

Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas

Changes, Concepts and Cases

Tobias Debiel/Sascha Werthes
(Eds.)

INEF Report
80/2006



Institute for Development and Peace

NOTES ON THE EDITORS AND AUTHORS

Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, M.A. (Japanese Studies), Doctoral candidate at the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium.

E-Mail: elena.atanassova@arts.kuleuven.be

David Bosold, Dipl.-Pol., Speaker of the Working Group on Human Security at the University Marburg, AG HumSec, PhD candidate at the University of Marburg.

E-Mail: david.bosold@humansecurity.de

Tobias Debiel, Dr. sc. pol., Executive Director of the Institute for Development and Peace (Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden, INEF), University of Duisburg-Essen.

E-Mail: tobias.debiel@inef.uni-duisburg.de

Ruby Gropas, PhD, Research Fellow, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).

E-Mail: ruby@eliamep.gr

P. H. Liotta, MFA, PhD, Professor of Humanities at Salve Regina University and Executive Director of the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy in Newport, Rhode Island, USA.

E-Mail: peter.liotta@salve.edu

Taylor Owen, M.A., Doctoral candidate at Jesus College, Oxford University and Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Doctoral Scholar.

E-Mail: taylor.owen@jesus.ox.ac.uk

Sascha Werthes, Dipl.-Soz.-Wiss., Assistant Researcher at the INEF. Coordinator of the AG HumSec, PhD candidate at the Center for Conflict Studies, University Marburg.

E-Mail: sascha.werthes@humansecurity.de

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE:

Tobias Debiel/Sascha Werthes (Eds.): Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas: Changes, Concepts and Cases. Duisburg: Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen (INEF Report, 80/2006).



IMPRINT

Editor:

Institute for Development and Peace, INEF
at the University of Duisburg-Essen

Logo design: Carola Vogel

Layout design: Jeanette Schade, Sascha Werthes

Cover photo: Jochen Hippler

© Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden


Geibelstraße 41 D - 47057 Duisburg

Phone +49 (203) 379 4420 Fax +49 (203) 379 4425

E-Mail: inef@uni-duisburg.de,

Homepage: <http://www.inef.de>

ISSN 0941-4967



Tobias Debiel/Sascha Werthes
(Eds.)

Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas

Changes, Concepts and Cases

INEF Report 80/2006

Institute for Development and Peace
Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden (INEF)

University of Duisburg-Essen
Universität Duisburg-Essen



Abstract

Tobias Debiel/Sascha Werthes (eds.): *Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas: Changes, Concepts and Cases*. Duisburg: Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen (INEF Report, 80/2006).

When the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published its 1994 report, nobody expected that the human security concept outlined within it would attract so much attention from politicians and academics alike. This is all the more astonishing as the concept has provoked a lot of criticism ever since its first appearance due to its excoriated analytical ambiguity and its disputed political appropriateness.

One of the significant *changes* (see Debiel/Werthes) of human security concepts is that they put special emphasis on a horizontal and vertical extension. Thereby, new types of threats are taken into account with regard to a new referent object. Basically, all these *concepts* have in common that the object of security is not limited to the state but also includes the individual – no matter where he/she lives. Hence, these concepts implicitly emphasise that the various safety threats must be addressed through multilateral processes and by taking into account the patterns of interdependence that characterize the globalized world.

As if such an extraordinary extension would not be a big enough challenge for states and the international community as such, Debiel/Werthes and Werthes/Bosold (with regard to the members of the Human Security Network) point out how human security understood and accepted as a political leitmotif might have and might produce significant leverage on foreign policy agendas, as it might serve particular states and multilateral actors by fulfilling selected functions in the process of agenda-setting, decision-making and implementation. This might to a certain degree explain why different and ambiguous human security *concepts* despite criticism have gained so much attention especially in the political field.

The *case studies* by Atanassova-Cornelis, Gropas, and Liotta/Owen further exemplify these aforementioned ideas when illustrating human security on the Japanese foreign policy agenda, or when studying the link between human security and human rights, and even when comparing the European Human Security doctrine with the US National Security Strategy with regard to potentials and limits.

Content

Foreword	5
-----------------	----------

Sascha Werthes/Tobias Diebel

Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas: Introduction to Changes, Concepts and Cases	7
1. Changes: The Extension of the Security Agenda	8
2. Concepts: Human Security as Political Leitmotif	11
3. Cases: Human Security on Selected Foreign Policy Agendas	15
4. Conclusion	17

Sascha Werthes/David Bosold

Caught between Pretension and Substantiveness – Ambiguities of Human Security as a Political Leitmotif	21
1. Human Security as <i>Political Leitmotif</i> and Language Game	22
2. The Political Consequences of a Human Security Policy	23
3. Human Security, Ethics, and the National Interest	24
4. A Case in Study: The HSN's Agenda on Small Arms	28
5. Conclusion	31

Elena Atanassova-Cornelis

Defining and Implementing Human Security: The Case of Japan	39
1. Human Security within the Broader Debate on Security	40
2. Japan's Path to Human Security	41
3. Introducing Human Security	44
4. Substantiating and Implementing Human Security	47
5. Conclusion	49

Ruby Gropas

What Role for Human Rights in the European Security Strategy?	53
1. Setting the Backgrounds to Human Rights, Foreign Policy and Security	54
2. The Expanding Definition of Security	56
3. Human Security and Human Rights	57
4. A Secure Europe in a Better World	60
5. Concluding Remarks	65

P. H. Liotta/Taylor Owen

Europe Takes on Human Security	71
1. A Human Security Dilemma	72
2. Europe Incorporates Human Security	73
3. Unpacking Security Strategy: The European and U.S. Examples	76
4. The Intervention Dilemma	77
5. Moving to a Global Security Commitment	78

Foreword

The long awaited Human Security Report (October 2005), prepared under the leadership of Andrew Mack, or UN-Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Report "In larger Freedom: toward development, security and human rights for all" (March 2005) exemplify that human security is of great interest for foreign, security and development policy. Moreover, it has a great potential to offer for the scientific community.

It all began, more or less, with the 1994 Human Development Report. Over a decade ago, this UNDP Report basically encouraged international initiatives like the Human Security Network and the Commission on Human Security or the campaign leading to the 1997 Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines that popularized 'human security'. Human security is now a term frequently used in speeches and common to find on web pages of various foreign policy departments (e.g. Canada, Japan, Norway, Switzerland) and research institutes. However, even though "'human security' has entered the lexicon of international politics, the concept nonetheless remains highly controversial" (Hampson 2002: v).

This report summarizes spirited debates on human security with regard to its impact on foreign policy agendas and its practical implications for activities in the policy fields of human development, human rights, and even humanitarian interventions which mainly took place at a panel at the *3rd European Consortium for Political Research Conference* in Budapest, September 2005. Originally initiated by the Standing Working Group on Human Security (AG Hum-Sec) at the University of Marburg, the panel "Human Security and/on Foreign Policy Agendas – Theoretical and Practical Implication" was jointly organised with the Institute for Development and Peace (INEF), which runs a project on "Human Security in Theory and Practice" (<http://inef.uni-duisburg.de/page/projekt.php?lang=en>).

The papers presented here hopefully offer the curious reader an interesting and challenging new way of looking at what constitute the main threats to peace and security and how different actors try to respond to it when emphasising 'human security'. Moreover, the papers explore the strength and weakness of human security as a political leitmotif when becoming an organizing principle for foreign policy departments. We were fortunate and privileged to be able to gather an interesting group of international experts: *Elena Atanassova-Cornelis* (University of Leuven), *David Bosold* (University of Marburg), *Ruby Gropas* (Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, ELIAMEP), *P. H. Liotta* (Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy, Newport), *Taylor Owen* (Oxford University).

Finally, we like to thank all the paper givers and various contributors in the discussions at the conference in Budapest, as well as the participants of the INEF research colloquiums and the members of the project group for their interesting and helpful feedback.

— *Dr. Tobias Debiel* and *Sascha Werthes*

Duisburg, February 2006

Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas: Introduction to Changes, Concepts and Cases

Sascha Werthes/Tobias Debiel

Human Security is increasingly shaping foreign policy agendas. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Ottawa Treaty as well as the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) cannot be understood without referring to the orientation, co-ordination and mobilization enabled by this new “political leitmotif”. Meanwhile, Japan’s development policy and Canada’s foreign policy (see also Switzerland’s Political Affairs Department IV) have incorporated Human Security as one of their core principles and facilitated a more people-centred, bottom-up approach in the field of international assistance and international security policy. Furthermore, the current debate on state sovereignty and intervention strongly leans on the idea that states bear a responsibility to protect the security of their citizens and – if they fail to do so – have to face serious responses from the international community. Last but not least, Javier Solana triggered a controversial debate on a Human Security Doctrine for the EU.

The above-mentioned developments so far do not by themselves indicate a substantive shift in International Relations towards norm-based performance. Especially when taking into account the most recent developments such as the Iraq War (since 2003), U.S. opposition to the ICC, evidence on extra-legal detainments in the “war on terror” etc., even the con-

trary might be true. However, one can nevertheless argue that the discourse on foreign policy goals has changed significantly over the last decade. New international regimes, a more pro-active role of the UN Security Council as well as the setting up of new international institutions prove that this new discourse on a more ‘ethical’ foreign policy has an impact – be it significant or marginal, be it desirable from the observer’s point of view or not.

When the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published its 1994 report, nobody expected that the human security concept outlined within it would attract so much attention from politicians and academics alike. This is all the more astonishing as the concept has provoked a lot of criticism ever since its first appearance due to its analytical ambiguity and its disputed political appropriateness. However, extending the analytical and contextual focus of *security* as such is not so extraordinary as one might think. Different security concepts such as common, extended, and comprehensive security already broadened the political agendas. What is new and challenging is on the one hand the changing/deepening of the perspective: the individual is to be taken into account as an object of reference in addition to the state. In practical terms this means, as advocates of the human security approach point out, that on



the other hand today's political approaches to security have to more strongly integrate elements of foreign and development policy. This shift might be linked to the rising awareness that if security policy in an interdependent and globalized world is desired to be successful, it has to address more seriously the root causes of insecurity for states, and, equally or even more importantly, for people.

In our introductory article, we briefly sketch how in general the security agenda has been changed in the

last two decades by the horizontal and vertical extension of issues and reference objects. Secondly, we argue that human security provides a powerful "political leitmotif" for particular states and multilateral actors by fulfilling selected functions in the process of agenda-setting, decision-making and implementation. Finally, we introduce the selected case studies dealt with in this report, which nicely illustrate the implications human security as a "political leitmotif" might have.

1. Changes: The Extension of the Security Agenda

Far into the 1980s international security politics tended to focus on military threats emanating from other states (Debiel/Werthes 2005: 8, Werthes/Debiel 2006/2007). Most classical definitions (see e.g. Lippman 1943: 51) are based on a state-centred security perspective highlighting the importance of territorial integrity, political independence, survivability, and the capability to protect its own citizens. They assume that most threats are of external origin and, even more importantly, military in nature (Ayooob 1995: 5). Therefore the convincing ability to respond with (overwhelming) military means was regarded as sufficient.

One can easily contest the applicability of this security concept in regard to *today's* world. For example, the wilful neglect of states' sensitivity to situations in neighbour-ring states and strategically important regions is highly problematic in traditional se-

curity concepts. Nye (1974) already pointed out, when analysing the oil crisis (1970s), that in the age of interdependence the security of states can also be endangered by non-military developments (Nye 1974). Furthermore, the adherence to an increasingly outmoded perspective that violent conflicts are still primarily conflicts between states, or inter-state conflicts, neglects the fact that most of the threats to security, especially in the crisis regions of the south, in the Caucasus, and in central Asia, coincide with internal processes of state transformation and consolidation (Ayooob 1995, Paris 2004, Hippler 2005). Finally, the capability of a country to protect its own citizens, which was previously emphasised, clearly asked too much of these classical security concepts, as the new threats which endangered citizens could apparently not be dealt with by military means.



These limits induced the horizontal broadening of the international security agenda. With proponents of the *Strategic Studies* (in the 1980s) and subsequently furthered by *multilateralists* (in the 1990s) step by step new security concepts emerged, mainly referred to as *extended* or *comprehensive* security concepts. These concepts not only incorporated an economic and environmental dimension, they also took into account a broad spectrum of additional threats to the security of states (e.g. cross-border refugee migration, the spread of epidemics, gross violations of human rights). Nevertheless, they did not undermine the Realist logic of conventional Security Studies and remained mainly state-centred in that they still focused on the security of the state and its integrity and not so much on the capability to protect its citizens.

Common and *comprehensive* security concepts, on the contrary, imply a slight change in the perception of the world, as the perspective no longer focuses solely on the international system of states, but conceives the world as an international society of states. Basically, the comprehension of the world as an international system of states seduces the analyst to focus primarily on “power politics amongst states, and puts the structure and process of international anarchy at the centre of IR theory” (Buzan 2004a: 7), whereas the perspective of the international society of states “is about the institutionalisation of shared interest and identity amongst states, and puts the creation and maintenance of shared norms, rules and institutions at the centre of IR theory” (Buzan 2004a: 7). Common and comprehensive security thus not only accentuate power, but also emphasise the chances of (inter-national) law to enhance security (of states) or

in other words to address security threats.

When in the 1990s the so-called “Copenhagen School” (CS) emerged, another shift took place. This approach not only broadened (taking in some non-military issues to the range of threats to states), but also emphasized that non-military issues can be considered matters of security even if they are not threatening states (Buzan et al. 1998). It emphasises that threats and vulnerabilities in different areas, military and non-military, have to meet strictly defined criteria “that distinguish them from the normal run of the merely political”, to count as a security issue. “They have to be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind” (Buzan et al. 1998: 5). Their framework of analysis is nevertheless criticised for being state-centred even though more subtly (Hough 2004: 9). While accepting “the idea that non-military issues can be securitized and that the referent object of this can be something other than a state”, e.g. societies, the CS still sticks to the idea that it is mainly states which can be the securitizing actor (Hough 2004: 9) and the act of securing threatened people is still left to the state (Hough 2004: 17).

Beside the Copenhagen School approach other security concepts emerged at the end of the 1980s up to the middle of the 1990s, which not only broadened and widened the international security agenda but also deepened¹ it. Maybe the most well-

¹ The perspective we take here is more simplistic than the one taken by the Critical Security Studies approach. When speaking about deepening we simply refer to the level of analysis. On the different notions of deepening see Booth 2005: 14, 15.



known approach of this generation is *human security*. The human security approach attempts to conceptualize the changing nature of security in two ways: 1) by complementing state security; 2) by emphasising and addressing the root causes for (human) insecurity when enhancing human rights and strengthening human development (Glasius/Kaldor 2005: 66; Commission on Human Security 2003: 2). Security threats should not only be dealt with by security policy and military means, but comprehensively also by foreign and development policy and their respective policy tools.

The human security approach stressed and accepted that e.g. extreme economic and social distress, epidemics, the flow of refugees and trans-border migration, transnational terrorism, discrimination and violent repression by neo-patrimonial (authoritarian) elites, the illegal trade of drugs and weapons are all a result or a root cause of insecurity for people in an interdependent world and that therefore a security approach which mainly focuses on state security might not be sufficient enough anymore. However, even more important was the evolving consciousness that situations far away demanded a policy response, as they also produced significant effects in other states and among people living there.


Precisely, to address the results

but more importantly the root causes of insecurity in today's world, the UNDP (1994) postulated a comprehensive conception of human security. One might argue that the UNDP was at the forefront of postulating the human security approach, as they experienced firsthand the need to acknowledge that human security, either as a prerequisite for or as a necessary accompaniment to human development, is fundamentally pressing. Especially when working in post-conflict situations, the link between (human) security and (human) development becomes obvious. This also might explain why its concept ranges from a narrow *Freedom from Fear* perspective, which addresses threats to the physical and psychological integrity of people, to a broad *Freedom from Want* perspective, which addresses threats to the socio-economic well-being of people.

Despite the astonishing attention in the academic and political sphere human security has gained, for now, a general accepted definition seems not to be on the horizon.² Instead of proposing our own "working definition" of human security we try to demonstrate how an understanding of human security as political leitmotif might serve as a reasonable interim solution helping to analyse the significance of human security on foreign policy agendas.

² Maybe one of the most well-known definitions is the one proclaimed by the ICISS (2001: 15): "Human security means the security of people – their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms" (on different descriptions of human security see Alkire 2003).

Figure 1: The Horizontal and Vertical Security Agenda Extension



2. Concepts: Human Security as Political Leitmotif

In this report the concept of human security as a political leitmotif (guiding vision) shines through all the various contributions (most clearly in

Werthes/Bosold). But what exactly is meant when speaking of something as a political leitmotif? Political leitmotifs do not image reality – nevertheless they might have analytical value.



In their contribution to this report Werthes and Bosold describe political leitmotifs as “a conceptional theme, to a certain degree clearly defined so as to retain its core identity if modified on subsequent appearances”. Even more importantly, they can be described as a more or less coherent idea which shapes the attitude and performance of actors. They are despite a certain flexibility – or critically ambiguity – coherent patterns of thought. Thus, they help to formulate political agendas or to guide decisions. When implementing policies they provide a relevant referential framework or an important benchmark. With regard to the aforementioned, political leitmotifs, as they contain to a great extent intuition and knowledge based on experience about what is and what should be possible, provide the basis for communication between political and administrative policy-makers, policy-orientated researchers and an interested public.

Political leitmotifs might get ahead and be especially helpful for managing situations of uncertainty and openness when they provide an opportunity for orientation; people can refer to these in cooperation and communication processes either by agreeing or by disagreeing (Dierkes et al. 1995: 12; Dierkes/Marz 1998: 16).³

Furthermore, whether they enjoy success depends on their ability to meet certain demands with regard to new or outstanding challenges. Following the sociological research on guiding visions one can postulate that political leitmotifs have to fulfil at least three functions (see Dierkes et al. 1995: 12-17):

1. Explanation and Orientation
2. Coordination and action-related decision guidance
3. Motivation and mobilisation

Elaborating on these functions we try to show how human security conceived as a political leitmotif describes ways to meet demands with regard to new and outstanding security challenges.

Explanation and Orientation: After the end of the East-West conflict peace and security policy debates concentrated on the often violent transition of development and transformation societies. Moreover, it became apparent that the world is becoming increasingly interconnected and interdependent. Events in far-away places could have a significant impact somewhere else. The “world” at the end of the 20th century was “willing” to deal more than ever with phenomena like transnational terrorism, internal conflicts, failing and failed states – to name only a few – and in addition has to deal with an evidently rising unilateralism of the last remaining superpower, the USA.

Old guiding visions like realism and traditional multilateralism seemed to be insufficient in giving answers and directives on how to understand, respond to or deal with these challenges. They seemed not to fit to the perceived complexity and interdependent interrelatedness which these challenges posed to the world as such. On the one hand guiding visions or political leitmotifs have to be appropriate to these complexities without on the other hand being too restricted in terms of a necessary openness to abstractness and ambiguous complexity. “Human security”, “world risk society” (Beck 1999), and “global neighbourhood” (Commission on Global Governance 1995) have

³ In the following we adapt and modify ideas by Dierkes et al. 1995, which were originally developed for a social scientific engineering research context.



to prove that they perform better as accurate guiding visions.

For now, one can argue that “human security” manages quite well to smartly integrate various trends and threats or the above-mentioned diffuse interrelated complexities. Be it the promising developments which evolve from the rapid and dynamic spread of human rights and democracy, or the dynamic and barely assessable developments in world economy, or – last but not least – the new security risks and threats originating in the transnationalising of organised crime and terrorism, or the increasing threat with regard to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, global epidemics like HIV/AIDS, or global environmental problems, or massive migration processes, these conflict-laden processes associated with so-called globalisation and its “stepbrother” fragmentation can all be discussed with regard to their implications for “human security”.

Particularly the UNDP, in its 1994 report, illustrates how human security might serve the function of explanation and orientation when it concludes that the main factors and root causes of violence and disrupted development processes can only be dealt with by a people-centred approach focussing on seven security dimensions: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. And by naming these dimensions of human security they make them valid benchmarks for a human security framework.

Coordination and action-related decision guidance: The above explained explanation/orientation function of political leitmotifs would be of limited use if they did not likewise help to coordinate policy conduct and serve as action-related decision guidance. In

addition to a ability to recognize, systemise and interpret changes and challenges in the world they should facilitate and coordinate goal-oriented action by establishing valid check marks.

Human security clearly leans on a conception of an international norms-oriented effective multilateralism. When guiding the analysis of multidimensional new security threats and the formulation of policies concerning these matters, it obviously supports the engagement of various state, non-state, and multilateral actors.

A prominent example of how human security as political leitmotif functions well as a valid benchmark and policy framework for collective action-oriented peace and security policies might be the Human Security Network (HSN)⁴. For now, one can carefully agree with the self-ascribed description that the “Network plays a catalytic role by bringing international attention to new and emerging issues”. Furthermore, it is stated that this is made possible by “applying a human security perspective to international problems”, where “the Network aims to energize political processes aimed at preventing or solving conflicts and promoting peace and development”

4 “The Network’s current efforts to achieve greater human security include issues such as the universalization of the Ottawa Convention on Anti-personnel Landmines, the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the protection of children in armed conflict, the control of small arms and light weapons, the fight against trans-national organized crime, human development and human security, human rights education, the struggle against HIV/AIDS, addressing implementation gaps of international humanitarian and human rights law, and conflict prevention” (<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/network-e.php>).



(<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/network-e.php>). Under the guiding vision of human security the network pursues security policies that focus on the protection and security requirement of the individual and society by promoting freedom from fear and freedom from want. This means, in concrete terms, protecting and promoting human rights, the rule of law, democratic governance and democratic structures, a culture of peace and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

Motivation and mobilisation: Nevertheless, political leitmotifs would stay politically inoperative if they did not – in addition to explanation/orientation and coordination/action-oriented guidance – help to significantly fulfil a third function. This is to motivate and mobilise concerned actors. And with regard to sociological and social-psychological findings, that is best guaranteed when leitmotifs stimulate not only the cognitive potentials of humans but also their emotional and affective personality as such (Dierkes et al. 1995: 15-16). This explains to a certain degree why discourses about leitmotifs and existing alternatives are sometimes – due to the fact that they are closely interrelated with norms, values and ideals – conducted in such a vehement manner (Dierkes et al. 1995: 17).

Security policy oriented leitmotifs most notably perform this motivation and mobilising function when they either serve as a positive and open integrative or a negative-segregative identification model. Nevertheless, in both ways facilitating and stimulating the coordination of collectives.

“Negative” Leitmotifs which produce concepts of “the other” stimulate social-psychological mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, of

in-group and out-group formation. Certain negative aspects of behaviour shape the concept of the enemy (Feindbild - foe image/bogeyman image). Other aspects or even change in behaviour or attitude, which might be associated with a willingness to cooperate or as confidence-building measures, will then be ignored, devaluated, or interpreted as cheap tricks.

In contrast, multilateralists tend towards leitmotifs which create positive integrative possibilities for identification. Both the guiding vision of a “global neighbourhood” of the Commission on Global Governance (1995) and the UNDP-proclaimed leitmotif of “human security” take accurate aim at reducing the spatial and emotional distance when appealing to (international) solidarity and compassion. The evolving comprehension of complex patterns, relationships, and interdependencies in wars/internal conflicts or situations of underdevelopment is evoked by reasoning with analogies: the well-known action-oriented contexts of e.g. every individual’s own neighbourhood or everyday life experience with regard to similar needs, worries, and fears is designed to foster empathy and understanding. And this, together with the underlined notion and comprehension of proximity and transnational interrelatedness of situations here and there, motivates and mobilises.

Whether leitmotifs like these are able to motivate and mobilise not only a critical public but also political decision-makers remains an open question. Nevertheless, the UNDP has surely proven that human security inside the UN system and with regard to world conferences already has a certain motivating and mobilising impact. Furthermore, when looking at

middle powers like Canada and Japan, or at the members of the HSN, or latterly at the EU, one can observe that the leitmotif of human security

has the potential to motivate and mobilize collective reflections and perhaps also collective action in the world of states.



3. Cases: Human Security on Selected Foreign Policy Agendas

15

Human security concepts vary widely, as the various case studies in this report illustrate. For example, the Canadian and Norwegian government and to a certain degree the HSN focus on a narrow conception of human security, mainly addressing 'Freedom from fear' aspects, that is physical violence, especially in violent conflicts. Accordingly, under certain well-defined circumstances interventions in the internal affairs of a sovereign state can be legitimised. Put differently, it is argued that in cases of imminent direct threats to the survival of people, as in Rwanda in 1994, the international community has to fulfil its responsibility to protect and act respectively. Furthermore, the narrow approach focuses for example on the banning of anti-personnel landmines, the establishment of the International Criminal Court, and the stopping of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in conflict zones.

Sascha Werthes and *David Bosold* refer to the goal of the HSN to stop the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in conflict zones in their case study. By juxtaposing rhetorical claims/pretension and actual political action with regard to policy dynamics, they critically assess the potential and limits of political leitmo-

tifs in general and of human security in concrete terms. They argue that an analysis which emphasises the role of language is well-suited to yield additional insights in order to come to grips with the fluidity of political leitmotifs such as e.g. human security. Moreover, they illustrate that political leitmotifs can successfully include ethical dimensions. The advantage of human security as a political leitmotif is, then, that the ethical/normative dimensions do not refer to the state but rather focus on the individual, thereby allowing a broader variety of actors to commit themselves to this specific goal. Furthermore, because the leitmotif is so flexible and multifaceted it represents a window of opportunity for like-minded countries and actors to work on at least certain issues of human security by contributing resources and expertise in fields of paramount importance to them. Therefore, overemphasizing the shortcomings of leitmotifs means to underestimate their potential, which exactly relies on its ambiguity/ flexibility (similar but more critically with regard to the ambiguity aspect Paris 2001).

As pointed out, the broad conception of human security emphasises that the security *and* well-being of individuals has an effect on the security



and well-being of other individuals. For example, extreme poverty might lead to crime or migration, or more drastically to trans-border criminal networks engaging in human, arms, and drug trafficking. The incapability of one state to deal with the spread of HIV/AIDS, SARS, or Dengue fever might lead in a globalized world to an increased spread of the epidemic in the whole world, threatening the survival and well-being of individuals everywhere. This broad approach, emphasised e.g. by UNDP and the Japanese government, no longer allows for a clear-cut juxtaposition of (human) security and (human) development policies, as it not only addresses threats to the survival but also to the well-being of the people. It therefore demands a policy of protection and empowerment (Commission on Human Security 2003).

Japan stands as the perfect example for having this broad conception of human security on the foreign policy agenda. *Elena Atanassova-Cornelis* therefore analyses Japan's path to human security, the introduction and definition of the leitmotif in the Japanese context, and Japan's concrete initiatives for its implementation. The paper demonstrates that both the conceptualisation and the practical implementation of this notion by Japan reflect the Japanese historical and normative background, and the country's particular preference for non-military and human-centred foreign policy. Thus, this paper argues that instead of trying to make human security a coherent concept, scholars should accept its multifaceted nature. Hence, it should be analysed from the perspective of different actors, whose approaches to the 'leitmotif' may be an expression of actors' specific backgrounds and policy preferences. A deeper understand-

ing of why human security is attractive to different actors and why they emphasise different variants or priorities, might allow scholars to point out where the chances for joint policy projects are highest. Moreover, this gives preliminary answers to the question why certain political leitmotifs gain more attention or are more attractive than others.

Atanassova-Cornelis illustrates in great detail how human security has become for Japan an instrument for foreign policy actions in line with the country's historical context and international behaviour after World War II. Explicitly accentuating the changing nature of security, the Japanese approach places particular emphasis on human needs and human development, which is materialised in practice through its ODA policy. Human security, in the Japanese case, reflects the values of its society as it is dedicated to peace and permeated by anti-militarism, and strongly opposed to coercive means, such as the use of force. Yet the Japanese approach also stresses the need to prevent conflicts and to deal with their consequences for humans. Against this background, human security is a rather natural extension of Japan's non-military security agenda, as well as a possibility for Japanese policy-makers to increase the country's role in international peace and security.

The extent to which human security as a political leitmotif can be incorporated in the European conceptualisation of security, as well as the extent to which it is increasingly becoming a point of reference, and fulfils a function of orientation, is explored by *Ruby Gropas*. Her twofold approach on the one hand exemplifies (in a similar manner to *Atanassova-Cornelis*) how human security is



linked to Europe's historical and normative background with regard to the special emphasis human rights have in Europe. And on the other hand, she suggests that EU institutions can have an instrumental role in enabling Member States to adopt common positions that pro-mote the respect of human rights by providing narratives of mutual identification of what constitutes a threat to their security and of the means through which to address current challenges.

Gropas convincingly argues that should human security become an orientation for a "European" foreign policy, it has to be in line with the EU's understanding of human rights and it should adhere to the EU's tradition of fostering projects of multilateralism and of promoting a rule-based international order. She argues that the further underpinning of the European Security Strategy with the proposed Human Security Doctrine would widen the scope for cultivating the respect and the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms while addressing global and regional security challenges.

P. H. Liotta and Taylor Owen go one step further when analysing the manner in which the publication of the 'European Security Strategy' in 2003 and 'A Human Security Doctrine for Europe' in 2004 has proposed a shift in the focus of EU's security mandate from the sovereign rights of

nation-states to the protection of individual citizens. They show how the European security strategy stands in notable contrast to the September 17, 2002 'National Security Strategy of the United States of America'. Their analysis gives first insights on the possible strategy in which the EU will use human security as a political leit-motif to coordinate its foreign and security policy action and how it functions as action-related guidance for decisions. They conclude that while it is only a preliminary and still problematic strategy, the EU has taken a significant first step towards conceptualizing the matching of its force capability with the reality of contemporary human insecurity.

Liotta/Owen point out where the limits and pitfalls of these new developments lie. For now it remains unclear, for example, how the EU will truly broaden its capabilities to respond with an overarching human security policy – other than simply addressing the necessity to act. For there is still a long way to go for the EU to be ready to intervene when necessary, and to have the organization and structure to do it. Equally challenging is the complexity of finding decisions for organizing the common budget with regard to long-term investment and planning. Nevertheless, Liotta/Owen emphasise and illustrate that at least a constructive and interesting dialogue has begun.

4. Conclusion

The security landscape has changed and, as we have pointed out and the papers will in more detail, the

old security concepts are no longer adequate for coping with the "new" security threats in an interdependent



world. In contrast, the concept of human security is increasingly shaping foreign policy agendas.

Human security helps – however vaguely – with the conceptualisation of the broad range of currently perceived threats. More-over, it offers a normative reference point for evaluating and orientating policies and political instruments: the security and protection of the individual. It thereby demands creativity and flexibility when deciding on policy strategies and policy instruments.

Especially with regard to policy strategies and policy instruments, the “flexibility” of human security allows the various actors on the one hand to give the approach their own flavour and on the other hand to offer the chance for concerted policy projects. Japan, as is pointed out by Atanassova-Cornelis, addresses human security from a human needs oriented perspective, which makes it not always easy to differentiate this from a human development policy, but which is therefore coherent and compatible with Japanese’ post-World War II foreign policy tradition. In line with her, Gropas argues that the strength of human security lies in its capability to be linked with a specific country’s (or actor’s) tradition, perception of the world, or simply with certain policy priorities. With regard to the EU, she points out the linkages between human security and human rights therefore, arguing convincingly that a European human security concept, in contrast to a Japanese one, should be focussed on human rights. Liotta/Owen likewise take a close

look at the EU, but while also seeing a shift in the focus of EU’s security concept from the sovereign rights of nation-states to the protection of individual citizens, they remain to a certain degree sceptical about the velocity with which the EU can live up to its own ideas which are being developed at the present. This is exactly what Werthes and Bosold do in their case study. After having explicated how comprehending human security as a political leitmotif might help to understand why in the case of the Human Security Network various states work together, they look into how far their claims really produce substantive results.

In sum, Canada and Japan have proven already that human security, despite its current definitional ambiguity, can serve as a political leitmotif, and helps to formulate policy agendas leading to substantial results (e.g. the Ottawa Process and the establishment of the ICC). In the case of the EU, the papers show that despite being an element in an orientation process of the EU’s foreign and security policy, it remains an open question whether human security as a political leitmotif will also serve the other functions. The flexibility and fluidity of the human security leitmotif, sure enough, allow different (international) actors to focus on and prioritise different aspects of today’s and tomorrow’s insecurities. This additionally and advantageously might permit collaborative efforts of various inter-national actors, as long as political inventiveness is maintained (Bosold/Werthes 2005: 101).



References

- Alkire, Sabina 2003: Concepts of Human Security, in: Chen, Lincoln/Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko (Eds.): *Human Insecurity in a Global World*, Cambridge: 15-40.
- Ayoob, Mohammed 1995: *The Third World Security Predicament: State-Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*, Boulder/London.
- Beck, Ulrich 1999: *World Risk Society*, Oxford/Malden.
- Booth, Ken 2005: Critical Exploration, in: Booth, Ken (Ed.): *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, Boulder: 1-20.
- Bosold, David/Werthes, Sascha 2005: Human Security in Practice: Canadian and Japanese Experiences, in: *International Politics and Society*, 1/2005: 84-101.
- Buzan, Barry 2004a: *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge.
- Buzan, Barry 2004b: A Reductionist, Idealistic Notion that Adds Little Analytical Value, in: *Security Dialogue*, 35, 3: 369-370.
- Buzan, Barry/Wæver, Ole/Wilde, Jaap de 1998: *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder.
- Commission on Global Governance (1995): *Our Global Neighborhood. Report of the Commission on Global Governance*, Oxford.
- Commission on Human Security, 2003: *Human Security Now. Protecting and empowering people*, New York.
- Debiel, Tobias/Werthes, Sascha 2005: Human Security – Vom politischen Leitbild zum integralen Baustein eines neuen Sicherheitskonzepts?, in: *S+F Sicherheit und Frieden Security and Peace*, 23 (1): 7-14.
[Human Security - Political Leitmotif or Integral Part of a New Security Concept]
- Dierkes, Meinolf/Marz, Lutz 1998: *Lernkonventionen und Leitbilder: Zum Organisationslernen in Krisen*, Discussion Paper FS-II 98-101, Berlin (Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin).
<http://www.bibliothek.wz-berlin.de/pdf/1998/ii98-101.pdf> (27.12.2005)
[Learning Conventions and Guiding Visions: Organisational Learning in Crisis]
- Dierkes, Meinolf/ Weert Canzler/ Lutz Marz/ Andreas Knie (1995): *Politik und Technikgenese*, in: Renate Mayntz/ Bernd Meisheit (Koordination und Herausgabe), *Zur Technikentwicklung. Berichte aus den Verbundprojekten*, Köln (Verbund sozialwissenschaftliche Technikforschung), *Mitteilungen*, 15/1995: 7-28.
[Politics and Technology Genesis]
- Glasius, Marlies/Kaldor, Mary 2005: Individuals First: A Human Security Strategy for the European Union, in: *International Politics and Society*, 1/2005: 62-83.



- Hampson, Fen Osler 2002: *Madness in the Multitude. Human Security and World Disorder*, Don Mills.
- Hipppler, Jochen (Ed.) 2005: *Nation-building. A key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation?*, London
- Hough, Arthur 2004 (Reprint 2005): *Understanding Global Security*, New York.
- International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 2001: *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, Ottawa.
- Lippman, Walter 1943: *US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, Boston.
- Nye, Joseph S. 1974: *Collective Economic Security*, in: *International Affairs*, 50 (4): 584-598.
- Paris, Roland 2004: *At War's End. Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, Cambridge.
- Paris, Roland 2001: *Human security: paradigm shift or hot air*, in: *International Security*, 26 (2): 87-102.
- United Nations Development Program, 1994: *New Dimensions of Human Security*, in: *UNDP Report 1994*, New York.
- Werthes, Sascha/Debiel, Tobias 2006/2007: *The Horizontal and Vertical Extension of the International Security Agenda: How does the Human Security Approach fit in?*, in: *Brauch, Hans Günter, et al. (Eds.): Globalisation and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualising Security in the 21st Century*. Berlin et al.: Springer-Verlag, forthcoming.

Caught between Pretension and Substantiveness – Ambiguities of Human Security as a Political Leitmotif

Sascha Werthes/David Bosold

Despite (or because of) the term's vagueness and lack of analytical clarity (Paris 2001, Newman 2004) the human security concept has attracted considerable attention, both in academia and politics. Most researchers have focussed on human security as a broadened and/or deepened type of traditional security policy, implicating a shift of or adding of referent objects (the state, societal groups, individuals, the environment), modes of prioritisation and the relation of national and human security, to name only a few (Burgess et al. 2004). Most academics regard efforts for human security as difficult within the existing order of states, whose scopes of action are legally 'protected' by international law due to the norm of national sovereignty.¹ Scholars have not yet come to grips with this dialectical relation of national and human security, as the former represents both a cause and a prerequisite for the latter.

Some of these criticisms are indeed to a certain extent justified,

though most of the debates have concentrated on aspects we regard as neither relevant for policy-makers, who use the term frequently, nor fruitful – as it is “over-theorised” – in terms of academic research. The latter aspect refers to debates in academic journals which call for a precise definition of “human security” (see e.g. *Security Dialogue* 2004), arguing that this will solve the problem of ambiguity and make it possible for policy-makers to act in clearly defined processes within specific sectors to realise the goal of a human security centred policy (see also Werthes/Debiel in this report).

While these criticisms allow for a critical evaluation of ‘human security’ as a *coherent* political concept, we might ask ourselves if such an undertaking is relevant for the reality of politics and policies. That is, whether a political concept can be coherent *per se*, with a clear underlying ‘logic of action’ that leads to clearly defined agendas, political processes and results. When the Japanese and the Canadian government have a different understanding of human security² –

1 The main argument goes that “some states are unable or are unwilling to provide security for their citizens” (Bain 2001: 279) and that the international norm of non-intervention more often proves to be a cause of human insecurity rather than the prerequisite for human security, see the report of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2001). For the academic IR-debate see e.g. *Security Dialogue* with contributions of Thomas/Tow (2002a, 2002b), Bellamy/McDonald (2002), Liotta (2002a, 2002b), Smith-Windsor (2002), Grayson (2003); a very good overview is provided by Kerr (2003).

2 Canada's definition of human security did not include anti-personnel landmines as a human security issue in policy documents and speeches in 1995, but rather declared it an issue of disarmament (Canada 1995). From the beginning of the “Ottawa-Process” in 1996, though, banning anti-personnel landmines became *the* human security issue *per se* (Axworthy 1996a, 1996b, Axworthy/Taylor 1998, DFAIT 1999).



not to mention other actors, be it academic or governmental – it becomes clear that “fixing” the meaning of human security becomes a strikingly arbitrary undertaking, since its meaning is subject to the affirmation and contestation of others and, moreover, embedded in a varying contextual

and temporal setting. Put differently: human security is an amorphous term that is in constant flux. Firstly, because different actors have different understandings of the notion. Secondly, because the meaning is reconstructed and changes through future events that cannot be foreseen.

1. Human Security as *Political Leitmotif* and Language Game

In general, the concept of a *leitmotif* (leading motif) can be understood as a conceptional theme, to a certain degree clearly defined so as to retain its core identity if modified on subsequent appearances. That is, *human security* when conceived as a political leitmotif can be understood as a more or less coherent normative framework for foreign policy. Basically, we argue that when enhancing *human security* is the self-ascribed (by *relevant* politicians or by the government) political leitmotif of a specific country (e.g. the member states of the Human Security Network, HSN), its impact should be significant not only in formulating specific policies but also in pursuing these policies. Like a normative and practical compass it might then help to orientate, to coordinate, and to motivate a country's policy (see Werthes/Debiel in this report). Eventually, it will help to decide what kind of policies can be legitimized. When an idea is broadly accepted as *the* political leitmotif, it should determine relevant policy processes. Moreover, when it is clarified or substantiated in empirical observable goals (like e.g. reducing the threat of small arms and light

weapons) one can postulate that it serves as a valid benchmark for analysing policies – thereby, juxtaposing pretension (that is the rhetorical ‘speech act’) and substantiveness (the means and political action).

Put differently: language is a fundamental part of our daily life – obviously – and therefore of political life, too. Especially, when it comes to political leitmotifs, such as human security, the advantages of an approach that takes into account the performative power of these notions become obvious (Gould 2003, see also Fierke 2003: 71ff., Fierke 1998). One should therefore perceive human security as a political leitmotif *and* a language game which entails specific rules (see Fierke 1998).

Onuf's (1989) seminal work on the construction of rules through social interaction, and thus language, therefore becomes very fruitful for an analysis. If the human security discourse is understood as a discourse that tries to establish specific rules of the game and, therefore, predefined sets of meaning, the concretion of human security by governments entails consequences that these may not



have completely understood. Most governments – one might argue – understand human security as a *holistic* concept, thus relating different aspects of policy that were hitherto perceived unrelated. In addition, it is seen as a *normative* concept. Both aspects have practical consequences. For example, if government A declares that in order to improve the level of human security its foreign policy has to deal with issues B, C and D at the same time and that this action has to be done coherently, political processes are expected to change. If the Canadian government intends to improve human security for the people in Afghanistan it might pursue a foreign policy through demining (a component normally undertaken by the military), prosecution of war criminals (e.g. through a ruling of the ICC) and human rights promotion/democratization (through the

work of officials of the foreign ministry or the Canadian International Development Agency). When other governments commit themselves to one or more of these tasks the chances for concerted foreign policy projects have been established, no matter if they also have committed themselves to the political leitmotif.

Nevertheless, a transparent, while still flexible leitmotif like human security further enhances the chances for concerted policy projects, *par excellence* exemplified in the HSN, which, basically speaking, tries to push forward concerted policy projects. That is, foreign policy becomes concerted in being oriented towards a pre-established aim – here, a somehow defined improvement of human security – and the subjugation of all activities of the different ministries and governments to achieve that goal.

2. The Political Consequences of a Human Security Policy

While the iteration of different standards and premises of human security not only define the nature of human security, and, therefore the *ends*, it also defines the *means* or, at least, the legitimacy of these means. When governments are hence pursuing a normative (or ethical) coherent foreign policy for achieving human security, they rhetorically predispose strategies and instruments for its realization, while excluding other choices.

That is, human security as a political leitmotif might help politicians

to formulate and legitimize certain policies and concrete policy goals. When, as is done frequently, these policy goals are substantiated in terms of empirical observable goals, one can test if a certain policy is able to realize this goal. In addition, and more interestingly, when the policy is attached to an overarching leitmotif, one can include the broader policy context. That is, one can postulate that the respective government tries to make sure that other policies do not run counter to the self-ascribed political leitmotif and the substantiated policy goals.



In order to evaluate the ethical rhetoric of politicians the context of a specific moral/ethical foreign policy identity needs to be highlighted. Carefully(!) argued, the ‘*way of acting*’ towards objects can reveal the ethical dimension of a country’s (foreign) policy which creates a form of political identity, a foreign policy identity (see Mutimer 2000). Thus, for example, acting towards objects which constitute sources or forms of insecurity (landmines, small arms) can create a form of political identity. Furthermore, by invoking an ethical rhetoric one’s own identity becomes stabilised and – in assuming that others’ behaviour is not in compliance with one’s own – legitimised. Thus, it is through a process of naming certain criteria to be legitimate that moral superiority is taken for granted. However, this also allows for a meticulous taking stock of whether one lives up to its promises or pretensions.

In sum, one can conceive human security as a leitmotif shaping the foreign policy identity of specific actors which ascribe it to themselves (e.g. the members of the HSN). However, this alone only allows for the description of *one* certain foreign pol-

icy. What it does not do is to provide a framework or guideline for evaluation. An evaluation only becomes possible because in our case a human security policy is presented as a morally superior and ethical foreign policy. Since this ethical dimension is used to discredit specific forms of conduct of political action it can therefore be used to analyse the credibility and coherence of those who claim their righteousness.

In the next chapters we will look more closely at Canada, Norway, Switzerland, and Austria, which are all members of the HSN and additionally significant producers and traders of small arms and light weapons. A closer look is interesting as the HSN has put itself at the forefront of regulating supply, reducing demand, and ending misuse of small arms, as one way of working for the “human security vision”. Moreover, a closer look might reveal whether the reiterated criticism that human security has either been used to conceal real interests under the cover of a foreign policy “with a human face” (Neufeld 2002) or been implemented to do foreign policy on the cheap (Nossal 1999) can be supported.

3. Human Security, Ethics, and the National Interest

A human security based foreign policy agenda has most prominently been pushed forward by Canada and Japan but also by the countries which are members of the HSN³

(Bosold/Werthes 2005). Here, much attention has been devoted to the question of how far human security


³ The Human Security currently has 13 members: Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica,

Greece, the Netherlands, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand, South Africa (observer), see <<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org>>.

can be related to (or differentiated from) human and sustainable development, human rights or multifaceted peace-building activities (Nef 1999, Ramcharan 2002, Bastian 2004, Newman/Richmond 2001). In addition, discussions have focussed on these

countries' conceptualisations of human security as *freedom from fear* (that is, mainly, protection from physical violence) and/or *freedom from want* (that is, empowerment and the supply of basic human needs).

Figure 1: The Range of Human Security Concepts



In that sense, a lot of energy has been devoted to analysing the specific character of human security. A review of the existing literature reveals a certain *naïveté*, because most authors have underestimated the fluidity of the concept and the fact that these governments have continuously changed their human security agenda. While it is impossible (and in our case of negligible importance) to retrace the reasons for this, be it domestic pressure, the changing international environment or shifting alliances, it has to be stressed time and again that human security is *not* a fixed foreign policy agenda, instrument or process whatsoever. It is, like other political terms, exposed to continuous (re-)interpretation, (re-)construction and contestation, and only comprehensible in its (temporal and cultural) context. Although the study of the different national and global human security discourses is potentially fruitful,

our interest in this paper is more straightforward and empirically grounded.

Despite textual changes in different human security agendas, one can discern a core, that is, some key characteristics, which remain unchanged. As we have argued elsewhere (Bosold/Werthes 2005: 99), these include the following:

- a) The object of security is not limited to the state but also includes the individual.
- b) People should have the opportunity to live decently and without threats to their survival.
- c) Safety threats must be addressed through multilateral processes and
- d) by taking into account the patterns of interdependence that





characterize the globalized world in which we are living.

These four characteristics will allow for an evaluation of the seemingly diametrically opposed spheres of national interests and ethics.

What has come to be understood as normative or ethical foreign policy has been analysed with much scrutiny over the last decade. However, there has remained considerable divergence on the analysis of that trend. Most scholars agree that a “rhetoric turn” has taken place in foreign policy, especially in the official (re)presentation of foreign policy by political figures in speeches, newspaper comments, etc. (Chandler 2003, Dunne/Wheeler 2001, 1998, Brown 2001, Irwin 2001, Gelb/Rosenthal 2003, Toje 2002). One might argue that human rights and, nowadays, human security have become starting points for an ethical foreign policy orientation. Whereas human rights or human rights abuses are common rhetorical figures in the debates on a new interventionism, human security is discussed as a benchmark for global security and a point of reference for global action.⁴ One example is given by the justification of NATO’s air raids in Kosovo 1999 by then Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy (bold parts: emphasis added):

“Kosovo is a good illustration of the human security crisis that the world is facing at the end of this century, [...] At its core, the human security agenda is an effort to construct a global society in which the **safety of people is an international priority** and a **motivating force for international action**; where international humanitarian standards and the rule of law are advanced and woven into a coherent web protecting the individual.

4 Although it is not always easy to estimate when these terms might be simply instrumentalized as smoke screens for purely interest-driven policies.

[...] What this means for us is that **human security is not just a foreign policy idea, but a political imperative, placed on all our agendas by the weight of public opinion**. Nothing has reinforced public support for Canada’s policy on Kosovo more than the anguished faces of refugees flowing across Kosovo’s borders. The citizens of the countries around this table are largely unaffected by these threats, but **human security stands for the values they share**. [...] None of us around the NATO table saw, or sees, any strategic advantage to intervening in Kosovo. No oil or other vital minerals are at stake.” (Axworthy 1999)⁵.

This statement exemplifies how human security as a political leitmotif brings together various elements of government policy (defence, trade, development, aid, peacebuilding, etc.) under one common foreign policy mandate. Even more interestingly, as the statement of Axworthy shows, human security fosters serious engagement for people not living inside the respective national borders in cases where no strategic (*real*political) interests are at stake. Put differently, the security of people, inside or outside of a country’s borders is made the primary object to protect, because it is a moral and ethical obligation. Implicit in these statements is the assumption that a human security foreign policy is better equipped to address current international challenges as it links internal situations to global security. It is not only the interdependence of states which is emphasized but also the notion of the interdependence of the situation of people all over the world which is emphasized. This is exaggerated, when saying that “Human Security has become both a new measure of

5 The arguments can also be found in Axworthy 2003, 2004. For a more general stance on the primacy of ethical concerns within a human security framework see also Vollebæk 1999, Johnson 1999, Kalista 2000, de Hoop Scheffer 2002, Swiss Delegation 2004, HSN 1999.

global security and a new agenda for global action" (HSN 1999). That is not to say that (normative) political leitmotifs are *per se* immune of any hypocrisy, but as they put various elements of government policy under one leading prioritized motif they might make hypocrisy strikingly obvious and easier to illustrate.

Thus, what has remained contested since is the question whether the invocation of ethical concerns has had an impact on foreign policy in the sense that there are now ethical objections against some means of foreign policy or whether ethical concerns are used as an instrument to conceal other interests (Grayson 2004). Furthermore, the question has been raised to what extent ethics and interests can be reconciled (Brown 2001: 21-22). Brown notes that due to the multidimensional character of foreign policy an exclusive promotion of one particular aspect, e.g. human rights, is not feasible (Ibid.: 29). Notwithstanding this, he argues that sometimes actors stress a strictly one-dimensional perception of aspects in order to engage in dialogue (Ibid.: 30). In this way the danger that ethical discourses of governments represent sheer monologues is countered. This is an aspect which Karen Fierke – in the very same volume – describes as a critical mirror. She argues that “the explicit articulation of an ethical foreign is a positive development, so long as it increases the potential for holding the government accountable for its promises” (Fierke 2001: 143). However, there is some danger that the moral dimension of the policy may be used to build support for actions that might otherwise be questioned. She argues that a “foreign policy that is ethical in practice requires that individuals and groups be ready to hold up a critical mirror to government action.” Basi-

cally, this means that “the explicit articulation of an ethical foreign policy has provided a framework for others to make a comparison between policy and implementation” (Fierke 2001: 143-144). Individuals and groups ready to hold up a critical mirror to government action can best be found in democracies.

When an ethical foreign policy in a democratic society is tied to the consent of the citizenry, public opinion plays an important role. Therefore, a human security policy seems to be in perfect resonance with the simultaneous demands of Western populations in pursuing an ethically responsible, issue-based foreign policy while simultaneously trying to push forward one’s own interests. Recent findings of opinion polls actually complement the functionalistic argument that a human security policy may not only be able to make foreign policy more coherent but suggest that a government can thereby also increase the support for its (foreign) policy. As a recent study (November 2004) shows, Canadians interestingly supported two out of six different concepts overwhelmingly.⁶ One of these was the approach, supported by three out of four Canadians, relating to the statement “given how important trade is to Canada’s economy, protecting our trade relationships should be our top our foreign policy priority”. The other was the proclamation: “Canada should focus its international efforts on working with non-governmental organizations to build support for specific solutions to

6 Briefly summed up: 1) Why not be Switzerland; 2) Foreign Policy as Canada – U.S. relations; 3) Foreign Policy as a trade policy; 4) Reviving the Glory Days?; 5) Canada the New Norway; 6) A Foreign Policy of “Soft” Power. For a detailed discussion and explanation see Innovative Research Group 2004.





key problems, like the ban on landmines, and not try and do so many other things”, an opinion held by 69% of Canadians (Innovative Research Group 2004: 20-22).

Not really surprisingly but interestingly, it is that same ambivalence of public opinion which can now also be found in governmental documents and speeches. It is noteworthy that the vision statement most heavily rejected (by 81%) was “we should spend what it takes to be the international power we used to be,

even if it means doing without things we would like in areas like health and education”.

We will now seek to “mirror” the HSN’s agenda in order to hint at some of the inconsistencies in the countries’ foreign policies. Nonetheless, we argue, in accordance with Brown, that the overall thrust of the agenda by the HSN has resulted in processes and developments which bring claims/pretension and substantiveness more in accordance with each other.

4. A Case in Study: The HSN’s Agenda on Small Arms

Small Arms have been placed high on the agenda, and the issue seemed to be destined for realising the initial idea of the HSN, that is, repeating the success of the Ottawa process (HSN 2005b, Axworthy 2001). The official will of the member states to find ways to eradicate the illicit trade in SALWs was documented in a series of statements which have been issued since 1999 (HSN 2000, HSN 2003, HSN 2004). One statement which is exemplary for these is that made in May 2005 at the 7th Ministerial meeting in Ottawa, saying that “the threats posed by small arms, light weapons, and ammunition must be addressed with a people-centred approach” (HSN 2005a, also see the speeches by Swiss, Austrian and Norwegian officials Maurer 2005, Köffler 2004, Vollebæk 1999).

It is interesting that all statements explicitly call for a better control of illicit trade in SALWs, and not

for a reduction in the general trade of or the production of small arms. Yet there are some analogies between the efforts to ban landmines and those dealing with the issue of SALW – one being Axworthy (2003: 345) saying that “when the Ottawa land-mines conference came to an end, several participants asked whether this kind of process could secure a treaty for the control of small arms. It seemed a natural fit, so I asked my officials to develop a strategy”. If that were completely the case, however, a complete stop on the production of SALWs or at least export of those weapons would have to be implemented. Obviously, this is a naïve and unrealistic assumption, given the fact, that in proportion – in contrast to landmines – Switzerland, Austria, Norway and Canada are significant producers and exporters of SALW (Austria and Canada being in the top 10 of exporting

countries worldwide, Norwegian Church Aid 2005: 52).

Table 1: Exporters of Firearms and Ammunition in 2001 and selected data from the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer 2005* (based on 2002 customs data from UN Comtrade)

	Country	Millions US \$	Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer Total Points* (20 points max)	Information on deliveries* (4 points max)	Information on licences granted* (4 points max)
1.	USA	741	16	4	4
2.	Italy	299	12.5	3	2
3.	Belgium	234	6.5	2	0
4.	Germany	157	15.5	2	4
5.	Brazil	100	7.5	2	0
6.	<i>Austria</i>	78	6.5	2	0
7.	Japan	70	7.5	2	0
8.	Spain	65	11.5	2.5	1
9.	<i>Canada</i>	54	12	4	0
10.	Czech Republic	52	12.5	3	2
...	Switzerland	7 (11.7 CHF)	9	2	0
...	South Africa	> 7 (70 ZAR)	5	2	0
...	Norway (data 2000)	> 0.6 (5 NOK)	10.5	2	0

Sources: Norwegian Church Aid 2005: 52, SECO 2001, South Africa 2003, Utenriksdepartementet 2000, Small Arms Survey 2005: Tab. 4.3.

However, in general, figures on the ratio of SALW production in comparison to the whole armament and military sector are difficult to obtain and different mechanisms of measuring actual data of arms exports make efforts of comparison to a certain degree unreliable (Bauer/Bromley 2004: 11, 24-29). This is mainly due to statistics that rely on figures collected either exclusively by customs statistics or data provided by the industry itself and the preliminary export licences granted by the country in which the company is producing. Worse, the countries have very different approaches of issuing these export licences which allow for loopholes in a number of cases (Weidacher 2005: 3-4).

Notwithstanding those figures, one should at least be able to take for granted that the HSN member coun-

tries are not interested in allowing the sale of these products to countries which have a high rate of human insecurity. In that respect, however, the picture is bleak. Companies in Austria and Switzerland have allowed production of small arms under licence in other countries, thus circumventing all forms of domestic export controls (Control Arms 2003: 64). One of the top 4 SALW producers in Europe, the Austrian-based company Steyr-Mannlicher, announced in 2004 that its complete production of military-style firearms was to be moved to Malaysia (Weidacher 2005: 23). In 2005 the company (as well as governmental agencies) came under heavy criticism for exporting sniper rifles to Iran (*ibid.*: 78).

Another example of loopholes and neglect of the issue is represented by a finding which followed the trac-





ing back of confiscated weapons into the state of Rio in Brazil. Among others, small arms from Austria and Switzerland were found, however, there was no official reaction by any government. "In July 2002, Brazil asked for international co-operation to trace the routes of the weapons in order to curb their flow into the notoriously crime-ridden state. So far there has been a deafening silence from all foreign countries involved, with the exceptions of Argentina and Germany" (Control Arms 2003: 65).

As far as the four countries mentioned belonging to the HSN are concerned, their official call for a strict export control does not seem to match existent trade figures. The database of the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) in the period from 1999-2003 (the period of efforts to curb SALW trade within the HSN framework) lists small arms exports from Austria to African countries such as the Congo, Egypt, Sudan, Zimbabwe and from Switzerland to Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Sudan (NISAT 2005). While Norway's record with African countries besides exports to Egypt seems to be in line with the official rhetoric, exports to non-democratic states such as Saudi Arabia and El Salvador also reveal possibilities of improvement (*ibid.*). Last but not least, figures for Canadian exports to Africa reveal shipments to Algeria, Egypt and Zimbabwe (*ibid.*).

In addition, figures on transparency in small arms trade reveal further scope for improvement, especially as far as the aforementioned regulations on production licences are concerned (Small Arms Survey 2004, ch. 4 plus Annex). Since most of the criticisms had been made public some years earlier, a real need to significantly alter existing regulations does

not seem to have been perceived in most national ministries responsible for the issue (Haug et al. 2002). Seen in this light, statements such as the one by the Austrian ambassador to the UN, Wernfried Köffler, that "more detailed information may be obtained from our national report" (Köffler 2004), are somewhat hypocritical given the country's 6.5 points out of a 20 point transparency scheme and the fact that figures on the export of armament are still not available on a governmental website. In that respect Norway and Canada fare much better and receive 10.5 and 12 points respectively (see Tab. 1).

Besides trade in small arms, further inconsistencies in the arms trade can be named. Canada, for example, has repeatedly sold armament or dual use equipment to the U.S., which is exempted from the country's export regulations and controls. One of the most prominent cases was the sale of more than 20 helicopters to the U.S. which were "upgraded" and eventually delivered to Columbia to "dismantle the drugs trade". Due to this loophole no export figures for exports to the U.S. are available, which may indirectly cause human insecurity (Control Arms 2005: 6ff.).⁷

Against the backdrop of increasing controls of the shipment of SALW and other military equipment through multilateral efforts, it is furthermore surprising that the HSN members "[...] further call on states to support the implementation of regional initiatives and action plans"

⁷ Another issue which needs to be addressed in the future is how far companies which undermine efforts to create human security can be held accountable by domestic and international legislation. Related to this is the aspect of whether such an undertaking is desired by the countries' governments.



(HSN 2005a) and do not take part in some of these efforts themselves.

Three noteworthy mechanisms have been established: the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports in 1998, the Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies in 1996 (Wassenaar Arrangement 2005) and the UN Firearms Protocol which has entered into force recently (IANSA 2005). While the EU's Code is primarily interested in harmonising the member states' policies (Bauer/Bromley 2005), the Protocol's purpose is "to promote, facilitate and strengthen cooperation among States Parties in order to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition." (UNGA 2001). The Wassenaar Agreement's policy is intended to promote greater *responsibility* in the arms trade but has more specific aspects as far as SALWs are concerned, since its objectives are to prevent the "destabilising accumulation of such arms" and to "prevent the acquisition of conventional arms by terrorist groups and organisations, as well as by individual terrorists" (Wassenaar Arrangement 2002).

Yet, while all four countries of the HSN that have been observed more closely are members of the Was-

senaar Arrangement, the transparency of their export of SALWs remain way below the figures of other countries and large weapons exporters such as the U.S., the UK or Germany (Small Arms Survey 2005: 112). Incomprehensibly, in addition, Switzerland as a HSN member does not form part of the UN Firearm Protocol to this day (UNSC 2005). What provides cause for optimism, though, is an increasing availability of statistics on ministries' web sites, especially as far as the last two years in Canada and Norway are concerned.

This short review is hoped to have shown that political leitmotifs, when applied to the whole set of foreign policies, allow for critical reflections on various elements of government policy. When subscribing to a leitmotif the question arises how far relevant policies serve the self-ascribed goals, and how far *all* government action is directed towards this proclaimed guiding vision. Policies which run counter to this prioritized leitmotif can be used to hold up a critical mirror to the government, to hold it accountable for its action (or neglect of action). After having looked at the SALW trade figures and practices one can conclude that further initiatives are needed to make government rhetoric and action congruent.

5. Conclusion

In the cases of Austria, Switzerland, Norway, and Canada the "mirror" on SALW trade reveals inconsistencies and a gap between claims and substantiveness. Other countries of

the HSN might also be included in this respect, most notably South Africa, which is an observer of the HSN but is said to have the least strict laws on SALW trade.



Sometimes the image – as in the case of SALWs – is far more impressive than the actual content. Despite the call for better controls of arms sales, dubious forms of export are practised by the countries making these calls, and, ironically, these might actually increase their market share, since the demand will be met less by Eastern European countries (e.g. Bulgaria), which have sold stockpiles to a significant extent. The exports of these latter SALWs have been increasingly controlled and prevented. While there is an evident contradiction in calling for an improvement of human security and actually selling SALW in an ethically irresponsible manner, progress also has to be taken into consideration (IANSA/Biting the Bullet 2005). Over the last decade governments have funded several local and regional initiatives on small arms surplus destruction and the like.

On a theoretical level our findings show that a closer look at and analysis of language is needed when it comes to evaluating foreign policy in today's world. This is true for two reasons: firstly, because the language and meanings of words used in the foreign policy discourse undergo slight but often significant changes which are not analysed when the focus is exclusively on theoretical frameworks that do not take into account the performative character of language. Secondly, because foreign policy has undergone significant changes by sticking more closely to public opinion and becoming more based on ethics and values. This latter point has considerable consequences, as we have tried to show. An ethical, or more precisely, a human security policy is well suited to appealing to a country's citizens, and it also allows for framing issues in terms of a value-

based context. Nevertheless, this also allows for a critical appraisal of such a policy – a factor that is often overlooked.

In general one can therefore say that political leitmotifs – and human security in particular – have the potential advantage that they can be used as a “mirror” for critical observations with regard to whether governments live up to their promises and pretensions. When this is carried out, foreign policy might become more transparent while successfully incorporating ethical dimensions. Then the advantage of human security as a political leitmotif is that it does not refer to the state but rather focuses on individuals, thereby allowing a broader variety of actors to commit themselves to a specific policy goal. Moreover, because the leitmotif is so ambiguous (or, positively formulated, flexible and multi-faceted) it represents a window of opportunity for most countries and actors to work on at least certain issues of human security by contributing resources and expertise in fields of paramount importance to them. Therefore, overemphasizing the shortcomings of such leitmotifs as human security entails underestimating their potential, because it is these shortcomings which open up debate among societal groups on the legitimacy of certain decisions. Hence, it may well make the foreign policy process more democratic, because governments can be held accountable to match their rhetoric with action.

This may add another crucial aspect to understanding the Human Security Agenda: namely, that there is a need for states to live up to their promises in order to make those “coalitions of the willing” (Axworthy/Taylor 1998: 193) or concerted

policies of like-minded countries possible. Otherwise, successes like the Ottawa process, due to a "coalition of NGOs, humanitarian organizations, and medium and small powers" (ibid.: 192), will go down as a histori-

cal coincidence. A transparent, comprehensive and broadly shared political leitmotif might facilitate this kind of processes, but it is by no means a sufficient condition.



References

33

- Axworthy, Lloyd 2004: Human Security: An Opening for UN Reform, in: Price, Richard M./Zacher, Mark W. (Eds.) 2004: *The United Nations and Global Security*, Houndsmills/Basingstoke: 245-259.
- Axworthy, Lloyd 2003: *Navigating a New World. Canada's Global Future*, Toronto.
- Axworthy, Lloyd 2001: Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First, in: *Global Governance*, 7 (1): 19-24.
- Axworthy, Lloyd 1999: Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting", Cologne, Germany, June 9, 1999.
http://w01.international.gc.ca/min-pub/Publication.asp?publication_id=377168&Language=E (1.07.2005).
- Axworthy, Lloyd 1996a: Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy to a Meeting of the National Forum on Foreign Policy 'Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World', Winnipeg, Manitoba, December 13, 1996.
- Axworthy, Lloyd 1996b: Notes for an Address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy to the 51st General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, New York, September 24, 1996.
- Axworthy, Lloyd/Taylor, Sarah 1998: A ban for all seasons. The landmines convention and its implications for Canadian diplomacy, in: *International Journal*, 53 (2): 189-203.
- Bain, William 2001: The Tyranny of Benevolence: National Security, Human Security, and the Practice of Statecraft, in: *Global Society*, 15 (3): 277-294.
- Bastian, Sunil 2004: Human Rights and Human Security, in: *Conflict, Security and Development*, 4 (3): 411-418.
- Bauer, Sibylle/Bromley, Mark Bromley 2004: *The European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. Improving the Annual Report*, (SIPRI Policy Paper 8), Stockholm.
- Bosold, David/Werthes, Sascha 2005: Human Security in Practice: Canadian and Japanese Experiences, in: *International Politics and Society*, 2005 (1): 84-102.
- Brown, Chris 2001: Ethics, interests and foreign policy, in: Smith, Karen E./Light, Margot (Eds.): *Ethics and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: 15-32.



- Burgess, J. Peter et al. 2004: Special Section: What is 'Human Security?', in: *Security Dialogue*, 35 (3): 345-387.
- Canada (Government of Canada) 1995: *Canada in the World*. Canadian Foreign Policy Review, Ottawa.
- Chandler, David 2003: Rhetoric without responsibility: the attraction of 'ethical' foreign policy, in: *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 5 (3): 295-316.
- Control Arms 2005: *The G8 global arms exporters*, Control Arms Briefing Paper, June 2005.
<http://www.controlarms.org/downloads/globalarmsexporters.pdf> (27.07.2005)
- Control Arms 2003: *Shattered Lives. The Case for Tough International Arms Control*. London, Oxford.
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/conflict_disasters/downloads/shattered_eng_full.pdf (1.08.2005)
- de Hoop Scheffer, J. G. 2002.: Common values, joint responsibility, shared commitment, address by Mr. J.G. de Hoop Scheffer, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the 57th session of the UN General Assembly.
http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=MBZ459877 (1.07.2005)
- Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) 1999: *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World*, Ottawa.
- Dunne, Tim/Wheeler, Nicholas 2001: Blair's Britain: a force for good in the world?, in: Smith, Karen E./Lights, Margot (Eds.): *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, Cambridge: 167-184.
- Fierke, Karin M. 2003: Breaking the Silence: Language and Method in International Relations, in: Debrix, François (Ed.): *Language, Agency, and Politics in a Constructed World*. Armonk: 66-86.
- Fierke, Karin M. 2001: Constructing an ethical foreign policy: analysis and practice from below, in: Smith, Karen E./Light, Margot (Eds.): *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, Cambridge: 129-144.
- Fierke, Karin M. 1998: *Changing Games, Changing Strategies. Critical Investigations in Security*, Manchester.
- Gelb, Leslie H./Rosenthal, Justine A. Rosenthal 2003: The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy, in: *Foreign Affairs*, 82 (3): 2-8.
- Gould, Harry D. 2003: Constructivist International Relations Theory and the Semantics of Performative Language, in: Debrix, François (Ed.): *Language, Agency, and Politics in a Constructed World*, Armonk: 50-65.
- Grayson, Kyle 2004: Branding 'Transformation' in Canadian Foreign policy: Human Security, in: *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 11 (2): 41-68.
- Grayson, Kyle 2003: Securitization and the Boomerang Debate: A Rejoinder to Liotta and Smith-Windsor, in: *Security Dialogue*, 34 (3): 337-343.
- Haug, Maria/Langsvandslien, Martin/Lumpe, Lora/Marsh, Nicholas 2002: *Shining a Light on Small Arms Exports: The Record of State Transparency*, Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. 4.
<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/OPs/OP04.pdf> (17.07.2005)



- Human Security Network (HSN) 2005a: Ministerial Statement on Human Security and UN Reform, 7th Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network, Ottawa, 18-20 May 2005.
<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/docs/31may2005-e.php>
(19.07.2005)
- HSN 2005b: The Human Security Network.
<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/network-e.php> (1.07.2005)
- HSN 2004: Chairman's Summary of the 6th Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network May 27th-29th, 2004.
http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/docs/bamako_chair-e.php
(27.07.2005)
- HSN 2003: Statement of H.E. Cheick Sidi Diarra Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Mali to the United Nations on behalf of the member countries of the Human Security Network.
<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/docs/9jul2003-e.php> (19.07.2005)
- HSN 2000: Statement of the Human Security Network to the U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects.
http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/docs/SALW_Statement-e.php
(17.07.2005)
- HSN 1999: A Perspective on Human Security. Chairman's Summary of the Ministerial Meeting, Lysøen, Norway, 20 May 1999.
http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/docs/Chairman_summaryMay99-e.php (1.07.2005)
- International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)/Biting the Bullet 2005: Report on the United Nations Programme of Action POA.
<http://www.iansa.org/documents/2005/red-book/red-book-2005.pdf>
(21.07.2005)
- IANSA 2005: UN Firearms Protocol – has your country ratified?.
<http://www.iansa.org/un/firearms-protocol.htm> (01.08.2005)
- Innovative Research Group (with Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute and the Dominion Institute) 2004: Visions of Canadian Foreign Policy, November 4, 2004.
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/DCI_CDFAI_report_formatted_V5.pdf
(17.07.2005)
- Irwin, Rosalind (Ed.) 2001: Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy, Vancouver.
- Johnson, Hilde F. 1999: Speech at the Oslo Meeting on Ethical Values in International Relations, Holmenkollen Park Hotel, Oslo 24-25 June 1999.
<http://odin.dep.no/odinarkiv/norsk/dep/ud/1999/taler/032005-090263/dok-bn.html> (1.07.2005)
- Kalista, Monika 2000: Statement by Dr. Monika Kalista, Director General, Cultural Policy Department Austrian Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the Plenary Meeting of the X. UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 11 April 2000.
http://www.bmaa.gv.at/view.php3?f_id=1312&LNG=de&version=
(1.07.2005)



- Kerr, Pauline 2003: The evolving dialectic between state-centric and human-centric security, Working Paper 2003/2 (Department of International Relations, Australian National University), Canberra.
- Köffler, Wernfried 2004: Austria's Policy and Priorities on Small Arms and Light Weapons.
http://www.aussenministerium.at/view.php3?f_id=5338&LNG=en&version=&submit=1 (17.07.2005)
- Liotta, Peter H. 2002a: Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security, in: *Security Dialogue*, 33 (4): 473-488.
- Liotta, Peter H., 2002b: Converging Interests and Agendas: The Boomerang Returns, in: *Security Dialogue*, 33 (4): 495-498.
- Maurer, Peter 2005: Statement by H.E. Peter Maurer, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations, to the 59th session of the General Assembly informal consultations on the Report of the Secretary-General in larger freedom, Cluster II : Freedom from fear", New York, 21 April 2005.
http://www.eda.admin.ch/newyork_miss/e/home/interv/59th/general.ContentPar.0020.UpFile.tmp/sp_050421_engl/french_ef.pdf (1.07.2005)
- Mutimer, David 2000: *The Weapons State. Proliferation and the Framing of Security*, Boulder.
- Nef, Jorge 1999: *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability. The Global Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment*, 2nd ed., Ottawa.
- Neufeld, Mark 2004: Pitfalls of Emancipation and Discourses of Security: Reflections on Canada's 'Security With a Human Face', in: *International Relations*, 18 (1): 109-123.
- Newman, Edward 2004: A Normatively Attractive but Analytically Weak Concept, in: *Security Dialogue*, 35 (3): 358-359.
- Newman, Edward/ Richmond, Oliver P. (Eds.) 2001: *The United Nations and Human Security*, Houndsmills/ Basingstoke.
- Norwegian Church Aid 2005: Who takes the bullet? The impact of small arms violence.
http://www.nisat.org/publications/Who_takes_the_bullet/Who%20Takes%20the%20Bullet,%20the%20impact%20of%20small%20arms%20violence.pdf (17.07.2005)
- Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers 2005: *Database of Small Arms Transfers*.
http://82.199.16.4/nisat1/PublicQuery_New.aspx (17.07.2005)
- Nossal, Kim Richard 1999: Pinchpenny diplomacy. The decline of 'good international citizenship' in Canadian foreign policy, in: *International Journal*, 54 (1): 88-105.
- Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood 1989: *World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*, Columbia.
- Paris, Roland 2001: Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?, in: *International Security*, 26 (2): 87-102.
- Ramcharan, Bertrand G. 2002: *Human Rights and Human Security*, The Hague.

- State Secretariat for Economic Affairs Switzerland (SECO) 2001: Ausfuhren von Kriegsmaterial nach Kategorie pro Empfängerstaat (01.01.-31.12.2001). <http://www.seco-admin.ch/news/00162/index.html?lang=de> (28.12.2005)
- Small Arms Survey 2004: Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk, Oxford. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/publications/yb_2004.htm (17.07.2005) (partly available).
- Small Arms Survey 2005: Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War, Oxford.
- Smith-Windsor, Brooke A. 2002: Terrorism, Individual Security, and the Role of the Military: A Reply to Liotta, in: Security Dialogue, 33 (4): 489-494.
- South Africa 2003: South African Export Statistics for Conventional Weapons 2000-2002. http://www.nisat.org/Export_Reports/South%20Africa%202000-2002/20002002.pdf (28.12.2005).
- Suhrke, Astri 1999: Human Security and the Interests of States, in: Security Dialogue, 30 (3): 265-276.
- Swiss Delegation 2004: Priorities of the Swiss delegation at the 59th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. http://www.eda.admin.ch/sub_uno/g/uno/publi/pdf.ContentPar.0043.UpFile.tmp/rp_140904_59.UN.CH_d.pdf (1.07.2005)
- Thomas, Nicholas/Tow, William T. 2002a: Gaining Security by Trashing the State? A Reply to Bellamy and McDonald, in: Security Dialogue, 33 (3): 379-382.
- Thomas, Nicholas/Tow, William T. 2002b: The Utility of Human Security: Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention, in: Security Dialogue, 33 (2): 177-192.
- Toje, Asle 2002: Ethics in Foreign Policy: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice, in: Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 15 (1): 7-8.
- United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 2001: Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/255e.pdf (28.12.2005)
- United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 2005: Small Arms Report of the Secretary General. <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/221/43/PDF/N0522143.pdf> (17.07.2005)
- Utenriksdepartementet 2000: Eksporten av forsvarsmateriell fra Norge i 2000. <http://odin.dep.no/ud/norsk/dok/regpubl/stmeld/032001-040012/hov006-bn.html> (28.12.2005)
- Vollebæk, Knut 1999: Values in world politics – how do they matter?, Speech at the Oslo Meeting on Ethical Values in International Relations, Holmenkollen Park Hotel, Oslo 24-25 June 1999. <http://odin.dep.no/odinarkiv/norsk/dep/ud/1999/taler/032005-090291/dok-bn.html> (1.07.2005)
- Wassenaar Arrangement 2005: The Wassenaar Arrangement – Introduction. <http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html> (28.12.2005)





Wassenaar Arrangement 2002: Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons.

http://www.wassenaar.org/guidelines/index.html#Small_Arms_and_Light_Weapons (28.12.2005)

Weidacher, Reinhilde 2005: Behind a Veil of Secrecy: Military Small Arms and Light Weapons Production in Western Europe, (Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 16), Geneva.

Wheeler, Nicholas J./Dunne, Tim 1998: Good international citizenship: a third way for British foreign policy, in: *International Affairs*, 74 (4): 847-870.

Defining and Implementing Human Security: The Case of Japan

Elena Atanassova-Cornelis

The end of the Cold War has made a serious impact on the nature of the international environment, on the way the foreign policy of states is to be conducted and on issues that are to be prioritised. While the deepening of globalisation has brought numerous benefits to many countries, this process has widened the gap between rich and poor, both in a domestic and in an international context. Issues such as poverty, inequality, health and education have thus come to occupy states' political agendas. Furthermore, a number of countries have experienced political and economic instabilities since the end of the Cold War, which resulted in heavy casualties, refugee and internally displaced person problems, landmines and small arms concerns.

All these challenges and threats have triggered a debate on the understanding of security, shifting its focus from the traditional preoccupation with the state to the individual, i.e. the human being - its needs, concerns and development. Security thus became a contested notion: state or human, military or non-military security? Human security, which emerged as a concept out of this 'post-Cold War search for a new security paradigm' (Acharya and Acharya 2000), has remained controversial as well. Are the basic human needs most crucial? Should we rather focus on human development? Is not protecting

people in conflict situations the core of this notion? Different approaches to the concept have resulted in a number of unclear definitions, making human security a point of discussion among scholars and analysts. Despite a lack of agreement as to what it precisely means, a number of governments, in first place Canada, Norway and Japan, have integrated the concept into their foreign policies and have undertaken actions towards its implementation.

This paper explores the concept of human security, by way of taking Japan as a case-study. It analyses Japan's path to human security, the introduction and definition of the concept in the Japanese context, and Japan's concrete initiatives for its implementation. The paper demonstrates that both the conceptualisation and practical implementation of this notion by Japan reflects the Japanese historical and normative background, and the country's particular preference for non-military and human-centred foreign policy. In so doing, this paper argues that instead of trying to make human security a coherent concept, scholars should accept its multifaceted nature and hence analyse it from the perspective of different actors, whose approaches to the concept may be an expression of actors' specific backgrounds and policy preferences.



1. Human Security within the Broader Debate on Security

The debate in security studies since the end of the Cold War has shifted the traditional, or old, focus of security from the state to a new referent object, i.e. the individual, and has expanded the portrayal of threats solely in military terms to encompass non-traditional, or non-military, types of threats. The changing nature of security from the beginning of the 1990s has become the ground on which the concept of human security was developed. In this sense, human security, with its primary focus on humans and non-military threats, has come to reflect the contested notion of security.

Human security has emerged largely as a response to ethnic conflicts and civil wars, the deepening of globalisation, the widening gap between rich and poor and the spreading of human rights after the end of the Cold War. As a new and non-traditional view of security, human security was first mentioned in the 1994 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) annual publication called *Human Development Report* (see UNDP 1994: 22). Following the report, the concept gained quickly popularity within international society, which can be attributed to its emphasising the human being, in contrast to the traditional state-centric view of security. In terms of conceptualisation, however, human security has remained a contested notion, as its strongest proponents have produced a number of broad and inconsistent definitions, and have not reached an agreement as to what it precisely means. As a result, human security has been criticised for being a 'mean-

ingless' notion, failing to provide either policy-makers with practical tools for devising particular policies or scholars with analytical tools for scholarly research (Newman 2001; Paris 2001). Despite such criticisms, human security became so popular throughout the 1990s that it led to the establishment by Canada and Norway of a 'human security network'¹, consisting of states and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engaged in the promotion of this 'new' security concept. The most active advocates of human security have become the governments of Canada, Norway and Japan, with Japan and Canada however promoting different approaches to the concept.

At the same time, instead of trying to make human security a coherent concept, using it as Roland Paris (2001) suggests, as 'a descriptive label for a class of research' may eliminate the problem of finding a universal definition. Thus, human security may be regarded as a broad category of research in the field of security studies that mainly explores non-military threats to individuals, groups and societies (ibid.). In this way, it could accommodate the works of those scholars that look beyond the traditional, i.e. state-centric and military, interpretation of security. Furthermore, such an approach would permit for an explanation of human security from the perspective of various actors, whose ways of dealing with human security issues may re-

¹ For information on the network, see its official website: <<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/menu-e.php>>.

flect specific historical backgrounds and social norms, and represent differences in strategic thinking and policy choices (see also Newman 2001).

Against this background, the following sections of the paper will discuss why and how Japan has become one of the world's leading states in the promotion of human security, and will illustrate that the country's approach to the concept is linked to Japan's non-military foreign policy identity, based on its historical background and adherence to anti-

militarist norms and pacifism. In this way, the case of Japan will serve to confirm the proposition that approaches to human security may reflect actors' particular backgrounds and foreign policy preferences, which could explain the concept's multifaceted nature. Accordingly, human security may be regarded as a category of research and used, therefore, as a basis for addressing specific questions or issues, and for developing viable policy recommendations.



2. Japan's Path to Human Security

2.1 Historical and Normative Context of Japan's Foreign and Security Policy after 1945

The ending of World War II left Japan completely devastated, facing an urgent need for economic and societal rehabilitation. In order to achieve this, Japan had no other choice but to align itself with the West, which was established with the simultaneous signature in 1951 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security Treaty. Despite Japan's military alliance with the US, however, the devastating experience of defeat and the fears of a militarist revival led Tokyo policy-makers to pursue a 'peaceful' foreign and security policy, which reflected Japan's post-war 'culture of anti-militarism' (Berger 1993, 1996).

The policy of being a member of the Western camp brought numerous advantages for Japan. It helped the country, first, maintain peace and democracy, and, second, achieve eco-

nomical growth and prosperity under the security umbrella of the US. By way of prioritising its military alliance with Washington Tokyo ensured the guaranteeing of Japan's national security. Through the pursuit of economic security, on the other hand, Japanese policy-makers sought to avoid engaging the country in the military dimension of security, which remained highly contested due to the legacy of Japan's militarist past. The focus on economic growth, furthermore, reflected what from the 1980s became known in Japan as the concept of 'comprehensive security'. It was an interpretation of Japanese security from a broader perspective than the traditional military dimension, and included social, economic and political aspects for achieving national security objectives (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993: 105-8; Katzenstein 1996: 3).

The priority given to economic expansion was strengthened by the non-acceptance of the use of military force as a legitimate instrument of statecraft. This was incorporated in



the post-war 'pacifist' Constitution of 1947 through Article 9, which restricted Japanese military activities to self-defence only.² Related to this, at the end of the 1960s, Japan embraced the three non-nuclear principles - not to produce, possess or bring into Japan nuclear weapons. These anti-militarist norms have become the strongest characteristics of the Japanese state ever since 1945, having their roots in collective memories of the militarist expansion and the following war with America (Berger 1993). They have further come to define Japan's priority in terms of pursuing peaceful means of foreign policy (e.g., foreign aid and investment; cooperation in the civilian and non-military sphere of action), which became 'the most important hallmark of Japan's security policy' (Katzenstein 1996: 10).

Tokyo's close ties with, and dependence on, Washington in the security area prevented Japan from having an active foreign policy and hindered its ability to shape international events independently. This is the reason why Japan has long been described as a 'reactive' state, i.e. a state that reacted to international situations and demands of other countries, mainly the US. The reactive approach during the Cold War, applied to Japan's international political role, sharply contrasted with the country's fast economic expansion throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. However, a need for Japan to commit to active international behaviour arose sharply following the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990, to which Japan responded with a US\$ 13 billion financial contribution, yet failed to contribute to multina-

tional forces, i.e. to dispatch its Self-Defence Forces (SDF) to the Gulf. Tokyo's reliance on its 'chequebook diplomacy', i.e. on financial contributions only, and the inability of Japanese policy-makers to deal with such an international crisis resulted in severe international humiliation and criticism, which acted as a push for a serious redefinition of Japan's post-1989 foreign policy behaviour. As Japan had risen to the level of a state being able to exert political influence on its international environment, its foreign policy had to be adapted so as to reflect the country's economic capabilities.

2.2 Pursuing a Proactive International Role from the 1990s

Following the Gulf War criticism and responding to the need for greater engagement in the area of international security, in the course of the 1990s Japan significantly increased its multilateral personnel involvement for the maintenance of international peace and stability. In June 1992 the country enacted the International Peace Cooperation Law (IPCL), which enabled participation of its personnel in international humanitarian relief operations and contribution to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) on a fully-fledged scale. Since the enactment of the IPCL Japan has dispatched its SDF to participate in both UNPKO and non-combat humanitarian relief missions, and has sent electoral observers to elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The IPCL was amended in December 2001 to enable Japan's full-

2 See The Constitution of Japan, Article 9. <<http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Japan/English/english-Constitution.html>> (27.06.2005).



scale participation in the primary duties of Peacekeeping Forces (PKF).³

Furthermore, throughout the first post-Cold War decade Japan expanded its development and humanitarian aid programs, and became actively involved in global crisis management, comprehensive conflict prevention and environmental protection. In addition, the 1990s saw a deepening of Japan's relationship with the EC/EU⁴, which came to encompass strictly humanitarian and civil agendas. The partnership between the two was further strengthened by the adoption of the Joint Japan-EU Action Plan in 2001, which has been followed by a process of implementation by both sides.

The altered international environment after the end of the Cold War also caused a change in the US-Japan alliance, which was reassessed and strengthened throughout the 1990s in order to adequately respond to the new political agenda and security challenges of the post-Cold War era.⁵ In the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist attacks on the US, Japan enacted the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, which permitted the dispatch of its SDF to the Indian Ocean to provide rear-area logistical support for the US and coalition naval ships fighting in Afghanistan. Furthermore, as Japan became one of the

first supporters of the US policy towards Iraq in 2003, the Koizumi government introduced a law for the reconstruction of Iraq in July 2003, which permitted Japan to engage proactively in the rebuilding of Iraq, in the form of both financial and human contribution. The latter was achieved with the dispatch at the beginning of 2004 of Japan's SDF on a humanitarian mission to the southern part of Iraq, which was extended for one more year in December 2004. While the dispatch was done without the sanction of the international community and therefore caused a lot of controversies both inside and outside Japan, it was clearly for non-combat purposes.

As has been illustrated with the above analysis, Japan's post-war pacifism and adherence to anti-militarist norms have continued to define Japanese foreign and security policy after the end of the Cold War. Different avenues, which Japan has used for exercising an active international role, have aided the country to promote non-military security cooperation and respond to non-traditional security challenges. They have reflected Japan's non-military stance on security diplomacy, thereby directing the path of its international behaviour. In this context, the rise of human security in Japan's foreign policy at the end of the 1990s can be regarded as having emerged naturally from the country's pursuit of an active non-military international role.

3 PKF's primary duties refer to such activities as monitoring of disarmament of armed forces; stationing and patrolling in buffer zones; traffic check or disposal of abandoned weapons among the international peace cooperation works.

4 For a brilliant analysis of Japan-EC/EU relations, see Gilson (2000).

5 This was done through the signing of the 1996 *Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st century* and the revision of the original 1978 *Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation* in 1997.



3. Introducing Human Security

3.1 The Role of Prime Minister Obuchi

The recognition of the human security concept in Japan was directly related to the Asian currency and financial crises that hit East and South-East Asia in July 1997. While having a devastating impact on the economies of the Asian countries, increasing poverty and spreading political instability, the crises gave rise to a new understanding of security, focusing the attention of the Asian people on humans and not on states (Acharya and Acharya 2000). In the context of the Asian crises, Prime Minister Obuchi Keizō⁶ (1998-2000) delivered two speeches at the end of 1998 with which he introduced the concept of human security. While the concept served as a means to emphasise Japan's efforts in response to the crises (Fukushima 2004: 13), these speeches became the basis for the subsequent integration of human security into Japanese diplomacy and, moreover, for making it, as described in the 2000 *Diplomatic Bluebook*, 'a key perspective in developing Japan's foreign policy'.⁷

On 2 December 1998 in Tokyo, Obuchi defined the concept as 'the key, which comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and strengthens the efforts to

confront those threats' (Obuchi 1998a). He further stressed that Japan had contributed to Asian countries to help them dealing with the crises, and had assisted, in the first place, the 'socially vulnerable segments of population on whom economic difficulties have the heaviest impacts'. Finally, Obuchi proposed making 'the 21st century a human-centred century', by which he clearly emphasised his perception of security in terms of people, in contrast to the traditional, state-centric approach. Later the same month, in his speech at the ASEAN+3 Summit in Hanoi on December 16, Obuchi declared that the 21st century for Asia should be 'a century of peace and prosperity built on human dignity' (Obuchi 1998b). Furthermore, as an expression of Japan's commitment to the promotion of human security, Obuchi announced that Japan had decided to make a financial contribution for the establishment of a Human Security Fund under the United Nations. The fund was established only three months after Obuchi's Hanoi speech, in March 1999, on the basis of Japan's financial contribution.

The two speeches by Obuchi Keizō in 1998 can be considered as the foundation on which Japan's approach to human security was later developed and its policy agenda devised (Fukushima 2004: 16). He clearly used the concept of human security for referring to developmental policies from a human-centred perspective rather than to traditional security policy with military emphasis (Edström 2003: 214). Human security, therefore, was a rather natural extension of Japan's non-military and human-oriented international behaviour

6 The Japanese personal names are given according to Japanese convention, with the surname first, followed by the given name.

7 See the official website of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs for various issues of the *Diplomatic Bluebook*: <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/diplomatic/other/bluebook>>.

throughout the 1990s, which explains why it was easily integrated into Japanese foreign policy after Obuchi's speeches. The *2000 Diplomatic Bluebook* states that: 'Prime Minister Obuchi clearly located "human security" in Japan's foreign policy', while the *2001 Diplomatic Bluebook* refers to human security as 'the cornerstone of international cooperation in the 21st century' with Japan 'working to make the new century a human-centred century'. Furthermore, starting with the *2000 Diplomatic Bluebook*, human security is described in subsequent issues (2001, 2002, 2003) as being 'a key perspective' of Japanese foreign policy. Against this background, as has been argued by Werthes/Bosold (in this Report), one could say that this new security concept has become a 'political leitmotif' of Japan's foreign policy.

3.2 Further Initiatives

Following Obuchi's sudden death in May 2000 human security has remained an important pillar in the policies of successive Japanese administrations. Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō (2000-2001), the immediate successor of Obuchi, maintained a strong support for human security. In his speech at the Millennium Summit of the UN in September 2000, Mori emphasised that human security has become 'one of the pillars of its [Japanese] diplomacy' and Japan, therefore, 'will spare no effort to make the 21st century a human-centred century', while being committed to further develop 'the concept of this human-centred approach' (Mori 2000). In this context, Mori announced the Japanese government's plan to make an additional substantial contribution to the Trust Fund for Human Security (initially called the Human Security Fund), and Japan's intention to create

'an international committee on human security'. Following Mori's announcement, the inauguration of the Commission on Human Security was formally declared in January 2001.

The successor of Mori in April 2001, Koizumi Junichirō (2001-present), referred to human security when he addressed the International Symposium on Human Security in December 2001. Although he focused primarily on Japan's response to the 11 September terrorist attacks on the US and Japan's role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, Koizumi linked the eradication of terrorism with the necessity to deal with 'other diverse threats to individuals' because 'armed conflicts, poverty and other socio-economic factors create "hotbeds" for terrorism' (Koizumi 2001). He underlined that human security was important, for it served 'to protect survival, livelihood and dignity of individual human beings from diverse threats ...so as to realize the full potential of each person'. In his speech to the Diet in January 2003, Koizumi said that human security should be a priority focus of Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) (cited in Fukushima 2004: 16).

Since its introduction by Obuchi in 1998, human security has been actively promoted by Japanese decision-makers. While Koizumi has articulated human security less explicitly in his speeches in comparison to his predecessors, the concept has continued to be seen as an operational tool for achieving practical goals in accordance with Japan's human-centred diplomacy. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, under Koizumi the concept has come to occupy a place of priority in Japan's ODA policy.





3.3 Concretizing Human Security

Japan has advocated an approach to human security closely related to the 1994 formulation of the UNDP, thereby embracing a broad definition of both freedom from want and from fear. In line with Obuchi's Tokyo speech of 1998, human security was described in the 1999 *Diplomatic Bluebook* as a notion that 'comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten human survival, daily life and dignity [...] and strengthens efforts to confront these threats'. Possible security threats included issues as various as environmental degradation, violations of human rights, transnational organised crime, refugees, poverty and infectious diseases such as AIDS. This official Japanese interpretation of human security was somewhat changed in the 2002 *Diplomatic Bluebook*. While emphasising the need for *protection* of 'the lives, livelihoods, and dignity of individual human beings', the document also stressed the *realisation* of 'the abundant potential inherent in each individual'. The formulation thus focused not only on the protection of the individual from threats, but also on its broad development as a human being. The general emphasis, however, was rather placed on the freedom from want aspect of human security.

The freedom from fear interpretation is also present in the Japanese definition, although the human costs of violent conflicts do not represent the main focus for Japan as they do, for example, for Canada. The Japanese government has clearly stated that, for Japan, human security was a broader concept, with freedom from want being 'no less critical' than freedom from fear, and, therefore, it was 'necessary to go beyond thinking of

human security solely in terms of protecting human life in conflict situations' (Takasu 2000a). In this regard, Japan has distanced itself from the Canadian approach to human security in terms of humanitarian intervention.⁸ The Japanese government has argued that such an interpretation has been used as justification for the use of force in situations with massive human rights violations, which, in Japanese view, was an extremely 'controversial issue' that required careful examination 'not only on moral and political but also on legal grounds' (Takasu 2000b). Indeed, for Japan the use of force cannot be a means for ensuring human security. The legal constraints based on Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibit the country from intervening militarily in armed conflicts. Most importantly, however, the strong anti-militarism that permeates Japanese society and is reflected in the country's pursuit of a non-military foreign policy behaviour makes humanitarian intervention a very undesirable option for Japan.

The Japanese interpretation of human security has remained to a great extent unchanged since the introduction of the concept in 1998, although it has been slightly revised. The emphasis has continued to be placed on human needs rather than on protection of people from violent conflicts. At the same time, a stress on human fulfilment and development was added, which was further expanded in the 2003 final report of the Commission on Human Security (to be discussed in the following section). In particular, the focus on the 'development' aspect of human security has been reflected in, and implemented through, Japanese ODA policy.

⁸ See Fukushima (2004) for a detailed analysis of the Canadian definition.



4. Substantiating and Implementing Human security

Japan has been implementing human security through, on the one hand, the Trust Fund For Human Security (hereafter the Trust Fund) and ODA, and on the other, the Commission on Human Security (CHS) (Fukushima 2004: 22). While the Trust Fund and ODA have been used to put the concept into practice, the task of the CHS was to formulate a definition of human security and make recommendations to the international society that would serve as guidelines for future policies and actions.

4.1 The Trust Fund for Human Security

Initially called the Human Security Fund, the Trust Fund was established in March 1999 in the UN with an initial contribution from the Japanese government of approximately US\$ 4.63 million (¥500 million). Since then, the fund has received additional financial assistance from Japan which by the end of the fiscal year 2004 (March 2005) had amounted to approximately US\$ 256 million (¥29 billion), making the Trust Fund one of the largest of its kind established in the UN (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2005: 9). The Trust Fund donations have been used to support projects implemented by UN-related organisations, which address from the perspective of human security threats such as poverty, environmental degradation, conflicts, landmines and infectious diseases. The main focus of the projects has been in the area of community development and post-conflict peace-building (Fu-

kushima 2004: 22), which reflects the priority that the Trust Fund gives to the least developed countries and those affected by conflicts.⁹

4.2 The Official Development Assistance Program

The introduction of human security into ODA followed Obuchi's speeches at the end of 1998.¹⁰ In the 1999 annual Japanese ODA report (which in 2001 was renamed as White Paper on ODA renamed from the 2001 White Paper on ODA) a section on 'Human security and ODA' was included, which quoted Obuchi's promotion of the concept and referred to ODA projects aimed at realising human security in practice, such as Japan's assistance to Kosovo and programs for the removal of anti-personnel landmines (Fukushima 2004: 23). Although human security was mentioned in the subsequent White Papers, it was only from 2003 onwards that it came to occupy a substantial place in Japan's ODA program. This was a result of the revision

⁹ The 2005 Trust Fund pamphlet (March 2005) gives the following statistics: the largest number of projects, out of total 118 approved by the fund, are in the area of health and medical care (30%) and poverty (27%), followed by refugee problems (12%) and conflict (11%). The budget allocated to the projects (out of total appr. US\$ 149 million) shows that those related to conflict situations occupy the first place (appr. US\$ 55 million, or 37%), followed by poverty (appr. US\$ 32 million, or 21%) and health (appr. US\$ 28 million, or 18%).

¹⁰ For details about Japan's ODA, see the official website: <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/index.html>>.



of the ODA charter, the basic document of Japan's ODA policy.

The revised ODA charter identified human security as one of the 'basic policies' of ODA, describing it as an important perspective through which 'direct threats to individuals such as conflicts, disasters, infectious diseases' could be addressed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2003). The text stated that Japan would implement ODA 'to strengthen the capacity of local communities through human resource development' and would 'extend assistance for the protection and empowerment of individuals' with a view of ensuring that human dignity would be maintained 'from the conflict stage to the reconstruction and development stages'. The stress on both protection from threats and empowerment of individuals was thus in line with the Japanese interpretation of human security. In order to materialise the concept in reality, Japan has used the Trust Fund as a main vehicle for the realisation of human security objectives, and has additionally utilised the Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects.

Asia has remained a priority region in the new ODA charter, as was the case under the former charter. In this framework, Japan has extended ODA, particularly to South-East Asian countries, to support their economic and social development, and with a view to alleviating regional disparities. Africa has also continued to be an important addressee of Japan's ODA, with Japan providing aid through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process, and by way of extending grant aid in the areas of health and medical care, education, water and food. Other initiatives in-

clude Japan's participation for peace consolidation in, and reconstruction of, Sri Lanka, and assistance provided for political, economic and social institution building in Cambodia, Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan.

4.3 The Commission on Human Security (CHS)

The CHS was established in January 2001 on the initiative of the Japanese government and in response to the UN Secretary-General's call at the 2000 Millennium Summit of the United Nations for a world 'free of want' and 'free of fear'. The commission was mandated to develop the concept of human security as an operational tool for policy formulation and implementation, and to propose concrete initiatives for dealing with human security issues. As such, the CHS was supposed to promote the understanding of the concept and encourage greater engagement on the part of international society for its practical realisation. In 2003, the CHS compiled a final report titled 'Human security now', which was submitted to both the Prime Minister Koizumi and the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and published in May 2003.

According to the CHS report, human security seeks 'to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance *human freedoms* and *human fulfilment*' (CHS 2003: 4, emphasis added). 'Fundamental freedoms', it was said in the report, are those that 'are the essence of life' and human security, therefore, meant protecting those freedoms from 'critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations' (ibid. 4). The report further emphasised that human security reinforced human dignity and also aimed 'at developing the capa-

bilities of individuals and communities' to act on their own behalf (ibid.). In this way, the CHS report added to the 'protection' aspect of human security an 'empowerment' interpretation, which stressed the abilities of individuals to protect themselves from threats and conflicts, and to respond to problems. Human security was, therefore, described in the report as encompassing several kinds of freedom – 'freedom from want and freedom from fear, as well as freedom to take action on one's own behalf' (ibid. 10). The CHS report further explored two particular aspects of human security – first, conflict-related concerns and second, development-related issues. The report underlined that the topics selected were 'suggestive rather than exhaustive', which was hoped to encourage further exploration of human security issues by the international community (ibid. 12).

The CHS report has been criticised for not being able to propose a clear definition of the concept of hu-

man security in terms of its being freedom from fear or freedom from want (Fukushima 2004: 28). As is emphasised at the beginning of the CHS report, however, 'any concept of human security must be dynamic', because 'what people consider to be 'vital' – what they consider to be 'of the essence of life' and 'crucially important' – varies across individuals and societies' (CHS 2003: 4). Thus, the report's main contribution should be seen from the perspective of its explicitly addressing the topic and suggesting concrete actions, thereby clearly locating the security of people within current discussions on security. The report has, furthermore, set the scene for a continuation of the debate on human security both inside and outside of Japan, encouraging further action with its recommendations rather than serving as a defining tool. This is the reason why it was clearly stated in the CHS report that it refrained from 'proposing an itemised list of what makes up human security' (ibid.).

5. Conclusion

The Japanese approach to human security has been more as a policy tool for activities in the area of non-traditional security, than as a particular conceptualisation that needs precise definition in order to be put into practice. Not only has human security become 'one of the key perspectives' of the country's foreign policy – that is, serving as a political leitmotif – but it also quite quickly found its way into being implemented in practice through Japan's development policies and activities in the area of post-conflict peace-building and,

recently, efforts in peace consolidation.

Human security, with its focus on threats other than the traditional military ones, reflects the Japanese 'comprehensive' view of security, advocated vis-à-vis its own national security as early as from the 1980s and applied to the international context after the end of the Cold War. As an expression of the changing nature of security with the individual as a referent object, the Japanese approach places a particular emphasis on hu-





man needs and human development, which is materialised in practice through its ODA policy. Human security, furthermore, expresses the values of a society dedicated to peace and permeated by anti-militarism, and strongly opposed to coercive means, such as the use of force. Yet, the Japanese approach also stresses the need to prevent conflicts and to deal with their consequences for humans. Against this background, human security is a rather natural extension of Japan's non-military security agenda, as well as a possibility for Japanese policy-makers to increase the country's role in international peace and security. Human security thus reflects Japan's historical background and norms, its evolution from a reactive to a proactive state and its particular preferences for peaceful means both for solutions of conflicts and international cooperation.

This paper has illustrated that, despite being described by a number of scholars as a 'meaningless' notion, for Japan human security has become an instrument for foreign policy actions in line with the country's international behaviour. While as a concept of security it may be too broad to be defined in a coherent way, human security may be regarded as a class of research in the field of security studies mainly concerned with non-military threats to actors other than states. Such a field may then accommodate different conceptualisations and approaches that could reflect actor's specific backgrounds and policy preferences. While formulations may vary, they could be used, as has been demonstrated by Japan, as recommendations and policy tools for the practical realisation of the security of the individual, which, first and foremost, represents the whole idea of human security.

References

- Acharya, Amitav/Acharya, Arabinda 2000: Human security in Asia Pacific: puzzle, panacea or peril?, in: Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security Bulletin, 27/2000.
<http://www.iir.ubc.ca/cancaps/cbul27.html#husec> (18.05.2005)
- Berger, Thomas U. 1993: From sword to chrysanthemum: Japan's culture of anti-militarism, in: International Security, 17(4): 119-150.
- Berger, Thomas U. 1996: Norms, identity and national security in Germany and Japan, in: Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.): In The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: 317-356.
- Commission on Human Security 2003: Human Security Now, May 2003.
<http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html> (02.07. 2005)
- Edström, Bert 2003: Japan's foreign policy and human security, in: Japan Forum, 15 (2): 209-225.
- Fukushima, Akiko 2004: Human security: comparing Japanese and Canadian governmental thinking and practice, in: Canadian Consortium on Hu-

man Security (CCHS), August 2004, CCHS human security visiting fellow paper.

http://www.humansecurity.info/CCHS_web/Research/en/index.php
(24.06.2005).

Gilson, Julie 2000: *Japan and the European Union: a Partnership for the Twenty-first Century?*, London.

Koizumi, Junichirō 2001: Remark by Mr. Junichirō Koizumi Prime Minister of Japan at the International Symposium on Human Security, Tokyo, 15 December.

http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/sympo0112_pm.html
(30.06.2005)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2003: *Revision of Japan's Official Development Assistance Charter*, August 2003.

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/revision0308.pdf> (1.07.2005)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan 2005: *The Trust Fund for Human Security – For the “Human-centered” 21st Century*, March 2005.

http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/t_fund21/t_fund21.pdf
(2.07.2005)

Mori, Yoshirō 2000: Statement by H.E. Mr. Yoshirō Mori Prime Minister of Japan at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations, 7 September.

<http://www.un.org/millennium/webcast/statements/japan.htm>
(30.06.2005)

Newman, Edward 2001: Human security and constructivism, in: *International Studies Perspectives*, 2 (3): 239-251.

Obuchi, Keizō 1998a: Opening remarks by Prime Minister Obuchi at An Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow, Tokyo, 2 December.

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/intellectual/asia9812.html>
(29.06.2005)

Obuchi, Keizō 1998b: *Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia*, policy speech by Prime Minister Keizō Obuchi at the lecture program hosted by the Institute for International Relations, Hanoi, 16 December.

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9812/policyspeech.html>
(29.06.2005)

Paris, Roland 2001: Human security: paradigm shift or hot air, in: *International Security*, 26 (2): 87-102.

United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 1994: *Human Development Report*, New York/Oxford.



What Role for Human Rights in the European Security Strategy?

Ruby Gropas

Promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms through foreign policy-making is more than just an end in itself. Viewed from a liberal-democratic perception of foreign policy, it is the means through which to achieve a democratic peace and thereby promote security.¹ This premise is based on the assumption that nations respecting the rights and freedoms of their citizens are less prone to internal upheaval and more prone to the maintenance of friendly inter-state relations (Donnelly 1998, Risse-Kapen 1995, Russett 1998). The concept of 'democratic peace' is therefore closely interlinked with the inclusion of human rights in policy-making. The developments in international law and the changing norms and standards within the international community which occurred in the second half of the twentieth century have redefined the concept of sovereignty and what is considered a legitimate foreign policy objective. The consequences of the two World Wars, the creation of the UN framework, and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, along with the codification and institutionalisation of individual and minority rights within international and re-

gional institutions, have redefined the position of individuals in international relations and the terms of their relationship with their Nation-States. This took place against the backdrop of bipolar competition between ideological systems and often conflicting perceptions of democracy and human rights (i.e. individual v. community rights/ first v. second generation rights, etc.)

In the latter half of the twentieth century, it became part of the 'morality of states' to acknowledge rights and obligations to entities which are not states, such as individuals, ethnic groups, interest groups, non-governmental organisations, etc (Hill 1989). Such entities emerged as actors increasingly able to influence the policies, the objectives, the choice of means and instruments, and the public debate of the traditionally 'supreme' actors of international relations. NGOs and (intergovernmental and supranational) institutions played a fundamental role in advancing the idea of international and regional legal protection of human rights and in pushing human rights concerns onto diplomatic agendas. Moreover, the globalisation process and international telecommunication and media networks accelerated the dissemination of human rights idea(l)s and world-wide public awareness of human rights violations.

¹ An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Third ECPR Conference, which was held in Budapest, 8-10 September 2005 as part of the panel on Human Security and on Foreign Policy Agendas – Theoretical and Practical Implications. The author is grateful to the valuable comments and feedback of the panel convener Tobias Debiel and to Taylor Owen.



1. Setting the Background to Human Rights, Foreign Policy and Security

As described above changing international norms were given an added impetus with the end of the Cold War. The apparent success of the liberal democratic model based on the respect and protection of human rights made the promotion of these rights and freedoms into necessary elements for the achievement of peace, stability and co-operation. They have thus come to occupy a central position in contemporary international relations and in foreign policy-making.

Although the fall of the Iron Curtain freed international relations from bipolar power politics, a new phase of instability was triggered with the disintegration of the Soviet structures, the effects of new states being created across Europe and Central Asia, and with the multiplication of ethnic wars and regional conflicts across the world. The concept of security was expanded in its scope and nature to include human security, and without a competing ideology, democracy, human rights and the rule of law became identified as the cornerstones of international peace and regional security. The discourse on individual and minority rights led to the legitimisation of humanitarian intervention, even through military means, thereby deeply affecting the nature of state sovereignty. Hence, in spite of persisting human rights abuses and a degree of rhetoric hypocrisy and selective application that continued to surround human rights issues in world politics, individual and minority rights became international standards of respect and legiti-

macy. Even cases where governments merely paid lip-service to human rights or used human rights issues in their relations with third states in a purely instrumental manner (i.e. to deny the granting of, or to acquire development assistance) may have paradoxically contributed to the emergence of norms, standards, practices, and general expectations within domestic and international public opinion, and within international organisations. These in turn further affected government policies. This spiralling effect led many states to declare 'ethical' foreign policies² and from the receiving end, many other states (particularly from Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Third World) to increasingly accept conditionality as the rule of the game. In effect, trade, co-operation and assistance agreements, and membership in regional, international or supranational organisations have become conditional upon democratisation criteria and the respect of their citizens' fundamental rights and freedoms. It appears that at the end of the 20th century, despite the existence of cultural relativist objections and the persistence of inconsistencies in the application of human rights policies, the traditional theoretical tensions reproaching the inclusion of ethical considerations in inter-state relations had been largely overcome.

In more recent years, however, the role of human rights in foreign policy and in international relations

² For example, New Labour declared the launch of an ethical foreign policy in 1997.



has been characterised by conflicting and often contradictory approaches and practices. On the one hand, respect for human rights is entrenched as a fundamental cornerstone for stability, security, democracy, good neighbourly relations, and development. On the other hand, security priorities seem to take precedence over upholding certain rights that have been long identified as belonging to a core of human rights, and at times even to be furthered to the detriment of civil rights and liberties. In the post 9/11 world, human rights are just as relevant – if not more, though the debate has increasingly shifted to maintaining the balance between security and respect for civil liberties in the fight against terrorism.

In effect, it has become commonplace to argue that since the events of 9/11, the tensions between human rights and security have been reintroduced. NGOs active in the field of human rights and protection of civil liberties³, have been particularly concerned that the universality of human rights is being challenged. Double standards and selectivity are becoming the norm through the anti-terrorism legislation that has been adopted and through increasingly common practices of indefinite detentions without trial, special courts based on secret evidence, the absence of sufficient judicial oversight, inhuman treatment of detainees, asylum application handling, etc. This is all the more disconcerting given that some of the direct or indirect challenges to long-accepted human rights

standards (such as the Geneva convention on the treatment of prisoners of war) have been made by the governments that have been at the forefront of efforts to establish these as international standards and obligations on behalf of all states. Coupled with a greater reluctance on behalf of governments to criticize others' domestic policies, this has led to a tilting of the balance at the expense of human rights and freedoms.

A multitude of questions arise: how do we define security today? What creates security? What constitutes a threat to security? Whose security is at stake? How should security threats be handled? And, at what cost? Against this background, it becomes relevant to explore the relationship between human rights and security and to focus in particular on the way in which this is expressed in the EU's Security Strategy. The European Security Strategy is studied because it constitutes the most structured and formal declaration of the EU Member States' common understanding of security and of challenges to security.

To this intent, the paper first briefly examines the expanded definition of security and then turns to the relationship between human rights and human security. In the last section, it focuses specifically on the EU's Security Strategy as expressed in the document proposed by High-Representative for CFSP Javier Solana "A secure Europe in a better world" and adopted by the European Council in December 2003.

3 See for instance Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Human Rights First, The Carter Center, etc.



2. The Expanding Definition of Security

Security has been a dynamic field of study, particularly since the end of the Cold War. The study of security has been expanded through constructivist, post-modernist, neo-realist, environmentalist and gender schools of thought and especially from strategic and peace studies. Traditionally associated with international relations studies and in particular with strategic studies, it has increasingly concentrated on what a broader understanding of security entails, on how security is defined in terms of what it means to be secure, on whose security is at stake, on what is at stake, and on what one is to be secured from (Walker 1997).

At its most basic level, security involves survival in the face of an actual or perceived threat to the referent. Traditionally, the referent has been the state, and military means have been the main means through which to ensure security. Threats to security have usually been considered in terms of threat to national sovereignty, territorial integrity, etc. In recent years, alternative understandings of security have gained ground. Thus, the referent may be the state, but also the nation, a social group, a community, a family or an individual. By the same token, the security agenda has been broadened beyond the strict focus of state and national security to focus on individuals, communities, or the international collectivity. In parallel, it has moved away from traditionally military issues, epitomised by nuclear security, to encompass issues of economic well-being, cultural identity, human and civic rights, and environmental concerns.

The expansion of the concept of security has developed in parallel with the wider twentieth-century academic debate that has strengthened the cosmopolitan conception of humans as members of the global community and holders of rights irrespective of geographic, political, social, ethnic, class, racial or other considerations (Vincent 1986 and 1992; Held 1995; Ruggie 1993 and 1998). Whereas in the case of the state, the security criterion is sovereignty, in the case of the individual and of society, the security criterion tends to be identity (Wæver 1995) and the fulfillment of socio-economic rights and needs.

Interestingly, certain aspects of this expanded definition of security have been willingly embraced by international organisations such as the UN since the early 1990s, with the UNDP dedicating its Human Development Report to 'New Dimensions of Security' in 1994. Since this report, emphasis has been placed on supporting a sustainable development model in order to ensure peace, stability and security in the Third World. And, efforts have been directed towards recognising that people's security is not limited to protection of borders or military might but that 'human security' is equally understood as encompassing economic security, income security, health security, food security, personal security, community security, environmental security and security from crime and terrorism. In these cases, the threats are unemployment, disease, hunger, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards.

Threats to security, whether existential or perceived, may thus be traditional in nature or 'modern.' The latter category basically refers to threats that do not target the state (i.e. its territorial integrity, its borders and sovereignty) but constitute a threat to human security (i.e. the people). This encompasses terrorism, proliferation of WMD and failed states, and cannot be addressed by purely military means since the root causes fall well outside the realm of the military. At the same time, the scope of such threats currently cannot only be addressed by civil agencies and necessarily require responses that are also military in nature (Paulaskas 2005).

In all cases, however, security is associated with peace, stability, the absence of violence or even more broadly, the absence of threat. At the same time the notion of 'soft-security' has emerged in parallel, or in contrast, to hard security concerns. Soft security refers to issues that are mainly of a non-military nature and that require political and economic co-operation in order to be addressed. With regard to the European continent, soft-security risks have included political and economic instability, ethnic and religious conflict, minority rights, immigration, refugee and asylum issues, environmental concerns, organised crime and trafficking.

The policy implications of this expanded, or even enriched, definition of security is that it becomes the core, underlying motivation for the formulation and implementation of a foreign policy that encourages democratisation and the rule of law, that condemns violations of human rights, and that even intervenes to protect human rights. Intervention may take a multitude of forms ranging from diplomatic criticism to sanctions or forcible humanitarian intervention. Emanuel Adler's definition of security within international relations is appropriate in this context. Adler has defined security as: "'comprehensive' (it links classic security elements to economic, environmental, cultural, and human rights factors), 'indivisible' (one state's security is inseparable from that of other states), and 'cooperative' (security is based on confidence and cooperation, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the work of mutually reinforcing multilateral institutions)" (Adler 1998: 119-120). These conceptual dimensions of security are reflected in practice in the EU's understanding of security and constitute the guiding principles of Europe's Security Strategy that may be considered as the most important text defining the goals and foundations of Europe's common foreign and security policy to date.

3. Human Security and Human Rights

Given that human beings are at the epicentre of the broadened concept of security it is relevant to consider the relationship and connections that exist between human security and human rights.

The Commission on Human Security (CHS) defines human security as the

protection of "the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and fulfilment". Human security has been identified as being universal, its components are inter-dependent, it is best assured through prevention and it is people-(not threat) centred (King & Murray





2002). It has also been argued that it is complementary to state security as it furthers human development and enhances human rights (Commission on Human Security Report 2003). Human security signifies protecting fundamental freedoms, protecting people from critical threats, conflicts and deprivations, and providing the opportunity for people to build on their strengths and aspirations to achieve their full potential. Thus, human security involves a mutually reinforcing relation between protection and empowerment. In the academic corner, it has prompted research on the inter-connected dimensions of the expanded notion of security, development and human rights. In the policy-making corner, it has been officially incorporated in the foreign policies of Canada, Norway and Japan and it is at the epicentre of the UNDP's activities while it is also taken up by the World Bank.

The UNDP's formulation of human security, which is also perhaps the broadest and most all-encompassing, comprises the following core dimensions of security:

- *personal and physical security* (such as the right of individuals and communities to preserve life, health and dwell in a safe and sustainable environment);
- *economic security* (including access to employment and to the resources necessary for one's own existence, improvements in the material quality of life, etc);
- *social security* (for instance providing protection from discrimination based on age, gender, ethnicity, social status, freedom to associate, etc);
- *political security* (invoking the right to representation, participation and dissent as well as the empowerment to make choices and being able to effect change. This also involves the right to recourse to justice);
- and *ethnic and cultural security* (which involves a social climate

in which minority populations or special groups feel secure in expressing their identity, their characteristics and needs).

These seven dimensions cover practically all aspects of human activity and therefore risk having their importance diluted from a policy-relevant approach. Thus, a more concrete definition has been sought, and in effect, a more tangible perspective was as outlined in the Report by the Commission on Human Security.⁴ It is proposed that human security is relevant to address threats faced by people in the following circumstances:

- It involves protecting people in violent conflict, particularly given that civilians are the main casualties in conflicts. Integrated strategies that combine political, military, humanitarian and development considerations are required in this context to end human rights violations and provide humanitarian assistance where needed;
- It also involves protecting and empowering people in post-conflict situations where reconstruction, reconciliation, stabilisation and setting up functioning, legitimate and efficient institutions are necessary for rebuilding stability and security within these societies;
- It equally involves protecting and empowering people undergoing

⁴ The Commission on Human Security (CHS) was established with the initiative of the Government of Japan and in response to the UN Secretary-General's call at the 2000 Millennium Summit for a world "free of want" and "free of fear." It is co-chaired by Sadako Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees and Amartya Sen, Nobel Laureate and Master of Trinity College, Cambridge. (<http://www.humansecurity-chs.org>)



migration, whether this is cross-border or internal. It is relevant for refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced persons just as much as it involves persons migrating to escape natural disasters or seeking an opportunity to improve their situation;

- Related to this is the issue of economic insecurity caused by extreme poverty. Human security entails efficient and equitable trade arrangements, and economic growth that extends to all segments of society and that offers a system of social protection;
- This in turn is intricately connected with health and education. Conditions of insecurity, poverty and conflict are the main root causes of ill-health and inefficient health systems unable to deal with global infectious diseases and poverty-related health deprivations. At the same time, basic education and knowledge are the cornerstones of human security, not only because they empower people to achieve their aspirations, but also because they provide them with the skills to protect themselves from other threats to security (for example, by offering health education, or teaching respect and tolerance for diversity, etc.).

All of the above dimensions of human security acquire authoritative relevance and even a commanding obligation to be respected and protected because of the fundamental nature of human rights and freedoms. The Human Security Commission undertook the task of tying human security to human rights to the advantage of both.

In effect, it has suggested that by placing human security in the con-

text of human rights it strengthens correlative duties. Correlative duties are attached to practically all human rights and these basically involve the following: the duty of respecting a particular right and refraining from interfering with the enjoyment of the right; the duty of protecting from the violation of rights by state authorities or other actors; the duty to promote rights, which entails raising public awareness and providing the necessary procedures for the rights to be asserted and protected; and finally, the duty of the state to take appropriate measures towards the full realisation of the right. Furthermore, these duties are both positive (in that they relate to the need to undertake specific tasks to meet these duties) and negative (given that in certain cases they require the non-intervention of state or other authorities). But in all cases, these issues require policy responses, and most of all they require concerted policy responses between countries and with international organisations and civil society actors.

By the same token, it can equally be argued that human security can reinforce human rights on policy-makers' agenda for a number of reasons. This is by no means an exhaustive account; it merely aims at pointing out five arguments that may be particularly influential:

First, human security can restrain the degree of state discretion in the realisation of rights. From this perspective, it is suggested that by attributing to human security the same importance as national security, respect for human rights and national security arguments no longer need to be balanced since these become complementary. Thus, the questions of choosing between security and rights, between safety and respect for liber-



ties, become irrelevant. Second, it may strengthen the pace and intensity at which states are required to address the social and economic rights of their people. In effect, social and economic rights are often subject to a progressive realisation approach providing state authorities with a wide leeway and limited pressure to undertake the necessary reforms and measures. Given that under-development and extreme poverty have been identified as being among the root causes of most contemporary threats and challenges to human security (regardless of whether this takes the form of migration, epidemics, civil unrest, terrorism, environmental degradation, etc), it makes it a more pressing concern to respect of the second generation of human rights. Third, human security can provide the framework within which different sets and categories of human rights may cease to be considered as conflicting (particularly regarding first and second generation rights) and through which their indivisibility and interdependence can be reinforced. Fourth, human security makes the need for humanitarian intervention on the

grounds of serious human rights violations more pressing, though it also extends the debate on whether, to what extent and at what stage force ought to be used for the purpose of protecting human rights. Fifth, human security expands the notion of threats to human rights and of who can perpetrate these violations, thereby widening the scope to include non-state actors and private entities.

For all the enthusiasm that 'human security' has triggered, it has raised just as much criticism. It has been contested for its theoretical incoherence, its scope, the difficulty in measuring it, and its utility, since it is argued that it cannot meaningfully be reflected in practice and that more often than not it raises false hopes (see Oberleitner 2003). Nonetheless, its influence within UN agencies and within specific sectors (for instance regarding land-mines, small arms, the ICC, development cooperation, etc) is not inconsiderable. Equally significant is the extent to which the dimensions of human security can be found in the EU's formal definition of how it understands its common security.

4. A Secure Europe in a Better World

From a policy-relevant perspective, the academic debate relating to the proliferation of referent objects and of threats, or of perceived threats, has been particularly pertinent as regards the formulation or reformulations of countries' foreign and security policies. The relationship between this expanded conceptualisation of security and human rights is relevant for foreign policy-making, not just to be able to identify the root

causes of its security challenges, but equally to be able to ascertain the most appropriate means and instruments to achieve greater security.

Javier Solana's *A Secure Europe in a Better World* reflects these recent trends since it attempts to refer to security both at the state level and at the human level (i.e. individual/ community), while taking into account both hard and soft security issues. This text is an effort to formalize the place se-



curity holds in the EU's world-view of international relations, and the ways in which the EU considers it can contribute to global and regional security. It thus acknowledges that the EU is a security-maker, a security provider, and it also recognizes the need to enhance its instruments and priorities across various fields in order to be able to respond effectively and efficiently to the current challenges to security in all levels. The question of whether and to what extent it succeeds in accomplishing these is beyond the scope of this paper.

What is argued in this paper is that the EU Security Strategy goes a long way in terms of making human security an inextricable dimension of national/European security and thereby bringing the respect and protection of fundamental rights and freedoms to the centre of the EU's understanding of security.

It is necessary, however, to go a step back in order to provide the wider framework within which the EU Security Strategy was adopted, since a number of exogenous and endogenous factors determined the need to stipulate a common security strategy, and ultimately its content.

4.1 Adopting the EU Security Strategy

The National Security Strategy, published in 2002, provided a clear picture of the way in which the US perceived threats to global, regional and national security and also outlined its response to these threats, thereby opening the debate on 'pre-emptive strikes.' The war against Iraq that eventually followed in 2003 unleashed a series of internal crises and clashes in Europe and in its transatlantic partnership. These two

events made evident that at the EU level there was no clear definition of what constitutes a threat to national and global security; and, that there was no common approach with regard to the preferred means and instruments through which to address current security challenges. Common strategies for particular regions (i.e. Southeast Europe, or Russia) had been drafted, yet still, a full decade after Maastricht during which the EU had been declaring a Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Union and its Member States lacked the most fundamental element: a formal set of common strategic objectives.

This gap was not only damaging for the EU's identity and credibility on the international scene, it was also harmful to the sense of mutually shared values that exist within the EU security community (cf. Adler, Ruggie). The United Kingdom, France and Germany set the High Representative for the CFSP with the task of drafting a European Security Strategy to address this gap (Cameron 2004). Thus, an EU institution – in this particular case, the High Representative for the CFSP – was attributed the responsibility of serving as a mediator and facilitator between the Member States' perceptions of security challenges and preferred means to address these in order to produce a policy output that would reflect the EU's values and its definition of security. This basically involved 'codifying' the existing EU 'acquis' relating to the EU Member States' understanding of security; facilitating the identification of common strategic goals; providing the platform for further consensus, thereby setting an additional foundation for a common European foreign policy; and initiating a relevant set of policy recommendations.



In effect, in June 2003 at the Thessaloniki Summit, Javier Solana, High Representative for the CFSP put forward a first text with a series of recommendations for a secure Europe in a better world. During the six-month period that followed, an attempt at a public debate on foreign and security policy was instigated especially to obtain the input of other non-state actors (i.e. think-tanks, and representatives of epistemic communities). The EU Institute for Security Studies invited experts to three seminars held in Rome, Paris and Stockholm to discuss the proposed text. On 12th December 2003, the revised document proposed by Javier Solana was adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the European Council in Brussels. Commonly referred to as the *European Security Strategy*, this document constitutes a succinct assessment of global security challenges and key threats as perceived by the EU and its Member States. Moreover, it identifies the EU's strategic objectives, and proposes a series of policy implications for the Union.⁵

The European Security Strategy was welcomed by most as an encouraging initiative, and even as a 'triumph of hope over experience' (Wallace, *Financial Times*, 27 June 2003). Given the severe rift in transatlantic relations over the war against Iraq and the split between European governments (including EU member states and the accession states) in two bitterly opposing camps, this initiative was an undisputed accomplishment. It provided an opportunity for a consensus on the EU's long-term

security goals between the EU Member States not only at a time of global crisis, but also at a turning point for Europe given that the fifth enlargement, creating the EU of twenty-five Member States, was coming up.

4.2 The Main Dimensions of the EU Security Strategy

In response to the new international environment, five key threats for the EU and its Member States were identified by the High Representative for the CFSP (*European Security Strategy*, 2003):

- *terrorism* – this is considered as a strategic threat to the whole of Europe, emphasis is placed on terrorism at the global scale linked to violent religious extremism; Europe is seen as both a target and a base for such terrorism, thereby making concerted action indispensable;
- *the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction* – technological advances have made WMD increasingly dangerous and the potential for an arms race in the Middle East is presented as particularly disconcerting, as is the risk of terrorist groups acquiring WMD;
- *regional conflicts* - regardless of whether these are close to Europe's borders or far away, violent or frozen conflicts threaten human rights, social and physical infrastructures and regional stability overall, while providing fertile ground for extremism, terrorism, state failure, organized crime and even an arms race for WMD;
- *state failure* – bad governance, corruption, weak institutions

5 Solana J., A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels, 12 December 2003. The full text can be downloaded from: <http://ue.eu.int/solana/list.asp?BID=111>.



and lack of accountability, abuse of power and civil conflict erode the state and its institutions, leaving the ground free for organized crime and terrorist groups;

- *organized crime* – activities range from illegal migration to drugs, trafficking in humans and weapons and constitute one of the prime challenges for Europe's borders.

These global threats are perceived to be interdependent and mutually reinforcing, and when considered in combination, constitute a radical threat to regional stability and to European security.

Three strategic objectives are singled out in order for the European Union 'to defend its security and to promote its values' (10: 2003) while also sharing 'in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.' (4: 2003). These three objectives are outlined in the document as follows:

First, the EU must continue to be active in addressing these key threats. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early, and none of the new threats is purely military, nor can it be tackled by purely military means. In this, it is argued, the EU and its Member States are well-equipped, with both military and especially non-military means at their disposal. Second, the EU must build security in its neighbourhood. As the EU has enlarged, it has come closer to regions of frozen or latent conflicts or regions that were recently engaged in violent conflict. The core task is to promote 'a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative rela-

tions.' (13: 2003) Making sure that no new dividing lines are created along the European continent, particularly as regards the Balkans, resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and engaging in a broader engagement with the Arab world are at the core of this effort. The third strategic objective is to promote an international order based on effective multilateralism. In effect, in the document adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the EU Member States, it is underlined that 'the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.' (14: 2003) Naturally, the UN and the UN Security Council are accorded central importance, as are the main international organizations, while the transatlantic partnership, and particularly the NATO dimension, are presented as the principal pillars of this system. It is also noted that based on its own experience, security can be increased through confidence building and arms control regimes between well-governed democratic states. It is thus re-stated that the best means of strengthening the international order is to spread good governance, support social and political reform, establish the rule of law and protect human rights. And, the EU is well placed to contribute in a very significant manner to this through its trade and development policies, through assistance programmes and its conditionality criteria.

To be more effective, however, the text concludes that the EU needs to be more active in pursuing the strategic objectives (particularly regarding preventive engagement), more capable (by systematically pooling civilian and military resources in more efficient and flexible ways while strengthening the diplomatic and de-



fence capabilities of the member states in combination with the EU institutions), more coherent (both in terms of instruments and capabilities) and work in developing closer partnerships with those who share common values and goals with the EU.

4.3 To What Extent does the European Security Strategy Incorporate Human Security?

It is contended here that the European Security Strategy lies within the evolution that has increasingly characterized the EU's foreign policy both with regard to its priorities (Smith 1998), and with regard to the role the EU institutions have played in institutionalizing the triptych of democracy, human rights and rule of law in the EU's external scope of action.

First of all it reflects a wider understanding of what constitutes core threats to European security. The European Security Strategy reflects the shift from an exclusively military conception of security to one encompassing social and economic inequalities, non-traditional security threats or 'soft security' challenges. Second, it indicates the shift that has taken place with regard to how security challenges ought to be faced and handled. In effect, military alliances and balance of power tactics are no longer considered sufficient; rather increasing institutionalization of relations in multilateral fora and institutions and legally binding agreements are preferred, leading towards a more 'cooperative' approach to security. Finally, it reiterates the position that international order is fundamentally based on the respect for human rights and freedoms.

The text addresses the threats posed by terrorism and proliferation of WMD and identifies these as top priorities, but strengthening the international rule-based order according to the principles of multilateralism, cooperation between partners, and the core role of international and regional institutions are ranked just as highly. This underlines the core messages of the European Security Strategy: that no single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own; and from a more normative perspective that the EU aims at contributing to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world. The EU's formalized support for multilateralism and the declaration of intent to take on greater responsibility and action so as to carry greater political weight is in rhetorical terms an illustration of its gradual willingness to promote its world-view on international relations and its conception of security on the global scene.

The text is a statement of objectives, values and strategic guidelines. It does not spell out the details of how the EU can be more active, more effective, more capable or more coherent; nor does it refer to the particular roles of the EU institutions. Given the current period of reflection following the French and Dutch referenda results on the European Constitutional Treaty and its uncertain future this is probably a good thing since it does not require a revisiting of its policy recommendations, which are sufficiently general in nature and scope to continue to be relevant.

The importance of the text that was drafted by the High Representative is that it succeeded in synthesizing the common security concerns and strategic objectives of the EU



Member States at a time when the definition of what constitutes a threat to international and human security and in which instances military force is the most appropriate means of addressing it certainly did not have an evident answer. Internally, its value is fundamental since it constitutes an important reference point in the efforts to establish a more credible and substantial common EU foreign and security policy and strives to achieve more coherence while urging for closer cooperation. Internationally, its value is just as important, if not more, since it constitutes a clear and succinct presentation of the security concerns that the EU has prioritized, of the factors that the Union considers to be conducive to instability and insecurity, and of the political role it aspires to fulfill in order to contribute to global peace, prosperity and security. In terms of rhetoric, the text achieves its purpose. The promotion of Europe's common values - namely, respect for democracy, human rights, rule of law, market economy, solidarity, sustainable development - appears inbuilt in its understanding of security and the scope of its Security Strategy. What remains is to see the ways in which this Security Strategy will eventually be implemented.

Precisely this question was at the core of the Barcelona Report of the

Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities. The report was presented to the High Representative in September 2004 and proposed a Human Security Doctrine for Europe in order to provide the EU with the capabilities to implement the ESS (<http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityDoctrine.pdf>). It outlines a series of seven principles according to which the ESS should develop, namely: the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments and the appropriate use of force. And it posits that for its implementation it requires an integrated set of civil-military capabilities that would be suited to carrying out human security operations and a legal framework that underpins the decisions to intervene. The report admits that the ESS ought to be grounded in pragmatism since the EU's capacity for operational missions is limited, as is in many cases the political will to carry them out. Nonetheless, it offers detailed description of the technical requirements of the Human Security Response Force it proposes, since it argues that the EU's critical interest is in developing capabilities that can contribute to global human security, which is inextricably linked to the security of Europeans.

5. Concluding Remarks

Respect for human rights has generally been associated with respect for the rule of law and democratic governance. And, this triptych has come to be considered as one of the core foundations for internal stability

and prosperity, and for international peace and security. Security in this context encompasses human security and consequently requires respect and protection of individual and minority rights and freedoms.



Today, the protection and promotion of human rights are considered legitimate objectives of foreign policy. This has not been limited to diplomatic declarations or public condemnations of human rights violations. It has also been articulated through (forcible) humanitarian interventions, human rights conditionality clauses to trade and/or association agreements, development cooperation and technical assistance programmes, etc. The promotion of human rights concerns and democratic principles in foreign policy is a continuous process. It is not a one-off decision or policy output, but an objective that is best seen as an on-going process, where competing interests, understandings and priorities are accommodated, and where policies and instruments are remodelled based on the changing situations and demands stemming from the domestic and international environments. At the moment, in the post-9/11 world where the core security threats are identified in rogue and failed states, terrorism, WMD and organised crime, the protection of human rights is necessarily modelled in response to these. It is, however, important to not disregard the multiplicity of inter-linked issues (poverty, the pressures of modernisation, social and cultural alienation of some population groups in foreign societies, political crises, etc) that constitute the root causes of many of these modern security threats, since it is these that must ultimately be addressed. It is just as important to avoid the pitfall of addressing these security threats at the expense of domestic civil liberties. Striking the balance with regard to this tension is one of the EU's major challenges, since it will influence the quality of democracy within the Member States as well as its moral authority in international

affairs and hence its leverage in pressuring others to adhere to international norms and standards and in democracy promotion.

The expansion of the security concept has rendered sustainable security a core policy objective. In view of the increasing inter-dependencies between sectors, functions, states, economies, peoples, and civil societies that have characterised the world since the twentieth century, it has been argued that sustainable security can best be achieved through coalitions, through collective actions, through mutual and common approaches and solutions. It is a common approach to 'hard security' that was the foundation for the EEC, and then the EU, and which has led to unprecedented attempts to orchestrate a common security and defence policy among the Member States (CFSP, ESDP). It is equally cross-border cooperation and concerted action at the supranational level on soft security issues (relating to economic development, social cohesion and civil society building) through functioning, legitimate institutions and democratic processes at the national level that were the foundation of the European security community. And, it is to this security community that the candidate neighbouring countries, or aspiring candidate countries and their people wish to adhere. It is a security provider not only for the accession, or aspiring candidate neighbouring countries, but for a significant number of countries around the world through its development cooperation, through its technical assistance programmes, and through the moral weight and its influence in international affairs when it does put forward a common, united position. Thus, the European Security Strategy and its emphasis on promoting multi-



lateralism in a rule-based international order inevitably reflects this. The challenge lies in the extent to which the EU will be effective, committed and strong-willed enough to promote this model of security-building further in international relations.

The EU has a distinctive perception of democratic governance and of security in inter-state relations. It is based on multilateralism, integration, co-operation, respect for international law and solidarity. This is currently expressed within the European Security Strategy in a very clear manner. The EU also has an undeniably rich experience in promoting democracy

and consolidating democratic institutions and governance in post-authoritarian countries; its track record probably includes some of the most successful cases of 'regime change' that have been achieved through constructive conditionality and linkages between reforms and benefits. It should thus not limit itself to 'preventive engagement' and by further underpinning the European Security Strategy with the proposed Human Security Doctrine there exists a wide scope for furthering respect and protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms while addressing global and regional security challenges.

References

- Adler, Emmanuel. 2005: *Communitarian international relations. The epistemic foundations of international relations*, London.
- Adler, Emmanuel./Barnett, Michael. (eds.) 1998: *Security communities*, Cambridge.
- Adler, Emmanuel. 1997: *Seizing the middle ground: constructivism in world politics*, in: *European Journal of International Relations*, 3 (3): 319-363.
- Adler, Emmanuel./Haas, Peter. M. 1992: *Conclusion: epistemic communities, world order, and the creation of a reflective research programme*, in: *International Organization*, 46 (1): 367-390.
- Alkire, Sabina.: *Conceptual Framework for Human Security: Working Definition and Executive Summary*, Commission on Human Security. 16 February 2002,
<http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/outreach/frame.html>
 (20.12.2005)
- Bulmer, Simon. 1995: *Four faces of European Union governance: a new institutional research agenda*, in: *European Policy Research Unit*, 2/1995, University of Manchester, Manchester.
- Cameron, Fraser. 2004: *The EU's Security Strategy*, in: *Internationale Politik: Transatlantic Edition*, Spring.
- Collins, Alan. 1997: *The Security Dilemma and the End of the Cold War*, Edinburgh.



- Commission on Human Security 2003: Final Report of the Commission on Human Security to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, 1 May 2003.
<http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html>
- Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. 2004: Civil liberties and counter terrorism: a European point of view, Center for Transatlantic Relations.
- Donnelly, Jack. 1998: Human rights: a new standard of civilization?, in: *International Affairs*, 74 (1): 1-24.
- Held, David. 1995: *Democracy and the global order*, Cambridge.
- Held, David. (ed.) 1993: *Prospects for democracy: North, South, East, West*, Cambridge.
- King, Gary./Murray, Christopher. J. 2001-2002: Rethinking Human Security, in: *Political Science Quarterly*, 116 (4): 585-610.
- Leonard, Mark./Gowan Richard. 2005: *Global Europe. Implementing the European Security Strategy*, Brussels.
- Oberleitner, Gerd. 2003: Human rights and security – the two towers?, Centre for the Study of Human Rights, 11 February 2003, LSE, London.
- Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso. 2004: *Europe, a civil power. Lessons from EU experience*, The Federal Trust for Education and Research, London.
- Paulaskas, K. 2005: Coping with Traditional Security Threats – Responses to Terrorism, Proliferation, Failing States, in: *DGAP: NATO vs EU? Security Strategies for Europe*, DGAP- Schriften.
- Pollis, Adamantia. 1998: Towards a new universalism; reconstruction and dialogue, in: *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights*, 6 (1): 5-23.
- Pollis, Adamantia./Schwab, Peter. (eds.) 1979: *Human rights: cultural and ideological perspectives*, Praeger Special Studies, New York.
- Pridham, Geoffrey. 2005: *Designing Democracy. EU enlargement and regime change in post-communist Europe*, London.
- Risse, Thomas./Ropp, Stephen.C./Sikkink, Kathryn. (eds.) 1999: *The power of human rights. International norms and domestic change*, Cambridge.
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995: *Co-operation among democracies. The European influence on US foreign policy*, New Jersey.
- Ruggie, John. Gerard. 1998: *Constructing the world polity. Essays on international institutionalization*, London.
- Ruggie, John. Gerard. (ed.) 1993: *Multilateralism matters. The theory and praxis of an institutional form*, New York.
- Russett, Bruce. (ed.). 1993: *Grasping the democratic peace: principles for a post-Cold War world*, New Jersey.
- Smith, Karen. 1998: The instruments of European Union foreign policy, in: Zielonka, Jan. (ed.): *Paradoxes of European foreign policy*, Kluwer Law International, The Hague: 67-85.

- Solana, Javier. 2003: A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy, 2003, EU-ISS, Paris.
- Steiner, Heiner.J./Alston Philip. 1996: International human rights in context - law, politics, morals, Oxford.
- The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, 'A Human Security Doctrine for Europe,' Barcelona, 15 September 2004.
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/HumanSecurityDoctrine.pdf>
- UNDP 1994: Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security, New York/Oxford.
- Vincent, John.R. 1992a: Modernity and universal human rights, in: McGrew, Anthony., Lewis Paul. (eds.): Global politics: globalisation and the Nation State, Blackwell, Cambridge Massachusetts : 269-291.
- Vincent, John.R. 1992b: The idea of rights in international ethics, in: Nardin, Terry./Maple, David.R. (eds.): Traditions of international ethics, Cambridge: 250-269.
- Vincent, John.R. 1986a: Human rights and international relations, Cambridge.
- Vincent, John.R. (ed.) 1986b: Foreign policy and human rights; issues and responses, Cambridge.
- Waever, Ole. 1998: Insecurity, security and asecurity in the West European non-war community, in: Adler, Emmanuel./Barnett, Michael. (eds.): Security communities, Cambridge.
- Waever, Ole. 1995: Securitization and Desecuritization, in: Lipshutz, Ronnie.D. (ed.): On Security, New York.
- Wallace, William. 2003: Hard decisions are needed to defend Europe, in: Financial Times, 27.06.2003.
- Youngs, Richard. (ed.) 2005: Global Europe. New Terms of Engagement, Report 2, (The Foreign Policy Centre, The British Council, European Commission in association with Wilton Park).



Europe Takes On Human Security

P. H. Liotta/Taylor Owen

"The human tragedy reaches its climax in the fact that after all the exertions and sacrifices of hundreds of millions of people and of the victories of the Righteous Cause, we have still not found Peace or Security."
Winston Churchill

Europe, as identity and union, has undergone an extraordinary transformation since the end of Cold War. In recent history, much of this remarkable change has only accelerated, both with the expansion of membership in the European Union, a growing independence in terms of foreign policy, and an emerging recognition that disagreements about Europe's future and identity are inevitable. Nonetheless, as J. Peter Burgess has aptly summarized, a major European shift regarding the concept of security is underway. With Solana's Thessaloniki Summit document "A Secure Europe in a Better World", Burgess argues, the European community of *values* is being transformed into a *security* community.¹ That this shift has embraced the concept of

human security makes it all the more significant. While the concept has received attention on the margins of international affairs, it has yet to guide the foreign policy of a major international actor. A European human security foreign policy would therefore offer a fascinating test of the 'New Security' which proponents of the concept have been advocating.

Reflecting this shift, the document "A Secure Europe in a Better World" – most commonly known as the *European Security Strategy* – stands in somewhat notable contrast to the September 17, 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Specifically, the European Union strategy emphasizes the notion of cooperative engagement, relying on the strength of 450 million members and the recognition that no one country – perhaps in direct contrast to the U.S. national strategy – can "go it alone." Although the concept of "sharing hegemony" between the U.S. and Europe seems immensely sensible, reality equally dictates that this sharing is unlikely to occur in the near future.²

1 Drawn from an abstract of a presentation at the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy, titled "Culture Wars? War Is already a Culture," December 6th, 2004, at a workshop titled "Prepared for Peace? The Use and Abuse of 'Culture' in Military Simulations, Training and Education." Burgess refers to the work by Mary Kaldor (1999) "New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era". Notably, Kaldor was the instrumental force between the creation and production of "A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities".

2 For the best argument in favor of such an approach, see Schweiss (2003)



The purpose of this essay is not expressly to detail the chronology, conceptual development, and evolution of European defense policy. Yet, with the publication of the *European Security Strategy* in 2003 and with the subsequent 2004 publication of *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*:

The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, the EU has declared inherent security values in both promoting the rights of nation-states and in protecting the rights of individual citizens. The EU has also provided a proposed force planning structure to support these values.

1. A Human Security Dilemma

Human security may rest uncomfortably on the horns of a dilemma. While middle power advocates of the concept push for its increased acceptance in the international community, the sheer broadness of the concept provides little guidance for how the term is to be used – for what human security policy might look like. This difficulty is highlighted by contrasting middle power versus European and American use of human security ideas.

While the effort to promote human security in the arena of “high politics” on the part of the Canadian and Norwegian governments since the 1990s is well known, there is a tempting sense of proselytizing righteousness as well. Such so-called “middle power” states, after all, can exercise significant moral clout by emphasizing that the rights of the individual are at least as important as protecting the territorial and sovereign integrity of the state. Yet when larger powers, particularly those with significant militaries (such as the United States or the United Kingdom) advocate similar positions, it is their overwhelming power that is recognized, respected, and resented.

On the one hand, what is perceived as the “moral clout” of the

middle power is sensed as “hegemony unbridled” when it is emphasized in an attempted similar fashion by major powers. On the other hand, when actions taken in the name, or in the principled following, of human security do occur, they are often inextricably linked to issues that are embedded in the more traditional concepts of “national security” and protection of the state. Idealism thus becomes enmeshed in realism; actions taken on behalf of the powerless are determined only by the powerful. Accordingly, we witness 150,000 American forces deployed to Iraq in 2003 but only six communication command and control specialists initially put ashore in Liberia to support Nigerian peacekeepers in stability and security operations. Nominally, both scenarios involve regime change and stabilizing regional security – as well as intervention for the protection of citizens abused by the state. Yet the physical and economic geography of Iraq place it at the center of a region declared “vital” to U.S. interests, awash in petroleum and natural gas resources. National security interests, in the form of geopolitics, again trumps the intervention priority list. Moreover, the alleged bellicosity of the former Iraqi regime, particularly regarding potential or actual posses-



sion of weapons of mass destruction, clearly supported more traditional national security interests such as defense of the homeland and protection of one's territory from attack. Liberia, while clearly a regional troublemaker, never posed a "threat" to the United States or any of its close allies. (Make no mistake: it was a brutal, authoritarian regime that threatened its own people as well as the entire security architecture of West Africa but remained little more than a perceived peripheral threat for many)

Undoubtedly, increasing numbers now speak out on behalf of what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has termed the "responsibility to protect": the suggestion of six criteria for international humanitarian intervention to enforce the principle of individual security that sovereign states owe to their citizens. While the ICISS commission stresses the importance of UN security council authorization, there is potential risk in their proposition - that the "responsibility to protect" might enable the "right to intervene." In the topology of power, dominant states may continue to intervene at the time and place of their choosing. The ICISS guidelines are helpful, but further clarity is vital to mitigate against unilateral intervention.

While there has been an undeniable political rift between the United States and the EU since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Kagan notes

what is arguably a deeper, ideological separation concerning the relation between state sovereignty and security:

"The fact remains that Kosovo war was illegal, and not only because it lacked Security Council authorization: Serbia had not committed any aggression against another state but was slaughtering its own ethnic Albanian population. The intervention therefore violated the sovereign equality of all nations, a cardinal principle - of the UN Charter and the bedrock principle of international law for centuries. During the Kosovo conflict, Henry Kissinger warned that "the abrupt abandonment of the concept of national sovereignty" risked unmooring the world from any notion of order, legal or otherwise. Many Europeans rejected this complaint at the time. Back then [...] before the Iraq war [...] they did not seem to believe that international legitimacy resided exclusively with the Security Council, or in the UN Charter, or even in traditional principles of international law. Instead they believed in the legitimacy of their common postmodern moral values." (Kagan 2004: 75)

In 2003, during the dispute over Iraq, those postmodern values did not seem to be universally shared or even understood. Yet it is against this backdrop that the EU chose in late 2004 to address a context and a justification for incorporating human security as a philosophy, if not a complete doctrine, worth considering. A recent EU effort directly takes on critics of human security, and in many ways for the first time moves the concept from a hit and miss tool of advocacy to a viable challenge to the traditional security paradigm.

2. Europe Incorporates Human Security

In September 2004, an independent study group at the request of EU Secretary-General Javier Solana released 'A Human Security Doctrine

for Europe' which detailed the scope, organization, and intent that the EU "should build its security policy on a 'human security doctrine,' aimed at



protecting individuals through law-enforcement, humanitarian assistance with the occasional use of force" (p 239/04) Taking into account the need for complementarities in civil and military operations for EU missions in the Balkan, in the great Lakes region of sub-Saharan Africa, and in the South Caucasus, the document proposed the development of a civil-military force of 15,000 personnel, to include one-third civilian professionals who would support crisis management operations.

Concerning this proposal, two notable aspects arise. First, the convenor of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities was Mary Kaldor, author of the widely acknowledged work *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. According to Kaldor,

"Europeans cannot be secure while millions of people live in intolerable insecurity [...] Where people live in lawlessness, poverty, exclusivist ideologies and daily violence, there is fertile ground for criminal networks and terrorism. Conflict regions export or transport hard drugs and guns to the European Union. That is why a contribution to global human security is now the most realistic security policy for Europe." (Glasius/Said 2005)

The document does not shy away from expressing high ambitions for the European Union and its capability to project force – on a global scale. While some observers remain skeptical that the EU often pronounces lofty ambitions without the ability to integrate and organize or to support such a global force, *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe* may be the most direct document to date to so openly declare Europe's responsibility to act independently, and, if necessary, to act beyond the borders of

Europe. Indeed, these responsibilities are clearly stated: "A human security approach for the European

Union means that it should contribute to the protection of every individual human being and not only on the defense of the Union's borders, as was the security approach of nation-states" (Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities 2004: 5).

This rationale, however, falls victim to one of the difficulties of any potential human security based foreign policy, namely, how direct a link must be made between vulnerability abroad and EU security. Once the human security doctrine is applied to people outside of the EU's political responsibility, must they justify intervention on national security grounds? If so, there are significant difficulties with relying solely on the 'terror breeding ground' argument in guiding an entire foreign policy. If not, they will have to move beyond direct causal links to a more nuanced argument connecting suffering abroad to security at home.

The document also presents a decidedly *narrow* definition for human security. By emphasizing "law-enforcement with the occasional use of force," the focus on human security remains strictly limited. However, the report does state that in extreme circumstances, a human security intervention may be needed against the more egregious, non-violent threats, thus incorporating some aspects of the broader human security conceptualization, though notably using the type of threshold suggested above as a limiting mechanism. Generally, however, while the term "human security" is still evolving, the EU "doctrine" seems to intentionally limit itself to a focus on violence and how to stop it.³ Yet with this limiting focus,

³ As one anonymous reviewer noted, the EU document is at least much a philosophy as it is a doctrine. We agree.



the EU human security doctrine emphasizes legal frameworks and institutions (such as the International Criminal Court – which the U.S. has refused to recognize) and developing specific guidelines and criteria that could authorize intervention exclusive of UN Security Council authorization (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities 2004: 20-22). While stressing the need to prevent “gross human rights violations,” the declaration is quite specific in other ways regarding norms, expectations, and the responsible commitments of states to their citizens:

The [Human Security] doctrine [for Europe] comprises three elements:

- “A set of seven principles for operations in situations of severe insecurity that apply to both ends and means. These principles are: the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force. The report puts particular emphasis on the bottom-up approach; on communication, consultation, dialogue and partnership with the local population in order to improve early warning, intelligence gathering, mobilisation of local support, implementation and sustainability.
- A ‘Human Security Response Force’, initially composed of 15,000 men and women, of whom at least one third would be civilian (police, legal experts, development and humanitarian specialists, administrators, etc.). The Force would be drawn from dedicated troops and civilian capabilities already made available by member states as well as a proposed ‘Human Security Volunteer Service’.
- A new legal framework to govern both decisions to intervene and operations on the ground. This would build on the domestic law of host states, the domestic law of sending states, international criminal law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law.” (Ibid.: 1)

By detailing “capabilities” in the form of force structure and or-

ganization – especially the EU Human Security Response Force of 15,000 personnel (roughly the size of a division) – the doctrine notably comprises both military and civilian specialists, able to deploy to locales as disparate as Macedonia, Kosovo, or the Democratic Republic of Congo. The force itself would be tiered, drawing first on staff and headquarters capabilities from Brussels, with a secondary force of 5,000 personnel able to deploy in ten days. The final tier of 5,000 personnel would remain at a lower level of readiness but would periodically train and exercise together (Ibid.: 18-19).

The force would also draw from a professional core, with a civilian component of doctors, medical personnel, legal specialists, human rights monitors, and those who “straddle” the military/police divide such as *carabinieri* or *gendarmerie*. The final aspect of this organization would be the “Human Security Volunteer Service.” (Ibid.: 20) All would be expected to be culturally aware, multinational, attuned to the multiple dimensions of conflict and intervention, and imbued with a specific, dedicated *ethos*. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private corporations might also comprise part of the “Human Security Volunteer Service.”

In short, this EU Human Security Force would represent an ambitious, even breathtaking, initiative to respond to crisis challenges. By responding simply to direct threats, the doctrine itself might be nothing more than a well-thought through intervention force proposal; itself, it would remain little more than a response force to violence and its aftermath. However, by clearly distinguishing the roles of civic, humanitarian and



military responses to this violence, the proposed “doctrine” is taking a significant step away from the historic traditional security response. Yet the doctrine bears a direct lineage with the *European Security Strategy* (ESS),

nonetheless, and takes from it a focus on direct threats: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states, and organized crime (ESS 2003: 6-9).

3. Unpacking Security Strategy: The European and U.S. Examples

One might (correctly) argue that little consideration is given in the EU human security doctrine regarding the broader conception of human security. Yet the example of why it is important to recognize these broader human security necessities – and act on them – is deeply embedded in the *European Security Strategy* itself. Notably, nowhere in the EU strategy – or the U.S. *National Security Strategy*, for that matter – do the words “human security” appear. Yet its principles, including the need to address and solve longer-term development issues that could actually sustain and resolve the security dilemma of many in nations and in regions in crisis, are omnipresent. Indeed, the strategy’s full title presents the claim of *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, thus stressing the need for the EU to “get real” and act on its responsibility and in its role as global actor:

“Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90 percent of them civilians. Over 18 million people world-wide have left their homes as a result of conflict.

In much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns. Almost 3 billion people, half the world’s population live on less than 2 Euros a day. 45 [sic] million die every year of hunger and malnutrition. AIDS is now one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of societies. [...]

Security is a precondition for development. [...]

In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments [...] Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.” (ESS 2003: 3)

The U.S. *National Security Strategy* of 2002, which emphasized the “non-negotiable demand of human dignity” and the reduction (if not eradication) of poverty, also leans toward the broader conception of human security through long-term development, free trade and free markets, and the practice of good governance and policies. However, the national interest in tackling vulnerability abroad is argued in notably moralistic terms, this differing significantly from the securitization of these issues in the EU ‘Doctrine’. And although the specific organization and deployment of military forces is never detailed in official Bush administration documents and declarations, the sentiment to respect “freedom” is unquestionable:

“There is only one force of history that can break the reign of hatred and resentment,

and expose the pretensions of tyrants, and reward the hopes of the decent and tolerant, and that is the force of human freedom. [...] The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world. [...] Freedom, by its nature, must be chosen, and defended by citizens, and sustained by the rule of law and the protection of minorities. And when the soul of a nation finally speaks, the institutions that arise may reflect customs and traditions very different from our own. America will not impose our own style of government on the unwilling. Our goal instead is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way." (Bush 2005) [Notably, as of this writing, no U.S. Military Strategy has been officially published since 1997 – although draft update documents (which have, to date, been rejected) have been circulating within the Pentagon for the last several years]

U.S. strategy documents and declarations do not detail how military forces uphold human security; rather, the emphasis remains on good practice of governments and on development as issues that receive priority (NSS 2002, in particular i-ii). Further, it is hard to parse the statement's significant shift towards unilateral preventative use of force and the expanded list of conditions under which this might be justified with the broader signals towards human secu-

rity principles.

What distinguishes the respective EU strategy and subsequent human security doctrine are 1) establishing a clear "objective" for "stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based order" (ESS 2003: 14); 2) a basic recognition that "establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order" (Ibid.: 16) and 3) a detailed operational force proposal for protecting human security. Taken collectively, these documents implicitly recognize the fragile web of security, and that no single instrument – no matter how seemingly powerful in its application – is sufficient to address new and emerging security issues. The old cliché that describes the "blowback" that otherwise often occurs is an apt reminder: *If all you have is a hammer, then every problem begins to look like a nail.* Surely, as the interventions in Somalia and in the Balkans illustrate, traditional applications of military security are often necessary, but certainly not sufficient, instruments for achieving real security.

4. The Intervention Dilemma

Ultimately, all nations and all alliances are far from what O'Hanlon and Singer term a global intervention capability on behalf of "humanitarian transformation" (O'Hanlon/Singer 2004: 77-99) Granted, the threat of mass casualty terrorism now exists anytime, anywhere – and states and regions are responding differently to this challenge. Yet the global commu-

nity today also faces many of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering states, and humanitarian crises. While Europe and the European Union are perhaps no closer than anyone else to addressing how best to solve these challenges, Europe has at least acknowledged the need to think, act, and organize differently to prepare for the future. Spe-





cifically, the EU security strategy stresses the necessity of “effective multilateralism” and often acknowledges the crucial leadership roles of the U.S. in making this multilateralism both coherent and effective (ESS 2003: 14-16; 20).

Essentially, states and regions, in a globalized context, can no longer afford to solely emphasize national security issues without recognizing that abstract concepts such as values, norms, and expectations also influence both choice and outcome. In its most recent declarations, the European Union appears to have incorporated these recognitions as a basic

ethos in approaching security. Yet, as the blatant international failures to do anything in 1994 in Rwanda and in Darfur in 2005 illustrate – other than a collective international decision to do *nothing* – human security is hardly proving to be the trump card of choice in decisions by states to intervene in the affairs of other states, to include violating traditionally respected rights of sovereignty. In other words, taken to extreme forms, both human security and national security can be conceptually approached as antagonistic rather than convergent identities. Each, in its exclusive recognition, remains problematic.

5. Moving to a Global Security Commitment

While sounding the death knell for NATO and the transatlantic relationship is hardly a certainty, many believe this has become a more likely possibility in recent years. Charles Kupchan, a former National Security Council member, has been quite clear in his views on the security dilemma:

“The Atlantic alliance appears poised for demise. Its founder and primary patron, the United States, is losing interest in the alliance, resulting in a military pact that is hollowing out and of diminishing geopolitical relevance. [...] Europe’s security order is thus in the process of becoming much more European and much less Atlantic.” (Kupchan 2003: 225-226)

At one point in history (known as the Cold War), the “hard” security map took precedence over all other mental maps – and NATO was the key security linkage. Clearly, that security map is shifting in front of our eyes. In response to that shift, nonetheless, the EU, perhaps paradoxically,

both distanced itself from the U.S. in creating specific security documents yet simultaneously made clear overtures *to* the U.S. in recognizing enduring security linkages:

“The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own. [...] The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA.” (ESS 2003: 3; 20)

Today, when we speak of the business of security – for the individual, the state, the community, and for regions – we find us ourselves mired in a complex web of seemingly endlessly contradictions. Perhaps one of the most overlooked aspects of the broadening future security architec-

ture lies in how Greater Europe has attempted to address *common* aspects of security and interests, rather than the exclusive self-interests of states.

By doing so, there has occurred a gradual shift toward what can only be called “global security.”

In moving toward an evolving commitment to global security, the EU has demonstrated some new, useful thinking. As a force proposal, and as a natural extension of the European security strategy, the EU human security doctrine does not address all problematic issues – and raises, internally, a few problematics of its own in terms of feasibility. It remains unclear, for example, how the EU is truly

broadening its capabilities to respond with an overarching human security policy – other than addressing the necessity to act, to be ready to intervene when necessary, and to have the organization and structure to do it (For the argument that human security requires a critical transformative ethos, see Grayson 2004, 2003) Equally, how to deal with strategic challenges (such as long-term investment and planning) or pragmatic factors (such as the question of how unarmed civilian specialists would themselves be vulnerable in intervention situations) remain, as yet, unanswered. But at least the dialogue has begun.



References

- Bush, George W. 2005: Second Inaugural Address, January 20, 2005.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html>
 (February 10, 2005)
- European Security Strategy, ESS 2003: A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy Brussels, 12 December 2003.
<http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> (7.02.2005); <http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf>
- Glasius, Marlies/Said, Yahia 2005: Europe Needs a Human Security Doctrine – And New Force with One Third Civilians. (Press Release)
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/solana/040915PreRelBar.pdf (7.02.2005)
- Grayson, Kyle 2004: A Challenge to Power over Knowledge in Traditional Security Studies, in: *Security Dialogue*, 35 (3): 357.
- Grayson, Kyle (2003): Securitization and the Boomerang Debate: A Rejoinder to Liotta and Smith-Windsor, in: *Security Dialogue*, 34 (3): 337-343.
- Kagan, Robert 2004: America’s Crisis of Legitimacy, in: *Foreign Affairs*, 83 (2): 75.
- Kaldor, Mary 1999: *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Palo Alto.



Kupchan, Charles A. 2003: The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy, in: *Political Science Quarterly*, 18 (2): 225-226.

National Security Strategy, NSS 2002: The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> (9.02.2005).

O'Hanlon, Michael/Singer, P. W. 2004: The Humanitarian Transformation: Expanding Global Intervention Capacity, in: *Survival*, 46 (1): 77-99.

S239/04: Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, Responds to Report by Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities.
<http://ue.eu.int/solana> (February 7, 2005)

Schweiss, Christina M. (2003): Sharing Hegemony: The Future of Transatlantic Security, in: *Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, 38 (3): 211-234.

Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities 2004: A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities.
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Human%20Security%20Report%20Full.pdf> (February 7, 2005).

Recently Published INEF Reports

- Debiel, Tobias/Sascha Werthes (Eds.):** Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas. Changes, Concepts and Cases. Duisburg (INEF Report, 80/2006), 80 pp.
- Debiel, Tobias/Monika Sticht:** Towards a New Profile? Development, Humanitarian and Conflict Resolution NGOs in the Age of Globalization. Duisburg (INEF Report, 79/2005), 44 pp.
- Stempel, Philipp:** Der Internationale Strafgerichtshof - Verbote eines Weltinnenrechts? Eine Studie zur Reichweite einer rule of law in der internationalen Politik. Duisburg (INEF-Report 78/2005), 72 S.
- Kocks, Alexander:** The Financing of UN Peace Operations - An Analysis from a Global Public Good Perspective. Duisburg (INEF Report 77/2005), 95 pp.
- Hirsch, Alfred:** Menschenrechte des Fremden: Zur Grundlegung einer interkulturellen Menschenrechtsethik. Duisburg (INEF-Report 76/2005), 46 S.
- Blome, Kerstin:** Paradigmenwechsel im Völkerrecht? Herausforderungen bei der Etablierung eines Weltinnenrechts im Politikfeld Menschenrechte. Duisburg (INEF-Report 75/2004), 56 S.
- Böge, Volker:** Neue Kriege und traditionale Konfliktbearbeitung. Duisburg (INEF-Report 74/2004), 69 S.
- Fuchs, Martina/Michael Giese:** Globale Arbeitsteilung - transnationale Kompetenzaufteilung. Beispiele aus der Automobilzulieferindustrie. Duisburg (INEF-Report 73/2003), 36 S.
- Falk, Gertrud:** Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers - eine Chance zur Bekämpfung ländlicher Armut in Subsahara-Afrika. Duisburg (INEF-Report 72), 50 S.
- Führmann, Bettina:** Abkehr vom Washington Concensus? Die wirtschaftspolitische Strategie der Weltbank zur Armutsbekämpfung. Duisburg (INEF-Report 71/2003), 59 S.



Single Copies can be ordered at:
Institute for Development and Peace, Universität Duisburg-Essen, D-47048 Duisburg.
Please add 0.95 EUR in stamps.
Almost all reports can be downloaded on the internet, see:
<http://inef.uni-duisburg.de/page/englisch/PublSerien.html>

The Institute for Development and Peace (INEF)

The Institute was founded in 1990 on the basis of a cooperation agreement between the Development and Peace Foundation (SEF), Bonn, and the University of Duisburg-Essen. Based on an interdisciplinary approach, INEF is concerned with

- global trends and global governance,
- interrelationships between development and peace in developing countries,
- global interdependencies between the economy, the environment, and security,
- development perspectives of developing countries in the World Economy
- the interplay between states, international organizations, the business sector, and civil society in world politics.

INEF and the SEF have set themselves the goal of

- playing a role in shaping the national, European, and international dialogue concerning global interdependencies and global governance, and
- providing impulses for political action, based on global responsibility, in North and South, East and West

INEF, often in cooperation with national and international partners, conducts research programs and systematically explores available international expertise and world reports. The Institute is integrated in a strong and viable international research network.

Directors and Executive Board

Director: Prof. em. Dr. phil. Franz Nuscheler

Executive Director: Dr. sc. pol. Tobias Debiel

Members of the Executive Board: Prof. em. Dr. phil. Franz Nuscheler, (spokesperson); Prof. Dr. Peter Meyns (deputy spokesperson); Prof. Dr. Michael Bohnet; Min.Dir. a.D. Dr. h.c. Winfried Böll; Prof. Dr. Thomas Heberer; Prof. Dr. Klaus Hänsch (MEP); Prof. Dr. Gerhard Bäcker (Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University Duisburg-Essen).

The INEF Report series

INEF Report is a series that appears at irregular intervals. It publishes major findings from the institute's ongoing research projects as well as overview studies on academic and policy debates concerning global issues. INEF Reports are primarily addressed to the research community and students of international relations, but also try to reach out to policy-makers interested in relevant scholarly results.



Institute for Development and Peace
Geibelstraße 41 D - 47057 Duisburg
Phone +49 (203) 379 4420 Fax +49 (203) 379 4425
E-Mail: inef@uni-duisburg.de
Homepage: <http://www.inef.de>

UNIVERSITÄT
**DUISBURG
ESSEN**

**UNIVERSITY OF DUISBURG-ESSEN
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**