

When Do Civil-War Parties Heed the UN? Findings from the IPI Security Council Compliance Database

CHRISTOPH MIKULASCHEK AND CHRIS PERRY



Cover Image: As part of its mission to the African Great Lakes region, a UN Security Council delegation visits Goma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on October 6, 2013. UN Photo/Sylvain Liechti.

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This is the second report in IPI's Understanding Compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions in Civil Wars project—a multiyear research project that aims to understand what factors most influence compliance with demands made by the United Nations Security Council.

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Executive Summary

The end of the Cold War brought an unprecedented surge in United Nations Security Council efforts to prevent, manage, and resolve internal armed conflict. But the sheer time and resources devoted to civil wars begs the question: to what extent and under which circumstances do civil-war parties actually implement the substance of Security Council resolutions? When and how often do civil-war parties comply with the Security Council's demands? To what extent do they respond to the council's offers of negative and positive incentives to cease hostilities and pursue a political settlement? Which factors most influence compliance with these demands? These are the questions that the International Peace Institute's Understanding Compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions in Civil Wars project aims to answer.

Empirical analysis confirms that the pattern of compliance across conflicts varies over time. These findings contradict conventional wisdom that the authority of the Security Council has gradually eroded during the post-Cold War era, and present instead a more nuanced picture. The trend in compliance over time was slightly positive from 1989–2003, though with considerable variation. That said, in most years the average level of compliance across civil wars was approximately medium-low; though this may not necessarily mean that the impact or effectiveness of the council's work was similarly medium-low. Compliance with Security Council demands that requested military or humanitarian conduct was lower, on average, than compliance with other demands.

This study theorizes that the conflict ecology, the UN conflict management strategy, great power politics, and linkages between a resolution and an existing peace process all help to shape civil-war parties' compliance behavior and incentive structure. We find the following:

- Demands made in the presence of a peacekeeping operation with a multidimensional mandate or a mandated monitoring mechanism are associated with higher odds of compliance.
 - Demands made during periods of low-intensity or no fighting are associated with higher odds of compliance.
 - Surprisingly, a lack of continuous consensus between the permanent members of the Security Council regarding a resolution is positively associated with compliance.
 - Demands made in the presence of a traditional peacekeeping operation, alongside a current or previously imposed sanctions regime, or following a Security Council field mission tend to be associated with lower odds of compliance.
 - Situations in which there is a proximate ongoing war, there are significant sources of lootable resources, or there has been a negative political shock all have a negative correlation with compliance.
 - Finally, the use of threats by the council presents mixed results, and the fact that a demand reiterates activity already agreed to by parties through an existing peace process has no effect.
- We see three main policy takeaways from our initial research:
1. The Security Council should design its conflict management strategy with a strong basis in reality on the ground. When drafting resolutions and considering possible mandate structures, realistic and reliable assessments of the conditions on the ground need to be taken into account.
 2. The Security Council should be mindful of negative spillover effects of persistent noncompliance with its demands across seemingly unrelated conflicts. Political actors closely watch the council's signals about its resolve and commitment to follow through on the implementation of its demands. If the council meets with a lack of compliance and general disregard in one conflict, it runs the risk of meeting the same or worse results in another.
 3. Finally, it is important to recognize that achieving high compliance with its resolutions is not the only objective pursued by the Security Council. In situations when the failure to demand an end to aggression or to other egregious acts would be irreconcilable with the council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council should not choose inaction over taking a principled stance because it fears that aggressors will not abide by its demands.

Introduction: The Security Council and Civil Wars

The end of the Cold War brought an unprecedented surge in efforts by the United Nations Security Council to prevent, manage, and resolve internal armed conflict. During the Cold War, the council generally refrained from engaging in civil war crisis management.¹ Then in the late 1980s, as the Cold War wound down, the council's approach to civil war underwent a paradigm shift. This was most noticeable as a move from a general stance of noninterference in most instances of internal armed conflict to a more proactive policy of peacemaking and peacekeeping in a majority of civil wars. Most conspicuously this has translated to the council's deployment of UN peacekeeping operations in twenty-five different countries affected by civil war since 1989. Further, the council has imposed sanctions on dozens of civil-war parties and established several transitional administrations and international criminal tribunals to address civil wars and their consequences.²

Between 1989 and the end of 2012, of the 1,459 resolutions adopted by the Security Council, 860—or nearly 60 percent—were issued in response to civil wars. During the eighteen years between the end of the Cold War in 1989 and 2006, the Security Council adopted resolutions that addressed twenty-seven of the forty-four civil wars that took place. Most of these resolutions contained demands directly addressing civil-war parties. These required parties to take a range of actions, including taking steps toward military de-escalation, proceeding with a political settlement, affording protection to civilians and humanitarian workers, and cooperating with a UN peace

operation in the performance of its mandate. These figures confirm that the prevention, management, and resolution of civil wars have come to constitute a core element of the contemporary agenda of the Security Council.

The sheer time and resources devoted to negotiating such a large number of resolutions begs the question: to what extent and under which circumstances do civil-war parties actually implement the substance of Security Council resolutions? When and how often do civil-war parties comply with the Security Council's demands? To what extent do they respond to the council's offers of negative and positive incentives to cease hostilities and pursue a political settlement? Which factors most influence compliance with these demands? These are the questions that the International Peace Institute's (IPI) Understanding Compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions in Civil Wars project aims to answer.

The abundant literature on the UN conflict management architecture shows that the results of the Security Council's efforts to end internal armed conflicts during the post-Cold War era have been mixed. Successes in resolving civil war in Mozambique and Central America stand in stark contrast with peacemaking and peacekeeping failures in Somalia and Rwanda. A number of comparative case studies offer explanations for this variation in multilateral conflict management outcomes.³ Quantitative studies and research projects using mixed methods have also made great strides in identifying the circumstances in which peacekeeping, embargoes, sanctions, and mediation can bring about self-sustaining peace after civil war.⁴ Additionally, a growing body of literature has focused on the specific role of the UN Security Council in ending armed conflict.⁵

1 However, there were a few notable exceptions such as efforts to resolve conflicts in the Congo, Cyprus, and the Dominican Republic during the 1960s.

2 This development was presented in detail in an earlier IPI report produced by this study. See James Cockayne, Christoph Mikulaschek, and Chris Perry, "The United Nations Security Council and Civil War: First Insights from a New Dataset," New York: International Peace Institute, 2010.

3 For example, William J. Durch, ed., *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007); Spyros Economides and Mats Berdal, *United Nations Interventionism, 1991–2004* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens, eds., *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Shanna Kirschner and Jana von Stein, "The Pieces of Peacemaking: Understanding Implementation of Civil War Settlements," *Civil Wars* 11, No. 3 (2009): 279–301; David Cortright and George Lopez, eds., *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002).

4 Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices After Civil War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Michael Gilligan and Ernest Sergenti, "Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3, No. 2 (2008): 89–122; Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

5 Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh, and Dominik Zaum, eds., *The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Chinmaya R. Gharekhan, *The Horseshoe Table: An Inside View of the United Nations Security Council* (Delhi: Dorling Kindersley, 2006); Michael Matheson, *Council Unbound: The Growth of UN Decision Making on Conflict and Postconflict Issues After the Cold War* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006); David Malone, ed., *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004); Bruce Russett, ed., *The Once and Future Security Council* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997).

Context-specific issues of compliance with Security Council resolutions have been investigated in several studies, specifically in the areas of counterterrorism and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁶ Compliance with Security Council resolutions in the context of war remains largely unexplored though, especially with regard to the council's impact on civil-war parties' decision-making calculus. This leaves researchers and policymakers alike with little guidance as to how multilateral actors can most effectively impact the behavior of governments and rebel groups engaged in armed conflict.

The Understanding Compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions in Civil Wars project aims to fill this gap. Based on the current literature on cooperation, compliance, and conflict management, the project develops a theory of compliance with UN Security Council resolutions in civil wars. The study encompasses a statistical analysis of civil-war parties' compliance with all 1,557 demands issued to civil-war parties by the Security Council during the first fifteen years after the Cold War (1989–2003). To this end, the project has compiled a dataset containing information on all 473 Security Council resolutions addressing civil wars between 1989 and 2006. The wealth of this data has been published in the IPI Security Council Compliance Database and is available on IPI's website.⁷

This report summarizes the first set of key findings of the project and introduces the full IPI Security Council Compliance Database. It builds on the descriptive work done previously in the project.⁸ The first section presents a description of trends in compliance from 1989 to 2003. Section two offers the initial tests of our hypotheses of compliance. The final section offers a conclusion as well as some general policy implications.

Patterns of Compliance

Between 1989 and 2003, the Security Council issued 2,403 demands to civil-war parties

Box 1. Definitions.

Demand refers to any operative paragraph in a Security Council resolution that spells out a behavioral instruction to a non-UN entity. The study's scope is limited to demands contained in resolutions (as opposed to, say, those contained in presidential statements), and compliance is limited to those demands addressed to conflict parties.

Conflict parties include all actors with an active fighting role in the conflict (both past and present).

The term **compliance** refers to all conduct (acts and omissions) by actors that conform to the requirements of behavioral prescriptions addressed to them. Conversely, **noncompliance** is conduct that fails to conform to such requirements.⁹ The concept of compliance only deals with the degree of conformity between a demand and the conduct of the actors(s) addressed by the demand. It is therefore agnostic as to the reason this conformity does or does not occur.

The **depth-of-demand variable** measures the potential hazard posed to addressees of a given demand that is associated with complying with that demand. Hazard in this case refers specifically to a risk to the demand addressee's survival or a negative impact on the addressee's ability to attain a strategic or tactical victory in the civil war or its aftermath. This measure takes into account that the hazard becomes more acute if other civil-war parties do not comply. In other words, the depth of a demand is the potential harm incurred by the demand addressee, assuming other civil-war parties do not comply with their obligations.

contained in 366 resolutions adopted in response to civil wars and addressed to 194 different actors. More than 64 percent, or 1,557, of these demands were aimed at past or present participants in armed

6 Kendall W. Stiles and Adam Thayne, "Compliance with International Law: International Law on Terrorism at the United Nations," *Cooperation and Conflict* 41, No. 2 (2006): 153–176; Peter Crail, "Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Risk-Based Approach," *The Nonproliferation Review* 13, No. 2 (2006): 355–396; Allen S. Weiner, Chaim Braun, Michael May, and Roger Speed, *Enhancing Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540* (Stanford, CA: Center for International Security and Cooperation, 2007); Monika Heupel, "Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Division of Labor Strategy," *Carnegie Papers* 87 (2007).

7 Both the dataset and the visualization portal are available at www.ipinst.org/coping-with-crisis/compliance-with-security-council-resolutions/programlist.html.

8 Cockayne, Mikulaschek, and Perry, "The United Nations Security Council and Civil War."

9 See Oran Young, *Compliance and Public Authority* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1979), pp. 4–5.

conflict, what we term *conflict parties*. The IPI Security Council Compliance Database measures compliance only for these conflict parties. In this section we provide a brief description of this compliance data. Specifically, we describe how compliance varies by the type of addressee, how compliance changed over time, and how it varies by the substance of the request and by the depth of the demand.


Persistent noncompliance with Security Council resolutions in one conflict can have spillover effects on compliance patterns in unrelated conflicts. Warring factions often watch for signals from the council about its resolve and commitment to the full implementation of its demands. The former UN under-secretary-general for special political affairs Marrack Goulding recounts a pertinent example from his own experience:

The resulting setback [in Bosnia and Somalia in 1993 and 1994] had a knock-on effect. Successful peacekeeping depends critically on the parties to the conflict having respect for and confidence in the United Nations. The humiliation and ineffectiveness of UN troops in Somalia—and, at about the same time, in Bosnia—undermined their credibility in other theatres. “Welcome to Mogadishu” was the banner held aloft by demonstrators on the quayside in Port-au-Prince who succeeded in turning away a US Navy ship that was to land the advance party of a new peacekeeping operation in Haiti.¹⁰

Conversely, successful implementation of Security Council resolutions in some situations can create expectations for further success in others. Potential spoilers who hold this expectation may in turn be deterred from thwarting the council’s attempts at ending hostilities and nurturing peace.

Empirical analysis confirms that the pattern of compliance across aggregate conflicts varies over time (see figure 1). This finding contradicts earlier studies that concluded that the authority of the Security Council has gradually eroded during the post-Cold War era, and presents instead a more nuanced picture.¹¹ In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, compliance by civil-war parties was generally high. This is at least partially due to the

Figure 1: Variation in civil-war parties’ compliance with Security Council demands over time.



fact that the first conflicts added to the council’s expanding post-Cold War agenda were those with prominent Cold War proxy dynamics (for instance, El Salvador, Namibia, and Nicaragua). The Soviet Union and the United States sought to disentangle themselves from many of these conflicts over the course of the late 1980s and early 1990s and used UN mediation and peacekeeping as one method to achieve this goal. However, average compliance levels quickly deteriorated as the council started to undertake more difficult conflict management efforts in protracted internal conflicts like Bosnia and Somalia during the early 1990s. Over time, compliance improved again as the Security Council gradually adjusted its repertoire of conflict management strategies to the challenges posed by post-Cold War civil wars.¹² Increasingly, the council made use of innovations such as multidimensional peace operations, formal compliance monitoring mandates, and sanctions. It also began to address an increasing array of issue areas not directly linked to armed conflict, such as internal political relations and the factions’ foreign

10 Marrack Goulding, “The United Nations and Conflict in Africa Since the Cold War,” *African Affairs* 98, No. 391 (1999): 155–166, p. 163.

11 Princeton Lyman, “Saving the UN Security Council—A Challenge for the United States,” *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law* 4 (2000): 127–146.

12 The year 1998 constitutes a notable deviation from this trend. In that year both short-term and medium-term compliance levels were lower than in any other year between 1993 and 2003. In 1998 the Security Council was actively engaged in conflict management in Angola, where compliance with the Lusaka Protocol and related Security Council demands broke down at the end the year. In 1998, the Security Council also addressed a number of demands to the parties of the escalating civil war in Kosovo without eliciting a high level of compliance.

relations, in its resolutions.¹³

That said, in most years the average level of compliance across civil wars was approximately medium-low¹⁴ in a four-point scale ranging from marginal to medium-low to medium-high to full or almost full compliance. This finding may not necessarily mean that the impact or effectiveness of the Security Council's work in civil wars was similarly medium-low. Even though the civil-war parties' behavior frequently fell short of what the council asked of them, it may have differed from the course of action absent intervention. In that case, the council's work would have an impact despite modest levels of compliance.

In resolutions adopted in response to civil war, the Security Council demanded a variety of behaviors from warring factions. This study identified twenty thematic types of behavioral prescriptions and proscriptions that were then arranged in five broad categories of demands related to¹⁵

- military behavior and law enforcement;¹⁶
- humanitarian actions;¹⁷
- governance and internal political relations;¹⁸
- the factions' external relations;¹⁹ and
- cooperation with the UN.²⁰

Between 1989 and 2003, compliance with Security Council demands that requested military or humanitarian conduct was lower, on average, than compliance with other demands (see figure 2). The finding that demands related to military behavior tended to elicit less compliance than other demands is most likely explained by the comparatively high potential hazard for unilateral compliance, reflected by the depth of demand score.

When the addressee is uncertain whether the other side will comply, actions such as pursuing military de-escalation can jeopardize the complying party's ability to attain victory or its very survival. Our depth of demand measure strives to capture this hazard. In other words, the depth of a demand estimates the risk associated with unilateral compliance with a demand. The depth of each obligation explains why the costs associated with compliance with some demands creates high incentives for noncompliance, while conforming to other demands does not significantly raise the cost calculus for civil-war parties. This would make compliance with the latter both more attractive and more likely.²¹ Figure 2 depicts the mean compliance and depth-of-demand scores for each thematic category of demand.

The pattern of civil-war parties' compliance with demands for humanitarian behavior is more puzzling. Figure 2 shows that between 1989 and 2003 both short-term and medium-term compliance with demands requesting humanitarian action was lower, on average, than it was for any other thematic set of demands. At the same time, the average depth of these demands tended to be lower than it was for any other thematic category of demands.

There are four plausible explanations for this. First, some conflicts feature civilian populations as the primary source of contention. Indeed, in some cases, such as Bosnia and Rwanda, the displacement or annihilation of civilian groups was one of the primary objectives. In these cases, demands that fall under the protection-of-civilians rubric can present interesting dynamics. While on the face of it, complying with these demands does not

13 Cockayne, Mikulaschek, and Perry, "The United Nations Security Council and Civil War."

14 A medium-low score could mean that (1) compliance was observed in a minority of incidents covered by the demand; (2) compliance only occurred with respect to aspects of the demand of relatively low significance; or that (3) compliance was sporadic, late, or some combination thereof. See Christoph Mikulaschek, "Guidelines for Assessing Compliance with Security Council Resolutions," New York: International Peace Institute, June 2009, pp. 7–8, available at www.ipinst.org/coping-with-crisis/compliance-with-security-council-resolutions/programslist.html.

15 Cockayne, Mikulaschek, and Perry, "The United Nations Security Council and Civil War," Annex 3.

16 For example, operative paragraph 4 of Resolution 942 (1994), which required civil-war parties in Bosnia to observe the cease-fire to which they had previously agreed and to refrain from all new acts of hostility.

17 For example, operative paragraph 8 of Resolution 1509 (2003), which required civil-war parties in Liberia to ensure safe and unhindered access of relief personnel to all those in need and delivery of humanitarian assistance.


18 For example, operative paragraph 8 of Resolution 999 (1995), which required civil-war parties in Tajikistan to agree to the early convening of a further round of inter-Tajik talks and implement confidence building measures.

19 For example, operative paragraph 22 of Resolution 1341 (2001), which required the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi to continue the dialogue initiated between authorities.

20 For example, operative paragraph 12 of Resolution 1393 (2002), which required civil-war parties in Georgia to implement the recommendations of the joint assessment mission to the Gali district, carried out under the aegis of the UN.

21 George Downs, David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoon, "Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?," *International Organization* 50, No. 3 (Summer 1996): 379–406.

Figure 2: Variation in civil-war parties' compliance with Security Council demands by type of demand.



present a significant hazard or risk to parties' survival or stated goals, from the standpoint of the parties' implicit goals, compliance *can* present significant challenges to "victory" vis-à-vis control or destruction of a specific group. This may not be captured in depth-of-demand scores.

Second, and somewhat related, some civil wars are highly predatory in nature. In these cases, the protection of civilians would be akin to shutting off access to lootable resources in terms of financing and material support. This is especially true in the case of rebel groups that may lack access to the formal financing mechanisms afforded to states. Again, our coding may not capture "protection of civilian" or "humanitarian access" demands as threatening civil-war parties' survival or success and hence underestimate the depth of demand for these cases.

Third, demands that request action—such as the provision of humanitarian access—can present a potential "cost offset." External humanitarian


intervention can indirectly provide resources, by freeing up resources for fighting that would otherwise be allocated toward populations.²² This cost offset would likely enter into conflict parties' decision-making calculus in ways not captured by the depth-of-demand variable.

Fourth, and perhaps most convincingly, the findings on compliance with demands for humanitarian action could indicate what is sometimes called the "humanitarian alibi." Council members may be more inclined to invoke humanitarian demands as part of their conflict management strategy in cases where the council is unable or unwilling to commit to more forceful implementation of its will. If this is the case, humanitarian demands would be more likely to be called for in more intractable situations where council leverage is low.

Overall, the trend in compliance over time was slightly positive from 1989–2003, though with considerable variation when accounting for depth

22 In her book *Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), Fiona Terry identified three perverse effects of humanitarian action in refugee camps—namely, that humanitarian action can (1) provide some form of protection to armed groups through the creation of safe zones; (2) contribute to the economy of war, particularly by freeing up resources that would otherwise be allocated for service provision; and (3) provide a modicum of legitimacy for an armed group vis-à-vis its base population as humanitarian actors need to deliver aid under the authorization of the de facto authority, thus sometimes empowering rebel groups. In this way, states that comply with seemingly harmless demands to allow humanitarian access could very well be strengthening their enemies.

Figure 3: Variation in number of Security Council demands based on depth-of-demand variable over time.



of demand (see figure 3). Short- and medium-term compliance with demands of low depth saw a much sharper increase than compliance with medium- and high-depth demands. What's more, after 2001 low-depth demands were more prevalent than medium-depth demands, and in 2003 they were equally frequent as high-depth demands.

Explaining Compliance

The dynamics surrounding compliance with Security Council resolutions are complex and multifaceted. Conflict management strategies of multilateral actors such as the UN have varying degrees of success. As seen most recently in the examples of Syria and Libya, great power dynamics, the work of regional organizations, and other factors can also significantly impact the calculus of the warring factions on the ground. Many times, the Security Council is only providing legitimacy and momentum to a peace process already underway. As always, events on the ground that are

out of the control of external actors can affect conflict dynamics for good or ill.

As mentioned above, the general compliance trend was slightly positive over the period from 1989–2003, but there was considerable variation. This trend holds even when accounting for changes in depth of demand, our measure for the hazard associated with compliance, over time. The question remains: what explains this trend? Security Council demands to civil-war parties require cooperation under circumstances that tend to be complex and challenging. Factions are often asked to cease fire, redeploy their troops from offensive positions, or demilitarize strategically important locations in the midst of active armed conflict. Each party faces a wide array of defensive and offensive incentives, responses to which run the risk of being perceived as threatening other factions, in what is termed by international relations scholars as the “domestic security dilemma.”²³ Even when fighting ends and parties seek to rebuild peace, the road to building robust

23 See Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” in *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, edited by Michael Brown (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 103–124; Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” *International Security* 20, No. 4 (1996): 136–175; Barbara Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” *International Organization* 51, No. 3 (1997): 335–364; Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, “Civil War and the Security Dilemma,” in *Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention*, edited by Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 15–37; or Michael Doyle, “Strategy and Transitional Authority,” in Stedman, Rothschild, and Cousens, *Ending Civil Wars*, pp. 71–78.

institutions and a relationship of mutual trust and respect is a long and winding one. In short, compliance with the Security Council's demands typically introduces a range of risks for civil-war parties.

This study develops a theory of compliance with Security Council resolutions in civil war. We put forward four broad factors that help to explain compliance:

- the conflict ecology addressed by a conflict management effort;
- the UN's conflict management strategy;
- the signaling effect created by political dynamics between great powers on the council, as demonstrated in voting outcomes; and
- the linkage between council demands and any ongoing peace process.

Using the IPI Security Council Compliance Dataset, we can quantitatively test this theory by analyzing compliance by civil-war parties with all demands addressed to them by the Security Council between 1989 and 2003. We use an ordinal logit model as our empirical model. For a full description of the quantitative methodology, as well as our regression tables, see Annex 2.

CONFLICT ECOLOGY

Conditions on the ground strongly affect the costs and benefits of compliance with the Security Council in the most direct way. We call the local context that exists at the time when the Security Council engages in conflict management the "conflict ecology." The degree to which the conflict ecology is amenable to mediation and conflict management varies greatly over time and affects the prospects for compliance. A number of studies on civil war duration and termination suggest various proxies to describe conflict ecology: conflict intensity (often measured using battle-related deaths), the stability of the political system

on the ground and the state's capacity, rebel funding sources, and the broader operating environment in the region.

There is ample literature on the circumstances under which attempts at peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding are more or less likely to be successful.²⁴ Building on this body of knowledge, we hypothesize that the following factors will be negatively correlated with compliance (see table 1 below):

- a negative political shock²⁵ (large shift toward autocracy) in the year prior to the adoption of a demand to a civil-war party by the Security Council,
- a significant availability of lootable natural resources as a financing mechanism,
- a higher number of warring parties,
- an ongoing civil war in a proximate country, and
- higher intensity of fighting.

We find a highly significant negative correlation between negative political shocks and compliance that holds across the models.²⁶ In fact the odds of observing high compliance versus medium to low compliance in demands that come in the wake of a negative political shock can be expected to be around 40–50 percent lower both in short and medium terms, when holding other factors constant. This could point to a number of explanatory factors. Shifts toward autocracy can lead to political grievances, which can make it difficult to create the political space for compliance with Security Council resolutions. Political shocks can also shift the expected utility of compliance. The collapse of state authority can lead to an increase in the opportunity and attractiveness of predatory behavior that can undermine a peace process. It can also severely constrain the state's ability to comply.

24 George Downs and Stephen Stedman identify the number of warring parties, the lack of a prior negotiated peace agreement, the likelihood of spoilers, a collapsed state, the number of soldiers, lootable natural resources, hostile neighboring states, and demands for secession as eight factors that determine the difficulty of implementing peace agreements (Downs and Stedman, "Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation" in Stedman, Rothschild, and Cousens, *Ending Civil Wars*, pp. 43–69). Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis find that the number of deaths and displacements, the type of the outcome (negotiated settlement, truce/stalemate, or victory), the number of factions, and the level of economic development and growth as predictors of success or failure of United Nations peace operations (Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*). Virginia Page Fortna concludes that the baseline prospects for success at keeping peace after civil war are determined by the type, duration, and outcome of the conflict, the number of civil-war parties, rebel access to contraband financing, and support for rebels by neighboring states (Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?*).

25 Negative political shocks are defined as a six-point or greater decrease in the Polity score or the onset or continuation of an "interregal" period during the year preceding the adoption of a Security Council resolution. See Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagers, *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2002*, v.p4v2007 (College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2008).

26 Statistical significance refers to the estimate of how confident one can be that the results of a statistical test are not derived by chance alone. We report significance at the 90 percent, 95 percent, and 99 percent levels. For example, a 99 percent significance level means that there is a 1 percent probability that the results can be attributed to chance.

Table 1: Conflict ecology variables.²⁷

Variable	Description	Effect (Hypothesis)
Negative political shock	Negative political shocks are defined as a shift toward autocracy or the beginning or continuation of a period of state failure. The data gathered by the Polity IV Project at the University of Maryland allow us to determine whether a country experiencing civil war was also suffering from a negative political shock. Negative political shocks are recorded when there was a six-point or greater decrease in the Polity score or the onset or continuation of an “interregnal” period during the year preceding the adoption of a Security Council resolution specifying a demand to civil-war parties. A strong shift toward autocracy can create political grievances. The collapse of state authority generates opportunities for predatory behavior by nonstate armed groups and decreases the capacity of the state to affect compliance. In both instances, the expected utility of compliance decreases.	Negative and significant in almost all model specifications (Negative)
Lootable natural resources	The availability of lootable natural resources, such as alluvial diamonds, illicit drugs, or even other agricultural products, can generate income for warring parties. Continued violence may also provide the ideal setting for illegal gemstone mining and drug cultivation, decreasing the expected utility of compliance for some demands.	Mostly negative and significant in most model specifications. Positive in the short term when controlling for thematic type of demand. (Negative)
Proximate civil war	An ongoing civil war in a proximate country can have negative repercussions for a peace process. A number of works have explored how states are more likely to experience armed conflict if neighboring states are in conflict. Civil wars also last significantly longer if they take place in a country bordering another state undergoing internal armed conflict.	Negative and significant in most model specifications (Negative)
Conflict intensity	We also hypothesize that demands issued after the cessation of hostilities or during lulls in fighting will be positively correlated with compliance when compared to those adopted during high-intensity fighting. Termination of major combat signifies a drop in casualty rates to below twenty-five in a year, and it often follows a peace agreement or cease-fire. This could mean that parties are at a stalemate or that some compromise was reached. It could also indicate that there is a form of “consolidated stalemate” resulting in relatively unchallenged safe havens for rebels. In this case, the government is either unable or unwilling to challenge these havens. Either way, this should lead to stronger incentives to (or weaker incentives not to) comply with the council.	Negative and significant in most models. Short-term effect is more pronounced for high versus medium intensity while this effect is reversed in the medium term. (Negative to varying degrees for medium and high intensity compared to low intensity)
Number of warring factions	Earlier studies reached differing conclusions as to whether and how a much the number of civil-war parties impacts the likelihood of successful conflict management. Virginia Page Fortna finds that wars involving a high number of warring factions are less likely to resume than those fought between fewer parties. ²⁸	Negative and consistently significant (Negative)

27 On political shocks see Marshall and Jagers, *Polity IV Project*. On natural resources see Buhaug and Lujala, “Geography, Rebel Capability and the Duration of Civil Conflict.” On proximate wars and instances see Kristian Gleditsch, *All International Politics is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Kristian Gleditsch, “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War,” *Journal of Peace Research* 44, No. 3 (2007): 293–309; Kristian Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, and Kenneth Schultz, “Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad: How Civil Wars Lead to International Disputes,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, No. 4 (2008): 479–506; Kristian Gleditsch and Michael Ward, “War and Peace in Space and Time: The Role of Democratization,” *International Studies Quarterly* 44, No. 1 (2000): 1–29; Michael Ward and Kristian Gleditsch, “Location, Location, Location: An MCMC Approach to Modeling the Spatial Context of War and Peace,” *Political Analysis* 10, No. 3 (2002): 244–260. On proximate wars and duration see Dylan Balch-Lindsay and Andrew J. Enterline, “Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820–1992,” *International Studies Quarterly* 44 (2000): 615–642. On conflict intensity see for example Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Promises and Pitfalls of an Emerging Research Program: The Microdynamics of Civil War,” in *Order, Conflict and Violence*, edited by Stathis N. Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 402. On number of warring factions see Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?*, p. 117.

28 Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?*


Our results on the presence of lootable natural resources are also consistent with our hypothesis across most model specifications. In almost all models the relationship between the availability of lootable resources and compliance is negative and statistically significant. This finding resonates with the literature on loot-seeking behavior in civil war, which concludes that the presence of easily exploitable natural resources constitutes an incentive for many rebels to act as spoilers in the peacemaking process in order to perpetuate war economies based on things like illegal gemstone mining or drug cultivation.²⁹

This study also finds a highly significant but substantively weak negative relationship between the number of civil-war parties and compliance when holding other factors constant. On average, the odds of observing high compliance versus low to medium-high compliance drop by around 4 percent with each additional conflict party. This holds across short- and medium-term compliance. While the average demand was made in a situation where there are six to seven conflict parties, more than half (55 percent) were made in situations with only two parties (see figure 4).

The presence of a civil war in a state bordering a conflict country addressed by a resolution is consistently negatively associated with short-term compliance. This result is significant across all model specifications in the short term. Interestingly, the relationship between civil wars in neighboring states and medium-term compliance is much weaker and less robust. This would seem to indicate that proximate wars are more important to short-term crisis management than to longer-term strategic engagement. More research is necessary to analyze this tentative result.

Unsurprisingly, high and medium conflict intensity (at least 1,000 battle-related deaths and 25–1,000 battle-related deaths in a year, respectively) at the time a demand is issued is associated with lower compliance scores, on average, than low conflict intensity (less than 25 battle deaths in a year), when controlling for other factors. This result is statistically significant in most model specifications for short-term compliance, but it is

Figure 4: Breakdown of demands in relation to the number of warring factions at the time of adoption.



less robust across model specifications for medium-term compliance. This seems to make sense, since these lull periods represent either lulls in fighting or postwar periods. In the postconflict phase, demands made by the council may reflect ongoing peacebuilding efforts and would thus call for courses of action that parties were already engaged in. Likewise, during lulls in fighting the decision-making calculus of conflict parties should be much more favorable to compliance, as many of the demands made by the council rest on the bedrock of a stabilized security situation. One caveat here is that lulls in fighting may also represent protracted stalemates. In these cases, parties may not be engaged in active conflict but neither are they amenable to engaging in active dialogue or peacebuilding activities. Thus, we would expect compliance in these stalemate situations to be lower with respect to demands to settle the conflict and much higher for demands aimed at mere crisis management, such as those of a humanitarian nature. Further research would be helpful in disaggregating these effects.

²⁹ See Scott Gates Buhaug and Päivi Lujala, "Geography, Rebel Capability and the Duration of Civil Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, No. 4 (2009): 544–569.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STRATEGY

While the conflict ecology shapes the civil-war parties' incentive structure for compliance on the ground, the Security Council tries to alter that incentive structure. The Security Council often holds an extraordinary amount of leverage over civil-war parties. It has unique enforcement authority under the UN Charter and can make use of a wide variety of positive and negative incentives available across the UN system. The Security Council remains the only international institution with the authority to impose sanctions with binding force for all states. It can also deploy a diverse set of field presences, most notably peace operations.³⁰

Some of these tools are explicitly mentioned in the Charter (e.g., economic sanctions) while others were developed through the practice of the council (e.g., peacekeeping). Once the Security Council started to regularly engage in civil-war conflict management following the end of the Cold War, it gradually adjusted this repertoire to meet the special challenges posed by internal conflict. During the early 1990s and 2000s, the council greatly expanded the deployment of multidimensional peace operations. In recent years, it has frequently imposed targeted sanctions and has referred conflict situations to international tribunals and the International Criminal Court. During the past few years—i.e., after the end of the temporal scope of this study—it has increasingly resorted to the deployment of special political missions.³¹

We hypothesize that the following factors will be positively correlated with compliance (see table 2):

- compliance monitoring,
- a Security Council mission to the country beforehand,
- the deployment of a multidimensional peace

operation,

- the use of sanctions, and
- the use of threats and positive incentives.

Perhaps surprising to some, the majority of demands made by the Security Council after the Cold War were connected to some manner of compliance-monitoring mandate. In each case, the mandate to monitor compliance with a demand was included either in the Security Council resolution issuing the demand, a previous resolution or presidential statement, or another United Nations document. Between 1989 and 2006, a formal compliance-monitoring mandate was assigned with respect to more than 90 percent of all demands of the Security Council to civil-war parties.³² In recent years, the Security Council used a number of different institutions and actors to carry out these mandates, including panels of experts and commissions of inquiry.³³ However, most compliance-monitoring mandates—nearly 60 percent—were assigned to UN field personnel, particularly peace operations and special representatives of the secretary-general. International organizations other than the UN also figured highly as compliance monitors with 15 percent.³⁴

Our findings on monitoring mechanisms confirm our hypothesis of a positive relationship. In fact, monitoring mandates show one of the strongest, most robust, and most consistent relationship of any of our explanatory variables. In all models, monitoring mechanisms had roughly the same significant effect over the short and medium terms. When a monitoring mechanism was present, the odds of observing high compliance versus low to medium-high compliance was 60–80 percent higher on average when controlling for other factors.

An important aspect of monitoring mechanisms is the actor tasked with monitoring. Initial findings

30 Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?*; Jean Krasno, Bradd C. Hayes, and Donald C.F. Daniel, *Leveraging for Success in United Nations Peace Operations* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003).

31 See, for example, Alischa Kugel, ed., *Review of Political Missions 2011* (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2011).

32 See Cockayne, Mikulaschek, and Perry, "The United Nations Security Council and Civil War," pp. 37–39.

33 In general, the council can draw on a wide range of monitoring bodies, including the following: councils, such as the UN Council for Namibia; commissions, such as the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine; consular commissions, such as the Consular Commission for monitoring the situation in Indonesia; committees, including the Sanctions Committee; panels of experts, such as the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; UN field personnel (peacekeeping operations officials, special representatives of the secretary-general, special envoys of the secretary-general), as in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon; the Security Council itself; the president of the Security Council; the secretary-general; another UN body; another international organization; specific states; or a fact-finding mission established by the Security Council.

34 For instance, the Kosovo Verification Mission established by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe monitored compliance by the government and rebels in Kosovo with the demands in Resolution 1199 (1998). The Third Party Verification Mechanism (TPVM) composed of South Africa and the UN secretary-general fulfilled the task of monitoring the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Table 2: Conflict management strategy variables.³⁵

Variable	Description	Effect (Hypothesis)
Monitoring mandates	Monitoring mandates are one of the primary compliance strategies available to the Security Council. Monitoring has three possible relationships with compliance. First, the Security Council can supply parties with assurances about the opposition's compliance level, decreasing information deficits that can hinder compliance. Second, if noncompliance is reported back to the Security Council, the council can be expected to take action in order to avoid hurting its credibility. Third, a noncomplying party often blames the other side for acting first. Impartial monitoring of each side's conduct makes it impossible for third-party interveners to use ambiguity as an excuse for the failure to assist the victim of a violation, raising the prospect of sanctions against spoilers.	Robustly positive generally. When disaggregated into UN and non-UN actors tasked with monitoring, effect is less robust for each. (Positive)
Security Council mission	Since 1992, the Security Council has undertaken dozens of overseas missions to civil-war countries, during which it communicated directly and confidentially with leaders of warring factions and regional actors. These field visits constitute an opportunity for Security Council members to communicate expectations and consequences to parties directly. This can serve to clarify any ambiguity and allow noncomplying parties to offer justifications for their behavior. This strategic interaction may impact the decision-making calculus of the factions.	Robustly negative (Positive)
Multi-dimensional peace operation	Traditional and multidimensional peace operations are the most frequent recipients of compliance-monitoring mandates. Further, multidimensional peace operations and enforcement missions offer additional incentives for compliance in the form of "peace dividends" provided by missions. These consist of quick impact projects (QIPS), direct benefits to ex-combatants, kickbacks to warring factions, training for national security and justice sector institutions, and humanitarian aid. Finally, the use of force in protection of a mandate can help deter or coerce spoilers into compliance.	Robustly positive (Positive)
Sanctions, threats, and positive incentives	One of the Security Council's strategies for obtaining leverage over civil-war parties is to impose sanctions and then use their removal as an incentive for the factions' compliance with the council's demands. Sanctions also drastically increase the cost civil-war parties sustain for accessing the matériel, finance, and political support they need to maintain. The Security Council has developed a diverse repertoire of targeted sanctions from which it can choose, including arms embargoes, general trade restrictions, petroleum trade embargoes, and other primary commodity export restrictions, as well as financial, travel, and diplomatic sanctions. In addition to sanctions, the council has the ability to make use of threats, such as threats of sanctions or force, and positive incentives, such as territorial recognition or financial benefits, to entice parties to comply with its will.	Mixed for sanctions, incentives, and threats (Positive)

on the differentiation between actors show that both UN and non-UN monitoring mechanisms may have a positive relationship with compliance, though the results are not robust. Interestingly, in the short term the effect of non-UN compliance monitoring is more than twice that of UN compliance monitoring. In the medium term, however, the effect of UN compliance monitoring increases and strengthens while the effect of non-UN

compliance reverses and weakens. Only the relationships between non-UN monitoring and compliance in the short term and UN monitoring and compliance in the medium term are statistically significant, however, indicating that further research is necessary.

Somewhat counterintuitively, the odds of high compliance are robustly and significantly lower—by about 30–40 percent on average—if the Security

³⁵ On monitoring mandates see Tony Addison and Mansoob Murshed, "Credibility and Reputation in Peacemaking," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, No. 4 (2002): 487–501; Barbara Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, pp. 53–54. On Security Council missions see, for example, United Nations, *Report of the Security Council Mission to Afghanistan, 21 to 24 June 2010*, UN Doc. S/2010/564, November 1, 2010. On Security Council missions and strategic interactions see Chayes and Chayes, "On Compliance," pp. 175–205, and Chayes and Chayes, *The New Sovereignty*. On multidimensional peace operations see Trevor Findlay, *The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), and Stephen Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes" *International Security* 22, No. 2 (1997): 5–53. On sanctions see Cockayne, Mikulaschek, and Perry, "The United Nations Security Council and Civil War," p. 39; David Cortright and George Lopez, *The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); and Cortright and Lopez, *Smart Sanctions*.

Council members undertook a mission to the conflict theater before they issued a demand. Two factors may help to explain this result. First, there is a possible selection effect, whereby the Security Council is more likely to undertake a field mission when it anticipates noncompliance before issuing a demand. This expectation of noncompliance could be based on insider information that would not be captured in our conflict ecology indicators. Second, field visits by the members of the Security Council offer factions an opportunity to probe the Security Council's resolve and unity of purpose. When Security Council members send mixed messages to their interlocutors and fail to credibly commit to bearing the cost of confronting spoilers, a mission's impact may end up being contrary to its objective.

The effect of multidimensional peacekeeping on compliance is significantly and robustly positive. The size of the effect varies depending on the variables included in the model. The effect of multidimensional peacekeeping on compliance becomes stronger when compliance monitoring is dropped. This suggests that at least part of the positive effect of multidimensional peace operations on compliance stems from these operations' ability to provide reliable information and reassurances to factions. According to previous research, other positive effects of multidimensional peacekeeping on peacebuilding success could include factors such as strengthening moderate forces and promoting the emergence of new actors (voters, political parties, and civil society organizations) committed to peace.³⁶ This could help to explain the stronger relationship with medium-term compliance as opposed to short-term compliance.

Interestingly, when both traditional and multidimensional peacekeeping are accounted for, traditional peacekeeping either has a consistently significant negative relationship with compliance or a very weak and statistically insignificant positive relationship, when controlling for other factors. This relationship persists and is actually strengthened when the presence of multidimensional peacekeeping operations is not accounted for in the model, and it is only positive when monitoring is not accounted for. This could indicate that the only value added by traditional peace operations relates to their monitoring tasks.

A more favorable (and more likely) explanation lies in the possible "selection bias" of UN peace operations. As pointed out by Nicholas Sambanis, "a point that deserves special attention is that peace treaties are usually necessary for certain UN mandates, especially multidimensional ones."³⁷ As such, traditional UN peacekeeping operations may be more likely to be deployed in conflict situations with higher levels of political intractability. Earlier studies have also shown that deployments of traditional UN peace operations are more likely to occur in difficult civil-war settings than in less protracted civil wars. Thus, the Security Council does not merely deploy peace operations where it expects compliance from all warring factions. Indeed, when examining correlations between type of peacekeeping operation and conflict intensity, we see that multidimensional peace operations are about 20 percent less likely to take place in the presence of demands that are issued in high-intensity fighting (see table 3). However, traditional peacekeeping operations show a positive correlation with high-intensity fighting.

Table 3: Correlation between peace operation and conflict intensity.

	Traditional peacekeeping operation	Multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation	Low-intensity fighting	Medium-intensity fighting	High-intensity fighting
Traditional peacekeeping operation	_____	-0.607 ***	0.018 –	-0.062 **	0.047 *
Multidimensional peacekeeping operation	-0.607 ***	_____	0.016 –	0.190 ***	-0.207 ***

Note: * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent; two-tailed tests

36 See Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*.

37 Nicholas Sambanis, "Short-Term and Long-Term Effects of United Nations Peace Operations," World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4207, April 2007, p. 16.

While all of the models controlled for conflict intensity, this analysis is imperfect as our conflict intensity indicator is admittedly highly aggregated. Further research should focus on this relationship to gain a better understanding of the interplay of factors.

In addition to peace operations, Security Council missions, and formal compliance monitoring, the council has an array of sanctions, threats, and incentives in its toolbox. During the years from 1989 to 2003, more than half of all demands addressed to civil-war parties through a Security Council resolution were issued in the presence of sanctions against the warring factions or the state involved in the civil war. The frequency with which the Security Council imposed sanctions against civil-war parties suggests that one of its preferred strategies to obtain leverage over civil-war parties was to impose sanctions and then use their removal as an incentive for compliance. At the same time, the Security Council imposed sanctions in order to increase the difficulties and costs civil-war parties face in continuing hostilities as opposed to engaging in the military de-escalation demanded by the Security Council.³⁸ Both rationales for the imposition of sanctions should explain why they make compliance more attractive for civil-war parties and would therefore be associated with higher compliance.

The data does not bear this out. Across conflict situations the council adopted a variety of types of sanctions against civil-war parties, most frequently in the form of arms embargoes. Across all models, the existence of sanctions at the time of a demand is strongly and significantly negatively correlated with compliance. The relationship ranges from a 30–50 percent drop in odds of observing high compliance versus low to medium compliance and is consistently stronger in the short term than the medium term. This holds in significance even when accounting for the thematic types of demand, such as military action or cooperation with a UN body.³⁹ It does not completely hold true, however, when the type of sanction is accounted for. Of the seven types of sanctions we identified,⁴⁰ only two

Table 4: Sanction regimes in effect at time of Security Council demands.

Sanction Regime	Percentage	Count
Any	54%	839
Arms	53%	834
Oil	15%	238
Travel Restrictions	11%	172
Financial	10%	148
Targeted	9%	148
Diplomatic	4%	63
General Trade	3%	45

have a significant relationship in the short and medium term: arms embargoes and financial sanctions.

In nearly all cases in which sanctions were present at the time of the adoption of the demand, the sanctions regime consisted of at least an arms embargo (see table 4 for the full breakdown of sanctions type). It is no surprise then that the effect of arms embargoes largely mirrors that of sanctions generally. Financial sanctions, which were much less prevalent over the period examined (present in 10 percent of cases), were strongly, significantly associated with a 350–750 percent increase in odds of observing high compliance, holding other factors constant. Though statistically significant, the magnitude of this should be taken with a grain of salt due to the relatively large variance of this variable. Diplomatic sanctions showed the same significant effect in the negative direction for medium-term compliance. The other types of sanctions gave results that were mixed, though the relatively high level of variance of the variables makes it impossible to draw firm conclusions.

The Security Council also made use of positive incentives for compliance and threats for noncompliance, though far less frequently than sanctions. These “carrots and sticks” included the conditional promise to deploy a peace operation, the promise to remove sanctions as well as threats to impose them, the promise of financial support or technical assistance in the country experiencing civil war, and the threat of force. In fact, the Security Council

38 See Cockayne, Mikulaschek, and Perry, “The United Nations Security Council and Civil War,” pp. 37–39.

39 We categorize demands into five broad thematic groups based on the type of action requested: military, humanitarian, internal governance, external relations, and cooperation with UN bodies. It is important to note that group membership is not mutually exclusive. For example, a demand requesting that parties “exercise restraint, particularly with respect to civilian population” would count as both military and humanitarian action.

40 We categorize sanctions regimes into general trade, arms, oil, financial, travel restrictions, targeted, and diplomatic sanctions.

only utilized incentives as a conflict management strategy in 7 percent of the demands from 1989 to 2003. This can be explained by the fact that the council has relatively little access to positive incentives such as aid, which is disbursed by international financial institutions, national foreign aid agencies of major donor countries, the UN General Assembly, the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the UN Economic and Social Commission, and the multitude of UN agencies, funds, and programs. While used slightly more often, threats—especially the threat of force—were still only associated with 30 percent of demands, 12 percent of which were threats of force and 10 percent were threats of sanctions.

The results for the use of positive incentives by the council are surprising. Positive incentives are not statistically significantly associated with compliance in most models. However, the coefficient is negative across all model specifications. While not robust, the result is statistically significant over the medium term in some models, and the effect is regularly more pronounced over the medium term as opposed to the short term. Threats for noncompliance follow a similar but distinct pattern. Threats from the council read broadly are associated with lower compliance when holding other factors constant, a result that is statistically significant in half of the models. This effect is weakened and lessened in relation to medium-term compliance.

This could indicate that threats may have a marginal impact on some situations. Interestingly, significance is lost when accounting for the number of warring factions. More research is needed, but this could indicate a systemic relationship between the effectiveness of threats and the difficulties in coordinating a multitude of actors. Second, since the models control both for monitoring mandates and field personnel in the form of blue helmets on the ground, the negative association with compliance could be indicating a sort of “unstaffed mandate” effect. One could well imagine (and indeed can observe today) situations in which the threats and promises issued by the council are not credible due to a political stalemate among its members. In such a case, the use of threats,

sanctions, and incentives could well indicate a council unable affect compliance.

On a final note, incentives offered and threats made to civil-war parties through informal channels are outside the scope of this study. Alternative communication channels could include press releases, stakeout statements, and letters from the president of the council, as well as informal remarks made at meetings during council missions and country visits by its subsidiary bodies. At this time, data on these informal communication channels does not exist and could offer fertile territory for future research.

GREAT POWER DYNAMICS

The five permanent members of the Security Council (P5) hold considerable sway over the decision-making process within the council.⁴¹ Their predominance in the Security Council derives mainly from their permanent membership in the body and their veto power over nonprocedural decisions. Additionally, the members of the P5 are imbued with a large amount of military and economic power in most conflict regions. We hypothesize that continuous, unanimous support from the P5 will have a positive correlation with compliance.

Formal disagreements among the permanent members of the Security Council on resolutions can signal to spoilers that the demands contained therein do not have strong support and will likely have weak enforcement. It is conceivable, though, that abstention by P5 members may at times have the opposite effect. In the absence of a negotiated compromise resolution, P5 members have two options: veto or abstain. Using a veto carries a cost both in terms of friction with other council members as well as being seen as impeding conflict mediation in the eyes of public opinion. By abstaining instead of using a veto, a P5 member state could be signaling the unwillingness to sustain these costs despite its substantive reservations about a resolution. This will impact the decision-making process of civil-war parties who had hoped to be shielded by the veto power.

Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that, on average, a lack of P5 consensus over the two and

41 See Bruce Russett, Barry O'Neill, and James Sutterlin, “Breaking the Security Council Restructuring Logjam,” *Global Governance* 2, (1996): 65–80, and Barry O'Neill, “Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40, No. 2 (2001): 219–237.

four years prior to the adoption of a resolution is significantly, robustly, and positively associated with compliance with a given demand over the short term. Specifically, a prior P5 veto on the situation is associated with a 70–130 percent increase in the odds of observing high versus low or medium compliance. This indicates to us a counterhypothesis that it is rather the shift from great-power disagreement to consensus in the Security Council on conflict management in a civil war that is associated with higher compliance with demands to civil-war parties. In other words, the lack of a track record of continuous consensus within the P5 could indicate a previous blocking by a key ally to one or more of the conflict parties. A shift by a P5 member signals to potential and actual spoilers that the support of that P5 ally has disappeared. Under this hypothesis we would expect to see a stronger effect on compliance when there is a lack of consensus over the two years prior to the resolution being issued rather than the four years prior. This is indeed borne out. Additionally, a veto by a permanent council member of a prospective demand on the situation is robustly significant while abstention by a permanent member is neither significant nor consistent, which gives further support to this theory.

ONGOING PEACE PROCESS

The Security Council often, but not always, acts in order to reinforce an existing bargaining process involving the civil-war parties or to support the implementation of agreements already concluded. Fifty-two percent of the Security Council demands addressed to warring factions request them to behave as some or all of them had already promised in an earlier agreement. We hypothesize that demands reiterating promises previously made in peace agreements will be positively correlated with compliance.

Linkages between Security Council resolutions and peace processes may have two effects. First, civil-war parties that are eager to signal their commitment to a peace agreement can urge the council to adopt resolutions that endorse the agreement. By doing so, these civil-war parties can show their willingness to raise the cost of later noncompliance.⁴² Second, compliance with

demands that reiterate promises made could help to cement concessions made by the opposing side.

This expectation is not borne out by the first results, which do not show a significant correlation between the party's prior consent to the substance of the demand and compliance with the demand. Interestingly, this holds even when controlling for thematic type of request. Future research should strive to disaggregate the nature and health of such prior agreements to better measure the degree, rather than mere existence, of prior consent.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The end of the Cold War brought an unprecedented surge in efforts by the UN Security Council to prevent, manage, and resolve civil wars. From 1989 to 2003, the Security Council deployed peace operations to more than two dozen countries experiencing civil war, imposed sanctions on numerous warring factions, established transitional administrations and international criminal tribunals, and adopted 827 resolutions in response to civil wars. While over this time the average level of compliance with council demands varied, there was a slight increase in compliance due to a variety of factors.

This study theorized that the conflict ecology, the UN conflict management strategy, great power politics, and linkages between a resolution and an existing peace process all help to shape civil-war parties' compliance behavior and incentive structure. We found the following:

- Demands made in the presence of a peacekeeping operation with a multidimensional mandate or a mandated monitoring mechanism are associated with higher odds of compliance.
- Demands made during periods of low-intensity or no fighting are associated with higher odds of compliance.
- Surprisingly, a lack of continuous consensus between the permanent members of the Security Council regarding a resolution is positively associated with compliance.
- Demands made in the presence of a traditional

42 Cockayne, Mikulaschek, and Perry, "The United Nations Security Council and Civil War."

peacekeeping operation, alongside a current or previously imposed sanctions regime, or following a Security Council field mission tend to be associated with lower odds of compliance.

- Situations in which there is a proximate ongoing war, there are significant sources of lootable resources, or there has been a negative political shock all have a negative correlation with compliance.
- Finally, the use of threats by the council presents mixed results, and the fact that a demand reiterates activity already agreed to by parties through an existing peace process has no effect.

It is important to remember that securing the maximal level of compliance is not the only consideration the council's members take into account when they deliberate on issuing a certain demand to a civil-war party. Apart from securing compliance, the rationale for adopting a resolution may be to signal the collective will of the Security Council to foster an international norm or the desire to maintain the body's perceived legitimacy by voicing strong opposition to egregious acts. In other cases, the Security Council is motivated primarily by the desire of some of its members to be perceived by their domestic constituencies as "doing something" in response to a mounting crisis.⁴³ These considerations explain why the Security Council's conflict management strategy is not always adjusted to the difficulty of the conflict setting in a way that maximizes the prospects for compliance.

We see three main policy implications from our initial research. First, the Security Council should design its conflict management strategy with a strong basis in reality. When drafting resolutions and considering possible mandate structures,

realistic and reliable assessment of conditions as they exist in the field need to be taken into account. For instance, integrating some of the emerging early-warning and conflict-mapping systems into council decision-making structures could go a long way in creating sound information on which to base council action. Likewise, better sharing of information, especially pertinent intelligence, by council members could help the council to draft better mandates. Most of all, the council must use this information when drafting resolutions to try to develop reasonable baseline expectations for compliance and to choose the appropriate conflict management strategies from its large repertoire.

Second, the Security Council should be mindful of negative spillover effects of persistent noncompliance with its demands across unrelated conflicts. Political actors closely watch the council's signals about its resolve and commitment to seeing through the implementation of its demands. If the council meets with a lack of compliance and general disregard of its authority in one conflict, it runs the risk of meeting the same results in another. In the longer term, prolonged noncompliance can take a significant toll on the council's legitimacy and effectiveness, and negatively affect the perception of the UN system as a whole.

Lastly, it is important to recognize that achieving high compliance with its resolutions is not the only objective pursued by the Security Council. In situations where the failure to demand an end to aggression or other egregious acts would be irreconcilable with the council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council should not choose inaction over taking a principled stance because it fears that aggressors will not abide by its demands.

43 Michael Lipson, "Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, No. 5 (2007): 5–34, p. 14.

Annex

Definitions

Battle-Related Deaths

This measure includes all people—combatants and civilians—killed in the fighting. It does not include victims of one-sided violence (such as the execution of prisoners of war or a genocidal campaign), the victims of increases in criminal violence that may follow a collapse of local authority, persons killed in unorganized violence (such as food riots), or increases in nonviolent causes of mortality (such as disease and starvation) that may result from the conflict.

Civil War

For the purpose of this study, we define a civil war as an internal armed conflict resulting in at least 500 battle-related deaths during a given year during the conflict.⁴⁴ This definition excludes interstate wars as well as extrastate armed conflicts, including those in occupied territories. The distinction between civil wars on the one hand and interstate and extrastate conflicts on the other reflects a fundamental difference between the legal and political framework for Security Council interventions in civil wars and those involving occupying powers and aggression against another state.⁴⁵

Compliance

We define compliance as the degree of conformity between the substance of the demand and the demand addressee's subsequent conduct. This definition implies that the concept of compliance is agnostic as to the reasons why this conformity between the behavioral prescription and the addressee's behavior does or does not occur.⁴⁶ Compliance with each of the 1,531 demands addressed to civil-war parties is assessed on a four-point scale that ranges from marginal to medium-low to medium-high to full or almost full compliance. This is irrespective of whether or not they would have maintained the cease-fire in the absence of a demand and instead is based solely on the *actual behavior* of the parties. Additionally, compliance is evaluated separately in the short term and medium term,⁴⁷ and scored based on a combination of completeness, timeliness, continuity, and universality of compliance. As the demand is the unit of observation for this study, compliance by multiple addressees with a single demand is assessed as a conceptually weighted combined score.⁴⁸

It is important to note that the issue of compliance with a Security Council resolution is conceptually distinct from the effectiveness of the council's work. An assessment of the impact of the council's work also includes an analysis of the causal linkage between its conflict management efforts and the evolution of civil

44 Cockayne, Mikulaschek, and Perry, "The United Nations Security Council and Civil War," Annex 1. We define a civil war as consisting of one or several simultaneous disputes over generally incompatible positions that (1) concern government and/or territory in a state; (2) are causally linked to the use of armed force, resulting in at least 500 battle-related deaths during a given year during the conflict; and (3) involve two or more parties, of which the primary warring parties are the government of the state where armed force is used and one or several nonstate opposition organizations. This definition is based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's definition of the term "armed conflict." See Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflict 1989–2000," *Journal of Peace Research* 38, No. 5 (2001): 629–644. The reader will notice that we use a lower battle-death threshold than most previous studies. We adopted this threshold in line with the argument presented by Nicholas Sambanis that favors a more fine-grained analysis of civil war. The relatively low battle-death threshold is meant to ensure that major armed conflicts in small countries, which are unlikely to surpass the commonly used threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths in a single conflict year, are not omitted from the data. See Nicholas Sambanis, "What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, No. 6 (2004): 814–858.

45 The purposes and principles of the United Nations listed in the organization's charter stipulate the non-recognition of territorial acquisition through aggression as part of a peace agreement mediated by the organization. Accordingly, United Nations intervention in interstate wars and in conflicts in occupied territories is typically inspired by the organization's desire to secure the withdrawal of the occupying forces, as evidenced by General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on Namibia, southern Lebanon, Timor Leste, and Western Sahara. While individual members of the Security Council may also hold strong preferences for specific outcomes of a civil war, the Security Council is typically willing to endorse a variety of substantive outcomes of civil wars as long as they hold the promise of sustainable peace.

46 See Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "International Law, International Relations and Compliance," in *The Handbook of International Relations*, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 2002), p. 539.

47 The assessment of short-term compliance only takes into account the conduct of the demand addressees that occurred within six months after the date of adoption of the resolution issuing the demand. Medium-term compliance captures the behavior displayed by the demand addressees within two years after the date of adoption of the resolution in which the demand figured. See Mikulaschek, "Guidelines for Assessing Compliance," pp. 11–12.

48 For full coding methodology, see *ibid.*, pp. 5, 12–14.

wars on the ground. Effectiveness is not a mere function of compliance since it also depends on a normative assessment of the appropriateness of the Security Council's response to a civil war. This study focuses on the narrow question of compliance. While it is possible to conduct a rigorous quantitative analysis of compliance, it would be overwhelmingly difficult to separately evaluate the effectiveness of specific demands of the Security Council. Findings on compliance derived from this study allow some cautious conclusions on the impact and overall effectiveness of the Security Council's efforts to resolve civil war, but in doing so the differences between these concepts need to be borne in mind.

Assessing compliance with rules, as Beth Simmons put it, entails compiling "objective evidence of subjective socially-based interpretations of behavior."⁴⁹ Thus, evaluating compliance entails making difficult judgments. This study utilizes several precautions to ensure that the methodology used for assessing compliance is both robust and transparent. First, the primary and secondary source material used to determine the score accompanies each compliance score. This documentation is published in PDF format on the IPI Security Council Compliance Database web portal.⁵⁰ Second, relying on a single coder would risk the inclusion of coder bias in the empirical results. This could be due to the inherent subjectivity of the coder's judgment. Thus, our methodology employed two coders working independently on each coding decision. Intra-coder disagreements were reviewed using the coder-supplied documentation scrubbed of indication as to which coder made the decision. Christoph Mikulaschek reviewed major disagreements while review of minor disagreements was conducted by one of the original coders, who was supplied with the documentation gathered by both coders. The coding team consisted of twenty-five doctoral students with a published record of expertise in the conflict area in question. Coders were trained at a one-day workshop in the assessment methodology. The coding methodology can be found in the project coding methodology and notes, available on the IPI website.⁵¹

Compliance is assessed by reference to either the incidents covered by the demand or, where the demand involved multiple sub-demands, by reference to the aspects of the demand. By "incident" we mean events triggered by the demand addressees that fall within the substantive scope of the demand and that occurred within the timeframe for assessing compliance. By "aspect" we mean sub-demands entailed within one demand.

We use a four-point scale to assess the levels of compliance, as outlined here. For the distribution of compliance scores, see figure 5 below.


1. No or marginal compliance: No compliance with the demand in all or almost all incidents covered by the demand, or compliance with no or almost no aspects of the demand of any significance to the achievement of the overall objectives of the demand.
2. Medium-low compliance: Compliance in a minority of incidents covered by the demand, or compliance only with those aspects of the demand that were of a relatively low significance to the achievement of the objectives of the demand.
3. Medium-high compliance: Compliance with a majority of incidents covered by the demand, or compliance with those aspects of the demand that were of relatively high significance to the achievement of the objectives of the demand.
4. Full or almost full compliance: Compliance with all or almost all incidents covered by the demand, or compliance with all or almost all aspects of the demand significant for the achievement of the objectives of the demand.

49 Beth Simmons, "Compliance in International Relations," paper presented at the meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, August 31–September 3, 2000, p. 24.

50 Available at www.ipinst.org/coping-with-crisis/compliance-with-security-council-resolutions/programslist.html.

51 See Mikulaschek, "Guidelines for Assessing Compliance," available at www.ipinst.org/coping-with-crisis/compliance-with-security-council-resolutions/programslist.html.

Figure 5: Distribution of short- and medium-term compliance and depth-of-demand variables.



Demands

Since Security Council resolutions are increasingly long and complex texts; it would be problematic to assess compliance with an entire Security Council resolution with a single score. For instance, Resolution 1493 (2003) on the civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo contains more than thirty operative paragraphs dealing with the cessation of hostilities, the protection of civilians, the effectiveness of the transitional government, natural resource exploitation, cooperation with the UN peace operation, and the regional dimension of the conflict.⁵² Instead, we chose individual demands issued in each operative paragraph of a resolution as the unit of observation for this study. Thus, any operative paragraph in a resolution that spells out a behavioral instruction is recorded as a separate demand.

The study's scope is limited to demands contained in resolutions (as opposed to those contained in presidential statements and other communications). Since resolutions constitute the most formal type of pronouncements by the Security Council they are the most visible signals conveyed by the council.⁵³ The IPI Security Council Compliance Database covers all 3,038 demands contained in resolutions that addressed a civil war between 1989 and 2006. However, the quantitative analyses focus exclusively on compliance by parties actively engaged in the civil war. Additionally, due to time and funding constraints, the variable of compliance was only coded for the time period from 1989–2003. This subset of the data is comprised of 1,531 demands to civil-war parties.

Depth of Demand

To understand compliance with Security Council resolutions, we need to control for variation in the depth of demands. We define the depth of a Security Council demand to a civil-war party as the potential hazard for the addressee that is associated with engaging in the demanded conduct. Specifically, the hazard associated with performing the requested conduct consists either in a risk to the demand addressee's survival or in a negative impact on its ability to attain victory in the civil war or win power in its aftermath. This hazard becomes more acute if other civil-war parties do not comply with any Security Council demands addressed to them or their commitments in the peace process. In other words, the depth of a demand is the potential harm incurred by

⁵² UN Security Council Resolution 1493, July 28, 2003, UN Doc. S/RES/1493.

⁵³ The council also utilizes a range of less formal channels for conveying messages to warring factions. Its president may issue a presidential statement or a press statement. The council's members can communicate their collective will to warring factions in closed-door meetings during a council mission or an interactive dialogue with the representative of a government engaged in an armed conflict. The operative part of resolutions or presidential statements can specify demands that are legally binding under the United Nations Charter. See Stefan Talmon, "The Statements by the President of the Security Council," *Chinese Journal of International Law* 2, (2003): 419–466. We acknowledge that the restriction of the scope of this study to the operative part of resolutions omits other means by which the council signals the collective will of its members to civil-war parties, most notably through presidential statements. However, we have no reason to believe that the patterns of compliance with presidential statements would be fundamentally different from those of compliance with resolutions, and we expect that our analyses allow general inferences on compliance with presidential statements.

the demand addressee assuming other civil-war parties do not comply with their obligations.

The depth-of-demand variable only captures the potential hazard for the addressee that is associated with engaging in the demanded conduct. In assessing compliance we did not weigh this hazard against potential benefits the addressee could gain from compliance. Evaluating both the potential hazard and gains from compliance and the likelihood that they will materialize would replicate the compliance decision-making calculus of civil-war parties and would therefore be endogenous to the level of compliance.

We use a three-point scale to assess the depth of demand. This scale does not allow the use of half-scores or fractional scores. For the distribution of depth-of-demand scores, see figure 5 above.

1. Low depth of demand: Compliance with this demand (in isolation from other demands) does not put the survival of the demand addressee as an organized group, or even the life of its senior members, at a significant risk. Nor does it significantly impact the addressee's chances to attain victory in the civil war or to win power in its aftermath. This is true even if other civil-war parties fail to comply with any demands of the Security Council addressed to them and renege on their commitments in the peace process.
2. Medium depth of demand: Compliance with this demand (in isolation from other demands) makes it significantly more difficult for the demand addressee to attain victory in the civil war or to win power in its aftermath, particularly if other civil-war parties fail to comply with demands of the Security Council addressed to them and renege on their commitments in the peace process. At the same time, compliance with the demand does not put the survival of the demand addressee as an organized group, or even the life of its senior members, at a significant risk, even if other civil-war parties fail to comply with any demands of the Security Council addressed to them and renege on their commitments in the peace process.
3. High depth of demand: Compliance with this demand (in isolation from other demands) puts the survival of the demand addressee as an organized group, or even the life of its senior members, at a significant risk, particularly if other civil-war parties fail to comply with any demands of the Security Council addressed to them and renege on their commitments in the peace process.

Independent Variables

The dichotomous variables that indicate the presence of compliance monitoring, Security Council sanctions, threats, positive incentives, overseas missions, and P5 voting behavior were coded for this project on the basis of primary documents from the UN.

The dichotomous variable indicating the presence of a multidimensional UN peace operation or enforcement mission was coded for this study on the basis of definitions developed by Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis.⁵⁴

Data for the size of peace operations was extracted from the Numbers of Uniformed Personnel in Peace Operations at Mid-Year dataset compiled by the Henry L. Stimson Center.⁵⁵ The measure for the size of peace operations uses units of troops per 1,000 square kilometer. Country area measurements are taken from the CIA World Factbook.⁵⁶

The dichotomous variable indicating civil-war parties' prior commitment to the requested conduct was coded for this project on the basis of extensive analysis of primary documents and databases of peace agreements.⁵⁷

The categorical variable measuring conflict intensity takes the value three if the number of battle-related fatalities exceeded 1,000 during the twelve months prior to the adoption of the demand, two if it exceeded 25 but was less than 1,000, and one if it dropped below 25. This data is from the PRIO Battle Death Dataset v.3.0.⁵⁸

54 Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, pp. 14–15.

55 Henry L. Stimson Center, "Numbers of Uniformed Personnel in Peace Operations at Mid-Year, 1948–2006," Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006.

56 Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook 2009* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2009).

57 United Nations Department of Political Affairs, "Peace Agreements Database," available on the UN Peacemaker website at www.peacemaker.un.org/document-search, and Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset," Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala University, available at www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_peace_agreement_dataset/.

58 Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths," *European Journal of Population* 21, No. 2–3 (2005): 145–166.

The presence and number of civil wars in one or more neighboring countries are recorded both as binary and continuous variables for this study.

Negative political shocks are recorded when there was a six-point or greater decrease in the Polity score or the onset or continuation of an interregal period during the year preceding the adoption of a resolution.⁵⁹

The variable indicating the number of civil-war parties was compiled with data extracted from the Yearly Warring Party dataset developed by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.⁶⁰

The dichotomous indicator of the presence of lootable natural resources in the civil-war country was coded for this research project on the basis of the definition of lootable natural resources described by Michael Ross.⁶¹

Methodology

Our primary analysis utilizes a series of six ordinal logistic regression models. Model specifications were varied as a robustness check. The results can be found in table 5 below.

59 See Marshall and Jagers, *Polity IV Project*.

60 Stina Högladh, "Yearly Warring Party Dataset," Version 1.0, Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University, 2006.

61 Michael Ross, "Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural Resources in Civil War," in *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*, edited by Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2003).

Table 5: Ordered logistic regression of compliance with Security Council demands.

	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3		MODEL 4		MODEL 5		MODEL 6	
	Short	Med.	Short	Med.	Short	Med.	Short	Med.	Short	Med.	Short	Med.
MONITORING MANDATE	0.499***	0.482**			0.583***	0.59***	0.589***	0.648***	0.476**	0.584***		
	0.188	0.189			0.178	0.177	0.184	0.184	0.186	0.187		
UN MONITORING											0.163	0.335*
											0.175	0.178
NON-UN MONITORING											0.345*	- 0.136
											0.185	0.184
TRADITIONAL PEACEKEEPING MISSION	- 0.144	- 0.234	0.052	- 0.031	- 0.31*	- 0.429***	- 0.371**	- 0.511***	- 0.48***	- 0.603***	- 0.152	- 0.464**
	0.187	0.187	0.171	0.168	0.162	0.161	0.175	0.174	0.159	0.162	0.197	0.201
MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACEKEEPING MISSION	0.307*	0.375**	0.457***	0.537***					0.667***	0.725***	0.486**	0.75***
	0.179	0.183	0.170	0.171					0.181	0.184	0.198	0.202
SANCTIONS	- 0.617***	- 0.397**	- 0.607***	- 0.392**	- 0.554***	- 0.351**			- 0.674***	- 0.471***	- 0.689***	- 0.587***
	0.167	0.168	0.166	0.167	0.169	0.170			0.136	0.135	0.172	0.174
SANCTIONS: GENERAL TRADE							0.123	- 0.345				
							0.376	0.381				
SANCTIONS: RMS							- 0.546***	- 0.415**				
							0.183	0.183				
SANCTIONS: FINANCIAL							1.496**	2.000***				
							0.704	0.718				
SANCTIONS: TRAVEL							- 0.562	0.029				
							0.622	0.627				
SANCTIONS: TARGETED							- 0.599*	- 0.362				
							0.349	0.365				

Note: Reported coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; two-tailed tests.

Table 5 continued: Ordered logistic regression of compliance with Security Council demands.

	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3		MODEL 4		MODEL 5		MODEL 6	
	Short	Med.	Short	Med.	Short	Med.	Short	Med.	Short	Med.	Short	Med.
SANCTIONS: DIPLOMATIC							-0.823	-1.726***				
							0.602	0.619				
THREATS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE	-0.326**	-0.124	-0.272*	-0.077	-0.363**	-0.159			-0.128	0.142	-0.244	0.036
	0.146	0.146	0.144	0.145	0.147	0.147			0.145	0.144	0.149	0.149
THREATS: LOSS OF BENEFITS							-1.166	-1.535**				
							0.718	0.760				
THREATS: LOSS OF FINANCIAL BENEFITS							-0.259	0.705				
							0.529	0.535				
THREATS: PEACEKEEPING OPERATION							0.658	1.447*				
							0.730	0.779				
THREATS: FORCE							-0.105	-0.079				
							0.229	0.233				
THREATS: SANCTIONS							-0.395	0.034				
							0.330	0.322				
THREATS: OTHER							1.053	1.578**				
							0.643	0.693				
POSITIVE INCENTIVES FOR COMPLIANCE	-0.218	-0.267	-0.184	-0.222	-0.299	-0.374*	-0.395	-0.777***	-0.246	-0.432*	-0.191	-0.27
	0.224	0.227	0.223	0.226	0.218	0.221	0.262	0.268	0.218	0.223	0.224	0.226
PREVIOUS SECURITY COUNCIL MISSION	-0.432**	-0.48***	-0.406**	-0.452**	-0.424**	-0.462***	-0.51***	-0.546***	-0.3*	-0.496***	-0.392**	-0.389**
	0.180	0.178	0.180	0.178	0.179	0.177	0.188	0.185	0.174	0.172	0.182	0.180
P5 VETO 2 YEARS PRIOR	0.536*	0.693**	0.584*	0.743**			0.578*	0.841**	0.646**	0.884***	0.703**	0.814**
	0.322	0.325	0.322	0.325			0.341	0.351	0.317	0.321	0.331	0.334
P5 ABSTENTION 2 YEARS PRIOR	0.164	-0.2	0.279	-0.089			0.263	-0.282	0.166	0.162	0.278	0.116
	0.272	0.269	0.268	0.266			0.278	0.276	0.255	0.253	0.274	0.272

Note: Reported coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; two-tailed tests.

Table 5 continued: Ordered logistic regression of compliance with Security Council demands.


	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3		MODEL 4		MODEL 5		MODEL 6	
	Short	Med.	Short	Med.	Short	Med.	Short	Med.	Short	Med.	Short	Med.
P5 CONSENSUS CHANGE 2 YEARS PRIOR	-0.285	-0.113	-0.239	-0.064	-0.075	0.129	-0.172	-0.121	-0.41*	-0.18	-0.286	-0.059
	0.243	0.238	0.243	0.237	0.225	0.221	0.253	0.247	0.244	0.239	0.245	0.238
P5 VETO 4 YEARS PRIOR					0.349	0.583*						
					0.299	0.303						
P5 ABSTENTION 4 YEARS PRIOR					0.397	0.012						
					0.255	0.253						
PARTIES' PRIOR CONSENT TO SUBSTANCE OF DEMAND	-0.025	-0.018	-0.01	-0.002	-0.032	-0.017	-0.032	0.006	-0.036	0.017	-0.035	-0.046
	0.105	0.104	0.105	0.104	0.105	0.104	0.108	0.107	0.104	0.103	0.105	0.105
MEDIUM INTENSITY AT THE TIME OF THE DEMAND	-0.571***	-0.615***	-0.61***	-0.656***	-0.552***	-0.593***	-0.434**	-0.373*	-0.034	-0.146	-0.667***	-0.675***
	0.194	0.193	0.194	0.192	0.196	0.194	0.201	0.200	0.162	0.162	0.198	0.197
HIGH INTENSITY AT THE TIME OF THE DEMAND	-0.681***	-0.396**	-0.775***	-0.483**	-0.715***	-0.467**	-0.674***	-0.396*	-0.129	0.035	-0.76***	-0.331*
	0.200	0.197	0.197	0.194	0.195	0.191	0.205	0.203	0.185	0.183	0.204	0.201
ONGOING CIVIL WAR IN PROXIMATE COUNTRY	-0.607***	-0.304**	-0.68***	-0.378***	-0.52***	-0.222	-0.375**	-0.191	-0.41***	-0.014	-0.497***	-0.076
	0.139	0.139	0.136	0.136	0.135	0.135	0.157	0.160	0.131	0.130	0.152	0.153
NEGATIVE POLITICAL SHOCK	-0.744***	-0.537**	-0.747***	-0.549**	-0.788***	-0.588***	-0.74***	-0.366	-0.655***	-0.545***	-0.736***	-0.576***
	0.224	0.215	0.223	0.214	0.224	0.214	0.235	0.224	0.215	0.209	0.225	0.217
NUMBER OF WARRING FACTIONS									-0.031***	-0.039***	-0.032***	-0.046***
									0.007	0.007	0.012	0.012
LOOTABLE RESOURCES	-0.368	-1.26***	-0.427	-1.322***	-0.434	-1.236***	0.063	-0.698	0.177	-0.323**	-0.532	-1.641***
	0.411	0.412	0.410	0.411	0.417	0.415	0.439	0.440	0.145	0.147	0.415	0.418
MEDIUM DEPTH OF DEMAND	-0.929***	-0.945***	-0.895***	-0.913***	-0.935***	-0.958***	-0.938***	-0.932***	-0.841***	-0.84***	-0.9***	-0.885***
	0.131	0.132	0.130	0.131	0.130	0.132	0.134	0.134	0.131	0.131	0.131	0.132
HIGH DEPTH OF DEMAND	-1.49***	-1.301***	-1.432***	-1.249***	-1.493***	-1.32***	-1.58***	-1.414***	-0.153***	-1.375***	-0.144***	-1.217***
	0.148	0.148	0.147	0.146	0.148	0.147	0.160	0.158	0.157	0.156	0.149	0.148

Note: Reported coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses); * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; two-tailed tests.

Table 5 continued: Ordered logistic regression of compliance with Security Council demands.

	MODEL 1		MODEL 2		MODEL 3		MODEL 4		MODEL 5		MODEL 6	
	Short	Med.	Short	Med.	Short	Med.	Short	Med.	Short	Med.	Short	Med.
THEMATIC REQUEST: MILITARY							-0.454***	-0.445***	-0.463***	-0.462***		
THEMATIC REQUEST: HUMANITARIAN							0.119	0.119	0.117	0.117		
THEMATIC REQUEST: INTERNAL GOVERNANCE							-0.852***	-0.903***	-0.829***	-0.917***		
							0.140	0.140	0.137	0.137		
THEMATIC REQUEST: EXTERNAL RELATIONS							-0.459**	-0.128	-0.444**	-0.042		
							0.184	0.176	0.180	0.172		
THEMATIC REQUEST: COOPERATE WITH UN BODIES							0.097	-0.066	0.085	-0.015		
							0.123	0.121	0.120	0.119		
COMPLIANCE CUT: 1 2	-1.828	-3.046***	-1.796	-3.019**	-1.715	-2.960	-1.751	-2.939**	-1.209	-3.295***	-1.946	-3.168***
	1.349	1.181	1.346	1.177	1.357	1.192	1.391	1.233	1.310	1.146	1.356	1.192
COMPLIANCE CUT: 2 3	-0.136	-1.063	-0.110	-1.04	-0.024	-0.982	0.03	-0.839	0.501	-1.269	-0.252	-1.162
	1.349	1.179	1.346	1.175	1.357	1.190	1.391	1.232	1.310	1.144	1.355	1.190
COMPLIANCE CUT: 3 4	1.337	0.706	1.358	0.722	1.453	0.791	1.566	1.038	1.976	0.525	1.226	0.635
	1.349	0.148	1.346	1.177	1.357	1.191	1.391	1.233	1.311	1.144	1.355	1.191
REGION	X		X		X		X		X		X	
YEAR	X		X		X		X		X		X	
OBSERVATIONS (RESIDUAL DEGREES OF FREEDOM)	1567 (1524)		1567 (1524)		1567 (1524)		1567 (1510)		1567 (1526)		1567 (1522)	
RESIDUAL DEVIANCE	3513.723	3357.156	3520.849	3463.053	3513.222	3460.79	3408.989	3332.145	3492.797	3416.547	3512.179	3435.817
AKAIKE INFORMATION CRITERION	3599.723	3473.156	3604.849	3547.053	3597.222	3544.79	3522.989	3446.145	3574.797	3498.547	3602.179	3525.817

Note: Reported coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses); * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; two-tailed tests.



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