Obligations of a Global Neighbor

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Preface

As writings on globalization have matured and moved away from some of the earlier fear mongering about cultural homogenization, scholars have come to argue something different. One of the consequences of globalization is the *accentuation* of difference and diversity. With globality, seeing the world as one place, individuals and communities have sought or been forced to situate themselves in relation to others. This process leads to questions about how am I different and what do I share with these others. 'Living together' has taken on a number of new meanings in a globalized world. This realization provides the starting point for this working paper by Joyce Bellous. Beginning from the normative position that persons living in a globalized world have to reconsider and strive toward 'neighbourliness', she uses her scholarly background in religion and theology to reflect upon how such a way of living might be realized. She focuses upon different conceptions of identity – Kantian man, Post-modern Woman, Dyadic members – to carry out her analysis. In a thoughtful way, she argues that spirituality will be crucial in realizing neighbourliness in communities where these ideal typical identities in varying forms exist side by side.

William D. Coleman
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ABSTRACT

Globalizing processes increase the importance of developing civility both within societies and between societies. More broadly, they point to the need for global civility. Building global civility requires the development of a sense of neighborliness. Civility will result from a strong sense of neighborliness.

Understanding the obstacles to building neighborliness requires some consideration of how personal identities are constructed. In a time where the usual institutions for creating identities, particularly nation-states, are losing legitimacy, building a personal identity becomes even more important for making sense of the world and living in that world. The difficulty for the formation of civility is that individuals build their identities in different ways, aspects of which can be summarized in terms of three ideal types: Kantian Man, Post-Modern Woman, and Dyadic Members. For neighborliness to develop, and thus for global civility to have a chance, interfaces between these types of identities must be found. These interfaces will be found if a sense of moral obligation to one's neighbor is developed. The development of moral obligation becomes more possible if we look to three processes: building obligation through spirituality, building obligation through social capital and reducing insecurity.

Obligations of a Global Neighbor

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We are not going to have a global information economy without a global civil society....Political theory has all but disappeared, largely because in its dominant Anglo-American individualist rationalist guise— operating within the confines of the bounded sovereign state—it has become trivial and meaningless in an era of globalization. This is a situation that cannot be allowed to continue (Higgott, 21; 30).

There is no democracy without genuine opposing critical powers.... Now that the great utopias of the nineteenth century have revealed all their perversion, it is urgent to create conditions for a collective effort to reconstruct a universe of realist ideals, capable of mobilizing people's will without mystifying their consciousness (Bourdieu 1998:8-9).

Global Neighborly Obligation

To promote global civility, salient differences and implications for human being that follow from them must be included in understanding what constrains human experience and holds people together. What holds people together, despite their differences, are ethical bonds formed out of a learned and remembered sense of obligation they hold towards themselves and their neighbors. When *learned and remembered*, these bonds are expressed as a *felt* sense of obligation that motivates moral constraint. Neighborliness then, has ethical and educational aspects. Neighbors are all those engaged in the duties and rights of reciprocal moral[1] obligation: Each person is a neighbor, also in need of help, so that neighborliness influences the formation of personal identity. Proximity raises two questions about neighborliness: Who is my neighbor? How shall I act as a good neighbor? Proximity (nearness) has implications for global civility since economic space becomes more and more compressed.

The idea of nearness is central to understanding the role obligation plays in learning to be a good global neighbor. In the formation of nation-states, nearness implied sameness and eclipsed difference. In a global economy, nearness does not imply sameness; people construct personal identity along different lines, yet live side by side in multicultural states and are affected by economic conditions ranging across the world, at times with disastrous results. Given the ways we currently affect each other, global civility requires that we be neighborly and incorporate significant differences into an obligation to treat all others as neighbors. Core aspects of neighborly treatment include building moral obligation through acknowledging spirituality, increasing social trust, and reducing insecurity. I argue that spirituality unites the other two aspects of neighborliness by insisting that humanity is linked beneath its apparent differences and these connections carry the force of moral obligation.

The ideal of global neighborliness also requires reframing personal identity. Identity has to do with the cumulative ways we are named and known, by others and our selves. Aspects of identity may be relatively stable or fluid, depending on context (Heidegger 1969; Baumeister 1986; Castells 1997). Globalization influences identity formation. It is a problem for identity because dominant political culture (e.g., democracy) is grounded on notions that do not convey everything relevant to its formation. Religion, gender and culture are important. Three models for forming personal identity misinterpret each other when thrown together in a global context. The Kantian Man, the Post-modern Woman and Dyadic Members constitute legitimate ways to form personal identity but create tension for one another due to their unique attributes. Yet a connection among them could ground motivation to be good global neighbors and promote social trust—a connection I call an *economics of happiness*. (Bourdieu 1998: 40) Through analyzing identity-forming patterns we see the roles that spirituality, social trust and happiness play in global civility.

Identity is a function of memory. Personally and collectively, we are what we remember and we lose touch with what we forget. An identity model for global neighbors is a problem since it is under construction, not held in memory. Its construction depends on what we recall of human history. In general, neighborliness is at the core of what is durable and endurable in human experience. As a moral ideal, global neighborliness allows for a horizon of meaning, i.e., "a picture of what a better or higher mode of life would be, where 'better' or 'higher' are defined not in terms of what we happen to desire or need, but…a standard of what we ought to desire" (Taylor 16). Being a global neighbor is desirable if long term survival depends on sustainable development for a small globe. Like any moral ideal, neighborliness limits what individuals get—limits that are central to moral obligation. Questions raised about what people can and cannot legitimately get from life are informed by a moral ideal that limits the legitimacy of some of the effects of globalization.

Let us consider one of these effects. Globalization has at least two semantic categories to which it belongs—it is an idea and an activity—categories that reinforce one another. First, globalization is a "myth in the strong sense of the word, a powerful discourse, an *idée force*, an idea [that] has social force, which obtains belief." (Bourdieu 1998: 34) As an activity, it has political, economic and cultural effects that compress space and time, reinforcing the sense of its inevitability to shape the future. In the bond between idea and activity, globalization is forceful: when some people act, others (even far away) are acted upon. Globalization produces effects that appear to enhance human agency for some and reduce it for others. Moral significance is revealed in the effects of passivity, which diminishes personal value in terms of self-respect and respect for others. In contrast to passivity (feeling helpless in the face of insurmountable odds), and the insecurity it engenders, neighborliness aims at human flourishing by meeting individual and collective social needs simultaneously. Neighborliness is based on a conviction that personal interests overlap communal interests and enhance human agency.

Zygmunt Bauman (1999: 156-67) points to an *agency gap* in the dominant global economic pattern. He suggests that globalization rides above human agency, on its own steam, so to speak. To him, human agency is the capacity to make collectively binding choices and carry them out. He focuses on dimensions of passivity in global relationships and argues that the more consistently the pattern of liberalization, deregulation and capital fluidity is applied, the less that power remains in the hands of the agency that promotes it. To him, with the influx and increase of globalizing effects there is a decrease in human agency for those with diminished resources. It is difficult for the disadvantaged to forge social issues into effective collective action against the energy and drive of globalization (Bauman 161-162) due to its pervasiveness as a strong myth. To Bauman, if globalization is a generalized activity, given its effects, it is hard to exercise human agency at all. Globalizing effects get out of hand for those who initiate them as well as for those affected by them in local contexts. Agency becomes more delusion than reality.

Without human agency we cannot build a civil global society. As an ideal, neighborliness depends on human agency. A global civil society would be one in which neighborhoods crossed ethnic, racial, economic, gendered, religious and secular lines. Conflict is inevitable but relieved by moral obligation to address passivity and the social insecurity that passivity creates. I argue throughout that global civility depends on being good neighbors. Neighborliness creates certain obligations that must apply everywhere to flourish anywhere on the globe. To construct an ideal of global neighborliness, I first recall identity-patterns that inform its future, the Kantian Man, Modern Woman and Dyadic Member. Then I will relate spirituality, social trust and economic happiness in the nexus of global civility's sense of obligation.

Kantian Man and Moral Obligation

Globalization is a shift in perception of proximity among peoples in the world and shapes moral obligation. The idea that earth's citizens are connected is congruent with Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804) moral framework. He thought that "obligation applies to all of us since the earth is round and connected. As a consequence, every part of the earth affects other parts and people cannot escape these effects without leaving the face of the earth" (Kant 1996: 50). To ground moral obligation, Kant made a model for humanity focused on male heads of households. To him, mankind [sic] has a duty to himself on the basis of the humanity within him *as a sensible being* and *as a free being*. He shaped our idea of humanity. His view is central to psychological, philosophical, educational and moral thought, particularly with respect to moral development and justice.

For example, Lawrence Kohlberg's (Henry 2001; Walsh 2000)[2] six-staged moral development theory can be traced back to Kant. For Kohlberg, human development matures through six stages organized according to three headings: pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional. His theory takes justice as its pivot point; it is an *ethics of justice*, following John Rawls's work, *A Theory of Justice* (1971), which was based on Kant. The veil of ignorance, (Rawls 136-142) on which justice is grounded, intimates a connection with *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, in which Kant proposed that we "[a]ssume a human being who honors the moral law, and who allows himself [sic] to think (as he can hardly avoid doing) what sort of world he would create, were this in his power, under the guidance of practical reason—a world within which he would place himself as a member….he might see himself in danger of forfeiting much in the way of personal happiness…[but]…would thus feel himself compelled by reason to acknowledge this judgement with complete impartiality…(Kant 1998: 35).

Feminist theory took up the image of a veil of ignorance, behind which reasonable people stand to create fairness for all. Susan Moller Okin (1982) offered insight on fairness by arguing that if those standing behind the veil of ignorance do not know if they are male or female, following Rawls, injustices associated with gender discrimination would disappear. That is, by extending the conditions set out by Rawls to women, civil personality is altered to include them, something that Rawls himself did not do and Kant did not allow.

Carol Gilligan (1982) established *an ethics of care* and argued that Kant's model for a modern human being does not fit the moral framework that women normally construct.[3] Women as a social category (have been or) are linked to responsibilities that inhere in being a *modern* female and focus the obligations modern women *felt*. Those who analyze the third model, Dyadic Member, say that Kohlberg did not accurately describe how moral obligation is constituted for them, i.e., people who grow up in strong group or oral cultures. (Bellous, 2000) Modern Women and Dyadic Members establish connectedness on the empathy and solidarity characteristic of their own *felt* sense of obligation.[4]

Care and justice are inherent in global civility. Harmonious relations between justice and care are preserved and prized in a *felt* sense of neighborly obligation. But Gilligan's implication for the lack of fit between women and the Kantian Man remains. We have a conundrum. The Kantian Man is ideal for individualism but disallows to some people the right to exercise civil personality and does not fit all human experience. To make this point, I examine the Kantian Man, Post-modern Woman and Dyadic Member for insights into global civility, before going on to explore spirituality, social trust and happiness as three strands in global neighborly obligation.

Kant divided obligation into the doctrine of right (external constraint) and the doctrine of virtue (internal constraint). When we act in accordance with external constraint *we act lawfully*. An action grounded on self-constraint is virtuous because these duties interface with inner freedom, and we *act virtuously*. Kant said immaturity is "the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another", expressed in his

slogan: "Have courage to use your own understanding" (Reiss, 1991: 54). On this view, adults are mature agents when they develop their capacity to act on their own volition. This assumption is so pervasive in the West that when we see people act we assume they act voluntarily. (Bellous 1998: 149-177)

Virtue and neighborliness depend on internal constraint. The doctrine of virtue requires that we give ourselves maxims to direct our actions on the basis of duty, for the sake of duty. A maxim is a principle of action that a reasonable person takes on and tries out, and applying reason, uses as a justifiable guide for life. Unlike rules, maxims require an understanding of virtue. Ethics requires people to think, reason and judge what they *will* do. Legal constraint is brought to bear on those who refuse to act as good neighbors. To be a good neighbor is to act in a particular manner toward others even when one is not legally bound to do so. Looking after a neighbor's garden while she is on holiday, which she does for you, is outside the borders of legal constraint, just as looking out for her children when they are on the street alone is virtuous. Virtuous moral obligation contributes to neighborliness but raises the question of how we acquire and assess our maxims. Neighborly virtue is summed up in the categorical imperative: "So act that the maxim of your action could become a universal law." (Kant, 1996: 154) If Kant's theory actually applies to human experience (which he did not think was automatic) universal laws would be few but deep-going.

His categorical imperative shaped individualism. Kant thought of practical moral reason as the way to orient thinking, much like we use a subjective sense of right and left-handedness to orient ourselves in a dark room or at night. He also said reason had limits established by reason's own needs. He identified reason's own need for one single object to orient itself, an object which he thought must be unlimited and of the highest independent good (Kant 1998:8). Only with the presupposed existence of such a Being could reason operate. That object was God. Kant constructed moral obligation on the bases of duty to oneself and God's existence. The spiritual implications of God's existence permit pure reason to flourish on its own terms as long as it does not forget its inherent needs. Hence, an individual was *not* free to pursue his own thinking wherever it might lead, an option he specifically rejected; extreme freedom destroys reason due to the violation of its own laws, i.e., needs. (Kant 1998:14) If reason prizes extreme freedom, a *felt* sense of obligation to human community is lost.

To Kant obligation was communal and personal. We have a personal duty to our selves to act in accord with the value of humanity that is within us. Our duty to our selves is just like the duty we have to others. Although Kant does not say it this way, he was aware of the privilege we attach to our own perspective. We know our selves better than we know any one else, although less well than we like to think (Kant, 1996: 155). For the most part, we make sense to our selves. We know what would make us happy. Other people are less easy to grasp.

To link personal and communal obligation, Kant (1996: 150ff) set out two virtuous ends that are also duties: duties to one's own perfection and to the happiness of others. Perfection refers to cultivating our faculties (or natural predispositions) and cultivating our wills (moral cast of mind) so as to satisfy all the requirements of duty. Someone else's perfection cannot be my duty; someone else's perfection is an end that person must set as her or his own. The overall aim of these two ends is that we must become worthy of the humanity that dwells within us in terms of moral feeling, or cultivation of the will towards duty. Happiness refers to the desire that everything should always go the way we would like it to—a continuous enjoyment of life, complete satisfaction with one's condition. Perfection and happiness are not interchangeable: we do not have a duty to our own happiness nor to the perfection of others. Happiness is an end for every human being. Personal happiness is not a duty; it can be assumed as something individuals will pursue.

There are boundaries around the pursuit of personal happiness. Happiness is satisfaction with one's state

or holistic situation. When I am committed to the happiness of others as a duty, I am committed to their (permitted) ends that I thus make my own end as well. It is for the other person "to decide what they count as belonging to their happiness; but it is open to me to refuse them many things that *they* think will make them happy but that I do not, as long as they have no right to demand them from me as what is theirs" (Kant, 1996: 151). The strength of Kant's Man is a capacity for authenticity and agency. As an active citizen of the state his obligations to others are harmonious with agency and authenticity through an ideal of duty, self-imposed. He enjoyed the benefits and accepted the responsibility of civil personality, i.e., as one who did not need to be represented by another where rights are concerned. Passive citizens required someone else to represent their rights. Active citizens voted on their own behalf and on behalf of all passive citizens who lacked civil personality. Passive citizens included, for example, apprentices, servants, minors *and all women*. All passive citizens were "mere underlings of the commonwealth because they [had] to be under the direction or protection of other individuals, and so [did] not possess civil independence" (Kant, 1996: 91-92).

Dependence on others was in no way to be opposed to their freedom and equality *as human beings*, but they could not vote. That is, active citizens had the freedom and equality that went along with being human and the voting rights that went along with having civil personality. Passive citizens had the freedom and equality that went along with being human. Feminists insist that the personal is political. Passive citizenship demeans humanity. Kant himself insisted on using one's own understanding as a hallmark of mature humanity. In short, the modern woman remained childish when modelled on the Kantian Man. While Kant connects personal and communal moral obligation, passivity inheres in modern female identity. Post-modern women continue to struggle for acknowledgement of their civil personality and to receive the social attention that should go along with it (Derber 2000).

In terms of a *felt* sense of obligation, Kant proposed an internal judge as conscience: "an ideal person that reason creates for itself" (Kant 1996: 189-190). With help from the ideal man, one is capable of independence, self-awareness, self-consciousness, self-control, personal responsibility, critical distance from the self and autonomy. He linked personal identity to communal obligation. A sense of honor develops within a virtuous individual due to his moral endowment, composed of the following elements: "moral feeling, conscience, love of one's neighbor, and respect for oneself (self-esteem);" we have no obligation to have these aspects of morality, rather "these subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty" ground our capacity to be put under moral obligation at all. (Kant 1996: 159)

In summary, individual identity is located in an internal, individuated space bounded by a psychophysical entity—a mind/body. Interior living space in a psychophysical entity provides room for the personal identity formation of an individual. (See appendix #1) Inwardly, an individual experiences his own mind/memories and body. For an individual, I implies I only. As a consequence, he is his own witness and judge. He asks himself the question: Who Am I? Identity is shaped through the conversation he has with himself in response to this modern identity question. Motivation for asking the question and for acting virtuously eventually comes from a learned sense of honor (Kant 1996:175) not from fear of punishment.

Twentieth century influences took over the Kantian Man. Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) posed the problem being civil presents to humanity and said that aggressive tendencies in human beings make loving one's neighbor impossible. (Freud 1969: 45-53; 79ff) The modern world was conceived as competition between equally active moral agents with secure civil personality. If material resources are scarce, competition is unfriendly and potentially hostile. Not only does globalization beg the question of Female and Dyadic Member loss of civil personality, but also there was twentieth century conflict between Kant's and Freud's views on neighborliness. A motivation Kant assumed as part of civility, Freud rejected outright. In light of this loss, we

need to retrieve spiritual bases for being neighborly. Spirituality contributes to an emerging conception of neighborliness by placing a duty to be good neighbors in a framework of ultimate human concerns, based on underlying connections assumed to exist between human beings. Female and Dyadic Member insights contribute to perceiving the benefits of human connection and the *felt* sense of obligation that arises from them.

Post-modern Women and Moral Obligation

For modern women, a *felt* sense of obligation had its origins in the onset of modernity. Mary Wollstonecraft constructed femaleness on aspects of the French Revolution. (Flexner 1972; Todd, 1993) For her, being female was essentially, though not simplistically, summed up in the relation between a husband and wife who formed a household. Wollstonecraft wanted rights and education for women so they would be good marriage partners and hold the household together. But modern womanhood came under pressure from the ideal of a Kantian Man. Authenticity attracted women. They rejected civic passivity and realized that the well-being of a household required them to gain access to public life and the vote. Their rebellion grew out of the illogic of denying them civil personality but leaving them to raise sons who would enjoy it eventually.

To understand authenticity is to see that rationally autonomous subjects can step back from a particular project and question whether to continue pursuing it, since no end is exempt from possible revision of the self. Evidence of inner liberty is the freedom to follow thinking wherever it might lead, a secular option Kant rejected by saying reason's own need is dependent on God's existence (Kant 1998: 3-14). A secular individual, who feels little obligation to them, may revise projects, commitments, associations and goals in the light of new evidence (Kymlicka 9-20). I want to distinguish the intellectual freedom to change one's mind from physical and emotional freedom to leave projects, associations and commitments. Freedom of the mind is not the same as freedom of the heart, yet both types of freedom characterize the authentic individual. The possibility of walking away from projects puts strain on the possibility of relationship.

To do so, I will provide a brief summary to show that *modern* no longer describes female experience. *Post*-modern refers to Western white heterosexual women. I am not here describing women from other cultures. Although white Western women are no longer modern, it is not clear what female identity signifies. As mentioned, identity is about how we are named and known: we are named and known by others before we name and know ourselves. Identity is not passively received: infants interact with ways they are named and known and contribute powerfully to their own subjectivity. (Stern 1985) Yet the pressure of being named and known leaves on identity the trace of common human patterns as well as the imprint of the personal. While gender is not the only way in which we are named and known, it is first. (Miller and Scholnick 1-28).

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) also drew a design for modern women. In two novels *Emile* (which Kant read repeatedly) and *Eloisa*, Rousseau depicted a domestic world based on his creation of a new Adam and a new Eve. He thought that if men and women were romantically joined in a private household that linked female material and relational dependence to male sexual satisfaction, public life would hold together because families would produce good citizens. The modern woman was the companion of an autonomous rational male head of a household. She was insufficient without such a husband. All work was genderized, i.e., assigned on personal, social, cultural, political, economic and sexual roles. In the household, it was up to her to feel and left for him to think. Domestic duty, economic dependence and passive citizenship shaped modern femaleness. Women worked in a household that for them was neither public nor private but that conflated the two, leaving them without a room of their *own (Bellous 2002).*

Empathy and solidarity among modern women was grounded on an identity that was largely undifferenti-

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ated. Women's work was uniform. They did unpaid domestic labor that ensured their economic dependence. Daughters learned from their mothers how to be submissive females; solidarity extended over a woman's life span. That is, modern women were girls, mothers and grandmothers but always dependent. They made sense of each other's lives and understood one another—whether or not they got along. (Chesler 2001) During the twentieth century, homemaking was expanded and professionalized, leaving behind the modern apprenticeship model for learning that characterized how mothers taught daughters to cook, clean and care for a family. The housebound relationship between modern mothers and daughters was altered and empathy and solidarity among women was weakened. In the nature of women's work as it relates to the body we can identify the tension between modern and *post*-modern women.

For modern female labor, i.e., the vast work of reproduction, constitutes an "economy of practices" (Bourdieu 1983: 242) that sustains and supports other forms of capital accumulation. Since the "social world is accumulated history," the embodied living labor of modern women takes time to accumulate within those in her care and produces profits of various kinds. It is a living labor that has a tendency to expand itself and "persist in its being"; as a form of social energy, it is inscribed in the objectivity of things, as a result of which everything is not equally possible or impossible (Bourdieu 1983: 242-243) because it lives in memory. If the social world were not an accumulated history, banked in human being, life could be construed as a game of perfect equality of opportunity, like a game of Roulette, in which every moment is perfectly independent of each previous one, such that at each moment anyone could become anything. (Bourdieu 1983: 242) The critical point for redesigning global civility is not that modern work constrained women's options; rather, they could not play Roulette with other people's lives.

On the basis of their work and on the strength of being female, empathy and solidarity united women. Obligations that seemed obvious were built out of a deep sense of connection to family, enforced through economic dependence. A good white Western woman was submissive and weak—an obligation that went along with economic dependence and pleasing men—a modern female pattern that had another important dimension. The internal living space for women was constructed differently from that of the Kantian Man. Women have the capacity for giving birth. Whether or not women actually bear children, being female has this potential.

Within the modern economically-dependent woman are two human beings, one potential and one actual life. (See Appendix #2) The potential to birth another life integrated modern female identity and value. The inner world of femaleness housed one adult and potential *others*. It is in this context that the abortion issue is to be understood. Abortion is an identity issue as well as a moral and economic one. Researchers from the 1980s onwards noted that women tend to work out moral obligation and identity in terms of connection and empathy and seem not to follow the moral pattern that Kohlberg described. (Gilligan 1982) They tend to govern their behavior by taking particular account of the others they are with even to their own detriment. (Pipher 1994) This aspect of being female is not necessarily associated with actually bearing children. Feeling drawn toward life-sustaining obligations to others, who are integrally linked to the self, is an aspect of being a modern female. It is impossible to conclude that this sense of obligation emerges only as a result of socialization. Neither am I making an essentialist argument; I am not sure what that would entail. Yet being a home for others is within a modern woman's view of her self; the potential to give birth is at the core of her perspective on the world and her *felt* obligations to it.

The inescapable internal living space to accommodate more than her self, and an attendant sense of obligation, formulated on dependency, moved *post*-modern women to recalculate the costs of being female. (See appendix #2) Heterosexual Western white women face two options that can appear to be in conflict:

pursue authenticity and uniqueness as human persons or else discover the limits and blessing of being mothers and wives. That is, either become a Kantian Man or be his wife/mother. The first path, an attempt women make to ape a Kantian Man, cripples them as far as they are inescapably female. Being Man or Mother is a false dichotomy but few see how to move beyond it creatively. It is a tension between the head and the heart, between choosing a career and having a family that has not been resolved. Even at this point, work places tend to assume there is someone at home full time caring for the young children of workers. The result is that moral and social obligations for women appear more complex and connected to other people's lives than is true for the Kantian Man.

Women have officially gained civil personality and rights and responsibilities that inhere in it. With the end of the modern woman, which is essentially the end of economic dependence of wives on their husbands, women are unsure of what it means to be female. Perhaps the tension *post*-women feel can be relieved with time since those who want to found a household with a partner have enough time for career and family given the longevity so many Western women enjoy. But reproductive labor must be acknowledged as valuable; political and personal passivity must be named and refused—a refusal that can be realized only if women perceive their future as hopeful.

What added value do *post*-modern women bring to the formation of global civil citizens? Women contribute a developed capacity for maintaining connection, empathy and solidarity. Feminist theories of moral development emphasize metaphors of friendship, conversation, apprenticeship and narrative (Miller and Scholnick 2000: 34-42) in which the primary aim is to sustain human solidarity. The motivation for moral obligation is the care and connection women feel for children, husbands, extended family and the neighborhoods in which they want their children to grow up and flourish. Under the current conditions, that neighborhood is the whole earth. In addition, modern women offer reproductive work that establishes and maintains human connections—they spend time and energy holding the social world together—at work and at home. But if adult life is modeled on a Roulette game played by those who are solitary and free it is difficult to prize women's work. It is hard to value their *felt* obligation for those around them if women themselves are misunderstood and perceived as weak or mistaken about personal identity *per se*. As yet, globalizing strategies do not typically include women's ways of forming identity in the discussion of global civility. Their inclusion helps realize human maturity among global citizens, due to insights women have about holding a neighborhood together for its own good. Western white women are not alone in knowing how to embrace the social world.

Dyadic Members and Moral Obligation

When compared with the modern female, the Kantian Man shows up as radically self-contained, which is thought to indicate his moral and personal maturity and strength, though I do not say he is the same as a solitary, extremely free individual. In other cultures, the family in oral or strong group cultures produces a different identity. If the basic unit of social analysis for the Kantian Man is the solitary individual, the basic unit of social analysis for strong group or oral cultures is the Dyadic Member. That is, within strong groups or oral cultures (Bellous 2000) the basic human unit is more than one. Dyadic Members are connected to a social unit that forms personal identity within a context of others that are essential to that identity, primarily the family. Dyadic Members are embedded in "an undifferentiated family ego mass" (Malina 1992:73). This relationship among significant others is caught in the expression, "You are because we are" and "It takes a village to raise a child," expressions that are not mere slogans but constitute social reality. As a result, Dyadic Members continuously need others to know who they are—which is not a form of identity weakness although it may seem so from an

individualistic perspective.

Additionally, Dyadic Members, even though they are single beings and unique in that singularity, are conscious that "I" always implies a "We" that is inclusive of the "I" and they know that their singular communications and interactions always involve that "We". Identity is formed through internalizing the family view and making it personal, a project held to be necessary to being fully human. For Dyadic Members, to be human is to live out the group expectation personally. Family loyalty is strong and the family system is hierarchical: the wife is submissive to her husband and children are submissive to parents, particularly the father. In general, family loyalty is loyalty to the father and also loyalty to the whole group. Misbehaviour shames the entire group. (Pilch 1993: 101-113)

Even though Dyadic Members experience themselves as whole in relation to others, "their total self awareness empathetically depends on this group embeddedness" (Malina 1991: 74). Due to shared experience and common narratives they build empathy and solidarity to ground moral obligation. The focus for forming member identity is not on personal ego but is directed towards the demands and expectations of those that bestow or withhold social honour. Dyadic Members live in cultures that are drawn on the lines of exchanges of social honour. Honour shapes reputation and prestige so that social power is exercised through the granting or withholding of social honour. The group's perception is central to their ability to live well in society: without the group, a member ceases to be. Dyadic Members form a large part of the world's population. To compare, the Kantian Man asks himself: "Who Am I?" The question helps to focus and form personal identity. The Dyadic Member asks the group: "Who do you say that I am?" That question helps to focus and form a personal yet corporate identity. Dyadic Members make sense of others by cooperating socially. Individuals make sense of others by reflecting internally. Although identity for Dyadic Members is constituted sociologically, the Kantian Man is constituted psychologically.

With reference to moral obligation, conscience is constructed differently within individuals and Dyadic Members. For Dyadic Members the group bestows personal value. For them, Kant's instruction to use individual understanding as a guide to ethical behaviour is not understood. Dyadic personality "involves [a] general lack of personal inhibition in favour of strong social inhibition" (Malina and Neyrey 1991: 80). Other members are witness and judge of a member's social and moral success. Conscience is sensitivity to a public member-image with the purpose of striving to align personal behaviour and self-assessment with that image; it implies relatedness. Conscience internalizes things others say about, do to, and think about members. The Kantian conscience is a psychological construct *inside* as a personal voice (an ideal inner man) moved by autonomy and self-control. His moral point is to distinguish his own voice from the talk of other people. In order for moral success to be secured, what is within must be contiguous with outward patterns of acting; action is carried out in a materially scarce, hostile and competitive world. Individuals live within themselves and Dyadic Members live in common with others. Moral identity in Dyadic Members is experienced through the bonds of attachment that link them together in a relationally generous, interdependent world.

Western white women appear to have much in common with Dyadic Members, despite their differences. But Western women also fit aspects of individualism, or at least, hold individualistic aspirations. *Post*-modern women are caught between two ways of being—one sociological and one psychological. A feeling of 'caught-betweenness', a forceful pull in two contrary directions, is characteristic of oppressed groups. In both individualistic and dyadic societies, women are constituted as a group through practices of exclusion. In both models, maleness is understood in terms of the exclusion of femaleness. As a result, women constitute a group that is discordant with a public world based on maleness. Women and minorities seem uneasy in public space. People who feel they do not fit in a given context appear insecure to those who fit easily—but they are *made more*

insecure if the milieu is hostile to the way they perceive the world as a whole. The skills for relatedness and interdependence, so essential to global civility, develop by paying attention to common aspects of the spirituality of humankind.

Spiritually Grounded Obligation

The compelling force of obligation lies among its ties to survival. What compels also limits extreme freedom. Extreme human freedom is like extreme sport: players may or may not have a cohort or an audience, but have no need at all for a team. In contrast, spirituality insists that humanity is deeply connected—we are a team whether or not we play together well. Long-term survival depends on acknowledging connections that make life bearable for everyone. It is sometimes said women are more spiritual than men. I argue that the pattern of spirituality is a dimension of human being as such. Women are not more spiritual but historically at least, more aware of connectedness and perhaps easier to obligate. Obligations came with tiny, endearing faces and hungry mouths. If love weakened, financial dependence strengthened their *felt* sense of obligation.

Spirituality research agrees to a core assumption of the connectedness of all life but there is tension with regard to its other aspects due to its associations with religion and secularism. On one hand, spiritual awareness relies on symbolic expression of the kind often conveyed through religious language and ritual. Yet they are not identical. On the other hand, spirituality is an unwavering confidence in the connectedness of all life and cannot endure secularism that asserts itself in extreme freedom. Also, spirituality is jeopardized in cultures that privilege materialism. If spirituality is a dimension of human life, its expression must transcend religions and include secular experience in its purview. This is what its research shows, but spirituality cannot embrace extreme freedom, a feature of secularism that may thrive inside religious communities as much as outside of them.

Spirituality has biological (Hardy 1966) and psychological roots in human experience (James 1974; Hay/ Nye 1998), best conceived as "relational consciousness" (Hay/Nye 1998: 112-114). Relational consciousness emphasizes the core assumption of human connectedness and picks out two patterns of raised consciousness that emerge when people converse about their experience. Spiritual consciousness is 'raised' because it is an unusual level of awareness and because it is lifted above purely individual concerns. It is intense awareness: it is a sense of being objectively aware of one's self as subject, i.e., aware of one's awareness, and also aware of a reality as "a feeling of objective presence, a perception of… 'something there', more deep and more general than any of the [senses that] psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed" (James 73) and experienced as a direct apprehension of that reality (James 1974: 78). Those who have religious affiliations and those who have none feel this perception. (Hay/Nye 1998: 103) In addition to reflexive awareness, a person who speaks about spiritual matters lifts his or her vision above the myopia of individual concern. Spiritual awareness is far-sighted. For the non-religious and religious, it is a personal response "to the whole nature of things, it is systematic and reflective, and it loyally binds [a person] to certain inner ideals" (James 1974: 104).

Its relational aspect bridges objective and subjective experience; an intermediate 'space' between personal and material worlds, it is accessible from birth (Stern 1982). In the space between inner and outer reality, illusions form and meaning is created. This third site, neither the self nor the world but influenced by both, is the genesis of the spiritual aspect of human life. The spiritual is a mid-point reality between subjective and objective realities. Objects form here as a child experiences the self and the world and influence ongoing perceptions of everything. This intermediate space is an area of experiencing, "to which inner reality and

external life both contribute," and which, in turn, acts back on one's perception and understanding of outer and inner reality. It is a stronghold created by the "perpetual human task of keeping inner and outer reality separate yet interrelated" (Winnicott 2). Spirituality integrates experience and forms embodied concepts people live by. Embodied, emotionally laden concepts may shift their shape with changes in experience or are built up as fortresses against change. Reflecting on new experience is spiritual work that can be repressed; its personal repression is strongly influenced by culture that places no value on spirituality (Hay/Nye 1998: 151).

Spirituality forms illusions but an illusion is not something false. Illusion is not delusion. All art, science and religion depend on illusion for their existence. Illusion is the bedrock of learning, since all learning is organizing experience. In this intermediate space, organizing happens. Illusions are not false so much as idiosyncratic and useful organizing principles for ordinary living. Throughout life, we are called upon to test the world and our selves on the basis of concepts formed early. Concepts that flourish in the intermediate space between the self and the world are called "transitional phenomena" (Winnicott 1971: 4), transitional objects of perception. They (image plus idea) are the stuff of thinking; they are experience-rich and assumption-laden. These rich, laden concepts influence perception in terms of one's relation to God, other people, the world and the self, for example, in the value we attribute to other people's lives.

Spirituality forms identity in its quality of being holistically conceived and made up of insight, values and beliefs to give meaning, direction and purpose to life, including attitudes, emotions and behavioral dispositions that inform and are informed by lived experience. Its cognitive aspect constitutes a framework of ideals, beliefs and values about the self, others and the world as a whole. These may inform but do not determine action. People choose whether to act according to spiritual values. Spirituality is a dimension of identity formation that helps to sense how we are related to more than material realities. It motivates neighborliness the moment we recognize our own humanity in others and sense that losses of humanity for them are losses of humanity for us and a loss for the world.

People are more than material realities. Human beings experience something in them 'that expresses and carries the continuity of living personhood', a sense of a 'real me' that lies behind the accumulation of events that constitutes each life from beginning to end, an entity that has been called a soul (Polkinghorne 2002: 105). Because of its spiritual core, humanity has spiritual needs to celebrate, to mark significant moments, to bear witness to truths learned about life, to tell their story, to grieve, to mourn, to lament, to connect with the past, to make significant journeys, to express themselves symbolically, to seek purpose and meaning, to ask ultimate questions, to survive and to flourish, to experience longing and enjoy its satisfaction, to cope with life circumstances, to be seen, to be heard, to have a name, to be part of a larger community, to organize experience meaningfully so as to make sense of it, to maintain human dignity and to see the future as hopeful.

To live in a social world that disregards spiritual need is to be cast aside, neglected; it is to be profoundly unhappy and to lose hope. Hope is the crowning attribute of a positive spiritual disposition. Hope is foundational to the courage required for human agency. Hope is neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Hope is realistic. Optimism assumes that everything is possible and burns out by trying to do *everything*. Pessimism assumes that nothing is possible and rusts out by trying *nothing*. Hope is cautious enough to believe that some things are possible but is aware that life is complex. Hope sets out to discover what is possible and tries to succeed at *something*. If we consciously acknowledge spiritual human needs, and have the courage to be hopeful, we are compelled to consider an *economics of happiness* as a motivating ideal for global civility. The groundwork of an economics of happiness offers support for building and maintaining social trust. Trust is based on hope.

In summary, religion and spirituality are not the same but overlap. Religion is public and corporate; spirituality is its private, personal side. Religious identity derives from a cosmos that is held together by God.

Ethical obligation follows from God's Parenthood and God's activity as Creator and Sustainer of the order of things. Spirituality is a felt link to others and the world and senses there is more to life than its material. These *felt* connections ground moral obligation. Spiritual concerns do not negate the freedom to be secular. Secular and religious people could agree on essential values for personal and communal obligations, e.g., ecological obligations to care for the earth we depend on for survival, a human collaboration that also requires a developed capacity to build and maintain social capital or trust. But spirituality denies anyone extreme freedom; obligation must be *felt* as binding. A decrease of social trust and growth of insecurity evidence the loss of spiritual vitality and an increase of extreme freedom in the West.

The Politics of Insecurity

In a context that loses its spiritual vitality, is neighborliness a self-evident obligation? Freud did not think so. In *Civilization and its Discontents*, he proposed that neighborly affection was ill advised, if not odd. He based his view on two main objections to neighborliness. First he objected that love which does not discriminate seems to forfeit a part of its own value by doing an injustice to the object of its affection. His second objection to neighborliness is that not everyone is worthy of love, (Freud 1969: 39) a point directly related to his first objection. He grounded an argument against neighborliness on the premises that his love was valuable to him and he should not throw it away without reflection. Since love imposes duties upon him for whose fulfillment he must make sacrifices, if he loved someone, the other must deserve it in some way. Someone would deserve his love under the condition that "he is so like me in important ways that I can love myself in him" and he deserves my love "if he is so much more perfect than myself that I can love my ideal of my own self in him." (Freud 1969: 46)

Freud's focus on *eros* as a model for friendship strips away moral obligation and creates an un-neighborly world. It is a conceptual error to ground neighborliness on *eros*. My neighbor is not beholden to enhance the sense I have of my self. Friendliness is not even friendship, although it may lead to friendship. The call for compassion expressed toward a neighbor arises from the humanity within her not the particularity of her likeness to me or that she is more perfect than I am. To be a neighbor is not necessarily to be a friend; we are compassionate to strangers because we choose to live in a world that is trustful. In the last several decades in North America, such social trust declined. (Putnam 2000)

Social capital refers to the degree to which members of a community trust each other and engage in social relations based on that trust. Social trust arises as a *felt* connection, exercised in social networks, carried through norms of reciprocity and cooperation. Trustworthiness grows through these connections. Pierre Bourdieu observed that a network of connections is not a natural given, or even a social given, but the product of endless effort in investment strategies, individual or collective. They are consciously or unconsciously, aimed at maintaining social relationships or transforming contingent relationships, such as those of neighbors, colleagues or relatives into relationships that imply durable obligations. These in turn, are then subjectively *felt* in gratitude, respect, friendliness or friendship. In short, "the reproduction of social capital presupposes an unceasing effort of sociability, a continuous series of exchanges in which recognition is endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed" (Bourdieu 1983: 248-250). The embodied form of social capital is knowledge that 'knows how' to arrange for an increase in social trust and sets out to garner its increase. In general, women have been most active in establishing and perpetuating social trust (Putnam 2000: 93-99) and the collective and individual obligations that trust intimates for neighborliness.

The history of social capital has roots in neighborliness (Putnam 1993:124-125). At a time when force

and family were the only solutions to dilemmas of collective action elsewhere in Europe, citizens of Italian city-states devised a new way of organizing collective life. It was a richly religious time; religion was expressed in pious works and devotional exercises that lay associations carried out. Religion in this context united soul care with social care—that is, religion upheld spirituality. It was a time of unparalleled civic commitment. (Putnam 1993: 126-130) Rich networks of associational life constituted civic community and its pattern still does, since a "successful neighborhood is a place that keeps sufficiently abreast of its problems so it is not destroyed by them" (Jacobs 1992: 112). Although the United States enjoyed a high point of social capital a mere thirty years ago, by the end of the twentieth century its economy was healthy but the social fabric was weak (Putnam 2000: 25).

When social trust flourishes, self-interest is alive to the interests of others. To be confident in collective actions that potentially threaten immediate self-interest, neighbors assume that others will act collectively as well. Social agents operating for collective goods must care for the needs of all citizens, inside and outside the immediate family. Social capital is opposed to 'amoral familism,' which maximizes material, short-run advantage for nuclear families and assumes all others will do likewise, requiring everyone to survive on private family interests. Although civic-mindedness is not selfless, it regards the public domain as more than a battleground for the pursuit of personal and family interests. Neighbors do not 'ride for free', but see freedom as a result of their participation in the making and acting out of common decisions. They listen to one another and act on what they hear. Collective life is eased by the expectation that others will probably follow the rules. Knowing that others will, each person is more likely to do so, thus fulfilling the expectation. In civic regions, light-touch government is effortlessly stronger because it can count on more willing cooperation and self-enforcement among its citizenry: *citizens are happier.* (Putnam 1993: 115)

Bourdieu recommended an economics of happiness as a way to motivate civility. He opposed narrow, short-term economics to an economics of happiness that counts profits, individual and collective, material and symbolic, associated with activity (security), and the material and symbolic costs associated with inactivity or precarious employment. To Bourdieu, we cannot cheat the law of conservation of violence. All violence is paid for: structural violence exerted by financial markets in layoffs or loss of security is matched sooner or later in suicides, crime and delinquency, drug addiction, alcoholism, as well as a whole host of minor and major everyday acts of violence (Bourdieu 1998: 40). He analyzed the logic of insecurity further to say that:

> In the suffering of those excluded from work, in the wretchedness of the long-term unemployed, there is something more than there was in the past. The Anglo-American ideology, always somewhat sanctimonious, distinguished the 'undeserving poor,' who had brought it upon themselves, from the deserving poor, who were judged worthy of charity. Alongside or in place of this ethical justification there is now an intellectual justification. The poor are not just immoral, they are stupid, they lack intelligence. A large part of social suffering stems from the poverty of people's relationship to the educational system, which not only shapes social destinies but also the image they have of their destiny (which undoubtedly helps to explain what is called the passivity of the dominated [and] the difficulty in mobilizing them…) (Bourdieu 1998: 43). The insecurity Bourdieu describes is essentially a spiritual loss for those who suffer from it.

It is an effect of social insecurity to remove "social entitlements which are, whatever people say, among the highest achievements of civilization—achievements that ought to be universalized, extended to the whole planet, globalized, instead of using the pretext of globalization of the competition from economically and socially less advanced countries, in order to cast doubt on them" (Bourdieu 1998: 60). Social entitlements include the right to work, a health and welfare system, for which people have suffered and fought; important

and precious achievements, they do not only survive in museums, libraries and academies, but are living and active in people's lives and govern their everyday existence. (Bourdieu 1998: 61) A politics of insecurity generates anxiety, demoralization or conformism. Workers feel a profound sense of insecurity and confusion about themselves and their future; they form a disenchanted image of themselves and their group (Bourdieu 1998: 98). Their loss enervates hope and social trust and a sense of their connection to, and value in, the world as whole.

Bourdieu began to suspect that insecurity is the product not of an economic inevitability, identified with globalization, but of a political will. A flexible company in a sense deliberately exploits a situation of insecurity that it helps to reinforce; it seeks to reduce its costs, but also to make this lowering possible by putting workers in permanent danger of losing their jobs. The whole world of production, material and cultural, public and private, is carried along by a process of intensification of insecurity, for example through the de-territorialization of the company. The politics of insecurity, aimed at forcing workers into submission and their acceptance of exploitation is a mode of domination he believed was unprecedented, which he referred to as *flexploitation* (Bourdieu 1998: 84).

Resisting insecurity requires working together (charitably or militantly) against its destructive effects and redefining production time, reproduction time (carried out at home), rest and leisure (Bourdieu 1998: 86). He asked whether the suffering of insecurity could one day awaken and accomplish these aims. While he remained hopeful, he identified individuals who perceived themselves as 'solitary and free' and associated with dismantling institutional solidarities that prevent the social order from collapsing into chaos (Bourdieu 1998: 99-103). This 'new order' individual is not a Kantian Man held by moral obligation to consider the happiness of others; for all his solitariness, he was not free to do as his pleased.

An Ethics of Happiness

Bourdieu identified the old order as one that put confidence in reserves of social capital that protect the social order from falling into *anomie*, a capital which, if not reproduced, will inevitably run out, but which is far from exhaustion. He saw it as an order not governed by the pursuit of selfish interest and individual profit, that made room for those oriented towards a rational pursuit of collectively defined, approved ends, and the defense of public interest (Bourdieu 1998: 104)—the core of neighborly action. He clearly esteemed reproductive work and saw that all capital as an accumulation of labor in its materialized or embodied form, which modern women knew how to produce and sustain. Further, he made it clear that an accumulation of social trust requires collaborative know-how and the insight of strong-group knowledge.

If we seriously intend to educate global civility in the young so that they are able to be good neighbors, prizing the role women have in building cultural and social capital is a focus for hope in the future. In addition, global civility requires us to recognize that communal know-how is wise in its ability to hold together a neighborhood of friends, acquaintances, strangers and even enemies, as the example of post-Apartheid South Africa reveals. Spirituality contributes to the public good through its dispute with extreme freedom and its assertion of the connectedness of all life that expresses itself in a *felt* sense of obligation that limits self-interest. Neighborliness is constructed through empathetic conversations among people who understand reality differently but know their well-being depends on hearing differences that matter deeply to others.

It is not as if acknowledging spirituality will make us good neighbors; rather it reveals tendencies we have to work against the collective good even after articulating commitment to it. Establishing deep-going rules about social life does not guarantee they will be carried out—*establishing rules creates violations*. For

example, suppose in a work environment, all workers see that if anyone is offended by the action of another, they should speak to that person directly first rather than conveying their displeasure to other workers behind the back of the individual in question. Suppose, through conversation to adequately account for all their rational objections to doing so, they agree it is in their own and everyone's best interest to be forthright. Finally, they all publicly and freely agree to address their grievances in this way. Note that their agreement creates a violation. Now, if someone complains behind another's back, the offense is a public violation of a rationally agreed-upon course of action.

Without public agreement, there are no violations. Without a public sense of obligation, our only recourse is a private objection to injustice, which is weakened by its singularity. Public agreement is "a vehicle for responsible people to collectively imagine a public life they simultaneously know they would prefer and know they will, at times, fall short of"; public agreement "turns the straw of falling short into the gold of communal learning" (Kegan and Lahey 2001: 108-115). Violations of the public good are an inevitable part of social life that all human beings commit. Spiritual awareness recalls basic human needs and a *felt* sense of connection to one another. *A learned and remembered felt sense of obligation* treats violations appropriately and turns a violator's attention to core public agreements that encourage fairness. It requires an education to help people understand what an appropriate sense of obligation should feel like so they can learn to balance their own interests with those of others. For example, public agreement can be learned and practiced in classrooms comprised of good neighbors.

Public goods refer to the primary interests of all those living on an increasingly small globe, grounded on social trust that acknowledges spiritual needs. Good neighbors preserve the public good and are preserved by it. The world is not held together because we suddenly become good; it is held together *because we feel obligated to each other*. Human life is reasonably secure only when virtuous obligations prevail. The transformation of social practice takes place when important aspects of public life become the focus of our attention rather than giving in to the unreflective exercise of what seems easier to do. Being a good neighbor filters important issues about action, personally and communally, thus influencing the ongoing construction of identity. To consider what the human community has in reserve we can attend to contributions women make to a social world in which they are typically caught between individualism and membership. Perhaps an advantage of being caught between is the opportunity to see both sides.

The process of asking neighborly questions lies along the trajectory that Kant introduced, Rawls outlined and Okin elaborated. The point in examining three models for personal identity was to offer insight about the formation of a civility under the conditions of globalization, and to articulate patterns of identity that construct a *felt* sense of obligation to others and the world. Globalizing effects tend to privilege people that are extremely free in relation to the world and perceive capital accumulation in economic terms only. In the extremely free and economically driven, neighborliness is weak. The *felt* obligation of the Kantian model enables him to live from the inside by being 'distant and different'. Modern women and Dyadic Members learn empathy and solidarity that imbues their identity with shared narratives and common experience and creates a *felt* sense of obligation to be 'near and the same'.

From the Kantian Man we prize capacities such as those that develop and maintain personal difference, critical distance and uniqueness. From those who enjoy the know-how of community, we learn the competencies of social intimacy so as to be relationally near enough to let empathy ground human solidarity and our connections to the earth. In general, empathy is an intuitive act in which we give complete attention to someone else's experience so as to enable the other to realize that we both share and understand the essential quality of that experience. To be empathetic is to provide a safe haven for the particular experience of the other person and to release the other from feeling alone and strange.[5] Empathy nurtures solidarity, which in turn, supports an

economics of happiness. Social empathy is the work of making sense of how others organize their perceptions of the world so that we can express their views or experience in a way that *they* recognize and acknowledge as accurate.

For people in a global society empathy is hard relational work. To be a civil citizen is to be willing to be empathetic toward others who differ from us and to recognize our need for their empathetic interpretation of us in return. Global civility recognizes a responsibility to help build a spiritually-grounded, humane environment in order for the general population to flourish, and sets about seeing what can be done to bring that world into being. In short, global citizens understand the complexity of being 'near and different'. The spiritual longing to be well and happy, to count an ethics of happiness into the equations of capital accumulation, and to secure a good future for the world's children, is central to everyone's ultimate human concerns.

NOTES

[1] *I will use moral and ethical interchangeably.*

[2] *His stages are as follows: 1.* pre-conventional *that has two parts to it: stage one in which moral judgment is motivated by obedience and avoidance of punishment and stage two in which judgment is moved by individual, instrumental purpose and exchange; 2.* conventional *that has two parts to it: stage three in which moral judgment is motivated by mutual interpersonal expectations, and stage four in which it is moved by an effort to maintain the social system and conscience; and finally 3.* post-conventional *that has two stages: five which is based on social contract, and six in which moral judgment is motivated by universal ethical principles.*

[3] *It is important that Kohlberg acknowledged his theory of development admits of serious objections from Gilligan's feminist perspective as well as from Habermas's hermeneutical point of view (van der Ven, 185). For a summary of Kohlberg's moral theory, see for example, van der Ven, 184.*

[4] *I do not mean to imply that all women as a social category actually enjoy empathy and solidarity necessarily, although many women do, but they at least make some sense of one another, hence are not entirely mysterious.*

[5] *Joyce E Bellous, "Considering Empathy: Some Preliminary Definitions," on the* McMaster Journal of Theology and Ministry *http://www.mcmaster.ca/divinity*

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Kegan, R. and L. Lahey. *How the way we talk can change the way we work*. New York: Jossey-Bass,

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APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 2

Institute on Globalization and the HUMAN CONDITION

"Obligations of a Global Neighbor"

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