

A satellite-style map of the Middle East region, showing the Arabian Peninsula, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. The land is depicted in shades of tan and brown, while the water bodies are in deep blue and green. The map is the background for the entire page.

# A POLITICAL PLAN FOR A WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION-FREE ZONE (WMDFZ) IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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HARVARD Kennedy School

**BELFER CENTER** for Science and International Affairs

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## Foreword by Graham Allison

What could lead four of America’s wisest statesmen and veteran Cold Warriors to advocate that the United States embrace the vision of a world without nuclear weapons? The considered, collective judgment of Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry and George Shultz that the path the world is on today has brought us to a “nuclear tipping point.” These four statesmen have sounded an alarm about the likelihood that, on the current trajectory, the global nuclear order will unravel in ways that could lead to the spread of nuclear weapons, the destruction of great cities, and possibly even nuclear war.

Recognizing that complacency could soon lead to cataclysmic results, the “four horsemen of the apocalypse”, as some have called them, have urged the international community to think again. Their example is a challenge to all of us: how can we use our imaginations to bend the trendlines currently pointing us towards unacceptable outcomes?

HRH Prince Turki Al Faisal’s new plan boldly picks up the challenge. He has recognized that, in his words, “there is no more pressing international threat to peace and security than the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their possible use.” A veteran of international diplomacy, he understands that the path leading towards the summit of a world without nuclear weapons will be a long and hazardous climb. But he believes that real victories can be gained, and the security of the world enhanced, by aiming for achievable intermediate goals along the way.

His proposal for a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East seeks to inject much-needed energy into resolving a crucial issue that affects us all, none more than the peoples of the Middle East themselves. As we witness in Syria today, and perhaps with Iran in the near future, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons pose real and deadly threats that demand our utmost attention. Sadly, the international community has often clung to policies that, while embodying the best intentions, fail to tackle the obstacles to action.

Proposals that stretch the boundaries of conventional thinking predictably invite objections. Many will be uncomfortable with Prince Turki’s arguments, in whole or in part. But fresh thinking such as his is in short supply. Even those who disagree entirely will be enriched by the exercise of engaging with his analysis. When conventional prescriptions may appear close to exhaustion, and the path of least resistance may lead to disaster, it is vital to reexamine long-held assumptions and explore all alternative pathways that could lead to a breakthrough from the

current stalemate in which the region finds itself. As Prince Turki suggests in his conclusion, our destination otherwise may be a new and more dangerous Middle East containing many nuclear-armed states, in which the risk of nuclear war would be greatly magnified.

In arenas where current policies are likely to lead to catastrophic results, the challenge in proposing policy initiatives is not to offer a good idea. It is sufficient that a proposal simply be better than the alternatives. Prince Turki Al Faisal's perceptive, provocative plan seeks to meet that test. Readers will benefit from assessing it.

**Graham Allison**

Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

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## Introduction

“Nuclear weapons are the only weapons ever invented that have the capacity to wholly destroy life on this planet, and the arsenals we now possess are able to do so many times over. The problem with nuclear weapons is at least equal to that of climate change in terms of gravity - and much more immediate in its potential impact. So long as any state has nuclear weapons, others will want them. So long as such weapons remain, it defies credibility that they will not one day be used - by accident, miscalculation or design. And any such use would be catastrophic.”

This statement from a report by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament<sup>1</sup> delegitimizes nuclear weapons and is a case for their abolition, and it fits well with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1996 which stated: “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of International Law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.”<sup>2</sup> These clear and loud messages show that there is no more pressing international threat to peace and security than the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their possible use. If this serious threat is not matched by the concerted determination of the international community to eliminate it, international peace and security will remain a distant goal. Yet, while ridding the world of nuclear weapons and creating an international consensus for the immediate need to progress toward this noble goal for the sake of humanity should be at the top of the agenda for all states, realization of such a goal remains highly elusive.

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<sup>1</sup> In 2008, I was privileged to be a member of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament that was established by Australia and Japan to stimulate debate and build momentum for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in the lead-up to the NPT Review Conference for International Peace and Security that was held in 2010 in New York. My distinguished colleagues and I worked for over one year tackling all aspects of this issue and consulted experts from all over the world. We worked with governmental representatives, the global nuclear power industry and Non-Governmental Organizations devoted to the cause of disarmament, as well as those responsible for advancing and monitoring nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We concluded our mission by launching our report in Tokyo in December 2009, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers”, The report’s twenty-point action statement entitled “A New International Consensus on Action for Disarmament” was circulated to the Review Conference as a working paper from the Commission. The report is available at: <http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/international-commission-nuclear-nonproliferation-disarmament-eliminating-nuclear-threats-practical-agenda-global-policymakers/p21021>

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf>

There is an Arab proverb that says:

(هَلْ كُرتِي ال هَلْج كُردي ال ام)

“Not realizing all of an objective doesn’t mean some of it can’t be realized.” This is certainly the case when tackling the issue of nuclear non-proliferation by the international community. For instance, establishing regional nuclear free zones was a rational necessary step toward ridding the world of this dire threat. And this is well stated in paragraph 6 of the UN General Assembly Resolution Number 3263 which calls for the creation of such a zone in the Middle East. It reads: “the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the initiative of the States situated within each zone concerned, is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to halting the proliferation of those instruments of mass destruction and to promoting progress towards nuclear disarmament, with the goal of total destruction of all nuclear weapons and their means of delivery”.<sup>3</sup>

No region in the world is in greater need of becoming such a zone than the conflict-cursed Middle East. This region is in the midst of a drastic transformation. One of its states (Israel) is a de facto nuclear weapon state and another one (Iran) is progressing toward becoming one. Both countries have lied about their intentions in this regard. Israel publicly stated that it would not introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, yet it has over 200 warheads with the required delivery systems. Iran has publicly stated that it seeks the peaceful development of nuclear power, yet it continues to raise enrichment levels in its centrifuges while increasing their number and preventing IAEA inspectors from inspecting suspected sites.

Given the importance of this issue in this region and the current political changes taking place there, this paper aims to address the issue of establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East in order to realize the objective of ridding the region of weapons of mass destruction.

## **Too Much Ado about Nothing: Diplomacy of NWFZ and WMDFZ in the MENA Region**

The proposal of Egypt and Iran to create a NWFZ in the Middle East and its approval on

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<sup>3</sup> Resolution 3263 of the U.N. General Assembly of 9 December, 1974. Available at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/64/IMG/NR073864.pdf?OpenElement>

December 9, 1974 by General Assembly Resolution 3263 initiated a protracted diplomatic process that, so far, has failed to realize this objective or even bring us closer to it. This Resolution “commends the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East; considers that, in order to advance the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, it is indispensable that all parties concerned in the area proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons; calls upon the parties concerned in the area to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); expresses the hope that all States, in particular the Nuclear-Weapon States(NWS), will lend their full co-operation for the effective realization of the aims of the present resolution”.<sup>4</sup>

In the thirtieth session of the UN General Assembly in 1975, Resolution 3474 was adopted, adding new provisions and recommending that “states of the region, pending the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards, should:

- (a) “Proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons, in their territory or the territory under their control, by any third party;
- (b) Refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from any other action that would facilitate the acquisition, testing or use of such weapons, or would be in any other way detrimental to the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region under an effective system of safeguards.”

The resolution also urges “the Nuclear-Weapon States to refrain from any action contrary to the purpose of the present resolution and the objective of establishing, in the region of the Middle East, a nuclear weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards and to extend their cooperation to the states of the region in their efforts to promote this objective.”<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Resolution 3263 of the U.N. General Assembly of 9 December, 1974. Available at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/64/IMG/NR073864.pdf?OpenElement>

<sup>5</sup> Resolution 3474 of the U.N. General Assembly of 1975. Available at: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/001/87/IMG/NR000187.pdf?OpenElement>

This resolution could have been the foundation of a successful diplomatic process if the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) had pushed for it, especially considering that all the countries in the region - except Israel, which abstained from voting - welcomed its points. Further, the circumstances were propitious for action because no state in the region possessed the know-how or means to develop nuclear programs. However, it was clear from the beginning that the Israeli policy of nuclear opacity was and is the real obstacle to moving forward. By insisting that the Arab-Israel conflict be fully settled before instituting arms control measures, Israel has taken on the responsibility for the failure or success of this process along with the rising prospect of proliferation in the region. Had Israel accepted and implemented Security Council Resolution 242, peace could have been achieved earlier and would have helped in creating a NWFZ in the Middle East at its initiation.

With this fact clear, the international community represented by the General Assembly of the United Nations continued adopting annual resolutions with some modifications that responded to political and security developments in the region. In such a conflict-cursed part of the world, changing conditions are the norm, and in light of the eight years Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988), the use of chemical weapons in this war, the suspicions surrounding the Iraqi nuclear program, and the concerns about biological and chemical weapons programs in the region, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak called in April 1990 for establishing a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East.

Then, in light of the second Gulf War, the United Nations, both at the General Assembly (Resolution 4630 in 1991) and Security Council level (Resolution 687 in 1991), affirmed the need to create a WMDFZ in the region and therefore shifted the objective from a NWFZ to a WMDFZ. This issue remains a permanent item on the agenda of the annual sessions of the UN General Assembly.

On the regional level, in pursuance of the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, a multilateral working group on arms control and regional security (ACRS) was formed in 1992. Made up of 14 Middle East countries, this group worked for almost four years and negotiated initial agreements on actual measures of multilateral security cooperation that would adopt a program of confidence building measures (CBMs). However, the trust was not realized and the process collapsed due to the linkage of progress on arms control and security to the Israeli position toward the NPT and its nuclear arms control policy, as well as upon the collapse of the Madrid Peace Process.

The experience of this working group on negotiating the issues of arms control and regional security is a lesson for future efforts. Everything is connected with everything in the Middle East. Therefore, without tackling the roots of insecurity and instability, no confidence can be built and no progress can be made. This is why progress stopped at Israeli doors. What sense is there in one country demanding every other country in its region abide by international treaties, rules, and regimes, yet not itself? Israel joining the NPT is imperative for any confidence building measures to begin.

However, with the breakdown of the ACRS process, another process was initiated. The NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995 adopted a resolution on the Middle East recognizing the region's special status and called for the establishment of a Weapons Of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East, the accession to the NPT by states in the region that have not yet joined (Israel), and the placement of all nuclear facilities in the Middle East under the full-scope of IAEA safeguards.

The 2000 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed the 1995 resolution, and in the May 2010 Review Conference discussions, a WMDFZ in the Middle East was the dominant issue. As a practical step toward realizing this objective, it was decided to convene a 2012 conference for the states of the region to address the question of a zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. This decision had the support of the sponsors of the 1995 resolution - the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom. The Finnish Ambassador Jaako Laajava was appointed in October 2011 as 'Facilitator' for the conference, which was to be hosted by his country, Finland, in December 2012.

Preparations for the conference went ahead. However, the United States scuttled these efforts by claiming that there was no consensus on how to proceed and that, therefore, holding the conference would be a waste of time. This and other factors led to the conference being postponed.

## **The GCC and Nuclear Power**

It is the right of all nations - including Israel and Iran - to have nuclear programs for peaceful uses if they are transparent and under the supervision of the IAEA. All GCC countries are members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. All GCC countries have agreed to set up civilian, peaceful programs for developing nuclear energy and sharing nuclear know-how. Saudi Arabia

has signed memoranda of understanding with several countries and has announced its intentions publicly: over \$50 billion worth of contracts for reactors in the next twenty years. The Kingdom will concentrate on building human capacity along with the construction program. We look upon nuclear energy as an alternative power source for our domestic electricity and desalination plants. This will allow us to minimize our consumption of fossil fuels so that we are able to export more of our oil and gas instead of burning them for domestic usage.

The UAE has already signed contracts with South Korea to build nuclear reactors worth \$20 billion over the next ten years. The other GCC countries have not announced specific programs, yet. All these dealings are transparent and abide by all international treaties, rules, and safeguards.

## **Time to Act: Considering Alternatives**

The people of the region are no different from other people in that they aspire to peace and security in their countries or region. However, being under constant threat radicalizes them and leads them to a dim view of their future. The failure of the regional states and the international community over the last four decades to look seriously into the region's pressing issues, ignoring the hopes of the people to live normal lives with dignity and respect, has produced a generation full of frustration and anger that has fomented what we now see happening in the Arab World. The causes behind the changes taking place in the region are multiple, and if not addressed in a peaceful and secure regional environment, there will be no guarantee of a secure future, for the region or the world. Therefore, it is time for international diplomacy to firmly focus on the essence of all the issues threatening peace and security in the region.

As is well known, the Arab States, including Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries, have embraced establishing a WMDFZ in the Middle East. It is the official nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament policy of all Arab States. However, Israel has not made any public commitment in support of the zone, despite their claim of endorsing the idea. Iran, while paying lip service to it, is more committed to pursuing enrichment of uranium and other suspicious activities that raise doubts about its commitment to this objective, which will compel other countries in the area to pursue policies that could lead to untold and possibly tragic consequences. Indeed, the best way toward peace in our region is for all nations – but most importantly Iran and Israel – to support the establishment of a WMDFZ. Ironically, and as stated before, this is actually a concept of which the Iranian government itself had earlier approved, as seen when Iran and Egypt sponsored

a resolution to call for establishing the zone in 1974. In fact, quite often, from the early 1970's till now, Iran joined with other nations to work through the United Nations to attempt to gain support for what was then called a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.

And yet, despite all these efforts, our region can hardly be called free of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, the Middle East is the most militarized region in the world today, largely due to the many conflicts that have raged and still rage in the area. While soldiers, tanks, and planes have been growing in number in the area for some time, the Iraq-Iran War, from 1980–1988, and the second Gulf War of 1991, increased the danger of proliferation of WMD's in the region, as well as ballistic missiles capable of carrying them.

States seek WMD's for various reasons, including deterrence, arms races with neighbors, the ability to attack or project the ability to attack, or to spare the high cost of conventional weapons. The first nation in the region to acquire nuclear capability was Israel. One can follow this tragic arc right up to the announcement of the IAEA that it had found incontrovertible evidence of Iran working to develop nuclear weapons. And now we are witnessing the use of chemical weapons by Bashar Al Assad against his people, which is immediate proof that we need the zone yesterday, not tomorrow.

Saudi Arabia firmly believes that it is in every nation's interest, including Israel's and Iran's, not to possess nuclear weapons. This is why, through various initiatives, we are sending messages to Iran that it is their right, as it is any nation's right, and as we ourselves are doing, to develop a civilian nuclear program, but that trying to parlay that program into nuclear weapons is a dead end, and that wiser choices will result in wider riches. A WMDFZ is the best means to get Iran and Israel to give up nuclear weapons.

Barring the current Iranian support for a WMDFZ, the IAEA reports on Iranian nuclear capabilities are disturbing. But dealing with this issue by unilateral or unsanctioned military strikes would be entirely counter-productive and would be seen by the people of the region as proof of the double standards of American and European policies toward the region.

Despite the Israeli denial policy and its excuses of not having the regional peace that responds to its own interests and ambitions in the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is well known that Israel's unwillingness to cease its unlawful colonization and continuous refusal to grant the Palestinians their own homeland is the core reason that this conflict continues. There is no lack of proposals for

peace, many of them completely rational and fair. Indeed, one of the most promising is the Arab Peace Initiative, originally outlined by the Saudi Arabian monarch, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, in 2002. It calls on Israel to withdraw to its 1967 borders and the establishment of a viable and contiguous Palestine, with its capital in East Jerusalem, and bordering Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. The issue of refugees will be settled through mutual agreement. We urge Israel to take the necessary steps toward peace and justice. With peace, Israel will no longer have the excuse or the need to own and deploy weapons of mass destruction, including their nuclear arsenal.

Alas, the way in which the world community has so far dealt with the issues surrounding nuclear non-proliferation is actually an incentive for countries in the area to proliferate. When Pakistan and India detonated their bombs they were met with sanctions. But soon both countries were not only relieved of these sanctions but both of them have been presented with lucrative nuclear deals that enhance their nuclear capabilities rather than curtail them. India has garnered American, French, and Russian agreements to build reactors and acquire technical know-how. Pakistan is receiving unknown levels of support from China.

North Korea, having been sanctioned before it exploded its nuclear devices, is engaged in full negotiations with the Six - especially the U.S. - to remove the sanctions and receive aid. At present all cooperation and links with the Six have been halted. This, of course, encourages Iran to develop its own nuclear weapons to be treated alike and do pretty much as it wishes.

Israel continues to receive Western technical support and its technology companies are fully integrated into U.S. and European commercial and defense contracts that provide them with free access to the latest technologies. It has acquired submarines from Germany that can carry nuclear missiles, and its missile development system is so enmeshed with American know-how that one cannot identify one from the other. The case of the smuggling of Krytron nuclear triggers is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Israel's illegal acquisitions of American and European nuclear know-how. As for biological and chemical weapons, the story is even more alarming because Israel's nefariousness is totally under the radar. Given Israel's actions, is it any wonder that Iran is undertaking suspicious and disturbing steps to realize its nuclear ambitions?

## **Conclusion**

The Middle East is beset by a number of great challenges. There are immediate and interim steps toward tackling the roots of insecurity that can be pushed and have become more feasible be-



cause of the 2010 proposal. Such steps include:

1. A major push on chemical weapons, including the removal of chemical weapons from Syria in the near term, followed by Syrian, Israeli and Egyptian accession to the CWC. A similar effort could be made to achieve universal regional accession to the BWC.
2. The declaration of the establishment of sub-regional zones, with mutual verification arrangements that could add nonproliferation assurances for the whole area and provide model legal frameworks and technical cooperation for an expanded region-wide zone.

In the end, these challenges can be met by the same principle that recognized the reality of Israel's nuclear weapons and guided the IAEA to investigate and then announce the truth behind Iran's nuclear program. Of all the efforts in any upcoming conference that could be taken up for the sake of peace and security in the region and the world, I suggest that the global community represented by the UN Security Council take on the issue under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter and:

1. Create a WMDFZ in the Middle East.
2. State that all activities by member states deemed contributory to nuclear weapons development cease immediately and be put under IAEA inspection.
3. Guarantee a nuclear security umbrella by the permanent members of the Security Council for states that join.
4. Reward these states with economic and technical support to develop peaceful uses of nuclear power.
5. Guarantee, by the five permanent members of the Council, that countries that don't join and are seen to be developing weapons of mass destruction will face not only economic and political sanction but also military sanction.
6. Establish a regional security forum, open to all states of the region with, authority to convene discussions of a broad range of regional security issues, including the implementation of the 242 & 338 UN Security Council resolutions and the Arab Peace Initiative as well as WMD arms control and disarmament.

This declaration will not immediately establish the WMDFZ. A period of five to ten years should

be agreed to by all members of the zone to resolve all problems between them that may impede the zone's establishment. This declaration of intent will hopefully be sufficient to incentivize Israel to accept the hand of peace extended to it since 2002 by the Arab Peace Initiative. Iran will be equally incentivized to come clean on its secretive and suspicion-arousing program. On the other hand, failing to create the Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction will incentivize all countries in the area to undertake what may prove to be a fateful decision that will expand nuclear proliferation rather than confirm security and peace.

## Appendix A: Resolution 3263 of the U.N. General Assembly of 9 December, 1974

### **3263 (XXIX). Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.**

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

*Desiring* to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security by bolstering and expanding the existing regional and global structures for the prohibition and/or prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons,

*Realizing* that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones with an adequate system of safeguards could accelerate the process towards nuclear disarmament and the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

*Recalling* the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its sixty-second session, held in Cairo from 1 to 4 September 1974, on this subject,

*Recalling* the message sent by His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah of Iran on 16 September 1974 on the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,<sup>41</sup>

*Considering* that the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the initiative of the States situated within each zone concerned, is one of the measures which can contribute most effectively to halting the proliferation of those instruments of mass destruction and to promoting progress towards nuclear disarmament, with the goal of total destruction of all nuclear weapons and their means of delivery,

*Mindful* of the political conditions particular to the region of the Middle East and of the potential danger emanating therefrom, which would be further aggravated by the introduction of

nuclear weapons in the area,

*Conscious*, therefore, of the need to keep the countries of the region from becoming involved in a ruinous nuclear arms race,

*Recalling* the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa issued by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in July 1964,<sup>42</sup>

*Noting* that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would contribute effectively to the realization of aims enunciated in the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa,

*Recalling* the notable achievement of the countries of Latin America in establishing a nuclear-free zone,

*Also recalling* resolution B of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, held at Geneva from 29 August to 28 September 1968, in which the Conference recommended that the non-nuclear-weapon States not comprised in the Latin American nuclear-free zone should study the possibility and desirability of establishing military denuclearization of their respective zones,<sup>43</sup>

*Recalling* the aims pursued by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons<sup>44</sup>, in particular the goal of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons,

*Recalling* its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, in which it expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States,

1. *Commends* the idea of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

2. *Considers* that, in order to advance the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, it is indispensable that all parties concerned in the area proclaim solemnly and <sup>1</sup>immediately

<sup>41</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly. Twenty-ninth Session, Annexes, agenda item 101, document A/9693/Add.3.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, agenda item 105, document A/5975.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., Twenty-third Session, agenda item 96, document A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2. para. 17.

their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons;

3. *Calls upon* the parties concerned in the area to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

4. *Expresses the hope* that all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, will lend their full cooperation for the effective realization of the aims of the present resolution;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ascertain the views of the parties concerned with respect to the implementation of the present resolution, in particular with regard to its paragraphs 2 and 3, and to report to the Security Council at an early date and, subsequently, to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirtieth session the item entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”.

*2309<sup>th</sup> plenary meeting*

*9 December 1974*

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<sup>44</sup> Resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

## Appendix B: Resolution 3474 of the U.N. General Assembly of 1975

### 3474 (XXX). Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, in which it overwhelmingly commended the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

*Taking note* of the reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council and the General Assembly <sup>39</sup>, and the replies contained therein, on the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

*Recognizing*, on the basis of the above-mentioned reports, that the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East enjoys wide support in the region,

*Mindful* of the prevailing political situation in the region and of the potential danger emanating therefrom, which would be further aggravated by the introduction of nuclear weapons in the area,

*Conscious*, therefore, of the need to keep the countries of the region from becoming involved in a ruinous nuclear arms race,

*Taking note* of the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-free-weapon zones in all its aspects <sup>40</sup>, prepared by the *Ad Hoc* Group of Qualified Governmental Experts pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3261 F (XXIX) of 9 December 1974,

*Recalling* its resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968, in which it expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons <sup>41</sup> by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States,

1. *Expresses the opinion* that the Member States with which the Secretary-General has consulted through his notes verbales of 19 March 1975 and 13 June 1975 pursuant to General Assembly resolution

3263 (XXIX) should exert efforts towards the realization of the objective of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

2. *Urges* all parties directly concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a means of promoting this objectives;

3. *Recommends* that the Member States referred to in paragraph 1 above, pending the establishment nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards, should:

- a. Proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons, in their territory or the territory under their control, by any third party;
- b. Refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from any other action that would facilitate the acquisition, testing or use of such weapons, or would be in any other way detrimental to the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region under an effective system of safeguards;

4. *Recommends* to the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any action contrary to the purpose of the present resolution and the objective of establishing, in the region of the Middle East, a nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards and to extend their co-operation to the States if the region in their efforts to promote this objective;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-first session the item entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”.<sup>2</sup>

*2437<sup>th</sup> plenary meeting*

*11 December 1975*

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<sup>39</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Thirtieth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1975, documents S/11778 and Add.1-3 and *ibid.*, Supplement for October, November and December 1975, document S/11778/Add.4; A/10221 and Add.1 and 2.

<sup>40</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 27A (A.10027.Add.1), Annex I.

<sup>41</sup> Resolution 2373 (XXII), annex.

## Appendix C: Resolution on the Middle East adopted at 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference

### Resolution on the Middle East

The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Reaffirming the purpose and provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Recognizing that, pursuant to article VII of the Treaty, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones contributes to strengthening the international non-proliferation regime,

Recalling that the Security Council, in its statement 31 January 1992, affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling also General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus supporting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the latest of which is resolution 49/71 of 15 December 1994,

Recalling further the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning the application of Agency safeguards in the Middle East, the latest of which is GC(XXXVIII)/RES/21 of 23 September 1994, and noting the danger of nuclear proliferation, especially in areas of tension,

Bearing in mind Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and in particular paragraph 14 thereof,

Noting Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and paragraph 8 of the decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by the Conference in 11 May 1995,

Bearing in mind the other decisions adopted by the Conference on 11 May 1995,

1. Endorses the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process and recognizes that efforts in



this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction;

2. Notes with satisfaction that, in its report (NPT/CONF.1995/MC.III/1), Main Committee III of the Conference recommended that the Conference “call on those remaining States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it, thereby accepting an international legally commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities”;

3. Notes with concern the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, and reaffirms in this connection the recommendation contained in section VI, paragraph 3, of the report of the Main Committee III urging those non-parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities to accept full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

4. Reaffirms the importance of the early realization of universal adherence to the Treaty, and calls upon all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

5. Calls upon all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective;

6. Calls upon all States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to extend their cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment by regional parties of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

## **Appendix D: Reaffirmation of the 1995 Resolution in May 2010 Review Conference Discussions Excerpt**

### **IV. The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East**

1. The Conference reaffirms the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalls the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference stresses that the resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are achieved. The resolution, which was co-sponsored by the depository States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America), is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States parties renew their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation.

2. The Conference reaffirms its endorsement of the aims and objectives of the Middle East peace process, and recognizes that efforts in this regard, as well as other efforts, contribute to, inter alia, a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.

3. The Conference takes note of the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear-weapon States of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

4. The Conference regrets that little progress has been achieved towards the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

5. The Conference recalls the reaffirmation by the 2000 Review Conference of the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The Conference reaffirms the urgency and the importance of achieving universality of the Treaty. The Conference calls on all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so to accede to the

Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.

6. The Conference stresses the necessity of strict adherence by all States parties to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty. The Conference urges all States in the region to take relevant steps and confidence-building measures to contribute to the realization of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and calls upon all States to refrain from undertaking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective.

7. The Conference emphasizes the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. To that end, the Conference endorses the following practical steps:

- a. The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, will convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all the States of the Middle East, on the establishment of the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. The 2012 Conference shall take as its terms of reference the 1995 Resolution;
- b. Appointment by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, of a facilitator, with a mandate to support implementation of the 1995 Resolution by conducting consultations with the States of the region in that regard and undertaking preparations for the convening of the 2012 Conference. The facilitator will also assist in implementation of follow-on steps agreed by the participating regional States at the 2012 Conference. The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings;
- c. Designation by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, of a host Government for the 2012 Conference;
- d. Additional steps aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, including the IAEA, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and other relevant international organizations be requested to prepare background documentation for the 2012 Conference regarding modalities for a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, taking into account work

previously undertaking and experience gained;

- e. Consideration of all offers aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, including the offer of the European Union to host a follow-on seminar to that organized in June 2008.

8. The Conference emphasizes the requirement of maintaining parallel progress, in substance and timing, in the process leading to achieving total and complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in the region, nuclear, chemical and biological.

9. The Conference reaffirms that all States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and the States in the region, should continue to report on steps taken to implement the 1995 Resolution, through the United Nations Secretariat, to the President of the 2015 Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference.

10. The Conference further recognizes the important role played by civil society in contributing to the implementation of the 1995 Resolution and encourages all efforts in this regard.

### **Other regional issue**

1. The Conference strongly urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to fulfil the commitments under the Six-Party Talks, including the complete and verifiable abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in accordance with the September 2005 joint statement, and urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return, at an early date, to the Treaty and to its adherence with its IAEA safeguards agreement. The Conference also calls on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and all States parties to fully implement all relevant nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. The Conference reaffirms its firm support for the Six-Party Talks and remains determined to achieve the satisfactory and comprehensive resolution to the issues involved through diplomatic means.









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