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Force in Our Times

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ABSTRACT

Recent world politics displays two seemingly contradictory trends: on one hand, the incidence of international and even civil war shows a very great decline, but on the other hand the US, and to a lesser extent Britain and France, have been involved in many military adventures since the end of the Cold War. The causes are numerous, but among them are the unipolar structure of world politics, which presents the US with different kinds of threats and new opportunities. Central also is the existence of a Security Community among the leading states. A number of forces and events could undermine it, but they seem unlikely to occur. Even in this better world, however, recessed violence will still play a significant role, and force, like other forms of power, is most potent and useful when it remains far in the background.

A look at the past should make anyone hesitate to discuss the future of force. In 1811 a sensible person would have predicted that the coming century would be extremely bloody; in 1911 an informed observer could be quite optimistic. It is perhaps this knowledge that leads me in 2011 to see a mixed (but fairly bright) picture, and the safest prediction might be that whatever I am about to say will be proven wrong. Indeed, the unexpected revolt in Libya and what to me was the equally unexpected military response by France, the UK, and the US casts a somewhat different light – or shadow – on our understanding of the role of force today, and this understanding will in turn be influenced by how the operation turns out.

The fact that the Libyan operation is (so far) a limited one epitomizes the conflicting perceptions to which I will return. On the one hand, the incidence of war and even internal violence has greatly subsided. One the other hand, the US, and to a lesser extent Britain and France, are involved in an increasing number of violent affairs. On a smaller scale, the raid that killed Osama bin Laden also reminds us that force can solve an immediate problem, although the more important long-run effects remain to be seen. That no one today would echo Bismarck's famous claim that "Not by speeches and votes of the majority, are the great questions of the time decided…but by iron and blood," does not mean that force is without a role, or even that changes in behavior have matched changes in what leaders feel they can say out loud.

Before saying more about where force is now, I want to make some general points about force and violence in human societies. Because this topic is an enormous one, my treatment will be selective and telegraphic.

FORCE IN THE WORLD

The question of why wars occur is central to both scholarship and citizens' concerns about the world. Decision-makers also sometimes ask this. Thus when Japanese leaders made a presentation to

the Emperor in the late summer of 1941 that was designed to pave the way to attack the US and Britain, he stunned them by reading his grandfather's poem:

> All the seas, in every quarter,
>   are as brothers to one another.
> Why, then, do the winds and waves of strife,
>   rage so turbulently throughout the world?[1]

Here and elsewhere to pose the query seems to urge peace, the fact that more recent scholarship shows that the Emperor was deeply implicated in Japanese aggression reminds us that other motives can be at work.[2]

Life would be quite different were it not for the sad fact that it is easier to destroy than to build.[3] Relationships, lives, regimes, and civilizations that can be built only with enormous time and effort can be damaged if not destroyed with much less work. Although vulnerability is neither universal nor symmetrical, we as individuals, organizations, or states cannot avoid giving hostages to others. In fact, we may develop relationships in order to be able to threaten them, or to encourage others to build so that they will have reason to stay on good terms with us. Thus while the relative ease of destruction accounts for much that is unpleasant about human existence, it also provides the foundations for cooperation. Whether these foundations are stable or not is another matter, but the very belief that stability is at best limited may increase the incentives to cooperate. Thus from the start it is clear that force and the possibility of its use play multiple and complex roles in human life.

When searching for the fundamental causes of war and violence in general, it is hard to avoid discussing human nature. Kenneth Waltz may be correct that if such nature can be meaningfully said to exist, it cannot explain why violence occurs more in some areas and at some times than others and that its variable impact on behavior makes it a thin analytical reed on which to rest, but it remains central, especially in light of the past generation's research.[4] Perhaps the most important point is the most obvious

one: by their nature, human beings are capable not only of killing each other individually, but of conducting mass slaughter. This was the starting point for most classical Realists, whether they explained this by original sin or the inherent desire to dominate, as exemplified by the writings of Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau respectively. One does not have to deny that people who perpetrate such acts are evil to recognize that even ordinary people, previously undistinguishable from the bulk of the population, can commit unspeakable acts.[5] The propensity to commit violence is not spread evenly in the population, however, and almost all the perpetrators (and most of the victims) are young males. This fact is stressed by students of evolutionary psychology who argue that in the environment in which human evolution occurred, violence was often a strategy that led to males' productive success. Some support for this argument is provided by the fact that studies of other animals have overturned the old conventional wisdom that human beings were the only species that killed their own kind – we now know that such behavior is almost universal, and was almost certainly true of our evolutionary forbearers.

But this is not the entire story, which is not surprising in light of the fact that in all aspects of life the actual exercise of violence remains the exception rather than the norm (in both senses of the word). What is crucial is that humans seem to be born with capacity for empathy, sympathy, and the innate drive to help others.[6] Indeed, individuals, small groups, and societies could not have survived without extensive cooperation, and human beings are distinguished from other animals less by their propensity for violence than by their highly-developed ability to cooperate.[7] (Research also casts doubt on the related idea, central to much rational choice theory, that all people seek to maximize narrow self-interest, a posture that actually owes a great deal to socialization.[8])

When violence and war are not attributed to human nature, they are often seen as the product of emotion and irrationality. The exchange of letters between Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud exemplifies this position:

Dear Professor Freud,

This is the problem: Is there any way of delivering mankind from the menace of war? (Einstein, July 1932)

Dear Professor Einstein,

The ideal condition of things would of course be a community of men who had subordinated their instinctual life to the dictatorship of reason. But in all probability that is a utopian expectation. (Freud, September 1932)[9]

Parallel was Nelson Mandela's answer to the question of why the former Yugoslavia dissolved into a bloody war while South Africa made a peaceful transition to majority rule: "They [the Yugoslavs] thought through their blood and not through their brains. In countries where innocent people are dying, the leaders are following their blood rather than their brains."[10]

Without denying the role for emotion – and over the past quarter-century psychologists and neuroscientists have modified the previous cognitive revolution and shown that emotions are central to meaningful life – standard social science teaches us that violence can be as rational as any other activity. If one actor resorts to it, self-defense may force it on others; cost-benefit analysis may indicate that many valued goals can be reached only or most effectively through violence; in the international realm that lacks a sovereign, violence can result from the actors' shared desire for security even if, in principle, none of them wants to make others insecure.[11] A full exploration of this topic is beyond my scope here, and I just want to note that this perspective implies that violence might not be decreased by the standard liberal prescriptions of greater education, self-discipline, and other accoutrements of civilization. Perhaps this is as much an optimistic conclusion as a pessimistic one, because if violence could only be drastically reduced by the prominence of cold reasoning and self-control, the world might be a bloodier place.

RECESSED VIOLENCE

The previous discussion has concerned the <u>use</u> of force. But it may exert a powerful influence even – or especially – when it is not used. Crucial but difficult to study is what can be called the latent or recessed role of force. Many characteristics of society, international outcomes, and the behavior of actors (be they individual or national) are strongly shaped by the possibility of violence. This is clear when states retreat in the face of the danger of war; although only a few shots were fired during the Cuban missile crisis, when, why, and how it ended was obviously deeply influenced by the possibility that war would break out. Indeed, the origins of the crisis lay in the possibility that force might be used. In one version, Khrushchev placed the missiles in Cuba to protect it against the threat of another American-sponsored invasion; in another (not entirely incompatible with the first) the motive was to bolster the pressure on the US to change the status quo in West Berlin. In either case, Khrushchev's move was predicated on the possibility that force would be used in the future, and his behavior was driven by calculations that a bolstered military posture would increase the likelihood that he could get his way without actually having to fight.

Thus it is important not to equate the role and frequency of force with that of the actual outbreak of violence. Indeed, as with the more general concept of power, force may be most efficacious when it is least used, and even when the participants are unaware of the influence.[12] A story about a conversation between a Soviet and American general toward the end of the Cold War may be apocryphal, but is illuminating. To the American's obviously correct statement that "It is certainly fortunate that the wars during this period never became nuclear," the Soviet replied: "They were all nuclear." He was stating an important truth in that the occurrence and conduct of armed conflicts that involved the US, the USSR, or their allies were shaped, and usually confined, by the fear that they could escalate and involve nuclear weapons, and also by the mirror realization that the other side's fear that this could happen gave the state bargaining leverage. More broadly, nuclear deterrence was central to the conduct of the Cold War. Of

course this statement points to the difficulties of the general argument about the recessed role of force. Was deterrence needed? Did it actually restrain Soviet (or American) aggression? Did it exacerbate the tensions and increase the chance of war?[13] Even with so many documents open, this debate cannot be settled, and perhaps the Cold War would have played out more or less the same way had the atom never been split.[14]

At the simplest level, we are dealing with anticipated reactions when we consider non-use.[15] Here the actor consciously thinks about what will happen if she or others do use force, and adjusts her behavior accordingly, often in a way that means that violence does not occur. Most obviously, a leader may ask what the chances are that his country will win a war if it occurs, and, upon receiving a pessimistic answer, will make concessions. This was the case with the French in the second Moroccan crisis. Because the question was asked explicitly, it left traces in the historical record. But if the exchange occurs within a person's head, our confidence that the question was asked, let alone that its answer influenced behavior, must be greatly reduced. Explicit discussion is more likely to be found when war may be a viable option; when it obviously is not, people are not likely to talk about it. Thus I suspect that we could search Mexican records for the last 150 years without finding serious discussion of whether that country should plan to fight the US in order to regain the territories taken from it in the Mexican-American war. The reason for this is not a feeling that the outcome of the war was just, but an understanding that overwhelming American power meant that it would be foolish to waste time and energy thinking about a war, and that it would have been not only fruitless but counterproductive to raise the issue in diplomatic discussions. My assertion that if the military balance were different, Mexican-American relations would be very different rests on the implicit comparison to a counterfactual world where the balance tilted in Mexico's favor. This, in turn, rests in part on knowledge of other cases in which relative power did drastically change (and predicts that China may re-open discussions with Russia at some point in the future); just as it implies that the Zimmermann

Telegram would have gained a better reception from Mexico had German military prospects been better. But this evidence, if we can dignify it with this name, is obviously ambiguous and disputable, and the role of force in maintaining a situation may be made visible only when its threat is removed, as in the liberation of East and Central Europe in 1989. The difficulty of ascertaining whether latent force was at work is shown by Gorbachev's surprise at the results of his renouncing this instrument.

Again in parallel to the general exercise of power, violence can exercise its greatest influence when it is so deeply recessed that the actors do not realize that it is operating. I presented the lack of a Mexican demand to change the borders with the US as a case of anticipated reactions, but by this point many Mexicans may have internalized the judgments of the Mexican-American war and accepted the current border as not only unchangeable, but legitimate. Whether this consciousness is false or not is of course a normatively-laden judgment, fortunately one that my analysis does not have to engage with. Rather what is central here is that the perception that force cannot be used can over time influences not only the contours of international politics, but also underlying beliefs and attitudes. For example, the widespread sense that war is at best an instrument of last resort and represents a failure of diplomacy if not of civilization owes a great deal to the difficult of waging quick and decisive wars. Similarly, while the rule of international law is often held up as the polar opposite to a world governed by force, many of the basic precepts and interpretations of law have been shaped by the distribution of power in the world, as those with less of it are quick to note.[16] In this light, it is not surprising either that while peaceful change is often contrasted with change produced by war, the threat of the latter is often crucial to the former[17] or that powerful states often favor the renunciation of the use of force.[18]

TENSIONS IF NOT PARADOXES

To the fact that force may exercise its greatest influence when it is not being used we should add four other complicating factors.[19] First is the powerful but often conflicting role of expectations. In many

circumstances, beliefs about the likelihood of future conflict can be self-fulfilling as actors use force now because they expect that if they do not, they will have to fight under less advantageous conditions later. Nuclear weapons made us keenly aware of the danger of a mutually-undesired preemptive war,[20] and the war in Iraq spurred scholars to look back at history for the prevalence of preventive wars.[21] Indeed, it may not be an exaggeration to say that a fundamental cause of war is the fear of war, and this is the dynamic behind the familiar security dilemma. Most scholars believe that fear of war in the future played a large role in the German decisions in 1914, and the Japanese expansion in the 1930s was driven by the desire for economic self-sufficiency, something that was needed because a future war with the West was believed inevitable.

Beliefs can also strongly influence the outcome of confrontations in which war is prohibitively costly to both sides. Here the interaction resembles the game of Chicken that nuclear weapons have made so familiar to us. But the game can be played without them.[22] The basic point was well understood by Kaiser Wilhelm when he told Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg in the second Moroccan crisis: "Whoever declares in advance that he will not fight will achieve nothing in politics. I do not think that the French will pick up the gauntlet but they must feel that we are decided on extreme measures."[23] In the end, it was the Kaiser who made most of the concessions, but if his tactics were often maladroit his basic understanding of the situation was correct. Thanks to Schelling and those who have followed him, we now have a much greater understanding of the odd behavior that Chicken calls forth (e.g., foreclosing one's options, the rationality of irrationality, the threat that leaves something to chance).[24] When in their first meeting at Geneva in 1985 Gorbachev and Reagan agreed that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought," they were not only recognizing an obvious reality, but by declaring their recognition of it were implying that limited nuclear wars were impossible and that bluffing at the brink was to be excluded. But of course these implications themselves both depended on beliefs (a necessary condition for fighting a limited nuclear war

would be that both sides believed it could be kept limited) and underscored the essential paradox of Chicken because both sides kept their nuclear weapons while declaring that they could never be fired.

The Cold War highlighted another paradox of violence: power can come from the willingness to bear pain as well as the ability (and willingness) to inflict it. Although we often call wars a contest of arms, it has always been clear that individuals and states vary in their willingness to keep fighting in the face of risk and losses. Thus Clausewitz stressed that the people were an element equal to the government and the army in his trinity, and a state that is willing to continue the struggle in the face of very high casualties may prevail despite its inferior military position.[25] To Americans the most salient example is Vietnam, and Harry Summers begins his book on the subject with the following exchange:

> "You know you never defeated us on the battlefield," said the American colonel.
>
> The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment. "That may be so," he replied, "but it is also irrelevant."[26]

North Vietnam did not need to defeat the US on the battlefield; it "only" needed to be able to inflict sufficient casualties so that the American people (if not presidents Johnson and Nixon) preferred losing to continuing the fight, and it could only mount such a massive effort because it was willing to absorb enormous punishment.

The determinants of such willingness are multiple and insufficiently explored, but very important is the state's intensity of motivation. Thus while the US felt it was important to prevail in Vietnam, the North felt that it was vital to do so. What was at stake was much more important to the North than to the US, and this asymmetry offset the much greater military strength of the US. (The nature of the actor may be important here as well. Voters did not feel that Vietnam was worth the blood and treasure being spent; the preferences of the North Vietnamese people are harder to ascertain and mattered less because they had much less say in the matter.) By some lights, there is a significant measure of justice here in that outcomes

in part reflect how much each side values what is at stake. This is not to say that each will get its just desserts, but only that each stands a good chance of getting more of what it cares most about.

When intensity of preference is clear to others, conflict may be avoided because the less motivated side will realize that armed conflict is a losing proposition even if it has sufficient military strength to win. So force may play a recessed role here as states gain or keep what they care most about without having to fight or even perhaps to make overt threats.

As the previous paragraphs indicate, a central challenge for scholars (and policy-makers) is to understand actors' preferences and the intensity with which they are held. Morgenthau's textbook (but not many of his other writings)[27] may have talked about the national interest as though it was clear and unchanging, but one does not have to be a constructivist to know that this is wrong. For all the centrality of the question of how the national interest gets defined, our knowledge is relatively sparse, however. What is most relevant here, however, is the proposition, widely accepted if not completely verified, that the interests a country defines as extremely important if not vital tend to expand as its power does. Winston Churchill got to the heart of the matter:

> When nations or individuals get strong they are often truculent and bullying, but when they are weak they become better mannered. But this is the reverse of what is healthy and wise. I have always been astonished, having seen the end of these two wars, how difficult it is to make people to understand the Roman wisdom, "Spare the conquered and confront the proud." … The modern practice has too often been, "Punish the defeated and grovel to the strong."[28]

This means that a state's use of force may not decline as it gains a particularly advantaged position in the international system, which helps explain some of the puzzling trends to which I will turn in the next section. It is not only that such a state has the ability to bully others, but also that the state's conception of its needs grow in a way that will create new conflicts. In the case of the US today, this effect is magnified by perceptions of both the threat from terrorism and the opportunity to make a better world. Contrary to what one might expect, then, the American position as the sole superpower leads it to behave at least as much

as a revolutionary state as one that is seeking to maintain the status quo; often arguing that it is acting preventively.[29]

Bismarck's famous labeling preventive war suicide for fear of death assumes that the war will be disastrous for the state. When it believes otherwise, preventive wars may make more sense, and because there are few guarantees in international politics and fears often loom larger than hopes, it is difficult to put bounds on what acts should be undertaken in the name of prevention. One thing is clear, however: because powerful states are, by definition, in a relatively advantageous position they are prone to take strong preventative actions. Because they are well off many changes are likely to hold at least the potential for harm. Modern psychology indicates that losses hurt more than gains of the same magnitude gratify,[30] and states that have gained a powerful position find more values, positions, and territory worth fighting for. It is not only aggressors and evil states who find that the appetite grows with the eating. These impulses are more likely to be acted on because their great power gives these states confidence that the costs of acting now are reasonably low. So it is not entirely surprising that the US and the UK adopted a strong notion of prevention in overthrowing Saddam Hussein in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Although much remains in dispute about their objectives and perceptions, there is significant evidence that both governments were deeply concerned, not with existing ties between terrorists and Saddam, but with the danger that they would be brought to fruition later and that Saddam could eventually provide terrorists with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), even if he did not have them in 2003.[31] A middle-level official in the Bush Administration went so far as to tell me that while he thought Saddam was sensible enough not to engage in such an adventure, whoever succeed him might be bolder. To many of us, these fears seemed far-fetched and the estimates of the likely costs of invasion as under-weighted as the fears of the future were exaggerated, but at least decision-makers could not have been accused of

looking only to the short-run, and the discussion showed how great power can lead to great fears and a very broad conception of interest.

FORCE TODAY

Two dramatic and seemingly-contradictory trends are central. On the one hand, since the end of the Cold War if not before, the amount of inter-state and even civil war has drastically declined. Of course much depends on the time periods selected and the counting rules employed, but by any measure international wars are scarce if not vanishing, and civil wars, after blossoming in the 1990s, have greatly diminished.[32] Significant instances of civil strife remain and are made salient by the horrific examples that appear in the newspapers every day, but in fact all inventories that I know of conclude that they are fewer than they used to be. Ironically, although realism stresses the conflict–inducing power of international anarchy, the barriers and inhibitions against international war now seem significantly more robust than those limiting civil wars. But even the latter are stronger than they were in the past. Although a central question is whether these trends will be reversed, they truly are startling, of great importance, and were largely unpredicted. They also remain insufficiently appreciated; one rarely reads statements about how fortunate we are to live in such a peaceful era. Perhaps the reasons are that optimism is generally derided in the cynical academic community, peace is not the sort of dramatic event that seizes public (and media) attention, and in the absence of major wars, we all find other things to worry about.

But Plato was not entirely wrong to say that "only the dead have seen the end of war."[33] Force, even when deeply recessed, can come to the surface again. Discussions in the US and Europe about relations with Iran often debate whether force should be "taken off the table." But, regardless of whether it would be desirable to do so, would this be possible? As long as important disputes with Iran remain, with even the best will in the world there are limits to how far thoughts of the use of force could be pushed out of

the minds of all the participants, especially those in Tehran. It is interesting that Tony Blair told the Chilcot commission that with respect to Iraq "even prior to September 11, 2001…. You know, the fact is [that] force was always an option."[34]

Don't try to tell Bashar al-Assad or Muammar Qaddafi that force is no longer important. As Osgood and Tucker noted in their important study over 40 years ago, "if force has lost its utility, its condemnation on moral grounds is superfluous."[35] Libya, in fact, represents the other trend. Since the end of the Cold War, the US, and to a lesser but significant extent Britain and France, have used force more often than they did before. Panama, the Gulf War, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Libya are unmatched in the Cold War era. The US is now fighting three wars, although by the time this article appears in print its military role in Libya and Iraq may be over. Of course these military adventures are all small by comparison with most wars, and certainly by the standards of Korea and Vietnam, let alone the wars between Iran and Iraq and Ethiopia and Eritrea. Nevertheless, they cannot be dismissed.

It is beyond my scope to explore all the possible explanations for either of these trends, but it does seem clear that the rise in American military activity was caused at least in part by the end of the Cold War and the related fact that the US is now the sole superpower. The new configuration means that the US is no longer deterred from entering local conflicts by the fear of a confrontation with the Soviet Union, makes others rely even more on the US to be a policeman (if often a misguided one), and elevates the salience of both threats and values that were previously trumped by the superpower rivalry. Opportunities loom larger for the US and the UK than they did during the Cold War, and new threats calling for military intervention have increased in visibility if not in actual occurrence. To start with the latter, although terrorism was a concern during the Cold War, it played nothing like the role that it does now. Of course the US never suffered an attack like 9/11 before, but while I will briefly discuss the extent of the danger of terrorism later, here I want to argue that the common placement of terrorism at the top of the list of threats is a product not

only of the attacks over the past decade, but also of the paucity of other threats. The felt need to use force against terrorists, states that support them and even countries that might work with them in the future in part stems from a security environment that is remarkably benign.

The benign – for the West – environment also presents tempting opportunities. During the Cold War the US often hoped to see democracies flourish abroad, but was inhibited by the twin fears of Soviet counter-intervention and the chance that the democratic regimes would become anti-American or fall prey to a Communist take-over.[36] Parallel fears of course still exist, but without a Soviet threat they are less pressing, and the success of the democratic transitions in Eastern Europe led many Americans to believe that stable democracies are likely to spring up once authoritarian regimes are replaced, a view that was battered by the Iraq experiment and is now being tested in North Africa.[37] This pattern is consistent with classic Realist thinking, and specifically with Arnold Wolfers' argument that states will seek milieu goals when their security and other core values are largely satisfied.[38] Having done well, states can seek to do good. This is particularly true for the US because of its liberal ideology, the difficulties it has in understanding barriers to democracy, and its resistance to seeing limits to the possibilities for material and spiritual improvement.[39] Although it is now almost universally believed that we are witnessing a relative if not absolute decline of the West and the rise of Asian countries, for the most part this is more a prediction for the future than a description of the current situation. Temptations still abound.

THE SECURITY COMMUNITY

Alongside and in part responsible for the two contrasting trends in the use of force is the existence of a security community among the world's leading powers. Although I can be brief because I have discussed this elsewhere,[40] the point is of fundamental importance. For the first time in history, the leading states of the world (the US, most of Europe, and Japan) not only are at peace with each other, but find the

idea of war within this group literally unthinkable (which is the definition of a security community).[41] Although Russia and China remain outside the community (which is not to say that war with or between them is highly likely, but only that it is within the realm of possibility), the change in world politics is enormous. War among the leading powers of the world and, at least as much, fear of war, preparation for war, and the desire to avoid such wars if possible--and prevail in them if not--has been the driving motor of international politics for centuries. At the risk of hyperbole, I think we can say that turning off this motor is the greatest change in international politics that we have ever seen. Its implications remain hard to grasp, and indeed how citizens and leaders come to understand this new world will strongly shape how they behave. But even now it is clear that the existence of the security community is crucial to world politics, international relations theory, and our lives.

Obvious questions are what caused the community to form, what could lead it to be replicated elsewhere, and what if anything could lead it to unravel. I have discussed the first question in my earlier writings and so will discuss only the latter two topics here. Of course speculations about what could bring the community to an end are not unrelated to analysis of its causes despite the fact that path-dependence could be at work and the possibility that the community could survive an end to the factors that brought it into being. Nevertheless, just as the community was formed by changes in domestic regimes, ruling values and ideas, and the costs and benefits of war and peace, so factors in these categories might bring us back to earlier and less fortunate relations. On top of all the normal unknowns in dealing with possible futures, our speculations are limited by the fact that the security community is particularly psychological in that it is defined by the unthinkability of war among the members. If we know little about how events move from being seen as possible to actually coming about, we know even less about what forces and processes move them from being unthinkable to being seen as possible.[42]

Here it is worth stressing that the fact that war among the members is unthinkable has real consequences beyond the fact that peace is maintained. When I ask my undergraduates whether they think they will live to see a war with another leading power, they look at me as though I have lost my mind because such an idea has never crossed theirs. What – among other things – they fail to realize is that their state of mind is without precedent and that the ability to go about their lives without the slightest concern that they or their country might – just might – have to fight another leading power shapes a good deal of their lives and our society. This is not to say that their lives are now free from worry, but only that their freedom from worrying about what used to be considered the greatest scourge of the human race gives them freedom to worry about other things.

On a larger scale, societies and governments within the community can go about their business without thinking about how this might affect the prospects for peace or the outcome of war with other members. Like my students' lack of concern, we take this for granted, but in fact it represents a sharp break from the past. Rivalries, concern for relative position, and the desire for bargaining advantages still remain, but the intensity and consequences are quite different when war is out of the question. The whole tenor of inter-state relations and fundamental attitudes toward conflict and cooperation are different from the time a century ago when a British observer could return from a trip to Germany saying "Every one of those new factory chimneys is a gun pointed at England."[43]

I see no reason to expect the community to come to an end. Indeed, the fact that it is defined by the participants' beliefs that war cannot occur means that if they thought it would end, then in fact it would be dissolved (although war might not actually occur). More broadly, just as I noted earlier that expectations of war can be self-fulfilling, so can expectations of peace. But since academic musings have little impact, it

is safe to pursue our scholarly duty of asking about what developments, currently unforeseen, might destroy the community.

Just as one pillar of the community was the transformation of the old idea that war was honorable and glorious by the almost universal repugnance of it[44] (and this is one reason why any war now has to be carefully sold to the public), the community would be at least weakened if this attitude changed. Is it conceivable that war could come back into fashion? It is literally unimaginable that slavery or monarchical rule could return to favor. The current replacements for these ideas are deeply woven into the fabric of the social order, and the current conception of war as a terrible enterprise similarly does not stand alone and presumably could not change without wide-ranging alteration of our societies. One dreadful but I think unlikely possibility would be that the success of a series of military interventions of the type we have seen recently could lead to a general reevaluation of not only the utility of this kind of force, but of its fundamental role in human endeavors. Even without this, might values change in a cyclical fashion? Might boredom lead to a resurrection of the idea that force is noble? Could males, finding themselves losing power and status in their societies, seek a return to a world in which the arena of violence in which they have a comparative advantage is seen more positively? If it impossible to say that this cannot occur, it seems at least as difficult to foresee a chain of events that would bring this about. (But it is worth noting that before September 11, 2001 few of us believed that torture might come back into the inventory of state behavior.)

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes?[45] A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy, and bring back old-fashioned

beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a pre-existing high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

In the past, the conflict of interest that has sparked war has involved territory more often than economic issues, although of course the two are often linked.[46] Thus the rise of the security community has been accompanied by a decline in territorial conflicts, and reciprocal causation is surely at work here. Could territorial conflicts resume a salient place in relations among the leading power? Territory in the guise of self-determination continues, as the likely coming of a referendum on Scottish independence indicates. But a reduced attachment to territory is indicated by the fact that the rest of the UK is not willing to fight to prevent this, just as it would be willing to part with Northern Ireland if the majority of the inhabitants desired to join the Irish Republic. Indeed, the existence of a security community and the related decline in traditional security threats makes it easier for sub-national units to split off.

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Concern for territory has not entirely disappeared, of course, and the recent Danish claim on large portions of the Arctic reminds us that changes in climate and technology can endow areas with new value.[47] But the virulent disputes we see around the world stem from the break-up of states or the partition of areas of the globe previously ruled by others, and within the community it is hard to see either likely candidate territorial disputes or general trends that would return to traditional values. Could anything occur that would lead Germany to feel that it was vital to reclaim Alsace and Lorraine? If this were to happen, we would be in a different world. But to turn this around, we would have to be in a very different world for this to occur.

The security community is underpinned not only by the benefits it is believed to bring, but also by the perceived high costs of war. If large-scale conventional war would be very destructive, the presence of nuclear weapons pushes the costs off the scale (and it is worth remembering that although Germany and Japan do not have nuclear weapons, they could develop them very quickly). One does not have to accept all the precepts of standard deterrence theory to believe that it would take extraordinary incentives for the states to contemplate war with so many nuclear weapons scattered around. The other side of the coin is that the security community might be weakened if the costs of war were to become much less. The good news – from this perspective – is that there are few prospects of this. Even President Obama, who has stressed the need to abolish nuclear weapons, admits that this cannot be done in his lifetime. Missile defenses, endorsed by all American presidents since Reagan, remain out of reach, and no technologies or tactics are in sight that could render conventional war quick and relatively bloodless.

A more likely change would be an erosion of American hegemony. Among the leading powers, all are not equally leading. The strength, interests, and military presence of the US remain sufficient to see that others in the community do not challenge either it or each other. A decline in American power and a

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partial withdrawal of its influence are certainly possible, and at minimum, American troops might be withdrawn from Europe in the coming years. But would this matter? Even if American dominance played a large role in forming the community, it may not be necessary for the community's maintenance. Path dependence may operate strongly here, and although firm evidence is hard to come by, I would argue that in the absence of other changes of the kind I have discussed, it is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war. (On the level of policy prescription, however, I am cautious enough not to want to run the experiment.)

Is it an accident that all members of the security community are democracies (and that few established democracies are outside it)? The literature on the "democratic peace" is enormous, contested, and cannot be engaged here. But incentives to fight are sharply reduced when there is little about the other country that the state would want to alter in the wake of a successful war. Americans and French find aspects of each other's domestic politics and society strange and off-putting, but the differences are hardly great enough to justify considering fighting, even for those who do not feel that such variety is to be valued for its own sake. Probably the only real threat to democracy in these countries is a severe economic downturn, something that as we noted earlier could directly pose a threat to the community. But it is hard to imagine that a newly non-democratic regime would contemplate war against its more numerous and presumably more powerful democratic neighbors. More likely would be that the community would end, at least temporarily, because it would be the democracies that would use force against the country that had left the democratic ranks.

A danger that overlaps but is not identical with the rise of non-democracies would be the emergence of competing ideologies within the community—an end to the "End of History."[48] Fascism, communism, and now "political Islam" have played this role, but it is not impossible that the future could see

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new ideologies, even some that might not disturb the central democratic forms and functions. These remain hypothetical and hard to imagine. But this may reflect a lack of imagination; we may be so bound by those ideas with which we are familiar that we assume they exhaust the universe of possible ones.

RUSSIA AND CHINA

Russia and China clearly are not members of the security community since war between them or with members of the community is thinkable, and indeed is the basis of much of the latter's defense spending. I join with what I believe to be the consensus in rejecting the more extreme argument that war with or between either of them is inevitable. The obvious argument to the contrary is a version of power transition theory that holds that China's rise will create frictions so large and difficult that they cannot be coped with by diplomacy and peaceful adjustment. Neither theory nor history justifies such a conclusion, however.[49] But this does not mean that these countries will become part of a security community in the foreseeable future. The standard conflicts of interest, particularly over influence in neighboring regions, are strong, and if these countries became democratic probably would be amplified by nationalism from below and demagoguery from above.

If peace is to be maintained with and between China and Russia, it will have to be by the more traditional means of diplomacy and the deterrence, and as in the Cold War the enormous costs of nuclear war are a major inhibitor of it. Of course, armed conflict below the nuclear level is still possible, and the danger of inadvertent escalation that would accompany such clashes will give the parties pause before embarking on adventures and means that a cataclysm could yet occur. For those who see clashes of arms as impossible in our modern and interdependent world, however, the continuing arms competition between the US and the PRC must represent a puzzle, perhaps to be explained by the military-industrial complexes on both sides. I find this doubtful, partly because increasing Chinese military power is influencing China's

neighbors, albeit by accommodating the PRC on some occasions and balancing against it on others in ways that neither the PRC nor scholars can easily predict. Either way, however, Chinese arms are having an effect, revealing the continuing role of latent if not manifest force.

A SECURITY COMMUNITY IN THE REST OF THE WORLD?

Even by academic standards, it is embarrassingly crude to lump together the parts of the world not previously covered, but limits of space and my knowledge require me to do so. Here too, we see contradictions. One the one hand, the two largest international wars of the late 20th century were fought in the Third World (Iran/Iraq and Ethiopia/Eritrea); on the other hand, by the standards of European history, such wars have been remarkably few. Most of the borders the African states inherited from the artificial carvings of colonialism have been retained, and South America has largely been at peace. [50] Another tension, if not a contradiction, is that while it is commonly said that today threats (at least to the West) emanate not from strong states as they did in the past, but from weak ones, in fact it is the former who wage wars. In part, those concerned about weak states focus on terrorism and transnational threats such as crime, piracy, and disease. Strong states can impose a decree of domestic order and be held accountable by other states, and weak states provide both threats and opportunities that invite foreign intervention. But some states are hard to characterize as weak or strong (e.g., Afghanistan under Taliban rule), and the conflicts that could prove most disruptive and kill the largest number of people involve fairly strong states, such as India and Pakistan and Israel and its Arab neighbors. Furthermore, although terrorists can organize in ungoverned spaces along the Pakistan-Afghan border and Yemen, they can do most damage when they are fostered by a state, with is one of the reasons why Iran and Syria are widely perceived as a threats.

But whether weak or strong states are the problem, it does not appear that many regions, let alone the entire world, will form a security community in the foreseeable future. It may seem discouraging to suggest that others will not follow the path of the leading powers, but seen in a different light this is encouraging. The conditions that allowed a security community to form included centuries of massively destructive wars, and it would be Eurocentric in the extreme to believe that this is the only path to peace, or even to a security community. Here as in many areas, multiple causal links can produce the same outcome. Although this complicates social science methodologies, in this instance it may be a blessing for the world. Of course the possibility of arriving at this happy outcome does not mean that it will occur, but the remarkably low level of inter-state war in the Third World and the decline in the number civil wars certainly holds out hope. The gains from peace, the possibility of security guarantees, and the delegitimization and costs of war are conducive to peace. War among Third World countries is not likely to become unthinkable, but it may nevertheless be quite rare.

MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

What can be said about the future military interventions in the Third World by Western states, especially the US? Recent events exert a heavy influence on projections, perhaps too much so. Had I been writing when the prospects in Iraq looked especially dire, I would have said that we had seen the last of interventions for quite a while; if Libya turns out well, the obvious expectation would be that humanitarian and other interventions will recur. Of course, even now we do not know how either of these episodes will "turn out" (the scare quotes are needed because there never is a final outcome), but the point is that the future is influenced by the past – and by perceptions of the past. It is also influenced by military capabilities, and it is ironic that the British were in the forefront of the Libyan intervention and also scheduled defense budget cuts that would make a repetition of the operation extremely difficult. The US

presumably will retain these capabilities, but a necessary condition for its acting in Libya was the agreement that after it carried out the initial and most demanding operations it could pull back and let others take over, which would not have been possible without a strong British and French capability. In any case, the impulses of both threat and opportunity that have been present since the end of the Cold War are not likely to disappear. Whether this means that the US will be the leading rogue state and the greatest threat to world peace or whether it will be the upholder of universal values and the provider of public goods depends partly on value judgments, but the essential point here is that American military power still very much affects the rest of the world. Furthermore, it does so through anticipated reactions even when it is not used. As I noted earlier, the latent or recessed role of force is easy to miss because it operates on people's minds, and even their subconsciouses, rather than on their bodies.

OTHER THREATS AND WAR

It is not only the use of force by states that threatens national security today, with the obvious other dangers being terrorism, cyber attacks, and climate change. Here my crystal ball is especially cloudy, and I will be very brief.

Terrorism is not new, but its impact has grown with technology and the decline of other threats. The reversal of President Bush's initial intention to lower the American profile around the world and, most dramatically, his decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein was driven by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Bush and Blair argued – and I think believed – that the capabilities that these attacks revealed rendered unacceptable a set of risks that previously were seen as unfortunate but tolerable. In particular, the ultimate danger was that terrorists would acquire WMD from deeply evil regimes, and Saddam had put himself in this category by his oppression and use of poison gas against his own people.[51] The irony is that both the attacks themselves and the administration's arguable over-reaction to them can be explained in

part by the fact that Bush and his colleagues had previously misunderstood and underestimated the terrorist threat. They believed that the crucial security issues facing the US were those posed by large dissatisfied states (Russia and China) and that terrorism could do little harm unless it had a powerful state sponsor. This led them to pay little attention to terrorists before the attacks and to focus on the danger that they would receive WMD from a strong state in their aftermath.[52]

Regardless of one's judgment about Bush's policy, it is clear that terrorism can be a major threat only if it involves nuclear or perhaps biological weapons. If we grant, as I think we must, that at least some terrorists groups would like to inflict massive damage on their enemies, the question is how likely it is that they could acquire this capability. Definitive judgments are impossible, but while I believe that John Mueller is excessively dismissive, his conclusion that the danger is negligible is closer to the truth than the more common alarmist views. [53] Partly thanks to the preventive measures triggered by fears of terrorism, there no longer are large quantities of unsecured nuclear materials, let alone bombs, and the barriers to gaining and deploying nuclear explosives even in the form of a "dirty bomb" are many and formidable. Indeed the main threat of terrorism comes from its fundamental characteristic of inducing terror by leading people to expect more pain and punishment than it can in fact mete out. The danger, then, primarily comes from psychological and political overreaction both at home and abroad.

Intercepting and manipulating others' electronic messages is as old as the electronic communications media themselves. But there comes a point when a quantitative difference becomes a qualitative one, and with cyber systems penetrating every aspect of civil society as well as the military establishments, the potential for cyber conflict in many forms is now enormous. The multiple problems for analysis, let alone for national policy, can be indicated just by listing some of the ways in which this domain (and there is dispute about whether calling it a domain is misleading) differs from the worlds with which we

are more familiar. Experience of cyber attacks is limited, and because the relevant information is closely held, knowledge about what has happened is even more so. The technology is rapidly changing and, unlike the case with nuclear weapons, a good understanding of it is required to judge the political possibilities and dangers. On top of this, cyber conflict can blur the distinction between war and peace, and civil and military concerns and institutions are deeply intertwined in the cyber realm.

So even more than in the discussion of terrorism, I am led to non-conclusions. As with terrorism, it is hard to get a sense of proportion and estimate the magnitude of the threats. *Deformation professionelle* leads many of those who are most involved to paint alarming pictures that are hard for the rest of us to judge. The priority we should give this area and the opportunity costs we should be willing to pay to gain greater security are then difficult to estimate, or even sensibly discuss. The very fact that we have not faced a massive cyber attack both contributes to the uncertainty and means that if one occurs, the government and society will almost certainly be ill-prepared for it and that the crisis decision-making will be chaotic and make matters worse. But the fundamental question remains whether the lack of such an attack so far is a matter of good fortune or an indication that the problems are manageable.

Global climate change is also the product of technology, and the implications for the use of force are speculative but worrisome. Although it is possible that overall warming would take fewer lives than it would save through aiding agriculture in some areas and reducing deaths caused by cold, even leaving aside rising sea levels the disruption of existing patterns would create countless opportunities for conflict that could reverse the benign trends we have been discussing, even if it did not destroy the security community. There is some chance that the response to such a challenge would be greatly enhanced cooperation and dispute-resolution, but it is hard to see convincing grounds for such optimism. Of course, force cannot prevent climate change, but it can help shift more of the costs on to others. If the scientific

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consensus is correct, even controls on greenhouse gases much greater than those that can be reasonably expected will not prevent major disruptions, and how we cope with them may test us as much as wars did in the past. Shortages of food and water, loss of income, migration flows, and a general sense that the future is bleak would not guarantee wars, but hardly are conducive to peace. Although the competition for scarce resources has not been a major cause of war in the past, unless there are technological breakthroughs the future could bring unprecedented pressures. One does not have to be an alarmist to see multiple ways in which fighting could break out and few effective means of coping more cooperatively.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

To the untraditional forms of violence discussed in the previous paragraphs could be added the looming stresses on the system that could generate conflict and war. It is far from clear that the developed countries can soon climb out of the current deep recession, and the implications of long-term unemployment are very troubling. To predict that the world will return to high growth in the near future seems irresponsibly optimistic, even though it might be a self-fulfilling prophecy. The heavy indebtedness of many countries, both a cause and a consequence of current economic hardship, reduces the ability of states to cope with this and other stresses, and introduces additional elements of conflict. Rising prices for food and energy (and the former is partly a product of the latter) and the possibility of painful shortages can obviously generate both international and domestic strife. Demographic changes and a decrease in the ratio of workers to dependents holds the potential for further disruption and, like the debt crisis, makes it harder for states and societies to smoothly adjust.

These problems merit and have received extensive attention in their own right, and the "only" question relevant here is their implications for the future of force. It is obvious that they could produce multiple wars, both domestic and foreign. Indeed if history were an accurate guide, one would have to

predict such outcomes. This returns us to the central questions I have danced around in this article: How much will the future resemble the past? Are we entering a really new era - one that will see much less violence and be better?   The latter question reminds us that while violence brings with it terrible consequences, the lack of violence may have drawbacks as well. As I have stressed throughout, the lack of the use of force does not mean that it is not playing an important recessed role.   Bullying and, more subtly, the inducing of fundamental attitudes, expectations, and beliefs can have enormous effects. I would not want to go as far as to argue that the psychological damage caused by the latter processes is equivalent to the incredible physical damage seen in the 20th century, but this dimension is too easy to ignore. We should also not be too quick to identify nonviolent politics with democracy, let alone with justice. The "Arab Spring" of 2011 only reinforces our tendency to do so. But minorities with intense feelings can prevail in non-violent politics, although doing so calls for a greater degree of popular support and more deeply felt beliefs than is true when power is held by men with guns. Nevertheless, the shape of politics without violence is not necessarily benign. I wonder, for example, if the income distribution in the US and UK might not have become so unequal had the elites had reason to fear a violent domestic reaction to such expropriation.

Returning to international politics, a continuation let alone the spread of the security community would be a radical break from the past. This raises questions for IR theory which I will put aside here,[54] but also brings up the recurring topic of the possibilities for progress in international politics. Much Realism argues--or assumes--that the anarchic structure of the system leads to recurring patterns, many of them involving violence, and rules out long-term peace in the absence of clear deterrence. There is much to this perspective, but cost/benefit calculations, norms, and values (which can affect not only norms but also what are seen as costs and benefits) can and have changed over time. The world of politics today is different from that of earlier eras, in part because of what we have learned, including our hard-won knowledge of

how enormously destructive wars can be. Obviously wars are still possible, and the massive bloodletting between Iran and Iraq and Ethiopia and Eritrea could easily recur, either there or elsewhere. But as Paul Schroeder has so knowledgably and eloquently argued, over the long term there does seem to be progress in international politics.[55] Only a few would deny that there has been real progress in domestic societies and politics over the last 3,000 years, and even as a Realist I think it would be a strain to argue that all of this is attributable to rulers gaining the monopoly on violence, or at least on legitimate violence, that is lacking in relations among nations. Politics within and among states are not so cleanly divided; learning and even civilizing may proceed in both realms, albeit at different rates and in different ways.

[1] Quoted in Robert Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 258.

[2] Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York: HarperCollins, 2000).

[3] Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), p. v.

[4] Kenneth Waltz, Man, The State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); for good discussions see Keith Shimko, "Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism," Review of Politics, vol. 54, Spring 1992, pp. 281-301; Annette Freyberg-Inan, What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and its Judgment on Human Nature (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003); Ken Booth, ed., Realism and World Politics (New York: Routledge, 2011). For an

analysis based on modern biology, see Stephen Peter Rosen, <u>War and Human Nature</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

[5] Perhaps the best demonstration is the study of those who carried out rather than designed the Holocaust: Christopher Browning, <u>Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland</u> (New York: HarperCollins, 1993).

[6] For a good summary, see Michael Tomasello, <u>Why We Cooperate</u> (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009).

[7] For a summary of the literature, see Martin Nowak, with Roger Highfield, <u>SuperCooperators: Altruism, Evolution, and Why We Need Each Other to Succeed</u> (New York: Free Press, 2011). Ants and other eusocial animals cooperate even more than humans, but this can be explained by the unusual extent to which they share genes.

[8] Gerald Marwell and Ruth Ames, "Economists Ride Free, Does Anyone Else?: Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods, IV," <u>Journal of Public Economics</u>, vol. 5, June 1981; Dale Miller, "The Norm of Self-Interest," <u>American Psychologist</u>, vol. 54, December 1999, pp. 1053-60.

[9] Quoted in James G. Blight, "How Might Psychology Contribute to Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War?" <u>Political Psychology</u>, vol. 7, December 1986, p. 617.

[10] Quoted in Anthony Lewis, "Mandela the Pol," <u>New York Times Magazine</u>, March 23, 1997, p. 43.

[11] The literature on the security dilemma is large. For recent excellent discussions, see Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, <u>The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics</u> (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Shiping Tang, <u>A Theory of Security Strategies for Our Time: Defensive Realism</u> (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

[12] The classic works include David Baldwin, <u>Paradoxes of Power</u> (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," <u>American Political Science Review</u>, 1962, vol. 56, pp. 947-52; Stephen Lukes, <u>Power: A Radical View</u> (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

[13] I think many of these debates turned on differing analyses of Soviet intentions: see Robert Jervis, <u>Perception and Misperception in International Politics</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), chapter 3.

[14] John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," <u>International Security</u>, vol. 13, Fall 1988; for a rebuttal, see my "The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment" in the same issue.

[15] Although I believe that the sources of disagreement among actors as to the likely outcome of wars are much broader and more important than Fearon's argument acknowledges, he shows that anticipated reactions can drastically reduce the incidence of the actual use of force without reducing its recessed role: James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," <u>International Organization</u>, vol. 49, Summer 1995, pp. 379-414. This has led to important research and debates that would be a digression here, but I should note the critique by Jonathan Kirshner, "Rationalist Explanations for War?" <u>Security Studies</u>, vol. 10, January-March 2000, pp. 143-150.

[16] For an early and cogent exposition, see Robert Friedheim, "The 'Satisfied' and 'Dissatisfied' States Negotiate International Law: A Case Study," <u>World Politics</u>, vol. 18, October 1965, pp. 20-41; for a related and fascinating discussion, see Stuart Banner, <u>How the Indians Lost their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier</u> (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005).

[17] See, for example, Frederick Dunn, <u>Peaceful Change: A Study of International Procedures</u> (New York: Macmillan, 1937); Charles Manning, ed., <u>Peaceful Change: An International Problem</u> (New York: Macmillan, 1937).

[18] Edward Hallett Carr, <u>The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations</u> (London: Macmillan, 1946) (the original edition was published in 1939 and used the analysis to justify the policy of appeasement).

[19] Tensions and paradoxes are central to Baldwin, <u>Paradoxes of Power</u>, and Giulio Gallarotti, <u>The Power Curse: Influence and Illusion in World Politics</u> (Boulder, CO.: Lynn Rienner, 2010).

[20] The classic treatment is Thomas Schelling, <u>The Strategy of Conflict</u> (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1960), chapter 9.

[21] See, for example, John Lewis Gaddis, <u>Surprise, Security, and the American Experience</u> (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), and Scott Selverstone, <u>Preventive War in American Democracy</u> (New York: Routledge, 2007). Earlier excellent treatments include Jack Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," <u>World Politics</u>, vol. 40, October, 1987, pp. 82-107, and Dale Copeland, <u>The Origins of Major War</u> (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

[22] For a general discussion of the topic of deterrence before Hiroshima, see the book with that title by George Quester (New York: Wiley, 1966).

[23] Quoted in William Mulligan, <u>The Origins of The First World War</u> (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 72. For parallel statements by American leaders during the Cold War, see, for example, Secretary of State Dean Rusk in US Department of State, <u>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963</u>, vol., XIV, <u>Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962</u> (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 656 and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger in US Department of State, <u>Foreign Relations of the United</u>

States, 1969-1976, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006), p. 258.

[24] Schelling, Strategy of Conflict; Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1966). As powerful as Schelling's reasoning is, the empirical question of whether and when actors behave in this way is subject to much more dispute, as the enormous literature on deterrence indicates.

[25] The classic article is Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," World Politics, vol. 27, January 1975, pp. 175-200.

[26] Harry Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 1.

[27] Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).

[28] Quoted in Woodrow Wyatt, "Churchill in His Element," Harper's Magazine, September 1954, pp. 38-46.

[29] For further discussion, see Robert Jervis, "The Remaking of a Unipolar World," Washington Quarterly, vol. 29, Summer 2006, pp. 7-20.

[30] The literature on prospect theory is now enormous: see, for example, Rose McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics: Prospect Theory in American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); Barbara Farnham, ed., Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Robert Jervis, "The Implications of Prospect Theory for Human Nature and Values," Political Psychology, vol. 25, April 2004, pp. 163-176.

[31] Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (New York: HarperCollins, 2008).

[32] See, for example, John Mueller, The Remnants of War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Mueller, "War has Almost Ceased to Exist: An Assessment," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 124, Summer 2009, pp. 297-321; Raimo Vayrynen, ed., The Waning of Major Wars: Theories and Debates (New York:

Routledge, 2005); Christopher Fettweis, <u>Dangerous Times? The International Politics of Great Power</u>

<u>Peace</u> (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010); Monty Marshall and Benjamin Cole, "Global

Report 2009: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility," Center for Global Policy and Center for Systemic

Peace, 2010, <u>http://www.systemicpeace.org/Global%20Report%202009.pdf</u>; Human Security Report

Project, <u>Human Security Report, 2009/2010</u> (Vancouver: HSRP, 2010), <u>http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-</u>

<u>security-reports/20092010/text.aspx</u> (Forthcoming in print from Oxford University Press); Ted Robert Gurr,

Joseph Hewitt and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, <u>Peace and Conflict 2010</u> (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers,

2009); World Bank, <u>World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development</u> (Washington,

DC: The World Bank, 2011). A provocative analysis of the general decline of violence is Steven Pinker,

<u>The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined</u> (New York: Viking, 2011).

[33] Quoted in Robert Dallek, <u>The Lost Peace: Leadership in a Time of Horror and Hope, 1945-1953</u> (New

York: HarperCollins, 2010), p. 370. There is controversy over this attribution: some scholars argue that it is

not found in any Platonic texts (<u>http://plato-dialogues.org/faq/faq008.htm</u>), and it may originate with George

Santayana, <u>Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies</u> (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922), p.

102.

[34] Testimony of January 29, 2010, p. 48 (http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/43909/100129-blair.pdf).

[35] Robert Osgood and Robert Tucker, <u>Force, Order, and Justice</u> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

Press, 1967), p. 224.

[36] For President Kennedy's classic expression of the latter fear, see Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., <u>A Thousand</u>

<u>Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House</u> (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 769.

[37] For a treatment of these beliefs that looks critically at the role of liberal ideology and scholarship, see

Tony Smith, <u>A Pact with the Devil: Washington's Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the</u>

<u>American Promise</u> (New York: Routledge, 2007).

[38] Arnold Wolfers, <u>Discord and Collaboration</u> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960), chapter 5.

[39] Although often disputed and misunderstood, extremely valuable here is Louis Hartz, <u>The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution</u> (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955).

[40] "Theories of War in an Era of Leading Power Peace," in Jervis, <u>American Foreign Policy in a New Era</u> (New York: Routledge, 2005), chapter 1; an earlier version appeared in <u>American Political Science Review</u>, vol. 96, March 2002, pp. 1-14.

[41] Karl Deutsch et al., <u>Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

[42] For a discussion of this in the context of revolutions, see Charles Kurzman, <u>The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran</u> (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2004).

[43] Quoted in Paul Kennedy, <u>The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914</u> (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), p. 315.

[44] John Mueller, <u>Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War</u> (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

[45] For the importance of status, see Richard New Lebow, <u>A Cultural Theory of International Relations</u> (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008; Lebow, <u>Why Nations Fight</u> (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Deborah Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy," <u>International Security</u>, vol. 34, Spring 2010, pp. 63-95.

[46] For good discussions, see John Vasquez, <u>The War Puzzle</u> (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Vasquez, <u>The War Puzzle Revisited</u> (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Paul Huth, <u>Standing Your Guard: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict</u> (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); Tanisha Fazal, <u>State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

[47] "Denmark: Leaked Document Reveals Plans to Claim Parts of the North Pole," <u>New York Times</u>, May 17, 2011.

[48] Francis Fukuyama, <u>The End of History and the Last Man</u> (New York: Free Press, 1992).

[49] For a good critique, see Richard Ned Lebow and Benjamin Valentino, "Lost in Transition: A Critical Analysis of Power Transition Theory," in Booth, ed., <u>Realism in World Politics</u>, chapter 12. For an excellent analysis of how different theories lead to different predictions about Sino-American relations, see Aaron Friedberg, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?" <u>International Security</u>, vol. 30, Fall 2005, pp. 7-45; also see his <u>A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia</u> (New York: Norton, 2011).

[50] Arie Kacowicz, <u>Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective</u> (Albany: State University of New York, 1998); Felix Martin, <u>Militarist Peace in South America: Conditions for War and Peace</u> (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

[51] Obviously there is room for enormous contention here, which I think we will never settle. For an elaboration of my views, see "War, Intelligence and Honesty: A Review Essay," <u>Political Science Quarterly</u>, vol. 123, Winter 2008-09, pp. 645-75; "Explaining the Iraq War," in a forthcoming volume edited by Trevor Thrall and Jane Cramer.

[52] The administration's lack of concern with terrorism is evident from the materials developed by the 9/11 Commission, a conclusion that it could not reach because of the need for its report to be bipartisan and unanimous.

[53] John Mueller, <u>Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), Part III.

[54] My earlier thoughts on this can be found in "The Future of World Politics: Will it Resemble the Past?" International Security, vol. 16, Winter 1991/92, pp. 39-73 and "Theories of War in an Era of Leading Power Peace".

[55] Schroeder, "Does the History of International Politics Go Anywhere?" in Schroeder, Systems, Stability, and Statecraft: Essays on the International History of Modern Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), chapter 12; Schroeder, "Not Even for the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Power and Order in the Early Modern World," in Ernest May, Richard Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner, eds., History and Neorealism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chapter 5. Also see Shiping Tang, "Social Evolution of International Politics: From Mearsheimer to Jervis," European Journal of International Relations, vol. 16, March 2010, pp. 31-55; Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature; K. J. Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); James Payne, A History of Force: Exploring the Worldwide Movement Against Habits of Coercion, Bloodshed, and Mayhem (Sandpoint, Idaho: Lytton, 2004); Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, eds., Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).