DIPLOMACY IN A DANGEROUS WORLD A CONVERSATION WITH AMERICA'S TOP DIPLOMATS

R. Nicholas Burns
David D. Newsom
Marc Grossman
Robert Kimmitt
Thomas R. Pickering

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF DIPLOMACY
EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

MISSION AND PROGRAMS

The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD), founded in 1978, is part of Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and is the School's primary window on the world of the foreign affairs practitioner.

ISD studies the practitioner's craft: how diplomats and other foreign affairs professionals succeed and the lessons to be learned from their successes and failures. Institute programs focus particular attention on the foreign policy process: how decisions are made and implemented.

ISD conducts its programs through a small staff and resident and nonresident associates. Associates, who include U.S. and foreign government officials and other foreign affairs practitioners, are detailed to or affiliated with the Institute for a year or more. The Institute seeks to build academic–practitioner collaborations around issues.

The Institute's immediate constituency is Georgetown students. ISD staff and associates teach courses, organize lectures and discussions, mentor students, and participate on university committees.

ISD's larger constituency is the broader academic and policy community. The Institute reaches this group through its conferences, working groups, publications, and research activities, which include participation from the men and women who make and influence foreign policy. Also, ISD's international affairs case studies are utilized in classrooms across the United States and around the world.

On October 29, 2007, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy hosted a roundtable with Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns, and his predecessors as Under Secretaries from past administrations. This was a rare opportunity to hear from the nation's top diplomatic practitioners together in one room. The Under Secretary for Political Affairs is the third most senior position in the State Department, and traditionally at the center of U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy formulation.

WELCOME
CASIMIR A. YOST

Ladies and gentlemen, good evening. My name is Casimir Yost. I direct the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy here at Georgetown. I am absolutely delighted to welcome five current and former under secretaries of state for political affairs, the number three position in the Department of State. I want to offer a particular welcome to Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Robert Kimmitt, who was under secretary of state from 1989 to 1991. And Ambassador Nicholas Burns, who holds the under secretary position at present. We know how demanding their schedules are and, so, to have them here with us, along with their colleagues, is a particular treat.

I think it is fair to say, to paraphrase President John F. Kennedy, that never has this much American diplomatic talent been assembled in one place since Thomas Jefferson ate dinner alone. The dean of the assembled under secretaries, David Newsom, a former dean of the School of Foreign Service, as well as a former director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, entered the foreign service in 1947. So, quite literally, the entire postwar history of American diplomacy is represented at this table in front of you.

Collectively, this group has served under eleven American presidents. We are particularly grateful to Under Secretary Burns for assembling this group of American wise men. I know he is basking in the glory of his beloved Red Sox, who, last night, for those of you who are completely unattached to the American scene, completed the sweep of the World Series. I suspect that if Nick had his way they would next be tasked with achieving Middle East peace.

Let me turn the proceedings over to Ambassador Thomas Pickering, chairman of the board of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy and under secretary of state for political affairs from 1997 to 2000. You have all been provided with biographies of the panel, so neither of us will go into extensive introductions. Suffice it to say that even Thomas Jefferson would have been impressed.

INTRODUCTION
THOMAS R. PICKERING

Thank you, Cas, and thank you all for coming tonight. It is a great pleasure, as chairman of the board of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, to join Cas in welcoming you. Let me also thank, most sin-

cerely, my colleagues for their time to be with you tonight. Without them, obviously, this would be a total nonevent. With them, this promises to be an extremely interesting evening for all of you. And, the fact that we are now at standing room only indicates the popularity of the event. And I know, because I know my colleagues well, that they will certainly live up to the billing.

Because the biographies have been distributed to you, I would just note that today Deputy Secretary Kimmitt is also acting secretary of the treasury. So, we are, in some ways, getting a special bonus out of Bob. But, not only that, Bob's work as deputy secretary of the treasury, now added on to with the absence of his boss, means that he made a particular sacrifice to come and be with us tonight, and we are extremely grateful to you, Bob. As we are to Nicholas Burns for his conception of the idea for such a discussion, his implementation of it, and his follow through.

Without doubt, the job of under secretary of state for political affairs is one of the most important in Washington and certainly one of the most interesting. I think all of us who have held the job probably would tell you, in all frankness, that it is certainly one of the most interesting positions in all of the United States. It is often, but not exclusively, the senior job that is filled by a Foreign Service officer, although a number of our colleagues have been deputy secretary of state, and one has become secretary of state, Larry Eagleburger, who also held this job.

It is the most important and interesting job because, in many ways, it brings together not only the summit of a long career for the professionals, but it also allows those professionals to deal in the broadest range of subject matter across the board. Not only is the under secretary expected to be a primary advisor to the secretary on every conceivable political or politically related problem, but also to take a strong and, indeed, vibrant interest in the work of the under secretaries who run the regional bureaus of the State Department.

From that perspective, I can think of no more interesting job in foreign affairs. I think you will agree, when you have heard my colleagues, that they represent the finest in the choices that were made by the presidents who appointed them.

I am going to ask them each to limit their opening remarks to five minutes. We will follow the order in which they served the president. But, because I have been asked to preside, I will come last, after Nicholas Burns.

They will each give you five minutes on a topic or issue of their choice. We will have a few minutes for panel response, if we wish to conduct a dialogue on anything that has been said. Then I want to quickly open the floor to all of you. You came here to be participants in the meeting. We welcome that.

When the floor is open to you, I hope you all stand up, when recognized, and give us your name and any affiliation you might have beyond that of Georgetown University student. Pose your question or your comment for us to respond to, and we will move rapidly to do so. I hope to keep the meeting on time, and I hope to end on time. Again, thank you for being here, and I would ask David Newsom if he would start.

DAVID D. NEWSOM

UNDER SECRETARY, TERM 1978–1981

It is a particular pleasure for me to come back to two places that have represented my life in the District of Columbia—the Department of State and Georgetown University. And to see many friends here. I appreciate very much both Nick Burns and Cas Yost for arranging these events.

It has been a quarter of a century since I turned in my State Department pass and pursued life after government. Reflecting back on that quarter of a century, it was interesting to me to find out that the list of items that were on our plate as priority items in 1978, '79, and '80 is not different from the list of items that Nick Burns is dealing with today: Middle East peace, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Horn of Africa, Cuba, developments in the two Koreas, and human rights.

It has been a quarter of a century since I turned in my State Department pass and pursued life after government. Reflecting back on that quarter of a century, it was interesting to me to find out that the list of items that were on our plate as priority items in 1978, '79, and '80 is not different from the list of items that Nick Burns is dealing with today.

But while the agenda may sound the same, new questions have been triggered by the constant attention to these problems. I will just name a few of them to throw out for discussion tonight: Problems that we did not have an answer, a totally satisfactory answer, to in 1981; and I am not sure that a satisfactory answer exists today.

First, balancing the need in American diplomacy for public statements by officials for the domestic audience against the risk that such statements will not be fully understood or correctly understood abroad—a constant burden of American diplomacy.

Second, balancing the domestic pressures for action, whether political or humanitarian, with the sensitivities and realities that we encounter in the regions affected.

Third, what to do about adversarial regimes, whether those are state or nonstate actors. Each available option has its disadvantages, whether it's opening conversations, imposing sanctions, isolating a threat, or using force.

And, fourth, facing the limitations on resources, both military and diplomatic.

As under secretary for political affairs from March 1978 to February 1981, I dealt with each of these general questions. I won't go into the specifics that history has recorded. But I will say that, adding to what Ambassador Pickering has said, and in the shadow of the World Series, the under secretary for political affairs is the utility outfielder in the State Department—taking on whatever comes up that nobody else wants to handle, including some congressional testimonies. I had to testify, for example, on Billy Carter's [President Jimmy Carter's brother] relations to Libya.

In that complex region from the Mediterranean shore to the Pakistan-Indian border, which was the center of attention in the late 1970s and remains so now, I would not exclude many other areas of the world. But that is where we had our focus. We face, in each region, complications of tribalism, questions of religious identity, difficulties of historic rivalries, problems of access to resources, overlapping claims to sovereignty, and histories of past imperialist ambitions, which are not always easy to understand. Those who do understand them, whether they are diplomats or academics, often have problems in communicating the realities of different politics and cultures to Americans steeped in our

own experience and tradition. It is a region where questionable assumptions can lead to unexpected consequences, and, yet, one in which our national interests and our traditional ties will probably, forever, require our involvement.

ROBERT KIMMITT

UNDER SECRETARY, TERM 1989–1991

Tom, thank you. I would start by saying that diplomacy, and the art and conduct of diplomacy, applies not just to foreign policy but also to national security policy more broadly.

I think of national security policy as combining foreign, defense, and international economic policies all resting on and drawing from a strong intelligence base. It is that international economic policy component in which I think there has been the most significant transformation, both since I served as under secretary in the first Bush administration and, indeed, since I served at the Treasury Department and with Jim Baker before that in the second Reagan term. It is hard to think of any major initiative that we take in which treasury, the State Department, the Defense Department, and others do not work quite closely together.

I think of national security policy as combining foreign, defense, and international economic policies all resting on and drawing from a strong intelligence base.

I have just recently come back from a trip through Europe. My boss, Hank Paulson, is in India right now. He comes back only to go off to South Africa. When he gets back, I head to the Persian Gulf and other places. When we travel, we meet not just with finance ministers and central bank governors, but also with foreign ministers. We get into the prime minister's office. I think, again, that you have to consider national security as an integrated web on an ever-accelerating basis.

There has been a traditional treasury role in the international area for some time. That is, the G5, later the G7, process, the work that we do in trade and in investment. But there has been a dramatic change since 9-11-2001.

First, on the international affairs side, we work very closely with our colleagues across the departments and agencies on different postconflict situations, like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. Just last week, we had our annual financial forum with the Iraq deputy prime minister, the Iraq finance minister, and the Iraq central bank governor. I think it might surprise many people here to learn that the macro economy in Iraq is pretty sound. Iraqis have been living under an IMF [International Monetary Fund] program since late 2005, meeting every one of their requirements. It is a country rich in natural resources. The question is how to deliver those resources to the benefit of the Iraqi people, and that is a question right now of budget execution ability, both in Baghdad itself and in the provinces. Again, this is something that we work on very closely on an interagency basis.

Probably the biggest change, though, with the Treasury Department, was when we stood up our office of terrorism and financial intelligence. This was in 2003, as the Department of Homeland Security was being created. We now have an under secre-

tary for terrorism and financial intelligence. And we have two assistant secretaries, one for illicit finance and one for intelligence and analysis. Treasury is now the newest and smallest member of the intelligence community. Our focus is on one thing and one thing only: keeping bad actors out of the world's financial system. That includes terrorists, nuclear proliferators, organized criminals, and drug dealers. To run a global terrorist and proliferation network, you need access to the world's financial system. It is when these bad actors come into the world's financial system that we have the best chance of detecting, disrupting, and dismantling their networks.

We had an example of this just last Thursday with the announcements made by Secretary Rice and Secretary Paulson on the further extension of U.S. sanctions, including financial sanctions, against Iran on proliferation and terrorism grounds. We have worked quite closely with Nick and our colleagues at the State Department on North Korea, in particularly the Banco Delta Asia case in Macau. There are also similar financial sanctions and broader economic sanctions in place against Burma and Sudan. In my view, sanctions are an important diplomatic instrument and lever for treasury and for our colleagues at the State Department.

I guess I will just close by saying that one thing that links both the international affairs side of what we do at treasury, and the terrorism on the financial intelligence side, is looking at and updating the world's financial architecture. There are people at this table who are very much involved in the security architecture restructuring that was done after the fall of the Berlin Wall, after Germany was unified. NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and other institutions have been greatly restructured since that time.

When you take a look at the world's financial architecture, it looks a lot more like it did in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944, than it does in reflecting the economy of today, or, certainly, the economy of the future. There have been some steps taken through the years, particularly the establishment of certain regional multilateral development banks that have tried to keep pace. There is a new and important emerging institution, called the G20, that includes the G7, plus thirteen other important economies, the most important of which would be Brazil, Russia, India, and China.

We are still working with the new leadership at the World Bank and, as of November 1, 2007, the new leadership at the International Monetary Fund whether it is on the positive side of the agenda—to make the world economy ever healthier and ever more able to deliver to those particularly in need, or on the punitive side—trying to keep proliferators, terrorists, and others out of the system.

We need to find a way on a global basis, not just a national or trans-Atlantic basis, to update the financial architecture for the economy that we face today and the economy in the next fifteen to twenty years. If you take a look at any projections of what capital flows, investment flows, trade flows, GDP [gross domestic product], regional and global growth look like, it is going to be dramatically different by the time some of you who are students today are in the positions that we have held in the past.

MARC GROSSMAN

UNDER SECRETARY, TERM 2001–2005

Thank you very much. I want to make two quick points, because I know we want to get as quickly as possible to your participation in this dialogue.

The first point is really a small reflection on the twenty-nine or thirty years that I spent in the Foreign Service. I loved being a Foreign Service officer. As Tom Pickering said, to be the under secretary of state for political affairs was a great, great privilege.

When I think back, though, on that time, to how my life was consumed for those years, it was with countries and bilateral relationships, with meetings and deadlines, and with issues and decisions by hours. As I have had a chance to reflect during the past couple of years, very much thanks to Georgetown University, I have come to recognize that there are huge changes in this world, that some of them are still relevant to those individual actors and that some of them are still relevant to the way that we do business in diplomacy not just in the United States but around the world. Some of these issues are going to require, I think, a huge change in the way to think about the profession of diplomacy.

***I have come to recognize that there are huge changes in this world, that some of them . . . are going to require, I think, a huge change in the way to think about the profession of diplomacy.* – Grossman**

When I consider what big issues are out there today, I do not mean to say, in any way, that Iraq and Iran and Middle East peace—all these issues—are not extremely important. I think about the challenges that are brought to us by dealing with the global environment and having to live sustainably on this earth. Or, secondly, dealing with bringing the benefits of globalization to those who have not yet benefited from globalization. And then the issues of nonproliferation. Those three things are consuming and, I believe, will be consuming for many, many years to come. And they will require, I believe, a different way of thinking about diplomacy, if we're going to be able to solve those problems. One way that has to change, I think, is that we have to recognize the simultaneity of the challenges that we face today.

Something I think about when looking back on my career is how a Foreign Service officer moves from assignment to assignment, and not necessarily working in the same region or context. But when you consider the global challenges that we face today, the only way to deal with them is simultaneously. I think about the work that Ambassador Pickering and I did, and Nick Burns continues, on Colombia. You do not solve the [drug] problem in Colombia only in a military way. There needs to be economic development in Colombia, human rights development, rule of law development, and the need to defeat the terrorists. All of those things have to happen simultaneously.

The same can be said for Turkey, where I had the good fortune and honor to be ambassador. Turkey is a country that illustrates the whole aspect of need for simultaneity. There will be no success in Turkey without more democracy; greater human rights; and more rule of law, economic development, and security. You have to deal with these things simultaneously.

If my observation is true, then the profession of diplomacy is changing in front of our very eyes. The job that many of us had abroad, to observe and to report so other people can make decisions—that's changing. Because what we ask people to do now to represent the United States of America is to fight crime, to fight terrorism, to fight narcoterrorism, and to deal with the questions of trafficking in persons and women and children.

The State Department faces a great opportunity to change the way we think about diplomacy and to think about it as David Newsom and Robert

Kimmitt did. That is the challenge, it seems to me, that is out there today.

I have the good fortune to serve as the co-chair of a commission from CSIS [the Center for Strategic and International Studies] which reported last week on the embassy of the future. When they first came to us, they said, "We would like to talk about the embassy of the future." And I said, "What do you mean, like architecture?" And, they said, "No, what is an embassy going to be like." And we said, "Yes, I'd like to think about that, because there's a new job to be done. And if it's right that there's a new job, then you need a new platform on which to do it, and if that's right, then you need a new way to think about how to treat the people."

We reported last week, and we had a chance to talk a little bit to Secretary Rice about it today. More people from the State Department. More technology. More training. A diversified and dispersed platform. And, obviously, then, questions about risk. When you put people farther and farther out in front to deal with societies around the world, you place them at greater risk and have to deal with those issues, as well. I think the State department and diplomacy have a huge opportunity to change, a huge opportunity to meet these requirements of the new world. And, I'm very, very pleased that all of you would be interested in it as well. Thank you very much.

NICHOLAS BURNS

UNDER SECRETARY, TERM 2005–

Thank you, Marc. Good evening, everybody. It's a pleasure to be here at Georgetown. Cas, thank you for the invitation to be here. I'm sorry, I cannot see all of you in the audience, but I hope you can hear us. And thank you for the engagement that is surely to come later in our discussion.

It has been a good day for us, a memorable day, because we have been able to convene for the past six hours and talk together about some of the challenges facing America.

Earlier, we addressed a group of younger diplomats at the State Department at a forum much like this. We also met with Secretary Rice and spoke with her, as well. So this is a nice way to finish a day.

The impression I have, as a career Foreign Service officer, is that we span this extraordinary range of time, from the administration of Harry Truman to that of George W. Bush. As a career person who changed jobs frequently, what I always had in mind was that I was handing the baton off to another person. I think you will see in the collective experience of this group that this is what happened. As we look toward our presidential election in 2008 and a transition that will come in January 2009, part of what we in government have to do is to ready ourselves and our successors to hand over that baton, to make sure that there has been a steady course, and to do as much as we can to maintain our security and advance our national interests at the same time.

I have another image in mind. That we, officers currently serving, are standing on the shoulders of those who have gone before. In the Foreign Service, as well as in the military officer corps, there is this tradition of continuity, a tradition that we learn from those who have gone before us. I certainly had that image in mind today as I listened to Ambassador Newsom and Ambassador Pickering, and to people who really accomplished extraordinary

things in their career. Those of us who follow them ought to be able to learn from them, if we listen to them. And that is why today's discussion has been useful.

I want to say, as Marc said, just a couple of things, maybe just two points to frame what I believe as a professional diplomat our nation is going to face in the next several years.

First, I think we are living in an extraordinarily challenging time—understatement of the evening. I cannot remember a time, in my twenty-five-year career, when our nation has faced so many crises that are vital to us, seemingly simultaneously. I think if we reflect on those challenges, and they're all around the world, geographically and functionally, then we need to inquire about American engagement in the world and American leadership in the world.

It may seem obvious to you that Americans should be engaged in the world and that our government should be engaged in every part of the world. But if you look at our 231-year history as a country, our diplomatic history, it is not at all obvious. Because we have swung wildly back and forth between periods of intense engagement and activity in the world and periods of relative, and sometimes absolute, isolation from it.

I went to another school of international affairs, just across town in Dupont Circle, Johns Hopkins. I had a wonderful professor my first year, Robert O. Osgood. He wrote a book called *Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Policy*. It was about this tension as to who we are as a people, about our place in the world, and about whether or not we ought to lead or retire from the world.

I guess one could say that, over the first two centuries of our national existence, there was legitimate debate about this. But if you reflect on what Ambassador Newsom, Ambassador Kimmitt, and Ambassador Grossman have just said, we are living in a time, post-9/11, where American engagement and leadership are required.

After 9/11, how could any American be isolationist? How could anyone say that our national interests are best served by staying home, or by pulling the covers over our head on cloudy mornings, just because the world is a forbidding place? After 9/11, when we understand that the Atlantic and Pacific no longer protect us, as nineteenth and eighteenth century Americans believed they did, from the ills of the world, we have to be engaged in the world.

In addition, I think we also have to resist the other temptation— unilateralism: The idea that because we are extraordinarily powerful in the world, and we are, we can somehow seek to dominate it, or go it alone, or forsake our alliances.

Measure power by any metric. Politically: A professor here, Madeleine Albright, who was the boss of many of us when she was secretary of state, said we are the indispensable country. Now she got in trouble for that. Some people beyond our shores said that sounds arrogant. I do not think she meant it that way at all. She meant that, because of our power, we have to be involved in the world's most important crises.

Economically: We are the largest economy and the most innovative.

***I went to another school of international affairs, just across town in Dupont Circle, Johns Hopkins. I had a wonderful professor my first year, Robert O. Osgood. He wrote a book called* Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Policy. *It was about this tension as to who we are as a people, about our place in the world, and about whether or not we ought to lead or retire from the world.* – Burns**

Militarily: I hope this doesn't sound like an arrogant or presumptuous statement for those of you who are not Americans in the room: We are the greatest military that the world has seen in many centuries.

The question that we have to answer as Americans is how to use that power responsibly and effectively, not just for the good of America but also for the good of the world. There is a tension in answering that question that I think has been implicit in what many of us have said this evening.

[W]e must be engaged in the world in an intelligent way, in an effective way. We have to lead, but in partnership with others around the world. If you look at the next generation's foreign policy challenges, your foreign policy challenges, they have a common denominator: None of them can be resolved by one country alone. – **Burns**

So, the first point I would like to leave you with is that we must be engaged in the world in an intelligent way, in an effective way. We have to lead, but in partnership with others around the world. If you look at the next generation's foreign policy challenges, your foreign policy challenges, they have a common denominator: None of them can be resolved by one country alone.

Now let us look at the most important challenges for the future: Global climate change, trafficking of women and children, international crime cartels, international drug cartels, terrorism (which is now a global phenomenon), and its juxtaposition with weapons of mass destruction—chemical and biological, and nuclear. If we are to confront any of these problems, attack them, succeed in overcoming them and in protecting our people and people around the world, we cannot accomplish success, find success on any one of them, if we are working alone in the world. We have to maintain our alliances and our partnerships. For America to succeed in the world, it needs to lead in the world, as well as be engaged in it.

The final thing I'd say is this: The world might seem like a fairly forbidding place to a lot of you, just looking at these terrible calamities that we have experienced, national disasters, man made disasters over the last several decades. But I also think we have some positive opportunities ahead of us, and it is important not only to face those terrible challenges, the difficult ones, but also to have ideals about what the world can become.

In that case, if we stay focused as Americans on our national values—support democracy, maintain a commitment to human rights, maintain a commitment to helping small countries protect themselves against big countries—and we see some of that being played out right now in central Europe, between Russia and some of our NATO allies, and other small countries in the former Soviet sphere of influence—then we can do powerful and good things in the world. I think any one of us going back sixty years could point out where each American president, Republican and Democrat, has upheld American values and accomplished important things in the world.

So, I would not want anyone here who is aspiring to a career in public service to think that, somehow, he or she will be facing a world with insurmountable problems. With a sense of idealism and commitment, our country can continue to do great things overseas.

THOMAS PICKERING

UNDER SECRETARY, TERM 1997–2000

Thank you, Nick, very much. Someone wise in the ways of diplomacy once said that diplomacy was turning challenges into opportunities. And, indeed,

I think many of us have experienced that over the years. I think we are all fully conscious of the fact that, in turning challenges into opportunities, as Nick said, we live in the world. We have the responsibility, in almost all of these cases, of leading in the world.

We also have to do something else that I think Nick pointed out. We have to start working broadly, multilaterally, bilaterally. Probably not unilaterally. We have come to understand very well that force is an extremely important adjunct of our diplomacy, but always best used as the last of all possible resorts.

We also have to do something else that I think Nick pointed out. We have to start working broadly, multilaterally, bilaterally. Probably not unilaterally. We have come to understand very well that force is an extremely important adjunct of our diplomacy, but always best used as the last of all possible resorts.
– Pickering

I want to mention three, or four, or five challenges very briefly that I think now face us, which I would hope that the administration will be able to continue to move on over its remaining months.

Nick has done an absolutely outstanding job in working with India. I had the privilege, back in 1992 and '93, of being there at the start of the change in Indian attitudes, both toward their own economy and to the outside world. What has now happened is bipartisan. It is progressing, and it is beginning to unite the world's oldest and the world's largest democracy in ways that are extremely important and need to be continued.

The Middle East remains a cockpit of problems for the United States and, indeed, because of the interrelationship of these problems, is best described in the term coined by the French, a "problematique," a series of interrelated and difficult problems. There are no easy answers in the Middle East, except commitment, hard work, and, I think, innovation.

I would begin with Iran. Nick reminded me today, and all of us, that, just last week, the secretary, once again, broadly opened the door to conversations directly with Iran. I think this is an extremely important step and one that would, I hope, be taken. I have a great deal of skepticism that the Iranians are yet ready to move in that direction. And, indeed, over the years, an Iranian diplomat, who has been very accomplished in his performance of his task, once told me that the tragedy always was that whenever the United States was ready to talk to Iran, Iran was not, and that the opposite was also true. Someday, I hope soon, those curves will cross. But, I think it is an extremely important issue, because I believe the Iranians consider us, and our world leadership role, if you will pardon the crude expression, the owners of the circus.

In some ways, we can make things happen that others cannot. In looking at that particular set of endeavors, we bring to the table a great deal. We have only to look at the example of the interlocked discussions that took place and are continuing to take place with North Korea in the group of six, and the success so far. We all have our fingers crossed that it will continue to be a success, as a possible, if not a model, basic set of principles that might be applied to moving ahead with Iran.

The second "I" in the Middle East is, of course,

Iraq. Here, I have been really both concerned, somewhat disturbed, and somewhat hopeful that, with the consistent and constant mention of the need for a political settlement, that we will begin on that course. Bob reminded us all today, and you, just a few minutes ago, of the progress that he sees being made in Iraq on the economic side. In my view, it needs to be complemented by beginning to work on the critical issues of governance, the division of oil revenues, and some of the other problems that, at the moment, escape, I think, realization in the Iraq context.

I would say just a couple of things here. I think that the regional players are extremely important. And, here again, I would point to Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria. They all have the capability either of being colossal spoilers, or, because they have a tremendous interest in the outcome in Iraq, and, as a result, obviously, they need to be engaged. I also think that a future Iraq and, indeed, a future arrangement for the region as a whole, is an important adjunct to a settlement.

Finally, I would say that I also believe that we do need to engage a great deal more than we have, and the secretary will be visiting Istanbul shortly, with, I think, an eye to continuing this process. We need to engage the principal players in the UN Security Council and, perhaps, important states like Germany, Japan, and India, in a process of working toward a settlement, a political settlement in Iraq.

The Arab-Israeli dispute will not be settled quickly. It continues to have, I think, egregious problems to be dealt with. I admire the work that the secretary has been doing in pushing that process ahead. I would hope that, what I believe to be now a more studied silence on Hamas will, over time, permit those in that organization who have a view that the importance of a negotiated settlement and a two-state solution is, in every conceivable way, well above the use of violence and force and suicide bombing—to come into the tent, rather than to stay out. I think it is important to do everything we can to encourage that, not only for the future of the settlement, but also, I think, for the future of governance among the Palestinians.

This is but one of a number of very difficult and very tricky issues that have to be dealt with. The Middle East can never be rushed, but I also believe that the bicycle principle applies in the Middle East, that, if you are not riding forward, you are falling down. I think the secretary has begun to prove, once again, that it is important for the United States to lead, riding a bicycle and making this happen.

Finally, I would just say briefly that nuclear nonproliferation remains a worry. It remains a worry, in general. We have focused on Iran and North Korea. It remains a worry if they become conduits of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists.

I think it is time for a renewed push on nonproliferation in many areas. One of those can be what the nuclear powers are doing to make certain that, under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, they have fulfilled their obligations under article VI. Here, I would think, we are getting ripe for another round of critical nuclear and delivery vehicle disarmament negotiations between the United States and Russia. My view would be that it would be a stretch target, but it would be an important target to look at a 50 percent reduction [in nuclear weapons] over the next five years. It should be done, in my view, under international inspection and control.

The second step would be finally to ratify the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. A third step would be to take the suggestion the secretary has made for a fissile material cutoff treaty and try to carry that through. It would ratify what has already taken place among the critical nuclear powers, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons, and it would perpetuate that important step.

Finally, not just in connection with Iran, although I think it would play an important role in Iran, we ought to move ahead, perhaps, and organize a nuclear fuel regime, both to provide fuel for nuclear power reactors in the civil sphere and also to take back the spent fuel that contains plutonium, which would be an important contribution. It should be an arrangement that is competitive, that is, involving multiple suppliers among the nuclear weapons states. It should be an arrangement in which, perhaps, at the end, we ought to agree to provide fuel for civil nuclear reactors to all states using them, who, in fact, do not enter into enrichment reprocessing on their own. And we ought to arrange to do that, as long as those states are complying with their nonproliferation commitments. No other rules, perhaps, should intervene, as tempting as it might be to withhold fuel for political purposes.

These are important steps. They are challenges that could be turned into opportunities. My hope is that some of them will. Thank you very much.

DISCUSSION / Q & A

Newsom: One rather mundane comment. We are talking about a number of issues in which the United States hopes to prevail and have its view of an issue and the world understood abroad. The role of a diplomat is not just to create policy but also to be a persuader. Behind each of these initiatives that people are talking about, there must be American diplomats with the capacity, in personality, in experience, and in language, to sit down with those from other societies and to persuade them of the correctness of the American position. An American diplomat is also, more and more, becoming a politician, going out in other societies and campaigning, as campaigners do here.

So, as we think about the big issues in this School of Foreign Service, we should not neglect the techniques that are going to be necessary to make our prevailing in these issues possible.

Pickering: Thank you, David. Do others of my colleagues have comments to make at this point? If not, because we are limited both by the intensive lights preparatory to your third degree and because we can see only a horizon beyond the first couple of rows, I have asked Cas if he would perform the neutral function of standing at the pulpit and selecting speakers. There is a microphone, so please wait for the microphone to come to you. Please identify yourself and proceed with your question succinctly and rapidly. Thank you.

Question: Picking up on some of the themes that you were taking about, partnerships emerged as a very key issue, and extending it beyond international partnerships, partnerships within the domestic system in U.S. politics is obviously important, as well. As an outsider looking into the system, I noticed some inconsistencies. Domestically, for example, on the one hand, you have the United States trying to work with Turkey. On the other hand, you have decisions that disrupt that relationship. And, then, when I look to external international affairs, I look at the relationship the United States has with key allies, such as Russia and China, and, certain economic interests and national interests trump that relationship between the United States and its allies.

My question to you is: As a leader and a superpower in a complicated system, how can the United States avoid acting unilaterally, and how can it make the system work, both domestically and internationally?

Burns: I will share the microphone with Marc and others who want to take a swing at this. Thank you very much for your question. I was the one, I think, who put on the table the suggestion that

while the United States, obviously, is a great power, it sometimes will find itself working in small coalitions. Very seldom, alone.

I think, if you look at the nature of the world today, the challenges we face, it does not lend itself to that kind of unilateral action and behavior. Because we simply do not live in that kind of world any longer. We need and require partners or allies to help us share the burden and to help us cope with the challenge as it arrives on our doorstep.

The role of a diplomat is not just to create policy but also to be a persuader. Behind each of these initiatives that people are talking about, there must be American diplomats with the capacity, in personality, in experience, and in language, to sit down with those from other societies and to persuade them of the correctness of the American position. – **Newsom**

I would take global climate change as the most obvious example of that. Where, obviously, our country has to put forward, now, a number of solutions to the problem, looking at the post-Kyoto regime. And we have begun to do that. I think we are in a transitional phase in our own country and government in thinking about global climate change. But we actually now have a group of fifteen countries together, the largest pollution emitters in the world, thinking through what type of regime is necessary, post-Kyoto, and what type of policies we have to determine to agree upon in order to be effective. And that is just the most obvious example.

But you also see it in terms of the way we have to cope with challenges in Africa, for instance. Africa is a place where the United States has a newfound national security interest. And we are doing some very good things, for instance, our HIV/AIDS program, our malaria initiative. But part of the drama in Africa right now is can the international community help the African countries cope with internal crises and civil disorder. And that speaks to the United Nations.

I know it is popular in some parts of the United States to still say "U.S. out of the UN," or to question why we would make a commitment. We have a former ambassador to the United Nations from our country sitting right here, Ambassador Donald McHenry.

I would think, if you look at the world objectively, it is in the U.S.'s national interest to build up the United Nations, to pay our dues, to help the United Nations cope with peacekeeping. In Sudan, we have a peacekeeping force going into Darfur in the next six weeks; in Somalia; in the Congo.

The United States just cannot hope to look at any part of the world and think that we can, by ourselves, either protect our own interests or do something beyond that, and that is to try to help other countries and other peoples achieve their interests, as well.

Broadly speaking, we need to think more multilaterally, and we need to act that way as well. And, I believe, on a number of issues, we are doing that right now. Iran, first and foremost, how we are approaching the many problems from that government.

Grossman: I wanted to also relay a point that Bob Kimmitt made in one of our earlier discussions today. Part of the answer is about discipline, and discipline in two ways. Discipline, first of all, in choosing the objectives that you are trying to follow and then, secondly, the discipline of our very complicated system of government to make sure that everybody is going in the same direction. I think the example you bring of Turkey is a really very important one. We have a number of objectives in Turkey. But, if you look at them, actually, you can deal with them simultaneously.

For example, one of the challenges that Nick and the administration have at the moment is dealing with this problem of the PKK terrorists, who are living in northern Iraq, attacking into Turkey. How do you manage that issue? That is a political and a military issue.

Secondly, while we are not members of the European Union, the United States ought to, it seems to me, continue to speak out for Turkey's full membership in the European Union. Not just because it would be good for the European Union and good for Turkey. It would be good for the United States as well.

And, then, finally, if you look at our long-term interests, I hope the administration will return to a vision of the East-West energy corridors that come out of the Caucasus, and put oil and gas on world markets because so many of these corridors run through Turkey.

If you are going to have those three objectives, you cannot deal with them individually. You have to deal with them simultaneously. Turks would not be interested in helping you on the energy issue if they do not feel that someone is not paying attention to the PKK. Europeans are clearly involved in the energy issue. So, it seems to me, this is a perfect example of simultaneity. If you combine simultaneity with discipline, then you can solve some of these problems.

Kimmitt: I am the only panelist who is not a career Foreign Service officer. I was a political appointee in both the Reagan and Bush administrations. This may not be politically correct on a campus, but I am proud to say I am a conservative Republican on national security matters, and I am a big believer in multilateralism. Why? Because it is effective. It proved effective during the first Gulf War. It is proving effective now on Iran.

At the end of the day, you can spend a lot of time on theory, but I think we are paid to deliver results. Tom mentioned one person's description of diplomacy. Mine is even more plebian. Diplomacy, for me, is the art of making it difficult for difficult countries to be difficult with you. And it is the art of making it easier for friends to be helpful. A multilateral path will almost always get you to that point.

Pickering: I agree with what has been said. I think if you reduce it to its simplest terms, and you are looking at unilateralism as the problem, unilateralism has two tools by which it can perform its functions. One of those is dictat, and the other is the use of force. We have not seen those tools to be very effective. I would consider sanctions a possible tool, but we all agree that sanctions are pretty much effective only if they become multilateral. And, certainly, use of force is a last resort or in defense of the United States, is a different situation than what we would call wars of choice. But, dictat and wars of choice have not proven themselves necessarily to be extremely effective, and, therefore, I think that once again shows us that multilateralism is probably, in most of these situations, the way to go, if not in all of them.

Question: The ambitions of the people and the governments of the Middle East seem to be quite different in the way they would like their lives and their societies to be. Why should not the United States contribute to the building of an organization, such as a people's conference, where it is the people of the Middle East who come together—races, ethnicities, our peoples—to decide what is necessary for them, even if this means, to some extent, not getting the kind of support that the United States has been getting from the regimes in the Middle East. In the interest of the future of the Middle East, why should not such an organization be built?

Pickering: I will be happy to address the question. I think that, for all of us, it is a fascinating and interesting idea. The question of government spon-

sorship, of course, is another interesting twist to the idea. I think, in general, we need to be cautious in dealing with problems of imposing democracy. I do not know that your idea is exactly that. But, I think, democracy is best home grown and not exported. We can assist and help.

There are a number of organizations, some of which I am in touch with. One, in particular, has signed up very large numbers of Palestinians and Israelis who not only meet together but also provide information on the basis of polls and surveys with respect to their outcome.

Some of that, I believe, is beginning to take hold. I am not sure, however, that one would totally resolve all of the issues in the Middle East in a very large conference of people. As useful as it might be, it is not an efficient mechanism, obviously, to get to the finely honed and difficult solutions that have to be prepared to make that happen.

We have, in effect, also, because of the increased polling in the region, in many ways, some of the outcome of the conference ready to hand for us to use. Whether, in fact, a government would choose, in one way or another, to deal with its relationships with very close friends in the Middle East by seeking, in effect, to turn them and their people at odds with each other, which might be the result of this, would be a difficult and somewhat risky proposition. The end result of which might be clarity with respect to people's views, but total confusion with respect to where the process would go.

So, it is a fascinating idea and an interesting one. I have suggested a number of ways in which it is already being accomplished. I will continue to look at it.

> ***[D]ictat and wars of choice have not proven themselves necessarily to be extremely effective, and, therefore, I think that once again shows us that multilateralism is probably, in most of these situations, the way to go, if not in all of them. –*** **Pickering**

Question: I absolutely agree that, in a post-9/11 world, American engagement and American leadership are essential. But what do you do in cases where popular opinion in certain countries conflicts with U.S. national interests in the region? I am thinking specifically of democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East. When Egypt had elections and when there were elections in the Palestinian territories, people showed a preference toward Islamist parties that may have either an anti-U.S. stance or not exactly a pro-U.S. stance. What do you do in cases like that, and is it possible to continue to promote democratic ideals in that region, when there is a chance that the results may not be to our liking?

Pickering: I guess it is a trenchant and interesting question, somewhat along the lines of the last one, but more sharply drawn. Who wants to take this one on? Sure, Marc, go ahead.

Grossman: First of all, thank you very much. It is not just trenchant. It seems to me the question of the moment, about how to go forward here in creating the opportunities, as I would put it, for people around the world to have enough space to make choices about their own lives. I think it is important to step back for a minute and consider how to speak about this.

First of all, I think, Ambassador Pickering is correct that democracy cannot be imposed from the top. You cannot go around and say the way we have figured this out, the way we want to live, the way we make our choices, is the only way that you can go forward. It has to come from the bottom. You have to be patient. You have believe in these things.

But I have come to think at the end of my time in the Foreign Service that it is very important for

the United States to keep speaking about pluralism. It is very important for the United States to keep speaking about the capacity of people to make decisions about their own lives.

I have also come to think two things. One is that I do not see in the world today that there are people who, on the basis of their color, their geography, or their religion, are not capable of living in societies where these kinds of choices are to be made. And, secondly, that there are some basic fundamentals that the United States can speak out in favor of, and those fundamentals have to do with the sanctity of the individual, the rule of law, and the role of women in society. While people will figure out their own ways to organize their societies, it seems to me that there are four or five things that run through societies that are more or less successful.

[T]here are some basic fundamentals that the United States can speak out in favor of, and those fundamentals have to do with the sanctity of the individual, the rule of law, and the role of women in society. While people will figure out their own ways to organize their societies, it seems to me that there are four or five things that run through societies that are more or less successful.
– Grossman

My second point is that elections do not equal democracy promotion. And elections do not equal democracy. While it is very important, I think, for us to continue to focus on the ability of people to choose their own governments, I do not think we can say, well, there was an election in this country and, therefore, this country is democratic.

A final point is one of public relations. It is possible that, to overcome the issues that you raise, we ought to be speaking of pluralism, rather than democracy, at least for a time. Not to get away from, as I say, the capacity of people to make their own choices, but so that you have, as Ambassador Newsom said, the ability for people to listen to you at least for a minute as you are making your case and to talk about pluralism.

With regard to the previous questioner. I agree with all of the cautions that Ambassador Pickering talked about. But if you think about this, perhaps there is something to learn from the CSCE [the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] / OSCE [the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] experience where people came to their own choices about how they wanted to live, that someday can be applied to the Middle East. They lived under a system that they wanted to change. We encouraged them in that thought, and the Helsinki process turned into an organization that does provide some way to talk about some of the security and political and economic issues that are available in the Middle East.

Burns: Can I just add my voice to Marc's very briefly to say how much I agree with what he said. I think you will see the United States focused in the short term, over the next three to four years, on four priority objectives.

First would be peace and stability in Iraq. Obvious.

Second, to find some way to be able to work with the Iranian government, if that is possible. Secretary Rice offered negotiations just the other day. But the United States needs to deny Iran a nuclear weapons capability, and the continued capability to fund and arm Hammas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Shia militants in Iraq, and the Taliban. Iran is doing all of that. An ascendant Iran is against the interests of our country and most of the Arab world in the Middle East.

Third, protect and defend democracy in Lebanon and defend Lebanon against continued Syrian

involvement and aggression.

And, fourth, and by no means in priority order, maybe first in priority order, to see our way toward an Israeli-Palestinian peace, nearly sixty years after the creation of the state of Israel and the dispersal of the Palestinian people from Palestine in May1948. That is a priority for us. It ought to be our priority to see the creation of an independent Palestinian state and the survival of Israel and Israel living side by side with that state and the acceptance of Israel by all of the other Arab states.

That is not farfetched. We are fifty-nine years into this, but we cannot give up. I think Marc is exactly right. If those are our short-term goals, the ones that I just enunciated as Americans, how can we not support reform, pluralism, the rule of law, and democracy in the Arab world, if we are friends with the Arab world and believe in the future of the Arab world? Not that any of us believe it can be imposed from our side; it cannot. Or that the region can be transformed immediately; it cannot. But as a long-term objective, Americans have always stood for those values in our foreign policy, as well as here at home. I do not think we ought to forsake them when it comes to the most violent part of the world, for the sake of our country.

Question: What does the Mexican government, and I will say most Latin American countries, need to do or need to know in order to get the U.S. government's attention? Not only to create short-term agreements, such as the Plan Mexico or Plan Colombia. Thank you very much.

Burns: I will just start briefly. I am sure that anybody else on this panel, maybe Bob, would like to comment.

You have got our attention. President Bush, I think, has visited the Americas eleven times in his presidency. It is the most of any two-term American president. We understand that the future of the United States is dependent upon the future of our hemisphere, particularly with your country. We have a symbiotic relationship with Mexico and with Canada, not just in NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agreement], but also in all the positive opportunities and all of the troubles along our borders. There is no question that we have to have a sustained involvement.

I think what is hopeful about what is happening in the Americas is that we have found a way to talk to each other across ideological divides. President Bush visited Latin America in February, and he made a point of saying that it was very important for the United States to be talking to those on the center-left, on the left-wing of the Latin America political perspective: President Lula of Brazil. President Bachelet of Chile, for instance, as well as politicians in the center and the center-right.

We have to speak to the reality of Latin America itself. That poverty alleviation and social justice, if that is what the people of Latin America are focused on—in the Andes, in Mexico, and Central America—then we have to be focused on that in our policies. President Bush used those words to talk about the ethanol agreement, for instance, between the United States and Brazil, that we hope to see now replicated in the Caribbean, as well as in Central America. Brazil and the United States will bring that agreement to joint ventures with countries in that region.

I think that that broader view of who we should be talking to, who we should be engaged with, is quite an intelligent way to move forward.

I would just say there also is an irresponsible left, from our perspective, in Latin American politics, and I put maybe three people in that category—the two Castro brothers and Hugo Chávez. We have famously bad relations with all three of them. But, beyond that, we ought to be engaging people throughout the Americas who are being elected by

their countries, like Evo Morales in Bolivia, and like President Lula of Brazil, and politicians of other stripes, for instance, President Calderón of Mexico, or President Aribe of Colombia. I think that that has been a significant move forward in American policy, maybe that the press has not commented upon very much but that was part of our reality, and it's a very positive sign of our future engagements.

Pickering: Thank you, Nick. I would just want to add a few comments, and maybe others would, too. I think creating and promoting a sense of genuine partnership is extremely important. Latin America and the United States, from time to time, have been able to take those steps together. They are not necessarily easy. There are, obviously, strong feelings in Latin America about the United States. The United States has to, in exerting its lead, do so with what I would call an open hand, in an effort to move in that direction.

I would add that one of the steps that has been proposed that I believe we all need to think a lot about and hopefully continue to promote is improving our trade relationships. Whether it is the FTA [free trade agreement] or more bilateral FTAs, the FTAA [Free Trade Agreement of the Americas], the hemispherewide trade relationship. I'm not sure I know which is going to be easiest and which is the best. But, certainly, we should have an end goal of achieving a very improved trading relationship throughout the hemisphere as a way of promoting jobs, helping to attack poverty, building development and, indeed, improving in general the economies of the hemisphere together. And, I would hope that those kinds of things continue to remain in our sights.

***If the results of an election bring a party to power that has declared objectives to destabilize a region, to harm American interests as we see them, it has to be expected that the United States is not going to react in a positive way. . . . But just the fact that we do not accept the results of a democratic election does not mean that we are not strong supporters of democracy.* – Newsom**

Kimmitt: I would just add, picking up on what Nick said, and this is from the treasury perspective, we have very close interaction with Mexico and all of the major economies of Latin America. We met with quite a number of those people just recently during the annual meetings of the IMF and the World Bank. Nick mentioned, also, our signature multilateral trade agreement, NAFTA. We worked very, very closely with Mexico and other major economies in the World Bank, the IMF, and, importantly, the Inter-American Development Bank, which will hold its annual meeting next year in Miami. We have already begun close work with all of the countries of Latin America on that important annual meeting.

But I think the thing that is not noticed as frequently is that we deal with the hemispheric neighbors not just on bilateral and hemispheric issues. The major economies, like Mexico, are also very important components of the world economy. It is quite significant that next year's G20 meeting, this new, expanded group of finance ministers that includes Mexico and Brazil, will be held in Brazil. The APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) annual meeting will be held in Peru. Not only are these countries important in a bilateral and regional sense, I think they also are playing an increasingly important role both in the trans-Pacific community and in the global community.

Newsom: I would just like to go back to the previous question about the U.S.'s reaction to elections, because I know it is a question that disturbs a great many people. When free and reasonably fair elections have been held, and the result is difficult

for the United States to accept, I go back to the Algerian election of a few decades ago, and others.

Those who ask that question, I am sure, have to realize that we are talking about not just their political system but our political system. If the results of an election bring a party to power that has declared objectives to destabilize a region, to harm American interests as we see them, it has to be expected that the United States is not going to react in a positive way. Perhaps, in such cases, the United States should do more to explore with the newly elected group whether some kind of understanding can be reached. But just the fact that we do not accept the results of a democratic election does not mean that we are not strong supporters of democracy. It does mean that, in some cases, the results of the election may run counter to some very deep and important interests of this country.

***[W]hen you take a look at people like David Petraeus and others, the leadership of the army of today and of the future, they recognize, . . . that they operate in the context of a broader national security policy that makes it important for them to understand what is going on in the State Department, the Treasury Department, and elsewhere. –* Kimmitt**

Question: I am wondering, given our experiences in Iraq and the struggles we face, how do you foresee the role of the U.S. military changing in advancing the national interests and promotion of democracy abroad?

Kimmitt: In addition to my earlier political incorrectness, you can imagine what it was like being a Vietnam veteran walking onto the campus of Georgetown Law School in 1974.

Let me say that I think the military of today is a force with which all Americans can be proud. The young men and women who put their lives on the line every single day for our freedoms deserve our absolute respect and admiration.

I think that the military will always serve that very important military role. But, I think, increasingly, when you take a look at people like David Petraeus and others, the leadership of the army of today and of the future, they recognize, going back to what I said in my earlier comments, that the military is part of that broader national security equation, that they have to have not just the depth of being able to be good soldiers, airmen, marines, and sailors, but they also have to understand that they operate in the context of a broader national security policy that makes it important for them to understand what is going on in the State Department, the Treasury Department, and elsewhere.

In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols bill was passed requiring all the military services to work closer together in a joint environment. That has actually turned out fairly well. There has been quite a bit of discussion about whether there should be a new Goldwater-Nichols Act and, if so, what is the next step. I think that not only do soldiers have to do well in their own service and inside the Defense Department, but they also have to operate very effectively both in the interagency community and in the international environment. That is why we are putting Treasury people, as well as State Department people, in the military commands. That is why we have military people from the commands working at the Treasury Department, at the State Department, and elsewhere.

I think soldiers will always have to deliver their craft. That is what soldiers are paid to do. But they are going to have to recognize that it will be done in that broader context where they have to have visibility and engagement in the broader national security community.

Burns: I think you have asked a very important question. I would turn it around a little bit. I think the State Department has to change more than the military, in this respect.

If you look at our interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the '90s and Afghanistan and Iraq in this decade, what we did as a country extraordinarily well was to deploy military force to achieve an objective. What we did not do well as a country was to handle the aftermath. How do you care for refugees in the wake of an intervention? Famine? How do you try to put back together civil governments, so that people have city services?

If you look at our record, we had a problem each time because there was no civilian component of the government ready to be deployed in the wake of each of those interventions to perform that task. Instead, we asked young army lieutenants and captains to be small-time mayors, to organize water systems and to bring civil services when they were not trained to do that. They did the best they could. Many of them did extraordinarily well.

Senator Biden and Senator Lugar, on a bipartisan basis, came to Secretary Powell and to Marc Grossman a couple of years ago to say that the State Department needs to have a reserve corps of people, both in the department and in our society, ready to do this kind of work. We are creating that. We are creating an institutional capacity to have one hundred and fifty people in the State Department whose job it is to provide that kind of service, working with NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], working with the United Nations for relief, and then to create a civilian reserve outside the State Department of American citizens, from all walks of life and all parts of the country, to be willing to drop what they are doing in their home towns and to go to a place like Afghanistan or Bosnia or Kosovo or Iraq to perform this function alongside the rest of the international community.

How do you care for refugees in the wake of an intervention? Famine? How do you try to put back together civil governments, so that people have city services? . . . We are creating an institutional capacity to have one hundred and fifty people in the State Department whose job it is to provide that kind of service, working with NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], working with the United Nations for relief, and then to create a civilian reserve outside the State Department of American citizens, from all walks of life. . . . **– Burns**

I think that is one of the lessons a professional diplomat can draw from our experience, sometimes very bitter over the last decade during these military interventions.

Pickering: I would strongly support it. I think there are two critical lessons, and Bob and Nick have both talked about them. Our diplomacy is effective because we have a strong military. It is, perhaps, tentative realpolitik, but I have always felt that as a diplomat negotiating for the United States that was a tremendous advantage. Not that we were about to unleash the military, but that the other side always knew that, in fact, we would stand up for our principles and for what we wanted to achieve.

I also think we have a long way to go. For years, I have felt that further integration of the civilian elements of the United States with the military is necessary to achieve these complex tasks, particularly postconflict tasks, tasks of reconstruction, tasks of dealing with natural disasters and recovery from emergencies around the world. We have now begun that process. It has taken us a long time.

I take some strength from the notion that it took the military a few years, as Bob mentioned,

Goldwater-Nichols and before, to achieve the kind of jointness that now makes our military so much more effective. I think that what I would call "combineness," the ability to deploy, to use effectively, to command and control, and to operate across the full spectrum of American agency capabilities and interests in dealing with some of these issues, is an important goal for all of us. The State Department should certainly be supporting that goal and looking forward to enlarging and strengthening the State Department, USAID [the U.S. Agency for International Development], and, perhaps, a new public diplomacy organization, also to support that kind of activity.

I thank you all very much for coming and for listening to us, for challenging us with a series of what I think are first-rate, excellent questions. And we appreciate your attendance and wish you all good luck. Thank you again very, very much.

BIOGRAPHIES

Marc Grossman is vice chairman of The Cohen Group, the strategic business consulting firm founded and headed by former Secretary of Defense and U.S. Senator William Cohen. Prior to joining, he had been a career foreign service officer since 1976.

Ambassador Grossman was under secretary of state for political affairs at the U.S. State Department from March 2001 to February 2005. Additionally, he served as director general of the Foreign Service and director of human resources, assistant secretary of state for European Affairs, and as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey. From 1984 to 1986, Ambassador Grossman was the deputy director of the Private Office of Lord Carrington, then Secretary General of NATO.

He received a bachelor's degree from the University of California, Santa Barbara and a master's degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

President George W. Bush nominated **Robert M. Kimmitt** to be Deputy Secretary of the Department of the Treasury on June 29, 2005. The United States Senate unanimously confirmed him on July 29, 2005, and he was sworn into office on August 16, 2005.

Mr. Kimmitt served from 1991 to 1993 as American Ambassador to Germany and was awarded the U.S. Defense Department Distinguished Public Service Award as well as Germany's highest honor, the Order of Merit. Mr. Kimmitt served from 1989 to 1991 as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and for his service during the Gulf Crisis and War, President George H. W. Bush presented Mr. Kimmitt with the Presidential Citizens Medal, the Nation's second highest civilian award.

From 1985 to 1987, Mr. Kimmitt served as General Counsel to the U.S. Treasury Department. He served at the White House as National Security Council Executive Secretary and General Counsel from 1983 to 1985, with the rank of Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. From 1976 to 1977 and 1978 to 1983, Mr. Kimmitt was a member of the NSC Staff.

From April 1970 to August 1971, Mr. Kimmitt served in combat with the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Vietnam, earning three Bronze Star Medals, the Purple Heart, the Air Medal, and the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry.

David Newsom entered U.S. Foreign Service, 1947. Served as diplomatic officer in Karachi, Oslo, Baghdad, London. Appointed ambassador to Libya, 1965, to Indonesia, 1973, to Philippines, 1977. In Washington, served as Officer-in-Charge Arabian Peninsula Affairs (1955–60), Director, Office of Northern African Affairs (1962–65), Assistant Sec-

retary of State for African Affairs (1969–73), Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (1978–81), Interim Secretary of State (1981). Advisor, U.S. Delegation to UN General Assembly 1972, 1978, 1979, 1980.

After retirement in 1981, he served as Director, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy and Associate Dean and Interim Dean, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. In 1991, appointed Cumming Professor of International Studies and Diplomacy at University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia. Retired from faculty University of Virginia, 1998. Currently Senior Fellow, Miller Center.

Memberships: Phi Beta Kappa; University President's Commission on Virginia 2000; National Research Council Committee on Science and Technology in Foreign Policy; American Academy of Diplomacy; Council on Foreign Relations; Charlottesville Committee on Foreign Relations. Member, Board, Institute for Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University; Westminster Presbyterian Church, Charlottesville (elder).

Awards: National Civil Service League (1971); Rockefeller Public Service Award (1973); State Department Distinguished Honor Award (1981); Foreign Service Cup (1987); American Foreign Service Association Lifetime Award (2000).

Author of The Soviet Brigade in Cuba, Diplomacy and the American Democracy, The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy, and The Imperial Mantle.

Thomas Pickering is senior vice president for international relations at the Boeing Company, a position he assumed in January 2001 upon his retirement as United States Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Ambassador Pickering held the personal rank of Career Ambassador, the highest in the US Foreign Service. In a diplomatic career spanning five decades, he has served as US ambassador to the Russian Federation, India, Israel, El Salvador, Nigeria and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. From 1989 to 1993, he served as Ambassador to the United Nations. His service in the US government began in 1956 in the US Navy. On active duty until 1959, he later served in the Naval Reserve to the grade of Lieutenant Commander. Between 1959 and 1961, he served in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department, and in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Amb. Pickering is also chairman of the ISD Board of Directors.

ALSO OF INTEREST

This discussion took place after a day-long seminar held at the State Department by Under Secretary R. Nicholas Burns, "A Conversation With America's Senior Career Diplomats." The State program included Arnold Kanter, who served as under secretary from 1991 to 1993. A transcript of the discussion is available on the State Department's Website: http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/95349.htm.

INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF DIPLOMACY
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service Georgetown University
1316 36th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20007
Telephone: 202-965-5735 Fax: 202-965-5652
Website: http://isd.georgetown.edu