, 'The Swedish Construction of Nordic Identity', p. 105.

51) Ibid, pp. 95-6; B. Stråth, 'Scandinavian Identity. A Mythical Reality', in N.A. Sørensen (ed.), ***European Identities. Cultural Diversity and Integration in Europe since 1700*** (Odense University Press, 1992), p. 45-53; Østergård, 'The Nordic Countries in the Baltic region', pp. 28-36; M. Lehti, 'Kansojen kilvoittelu kunniasta. Kansallisuusaatteen ja urheilun pyhä liitto', ***Historiallinen Aikakauskirja*** 3/2000. Early Finnish nationalism had similar features. For example, the Finnish national anthem ***Maamme*** (Our Country) from 1846 does not depict Finland as such, but plays with images of the northern landscape (M. Klinge, ***Kaksi Suomea*** (The Two Finlands) (Helsinki: Otava, 1982), pp. 102-3).

52) Henningsen, 'The Swedish Construction of Nordic Identity', pp. 112-4.

53) P. Joenniemi, 'Norden as a Post-Nationalist Construction', in ***Neo-Nationalism or Regionality?***

54) B. Bergreen, 'Sommer-Norden og Vinter-Norden', in K. Hastrup (ed.), ***Den nordiske verden I*** (Oslo: Gyldendahl, 1992) pp. 193-200.

55) R. Pyykkö, 'The North in Russian Cultural Tradition', in ***Dynamic Aspects of the Northern Dimension***, pp. 69-76.

56) J. McCannon, Red Arctic. Polar exploration and the Myth of the North in the Soviet Union 1932-1939 (Oxord: Oxford University Press, 1998).

57) M. Klinge, The Finnish Tradition. Essays on structures and identities in the North of Europe (Helsinki: SHS, 1993), pp. 232-3.

58) H. Mikkeli, 'Metsäturkki ja sen juron parturit. Näkemyksiä metsäluonnon ja kansanluonteen suhteesta 1800-1900-luvulla', ***Historiallinen Aikakauskirja*** 3/1992.

59) Lehti, 'Kansojen kilvoittelu kunniasta'.

60) H. Salmi and K. Kallioniemi, ‘Pohjan tähteiden tuolla puolen. Suomalaisuuden strategioita populaarikulttuurissa’, in H. Salmi and K. Kallioniemi (eds.), ***Pohjan tähteet. Populaarikulttuurin kuva suomalaisuudesta*** (Kirjastopalvelu 2000).
61) See more about early phases of the Finnish Nordic orientation M. Lehti, A Baltic League as a Construct af the New Europe. Envisioning a Baltic region and small state sovereignty in the aftermath of the First World War (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1999), pp.498-500.
62) P. Kosonen, ***Pohjoismaiset mallit murroksessa*** (Vastapaino, 1998), pp.38-9.
63) The role of the popular novel ***Täällä Pohjan tähden alla*** (Under the Northern Star) by Väinö Linna appears to have played an important role in re-vitalizing past stories mostly dating back to the nineteenth century.
64) Wæver, ‘Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War’, p.96.
65) P. Jukarainen, ‘Norden is Dead - Long Live the Eastwards Faced Euro-North’, ***Co-operation and Conflict*** 34 (4), 2000, p. 378.
66) S. Jervell, ‘Top-down or Bottom-Up Region Building. Some Notes on the Barents Co-operation’ in ***Multilayered Integration. The Subregional Dimension. Summary of an Inter-Governmental Conference, Bucharest*** (IESW, Warsaw Centre, 1996).

Bibliography

Arter, David, “Small State Influence within the EU: The Case of Finland’s ‘Northern Dimension Initiative’”. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, nr. 5, 2000, pp. 677-97.

Bailes, Alyson, “The Role of Subregional Co-operation in Post-Cold War Europe: Integration, Security, democracy”. Pp. 153-85 in Cottey, Andrew, (ed.), Subregional Co-operation in Post-Cold War Europe. London: Macmillan.

Bergreen, Brit, “Sommer-Norden og Vinter-Norden”. Pp. 193-200 in Hastrup, Kirsten (ed.), “Den nordiske verden I”. Oslo: Gyldendahl, 1992.

Black, Jeremy, The Rise of the European Powers 1679-1793 (Edward Arnold, 1990).

Christiansen, Thomas and Joenniemi, Pertti, “Politics on the Edge: On the Restructuring of Borders in the North of Europe”. Pp. 89-117 in Eskelinen, Jukka, Liikanen, Ilkka and Oksa, Jukka (eds.), “Curtains of Iron and Gold. Reconstructing Borders and Scales of Interaction”. Ashgate: Aldershot, 1999.

Christiansen, Thomas, Fabio, Petito and Tonra, Ben, Fuzzy Politics Around Fuzzy Borders: The European Union’s Near Abroad. Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 33, Nr. 4, December 2000, pp. 417-31.

Coates, Kenneth, “The Discovery of the North: Towards a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Northern/Remote Regions”. Pp. 31-44 in The Northern review, No. 12/13, 1993/4.

Crockford, Edward, James, “A Historic Shift in Europe’s Centre of Gravity”. P. 5 in Northern Enterprise, Autumn 1999.

Engman, Max, “Är Finland ett nordiskt land?”. Pp. 62-78 in “De Nordiske Fællesskaber”. Den Jyske Historiker, 69-70, december 1994.

Forsberg, Tuomas, “Soft Means to Hard Security: Finland and the Northern Dimension of the European Union”. Paper presented at a seminar “Regional Security and in Border Areas of Northern and Eastern Europe”. Pskov, 6-8 July 1999.

Gustafsson, Harald, “Nordens historia. En europeisk region under 1200 år”. Studentlitteratur: Lund, 1997.

Hacker, Kenneth, Political Linguistic Discourse Analysis. In: Stuckey, M. E., (ed.), The Theory and Practice of Political Communication research. New York: New York Press, 1996.

Haila, Yrjö, “Pohjoisen toiseus (The Otherness of the North). In: Seppälä, Marketta (ed.), Muukalaisia arktiksessa. Porin taidemuseon julkaisuja nr. 34. Painohäme Oy, 1996, pp. 106-13.

Hall, Patrick, The Social Construction of Nationalism. Sweden as an Example. Lund University Press 1998.

Van Ham, Peter, Testing Cooperative Security in Europe’s North: American perspectives and Policies. In: Trenin, Dmitri and van Ham, Peter, Russia and the United States in Northern European security.

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Programme of the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, vol. 5, Helsinki 2000, pp. 57-88.

Haukkala, Hiski, ”Introduction”. Pp. 9-20 in Haukkala, Hiski (ed.), “Dynamic Aspects of the Northern Dimension”. Jean Monnet Unit: University of Turku, 1999.

Henningsen, Bernd, “The Swedish Construction of Nordic Identity”. Pp. 91-120 in Sørensen, Øystein and Stråth, Bo (eds.), The Cultural Construction of Norden”. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997.

Heurlin, Bertel, Denmark and the Northern Dimension. DUPI Working Papers, nr. 11, 1999. Copenhagen: Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institutt.

Hirn, Yrjö (1921), Episodeja. Muutamia lukuja seitsemäntoistasataluvun elämästä ja kirjallisuudesta. Helsinki: Otava 1921.

Jann, Werner, “Common Security in the Baltic Sea region: A View from the German Länder”. Pp. 180-90 in “Common Security in Northern Europe after the Cold War - The Baltic Sea region and the Barents Region”. The Olof Palme International Centre: Stockholm 1994.

Jervell, Sverre, Top-down or Bottom-Up Region Building. Some Notes on the Barents Co-operation. In: Multilayered Integration. The Subregional Dimension. Summary of an Inter-Governmental Conference. Bucharest. IESW, Warsaw Centre, 1996.

Jervell, Sverre, “Norden og samarbeid mellom nordiske land”. Pp. 11-42 in “Norden i det nye Europa. En rapport fra det danske og svenske utenrikspolitiske institut og universitetet i Reykjavik”. Europa-programmet. Oslo 1991.

Joenniemi, Pertti, ”Norden - en europeisk megaregion?”. Pp. 21-49 in “Norden är död. Länge leve Norden!”. Nordiska Rådet: Stockholm, 1994.

Joenniemi, Pertti, “Finland, Europe and St. Petersburg in Search for a Role and Identity”. Pp.101-109 in Studia Slavica Finlandensia. Tomus XIII, Helsinki 1996.

Joenniemi, Pertti, “Norden as a Post-Nationalist Construction”. Pp. 181-235 in Joenniemi, Pertti (ed.), Neo-Nationalism or Regionality?

The Restructuring of Political Space around the Baltic Rim. NordREFO 1997:5 (Stockholm).

Joenniemi, Pertti, “Norden, Europe and Post-Security”. Pp. 62-73 in “Northern Dimensions”. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1998 (a).

Joenniemi, Pertti, “The Karelian Question: On the Transformation of a Border Dispute”. Pp. 181-206 in Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 33(2), 1998 (b).

Joenniemi, Pertti, The Northern Dimension: Allegiance or Revolt? In: Lassinantti, G. and Heininen, L., (eds.), The Northern Dimension. Stockholm: Olof Palme Centre/University of Lapland 1999, 71-82.

Jukarainen, Pirjo, “Norden is Dead - Long Live the Eastwards Faced Euro-North”. Pp. 355-382, in Co-operation and Conflict, vol. 34 (4), 2000.

Kidd, Collin, British Identities before Nationalism. Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Atlantic World, 1600-1800. Cambridge University Press 1999.

Kirby, David, The Baltic World 1772-1993. Europe’s Northern Periphery in an Age of Change. Longman 1995.

Kivikoski, Mikko, Onko Itä-Eurooppaa enää olemassa? In: Jäljillä.Kirjoituksia historian ongelmista. Osa 2. Toim. P. Kettune, A. Kultanen & T. Soikkanen. Turku: Kirja-Aurora 2000..

Klinge, Matti, Kaksi Suomea The Two Finlands). Otava: Helsinki 1982.

Klinge, Matti, The Finnish Tradition. Essays on structures and identities in the North of Europe (Helsinki: SHS, 1993).

Kosonen, Pekka, Pohjoismaiset mallit murroksessa. Vastapaino 1998.

Lehti, Marko, Kansojen kilvoittelu kunniasta. Kansallisuusaatteen ja urheilun pyhä liitto. Historiallinen Aikakauskirja 3/2000, pp. 226-240.

Lehti, Marko, “Competing or Complementary Images: The North and the Baltic World from the Historical perspective”. Pp. 21-45 in Haukkala, Hiski (ed.), “Dynamic Aspects of the Northern Dimension”. Jean Monnet Unit of the Turku University, 1999.

Lehti, Marko, A Baltic League as a Construct af the New Europe. Envisioning a Baltic region and small state sovereignty in the aftermath of the First World War. Peter Lang 1999.

Lehti, Marko, Non-reciprocal region-building. Baltoscandia as a National Coordinate for the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians. NORDEUROPAforum 2/98, pp. 19-47.

Magnússon, Finnur, “Nation, lokalsamhälle och klass. Om isländska identitetsuppfattningar 1880-1940”. Pp. 175-94 in Linde-Laursen, Anders and Nilsson, Jan, (eds), “Nationella identiteter i Norden - ett fullbordat projekt?”. Nordiska Rådet: Stockholm, 1991:26.

McCannon, John, Red Arctic. Polar exploration and the Myth of the North in the Soviet Union 1932-1939. Oxford University Press 1998.

Medvedev, Sergei, The Blank Space: Glenn Gould, Russia, Finland and the North. Paper presented at ISA Congress in Los Angeles, March 14-18, 2000.

Mikkeli, Heikki, Metsäturkki ja sen juron parturit. Näkemyksiä metsäluonnon ja kansanluonteen suhteesta 1800-1900-luvulla. Historiallinen Aikakauskirja 3/1992.

Mjöberg, Jöran, Romanticism and Revival. In; The Northern World. The History and Heritage of Northern Europe AD 400 - 1100. Ed. D. M. Wilson. London: Thames and Hudson 1980.

Mjøset, Lars (red), “Norden dagen derpå”. Universitetsforlaget: Samfundslitteratur. Oslo 1986.

Moisio, Sami, Pohjoisen ulottuvuuden geopolitiikka: pohjoinen periferia ja uuden euroopan alueellinen rakentaminen (On the Geopolitics of the Northern Dimension: the Northern periphery and the Construction of a New Europe). Terra, 112(3), 2000, 117-28.

Mouritzen, Hans, “The Nordic Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument: Its Rise and Fall”. Journal of Peace Research, vol. 32 (1), pp. 9-21.

Neumann, Iver, B., “State to Region: How to Save Formal Nordic Co-operation”, in Hedegaard, Lars and Lindström, Bjarne (eds.), NEBI Yearbook 2000. Yearbook on Northern and Baltic Sea Integration. Berlin: Springer Verlag International, pp. 243-50.

Neumann, Iver, Den Østelige EU-utvidelse fra Norden till Nordeuropa. In: EU's udvidelse mod Øst og Norden – fra prestigepolitik til brobyggning. Copenhagen: Nordic Council, 27-38. (?)

Ojanen, Hanna, "How to Customise Your Union: Finland and the Northern Dimension of the EU". Pp. 13-26 in Yearbook of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. Forssa 1999.

Okey, Robin, Central Europe/Eastern Europe: Behind the definitions. Past & Present No 137 (1992).

Parker, Noel and Armstrong, Bill, Margins in European Integration. London: Macmillan, 2000.

Petri, Olaus, Ruotsin kronikka. In: Skandinavian kirjallisuuden kultainen kirja. WSOY 1930.

Pyykkö, Riitta, The North in Russian Cultural Tradition. In: Dynamic Aspects of the Northern Dimension. Ed. H. Haukkala. Turku: Jean Monnet Unit 1999.

Rerup, Loretz, "Nationalisme og skandinavisme intill første verdenskrigs udbrud". Pp. 79-88 in "De Nordiske Fælleskaber". Den Jyske Historiker, 69-70, december 1994.

Ringmar, Erik, Identity, interest and action. A cultural explanation of Sweden's intervention in the Thirty Years War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996.

Rudbeck, Olof, Atland eli Manheim. In: Skandinavian kirjallisuuden kultainen kirja. WSOY 1930.

Said, Edward W., Orientalism. Penguin books 1978.

Salmi, Hannu & Kallioniemi, Kari, Pohjan tähteiden tuolla puolen. Suomalaisuuden strategioita populaarikulttuurissa. In: Pohjan tähteet. Populaarikulttuurin kuva suomalaisuudesta. Toim. H. Salmi & K. Kallioniemi. Kirjastopalvelu 2000.

Schmidt, Lars, "A Matter of Snow-how". Pp. 20-27 in Scanodrama. February 2000.

Stenbäck, Pär, "The Nordic Community and Nordic Co-operation in Light of the Development of European Integration". In: The Nordic Countries and the New Europe". Nordic Council of Ministers (Copenhagen), TemaNord 1997:553; pp. 105-14.

Stråth, Bo, “Nordiska Rådet och nordiskt samarbete”. Pp. 201-212. De Nordiska Fællesskaper. Den Jyske Historiker, 69-70, december 1994.

Sørensen, Øystein and Stråth, Bo, “Introduction: The Cultural Construction of Norden”, in Sørensen, Øystein and Stråth, Bo (eds.), The Cultural Construction of Norden. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997.

Sörlin, Sverker, “Framtidslandet. Norrland och det nordliga i svenskt och europeiskt medvetande”. In: Karlsson, Ingmar (ed.), I kontinentens utkant. Forskningsnämnden. FRN-Framtidsstudier. Uppsala 1986, pp. 109-67.

Østergaard, Uffe, “The Nordic Countries in the Baltic region”. Pp. 26-53 in Joenniemi, Pertti (ed.), “Neo-Nationalism or Regionality? The Reconstruction of Political Space around the Baltic Rim”. NordREFO 1997:5 (Stockholm).

Østergård, Uffe, “The Geopolitics of Nordic Identity – From Composite States to Nation States.” In: The Cultural Construction of Norden. Ed. By Ø. Sørensen & B. Stråth. Scandinavian Univerisity Press 1997.

Wæver, Ole, “Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War”. Pp. 77-102 in International Affairs, vol. 68:1, January 1992.

Wæver, Ole, “Between Balts and Brussels: The Nordic Countries after the Cold War”. Pp. 390-4 in Current History, vol. 93, no. 586, November 1994.

Wæver, Ole, “Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in Western European Non-War Community”. Pp. 67-118 in Adler, Emmanuel and Barnett, Michael (eds.), Security Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Wåhlin, Vagn, “Island, Færøerne, Grønland og det nordiske”. Pp. 38-62 in “De Nordiske Fællesskaber”, Den Jyske Historiker, 69-70, 1994.

Wolff, Larry, Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightment. Stanford University Press 1994.