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A PEOPLE OF WAR OR PEACE?
AMERICANS' ATTITUDES TOWARDS
THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE ABROAD
IN TERRORIST AND CONFLICT SITUATIONS

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ABSTRACT

This exploratory research presents the results of a March 2011survey of a random sample of 217 adults on their attitudes towards the use of force as a foreign policy alternative. This research note examines the social characteristics of those people who are more or less likely to support intervening in hypothetical foreign conflicts in situations in which the United States' national interests may or may not be at stake. The research reported here was aimed at answering several questions including: are there some demographic groups who are more likely to support intervening in foreign conflicts even when U.S. national interests are not necessarily at stake? I find that dispositional preferences interact with opinion about the geopolitical situation to determine whether military force is an acceptable option. The survey incorporates various foreign policy and terrorist scenarios. Findings include the following: I support the findings of others in that Democrats, liberals, and women are less likely to support military force as a foreign policy option. Using multivariate regression analysis it was also found that certain respondent dispositions, such as "value placed on human life," were more likely to constrain policy preferences. I also find conflicting support for the casualty hypothesis. In general the more casualties mentioned in a scenario the less likely Americans are to support the use of force, with a notable exception here among "hawks". I also find this is true for civilian casualties.

Key words: war, public opinion, terrorism, casualties

Introduction

Political scientists stress the role of elections and public opinion surveys as the main mechanisms in creating public policy and mediating policy shifts. Sociologists have paid less attention to surveys on public opinion towards foreign interventions (McAdam and Su, 2002). The disregard for public opinion is regrettable (see Burnstein, 1998), given that the links between protest activities, shifts in public opinion, and policy change should be of particular concern to policymakers. Protests work indirectly by first shifting public opinion in the direction of movement goals and once opinion has shifted in this way, it then acts to alter the policy preferences of those public officials subject to electoral pressures (McAdam and Su, 2002). The ability of a government to wage war is, to a significant extent, the result of the attitudes of the electorate towards that war. Public input into policy formation and evaluation – especially on this issue [of waging war or promoting peace]–is critical in a democracy (Coy et al, 2008). As per democratic peace theory (Layne, 1994), leaders of democracies must answer to the voters for war, and therefore have an incentive to seek alternatives. This research intends to observe the extent of support for alternatives to war when a situation abroad suggests the possible need for armed intervention on the part of the United States. In addition, in order to craft more effective campaigns and appeals against war, peace activists need to know which Americans support foreign military interventions and why, and which Americans also support alternatives to war and why.

The purpose of this research is to understand the characteristics of the citizenry which lead them to support military intervention abroad or prefer some alternative foreign policy such as the use of diplomacy to try to settle the situation. Sociologists stand to benefit from this study's insight into public opinion and military intervention. Fighting the "War on Terror" has(d) been one of the primary rationales used by both the Bush and Obama administrations for pursuing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite this singular focus of recent U.S. combat missions perhaps more than ever it is not clear how Americans decide or support the use of force.

A significant body of research on demographic factors and public opinion about war has led to a number of conclusions. It has been shown that women are less supportive of the use of force than men i.e. a "gender gap" (Allsop, Hewitt, and Wilcox, 1996, p. 67), liberals are generally much less likely to support military intervention than conservatives (Armor et al, 1967, in Mueller 1973:166, see Lakoff, 2001: 192) and are less isolationist than conservatives (Hermann, 1999, p. 554). Others (Bartels, 1994, p.495) have found, however, a weak correlation between support for the use of military force and political ideology. According to Boussios (2008) liberals are not *always* more likely than conservatives to oppose wars. It was found in the Korean and Vietnam Wars that there was not a substantive difference among liberals and conservatives on their attitudes towards these wars. This brings us to partisanship. According to Mueller (1973, p. 116), i.e. the "partisan mentality" theory, partisans seem to see the query [opinion on war or the use of military force] as one asking for the approval or disapproval of an action of the administration. For example, for most of the course of the Vietnam and Korean wars there was a Democrat President. Accordingly, Democrats were found to support these wars to a greater degree than Republicans (Mueller, 1973, p. 116-117). However, Mueller (1973) also found that there is no evidence that Democrats are simply more likely to be hawks than Republicans. According to Mueller, data from the Nixon administration [in the Vietnam War] demonstrate quite clearly that it is the partisan, not the hawk-dove, cue which is most important (Mueller, 1973, p. 117). Other scholars have supported this finding (Bartel, 1994, p. 495) and have found a weak correlation between militarism and partisanship. The results from the current survey, reported below, suggest that Democrats are less likely than Republicans or Independents to support the use of military intervention as a foreign policy alternative.

The Foreign Scenarios[1]

A number of scholars in the field (i.e., Mueller, 1973, 1994, 2002, 2005, 2007; Larson, 1996, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2009; Jentleson, 1992, 1998, 2007; Berinsky, 2009; Baum and Groelling, 2009) have analyzed American public opinion on U.S. intervention in foreign conflicts. In addition to analyzing these attitudes, this research will study the so-called casualties hypothesis[2]. Military intervention often runs the risk of inflicting civilian casualties. The belief that U.S. forces regularly violate the norm of noncombatant immunity (i.e., the notion that civilians should not be targeted or "disproportionately" harmed during hostilities) has been widely held since the outset of the Iraq War (Kahl, 2007). Although a number of scholars (Walzer, 2006) have made mention of the importance of preventing civilian casualties during wartime, no study has been done that effectively measures Americans' tolerance of such casualties when deciding on entering a military conflict.

The research will elicit opinions about hypothetical international situations (see *appendix*)—*before* the US government makes the decision whether or not to take action in a foreign conflict— to *avoid* circular reasoning problems[3] that previous researchers have experienced when using survey data. A circular reasoning problem exists when using survey data eliciting attitudes towards existing or prior conflicts because it asks respondents to pass judgment on wars which we have already fought or made a decision to enter into and therefore our leaders at the time believed that our national interests were at stake. Therefore the decision to go to war assumes, instead of evaluating, the legitimacy of the armed conflict (for more see Jentleson,

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1 Methodology: The Stony Brook University Center for Survey Research conducted this survey by telephone between February 23 and March 7 2011. A list-assisted method of random-digit-dialing (RDD) was used to obtain phone numbers in the sample. Within selected households, the individual of at least 18 years of age with the most recent birthday was selected for participation. Up to 8 contact attempts were made at each household phone number. In order to assure a representative sample, all households and individuals who were initially unwilling to participate in the survey were contacted again, and an attempt was made to persuade them to participate. The data was weighted using sample weights which were created based on population estimates drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2009 American Community Survey (ACS): gender, education, race, ethnicity, income, marital status and age, across the four US Census Bureau regions of the United States. Weighting was done using an iterative process that has been developed to estimate joint weights for any number of demographic variables for which population percentages are known only individually, not jointly. In addition, the weights were "trimmed," so that no individual respondent received a weight greater than 5. Generally speaking, minorities, males, less educated, lower income individuals, and employed individuals tended to be underrepresented in the sample. Weights compensate for a lower response rate among these groups. Response Rate 3 (RR3) refers to the number of completed interviews divided by completed interviews, non-interviews and an estimated number of how many unknown households that are eligible. Based on research by Westat, we estimate that of the 447 unknown households, 25 percent (roughly 112 numbers) were actual households (Pearce et al. 1998).1 Response Rate 3 was 20 percent. Response Rate 5 (RR5) treats all unknown households as non-households. Given this assumption, the response rate was 22 percent.

2 Mueller (1973), who is considered one of the leading scholars in this field, has proposed and the field has accepted a theory that sees the number of casualties as determining whether the public supports a war or not.

3 It [circular reasoning] shares much with the false authority fallacy because we [in this case, the public] accept these statements [in the case, the justification to intervene] based solely on the fact that someone else [in this case, the US government] claims it to be so (Hagin, 2002).

1992). For example, did Iraq casualties only become a strong concern once the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) justification lost its validity?   This is circular reasoning—the WMD justification lost its validity early in the war when there were few casualties. One cannot explain whether support for the war declined because the war lost its justification or because of increasing casualties.

Respondents were asked to decide how various hypothetical situations in other countries should be dealt with. For example, the respondent was presented with a hypothetical situation of a Pakistani Taliban-supported bombing of an airport in Athens, Greece which killed many Americans and what the US should do in response to this bombing. The three options they are given are the use of diplomacy, the use of air and naval power, or the use of troops. These three are not mutually exclusive and a respondent was able to say that all three should be used. If the respondent said that we should send troops they were then asked whether they still would be in favor of sending troops if it meant losing 500 soldiers, those who gave an affirmative answer to this question were asked if they still would be in favor if it meant losing 1000 soldiers, and finally those who gave an affirmative answer to this latter question were asked whether they still would be in favor if it meant losing 5000 soldiers (the approximate number of lives lost in the Iraq war).[4] This type of survey research reduces the circular reasoning problem by evaluating justification of the war prior to the US government's decision to enter that particular conflict, while at the same time testing the casualty hypothesis (similar work was done by Larson, 1996). The strongest hypothesis to explain war acceptance (Mueller, 1973) has to do with casualties. Some previous scholars (Murray, 1996; Russett et al, 1994; Herrmann, 1999) have used hypothetical scenarios in their explanations of how Americans make decisions on the use of force. Several explanations regarding citizens' choices on foreign policy put weight on partisan domestic cues—how the media and politicians help mold the policy conclusions the citizenry reaches. In addition, scholars have put a great emphasis on understanding decision making on foreign policy by the citizenry, by scrutinizing

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4 There is one circumstance in which participation in an armed conflict would lead to an increase in armed conflict, leading to greater commitment to that conflict. The author (Nincic and Nincic, 1995) believes that if the public were to see the already investment of human capital as an indicator of sunk costs and not want to "lose" (or devalue) the original investment they may actually be more likely to give their support to those situations (conflicts) that already suffered significant level of loss of life (i.e., American soldiers).

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the types of people likely to support the use of force. Although this research recognizes this as important, the types of situations in which the public would likely support the use of force have been inadequately studied. The grounds for intervening in foreign conflicts have changed in light of the new threats emerging from the War on Terror, and the focus of the Bush-Cheyney administration on preventive warfare.[5] The variables analyzed in the authors' theory presented in the research reported below include (1) the war locale (e.g., is the terrorist attack on our soil or the soil of our allies?); (2) the characteristics of the combatants (e.g., are the combatants terrorists or an army under the control of a dictator); and (3) the characteristics of our population (e.g., are they Democrats or Republicans?); (4) attitudes towards civilian casualties; (5)attitudes towards preventive warfare. This research will also be testing the casualties hypothesis.

Results

Table 1 shows how the respondents reacted to a hypothetical in which the Pakistani Taliban detonated a bomb in Athens Greece. Among the casualties were a large number of Americans. How should the US deal with this situation? In general, the sample was not in favor of getting militarily involved as a result of this scenario. Fifty-seven percent said we should use diplomatic options, 59 percent said we should use air and naval power; but only 33 percent said we should send troops into Pakistan. Of the 33 percent who were in favor of sending troops into Pakistan 54 percent said they would still be in favor of sending troops if it meant taking 500 casualties; of this group 82 percent remained in favor of sending troops even if the casualty level rose to 1000 and of this group 81 percent remained in favor of sending troops even if the casualty level went to 5000 soldiers. (See Table 1) I can conclude that only a minority want to send troops in this situation; but among that minority the extent of hypothesized casualties has little effect on their opinion.

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5 On preventive warfare, President Bush declared in an introduction to the "National Security Strategy of the United States," (published in September 2002) that the United States will act against "emerging threats before they are fully formed (Currie, 2003).

Even if it means taking 5,000 casualties the group that favors military intervention maintains its support for that intervention.

I found that Democrats were more likely than Republicans and Independents to support using diplomacy to deal with the hypothetical Taliban attack on Athens Greece. Democrats and Independents were also more likely than Republicans to be influenced by casualty level (see Table 1). I found that there was a considerable difference between the ways in which self-designated Liberals and Conservatives would deal with the terrorist attack. Liberals were more likely than conservatives to want to use diplomacy and substantially less likely than conservatives to want to use any type of military intervention. Hawkish liberals (those who supported military intervention to deal with the terrorist attack) were more likely than conservatives to be influenced by the level of casualties. But the number of hawkish liberals is so small as to not warrant any firm conclusions. There was only a small difference between men and women in the extent to which they favored using diplomacy but women were more likely than men to be affected by the casualty level in their decision as to whether to send troops. I also found that women are more *dovish* than men—this is particularly true in the case of those respondents in favor of sending troops if it meant taking 500 casualties. A multivariate analysis was done to explain the difference based on women's political ideology, political party, and value placed on human life[6]. I found political party (whether or not a woman was a Democrat) to be the only variable of significance.

The second scenario I used was one dealing with Iran and that country's nuclear program. If you believe that Iran is trying to build a nuclear weapon then justification for taking some action to stop them is strong. If you believe that Iran is only interested in using its nuclear capacity for peaceful purposes like the generation of electricity then the justification for becoming militarily involved would be low. Seventy-five

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[6] An index for the "human life" variable was based on two questions. Whether a respondent would want their son, daughter or relative to join the military if the US was in a war; and whether they would be willing to pay 750 dollars more for a new car if this would make cars safer and thereby cut by half deaths from auto accidents.

percent of the sample said we should use diplomatic measures to deal with this problem. Slightly less than half were willing to use air and naval power; but only 24 percent were willing to send troops into Iran to stop them from developing a nuclear weapon. Weak support for this option is an explanation for why our government is trying to use sanctions rather than military force to pressure Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions. Democrats and Independents are more likely than Republicans to support the use of diplomacy in the Iranian situation. Since this is the response of the current administration, perhaps Democrats are simply following their party's position, are isolationist[7], or how they value human life could explain this difference. Only isolationism and loyalty to the president was found to be significant. Democrats and Independents are also less likely than Republicans to support sending troops into Iran. But Democrats are twice as likely as Republicans to say they would support whatever policy our President adopts (See Table 2).

Liberals are much more likely than conservatives to support using diplomacy to deal with the Iran situation. They are also much less likely to support any type of force, regardless of casualties, in this situation. Women are slightly more likely than men to support diplomacy in the Iranian situation and are more likely to be influenced by casualties in making up their minds about sending troops.

I should point out what the survey says about important current topics. A substantial majority of our respondents oppose sending troops into Iran to end their nuclear development program. And there are really big differences between liberals and conservative on using air and naval power against Iran. Only 16 percent of liberals but a majority of 60 percent of conservatives favor using air and naval power against Iran. Almost all liberals but only two thirds of conservatives want to use diplomacy to try to settle the Iranian nuclear development problem. I don't know if the conservatives who don't want to use diplomacy in this situation feel

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[7] An index for the "isolationalism" variable was based on relevant responses to the hypothetical scenarios and whether or not US troops should be brought home from overseas bases.

we have already tried diplomacy without success or using diplomacy rather than military force is a sign of weakness. Further research is necessary on this question.

The same question comes up when I look at responses to our third scenario which asks what should be done to stop the genocide which was taking place in Kosovo. A significant portion (about one third) said we should do nothing. There was little difference between men and women, Republicans Democrats, and Independents on this question. Liberals were less likely to say we should do nothing than were conservatives (See Table 3) More than half of all demographic groups except for conservatives said that we should let the UN solve this problem. About 40 percent of Democrats were in favor of sending troops as compared with 21 percent of Republicans. Perhaps the explanation could be that since this situation has little to do with direct US national interests then it is possible that political party and value on human life are related. A multivariate analysis found this relationship to be insignificant. Interestingly, about 40 percent of respondents said that we should help the Kosovars by sending them weapons. Only one third were in favor of the path that we actually took in this situation—using air power against the Serbs to help the Kosovars. Given that this strategy turned out to be successful it is surprising to see how few people supported it (I ran a multivariate analysis on whether or not a respondent was knowledgeable on foreign affairs but this was not significant).[8] I can guess that many members of our sample were not familiar with the situation in the Balkans and our role in ending the war in one of those states. But it is worth noting that 65 percent of Democrats as compared with 33 percent of Republicans said they would support any policy that our President adopts.

As seen in Table 4 are the responses I received to a question on civilian casualties. In fighting the kind of urban guerilla wars such as that in Iraq and to some extent in Afghanistan it is almost inevitable that there be civilian casualties. This is especially true in cases in which the enemy uses civilians as shields by

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8 Regression results on knowledge=.193 Questions on knowledge of the Afghanistan War, US casualty levels in the Iraq War, and where the US has troops stationed overseas were used.

launching their attacks from heavily populated areas. In this case when we (the U.S.) return fire we will kill some of the enemy but also civilians. This can then be used by the enemy as propaganda against the US military forces. Almost two thirds of our sample said they were very concerned about civilian casualties; only about 10 percent said they were not too concerned. Women were more likely than men to say they were very concerned. A multivariate analysis was done to explain the difference based on political party, political ideology and value on human life. It was found that political party was not significant (whether or not a woman was a Democrat did not matter), but political ideology (whether or not a woman was liberal) and value on human life were both found to be significant. Both party affiliation and self-defined political orientation had a small effect in the expected direction. The gender difference on concern with civilian deaths—Table 4—confirms our hypothesis that women, in general, are more concerned with human life than are men with men being more likely to lose human lives to attain some political goal.

In Table 5 I show the results of the survey when the respondents were asked how many civilian casualties they would be willing to take in order to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden. Twenty-nine percent said about 10 and 24 percent said "none". The gender difference on concern with civilian deaths was evident again here—with women being less likely to accept civilian casualties— the most striking difference being percentage who said "none". In addition, 50 percent of Americans were unwilling to accept any large number of civilian casualties in our attempt to hunt down Bin Laden. This question was asked shortly before we actually killed Bin Laden in an operation that avoided civilian casualties. Sixteen percent of our sample was willing to use a nuclear bomb to kill Bin Laden. Such an operation would entail a very large number of civilian casualties. The same groups which were more dovish in our other scenarios were less likely to be willing to accept large numbers of civilian casualties to capture or kill Bin Laden.

In Table 6 I show the proportion of our sample who was willing to intervene in situations where civilians were being killed but this genocide was taking place in a situation which arguably was not threatening to American interests. Only about one third of our sample was in favor of military intervention in each of

these situations. I thought prior to conducting this research that Americans might me less willing to intervene in Africa than in countries where the people being subject to ethnic cleansing were white. This turned out not to be the case as approximately as many respondents were willing to intervene in Ireland as were willing to intervene in Darfur or Rwanda. In general the finding is that a significant majority of Americans are opposed to intervention in all areas if they do not perceive our interests threatened.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly I examined the attitudes of our sample towards the war the United States had been heavily (and is to a lesser extent still involved in as of this writing) involved in, the war in Afghanistan. The justification for this war was that Osama Bin Laden and his supporters in Al Qaeda were hiding in the mountains of Afghanistan and were receiving support from the sympathetic Taliban collaborators as well as neighboring Pakistani loyalists. Republican partisans strongly supported the war in Afghanistan throughout President Bush's tenure, with Democrats becoming increasingly opposed to it (Boussios, 2012). In each policy response that suggested the use of force (Table 7) Democrats were more likely to reject this policy and Republicans to support this policy. Interestingly, Independents were likely to take a hawkish stance, even more so then Republicans. A multivariate analysis was done using hawkishness[9], and value on human life. None of these variables were found to be significant.

Although the Afghan War was initiated by President Bush and the Republican Party, this war became "Obama's war" due to his escalation of the war effort there. Although a Democratic president came to power, once again as was seen in the Iraq war, support by Democratic partisans did not follow. In fact, Republicans "followed" President Obama, strongly supporting the war effort there, and Democrats were more likely to disapprove of the war. Democrats were in angst over his decision to escalate the war efforts there, furthering their disapproval (Boussios, 2012). Under Obama's watch, the United States initiated two troop surges in Afghanistan—the first being in February 2009 of 20,000 troops and the second being in December 2009 of

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9 For each hypothetical scenario, the *hawkish* factor was computed. This variable was then used in this regression analysis.

30,000 troops. In the proposed first troop surge, President Obama's decision to send an additional 17,000

troops to Afghanistan (Newport, 2009) was supported by 65% of the U.S. public. Interestingly, this included

not only majority support from Democrats, but even larger support from Republicans. This marks one of the

few instances in which a president receives more support for a policy decision from those who identify with

the opposing political party than he does from his members of his own party. Similarly, in the second

proposed troop "surge" (Newport, 2009), the majority of Democrats favored a reduction of troops; the majority

of Republicans favored a troop increase. However, Independents tilted more toward the Republican position.

The Casualties Hypothesis

For each foreign policy scenario, at first it seems strange that the proportion favoring sending troops

increases as the casualties also increase. However, this may be an artifact of how the questions were asked.

The only respondents asked the 1000 casualties question were respondents who said yes to the 500 casualty

question. Therefore, this is a self-selected group of hawks. The same was true for the 5000 casualty

question. What is particularly interesting is that raising the number of casualties does not turn off more people

to troop intervention. This is some evidence *against* the casualty hypothesis. What I find is that there are

some people who are willing to intervene with troops even if they know that there will be significant casualties

and that the level of these casualties does not matter very much to these respondents. Respondents who

are not willing to intervene with troops even with a hypothesized relatively low level of casualties can be

assumed to be even more against troop intervention when the levels of casualties are small. However, this

is a logical deduction since the way I asked the question does not allow us to show this latter point with

empirical evidence.

Conclusion

This survey asks a group of 217 American citizens their attitudes towards military intervention in a series of hypothetical situations. I found that most Americans believe that we should use diplomatic solutions to these problems. If diplomacy doesn't work then a significant number of people are in favor of using air and naval power to cope with the situation abroad. Only a minority are willing to use ground troops. Among those favoring the use of ground troops in general there is not a large decline when it is hypothesized that the number of casualties would increase. Thus people in favor of using ground troops seem to be only *slightly* influenced by the casualty rate. A majority of Americans are concerned about significant numbers of civilian casualties and a majority of our sample is now in favor of removing American troops from Afghanistan. In a table not shown here I find that a majority of respondents do not for see ending the war in Afghanistan in a favorable way. This is undoubtedly the main reason why people are opposed to continuing the war.

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Questions presented in the survey

Thinking about the war in Afghanistan, how do you think the US should respond? The U.S. should...
 Pull out all our troops; Keep the number of troops the same; Send in more troops

Do you feel more confident or less confident that the war in Afghanistan will come to a successful conclusion?
 More confident; Less confident

Consider the following hypothetical situation: imagine that the Pakistani Taliban claim responsibility for a large bomb that is set off in the airport in Athens, the capital of Greece. 506 people are killed including many Americans. How should the US respond?
Should the U.S. use diplomacy to pressure the…
Should the U.S. use air and naval power against…
We should send troops into…
Would you still be in favor of sending troops if it meant losing up to 500 soldier's lives?
Would you still be in favor of sending troops if it meant losing up to 1000 soldier's lives?
Would you still be in favor of sending troops if it would mean losing up to 5000 soldier's lives?
In light of the hypothetical situation I read before, tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statement "In a situation like the one described above, we should support whatever policy our President adopts"

If the U.S. uses the military to intervene in a foreign conflict how concerned are you with civilian deaths?
Very concerned; Somewhat concerned; Not too concerned.

Think of a situation in which the United States is trying to kill or capture Osama Bin Laden who is hiding in the area near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Suppose American forces could get him but their attack would involve civilians getting hurt or killed.

I will read a list of numbers: Tell me which of these is the greatest number of civilian deaths that you would be willing to accept in order to kill or capture Bin Laden.
 About 10; About 100; About 500; About 1000; Over 5000; No amount of civilian deaths would be acceptable; Would you support the U.S. using a nuclear bomb, if necessary, to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden?

The Iranian government is currently trying to develop a nuclear bomb. How do you think the U.S. should respond in trying to stop the Iranians from building a nuclear weapon?
Should the U.S. use diplomacy to pressure the…
Should the U.S. use air and naval power against…
We should send troops into…
Would you still be in favor of sending troops if it meant losing up to 500 soldier's lives?
Would you still be in favor of sending troops if it meant losing up to 1000 soldier's lives?
Would you still be in favor of sending troops if it would mean losing up to 5000 soldier's lives?

In light of the hypothetical situation I read before, tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statement "In a situation like the one described above, we should support whatever policy our President adopts"

A while back, there was a conflict in Kosovo between Serbians, who are mostly Christian, and Kosovar Albanians who are predominately Muslim. Many Kosovar Albanian civilians were raped or killed by Serbians. Which of the following statements do you agree with, regarding how the United States should have responded?

We should have done nothing
We should have let the U.N. solve the problem.
We should have sent the Kosovar people weapons and military advisors.
We should have used sea and air power
We should have sent in troops
Would you still have been in favor of sending troops if it meant losing up to 500 soldier's lives?
Would you still have been in favor of sending troops if it meant losing up to 1000 soldier's lives?
Would you still be in favor of sending troops if it would mean losing up to 5000 soldier's lives?
In light of this situation, tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statement...
"In a situation like this, we should support whatever policy our President adopts"

The constitution gives the President the authority to send troops abroad if necessary, but sometimes members of one group in a foreign country are being killed or raped in large numbers by another group but AMERICAN national interests are not threatened. We are interested in your opinion about these types of situations, whether you think the United States military should get involved, or stay out of it. I will read a list of situations like this. Please tell me if you think the U.S. military should intervene.

If one group of people in the Darfur region were being killed or raped by another group, should the U.S. military get involved?

If one group of people in Rwanda were killed or raped by another group?
If one group of people in South Africa were being killed or raped by another group?
If one group of people in Venezuela were killed or raped by another group?
If one group of people in Ireland were killed or raped by another group?

If the U.S. got involved in a war which you supported would you want your son, daughter or relative to join the military?
Yes; No.

Would you be willing to pay 750 dollars more for a new car if this would make cars safer and thereby cut deaths from auto accidents in half?
Yes; No.

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Table 1. Percentage of Americans indicating Support of different policy options in response to a Pakistani Taliban sponsored terrorist bombing in Athens, Greece, by Political Party Affiliation, Political Ideology, and Gender.

Date	Republicans	Democrats	Difference	Independents	Conservatives	Liberals	Difference	Men	Women	Difference	ALL
N	60	62		64	82	37		102	115		217
Diplomacy option	55	71	-16	47	57	70	-13	54	60	-6	57
Air and Naval power	63	44	19	67	67	35	32	67	51	16	59
Send troops into Pakistan	33	24	9	36	42	21	21	36	30	6	33
if losing 500 soldiers	60	27	33	70	57	38	29	70	37	33[a]	54
if losing 1000 soldiers	92	75	17	81	80	67	13	85	77	8	82
if losing 5000 soldiers	82	33	49	92	81	50	29	87	70	17	81
Whatever policy our President adopts	27	55	-28	36	27	43	-16	31	40	-9	36

Note: The "difference" score was computed by subtracting the proportion respondents by the corresponding characteristic. For example, for political party affiliation, the "difference" was computed by subtracting the proportion of "Republican" respondents from the proportion of "Democratic" respondents.
[a]Results of the multivariate analysis for this difference, by gender: Democrats (p=.05), Liberal (.383), Value on human life (.606).

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Table 2. Percentage of Americans indicating Support for policy responses against Iran to end their nuclear development program, by Political Party Affiliation, Political Ideology, and Gender.

Date	Republicans	Democrats	Difference	Independents	Conservatives	Liberals	Difference	Men	Women	Difference	ALL
N	60	62		64	82	37		102	115		217
Diplomacy option	63	86	-23ª	75	68	95	-27	70	79	-9	75
Air and Naval power	52	32	20	55	60	16	44	49	44	5	47
Send troops into Iran	33	15	18	23	35	3	32	26	23	3	24
if losing 500 soldiers	60	56	4	47	62	1	61	65	42	23	54
if losing 1000 soldiers	50	60	10	100	78	1	77	82	46	36	68
if losing 5000 soldiers	50	33	17	86	71	1	70	50	*	-40	63
Whatever policy our President adopts	27	60	-33	38	29	41	-12	30	48	-18	40

Note: The "difference" score was computed by subtracting the proportion respondents by the corresponding characteristic. For example, for political party affiliation, the "difference" was computed by subtracting the proportion of "Republican" respondents from the proportion of "Democratic" respondents.

ªResults of the multivariate analysis for this difference, by political party: Isolationist (.001), loyalty to president (.030), Value on human life (.057).

*Too small a number of cases to give stable result.

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Table 3. Percentage of Americans indicating Support for policy responses in Kosovo to stop the genocide, by Political Party Affiliation, Political Ideology, and Gender.

Date	Republicans	Democrats	Difference	Independents	Conservatives	Liberals	Difference	Men	Women	Difference	ALL
N	60	62		64	82	37		102	115		217
Do nothing	30	31	-1	27	42	14	28	28	33	-5	30
Let UN solve the problem	55	63	-8	53	46	66	-20	51	62	-11	57
Send Kosovars weapons	52	47	8	34	40	38	2	37	46	-9	41
Air and Naval power	36	28	8	36	31	25	6	45	21	24	33
Send troops into Kosovo	21	40	-19ª	28	23	28	-5	31	25	6	28
...if losing 500 soldiers	56	41	15	54	46	44	2	48	47	1	48
...if losing 1000 soldiers	40	29	11	71	60	25	35	46	44	2	45
...if losing 5000 soldiers	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	22
Whatever policy our	33	65	-32	47	35	49	-14	43	50	-7	47
President adopts											

Note: The "difference" score was computed by subtracting the proportion respondents by the corresponding characteristic. For example, for political party affiliation, the "difference" was computed by subtracting the proportion of "Republican" respondents from the proportion of "Democratic" respondents.
ªResults of the multivariate analysis for this difference, by political party: Value on human life (.208).

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Table 4. Americans' concern for civilian deaths in foreign conflict military interventions, by Political Party Affiliation, Political Ideology, and Gender.

Date	Republicans	Democrats	Difference	Independents	Conservatives	Liberals	Difference	Men	Women	Difference	ALL
N	60	62		64	82	37		102	115		217
If the U.S. uses the military to intervene in a foreign conflict how concerned are you with civilian deaths?											
Very concerned	62	71	-9	61	71	61	10	57	73	-16[1]	65
Somewhat concerned	23	21	2	23	21	23	-2	27	18	9	22
Not too concerned	13	7	6	16	7	16	-9	16	7	9	11*

Note: The "difference" score was computed by subtracting the proportion respondents by the corresponding characteristic. For example, for political party affiliation, the "difference" was computed by subtracting the proportion of "Republican" respondents from the proportion of "Democratic" respondents.

[1] Results of the multivariate analysis for this difference, by gender: Democrats (p=.695), Liberal (.039), Value on human life (.002).

* The difference of 2 percentage points are the "don't know" (1 point) and "refused" (1 point) responses.

Table 5. Percentage of Americans indicating support for various policy options to capture or kill Bin Laden, by Political Party Affiliation, Political Ideology, and Gender.

Date		Republicans	Democrats	Difference	Independents	Conservatives	Liberals	Difference	Men	Women	Difference	ALL
N		60	62		64	82	37		102	115		217
Greatest number of civilian deaths to kill or capture Bin Laden	About 10	28	42	-14	20	23	32	-9	28	30	-2	29
	About 100	15	15	0	17	17	19	-2	20	10	10	14
	About 500	2	0	2	6	4	5	-1	6	4	2	5
	About 1000	8	7	1	6	12	3	9	11	5	6	8
	Over 5000	12	0	-14	16	15	0	15	15	5	10	10
	None	20	26	-6	27	21	32	-9	15	32	-17	24
	Nuclear bomb	15	10	5	20	21	5	16	19	14	5	16

Note: The "difference" score was computed by subtracting the proportion respondents by the corresponding characteristic. For example, for political party affiliation, the "difference" was computed by subtracting the proportion of "Republican" respondents from the proportion of "Democratic" respondents.

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Table 6. Percentage of Americans indicating support for intervention in regions not within US national interests that is experiencing a genocide[1], by Political Party Affiliation, Political Ideology, and Gender.

Date	Republicans	Democrats	Difference	Independents	Conservatives	Liberals	Difference	Men	Women	Difference	ALL
N	60	62		64	82	37		102	115		217
Darfur	33	35	-2	41	35	24	11	40	32	8	36
Rwanda	32	37	-5	41	35	29	6	42	29	13	35
South Africa	32	31	1	41	34	24	10	38	30	8	34
Venezuela	32	27	5	34	31	22	9	34	29	5	31
Ireland	27	29	-2	31	28	16	12	28	30	-2	29

Note: The "difference" score was computed by subtracting the proportion respondents by the corresponding characteristic. For example, for political party affiliation, the "difference" was computed by subtracting the proportion of "Republican" respondents from the proportion of "Democratic" respondents.

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[1] Intervene with no US national interest If one group of people in the _____ region were being killed or raped by another group, should the U.S. military get involved?

Table 7. Percentage of Americans indicating Support of different policy options in Afghanistan, by Political Party Affiliation, Political Ideology, and Gender.

Date	Republicans	Democrats	Difference	Independents	Conservatives	Liberals	Difference	Men	Women	Difference	ALL
N	60	62		64	82	37		102	115		217
Pull out all our troops	55	71	-16	42	42	51	-9	41	54	-13	48
Keep the number of troops the same	63	44	19	67	35	35	0	28	33	-5	31
Send in more troops	33	24	9	36	18	3	15	26	4	22	14*

Note: The "difference" score was computed by subtracting the proportion respondents by the corresponding characteristic. For example, for political party affiliation, the "difference" was computed by subtracting the proportion of "Republican" respondents from the proportion of "Democratic" respondents.
[1] Results of the multivariate analysis for this difference, by political party: Hawkishness (.601), Value on human life (.346).
* The difference of 7 percentage points are the "don't know" responses.

Table 8. Percentage of Americans indicating confidence that the war in Afghanistan will come to a successful conclusion, by Political Party Affiliation, Political Ideology, and Gender.

Date	Republicans	Democrats	Difference	Independents	Conservatives	Liberals	Difference	Men	Women	Difference	ALL
N	60	62		64	82	37		102	115		217
More confident	23	18	5	23	28	14	14	26	20	6	23
Less confident	58	68	-10	67	57	81	-24	60	70	-10	65*

Note: The "difference" score was computed by subtracting the proportion respondents by the corresponding characteristic. For example, for political party affiliation, the "difference" was computed by subtracting the proportion of "Republican" respondents from the proportion of "Democratic" respondents.
* The difference of 12 percentage points are the "don't know" (11 points) and "refused" (1 point) responses.