CIAO DATE: 08/2013
July 2013
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
The 45-year-old NPT anchors states’ commitment to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy to nuclear weapons. The IAEA’s 40-year-old Model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) premises its verification standard on the early detection of diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or purposes unknown. The Agency’s mission in ensuring that nuclear uses remain solely peaceful has been challenged and remains the case in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. There are lessons to be drawn from the IAEA’s inspection process concerning these countries, and in that context, future adjustments of safeguards methods to consider. The IAEA conducted inspections in Iran under the CSA with and without an Additional Protocol (AP), in Syria under the CSA, and in North Korea under the CSA with certain restrictions. In all three cases, the Agency sought transparency visits in the early stages to understand claims on possible undeclared activities, and pursued added measures in later years. While there are similarities in all the three dossiers, there are also differences. The IAEA’s state-level approach implemented across the board over the last decade is the result of creating better understanding of each state’s nuclear activities. Internally, safeguards methods have also evolved from a material accountancy approach to a more pro-active, analytical and comprehensive evaluation process. Examples are given on a range of issues that the IAEA seeks to advance its safeguards approach. These include: emerging verification problems; use and sharing of third party information; issues associated with IAEA reporting practices; and states’ deception and concealment strategies.
Resource link: IAEA Safeguards - Evolving to Meet Today's Verification Undertakings [PDF]