CIAO DATE: 08/2013
July 2013
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
A long-standing goal of diplomacy with Iran is persuading Iran to suspend its enrichment operations while it clarifies its past activities and while negotiations proceed on a more permanent resolution to the nuclear crisis. However, there is problem in using suspension of nuclear material production as a negotiating step: The technical details of s uspension have never been clearly defined. In the case of suspending enrichment, the problem of determining how much material has been enriched to what particular levels is even more acute since countries agreeing to suspension probably have or have had weapons aspirations. The international community needs to be aware of the diversion risks during a suspension of enrichment activities and should mit igate these risks by including the necessary verification measures during negotiations and signing of any agreement on suspension. For that reason, inspections and monitoring of enrichment facilities where operations have been suspended should be even more intrusive than during normal operations . The containment and surveillance equipment that the IAEA uses when monitoring an operational nuclear facility (including cameras, seals, and detectors) is not necessarily sufficient to ensure that diversion of material or equi pment does not occur during a suspension. The only way to ensure nondiversion during a period of suspension is to insist not only on keeping containment and surveillance equipment in place but also on the dis able ment and sealing of , the feed supply system, the product recovery system, and the electric supply . Verified disablement should be a standard procedure during the suspension of an enrichment facility. It is crucial for inspectors to be constantly present during the preparation s and suspension period.
Resource link: Suspension of Nuclear Activities Is Not End of Diversion Risks [PDF]