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**THE ROLE OF THE UNIVERSITY IN ETHNIC  
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION,  
DEMOCRATIZATION, AND DEVELOPING HUMAN  
RIGHTS IN THE BALKANS**

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### *Abstract*

The aim of this paper is to elaborate the role of the University in democratization, developing human rights and transforming ethnic conflicts in the Balkan states proposing creative and applicable solutions. The main conclusions are, first, that if a system cannot be qualified as democratic one, appears the complex dilemma what could and should come first: developing democracy (including the university education) or transforming ethnic conflicts or preventing their escalations/deescalating them. Second, during conflict escalation, the Balkan and other University's duty is to offer to country's decision makers and the rest of the society and the world the knowledge residing on scholars in peace and conflict studies, philosophers, historians, economists, engineers, political scientists and many other fields that can help understand the goals, attitudes, interests, identities, and/or behaviors of the other and our conflict side as well as of the mediators, arbitrators, etc.

Having in mind the situation within the Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia) one can distinguish several criteria for their classification. From the perspective of the topic of this paper the most important their feature seems to be that they

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all have and take part in more or less similar and sometimes mutual ethnic conflicts. Second, a great majority of these states have been in certain stages of the post-communist democratization process and have had problems with human and other rights.<sup>2</sup>

### 1. Conflict Transformation

Since the beginning of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, present-day Yugoslavia (and at the first place Serbia) has been taking part in escalated conflicts in Slovenia (1991), Croatia (1991-1995) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995). In 1998-1999, the conflict in Kosovo escalated within the country itself, and the dispute or conflict in Montenegro could escalate (maybe followed by escalations in Sandzak, Vojvodina and/or some other parts of the country). In addition, although the Macedonian church had separated a generation ago, formally it has been under the Patriarchate of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Nis; a similar development seems to be taking place in Montenegro, etc.

Since Macedonia left Second Yugoslavia, Macedonia has been having the conflicts first with own Albanian minority and Albania, as they have been demanded state carrying or autonomous position or even separation of the Albanians in Macedonia. Second conflict has been with Greece, which has not been recognizing the name of the Macedonian state, nation and language as long as it matches the same name of the northern Greek province. On the other side, Macedonia had been taking from the Greek territory and heraldically incorporated the Alexander the Great's star of Vergina. A former Skopje Parliament's deputy speaker stated that the Greece "has no legitimate right over Aegean Macedonia".<sup>3</sup> Third conflict has been with Bulgaria as it has perceived Macedonians as a sort of Bulgarians, Macedonian language – as a dialect of the Bulgarian language (it seems that the situation in this regard was recently changed at least a bit) and has recognized Macedonians just as a kind of Bulgarians. However, many Macedonians consider

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<sup>2</sup> See Isakovic, Zlatko, "Democratization, Democracy and Ethnic Conflicts in the Balkans", *COPRI Working Papers*, no 9, 2000, <http://www.copri.dk/copri/downloads/2000/9-2000.doc>.

<sup>3</sup> Quoted after Herring, Eric, "International Security and Democratization in Eastern Europe", in: Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring and George Stanford (eds.), *Building Democracy? The International Dimensions of Democratization in Eastern Europe*, Leicester University Press, London, 1994, p. 99.

themselves as a distinct nation having own language. In addition, the VMRO used to show maps in which just 38% of the Greater Macedonia is in present Macedonian state, 51% - in Greece and 11% – in Bulgaria.<sup>4</sup> Beside the conflict with Macedonia, Bulgaria had the dispute (or should one call it conflict?) with own Turkish minority.

According to Galtung, conflict theory examines definitions, sources, impasses of conflict, *diagnosis* (critical conflict analysis), *therapy* (suggestions for conflict resolving, transforming or just for deescalation), *prognosis*, and *prevention*, i.e. suggestions for what can be done in the future in such a situation.<sup>5</sup> Conflict is political relationship in which parties have *incompatible goals, attitudes, interests, and/or behaviors*.<sup>6</sup> Goals, attitudes, interests and behaviors can be incompatible within an actor (e.g. dilemmas), among actors (disputes) or both.<sup>7</sup> Conflict exists to the extent that it is not possible for all of parties of that relation to achieve their goals, interests, and/or attitudes at the same time. The most common case is one where the parties have some colliding (for example, own sovereignty) and some coinciding (for instance, democracy) goals or interests (“mixed-motive game”). In extreme cases, one party loses what the other wins (“zero-sum game”) like in cases arising from deep rooted values or ideologies leaving no room for assisted negotiation.<sup>8</sup> One can differentiate the following methods utilized for conflict resolution purposes: *reformulating* a conflict apparently over power, justice or identity in terms of interests (economic, political, cultural, religious, etc.); *violence*, “with its simple winner/loser logic, is promoted by focusing on violence” instead on the root conflict; *third party intervention* including mediation (mediators wish to influence and sometimes

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<sup>4</sup> More details: Wiberg, Håkan, “Societal Security and the Explosion of Yugoslavia”, in Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup & Pierre Lemaitre, (eds.), *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, Pinter Publishers Ltd, London, 1993, p. 105.

<sup>5</sup> For more details see: Galtung, Johan, “The Ex-Yugoslavia: Several Remarks on Diagnosis, Prognosis and Therapy”, in Radmila Nakarada (ed.), *Europe and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia*, Institute for European Studies, Belgrade, 1994.

<sup>6</sup> See Wiberg, Håkan, “Identifying Conflicts and Solutions”, *Review of International Affairs*, vol XLIX, no 1070-71, 1998; Michell, C. R., *The Structure of International Conflict*, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1981, p. 29.

<sup>7</sup> See Galtung, Johan “Crafting Peace: On the Psychology of the TRANSCEND Approach”, in Johan Galtung, and Carl G. Jacobsen with Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen and Finn Tschudi, *Searching for Peace; the Road to TRANSCEND*, Pluto Press, London, 2000.

<sup>8</sup> Martinelli, Marta, “Forms of Third Party Intervention: Typology, Theoretical Approaches, Empirical Results”, in Håkan Wiberg and Christian Scherrer (eds.), *Ethnicity and Intra-State Conflict: Types, Causes and Peace Strategies*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999, p. 208.

force the parties, and they wish to influence the mediator); *conflict management* (avoidance and withdrawal, bilateral negotiation, third party intervention, etc.); *transformation of the root conflict draining negative energies at attitudes and physical and verbal behaviour*, etc.<sup>9</sup> In this paper will be mostly utilized the last mentioned method, which can be described as conflict resolution in a way that was not thought or proposed by any of conflict parties. Shortly, this method could be described as stimulating the parties to say: “This seems to be interesting, why don’t we try it?” The main preconditions are that the proposal is creative and, of course, applicable.

Before some proposal for conflict transformation is made, one should understand and learn how to cope with conflicts. In some situations (as in Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina) at least a temporary and fragile peace it is possible to be achieved by force, but it seems to be a more efficient way when ethnic conflicts are eliminated using even illusory arguments in the proper or narrow meaning of that term. “*Conflict-resolution is not about harming or killing people. It is about killing problems and harnessing the human and circumstantial attraction to violence. Violence is always part of the problem, never the solution*”<sup>10</sup>. In the case of conflicts in Kosovo and some others the most rational way seems to be, at least theoretically, if all not directly engaged actors play the role of conflict mediator within or as a complex enterprise or consortium, trying to employ their democratic and other advantages, and to avoid (expressions of) their weaknesses or temptations and handicaps.<sup>11</sup> However, the politicians of some of the parties in conflicts use (more) force as an argument, and some use (more) arguments.<sup>12</sup> This way seems to be often counterproductive as violence is exploited by other side’s propaganda creating group traumas (transmitted from generation to generation via family, elementary, high and university education and other segments of socialization process) and in that way a base for future conflicts and their escalations. Thus, violence gives

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<sup>9</sup> See: Martinelli, *Ibid.*; Galtung, *op. cit.*; Bercovitch, J. & Houston, A., “The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence”, in J. Bercovitch (ed.) *Resolving International Conflicts*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1996.

<sup>10</sup> Øberg, Jan, “Conflict-Mitigation in Former Yugoslavia - It Could Still Be Possible”, in: Radmila Nakarada (ed.), *Europe and Disintegration of Yugoslavia*, Institute for European Studies, Belgrade, 1994, p. 140.

<sup>11</sup> More details: Isakovic, Zlatko, “Diplomacy and the Conflict in Kosovo – Notes on Threats and Fears”, *COPRI Working Papers*, no 10, 1999, p. 28, [www.ciaonet.org/](http://www.ciaonet.org/)

<sup>12</sup> For more details see: Isakovic, “Democratization, Democracy and Ethnic Conflicts in the Balkans”, *op. cit.*

birth to new violence. However, the conflict transformation method empowers the parties to handle themselves the conflict using mostly peaceful and democratic political means. The final step of the transformation is reconciliation (bringing farewell to violence) between the parties in conflict.

As it was noticed, one should stay away from the notion that conflict behavior should always be something that is to be stopped. Moreover, it should not be considered that conflict in a wider sense of the term is something that should be necessarily avoided.<sup>13</sup>

## 2. Democratization, Developing Human Rights and Ethnic Conflicts

According to several definitions of democracy, it is a rule of majority as well as a procedure used for the non-violent elimination of political, economic conflicts and other discrepancies in positions, i.e. interests in society. However, sometimes, even without violating or abusing the mentioned procedures, one party in the conflict is dissatisfied or merely partly satisfied with the decisions, which shows that the conflict has not been fully resolved (and in this way eliminated), i.e. that it has been 'resolved' just in formal, and not in essential regard.

The link between the conflict transformation and democracy is visible having in mind the attitude that one of the most significant precondition for conflict therapy is readiness for dialog which can be considered as the essence of democracy. If existing Balkan or other system could not be qualified as democratic (as the readiness for dialog does not exist within major political forces and organizations), usually appears the complex dilemma what could and should come first: developing democracy or preventing escalation, deescalating or/and resolving ethnic conflicts?

The collapse of communism and the re-emergence of a number of small, multiethnic and easy to manipulate states, which have rather poor democratic traditions (partly thanks to the fact that many of them were born in the war conditions) have represented two earthshaking events. They have heavily influenced the re-emergence of numerous ethnic conflicts and tensions within the states as well as in inter-state relations in the region and beyond. For instance, in addition to the four ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia (Serbo-Croatian in Croatia, Serbo-

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<sup>13</sup> Wiberg, Håkan, "Identifying Conflicts and Solutions", p. 176.

Moslem, and Serbo-Croatian in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbo-Albanian in Serbia), now there are some four new (Moslem or Bosnian-Croatian in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the mentioned Macedonian-Albanian, Macedonian-Bulgarian and Macedonian-Greek conflict) and several potential intra-state and international conflicts of the successor states. After Slovenia used to be a member of the Serbo-Croatian conflict in Croatia in 1991, Slovenia has been the only conflict-free Yugoslavia's successor state, which managed to establish relatively stabile and democratic interethnic relations and human rights seen as one concrete way of overcoming the Balkan legacies as well as a concrete contribution to the peace in the region and beyond.

The situation in the Balkans has a special weight for the prospects of European security and European integration, which – according to some authors' beliefs – could be effectively thwarted by ethnic conflicts. It seems that the basic reasons for this belief came from already clearly demonstrated manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism as elementary and general indicators and generators of ethnic conflicts in Europe and elsewhere. This belief is further corroborated by the inclination toward establishing ethnically pure states, confinement to one's own borders, national particularism, selfishness, xenophobia or hegemonism, domination, authoritarian rule over other nations or parts of them, etc.

The formal and substantive aspects of the democratization process itself in the respective countries seem to be equally important.<sup>14</sup> By making distinction between formal and substantive democracy, one could reach a more differentiated understanding of the democratization process as it is experienced by each Balkan country. Understandably, the experience of only several years (or decades, in certain cases) in promoting democratic systems is not enough for making meaningful assertion as to the foundations and prospects of democracy. In any case, one can make assessments about whether a process of genuine democratization is under way, and how it can affect elimination and/or preventing escalation of ethnic conflicts in these societies by conflict transformation, managing, mitigating, regulating, mediating, resolving, its marginalization, etc.

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<sup>14</sup> More details see: Isakovic, Zlatko, "Democracy, Human Rights and Ethnic Conflicts in the Process of Globalisation", *COPRI Working Papers*, no 3, 2002, pp. 5-7.

One can detect existence of interdependence between the process of democratization and developing human rights and the modes of ethnic conflicts' resolution in the Balkan countries. The political and social statuses of divers ethnic groups as well as the level of their involvement in the process of democratization in each country are based on (1) the speed and course with which ethnic issues have been recognized; (2) the level of ethnic tension when the democratic process begins; (3) the size and power of different ethnic groups; (4) the ethnic composition of the previous and the present regime; (5) the political positions of the leaders of the main ethnic groups; (6) the presence or absence of external ethnic allies; and (7) ethnic composition of the military and police forces.<sup>15</sup>

In 1995 it was stressed that for the fruitful consociation and stable democracy, it is important the cooperation between élites of different groups (Lijphart), and the possibility that individuals and organizations belonging to different ethnic groups cooperate and affiliate themselves beyond borders of their respective ethnic or federal units (Lipset). The development of the situation in ex-Yugoslavia and processes in some other countries showed that "political élites monopolize the mediating role between the groups, and reduce the possibilities of direct cooperation between citizens and organizations from the areas they have the control over. It is considered that élites support heterogeneity of the society as a whole, i.e. between the ethnic groups, but act very energetically in order to impose homogeneity within the groups they control (Elazar)".<sup>16</sup>

#### a) Democratization, Developing Human Rights and the Ethnic Conflicts

It is considered that terrorism and ethnic violence may continue to appear in a decreasing number of countries. Although

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<sup>15</sup> More details see: Isakovic, Zlatko, "Human Rights Related to the Expression of Religion and Ethnic Relations in Macedonia and Balkans", Anthology of Papers Presented at the International Conference/Round Table *The Contribution of Religious Communities to Peace and the Removal of the Consequences of the War on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia*, ISCOMET, Maribor, in cooperation with The Foundation for International Understanding, Copenhagen, and The European Centre for Ethnic, Regional and Sociological Studies, University of Maribor, Rogaska Slatina, Slovenia, September 19-21, 1997.

<sup>16</sup> Stanovcic, Vojislav, "Vladavina prava i suzivot etnickih grupa" (The Rule of Law and Consociation of Ethnic Groups), *Status of Minorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, Collection of Papers Presented at the Scientific Meeting Held on January 11-13, 1995, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Belgrade, 1996, p. 68.



democracy will win, many countries will face great challenges during the process of democratization.<sup>17</sup> This attitude opens the question of the extent to which democratic and human rights devoted countries could support others becoming alike in the globalized world. However, this dilemma raises new questions, numerous of them boiling down to whether force can be used for an export of democracy or 'democracy'.<sup>18</sup> In that way, democracy (thanks to the process of globalization) could become global problem instead of a world benefit. As the 2000 presidential elections in the USA and a few other countries demonstrated, nobody is perfect as far as democracy is concerned and thus cannot have, pretend or claim the monopoly in this regard.<sup>19</sup>

The Second Yugoslavia's disintegration and the ethnopolitical conflicts in the successor states had had created one of the major challenges for the international community in the post-Cold War era before the September 11, 2001. One could conclude that major international actors have appeared insufficiently capable for making permanent analysis of the potential and escalated ethnic and some other conflicts, whose results could be used not only for preventing conflict escalation, but also for deescalating them by peaceful means. One could assume that some NGOs and some other kinds of organizations that characterize democratic societies could offer the requisite competence, knowledge, skills and enthusiasm, which could be used in a situation such is a conflict, but do not have the means to realize their programs, ideas, and activities. The involved third parties, like governments, international organizations (NATO, UN, Contact Group, OSCE, etc.) or their members, have at least to some degree such means and sources, but are handicapped by the incapability of eliminating the conflict without involving themselves in it in imposing a solution.

One can also define a few characteristics of democratic state's engagement during the process of disintegration often called the Yugoslav crisis. First, the states are vulnerable to foreign and/or local propaganda and political pressures linked to conflict.

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<sup>17</sup> See: Fukuyama, Francis, "Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon", *PS: Political Sciences and Politics*, vol 24. no 4, December, 1995, p. 659–63; Hobsbawn, E. J., *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780 – Programme, Myth, Reality*, second edition, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 164.

<sup>18</sup> See: Barzun, Jacques, "Is Democratic Theory for Export?", *Ethic and International Affairs*, vol 1, 1987; Gillies, David, and Schmitz, Gerald, *The Challenge of Democratic Development*, The North-South Institute, Ottawa, 1992.

<sup>19</sup> More details see: Isakovic, Zlatko, "Human Rights Related to the Expression of Religion...", *op. cit.*

This mediator's vulnerability is a temptation for the parties in the conflict perceiving the situation as an opportunity for waging a propaganda war over the mediator issue. The suitability of the mediator to remain efficient and accepted is additionally reduced by the victory of one party in that war. The mediator that is vulnerable in the above sense is more likely to allow their initiatives to be conditioned by propaganda and political pressures exerted on them than by the requirements of successful mediation.

An East Asian group of countries would in this aspect have fared better than the EC, because it would have the additional advantage of not being made up either of Moslems, Catholics, or the Orthodox. Thus, it is considered that the less vulnerable countries to foreign or local propaganda and political pressures linked to conflict are more appropriate for the role of mediator. While Serbs and Russians are linked with Orthodoxy and Slav ethnic origins, the Albanians' religious division creates, in fact, links with the Moslem, Catholic and Orthodox 'world'. In the case of Kosovo, a prediction that the dominant links of local Albanians with Moslem religion would be the most important was not showed correct.<sup>20</sup>

The propaganda war seems to have been going on since the escalation of Kosovo conflict began and before that time. One of its characteristics appeared to be that the sides tried to distinguish between the 'bad' and 'good' members of the opposite side: the Albanian side issued statements to the effect that their struggle was not aimed against all members of Serbian nation, but against Milosevic's regime, while the Serbian side distinguished between those Albanians who cooperated with the state and the terrorists who from time to time attacked those who cooperate. Political leaders of Albanian political parties in Kosovo were somewhere in between. One author concluded, "the biased international media coverage has repeated itself; the Serb side (also independent sources such as human rights institutes, independent media and the NGO Serb Media Centre in Pristina) has been largely ignored by leading media such as CNN, the *New York Times* and even the BBC".<sup>21</sup> The need for avoiding intensive repressive and similar measures against civilians was suggested, and particularly if the

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<sup>20</sup> More details see: Isakovic, Zlatko, "Diplomacy and the Conflict in Kosovo...", *op. cit.*; *Identity and Security in Former Yugoslavia*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2000, 177.

<sup>21</sup> "Questions before bombing Serbia", Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, *PressInfo*, no 47, 2 October 1998.

measures last continually for some two weeks.<sup>22</sup> The Serbian side also did not devote attention to the warnings that CNN become the sixth informal permanent member of the UN Security Council.

It was considered “international pressure will play a positive role only if it initiates the creation of authentic democratic potentials”.<sup>23</sup> Generally, democratization and developing human rights has a potential to help mitigate ethnic conflict. However, in the case of FRY and most of the other successor states such a potential was wasted, as the transition towards democracy produced a fertile ground for ethnic hatred, animosity and the political demands of power-thirsty political forces and leaders. The democratic turnabout allowed many ethnic tensions including the difficult Kosovo conflict to surface, but because this same democracy was young and fragile it had not been able to manage them properly and peacefully. It seems that this thesis has a wider validity in the Balkans, which are known as a focal point of ethnic conflict and which have been traditionally (at least, temporarily) ‘eliminated’ or ‘resolved’ through both morally and legally extremely unacceptable options, such as forced expulsion and ethnic cleansing, bombardment, etc.<sup>24</sup>

#### b) Ethnic conflicts and the democratization and developing human rights

The republic/nation elites in Yugoslavia before the big quarrel between them started operated “pretty much like the European balance-of-power system of the nineteenth century”; coalitions were issue-related and shifting. When these rules collapsed, Yugoslavia drifted from “mature anarchy” into a “raw anarchy”.<sup>25</sup> The first multi-party elections came at the worst possible moment since ardent nationalists won everywhere; “the runners-up included even more extreme nationalists, giving the winners little leeway for compromises.” It was stressed, “they engaged in various demonstrations of sovereignty, accelerating the conflict spiral:

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<sup>22</sup> For more details see: Simic, Predrag, “Instant Publicity and Foreign Policy”, *Media Studies Journal*, Fall 1993.

<sup>23</sup> Lutovac, Zoran, “Options for Solution of the Problem of Kosovo”, *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), vol XLVIII, no 1056, 1997, p. 14.

<sup>24</sup> See more details: Isakovic, Zlatko, “Human Rights Related to the Expression of Religion...”, *op. cit.*

<sup>25</sup> See: Wiberg, Håkan, “Making Peace in former Yugoslavia: Problems and Lessons”, in: James Calleja, Håkan Wiberg & Salvino Busuttil, in collaboration with Sanaa Osseiran & Peri Pamir (eds.), *The Search for Peace in the Mediterranean Region. Problems and Prospects*, Mireva Publishers, Valetta, 1994, pp. 231-2.

attacks on remaining pan-Yugoslav institutions increased Serbian fears and actions inspired by these fears”.<sup>26</sup> Democracies do not wage wars as in war circumstances they actually often become temporary (as much as wars could be perceived as transient phenomena) constitutional dictatorships having at least some characteristics common with permanent dictatorships.

Later development proved that democracy is imperfect decision-making system because it – among other elements – includes mass manipulation, which is usually easier in young than in old and mature democracies. In a post-communist society, the manipulation could be directed toward numerous issues including the very idea of democratic society. At the same time, acceptance of its imperfection is considered as a strong side of democracy. In the Second Yugoslavia ethnic mobilization became possible with democratization, but the mobilization was threatening and finally in good part destroyed democracy itself. One of main problems with democracy and human rights is that they – defending themselves – sacrifice themselves (in the first place the openness of the society as one of important features of democratic systems in which human rights are respected at least to certain degree) during violent conflict escalation. If this sacrificing lasts for a longer period, societies and their citizens – forgetting the ex-democracy and the ex-human rights protection level – could accept and begin to perceive their sacrificed, i.e. crippled form as the proper democracy and human rights.

Interethnic relations in the Balkan states are burdened by the bitter historical legacy and the presence of strong ethnic stereotypes in society in general and to some extent in what is usually called civil society (associations, trade unions and political parties). In addition, within the current interethnic relations one could still discover marks of their communist and/or other authoritarian past.

A study of ethnic conflicts should take into consideration significant difficulties and distinctions in the ethnic groups' structural position at the moment when democratization and human rights development process is at its very beginning and during it. Within the context of current and future interethnic relations in observed countries, the crucial question seems to be

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<sup>26</sup> Wiberg, Håkan, “Former Yugoslavia: nations above all”, in: Bogdan Góralczyk, Wojciech Kostecki, Katarzyna Zukrowska (eds.), *In Pursuit of Europe – Transformations of Post-Communist States, 1989-1994*, Institute of Political Studies Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, 1995, p. 100.

how to eliminate or prevent escalation of existing ethnic conflicts in order to give democratic and human rights power a chance to assert itself?

The advantages of democratization and the development of human rights and civil society may be used as a tool and platform for conflict transformation in the Balkans depending of, among other conditions, the forms which (new) escalation of ethnic conflict may take. It seems the more violent conflict escalation is the advantages are harder to use, including transforming the conflict in a nonviolent way. In purpose to examine this thesis, in this paper will be analyzed the cases of terror and terrorism as means often used in conflict escalation to achieve the goals for which armed force would otherwise have to be employed.<sup>27</sup>

As etymology shows, the chief weapon of both terror and terrorism is causing fear; “this fear is created for a political goal, it is linked to maintaining or seizing power. Both terror and terrorism have dual targets, dual addressees: the victim of the violence and the threat recipient. Finally, both terror and terrorism are in discord with certain norms of political behavior, which are different in case of terror and in case of terrorism, because, as a rule, terror is an action taken by those possessing legislative power, while individual terrorists are non-sovereign individuals, private individuals, differently subjected to a legal order”.<sup>28</sup> Some authors by definition eliminate governmental violence as a form of terrorism so long as the state has a legitimate monopoly of violence. Even here there are differences between types, situation, activities, tactics, degree to which psychological, social, etc. dimensions are important.

When reviewing the intimidation methods and actions used by 20<sup>th</sup> century terror states in the Balkans and elsewhere, one gains the picture resembling the visions of orders, which are considered suitable or even ideal for achieving goals of numerous terrorist organizations. The same fundamental phenomenon can be found in both cases: the mass production of fear justified by superior goals and principles utilized as a means for ruling over society.

There is technical possibility for two or more terrorist organizations, which are fighting to achieve different goals, to use the same terrorist actions due to their limited communicative

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<sup>27</sup> See more details: Isakovic, Zlatko, *Introduction to a Theory of Political Power in International Relations*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2000, pp. 177-187 and 192-197.

<sup>28</sup> Dimitrijevic, Vojin, *Strahovlada – Ogled o ljudskim pravima i drzavnom teroru (Reign of Terror – Essay on Human Rights and State Terror)*, Rad, Belgrade, 1985, p. 111.

values. Certain communication is possible to be established by choosing the place, time, means and some other circumstances and modalities of action as well as by the (un)selective choice of physical victims, but all this need not be sufficient for reflecting the terrorists' ideological, political and other values and goals in greater detail. If these attempts would be exhausted just in violence, the messages the terrorists use to generate fear would be lost.

For this reason terrorists resort to additional propaganda and other persuasive messages to announce their goals and win publicity among the intimidated people, often via mass media. Through their statements, announcements and other messages they sometimes force the media to convey, they try to enhance or at least partly modify the impact of their violent acts, when possible before committing them. These messages are used as resonators or amplifiers of intimidating messages, which is often obvious in the instances portraying the terrorists as "omnipotent men-machines", "extremely efficient", even "ready to do anything", etc.<sup>29</sup>

On the other hand, the intimidated people and others wish to gather as much information as possible in purpose to secure themselves, out of curiosity or sensationalism. Nowadays is difficult to achieve longer-lasting secrecy of data on terrorist acts – including the fact that they were committed, particularly if the terrorists themselves want publicity and if the acts were committed in public, in front of larger groups of people, etc. "Informing on an act of terrorism benefits the terrorists, because it fulfills one of their needs. However, it must also be emphasized that failure to report on a terrorist act allows for a much more dangerous type of informing, by word of mouth, rumors, which are by nature more difficult to control and prone to irresponsible exaggerations".<sup>30</sup> As in the era of mass media few lies can remain hidden for longer lasting periods, these secrets may leak and incur greater damage than the fear which media reports of the terrorism would cause.

Some authors maintain that reporting should be censored as media coverage practically guarantees the achievement terrorists' goals to attract public attention. This stand is based on the presumption that terrorist acts would not be conducted if their perpetrators knew those acts would not win publicity and on the understanding that there would be no terrorism if it were not for

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<sup>29</sup> See more details: Isakovic, Zlatko & Gingras, François-Pierre, *Persuasion: From rhetoric to terror(ism)*, Ashgate, Aldershot (forthcoming).

<sup>30</sup> Dimitrijevic, Vojin, *op. cit.*, 1985, p. 228.

contemporary communications and corroborated by the fact that it is not always possible to affect main social causes and conditions conducive to terrorism, especially when it is assisted and supported from abroad. Finally, some authors think that by advocating the opposite stand, one would to an extent give terrorism and its unacceptable brutality legitimacy.

However, journalists – particularly in democratic systems – are usually not willing to accept outside censorship of their reports. Some authors maintain terrorism appears when and as long as one group feels unfairly treated, notwithstanding the media behavior, the army's and police's ability to counter it, etc. In addition, it is considered that application of contemporary technology in combating terrorism could jeopardize and violate certain civic and human rights (such as the right to convey and receive information). One could conclude that some governments along with (escalated) conflicts are among worst enemies of human rights. Thus, these governments could use their chance by provoking conflict escalation in purpose to hide its own role in violating the rights.

If the failure in publishing news on terrorist acts can be ruled out as too risky, the question remains how to inform the public about them. As a rule, newsmen are willing to publish news about every specific terrorist act, attaching to it a dose of sensationalism. Anyway, terrorism is a negative sensation and – in keeping with the mass media rules – should be treated as such. As it was noted, “only a few rare phenomena can compare” with the attraction of terrorism.<sup>31</sup>

When terrorism is in question, mass media face the obstacles, which include primarily the restrictions imposed on them by the state legal and political rules or the community ethics and customs rules. It seems that from them stems the use of double standards in the journalists' position on terrorism: positive terrorists are qualified by words with positive connotations (dissidents, freedom or independence fighters, resistance movements, etc.), while the negative terrorists are awarded attributes gunmen, criminals, mercenaries, terrorists, even communists and some similar.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Radojkovic, Miroljub, *Terorizam i sredstva komunikacija* (Terrorism and Means of Communication), NIRO Decje novine, Gornji Milanovac, 1988, p. 10.

<sup>32</sup> See: Caplan, Richard, “International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo”, *International Affairs* vol 4, no 74, 1998, pp. 753 & 758.

A compromise solution to the problem might be found in the principle that the media should inform on terrorist and similar acts but not in a way that would turn them into the terrorists' mouthpieces. This means that informing should be accompanied by explanations of the ultimate goals and background of the terrorist acts. The behavior of Romanians in the late 1989 (during the events following the overthrow of Nicolae Ceausescu when the secret policy launched terrorism) showed that guided informing on along with explanation of terrorism, which is what the TV of Free Romania was in fact doing, could have psychological and social impact, which would be opposite to the one the terrorists wanted to achieve. Instead of fear, in the public opinion prevailed the feelings of revolt, aversion, even defiance of the terrorists. Specific combinations of the mentioned methods (including self-censorship), which seem to have been utilized in Serbia during the NATO bombardment in 1999 and the US after the September 11, 2001, needs future serious exploration, qualification and classification.

Between the commitment to inform the public on terrorist acts and avoiding being the terrorists' mouthpiece, exists a broad area, which could contain a large space for bureaucratic arbitrariness in determining what will (not) be published, journalists' inclination for sensationalism and the terrorists' efforts to gain publicity. Therefore, this stand does not fully resolve the problem of the media's position toward the terrorist acts, mostly because it is too general. "Theoretical thought is faced with the insoluble riddle of valuing contemporary forms of terrorism. Due to its proneness to the same factors imposing double standards on the media, it, too, can fall prey to them. If departing from the position that there should be full understanding of terrorism, theoretical thought risks to clash with moral and humanistic values, because terrorist methods are directed against them. If, however, science departs from the position that every existing order is justified, it risks fully turning into apologetics and abandoning the critical distance and option of revolutionary change. This temptation is attractive as well, again, because of the difficult evaluation of means used in terrorism".<sup>33</sup> The above problems prompted some authors to try to create a neutral definition of terrorism as the use of force or threat of force supposed to achieve a political goal by producing fear, frustration or uncertainty.

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<sup>33</sup> See more details: Radojkovic, op. cit., pp. 47-50.



The mentioned dilemma on the media and others' attitude on violence has not been resolved because people are still not willing to condemn every sort of violence, notwithstanding who is committing it, in which circumstances it was committed, who its victims are, what the perpetrators' goals and motives are, etc. Even in those societies that can be considered as democratic ones and with long democratic and human rights traditions, non-transformed escalated ethnic conflicts make all sides to restrain democracy and/or reduce formal (for instance, the freedom of expression) and substantive (for example, the role of media as a means for introducing political debate) democratic principles and practice along with the certain human rights.

Both terror and terrorism thanks to its violent form in mentioned way degrade and degenerate the achievements of democratization, the advantages of democracy and results of the development of human rights and civil society, which can be used as a tool and platform for conflict transformation. It seems the more violent conflict escalation is the achievements and advantages are harder to use, including transforming the conflict in a nonviolent way.

In general, successful democratization needs national unity as a basic precondition, which can hardly be fulfilled due to the existing ethnic conflict, particularly in multiethnic societies. Even in societies that can be considered as democratic ones and with long democratic traditions, escalated ethnic conflicts have lead their parties to restrain democracy and/or reduce democratic principles and human rights, and limit the functioning power of their democratic institutions and processes. Balkan states are no exceptions in such a situation. On the contrary, restrictions and suspensions seem to be more severe and more durable there. As a rule, ethnic conflicts, and especially escalated ones, have negative impacts on democracy and human rights, and at least partly disable the democratization and human rights development process. The more conflicts, the harder it is to achieve democracy and human rights protection and even more so to experience them.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Cf. de Nevers, Renee, "Democratization and Ethnic Conflict", *Survival*, vol 35, no 2, Summer, 1993, pp. 31-48. For a provocative and multi-faceted discussion of some of the major points discussed in this paper see one of the *Slavic Review* issues of 1996. The issue contains the article by Hayden, Robert M., "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers", vol 55, issue 4, Winter 1996, pp. 727-748. The authors who dispute his thesis in the same issue were Lilly, Carol S., "Amoral Realm or Immoral Obfuscation?", vol 55, issue 4, Winter 1996, pp. 749-754; Woodward, Susan L.

A fearful situation – which within conditions of ethnic conflicts stimulates ethnonational mobilization and division – cannot be assessed as favorable for the development of democracy and human rights. The kind of democracy which may appear within such conditions could be similar to that existing in some of the old Greek city-states exclusively reserved for the ruling class of citizens, and not accessible for others, i.e. slaves. In the Balkans there are no slaves any more but there are national divisions. Within these circumstances, threats, which generate fears and the “rally-round-the-flag” effect, could be qualified as counterproductive from the point of view of actors who use them as a means, and whose purpose might nevertheless be the democratization and human rights development within threatened states.

Lacking socio-political cohesion and a higher GNP in Serbia, and particularly in Kosovo, have probably contributed to the nervous way in which the state, the KLA and the other actors (re)acted and sometimes were using terror(ism), even when a goal could be reached by nonviolent political means. In Kosovo and elsewhere, that “what the predominant group sees as ‘law and order’ may be seen as intentional discrimination by others; and what the former sees as peaceful assimilation may look like planned ethnocide in the eyes of others”.<sup>35</sup> However, the more the sides use terror(ism) the more they will be lacking socio-political cohesion, which will bring additional readiness to use terror(ism), lack of the cohesion, etc. What can help the Serbs as well as the Albanians in Serbia is a stable and socio-politically united society and state. Thus, external threats seem to be counterproductive in so far as they aim to eliminate the conflict and protect minorities (Albanians, who are minority in Serbia, or Serbs, who are minority in Kosovo). The more outsiders threaten to use violence, the more they reinforce the cycle of violence and make democracy and human rights future distant phenomena. In the same way, chauvinists also get what they need, as the threats became valid reasons, i.e. excuses for achieving their goals, i.e. (to summarize briefly) isolation of their ethnic group and the whole society from the rest of the world.

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“Genocide or Partition: Two Faces of the Same Coin?”, vol 55, issue 4, Winter 1996, pp. 755-761; Wallace, Paul, “The Costs of Partition in Europe: A South Asian Perspective”, vol 55, issue 4, Winter 1996, pp. 762-766. Finally, Hayden replied to these articles (“Reply”, vol 55, issue 4, Winter 1996, pp. 767-778).

<sup>35</sup> Wiberg, Håkan, “Former Yugoslavia: nations above all”, op. cit., 49.

According to Joenniemi, there is the question whether it is acceptable for international community to tolerate jeopardizing (principles of) democracy and human rights in the name of (principle of) non-violence if all principles are relative. "With some security spaces being based on systematic repression and murdering, the luxury of operating with absolute principles is no longer there ... With human rights and democracy played against non-violence, the compromise could also be about non-violence". Thus, "the emergence of an international society built on common values such as human rights and democracy presents the peace movements with some formidable challenges".<sup>36</sup> It seems one of the challenges appears as soon as one tries to analyze a case such is the NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia, which punished the Serbian violation of human and some other rights of Albanians and/or Muslims or Bosniacs (in Srebrenica and some other places during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina) by violation of human rights including at the first place those which belong to their "third generation": the right to peace, the right to development and the right to a healthy environment.

The proper way of democracy and human rights' defense is their development, i.e. widening. In general, the more democratic mechanisms for eliminating ethnic conflicts are available the less it is likely that they will become violent conflicts which endanger democracy; the less the conflicts become violent the more are chances that they could be removed in a democratic way, etc. However, sooner or later democratic systems, especially if endangered, may start to defend themselves by means which could be passed in a democratic procedure, but in its essence are undemocratic as they make harm to (some of) substantive aspects of the democratization process.

One can add that economic potentials in observed region seem to be a satisfactory basis for relatively small armies, and the smaller they are, the more they are viable an efficient civilian control over them. In that case, there is little political and economic space for military autonomy and self-promotion. In addition, security should be maintained for all and not only by soldiers and armaments, but also by the experts and procedures associated with diplomacy and conflict resolution.<sup>37</sup> Otherwise, the states as well as the armies in the region could begin to follow the

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<sup>36</sup> Joenniemi, Pertii, "Toward Postmodern Peace Movements", *Peace Work for the Next Millennium*, The Åland Islands Peace Institute, Mariehamn, 1999, p. 57.

<sup>37</sup> See Wiberg, 1998: 178.

unfortunate destiny of the Second Yugoslavia and its YPA, but in many cases having poorer resources.

### 3. *The Role of the University*

The author of this paper elaborated in comparative way a segment of academic freedoms in the first place within Bulgaria, Macedonia and Yugoslavia at the University of Ottawa.<sup>38</sup> The issue seemed to be also interesting and at the same time sensitive in Canada and the USA.

The answer to the first question – *is it possible that a teacher in your country could be evaluated, promoted or dismissed on, according to your opinion, irrelevant grounds?* – was negative within situation existing in Bulgaria in 99 of hundred cases. Answer for Macedonia was negative too, although with some reservations related to cases when criteria for evaluation and promotion of teachers are interpreted in different ways referring to the definition of the term “scientific journal”, kinds of works which can be qualified as scientific, age of teacher who is demanding his/her promotion, etc. The situation in this regard became even worse since the ‘import’ of MA and Ph.D. diplomas from Pristina University has been stopped, which was the Albanians’ reason for establishing own university in Tetovo.

In this regard, the situation in Serbia seems to be difficult particularly after the university law was passed by the Parliament of Serbia on May 26, 1999, without consulting faculty, students or universities. It was considered that the law reduced the autonomy of academia. The government began to control the appointment and firing of deans, professors and university boards and became able to close faculties. The law also had limited the influence of professors on the curricula.

Numerous professors refused to sign a new labor contract required by the law as they perceived it as a humiliation or as “the declaration of loyalty to the ruling party”. At one faculty armed

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<sup>38</sup> The research effort was initiated by formulating a set of questions on the basis of the review of the Michiel Horn’s book *Academic Freedom in Canada: A History*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press (see Bruneau, Bill “Does Academic Freedom Really Matter?”, *CAUT Bulletin*, October 1999), and by sending it to several distinguished colleagues in mentioned and other Balkan countries. Since just a few colleagues created and sent their answers, the research covered just approximately one third of the countries in the Balkans. The results of the research were presented at the University of Ottawa, Fall term, November 18, 1999.

thugs prevented professors refusing to sign the contract to enter the building. Several tens professors have been suspended, etc. Thus, the answer that came from Belgrade was “yes, it is possible and also widely existing practice in Yugoslavia (Serbia).” After the position of the deans and the rectors was strengthened, fired and retired professors have taught in open area classrooms; students and professors of the Faculty of Philosophy were on strike.

It was a matter of dispute whether the law on university modeled according to a French law on university from 1960s or that from the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights Jiri Dienstbier qualified the laws on the universities, information and the prepared law on NGOs as “draconian” and as “gross human rights violations”. Membership of universities from Serbia was suspended on March 24, 1999; the Rector of Novi Sad University Svetolik Avramov said that the law “is not the Bible” and thus can be changed.<sup>39</sup>

The second question was *can one expect that grounds for discipline and dismissal could include religious differences with the university administration or the outside social establishment?* While the answer from Bulgaria was “90% no”, and from Yugoslavia just “No”, the main element of the answer from Macedonia seemed to be that “mainly no, although such a person cannot seek to become a vice-dean and even more the dean.”

The answers on the next question – *can one expect that a teacher might be mauled on account on his or her political conviction?* – were very different. The one that was received from Bulgaria was “99% no”. Main element of the answer from Macedonia was that after the new (so-called “anti-intellectual” or “non-intellectual”) Parliament and government were elected, many directors became porters, and *vice versa*. However, the ruling party IMRO does not have a greater influence on the University, although professors seem to be self-censored from time to time.

Finally, the answer from Yugoslavia was “yes, that is almost the official approach to the teachers supporting opposition to the regime in Serbia.” In 1998 students of the Belgrade University were sentenced to imprisonment after writing slogans against the law on university and the one on public information as they, in a magistrate’s opinion, “expressed civil resistance to the government

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<sup>39</sup> See: Serbian Unity Congress News, [http://news.suc.org/bydate/Nov\\_16/](http://news.suc.org/bydate/Nov_16/), November 16, 1999; Stefanovic, S., “Godinu i po dana od usvajanja srpskog Zakona o univerzitetu” (One and a Half Year from Passing Serbian Law on University), [http://blic.gates96.com/daily\\_pages/drustvo.htm](http://blic.gates96.com/daily_pages/drustvo.htm), November 29, 1999.

– and by insolent and delinquent conduct jeopardized the peace and quiet of citizens and the public peace and order”. At two Belgrade faculties para-police forces prohibited utilization of the premises and threaten with physical violence.

Over the years, it has become dangerous to express one’s views in public. Academics have been threatened with physical violence; professors and students have been assaulted physically; journalists have been killed under mysterious circumstances, etc. To reduce the danger of being threatened for one’s political opinions, some intellectuals have mostly kept themselves quiet and did not express too often their views in public.

According to one opinion, at least four factors operated here boding ill for the future. “The crackdown on human rights and civil society is probably 1) a sign of the government’s feeling of rapidly decreasing security and legitimacy; 2) a revenge for the huge civil society demonstrations almost two years ago initiated by the students; 3) related to the Kosovo conflict and the deal(s) between by FRY President Slobodan Milosevic and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke; and 4) the incredibly counterproductive policies of the international community since 1991.<sup>40</sup>

The answer from Bulgaria to the question *can one expect that a teacher’s language might weight against him or her?* was “100% no”, and from Yugoslavia – “absolutely, yes”. The official teaching language in Macedonia has been Macedonian, and there has been the state Pedagogical Faculty too, in which Albanian language has been also used. In addition, there has been the officially unrecognized University in Tetovo utilizing Albanian language. It was concluded, as long as the situation has been tolerated, even if discrimination in language regard exists, it would not be admitted.

To some degree similar were answers to the question *can one expect that a teacher’s country of birth might weight against him or her?*: Bulgaria: “100% no”; “Macedonia: No.”; Yugoslavia: “Yes, but not as an element of the top importance.”

In Bulgaria, it was 90% unrealistic *to expect that a teacher’s national or ethnic affiliation might weight against him or her*, while the answer for Yugoslavia was absolutely affirmative. In Macedonia, the University of Skopje as well as the one in Tetovo was almost ‘pure’ in ethnic regard. The establishing of the Tetovo

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<sup>40</sup> More details: “Support Free Media and Education in Serbia Now”, *TFF PressInfo*, no 51, November 23, 1999, <http://www.transnational.org>.

University, which issued its diplomas, was justified by the fact that students and probably professors Albanians – due to their language handicaps – were unable or less able to reach the state university. It was concluded that the whole problem was very politicized on both sides as it usually happens in conflict situations.

The question *can one expect that a teacher's sex might weight against him or her* was answered in similar ways in all cases Bulgaria: 100% no; Yugoslavia and Macedonia: No). It was also considered that Albanian women in Macedonia were more discriminated by their ethnic environment than by university.

The ninth question – *can one expect that a teacher's disloyalty (real or imagined) could be a reason for scant funding of universities and colleagues?* – was not answered by the colleague from Bulgaria, the answer from Macedonia was “no”, and from Yugoslavia was “yes, sometimes.”

The last question was *which institutions (if any) would be important agents in the fight for academic freedoms in your country?* While a concrete answer from Bulgaria was missing, the answer from Macedonia was that the agent should be university itself. However, it was considered that intellectual or academic milieu or environment was desperately weak and scared and that it was acting in an opportunistic way. Moreover, it was predicted that with the new government the situation would become probably harder.

The answer from Yugoslavia was that the task should be fulfilled by independent NGOs, media and trade unions. Earlier, Øberg had considered universities, independent media and civil society organizations, or NGOs were forces which can threaten the system. “Around the time of the bombing threat against Serbia, deputy prime minister Vojislav Seselj demanded that the USA should ‘withdraw their quislings like members of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, Belgrade (Intellectual) Circle, Women in Black, and not leave them as hostages. Maybe we can not reach every airplane but we will grab those that are close to us’”. In 1998, Øberg concluded “pressure creates counterpressure. I believe the internal and external cage makers will eventually help civil society to come together in civil resistance, for democratisation. There is already an alternative university in the making, there is a new ‘Belgrade Open School’ formed by some of the finest intellectuals and educators”, etc. “Perhaps one day even Serbs and Albanians will come together in an understanding that the lack of peace in a structural sense, the lack of democracy and

the ‘double-caged’ erosion of the Serbian civil society is their common problem.”

However, “intellectuals, media people and NGOs throughout Europe must wake up. The EU and other government organisations must open up for media and academic cooperation, for joint NGO projects. And if we mean business by democratisation and humanism and democracy, all sanctions must be lifted; they’ve been a mistake since 1991 and a violation of human rights. In short, let’s help citizens of Serbia to free themselves from both cages and shape their own future!”<sup>41</sup>

Academic freedoms are among guarantees for development of critical thinking needed when one assesses in a scientific way reports or statements that in conflict escalation circumstances, for example, our and our ally’s civilian (military) casualties are more (less) numerous, more (less) suffering, and enemy’s and its ally’s civilian (military) casualties are less (more) numerous, suffering, etc.

Ethnic conflicts, and particularly escalated ones, could be considered as a kind of worst enemies of academic, political and some other human rights and freedoms and democratization although this fact cannot justify all acts of authoritarian and similar governments. There is an open question how governments – if they cannot find a common language with academicians and other people who belong to their own side in conflicts – could be expected to find that kind of the language with the opposite conflict side? Although democracy cannot be considered as a perfect system, as long as it exists it creates at least theoretical possibilities and potentials for peaceful solutions to ethnic conflicts and problems in the Balkans and elsewhere.

One could conclude, academic freedoms that exist in the Balkans and other parts the world should not be taken for granted forever, as some of them, which exist today, could disappear or be limited in the future. This conclusion could be particularly applied to the escalated ethnic conflicts as it is often hard to distinguish at least some of those elements of politics that are determined by ethnic conflicts and their escalations from those that are regular features of authoritarian politics.

Galtung in his lecture “Peacebuilding, Conflict Transformation and World Order in the 21st Century” held at Carleton University, Ottawa, October 11, 2001, stressed that the Germany’s behavior

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<sup>41</sup> More details: *Ibid.*



after the end of the Second World War could serve as a conflict transformation pattern. One should mention first the significance of changes within schoolbooks, university textbooks, etc. The change should include presenting atrocities and other horrible things that we did sharing them in that way with our children and other descendants and the rest of the world. In addition to this self-critical method, exchange of people and their cultural values could be suggested too. Both these methods in good parts are in good parts in hands of the University (in the first place its managers, faculty and students) and those who take part, finance and in other way enable its activities.

The needed creativity and applicability of proposals for conflict transformation could in good part be achieved at the University. It is the place for dialog and global education whose purpose is to understand how other think, and to learn to respect other cultures. In organizational regard, the conflict transformation method includes adult education.<sup>42</sup> In addition, one could utilize at least some of the North American experiences with the evening and summer courses, workshops and other programs.<sup>43</sup>

One author assumed that the conflict between state sovereignty and ethnicity will remain one of the important features of the Balkan political landscape. “Within such a context, the primary task for every state is to be *learning to live with ethnic conflict and to deal with it without any kind of violence*”. The conflict resolution process in the region will most likely be a long-lasting one. “Reaching for swift and definite solutions in this case could mean only one thing: establishing a non-democratic rule with the aim of maintaining the state sovereignty by all costs”.<sup>44</sup> In some cases, people in the Balkans and some other regions – at the University and other places – should learn how to assume an attitude toward conflicts.

In purpose to take its part in democratization process, the University previously should be democratized itself; first of all, it

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<sup>42</sup> Galtung, Johan, “40 Years, 40 Conflicts”, in Johan Galtung, and Carl G. Jacobsen with Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen and Finn Tschudi, *Searching for Peace; the Road to TRANSCEND*, Pluto Press, 2000, p. 112.

<sup>43</sup> More details: Tomovic, Vladislav A., “Knowledge for What? – How Canadian and American Universities Prepare Their Students to Adjust to the Roles in the Industry i.e. Economy”, paper prepared for the Group of Experts for Prosperity of Serbia, Belgrade, June 14 – 18, 2001, p. 3.

<sup>44</sup> Vankovska-Cvetkovska, Biljana, “Sovereignty Principle and Ethnic Pluralism – A Challenge to Macedonian State”, *Medjunarodni problemi* (International Problems), vol XLIX, no 4, 1997.

should be a place for civil discourse and free speech.<sup>45</sup> The institutional autonomy of the University should be given “as soon as democracy fortifies itself”.<sup>46</sup> At conflict escalation time, the University should strive to preserve the scholars and students’ academic freedoms and “to pursue ideas that conflict with what we believe or what we would like to believe, and to explore deep problems whose solutions have no apparent applications”.<sup>47</sup> As challenges and uncertainties lie ahead at that time, there is the open question what is the proper role of the University within the conflict escalation process and simultaneous intensive and often dramatic national debate; how can the University contribute to deescalation?

This dilemma opens the question “knowledge for what?”, i.e. for what purpose observed society needs knowledge offered by the University during the conflict escalation process? Within the context of the conflict transformation method study, this questions means primarily how one can reach the empowerment of the parties to handle themselves the conflict by peaceful and democratic political means?

Answering this question one can begin with essential knowledge of the basic conflict (escalation) vocabulary. Trying to create the dictionary one could gather and analyze data on, for instance, how many faculty members, students and graduates can define the terms regarding the conflict process: *(ethnic) conflict, its early warning, escalation, diagnosis, mediation and mediator, third-party intervention, arbitration, resolution, management, therapy, prognosis, prevention, ethnic identities, genocide and ethnic cleansing, peace, peace-making and peacekeeping, peace-building, reconciliation, truth and reconciliation commission, etc.*

It is considered, “new generations of university students have to continue learning from general areas of human knowledge with respect for their professors’ areas of specializations. The professors, now, more than ever before, have to channel the minds of their students into the area of *pragmatism*, that is to say practical, *applied knowledge* about which the scholars, back at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, and thereafter, wrote.” This is the reason for the posing the pragmatic question: “Knowledge for What?”<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Tilghman, Shirley M., Installation Address at Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, September 28, 2001, WF-EUROPE Digest, no 169, October 1-2, 2001.

<sup>46</sup> See: Tomovic, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>47</sup> Tilghman, op. cit.

<sup>48</sup> Tomovic, op. cit., 6.

In the examination of the relationship between democratization, human rights and ethnic conflict one could verify the thesis that this relationship is two-sided: democracy has the potential to help mitigate and eliminate ethnic tensions, but transition toward democracy creates a fertile climate for hatred, biases and thus conflicts. There is an open question what can concerned countries and the international community do in order to promote democracy without exacerbating ethnic conflict?

Trying to answer this question, one should have in mind that human rights development and democratization could dampen, even transform ethnic conflicts or prevent their escalation under certain conditions. First, it is necessary that the forces pushing for genuine democratization recognize and acknowledge the ethnic diversity existing within the state along with the fact that nobody is perfect beginning with us ourselves. Second, they also have to find a way, which would be commonly perceived to be fair, to accommodate the goals and interests of different groups. On the one hand, the democratization and human rights development processes provide a propitious setting for allaying ethnic problems and preventing their transformation to conflicts and their escalation, and on the other hand – successful democratization needs national unity as the basic precondition. Another precondition both for democratization and for preventing or transforming ethnic conflicts is at least some economic prosperity, which could be also harder reached and/or maintained particularly in conflict escalation situations.

Security could be provided for all or nobody. Majority nations in mentioned Balkan countries will not be secure unless the human rights of the minorities would not be protected to a necessary and feasible degree. In these conditions, minorities should be deprived only of the right to self-determination or to secession (as that right is usually interpreted on the Balkans<sup>49</sup>). As one author has stressed, “as soon as minorities become majorities, new minorities appear. If the present number of nation-states is doubled, the number of minority problems may also be (roughly) doubled”.<sup>50</sup>

One author stressed the question: “How can political parties, attempting to bridge ethnic cleavages, find a common denominator

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<sup>49</sup> Glenny suggested that maybe a solution could be within the scope of the principle “all rights to minorities, excluding the right to secession” (see Glenny, Misha, “The Yugoslav Nightmare”, *The New York Review of Books*, March 23, 1995, vol XLII, no. 5, p. 57).

<sup>50</sup> Eriksen, Hylland Thomas, “Ethnicity and Nationalism: Definitions and Critical Reflections”, *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, vol 23, no 2, 1992, p. 221.

of national security that will satisfy the Bulgarian majority and Turkish minority in Bulgaria; Romanians and the Hungarians minority in Transylvania; Serbs, Croats, Muslims, and Albanians in the former Yugoslavia?”<sup>51</sup> Majorities should be deprived only of the ‘right’ to imperil and violate democratic and human rights of minorities, which are the guaranties and safeguards of minorities’ distinct identity and dignity. In this way, the Balkan states could protect their territorial integrity; the Balkans will gradually lose its reputation of the European “powder keg”. For this reason, the observed countries need developed economies and stable democracies and systems of human rights, which are protected by law along with traditional and other habits.<sup>52</sup>

The more a minority is far from being loyal to state in which it has been living, presumably the more the state will use its repression; looking from the other side, the more the repression is used by the state the less is the minority likely to be(come) loyal and to perceive the state power (authority) as legitimate, but perceiving it as “plain domination”.<sup>53</sup>

Although democracy is not a perfect system, as long as it exists it creates potentials and possibilities for peaceful transformation of ethnic conflicts. Before one made any proposal for conflict transformation or other form of conflict resolution, one should understand and learn how to cope with conflicts with peaceful political means. However, if existing system cannot be qualified as democratic one, appears the complex dilemma what could and should come first: *developing democracy or preventing escalation, deescalating or/and eliminating ethnic conflicts*.

After the September 11, 2001, events it is considered “freedom of inquiry, which is one of our most cherished organizing principles, is not just a moral imperative, it is a practical necessity.” It is in times of conflict escalation (called by this author “national crisis”) that “true commitment to freedom of speech and thought is tested.” Participants in the discussion often disagree about broadness of the shared blame, “about the ways in which nationalism and religion can be perverted into fanaticism”, “about whether a just retribution can be achieved if it leads to the deaths

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<sup>51</sup> Remington, Robin Alison “Security Dilemmas in the Post-Communist Balkans – Party-Army Dynamics”, *Eurobalkans*, Winter 94/95, no 17, p. 71.

<sup>52</sup> See more details: Isakovic, Zlatko, “Polozaj Makedonije u balkanskom okruzenju” (Macedonia on the Balkans), *Medjunarodna politika (Review of International Affairs)*, (Belgrade), no 1024, 1994, p. 35.

<sup>53</sup> See Duverger, Maurice, *The Study of Politics*, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York, 1972, p. 18.

of more innocent victims”, “about the political and tactical decisions that our government will make, both in achieving retribution and in seeking to protect against similar attacks in the future”, “about how and when to wage war and how best to achieve a real and lasting peace”. Just as the University has an obligation to search for knowledge world-wide, so the University also has “an obligation to insure that the scholarly work of the academy is widely disseminated, so that others can correct it when necessary, or build on it, or use it to make better decisions, develop better products or construct better plans”.<sup>54</sup>

In the days of conflict escalation, the Balkan and other University’s duty is to offer to country’s decision makers and the rest of the world the knowledge residing on philosophers, historians, economists, engineers, scholars in peace and conflict studies, political sciences and many other fields that can help understand the *goals, attitudes, interests, identities, and/or behaviors* of the other and our conflict side as well as of the mediators, arbitrators, etc. “The medieval image of the university as an ivory tower, with scholars turned inward in solitary contemplation, immunized from the cares of the day, is an image that has been superseded by the modern university constructed not of ivory, but of a highly porous material, one that allows free diffusion in both directions”.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Tilghman, op. cit.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*