

HOW INDONESIAN EXTREMISTS REGROUP

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HOW INDONESIAN EXTREMISTS REGROUP

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Almost ten years after the Bali bombing that brought terrorism in Indonesia to international attention, the country's violent extremists are weak and divided but still active. In the face of strong police pressure, they are finding ways to regroup on the run, in prison and through internet forums, military training camps and arranged marriages. In many cases, the same individuals keep reappearing, using old networks to build new alliances. The fact that they have been singularly inept in their operations in recent years does not mean that the danger of attacks is over. There are signs that at least some are learning lessons from past failures and becoming more sophisticated in recruitment and fundraising. Better understanding of how extremists regroup could lead to more effective counter-radicalisation programs.

The biggest blow to terrorist capacity in recent years was the break-up in early 2010 of a training camp in Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra, where an alliance of almost all major jihadi groups in the country had planned to establish a base. Many senior leaders were captured or killed and a wealth of information discovered that led to the arrest, trial and imprisonment of some 200 individuals. Instead of cowing the jihadis into submission, however, police operations inspired a new wave of activity motivated by the desire for revenge, with new partnerships and training centres established and new plans set in motion. Activity has been particularly noticeable in Medan, North Sumatra; Poso, Central Sulawesi; Solo, Central Java; Bima, West Nusa Tenggara; and parts of East Kalimantan. Underground activity has been directly or indirectly assisted by radical preachers whose meetings provide inspiration and meeting grounds for jihadis and sympathisers. Some pro-Sharia (Islamic law) advocacy groups that do not use violence themselves but whose teachings are in line with jihadi views play a similar role.

Almost all the plots since 2010, and there have been more than a dozen, are connected directly or indirectly to the fugitives from Aceh. The ease with which wanted men can move around, communicate with friends in prison, share information and skills, disseminate ideology, purchase arms, conduct training and recruit new followers shows how much basic preventive work still needs to be done.

Many of the jihadi groups operating today have links to Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), a group set up by radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in 2008 that has replaced Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as the country's largest and most active jihadi organisation. JI, responsible for the 2002 Bali attack, is now the object of scorn from more militant groups, accused of abandoning jihad. It continues to exert an influence through its schools, however, and many disaffected former members remain active through other organisations. Several smaller groups have emerged as well, often composed of inexperienced young amateurs who lack the skills, discipline and strategic vision of the generation that trained on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border between 1985 and 1994 and produced the Bali bombers.

Materials posted on radical websites suggest that the more educated extremists have learned important lessons from the Aceh experience, especially in terms of awareness of the extent to which their ranks have been infiltrated by the "enemy" – the Indonesian state. They conclude that they must be much more careful about vetting members, protecting communications and guarding secrets. If jihadis were to heed these lessons, the task of the police could become much harder.

There has been less introspection within the government about why recruitment continues to take place or why there are so many more terrorist plots – even if most have been poorly conceived. Indonesia's counter-terrorism successes have all been due to good law enforcement. The police have become skilled at identifying and arresting those responsible for violent crimes and interdicting plots as long as there is evidence, such as illegal possession of guns or explosives, on which to act. But virtually no effective programs are in place to address the environment in which jihadi ideology continues to flourish.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Indonesia:

1. Design a study to examine the networks extremists use to find sanctuary when they believe they are being pursued by police or that the place they are living has

- become insecure. Such a study could help define the support base for violent extremists in a way that could inform counter-extremism programs. Prisoners arrested in connection with the Aceh camp would be one possible respondent pool.
2. Design a program aimed at reducing the influence of extremist clerics that would include:
 - a) developing a consensus on what constitutes incitement and hate speech, then getting broad agreement from Muslim community leaders that such rhetoric is unacceptable;
 - b) ensuring that no government building and no institution receiving government funding can host anyone promoting such teachings;
 - c) identifying four or five target areas or specific institutions where extremist influence is high;
 - d) undertaking research in those areas to develop a profile of the followers of these clerics, with attention to socio-economic, educational and employment backgrounds of members and questions about what attracts them to the teaching; and
 - e) developing pilot programs, in consultation with community leaders and scholars, that might effectively challenge the teachings of extremist clerics; these should be regularly monitored, evaluated and adjusted as necessary.
 3. Strengthen capacity within the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) to analyse ideological debates on radical networks for clues as to changes of targets and tactics.
 4. Develop procedures for better information sharing among the BNPT; the Corrections Directorate within the law and human rights ministry; police; and prosecutors about extremist networks and individuals within them, with a view to their obtaining better understanding of not only the backgrounds of individual inmates but also the context in which they operate.
 5. Speed up efforts to put in place a system under the Corrections Directorate for identifying and monitoring high-risk detainees, both while in detention as well as after their release, to include:
 - a) adoption of a professional risk assessment protocol, with evaluations of inmates conducted by trained officials and based on careful research; and
 - b) a pilot project to work out possible weaknesses and make adjustments accordingly.
 6. Upgrade analytical capacity of corrections staff so that data systems now in operation can be used to improve supervision, as well as budgeting and planning.
 7. Design and implement a policy of zero tolerance toward any religiously-inspired violence, including maximum sentences for vandalism, assault and threats of violence, with clear instructions to all government employees, including police, to shun interaction with groups or members of groups that have a known history of such activity.
 8. Implement more serious post-operation assessments within the police to study what might have been done differently, especially when use of lethal force has resulted in serious injury or death, and increase training in the study of non-lethal options when confronting active shooters.
 9. Close loopholes in airport security that allow passengers to present false identification without fear of detection.
 10. Make more systematic use of the expertise of young Indonesian scholars when developing policy on countering extremism.

Jakarta/Brussels, 16 July 2012

HOW INDONESIAN EXTREMISTS REGROUP

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the 2002 Bali bombings, police in Indonesia have been increasingly effective in disrupting the networks of extremist groups.¹ But even under pressure, highly motivated jihadis are still finding ways to recruit and regroup.

They build new alliances in several ways. As they move from place to place to keep one step ahead of the police, they touch base with old friends or stop in areas that offer fresh possibilities for recruitment. In prison, members of different groups are pushed into each other's company; they can also draw common criminals into their circle. Prison visits to detained jihadis are an opportunity for friends and families of different detainees to meet each other and interact. Military training courses, even if only a few days long, throw men from different backgrounds together in a way that can provide the impetus for new group formation. Internet chat forums provide opportunities for both men and women with jihadi inclinations to initiate acquaintances that are then pursued in direct meetings. Extremist leaders can build bridges between groups through arranged marriages, including by finding wives for imprisoned members. Finally, public religious lectures (taklim) by extremist clerics provide opportunities for in-

dividuals interested in forming new cells to find potential partners.

All these methods were used by extremists to respond to police operations following the 2010 break-up of a terrorist training camp in Aceh. The discovery of the camp and the arrests that followed gave police a gold mine of information, but they also sparked a high level of activity within the jihadi community. New tactical alliances were established, with a nexus between Medan, North Sumatra; Solo, Central Java; and Poso, Central Sulawesi of particular note. Prisons became more important than ever as places for cross-organisational interaction. And revenge against the police – deemed “idolatrous oppressors” (*thaghut*) – took precedence over all other motivations for jihad.²

In one way or another, the fallout from the Aceh camp explains many of the plots that have taken place since: the killing of police in Central Java in March and April 2010; the August 2010 Medan bank robbery and September attack on a North Sumatra police station; a series of bombing attempts against churches and police posts, mostly unsuccessful, by a group in Klaten in December and January 2011; the suicide bombing in a police mosque in Cirebon in April 2011; the shooting of police in Palu, Central Sulawesi in May 2011; a plot to poison police in Jakarta in June 2011; the stabbing of a policeman in Bima, Sumbawa in May and later efforts to build bombs at an Islamic school there in July 2011; and the foiled plot for a third Bali bombing in March 2012.

These incidents, while mostly low-tech, low-casualty and amateurish, nevertheless show a resilience of the extremist movement that no one should take lightly. They also show in many cases an ongoing role of ex-members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), many but not all of them now with Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), the organisation established by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in 2008. JI as an organisation may have withdrawn from active jihad, but its influence on the jihadi movement through disaffected members continues to be felt. This report is based primarily on examination of trial documents and corroboration, where possible, with

¹ For earlier Crisis Group analyses of extremism in Indonesia, see Asia Briefing N°132, *Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon*, 26 January 2012; Asia Report N°204, *Indonesian Jihadism: Small Groups, Big Plans*, 19 April 2011; Asia Briefing N°107, *Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)*, 6 July 2010; Asia Report N°189, *Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh*, 20 April 2010; Asia Briefing N°95, *Indonesia: Noordin Top's Support Base*, 27 August 2009; Asia Briefing N°94, *Indonesia: The Hotel Bombings*, 24 July 2009; Asia Briefing N°92, *Indonesia: Radicalisation of the "Palembang Group"*, 20 May 2009; Asia Report N°147, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Publishing Industry*, 28 February 2008; Asia Report N°142, *"Deradicalisation" and Indonesian Prisons*, 19 November 2007; Asia Briefing N°63, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Current Status*, 3 May 2007; Asia Report N°114, *Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks*, 5 May 2006; Asia Report N°92, *Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing*, 22 February 2005; and Asia Report N°83, *Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don't Mix*, 13 September 2004.

² *Thaghut* in Indonesian refers to someone who worships someone or something other than Allah. It has come to be used as a term for police and other agents of the state who are considered legitimate targets of jihad.

individuals close to those detained. It examines in detail the actions of individuals forced to flee the Aceh camp and how their flight led to the establishment of new groups and new nodes of activity – and also to introspection within the jihadi movement about what went wrong.

II. THE LEGACY OF THE ACEH CAMP

The Aceh training camp, held from 28 January to 22 February 2010 in the hills outside Jantho, Aceh Besar, had been in the works since early 2009. The premise of its founders was that the jihadi movement needed a secure base (*qoidah aminah*) from which to mount attacks against the enemy and eventually build an Islamic state. Aceh was chosen because of its history of resistance against the Indonesian government, ability to apply Islamic law and strategic location on the tip of Sumatra; the organisers were mistakenly convinced they would have local support. The camp was the brainchild of Dulmatin, one of the Bali bombers, who had quietly returned from Mindanao in 2007.³ He worked closely with an ex-JI member named Ubaid, who in turn drew in Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.⁴

At least nine definable groups sent participants to the camp:

- ❑ JAT, led by Ubaid;
- ❑ Dulmatin's inner circle, including the friends who helped hide him after his return from Mindanao;
- ❑ Ring Banten, a Darul Islam faction from West Java, represented by its leader, Kang Jaja, and several senior members. Ring Banten had worked with JI on the first Bali bombing and with Noordin Top, the Malaysian ex-JI member, on the 2004 Australian embassy and 2009 hotel bombings;
- ❑ another Darul Islam faction, variously known as DI-Akram or the Abu Umar Group, represented by Enceng Kurnia, who had helped Dulmatin get to Mindanao in 2003;
- ❑ a group from Solo, Central Java that included several former associates of Noordin Top, among them a man named Suramto;
- ❑ followers of Aman Abdurrahman, a radical scholar and ideologue;

³ For background and details on the Aceh camp, see Crisis Group Report, *Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh*, op. cit. Dulmatin's real name was Joko Pitono. Born 6 June 1970 in Pernalang, Central Java, he was a JI member, trained on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, who taught after his return at the main JI school in Johor, Malaysia, Pesantren Lukman al-Hakim. He fled with his family to Mindanao via Poso, in Central Sulawesi, in 2003, and returned in 2007. He was killed by police in a raid outside Jakarta on 9 March 2010.

⁴ Ubaid's real name is Lutfi Hadaeroh. Born 12 December 1979 in Ngawi, East Java, he was imprisoned in Jakarta in 2004 for helping Malaysian terrorist Noordin Top. Before his 2007 release, he became close to fellow inmate Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. He became a member of the JAT executive council after it was formed in 2008.

- ❑ a few members of Mujahidin KOMPAK a group that had provided fighters to communal conflicts in Maluku and Poso; its leader, Abdullah Sunata, helped recruit for the camp but did not take part in the actual training;⁵
- ❑ a contingent of mostly ex-JI members from Lampung, Sumatra; and
- ❑ a group of some twenty locally-recruited Acehnese.⁶

The alliance included some two dozen recidivists, mostly men who had served sentences on terrorism charges but a few ex-narcotics offenders as well. Many of the personal bonds that made the alliance possible had been forged or strengthened among inmates in Cipinang prison.⁷ Some extremist “seeding” of Aceh had also taken place, so that sympathisers were in place to facilitate transit and supply

routes.⁸ These included a few experienced mujahidin who had fled to Aceh to escape earlier police operations.⁹

The original plan was for the camp to get underway in July 2009, but it was put on hold after Noordin Top and his men bombed the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta on 17 July. When recruits and instructors were all in place in January 2010, Ubaid dubbed the group “Al Qaeda Serambi Mekkah”, although the name was only aspirational; it had no known linkage to the real al-Qaeda.¹⁰

The jungle camp was broken up by police on 22 February 2010, when a local villager collecting rattan nearby reported unusual activity. Dozens were arrested within the first few weeks of the subsequent operation, and some of Indonesia’s most experienced fighters were killed over the next two months, including Dulmatin, Enceng Kurnia and Kang Jaja.¹¹ This also led to the dispersal of fugitives across the country in a way that helped blur organisational and geographical divisions within the jihadi movement and gave police a wealth of new information which they used to track down hundreds of suspects over the next two years.

⁵ KOMPAK is an acronym for Komit Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis (Crisis Management Action Committee), a charity founded originally to help victims of natural disasters that after 1999 became a major funder of jihad in Maluku and Poso.

⁶ For a history of the Darul Islam movement and its various factions, see Crisis Group Report, *Recycling Militants*, op. cit.

⁷ One example is the bond between Suramto, of Noordin’s group, and Iwan Dharmawan, alias Rois, of Ring Banten. They met when in Cipinang prison in 2004 and became friends, to the point that Suramto married Rois’s sister when he was released in late 2006. He visited Rois in prison regularly thereafter. In February 2009, one of Noordin’s men, Bagus Budi Pranoto, alias Urwah, himself an ex-prisoner, called Suramto and asked him to go to Cipinang and request Rois’s help in getting a suicide bomber for an operation. Rois agreed and directed a Ring Banten member on the outside, Sapta, to recruit one. By June 2009, Sapta had found Nana Ikhwan Maulana, who was interviewed and approved for the job by Suramto and Urwah. He blew himself up at the Ritz Carton Hotel on 17 July 2009. Suramto, who helped bring explosives for the operation to Jakarta, found refuge after the bombing with his Ring Banten friends. Eventually, he and Sapta took part in the Aceh training camp together.

⁸ In 2008, for example, Yudi Zulfahri had already persuaded Aman Abdurrahman’s Jakarta-based organisation, Al Urwatul Wutsqo, to open a branch in Aceh. Ust. Kamaluddin, head of the organisation’s daawa (religious outreach) department, who had recently finished a prison sentence, was instructed to go to Aceh with Yudi to obtain funding from the Qatar Foundation there. The funding did not come through, but Yudi invited Kamaluddin to move to Aceh anyway and got him a job teaching Arabic in a salafi *pesantren* (religious boarding school) in Indrapuri, Aceh Besar. He was gradually drawn into the plans from mid-2009 onwards. Imron Rosyidi, a Ngruki graduate and JI-turned-JAT member, as of August 2009 also went to Aceh to teach and ended up helping out with logistics. Then in December 2009, just before the participants started arriving, Imron arranged for Agus Supriyanto, a friend from Palembang, to go to Aceh with his bride to teach at Pesantren Fathul Ngulum in Aceh Jaya. Agus later took part in the camp.

⁹ One of the most prominent was Enal Ta’o alias Ridwan, alias Zaenal, who would have been well-known to Ubaid and a few others of the camp planners. A feared member of JI’s hit squad in Poso and wanted for a string of murders and attacks from 2003 to 2006, he was a Malaysian from Sandakan, Sabah, who helped with transit of JI members through Sandakan to Mindanao for training in 1999-2000. He reportedly was inducted into JI in 1998 by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and then enrolled in the JI-affiliated Pesantren al-Muttaqin, Cirebon. He had been living in Aceh since fleeing Poso in 2006 and was married to a local woman from Pidie Jaya, who reportedly had studied at a *pesantren* in Java; if so, it was almost certainly a JI-arranged marriage. While in Banda Aceh, he worked as a driver for the Qatar Foundation.

¹⁰ “Serambi Mekkah” means “veranda of Mecca”, a common epithet for Aceh.

¹¹ Dulmatin was killed by police in Pamulang, outside Jakarta on 9 March 2010. Enceng Kurnia and Kang Jaja were shot and killed trying to flee Aceh together on 12 March.

III. THE EMERGENCE OF MEDAN AND POSO

The Aceh debacle had a particular impact on two areas, Medan and Poso. In Medan, a jihadist cell led by a man named Mohammad Abdi, also known as Sabar and “The Boss”, responded to the crackdown by taking on a variety of roles, including training, fundraising and providing refuge as needed; by early 2011 Sabar seemed to have vanished into thin air, replaced as the group’s leader by Rizky Gunawan, alias Udin.

In Central Sulawesi, the Aceh project may have given JAT a new incentive for reviving the jihadi movement, dormant since 2007, with three ex-JI men, all former prisoners, in charge. Eventually the Medan and Poso cells were drawn into a tactical alliance.

A. SABAR’S GROUP IN MEDAN

At the time the Aceh camp got underway, there were at least five distinct jihadi groups in Medan, one of which was Sabar’s.¹² Not much is known about Sabar, who remains at large. He seems to have been a member of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) in Medan but held no official position.¹³ In 2003 he helped organise students to protest a local government ban on women wearing headscarves for official photos. Early 2005 found him in Aceh, leading a group of MMI volunteers to help out after the December 2004 tsunami.

By 2009, Sabar had put a small group together that included a few men from Medan, one man each from Jakarta and Padang; and three men from Tim Hisbah, an anti-vice group from Solo, Central Java.¹⁴ A few were recruited

online.¹⁵ Udin, one of the Medan students Sabar had helped mobilise for protests six years earlier, was also actively recruiting for him in Java and may have developed the original contacts with Tim Hisbah; he also had excellent relations with JAT’s Central Java branch.¹⁶

Sabar initially kept his distance from other jihadi groups in Medan. He did not attend a July 2009 meeting when Abu Bakar Ba’asyir came to the Medan area to discuss setting up a JAT branch for North Sumatra. He also apparently declined to take part in the Aceh training camp, concentrating instead on building up the resources of his own group.¹⁷ He was committed to raising funds through *fa’i* (robbing non-Muslims to raise funds for jihad) but he was very careful to put together small teams of two to four men so that police would not suspect anything other than ordinary crimes and not put too much effort into pursuit.¹⁸ Their first known venture was on 18 February 2010, days before police moved in on the Aceh camp, when they robbed an internet café.¹⁹ In May and June, his men successfully robbed two Medan banks.²⁰

Abdul Rohman, and Haedar. See deposition of Agus Gapek, 24 September 2010, in his case dossier, Medan District Court, 2011.

¹⁵ Amir, alias Nibras, was one of those recruited online. A young man from Pasuruan, East Java, he had attended a *pesantren* in Madura for high school. He became interested in jihad there and after graduating in 2007 he kept up the interest as he pursued Arabic language studies, first in Malaysia, then in Surabaya. Sometime in 2010, as he was chatting on the internet, he found a new friend who turned out to be Sabar. Sabar invited him to join him to deepen his knowledge of jihad, and he left for Medan in April 2010, where he remained until he was arrested for involvement in the Medan bank robberies. See deposition of Amir, alias Nibras, alias Arab, 26 September 2010, in his case dossier, Medan District Court, 2011.

¹⁶ Rizky, alias Udin, the Medan student, studied and worked on Java from 2008 to 2011. He attended Mercubuana University in Jakarta in 2008, majoring in computers and accounting. He then went to Ngawi, East Java where he taught in an Islamic elementary school. When he expressed an interest in getting married, Ust. Afif, head of JAT-Central Java, arranged a marriage with a woman from Klaten who had many friends at the al-Mukmin Pesantren in Ngruki, Solo.

¹⁷ “Serial Trilogi Kebangkitan Jihad di Indonesia”, <http://jaisyulghareeb.wordpress.com/2012/03/01/serial-trilogi-kebangkitan-jihad-di-indonesia-bagian-pertama/>. This is an assessment of shortcomings in the jihadi movement written by someone in Sabar’s group, with two parts posted on radical websites in March 2012 and a third part promised. The author said his group in Medan turned down an invitation to join.

¹⁸ “Serial Trilogi Kebangkitan Jihad”, op. cit.

¹⁹ The cafe was Warnet Haunatas in Medan Baru. See deposition of Abdul Gani Siregar, 9 October 2010, in his case dossier, Medan District Court, 2011.

²⁰ On 21 May 2010, they robbed a branch of the Indonesian People’s Bank (Bank Rakyat Indonesia, BRI) in South Binjai subdistrict, and on 16 June, a BRI branch in Amplas, Medan.

¹² The others were JAT; JI; a Darul Islam faction; and a group called Kumpulan Mujahidin Indonesia (KMI) run by ex-JI leader Toni Togar from his prison cell. On KMI, see Crisis Group Report, *Indonesian Jihadism*, op. cit. An extremist *pengajian* (religious study) group led by a man named Hasbi seemed to draw in some of those close to both Toni Togar and Darul Islam.

¹³ MMI was established in Yogyakarta in 2000 as a pro-Sharia advocacy organisation, with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as its leader; a collective governing council eventually led to Ba’asyir’s withdrawing and forming JAT. The local MMI leaders when the North Sumatra branch was formed in early 2007 were Ust. Syahrul as amir, Ust. Heriansyah and Dr Zulkarnain as treasurer.

¹⁴ For more on Tim Hisbah, see Crisis Group Briefing, *Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon*, op. cit. One of the Tim Hisbah men was Agus Gapek. He says he was in Semarang, Solo in early 2009, looking for a jihadi group to join and struck up a conversation at the Arofah Mosque with a man named Ust. Amri. It was Amri who suggested he join Sabar in Medan. Amri’s affiliation is not clear. Two of Agus’s friends from Tim Hisbah joined him shortly thereafter, Parjito, alias

With the break-up of the Aceh camp, however, Sabar seemed to move closer to the JAT orbit. In early June, he and the head of JAT Medan, Alex Gunawan, travelled together to Lampung to persuade some of the group that had participated in the Aceh camp to come back to Medan for training.²¹

In early August 2010, Sabar was sent a new fighter whose recruitment may have been arranged through JAT. The recruitment itself shows how fluid organisational lines had become. The young man in question was Jaja Miharja, a member of Ring Banten from West Java. In early 2008, he went to Surabaya to work. While there he joined a regular JAT religious study group (*pengajian*), although he was never inducted. In late 2009, he returned home to get married and worked thereafter as an itinerant trader of Islamic herbal medicines. In July 2010, he was contacted by a friend from Padang, whom he knew from the *pengajian* in Surabaya. He was told to await a communication from “Infokom”, who would arrange for him and his wife to travel to Medan. Travel funds were transferred to his account shortly thereafter. Once in Medan he realised that “Infokom” was Sabar.²²

Sometime just after Jaja’s arrival, Sabar organised training on Mount Sibolangit outside Medan.²³ It was a smaller version of a cross-organisational alliance, consisting of fourteen men from six different organisations.²⁴ Given the disparate origins of the men involved, there may have been an informal agreement among jihadi groups after the Aceh break-up that training and/or cross-organisational cooperation should continue.

In August 2010, Sabar’s group obtained a new member: Hilman Djayakusumah, a drug dealer who had been recruited in Bali’s Kerobokan prison in 2004 by Imam Samudra, one of the original Bali bombers who was later executed. Hilman helped with surveys of possible robbery targets around Medan but only stayed a few weeks before returning to Java, because his wife was giving birth.²⁵ As will be discussed below, Hilman resurfaced in March 2012 as one of five men involved in what seems to have been a JAT-directed plot for a third Bali bombing.

A few weeks after Hilman’s arrival, Sabar told his men that any further *fa’i* operations were on hold, because another group was planning to rob a branch of the CIMB-Niaga bank in Medan. Sabar was not in favour of the operation: he felt it was not well thought through, and too many people were involved. His fears were justified. In a nineteen-man job on 18 August, the robbers killed a policeman as they took the money, and police mounted a massive manhunt. On 19 September 2010, they tracked several of the robbers to a house in Tanjung Balai, Asahan, North Sumatra, killing three and arresting the others. Three days later, a group of armed men, led by Taufik Hidayat, the head of the CIMB-Niaga robbery, attacked a police station in Hamparan Perak, outside Medan, killing three officers. In police operations that followed, ten jihadis were killed, including JAT leader Alex Gunawan, and dozens more arrested. All this left Sabar’s as the most active jihadi group in Medan; it also increased the determination among the jihadis more generally for revenge.

Sabar and his men had prided themselves on strategic thinking in a way that distinguished them from the CIMB-Niaga robbers. Reflecting on these differences in 2012, a member of Sabar’s group wrote:

The two groups knew each other and operated in the same city, but on many issues they differed in their opinions and in their actions and field strategies. The first group [including the CIMB-Niaga bombers] thought that jihad actions of the urban guerrilla war needed to be undertaken immediately to retaliate for the blood of mujahidin that *thaghut* had shed. Their numbers were greater than the second group. It only remained to find funding and meet logistic needs. They didn’t stop to think about how the struggle would be continued in the future, or from where they were going to get new personnel that they would need for recruitment and training. The important thing was to go to battle to the end.

This differed from the second group’s approach that had a long term master plan that also looked at how to train and recruit while at the same time carrying out jihad activities. This second group had a tendency to be better organised [in the interests of being more effective]. They understood that in today’s climate ..., it wasn’t good to just take people off the streets.²⁶

But the counter-terrorism operations that followed the CIMB-Niaga robbery and the attack on the police station a month later hurt Sabar’s group as well, forcing it to disperse.²⁷ They also created an enforced solidarity between the long-term strategists and the short-term hotheads in various parts of the country, as both sought to escape the

²¹ Deposition of Beben Choirul Banen, 2 November 2010, in his case dossier, Medan District Court, 2011.

²² Deposition of Jaja Miharja, September 2010 (exact date not readable), in his case dossier, Medan District Court, 2011.

²³ The dates for this training are variously given as early July, late July and early August 2010, but early August seems most consistent with the other testimony.

²⁴ The men included Alex Gunawan, head of JAT-Medan, and one other JAT member; six of Sabar’s men, including three seconded from the Solo-based Tim Hisbah; two of Toni Togar’s KMI; three from the Lampung group; and Jaja Miharja.

²⁵ Case dossier of Agus Gaplek, op. cit.

²⁶ “Serial Trilogi Kebangkitan Jihad”, op. cit.

²⁷ Ibid.

police dragnet. One of the places affected was Poso in Central Sulawesi.

B. SANTOSO'S GROUP IN POSO

Poso had been the site of bitter fighting between Muslims and Christians from December 1998, in the immediate aftermath of nationwide political and economic turmoil that led to the resignation of then President Soeharto.²⁸ Beginning in mid-2000, JI had begun sending preachers and military instructors, many of them Mindanao-trained, to assist the Muslim side. A peace pact in December 2001 stopped the communal fighting, but extremist attacks, mostly by the local affiliates of JI and KOMPAK, continued. The JI group was based in Poso's Tanah Runtuh neighbourhood, the KOMPAK group in nearby Kayamanya.

Eventually JI came to see Poso as a secure base from which both *daawa* (religious outreach) and jihad could be launched. In the wake of the Bali bombings, as JI cells were disrupted or smashed across the rest of the country, Poso became the last remaining area of sustained JI activity. Poor leadership and increasingly brazen attacks, however, were ultimately the undoing of the local branch, and in a shootout on 22 January 2007, it was finally crushed – or so it seemed – in an operation that led to the arrest of most of the senior leadership that had hitherto escaped capture.

Poso had been quiet ever since, and the Tanah Runtuh and Kayamanya groups seemed to have lost all enthusiasm for jihad. But it turned out there were many individuals still eager to fight: all they needed was a little motivation, and JAT provided it.

In late 2009, JAT held preliminary discussions in Poso about establishing a local branch.²⁹ Three men, all ex-JI and former prisoners, were to take leadership roles: Yasin and Latif, both teachers (*ustad*), and a man named Santoso. Yasin assumed the primary role in recruitment; Santoso was to head the military effort.³⁰

It remains unclear how (or whether) Poso figured into the plans of Dulmatin and Ubaid for Aceh, but the timing is interesting. By the time the discussions about a JAT branch in Poso began, plans for the Aceh camp were well underway. The prospect of building a base in Aceh as part of a long-term strategy would have boosted the incentive to build serious JAT military units. Poso – where JI had invested a huge amount of time and resources – was a logical place in which to house one or, indeed, to build a second training site.

By late February 2010, just after the Aceh camp collapsed, Latif was in Solo on a weapons-buying trip. He managed to secure one M-16 and 80 bullets, but when he wanted to go back to Palu by ship from Surabaya, security at the Surabaya port was too tight, and he was forced to leave the gun with friends.³¹

In early March, Santoso came to Solo to discuss next steps with a group of Dulmatin's friends, all of whom had taken part in some way in the Aceh camp. One was a man named Sibghotullah, a KOMPAK veteran of the Poso conflict who was close to both Ubaid and Dulmatin. They were all watching television news together on 9 March, when a news bulletin came on announcing that police had killed Dulmatin in an operation outside Jakarta. Santoso left to return to Poso shortly thereafter, to be joined about two weeks later by Sibghotullah. Santoso found him a place to stay and a temporary job on a public works project.³²

The first inkling that Poso was back in business as a jihadi training centre came from the arrest of another Aceh fugitive, Joko Purwanto, in May 2010. Joko, who had trained in Mindanao and knew Poso well from having served as a JI military trainer there in 2001, testified that he had gone there in April to check about obtaining more weapons and raise funds to help other fugitives and their families. While he was there, he went with Santoso to inspect a possible training site and meet some of his fighters.³³ He returned to Jakarta a week later with a request from Santoso to

²⁸ For background, see Crisis Group Asia Reports N°127, *Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge*, 24 January 2007; N°103, *Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso*, 13 October 2005; and N°74, *Indonesian Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi*, 3 February 2004.

²⁹ Aryanto Haluta, a JAT member later arrested for involvement in the shooting of two policemen in Palu, said Abu Tholut came to Poso sometime in early 2010 to talk about setting up a branch. Deposition of Aryanto Haluta, 1 June 2011, in his case dossier, West Jakarta District Court, 2012. But after the collapse of the Aceh camp, Abu Tholut was lying low in Java, and his own accounts of activity in 2009 make no mention of Poso.

³⁰ Yasin had gone to Poso from Semarang as part of a JI *daawa* team and stayed on. He had been arrested after the January 2007 shootout, sentenced to five years and released in 2010. Santoso,

a Javanese living in Tambarana, Poso first came to police attention in August 2004, when together with six others, he robbed a truck carrying Djarum clove cigarettes. He was then active in the Tanah Runtuh group, the local affiliate of Jemaah Islamiyah based in a Poso neighbourhood of the same name. According to the testimony of fellow Tanah Runtuh members, he carried out the robbery on his own initiative, not on the orders of the military unit (*askari*), and there was much unhappiness with him at the time

³¹ Testimony of Mu'arifin, 28 September 2010, in case dossier of Abdullah Sunata, East Java District Court, 2011.

³² Santoso got a government contract cleaning gutters in Palu and employed several friends who later would form one of his hit squads. His experience suggests that employment projects for ex-jihadis need careful monitoring.

³³ Testimony of Joko Purwanto in case dossier of Abdullah Sunata, op. cit.

find ammunition as well as a few police uniforms that could be used in operations. On 8 May, he was arrested in Solo, together with the items on Santoso's shopping list.

In August 2010, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was arrested in West Java, but this did not stop plans for establishing a Poso branch – in fact it likely increased the determination to do so. In November, the acting head of JAT, Mohammed Achwan, came to Poso with Abdul Rahim Ba'asyir, Abu Bakar's younger son, to explain JAT's mission to the new recruits. By the end of their visit, the new branch was in operation.

C. THE SANTOSO-LED MILITARY TRAINING (TADRIB)

Santoso and his military wing proceeded to conduct three training sessions, undetected by local authorities, in January, March and May 2011. After the third, Santoso decided he needed more weapons for use in the training program; his aim was one man, one gun. Accordingly, he sent a hit squad to attack police guarding a bank in Palu. It was not a smart move. Two policemen were killed, a third injured, and in the arrests that followed, the scope of Santoso's operations was fully exposed.

The training, however, had brought some interesting groups together. The first, in Poso Pesisir subdistrict in late January 2011, involved about twenty men. Most were local, but there were at least five from Kalimantan. Their identities are not all known but the likelihood is that they were brought in through JAT connections.

The second, probably in March 2011 (the participants all remember the dates differently), was also in Poso Pesisir and in addition to the local participants included five outsiders, all with links to JI or JAT. Three of the five have since been arrested, and their backgrounds illustrate how much intermingling had taken place among groups:

- Imron Rosyidi, born in Jakarta in 1985, was a graduate of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) in Ngruki, Solo, class of 2000. After teaching briefly in East Java, he returned to Jakarta and joined MMI, almost certainly later transferring his loyalty to JAT when it split from MMI in 2008. In 2009, he left to teach at a *pesantren* in Aceh, and his house later became a transit centre and logistics base for men going to the Aceh camp. After police raided the camp, Imron fled first to Jakarta, with friends from Ring Banten, and then to Solo, where for the first time, in March 2010, he met members of Tim Hisbah.³⁴ He eventually

returned to Jakarta and laid low for several months. In early 2011, he recruited a few friends for the training and left for Poso via Jakarta and Balikpapan, where they picked up two recruits. Imron was arrested in June 2011.

- Agus Supriyanto, born in South Sumatra in 1982, was a friend of Imron's from his student days at Muhammadiyah University in Solo. In December 2009, Imron asked him to go to Aceh to teach, which he did; he then was asked to join the Aceh camp. After two weeks' training, he returned to his teaching job briefly before going back to Solo in mid-2010. Sometime thereafter he moved to Palembang, South Sumatra, and it was there that Imron contacted him again in early 2011 about the proposed training in Poso. He was arrested on 5 May 2012 in Palembang.³⁵
- Agung Prasetyo, also known as Gede and Akbar, from East Java, seems to have been a classmate of Agus's in Solo. He met Udin from Sabar's group sometime in early 2010 in Solo. Shortly afterwards, he moved to Samarinda, East Kalimantan. His brother-in-law, Mu'arifin, played a supporting role for the Aceh training camp, and after its break-up, at Mu'arifin's behest, he helped several fugitives from Aceh find shelter and work in Samarinda in March 2010.³⁶ He appears to have maintained contact with Sabar's group as well as with contacts in Central Java. He took part in the first Poso training in January 2011 and then appears to have become a recruiter for the second. He was arrested on 14 May 2012.

The third training, in May 2011, was more diverse. While most of the twenty or so participants were Santoso's own men, it included some interesting outsiders: Udin from Medan; two men from a JAT-linked school in Bima, Sumbawa, Ust. Abrory and Ust. Jipo; Cahya Fitriyanta, a graduate of JI schools who had become friends with Dulmatin's brother-in-law; and two men from Kalimantan. One of those, Muadz (also spelled Muats and Muad), is likely a member of the Darul Islam splinter known as DI-Akram or the Abu Umar Group, who was arrested in Tawao, in November 2011.

D. THE MOTORCYCLE ROBBERIES

All might have been well had not Santoso decided on the Palu police post attack. It led to the arrest of several men who mapped out the JAT branch for police and provided

³⁴ His Ring Banten friends introduced him to Mu'arifin, then living in Bandung, whose parents had a house in Solo. The Solo

house became a gathering place for some of the Aceh fugitives. Testimony of Mu'arifin, *op. cit.*

³⁵ "Dana Kamp Teroris Poso dan Gerja Solo Disimpan di Bank", www.beritasatu.com, 13 May 2012.

³⁶ Testimony of Mu'arifin, *op. cit.*

information that led to a new wave of arrests. It also led Santoso to tap into his reserves: ex-convicts recruited by Yasin and Latif in prison.

Until this point, most members of Santoso's military unit had been men he had known since the height of the conflict. But for several reasons, they needed extra manpower. They were also almost certainly short of funds, a substantial amount having been spent on the May training. Even though most had paid their own way, the outlay for the organisers was likely to have been substantial. After the police were on their trail, however, defence was also a priority. They also now had their own martyrs (*syuhada*), since the police had killed two of the Palu gunmen soon after the incident, and Santoso's group had to raise money for their widows and families.

For all these reasons, Santoso and another recidivist, Imron (no connection to Imron Rosyidi, above), decided to step up the theft of motorcycles to sell on the black market. His group had already done this several times, but the need was now more urgent. Imron, a core member of Santoso's group and himself an ex-prisoner, invited five men to join what was effectively a new cell of the Poso military unit. At least two, Fadlun and Irwanto had been inmates in Petobo prison in Palu when Ust. Yasin and others arrested in connection with the January 2007 clashes were sent there to serve their sentences. Yasin ran a religious study group at the prison beginning sometime in 2008 that in addition to Fadlun, who had been arrested for abducting a minor, consisted of two drug dealers, two thieves, three rapists and a murderer. He persuaded the criminals to repent their past deeds and began teaching them about *tauhid* (the oneness of God) and jihad.

It is not clear how many continued to take part in radical study groups once freed. Fadlun seems to have dropped out of religious activities after his release in 2009. He went to work as an undocumented migrant in Malaysia, came back in 2010 and worked in an electronics store until he was detained for embezzlement. After a month in police custody, he was released, worked as a construction coolie for a few months and was unemployed when Imron invited him to join the group. In August 2011 Irwanto, on Imron's instructions, asked Fadlun if he wanted to steal some motorcycles. Not having anything better to do, Fadlun agreed and between August and November 2011, he and Irwanto, sometimes with the participation of a third man, successfully stole and sold eleven bikes. Fadlun understood that half the proceeds of the sales were to go to the widows of men killed by police. His friend testified that 15 per cent was to go for the cause, with the remaining 85 per cent to be divided among the perpetrators.³⁷ The eco-

nomic incentive for ex-convicts taking part in religiously-sanctioned robbery was therefore high.³⁸

The question is whether Imron would have called up his ex-convict reserves if the military wing had not been in dire straits. Whatever the reason, it was ill-advised, because the thieves were caught and by November 2011 were back in prison – and Santoso's group was left more exposed.

E. BACK TO MEDAN

On 9 June 2011, police arrested Dulmatin's brother-in-law, Hari Kuncoro, in Central Java.³⁹ His friend, Cahya Fitriyanta, a computer expert and graduate of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's school in Ngruki, Solo who was already on the police wanted list, became frightened that he would be next and decided to change his identity, get a wife and flee, in that order. The first thing he did was to use his computer skills to make nine identity cards, each with a different name and place of birth. He then called a woman he had not seen since 2008, who had long been involved with radical groups, and arranged a hasty marriage. (Marriage was important because his wife could help provide funds and protection.) After the wedding, he immediately fled alone to Medan to stay with a new friend from the Poso training: Rizky Gunawan alias Udin. For a month he and Udin worked together, raising funds through internet fraud. According to police, Cahya's assets in Medan at the time of his arrest totalled more than Rp.8 billion (\$845,397), much of it in property; he and Udin were also able to make a substantial contribution to Poso training activities.⁴⁰

³⁷ Case dossier of Sarwo, (copy undated but probably November 2011).

³⁸ The stolen motorcycles were sold for very low prices, however, about Rp.1 million (\$95) each.

³⁹ Hari is married to Dulmatin's sister, Widya Martiyana.

⁴⁰ "BNPT seizes Rp8b in terrorist assets in Medan", *Jakarta Post*, 21 June 2012; and "Polisi Bekuk Terduga Teroris Poso", www.beritasatu.com, 12 July 2012.

IV. DULMATIN'S CIRCLE AND THE POLICE POISONING PLOT

Cahya and Hari Kuncoro were part of the circle around Dulmatin.⁴¹ Another man in this circle, married to the younger sister of Dulmatin's first wife, was Ali Miftah, a Cirebon native who lived in Solo, near the Ngruki Pesantren. Ali became involved in the Aceh camp through his relationship with both Dulmatin and Ubaid.⁴² His flight from Aceh led, through a series of twists and turns, to the formation of a new group in Jakarta.

Ali Miftah had been with Ubaid and others from the Aceh camp on 11 April 2010, when a police patrol saw their stopped car in Medan and went to investigate. All were arrested except Ali Miftah, who managed to escape. He returned to Solo and moved in with Joko Purwanto, one of the few other camp participants who had made it back unscathed to Java – and who was already in contact with Santoso in Poso.

Using Joko's place as a base, Ali Miftah moved around East Java – Surabaya, Malang, Jember, Jombang, Kediri, Magetan, Ngawi and Madiun – selling Islamic herbal remedies. Being constantly on the go was both a security strategy and a way of keeping in touch with jihadi friends, including those in prison. He was a regular visitor to the prison in Sragen, Central Java, for example, until it became too dangerous as the police net closed in. He also appears to have been in communication with Umar Patek, who had come back with Hari Kuncoro from Mindanao in June 2009 but had declined to get involved in the Aceh operation.

Joko was arrested on 13 May 2010 and held in Jakarta police headquarters; Ali Miftah moved back to his parents' house in Cirebon but remained busy with jihadi business, including trying to find a new safehouse in Jakarta for Umar Patek.⁴³ For help he turned to an old friend, Santhanam, a computer specialist who lived in the Kemayoran area of Jakarta.⁴⁴ Santhanam had long been a member of a

radical study group; by 2010, he was a follower of extremist cleric Halawi Makmun and had put together a group of seven men interested in a more active jihadi role. When Ali Miftah sounded them out about putting up Umar Patek, however, only two felt they could commit to the task, the plan was dropped, and Patek eventually left for Pakistan without their help.⁴⁵ The group still wanted action, however, and Joko Purwanto's arrest in May triggered discussions about what could be done for the mujahidin in prison.

In several visits to Jakarta between July 2010 and the end of the year, Ali Miftah met with Santhanam and his friends to discuss raising funds through *fa'i* and producing homemade weapons. They had downloaded material on bomb-making from a radical website and vowed to produce a weapon in a year; Ali Miftah also gave them a pen gun to try and replicate.⁴⁶ At the same time, he assigned Santhanam to make regular visits to Joko at his police headquarters cell. He seems to have seen Joko as the leader who had to sign off on all decisions.

In mid-February 2011, during another visit from Ali Miftah, Santhanam came up with the idea of trying to poison police. He said he was inspired by Halawi Makmun, who in his lectures urged that any and all means, including poison, be used to attack the *thaghut*, since they were responsible for so many Muslim deaths. Ali Miftah agreed but noted that limited funds meant they should rely if possible on poisons from natural sources such as ricin or snake venom. Through a simple Google internet search for "poisonous plants", Santhanam found a recipe for ricin, and they agreed to go forward, if possible before the verdict was handed down in the case of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, whose trial had already begun.

Ali Miftah, in the meantime, was feeling less and less secure in Solo and decided to flee to Poso. In February 2011, shortly after the meeting with Santhanam, he called up Santoso, whom he had met through Joko, and asked for assistance. Santoso agreed to help and found him a place to stay in Parigi, Central Sulawesi. He was working there as an herbal treatments salesman, kindergarten teacher and adviser to a mosque youth group when he was arrested on 11 June 2011.

⁴¹ Two others in the group were Tongji alias Warsito, who helped guard Dulmatin when he was living in Pamulang, outside Jakarta in 2009-2010 and Moh, Sibghatullah. Both took part in the Aceh camp.

⁴² He was a close friend of Ubaid's younger brother, Umar Burhanuddin, with whom he had been classmates at the JI school, Pesantren Darusyahada in Boyolali, Solo. Ali Miftah looked up to Ubaid as an intellectual and religious scholar. Case dossier of Ali Miftah, 15 June 2011.

⁴³ At the time, Umar Patek was already living in Jakarta, but the police raid that killed Dulmatin in March 2010 may have made him think about moving for safety reasons. He did change houses in June but stayed in the same neighbourhood.

⁴⁴ Santhanam met Ali Miftah through Ridwan Farid, a graduate of Ba'asyir's school in Ngruki, who led an extremist study group

in Jakarta. After the 2004 tsunami in Aceh, Ridwan joined Ali Miftah there as a volunteer, and the two men briefly shared a house in Jakarta after their return in early 2005. Santhanam met Ali Miftah for the first time at this house.

⁴⁵ He left in August 2010 and was arrested in Abbottabad, Pakistan in January 2011, deported to Indonesia three months later and put on trial for the first Bali bombings in 2012.

⁴⁶ Case dossier of Sanathanam, undated but probably June 2011. The website was Forum Islam at-Tawbah (at-tawbah.net) which among other things featured an Indonesian language version of the al-Qaeda online magazine *Inspire*.

Santhanam and his friends were arrested the day before, in possession of a plastic water bottle of the ricin they had prepared. That morning, Joko had called them from prison and told them if possible to go ahead with the operation that day after Friday prayers. A less competent group of terrorists would be hard to find. They had clearly not thought through any of the details; nor did anyone stop to think that Joko's instructions might be rather odd. They took the bottle of ricin, smeared the poison on two straws and went to a foodstall frequented by police near where Santhanam lived in Kemayoran. They were trying to figure out a way to insert the straws into beverages the police might order or into the local hot sauce that accompanies most Indonesian meals when they were arrested.

Dulmatin's circle was now largely arrested or dead, and Santhanam and his friends were in custody, but a big question remained about all the men in East Java that Ali Miftah had been visiting, not to mention Santoso from Poso, who remained at large.

V. THE LINK TO ABU UMAR

The involvement of Muadz from East Kalimantan in Santoso's May 2011 training suggests that the fallout from Aceh may have produced closer cooperation between JAT and a splinter of Darul Islam once referred to as DI-Akram, after its then leader, now more commonly called the Abu Umar Group.⁴⁷ This group initiated one of the earliest training programs for Indonesians in the late 1980s in Mindanao, at the headquarters of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Camp Abubakar, several years before JI began building a camp there. It also built up a transit route through East Kalimantan to Tawao in Sabah and on to Tawi-Tawi and Zamboanga in the southern Philippines.

Abu Umar, whose real name is Muhammad Ichwan, also known as Zulfikar, was recruited into Darul Islam in 1988, when still in high school in Jakarta, and formally inducted as a member in 1990. In 1997 he was sent to Mindanao for training, accompanied by Enceng Kurnia – the man who in 2010 was killed fleeing the Aceh camp. In 1999, angered by DI's lack of interest in defending Muslims in Ambon, he helped form a unit called the Abu Bakar Battalion.⁴⁸ Among the other founders was Ahmad Sayid Maulana – another instructor in the Aceh camp killed by police in May 2010. The group was behind a 4 March 2000 attack on a moderate Muslim politician, and from then on Abu Umar was on the police wanted list.⁴⁹

Following the attack, Abu Umar went back and forth between Ambon, to fight at the height of the communal

⁴⁷ Both are terms of convenience; it is not clear what members call their group. It seems to be part of a larger Darul Islam splinter that almost certainly has another name. The original leader was Taufiqur Rohman, alias Akram, alias Syamsudin, a Javanese who trained on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border with the first generation of JI leaders. When he returned from the border, he moved to Sabah, and went from there to Mindanao in 1989 to set up a training camp for DI. From 1991 to 1998 he lived in Nunukan, East Kalimantan, but was going back and forth to Mindanao. He and his family then moved back to Temanggung, Solo. On 27 January 2000, he was responsible for the bombing of the Kauman Mosque in Yogyakarta on the grounds that it was a *mesjid dhiror* (a mosque used to divide the *ummah* (Islamic community), the same rationale used by the April 2011 suicide bomber at the police mosque in Cirebon). He seems to have moved sometime thereafter to Central and West Sulawesi, where he was involved in a number of attacks. He was arrested on 9 May 2005, charged with the mosque bombing, and sentenced to four years in prison. He was released in 2008; it is not clear what he has been doing since. See "Perkara Pidana B.140 atas Nama Klien: Muhammad Auwal Suhardi, Taufiqur Rohman", Universitas Islam Indonesia, 2005.

⁴⁸ See Crisis Group Report, *Recycling Militants*, op. cit.

⁴⁹ The politician was Matori Abdul Jalil, then head of the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB).

conflict there, and East Kalimantan, to trade. In 2002 he moved his family to Sebatik, an island off the coast of East Kalimantan that is divided in half between Malaysia and Indonesia. He lived there for the next three years and taught in an elementary school, but his main mission seems to have been to help set up new training facilities in Mindanao following the destruction of Camp Abubakar by the Philippines army in 2000. While he was in Sebatik, other members of his organisation were active elsewhere: Enceng Kurnia in 2003 helped Dulmatin and Umar Patek escape to Mindanao via Poso, and Sabar, alias Abu Audat (not to be confused with the Medan-based Sabar), was helping train jihadis in South Sulawesi.⁵⁰ The latter, who was Makassar-based, later helped provide sanctuary to several important fugitives after the Aceh debacle.

In August 2005, after his boss, Akram, was arrested in Central Sulawesi, Abu Umar moved back to Jakarta, taking over the military wing of the DI unit there, re-establishing communications with former members of the Abu Bakar Battalion and actively recruiting new members.

Two members of his group went back to Poso to join in the battle against police on 22 January 2007. After police “won”, all of the militant groups represented may have decided that more military training was required. The Abu Umar group decided to aim for one session in Sulawesi every six months, although it did not quite manage it. The first took place in August 2007 near Palopo, South Sulawesi, and the second in July 2008, on Turtle Island (Pulau Kura-Kura) near the South-Southeast Sulawesi border, both with about 25 participants and both apparently strictly in-house, with no one from other organisations. One young man who took part in the second was Iwan Kurniawan, Enceng Kurnia’s younger brother.

In October 2008, several members of the Jakarta DI group were arrested, and Abu Umar, who until this point was just in charge of military affairs, took over full command of Jakarta operations, although it remained unclear how far the group extended. With Sabar alias Abu Audat in Makassar, it seemed at the very least to have an active South

Sulawesi component. In November 2008, Enceng Kurnia, Abu Umar’s comrade-in-arms, was released from prison.⁵¹

By the time of the third training, again on Turtle Island around October 2009, recruitment for the Aceh camp was underway. Enceng Kurnia and Ahmad Sayid Maulana were deeply involved, and Abu Umar, as early as September, had offered his men a chance to participate – and one young man from West Jakarta did.⁵² The orientation of Abu Umar’s group was more to the north, however, toward the southern Philippines, where it had a weapons supplier and strong connections through Tawi-Tawi and beyond. Given Enceng Kurnia’s close relationship with Dulmatin, there may have been discussions about mutual support and assistance if the Aceh project should succeed, but at that stage Abu Umar’s group showed no inclination to join forces with anyone else, at least on the military side; on the *daawa* side, it was happy to benefit from other groups’ *ulama* (scholars and religious authorities) because it had so few of its own.⁵³

A fourth training, in February 2010 near Mamuju, West Sulawesi, just preceded the Aceh camp’s collapse. From then on, Abu Umar and his friends were caught up in the aftermath. Most devastatingly, Enceng Kurnia was killed, making his younger brother Iwan – and others – determined to avenge his death.⁵⁴ Their members in Makassar and Jakarta took in fugitives, both from the Aceh camp and from the Medan bank robbery, some of whom then went on to Poso, meaning more communication and interaction with Sabar’s group in Medan and with Santoso in Poso – and increasing the chances that they would come to the attention of the police.⁵⁵

In February 2011, Abu Umar’s group organised a training session on Mount Walenrang, near Palopo, South Sulawesi. The trainees, intriguingly, included six men from Poso.

⁵⁰ In March 2003, Enceng Kurnia was instrumental in helping Umar Patek, Dulmatin and their families flee to Mindanao via Poso and Tawao, Sabah. In August 2003, he went to Mindanao himself for ten months. Once back in Indonesia, Enceng worked with KOMPAK leader Abdullah Sunata to conduct a military training course in West Ceram, Maluku for some 30 DI and KOMPAK cadres in July 2004. He was arrested in July 2005 for illegal possession of a weapon and withholding information relevant to the 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy. See deposition of Enceng Kurnia, July 2005, from his case dossier, Jakarta, 2006.

⁵¹ He took over after police arrested the then leader of the Jakarta cell, Budiman, who died a week later in a police hospital from a chronic liver disease. Budiman’s inner circle included a man who briefly led the Kayamanya group in Poso, Ruslan Mardani, alias Wahyu alias Uci. Uci was also arrested in October 2008 and later sentenced to ten years in prison.

⁵² Testimony of Asmuni alias Munir, 7 July 2011, in case dossier of Asmuni alias Munir, 2012.

⁵³ As a result, Abu Umar encouraged his men to attend the lectures and discussions of clerics such as Aman Abdurrahman, Halawi Makmun, Farid Okhbah and Cholil Ridwan. Several of the Abu Umar men arrested in July and November 2011 considered themselves followers of Aman Abdurrahman.

⁵⁴ Crisis Group interview, friend of Enceng Kurnia, Jakarta, August 2011.

⁵⁵ The fugitives assisted in Jakarta were Fitoyo, alias Fajar, Ibrahim and Andi Maralon, all apparently still at large, and in Makassar, Sibghotullah, who first stayed with Sabar, alias Abu Audat in Makassar and later went on to stay with Santoso in Poso.

The question is whether any of these were Santoso's men. It would make sense, given the post-Aceh imperative of getting as many people trained as possible, and at least one name possibly corresponds to a suspect in the shooting of the Palu police a few months later.⁵⁶ The fact that one of Abu Umar's men, Muadz, took part in Santoso's training in May 2011 strengthens the possibility that there was an exchange.

The training linkage raises the question of whether there were discussions as well with Santoso about securing weapons in the southern Philippines. Santoso was desperate for more arms for his training sessions; Abu Umar's men had all the connections to get them from the Philippines: he had an arms supplier in Zamboanga, and as of early 2011 his stepson was in Jolo with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).⁵⁷ Whether these links would have meant more cooperation in the future is uncertain. But on 4 July 2011 several of Abu Umar's men, including Iwan Kurniawan, were captured as they were smuggling guns from Mindanao through Surabaya. Abu Umar himself was arrested the same day just west of Jakarta.

VI. THE BIMA CONNECTION

If Poso comes up repeatedly in the chronicles of men fleeing Aceh, so does Bima, Sumbawa, east of Bali in West Nusa Tenggara province. The link to post-Aceh extremism is through two men who had attended JI-affiliated schools: Abrory and Uqbah.⁵⁸

Abrory helped establish the Umar bin Khattab Islamic boarding school in Bima in 2004 and became its head. As noted, he and another teacher from the school took part in Santoso's May 2011 training. Just over a month later, on 30 June 2011, a student from the school walked into a nearby police post and stabbed an officer to death. Less than two weeks later, on 11 July, a teacher was killed in an explosion as he was making a bomb, and school staff and students held off police for the next three days, allowing several other bomb-makers to flee. When police finally gained entry, they found evidence that more bombs had been produced. Abrory was arrested on 15 July 2011 – more than twenty years after his father had been arrested by the Soeharto government for plotting to establish an Islamic state.⁵⁹

Uqbah, through his former classmates, became involved in late 2008 in helping raise funds for Noordin Top for what became the hotel bombings.⁶⁰ After the bombings and a

⁵⁶ One suspect said that a fellow participant was "Charlie"; a member of Santoso's hit squad, later killed by police, was Fauzan alias Charles.

⁵⁷ It is not clear how or when Abu Umar's people joined the ASG, but Dulmatin and Umar Patek were forced out of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) territory in November 2005 as part of the peace negotiations between the MILF and the Philippines government. They joined the ASG on Jolo at that time, and it is likely that the DI men followed suit. They were all in one unit under Radullan Sahiron. Abu Umar's son reportedly left for Jolo in April 2011.

⁵⁸ Abrory was a graduate of Pesantren al-Muttaqien in Jepara, Central Java, class of 1999. Other alumni of al-Muttaqien include Mustaghfirin, arrested in 2006 for assisting Noordin, and Enal Ta'o, a Malaysian from Sandakan, Sabah who was involved in several violent crimes in Poso and fled to Aceh in 2006 to escape police. He was killed there in March 2010. Both Abu Umar and the Singaporean JI leader Mas Selamat Kastari sent their children to this school. Uqbah had attended Mahad Aly in Gading, Soli, in the class of 2003 with Ubaid, Suramto and Bagus Budi Pranoto, alias Urwah. Urwah was three years ahead of Abrory at al-Muttaqien, graduating in 1996 and then going on to Mahad Aly. Ubaid and Uqbah, in addition to being classmates at Mahad Aly, had earlier attended Pesantren Darusyahada in Boyolali, Solo.

⁵⁹ Bima has a long history of radical groups, originally linked to Darul Islam. One notable extremist in the late 1970s was Abdul Qadir Baraja, who taught at Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's Ngruki school. He was convicted of supplying explosives for the 21 January 1985 bombing of the Borobodur temple in central Java. On his release he founded a non-violent organisation, Khilafatul Muslimin, which continues to be active in Sumbawa, as well as a few other areas of Indonesia.

⁶⁰ Testimony of Suramto, alias Ziyad, alias Deni, 20 September 2010 in case dossier of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, 2011. The sequence of events seems to have started in late 2008 when Noordin Top's associate, Urwah, at that point out of prison for just over a year, invited several of his former classmates and protégés in the Solo area to join Noordin's group. One was Suramto. It is not clear exactly when Uqbah was drawn in, but in November 2008, Urwah instructed Suramto to give his bank account number to

wave of arrests that followed, he helped arrange sanctuary at the Umar al-Khattab for Dulmatin's brother-in-law, Hari Kuncoro, who had nothing to do with the bombings but suddenly felt uneasy living in Jakarta.⁶¹

In September 2009, Uqbah was summoned to Magetan, East Java by his old classmate, Ubaid, who was teaching at his parents' school.⁶² Ubaid invited Uqbah to join JAT but also asked him to help raise funds to support the families of mujahidin killed in police operations, his parents' school and various jihad-related activities; he would almost certainly have been aware of Uqbah's fundraising for Noordin. Uqbah agreed.

In December 2009, Ubaid and Abu Tholut, another senior JAT leader, came to Bima on JAT business and asked to meet separately with Uqbah. They told him of the urgent need for money to help the families of slain mujahidin and

Uqbah, so that funds could be transferred from Bima. The first two transfers, totalling Rp.21,000,000 [about \$2,000] seem to have been made well before the July 2009 hotel bombings in which Urwah was deeply involved. The third, a sum of Rp.27,000,000, must have reached Suramto much closer to the day of the attack. He managed to get Rp.10,000,000 to Urwah before the latter was killed, then used the rest of the money to support himself in Bandung as a fugitive. In September 2009, Suramto, this time on his own initiative, asked Uqbah for Rp.1,000,000, which Uqbah duly sent.

⁶¹ In August 2009, at the invitation of "my friend Uqbah", Hari moved to the Umar bin Khattab Pesantren. He and Umar Patek had returned to Indonesia together from Mindanao in June 2009, so he had only been back a month when the hotel attacks occurred. He must have worried that he could be traced through contacts with individuals tangentially involved in Noordin's group, although it is not clear whom. He stayed through December 2009 and appears to have conducted some military training for the teachers there. For much of 2010, after his return from Bima, he laid low on Java, preparing to go Afghanistan once Umar Patek had paved the way. Patek, however, was arrested in January 2011 in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and Hari's plans fell through. He seems nevertheless to have maintained some communication with Abrory, and in March 2011, before the Poso training, Abrory asked his help in buying a gun and gave him some money to do so. Police were already tracking Hari, and they arrested him in June, before he could make the purchase. See case dossier of Hari Kuncoro (date missing on Crisis Group copy but probably June 2011).

⁶² Efforts to set up a JAT branch in Bima were underway just months before Hari Kuncoro returned from Mindanao. In March 2009, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir came to Bima to give a series of public lectures, including at a mosque in Bolo, near the Umar bin Khattab Pesantren. He was accompanied by a number of JAT luminaries, and his host was a local man, Ust. Abdul Hakim (or Abah Hakim), referred to in the local media as the amir of JAT-Bima. See "Ustaz Abubakar Ba'asyir Kembali Berdakwah di Bima", 17 March 2009, sumbawanews.com, reprinted at <http://bimakab.go.id/index.php?pilih=news&mod=yes&aksi=lihat&id=409>.

other activities.⁶³ He agreed to help, and as of early February 2010, he had sent Rp.35,000,000 (some \$3,500) to Ubaid. By this time he understood that the funds were being used for a camp in Aceh, and though he was asked to join, he declined.⁶⁴ He was arrested on 3 December 2010.

Meanwhile, in May 2010, JAT-Bima helped another Aceh fugitive find refuge. This was Kamaluddin, a close colleague of Aman Abdurrahman. After taking part in the Aceh camp, he had managed to get back to Jakarta in March 2010 and was living quietly in Cikampek, East Jakarta with a group from Ring Banten. After a police raid on 12 May 2010 killed one of the men who had escaped with him from Aceh, Kamaluddin (Kamal, for short) decided to move on, leaving his wife, then eight months pregnant, in the care of his Cikampek friends. He called Andre Anggara, a man who had been a fellow member of a study group with Aman and was now a member of the Abu Umar group. Andre gave him a number of an Aman follower in Bima, now a JAT leader, who had helped bring Aman to Bima in 2009. With his help, Kamal found a place to live and work as well as a second wife to join him in his self-imposed exile. But when Uqbah was arrested in December 2010, Kamal decided that Bima was growing unsafe, so he moved on to Makassar.

The above events help put the stabbing of the policeman and subsequent standoff at the Umar bin Khattab Pesantren in mid-2011 into perspective. The Bima community was directly affected by police operations. Funds for two projects that became the target of the police – the hotel attack and the Aceh camp – had been raised in Bima. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who had come three times to Bima to oversee the establishment of a JAT chapter, was arrested in August 2010; Uqbah was arrested in December.⁶⁵ Abrory and a man named Jipo (also seen as Zipo) had taken part in military training in Poso in mid-May 2011 where the theme of the police as *thaghut* had clearly been reinforced.

After his arrest, Abrory argued in testimony that he knew nothing of plans for the stabbing, but that after it occurred, he knew the *pesantren* would be attacked by police, so he ordered the staff to prepare bombs, using skills he had

⁶³ They raised in particular the cases of the wife of executed Bali bomber Amrozi, who had recently suffered a stroke, and the families of Air Setiawan and Eko, two of Urwah's protégés killed after the hotel bombings.

⁶⁴ Deposition of Mujadidul Haq alias Uqbah, 9 December 2010 from his case dossier, West Jakarta District Court, 2011.

⁶⁵ Ba'asyir's visit in March 2009 was billed by the media as his second; it is unclear when the first one was. The third was in February 2010, when Abrory and others gave oaths and were formally inducted.

learned in Ambon in 2001.⁶⁶ In fact those skills had just been upgraded in Poso. When police entered the school after the three-day standoff, they found indications that other police posts were targeted for attack.⁶⁷

Sometime in July 2011, immediately after the *pesantren* siege, Jipo showed up at Udin's place in Medan. Bima was now linked with Medan and Poso in a new jihadi triangle.

VII. THE SOLO BOMBING AND TIM HISBAH'S RETURN TO MEDAN

A suicide bombing at the Full Gospel Bethel Church in Solo on 25 September 2011 that killed only the bomber served to reinforce ties between the Solo-based Tim Hisbah, Sabar's group in Medan and JAT in Poso – and may have led indirectly to the plot for a third Bali bombing.

The history of Tim Hisbah has been outlined in earlier Crisis Group reports.⁶⁸ It seemed to suddenly have changed in September 2010 from being a thuggish anti-vice organisation, conducting raids every weekend on Solo's entertainment industry, to a group of would-be terrorists. In fact, the change was neither that simple nor that sudden, but there is an explanation for the timing.

As noted, several Tim Hisbah members had made their way to Medan in 2009 and 2010 to work with Sabar. One of them was a young convert to Islam, Yuki Wantoro. He was killed by police in a raid on 19 September 2010 and became, for the radical groups in Solo, the poster child for police excesses. Shortly afterwards, Hisbah's head, Sigit Qordhowi, declared a "*bai'at mati*", a dare-to-die oath, against the police and created a bombing team, whose members he sent to study with a like-minded group in Klaten that supposedly had more expertise. When the Klaten group was arrested in January 2011, two of the Tim Hisbah bombing team fled to Cirebon, where they had friends in a jihadi study group. When several of the latter became implicated in the April 2011 suicide bombing of the mosque at the Cirebon police headquarters, they fled to Solo, where Tim Hisbah members helped them find work and lodgings.⁶⁹

On 13 May 2011, hot on the trail of the bomber's accomplices, police killed Sigit and two others in an operation in Solo. This was just a few days before Santoso's third training started in Poso. The deaths would have given a boost to the jihad spirit of the Poso participants, and they almost certainly heightened the incentive of the now thoroughly radicalised members of Tim Hisbah to strike back.

⁶⁶ Testimony of Abrory Ali, 21 July 2011 in case dossier of Abrory, alias Ustadz Abrory M. Ali, alias Maskadov, alias Abrory Al Ayyuby, 2012.

⁶⁷ Among other things they found a map of the subdistrict police station in Madapangga, near Dompu. "Polisi Temukan Rencana Penyerangan Polsek Madapangga Bima", www.ntbterkini.com, 16 July 2011.

⁶⁸ Crisis Group Briefing, *Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon*, and Report, *Indonesian Jihadism*, both op. cit.

⁶⁹ The bombing of the Cirebon mosque – while the faithful were at Friday prayers – generated heated debate on radical websites. Those in favour called the target a *mesjid dhiror*, a mosque that because of the way it was used served to divide the *umma*. The strongest defence came from Iwan Dharmawan, alias Rois, who after the revelations of his role in recruiting for the hotel bombings and Aceh had been moved to the maximum security prison on Nusakambangan island, off the coast of south Java. Through visitors, he was still managing to smuggle out statements and get them posted on the internet.

The attack came on 25 September, with the bombing of an evangelical church, the Full Gospel Bethel Church (Gereja Bethel Injil Sepenuh, GBIS) in Kepunton, Solo. In another illustration of the fluidity of organisational boundaries, the suicide bomber was one of the most wanted members of the Cirebon group, while Tim Hisbah provided all the backup assistance. The target was more in line with Tim Hisbah's very local agenda – it had been involved, together with the Klaten group, in a series of failed attempts to bomb both churches and police stations in late 2010 and early 2011. This time, in addition to rumours that the GBIS church was engaged in efforts to convert Muslims, an outbreak of fighting between Christians and Muslims and the burning of Muslim homes in Ambon on 11 September gave an added rationale to the selection of a church.⁷⁰ But the story did not end there, because the Tim Hisbah members involved in the bombing fled to Medan, where they were assisted by Udin of Sabar's group. Udin, the man who made so much money through internet fraud, has since been accused of helping fund the church bombing.

VIII. THE BALI PLOT

On 18 March 2012, police shot and killed five men who, they said, were planning a third Bali bombing. They had carried out surveys of two bars frequented by tourists, the Hard Rock Café in Kuta and the Lavidia Loca Café in Seminyak, and were said to be planning the imminent robbery of a money changer and a gold store. Three were ex-drug dealers who had served time in Kerobokan prison in 2004 and come under the influence of the Bali bombers. Their leader was Hilman Djaja Kusumah alias Surya.⁷¹

When Mukhlas, Amrozi and Imam Samudra entered Kerobokan in 2003, Hilman was serving a seven-year sentence for marijuana possession. He had been entrusted with the job of *tamping mesjid* (literally, mosque accompanier), an inmate job that involved cleaning the prison mosque and opening the cells of prisoners who wanted to attend Friday prayers. In this way he came to know Imam Samudra and the other men sentenced in connection with the 2002 Bali bombing and became their devoted admirer.⁷²

In 2004, a major fight erupted among inmates between Balinese gangs and a group of Bali bombers from Banten.⁷³ Hilman and a few other criminal recruits fought on the Banten side, which won. His prestige rose among the convicted terrorists, but for his role in the fighting, he was moved to another prison in Karang Asem, Bali. By 2007 he had been released, and, according to a fellow inmate, he went to Aceh, the source of his marijuana supplies before his arrest but also an attraction as the only province allowed to apply Islamic law in full. Hilman had changed in prison: as a result of Imam Samudra's influence, he had become very hardline. "He called all the Hindu guards *thaghut* and said we should kill unbelievers wherever we can find them", said a fellow inmate.⁷⁴

Much of the story of the Bali plot remains to be filled in, but it is clear that Hilman stayed in touch with his fellow inmates, his Banten friends and some of his JI mentors after his release. For a while, according to his family, he was living in Langkat, Sumatra, on the border of Aceh. In 2008, he married a woman from Cimahi, West Java and lived with her there. By mid-2010, he was with Sabar's group in Medan, using the name Suryo and actively planning bank robberies, although contrary to police statements, he was never involved in the CIMB-Niaga heist.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ See Crisis Group Briefing N°128, *Indonesia: Trouble Again in Ambon*, 4 October 2011. On 17 May 2012, an Ambonese gang member, Basri Manuputty, was arrested in Tanjung Priok, north Jakarta with five others and charged with provoking the September unrest and planting bombs in Christian locations, although his exact motivation and that of his accomplices is not yet clear.

⁷¹ Hilman, an ethnic Sundanese, was born in Bandung, 12 December 1976.

⁷² Crisis Group interview, former inmate, Bogor, 12 July 2007.

⁷³ On the Banten side were Abdul Rauf, Andi Hidayat and Agus, according to a man present, Crisis Group interview, 12 July 2007.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Case dossier of Agus Gapek, op. cit.

The plan for a new attack on Bali appears to have been a cooperative venture between JAT and Sabar's group, with a Sulawesi link as well. In addition to Hilman, the others shot by police were:

- Ahmad Busaeri bin Saiful Ali, alias Umar Hasan, alias Kapten. He overlapped with the Bali bombers for about five months in Kerobokan prison in 2004, where he was serving a sentence for possession of psychotropic drugs. Perhaps as a result of the brawl that Hilman was involved in, he was moved in January 2005 to Tabanan prison, also in Bali, from which he escaped in August 2006. He was originally from Jember, East Java.
- Nanang Rudianto, alias Anang, also from Jember, who shared a cell with Amrozi in Kerobokan prison in 2004 and part of 2005, where he was serving a two-year sentence for drug possession.
- Badaruddin Sulaiman Malla, alias Safri Sulaiman, alias Abu Hanif alias Amir, was born in Palu, Sulawesi in 1963 but lived in Makassar. He is believed to have had ties to JI or JAT.

Much less is known about the fifth man, Martino Rusli, alias Dede, who had long lived in Bali but had several addresses in West Java and the greater Jakarta area.

The use of ex-criminals as an advance team shows how prison connections made in 2004 were still operative eight years later. And this was only the field team. A suicide bomber from Sabar's group had reportedly been chosen, and the operation as a whole was under the direction of a man from JAT-East Java, another indication that Sabar may have moved closer to JAT.

IX. HOW EXTREMISTS REGROUP

The above narrative shows the extent to which Indonesian extremist groups have dispersed and realigned as police pressure has increased. They find refuge with each other, share contacts and skills, intermarry and train together in a solidarity born of necessity. It is a sign of weakness that geographic and organisational barriers have broken down, but it also creates new opportunities for groups to form. This can be a danger, especially as the desire for revenge, if anything, has increased. It is therefore worth looking more closely at the vectors through which interaction takes place. Post-Aceh developments suggest there are at least five: flight, prisons and prison visits; training; internet forums; and marriage.

A. FLIGHT

The process of finding safe places to hide pushes jihadis into each other's arms. There are numerous instances in this report: Aceh fugitives going to Makassar, Poso and East Kalimantan; Tim Hisbah members fleeing to Cirebon and later to Medan; Cirebon members fleeing to Solo; Medan bank robbers joining Abu Umar's group in Jakarta; Hari Kuncoro fleeing to Bima; his friend Cahya going to Medan. In each place of sanctuary, there is an opportunity for cross-fertilisation and new skill-learning, whether driving a car, as the Tim Hisbah members learned to do in Medan, or bomb-making. The appearance of a fugitive can infuse a group with new militancy, especially when the newcomer has particular credibility in the jihadi movement. Hari Kuncoro seems to have had this effect in Bima. Noordin Top had the same effect when he was on the run.

The networks used to choose sanctuaries are sometimes the old JI school networks – this was clearly operative with Hari going to Bima – but this may be declining, as fewer of the younger jihadis come from a *pesantren* background. Ali Miftah's travel to and from Aceh was entirely based around fellow alumni from the Darusyahada Pesantren, a JI-linked school. Several of the Aceh fugitives drew on friends from the old days of the Poso conflict; others drew on fellow *pengajian* participants.

One issue becomes how to make a living in the new area. Funding is rarely available and then only for limited periods; following the Aceh camp dispersal, helping mujahidin in hiding became a rationale for *fa'i*. Sooner or later, the fugitives will have to support themselves, and many take up itinerant trading to meet basic expenses. Trading cheap goods has the advantage of low capital outlay, a ready market, high mobility and a certain degree of anonymity. The high mobility is important, not just to be able to keep on the move as required, but also because it ena-

bles individuals to touch base with friends, sometimes including detainees, in other areas.

Selling *bakso* (meatballs) or other foodstuffs on pushcarts is one option, but perishable goods necessarily entail a limited geographic range.⁷⁶ Sale of mobile phone vouchers is popular because of the guaranteed market; so is sale of Islamic herbal remedies, in part because there are suppliers who are already part of the jihadi network and may be willing to provide goods on commission.⁷⁷

Before his arrest in June 2011, Ali Miftah had managed to combine constant moving around for safety with regular checking up on the status of his network.⁷⁸ When in Sragen in 2010, he made a point of visiting the imprisoned jihadis there, keeping them in the loop about jihadi activities and plans.⁷⁹ (Later, as it became more dangerous to visit prisons himself, he sent intermediaries to ask questions and check on rumours.)⁸⁰ As more and more arrests took place, he returned to his parents' house in Cirebon and, using it as a base, turned himself into a fruit trader, buying fresh produce in Tasikmalaya, three hours away, and selling it in Cirebon. As the Muslim holiday Idul Adha approached, he arranged to buy goats and sell them in Jakarta. Everywhere he stopped, he touched base with "members", exploring how to get arms and funds and plotting operations.⁸¹ In February 2011, with the net closing in, he con-

tacted Santoso in Poso and asked if he could come, arranging first to have herbal supplies delivered from Solo so he had something to sell there until he was arrested in June 2011.

B. PRISONS AND PRISON VISITS

Prisons can also reshape jihadi organisations in several ways: by throwing members of different organisations together in detention; creating or exacerbating fissures within a single organisation through co-option, real or perceived, of individual prisoners; recruiting common criminals; or interaction of friends and families during prison visits. As noted, the alliance for the Aceh camp very much depended on friendships forged among inmates of Cipinang prison in Jakarta. The surge of new jihadi inmates in Indonesian prisons since 2010 raises the likelihood that more such cross-organisational alliances will be formed.

Several recent plots have involved ordinary criminals recruited in prison. Ex-convicts with no jihadi past have the advantage of anonymity and the disadvantage of rudimentary indoctrination. Drug dealers, for example, are largely invisible to anyone monitoring terrorism. Their names will not come up on membership lists or in mapping exercises. There is no systematic documentation of the alliances that high-risk detainees make behind bars; it is hard enough to keep track of convicted terrorists themselves. Especially in times of unrelenting police pressure and scarce resources, jihadi groups may turn to former inmates to provide additional strength or a particular skill set, such as robbery. Santoso's use of criminal recruits for motorcycle theft is one example. For the criminals, association with jihadis provides higher status, a way of atoning for past sins and often, since the jihadis tend to have many visitors and donors, an access to better food, medicine and other benefits.⁸²

Alliances made in prison have thus far led to surprisingly few organised actions by inmates, but Indonesian authorities should take note of a little-noticed attempted escape on 8 May 2012 from the prison in Meulaboh, West Aceh. Over 40 prisoners escaped; 23 were soon recaptured. The organiser was a man named Syafrizal, a four-time recidivist who after his second drug offence was incarcerated in a Medan prison with a leader of *JI-Medan*, Toni Togar. After his third release in 2009, he robbed a bank to raise funds for jihad, was caught, served only a year in prison and was released again. This time he not only led several robberies but also tried to attack a prison in Lhokseumawe, Aceh to release fellow prisoners. He was caught in April 2011, tried and sentenced in 2012, and was shuttled around various prisons in Aceh until he led the jailbreak from

⁷⁶ This was the survival strategy pursued by members of a group implicated in the April 2011 suicide bombing in a police mosque in Cirebon, West Java, who fled to Solo, Central Java with the help of Tim Hisbah. See Crisis Group Briefing, *Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon*, op. cit.

⁷⁷ Other jihadis who sold Islamic herbal remedies include Rizky Gunawan, alias Umar, who sold both online, through a website, *took-muslim-solo.blogspot.com* and Facebook, and through a store, *Toko Azzam*, that he ran in Medan, supplied from Solo. (The store also had a branch in Klaten that seems to have been owned by someone else.)

⁷⁸ Ali Miftah claims never to have been a member of an Islamic organisation, but he was very close to the *JI* and *Noordin* network. He attended *Darusyahada Pesantren* in Boyolali, Solo, where one of his close friends was Umar Burhanuddin. Umar, together with his brother Ubaid, was arrested for training the team that bombed the Australian embassy in 2004. Both were released; Ubaid has since been rearrested for his leading role in setting up the Aceh camp. In 2007, Ali Miftah married the sister of *Dulmatin's* wife and became part of *Dulmatin's* inner circle after his return from *Mindanao*.

⁷⁹ Case dossier of Ali Miftah, op. cit.

⁸⁰ When he wanted to find out if it was true that a former *JI* member who had renounced *JI* in Aceh had begged forgiveness from Abu Rusdan, for example, he sent a courier to visit the man in question at the Jakarta police detention centre used by *Detachment 88*; the man denied it.

⁸¹ Case dossier of Ali Miftah, op. cit. He was involved in initial planning for a plot to poison the police, although it was one of his protégés who came up with the idea, not him.

⁸² Crisis Group Report, "*Deradicalisation and Indonesian Prisons*", op. cit.

Meulaboh. He is a classic case of a high-risk detainee who should have been identified as such at least after his third arrest, when it was clear he was working with known extremists.

Prison visits are also an important means of sharing information, keeping the network together and frequently making new contacts. Joko Purwanto, alias Handzolah, described going to visit Santoso in Poso to see about training and acquisition of weapons in the aftermath of the Aceh debacle. He arrived in Palu, the Central Sulawesi provincial capital, and before going on to Poso, his hosts insisted on his visiting the mujahidin serving time in Palu's Petobo prison.⁸³

Mujahidin wives made a point of regularly visiting Putri Munawaroh, one of the few women imprisoned on terrorism charges. Her husband was killed with Noordin Top, and the circumstances of his death elevated her to the top ranks of jihadi women, to the point that visits became obligatory for other women. The visits become a way for the women to exchange information (and also make hierarchies clear).

Several times while visiting friends in Sragen prison in 2010, Ali Miftah says he met another man on the same mission. It turned out the man was from Magetan, and when Ali Miftah mentioned a code word – "Anthurium", an ornamental plant once widely sold by jihadis in the Solo area – the man recognised his bona fides. An exchange of names and mobile phone numbers led eventually to an arms transaction.

If prison visits can serve as a meeting point, they can also serve recruitment purposes. One of the groups most vulnerable to recruitment by extremists may be the younger brothers of imprisoned or killed jihadis; it would not be difficult to draw some of them into a more active role. Enceng Kurnia's brother, Iwan, reportedly became determined on revenge after his brother's death. When Bali II plotter Subur Sugiarto was detained in Cirebon, his most frequent visitor was his younger brother, who had taken part in jihadi training exercises.⁸⁴ Ade Suradi, the younger brother of Australian embassy bomber Iwan Dharmawan, alias Rois, became an important contact point for his brother on the outside.

C. MILITARY TRAINING (*TADRIB*)

Military training (*tadrib*) provides another way that members of different jihadi groups can come together and form new alliances. The bonds are forged not just in the train-

ing itself but in the process of raising funds, obtaining necessary supplies and recruiting participants.

The camp in Aceh is the best example of the availability of a major new training site bringing together members of organisations that otherwise might not have collaborated. Santoso's Poso training sessions seem to have had a similar effect on a smaller scale, cementing relations particularly between Santoso and Sabar's group; Santoso and JAT-linked individuals in Kalimantan; and Sabar's group with the men in Bima.

Cahya Fitriyanta from Solo might not have met Udin from Medan had not the training camp provided an opportunity. It was the acquaintance made there that led to the partnership in internet fraud. Hari Kuncoro provided the introductions that led the Bima group to Poso, but once they were made, the Bima group could send other members for training without further need for intermediaries.

D. INTERNET FORUMS

Internet chat forums may be taking on an added importance as police pressure increases, for communication, recruitment and skill-training. Use of the internet is nothing new; in 1999, JI recruits were given instruction as part of their initial training, and Imam Samudra before his execution, preached the value of hacking and online fraud in the interests of jihad. Until recently, however, there has been little evidence of online recruitment. This may be changing. Several cases suggest that jihadi groups have grown more sophisticated in their use of the internet, and that individuals are using chat forums and Facebook to reach out to each other, including across organisational lines.

Sabar in Medan, for example, seems to have recruited at least one of his members, Amir, alias Nibras, via a chat forum.⁸⁵ He also seems to have been more aware than most of the risks of mobile phones, and much of his communication with members appears to have taken place through chat forums in commercial internet cafés, even when both parties were in Medan.

E. MARRIAGE

As in the past, marriages continue to be a way of reinforcing or rebuilding organisational strength. The priorities for the extremist groups are to find suitable wives for bachelors, including those in prison, as well as husbands for widows of slain jihadis. Like most extremists around the world, the Indonesian jihadis want to produce as many children as possible to increase their ranks. But marriages can also be a way of building cross-regional or cross-

⁸³ Case dossier of Joko Purwanto, op. cit.

⁸⁴ Crisis Group Report, "Deradicalisation" and Indonesian Prisons, op. cit.

⁸⁵ See fn. 15 above.

organisational alliances. Several examples emerge from groups described here:

- Ustaf Afif of JAT in 2009 arranged the marriage of Udin with a woman from Klaten. The marriage could be seen as tightening the alliance between Sabar's group in Medan and JAT-Central Java.
- In 2009, Agus Gaplek from Karanganyar, Solo married a woman from Ceram, Maluku, who worked at a bookstore in Cemani Solo, Toko Buku Arofah that was once affiliated to JI and may have become linked to JAT. He went back to Maluku with her for the wedding, was deluged with stories from his new in-laws about atrocities that had occurred during the Maluku conflict and returned to Solo, joining first Tim Hisbah, then Sabar's group that held out the promise of a more active jihad. It is not clear how the marriage was arranged, but it produced a Medan-Solo-Maluku link.
- In 2010, Putri Munawaroh, the widow of the man killed with Noordin Top, who herself is serving a three-year sentence for terrorism at a Jakarta prison, was married by teleconference to Ridwan Lestaluhu, an Ambonese jihadi serving a twelve-year term in Porong prison, Surabaya.⁸⁶ The marriage was arranged by former JI leader Adung and was witnessed by another JI man and his wife.⁸⁷ Putri will be released soon and should be permitted conjugal visits with her new husband, in a way that could strengthen ties between Moluccan and Javanese groups and families. Neither she nor Ridwan had any particular links to JI before the marriage, but the role played by Adung and her status as widow of a "martyr" could draw her deeper into Solo radical circles.
- In April 2011, Udin from Medan arranged the marriage of a Hisbah member to the widow of one of the CIMB-Niaga bank robbers, thereby tying Tim Hisbah and Sabar's group closer together.

There are also several examples of fugitives marrying women while on the run, to provide protection and, perhaps, an image of respectability, as well as to "serve their

biological needs", in the words of a former jihadi.⁸⁸ Ust. Kamal, for example, took a second wife after fleeing to Bima; this reinforced his ties to Bima as no training or internet chatting ever could. Cahya married Nurul, in what seems to have been a desperate and ultimately unsuccessful measure to give himself additional means of support.

All this calls for more attention to the role of women in the restructuring of jihadi alliances and a closer look at the men (rarely women) who play the role of marriage brokers within existing extremist groups.

F. TAKLIM

An earlier Crisis Group report noted that when religious meetings called *taklim* are led by radical clerics, they can become a vehicle for radicalisation and recruitment.⁸⁹ They also become places where new alliances can be forged and where young men can be tempted to move from activism against vice and apostasy to premeditated use of violence in the name of religion. This report provides numerous examples: Tim Hisbah members got to know Udin from Medan at Sigit Qordhowi's *taklim* in Semanggi, Solo. Santhanam, chief operative in the police poisoning plot, said he drew his inspiration from the lectures of Halawi Makmun in Jakarta. Aman Abdurrahman had the same kind of cachet before he was rearrested in 2010; his *taklim* provided a meeting ground for his followers and Abu Umar's men, and that connection helped Ust. Kamal find a place to hide in Bima.

These clerics pose a serious challenge to the government, because while their influence is pernicious, their incendiary speeches against *thaghut* are seen as protected by Indonesia's post-Soeharto commitment to freedom of expression. Ironically, that commitment is declining, in part as a result of the rise of Islamist militants such as these men demanding bans on books, performances, statuary, films and other forms of expression deemed offensive to Islam. Provisions in the criminal code penalising "hate-sowing" and incitement are rarely used, because of associations with the authoritarian past, when they were used to clamp down on dissent; when they are, they produce slap-on-the-wrist sentences that are no deterrent.⁹⁰ Unless the country can find a way to counter extremist speech in a way that is compatible with democratic norms, counter-radicalisation measures more generally are probably doomed to failure.

⁸⁶ Ridwan Lestaluhu was arrested for his role in a 2005 attack on a karaoke bar, Villa Karaoke, in Hative Besar, Ambon that left two dead and one wounded. Some of the men who took part in the attack joined KOMPAK and Darul Islam activists for an attack a month later in Loki, Ceram that left five policemen and their cook dead. Putri was accused of terrorism for failing to report her husband's activities to authorities. The only other woman tried and sentenced on terrorism charges was Noordin Top's third wife, Munfiatun, also accused of failing to report to authorities.

⁸⁷ Sunarto bin Kartodijarjo, alias Adung was arrested in June 2004 and sentenced to seven years in prison a year later for concealing information about Noordin Top. He was released in April 2009.

⁸⁸ Crisis Group interview, January 2010.

⁸⁹ Crisis Group Briefing, *Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon*, op. cit.

⁹⁰ Islamic Defenders Front leader Habib Riziek was sentenced to one and a half years for incitement after a riot sparked by his followers on 1 June 2008 in Jakarta.

X. LESSONS THE EXTREMISTS HAVE LEARNED

If the ways extremists regroup have become clearer with the information available since Aceh, it is also important to stress that the extremists have taken away several lessons that if put into practice could complicate counter-terrorism efforts. Most relate to the need for better security but also to the critical need for more community support. Some of these were outlined in a tract called “Trilogy for the Reawakening of Jihad in Indonesia” (Serial Trilogi Kebangkitan Jihad di Indonesia). The first two instalments were widely circulated on radical websites in March 2012; the third, which promised to outline a strategy for the future, has not yet appeared online.

The author, who calls himself Abu Jaisy al Ghareeb and appears to be part of Sabar’s group in Medan, sets out extensive evidence for the infiltration and monitoring by police of the extremist network. He cites, for example, the story of a prisoner arrested after Aceh who tells a visiting friend:

Brother, there is one thing that startled me when I was interrogated by a *thaghut* detective, and that was when he showed me photos of myself when I went to your house two or three months before I left for Aceh. You also showed up in photos with me somewhere else. Then the detective asked me: “Why did you go to this person’s house? Were you trying to get funds for the trip?”⁹¹

In fact, the author says, the visit was just a social occasion and had nothing to do with raising funds but suggests that police had the man in question under surveillance and were photographing anyone who came to his house.⁹²

He draws several conclusions:

- ❑ groups have to be much more careful about vetting members. Enthusiasm and motivation for jihad is not enough, particularly given the police penetration that has already taken place;
- ❑ secrecy has to be much more tightly guarded, with information on training programs, for example, only shared on a need-to-know basis. Family members in particular talk too freely, and many in the movement do not appreciate how sophisticated police monitoring and surveillance has become;
- ❑ the most likely source of betrayal lies in other jihadi groups, with particular venom reserved for Jemaah Is-

lamiyah, which the author suggests has become a puppet of the police;

- ❑ any program that has been compromised needs to be aborted;
- ❑ use of communications equipment should be much more careful, particularly given police wiretapping capacity. The author cites the example of a participant in the Aceh camp, now dead, who called a well-known cleric on his home phone asking for funds. The cleric immediately understood the danger and said, “brother, it’s not that I don’t want to help you, but if you go about it in this way, you’re not going to get what you need, and in fact a disaster may strike”. But the man continued using open phone lines and talking as if no one was listening;⁹³
- ❑ strategies have been too inflexible, with a lack of contingency planning;
- ❑ understanding of the theory of the “secure base” remains weak; more needs to be done to educate members about urban survival strategies and the need for camouflage; and
- ❑ community support, and general understanding of the need for jihad, is far below that needed by the mujahidin.⁹⁴

The first seven points are reactions to obvious carelessness of jihadis in the past. They also suggest that with an experienced leader who imposes better discipline and has more of a long-term strategy than has been evident to date, a jihadi group might succeed in operating under the radar and building capacity to the point that a major operation becomes possible.

There is an interesting precedent. In October 2002, after the Bali bombings and the wave of arrests that followed, the JI central command met in Solo to discuss next steps. One senior leader wanted to mount a series of attacks from Poso. Nasir Abas, then head of Mantiqi III, the regional division that included Poso, argued for a longer-term strategy, starting with developing Poso as a secure economic base where JI members would take over plantations and other enterprises and gradually build up the organisation’s income. As the economic base was being built, there would be intensified *daawa* and military training across the country. Some of the money from the Poso-based enterprises would be used to fund the establishment of small factories for production of homemade weapons, so that every provincial division (*wakalah*) would have its own arms depot.

By 2006, each *wakalah* would also have a group of men ready to be sent to the Philippines for combat training. If

⁹¹ “Serial Trilogi Kebangkitan Jihad”, op. cit.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

the Indonesian security forces tried to interfere with the expanding base in Poso, JI would be able to respond with coordinated retaliatory attacks across the country. The plan was accepted but never came to fruition, because Nasir was arrested in April 2003.⁹⁵ If a strategist of the same calibre were to emerge from the current ranks of jihadis, it could spell trouble.

The final point about community support is particularly worth noting. It is not new: other post-Aceh critiques from within the movement have also acknowledged this critical failing. But it leads to two conclusions: first, that the jihadi movement needs to invest more time in *daawa*, and secondly, that it needs the hardline pro-Sharia advocacy groups that may not use violence themselves but preach a complementary message.

As the author of an earlier critique, “Reflections on the Aceh Jihad”, wrote:

All manner of *daawa* organisations based in the community must be protected. There are institutions that focus on eradicating vice and educating young Muslims. There are specialists in going after deviant sects, in fighting liberalism and pluralism, specialists against Shiism, and specialists against Christianisation. All of these have a role to play in protecting the larger *umma* (Islamic community) against the disruptions caused by the vermin of wrongdoing and deviance.⁹⁶

Earlier Crisis Group reports have stressed the merging of agendas between jihadis and these advocacy groups, some of which use violence in support of their goals – though with blunt instruments rather than bombs and bullets. The weaker the jihadis become and the more they see the need to build community support, the more they will see the value in joining forces in a tactical alliance with groups that have a proven ability to build a mass base around local issues, whether these relate to church construction, vice eradication or expulsion of the Ahmadiyah community.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Crisis Group interview, Nasir Abas, Jakarta, June 2012.

⁹⁶ “Refleksi Jihad Aceh”, <http://elhakimi.wordpress.com>, 22 March 2010. He named several organisations as examples, all of them hardline advocacy groups: Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam. FPI); Institute for Study and Research about Islam (Lembaga Pengkajian dan Penelitian Islam, LPPI), a Jakarta think-tank that focuses on deviant sects; Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought and Civilizations (INSISTS, run by conservative scholar Adian Husaini); and Forum for the Anticipation of Christianisation Activities (Forum Antisipasi Kegiatan Kristenisasi, FAKTA).

⁹⁷ The Ahmadiyah community is an offshoot of Islam whose members recognise their founder, Mirza Gulam Ahmad, as a prophet. This is blasphemy to orthodox Muslims, who believe that Muhammad was the last and final prophet. Persecution of Ahmadis in Indonesia has intensified in recent years. See Crisis

The failure of the government to acknowledge, let alone address, the menace these groups pose to Indonesia’s social fabric is an invitation to more violence in the future.

XI. LESSONS THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD LEARN

The government could benefit from the same kind of introspection jihadis have engaged in to analyse why so little has happened in terms of effective counter-radicalisation programs. The National Counter-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, BNPT), established in 2010, is currently developing the first-ever national plan on counter-radicalisation, with inputs from the education, social affairs and law and human rights ministries and other agencies – ten years after the presence of homegrown terrorists was an established fact. It is also very much invested in the adoption of a stronger anti-terrorism law that would plug what it sees as holes in the existing law. The new legislation would, among other things, extend preventive detention, ban paramilitary training and penalise the “precursors” to terrorism, such as active involvement in plotting a terrorist act. It will inevitably be the topic of heated debate when it comes before parliament later in 2012, but regardless of its potential costs and benefits, a law by itself is not going to make a difference unless the government tackles extremism more broadly.

A. MORE ATTENTION TO RECRUITMENT

Little effort has been made to define and develop programs for groups particularly vulnerable to recruitment. As noted, these include the younger brothers and sometimes children of slain or detained extremists; they could usefully be the focus of a systematic education and social work program. Another group is unemployed or underemployed young men living near mosques where radical preachers hold forth. For these youths, many of whom work as pushcart vendors and parking attendants or in other low-paying jobs, the combination of time on their hands and the offer of something more exciting to do can be irresistible. Many of the members of Tim Hisbah were recruited from around a mosque in Semanggi, Solo where Hisbah’s late leader, Sigit Qordhowi, led discussion groups and launched his weekly raids on bars and brothels. A few pilot projects to engage youths in alternative activities around known extremist centres would be useful.

It is also worth looking at recruitment of the educated, middle-class, highly computer-literate young men and women who are active on internet chat forums. These are the people on whom the salafi jihadi ideology exerts a strong pull, who are somewhat more internationalist in outlook, devour the writings in translation of extremists from the Middle East and get a thrill out of access to al-Qaeda sites. A program specifically designed to engage them in online debate, involving religious scholars who have read the jihadi tracts and know how to respond both in style and substance, could be useful. Saudi Arabia worked out a mod-

el that Indonesian officials have examined, but their tendency is to assume that “moderates” can be engaged in the effort without immersing themselves in the radical tracts.

B. ZERO TOLERANCE FOR RELIGIOUSLY-INSPIRED VIOLENCE

The government needs to produce and enforce a zero tolerance policy for any kind of religiously-inspired violence. None of the extremists go into jihadi activity without passing through some intermediary radicalisation stage, often by participation in an extremist study group. But anti-vice raids, such as Tim Hisbah promoted when Sigit Qordhowi was alive, are particularly dangerous, because they often involve the use of non-lethal violence. There is some evidence to suggest that once there is positive reinforcement for one kind of violence, it may be easier to move on to another.⁹⁸

The demonstrable reluctance of the police to take action against violent Islamists whose crimes tend to be vandalism, assault and incitement has been explained in different ways, including fear, lack of resources, political considerations, collusion on protection rackets and lack of instructions from higher up. Different reasons can apply in different areas, but the absence of any effective government policies in confronting this kind of behaviour ensures that recruitment into extremist groups will continue.

C. BETTER PRISON MONITORING

Prisons remain a huge problem. The Corrections Directorate within the law and human rights ministry has been the recipient of significant donor aid to improve its ability to identify and monitor high-risk detainees, including after their release, but much more needs to be done, especially given the influx of new prisoners in the last two years. Corrections officials need to improve communications with BNPT so that full information on all extremist prisoners is made available at the time of their sentencing; agree on a protocol for assessing high-risk prisoners; train officials in how to use it; and test it in a few pilot projects before administering it more generally to all those convicted of terrorism and other violent crimes.

The Corrections Directorate is in the process of developing an online database that is now up and running with electronic case records of inmates in 149 of Indonesia’s 442 prisons, including most of those that house high-profile

⁹⁸ The evolution of a group arrested in Palembang in 2008 is an example. It went from castigating evangelical pastors who tried to convert Muslims, to using violence against them, to trying to make bombs for use against foreigners. See Crisis Group Briefing, *Indonesia: Radicalisation of the Palembang Group*, op. cit.

extremists. Through a short text message gateway, basic biographical information is available on all inmates in the system that profiles the category of offence, such as terrorism.⁹⁹ Corrections officials now need to give more attention to improving staff analytical capacity, so that the database can become an effective tool for supervision.¹⁰⁰

Prison staff need better training in monitoring inmate activities. It would be no unfair restriction on prisoners, for example, to limit their access to extremist publications and to prevent extremist offenders from giving interviews to journalists. Stricter policies on visitors also need to be in place, to prevent them from taking out handwritten tracts by detained ideologues that are then posted on radical websites, as well as to pay more attention to whom they visit. The database mentioned above has the capacity to collect the data on visitors to individual inmates; again it is analysis that is lacking. Likewise, more attention could usefully be paid to medical treatment inside prisons, so that there is not an excuse for groups linked to radical organisations to use the illnesses or medical conditions of detained extremists as a pretext for raising money.¹⁰¹

D. MORE TRAINING IN NON-LETHAL ARREST OPTIONS

Police need to take more steps to ensure that they do not unwittingly contribute to extremist motivation through excessive use of force. As noted in earlier reports, they need more training in non-lethal options for confronting “live

shooters”. The high rate of killings is almost certainly due to police awareness that they are the number one target and a sense of “kill or be killed”. But it is not clear that a systematic lessons-learned exercise takes place after operations against extremists to seriously examine what could have been done better or differently. It might help to change the incentive structure, so that rewards are higher for capturing suspects alive rather than killing them in operations. There also needs to be a clear and unambiguous ban on the use of torture to extract information (with criminal penalties actually imposed for transgression) and better training to draw on the experience of senior officers who have found that humane treatment actually yields greater dividends.

E. BETTER AIRPORT SECURITY

If nothing else, this report shows how mobile extremists are and how easily they can criss-cross the country with forged or borrowed identity cards. Virtually every one of the groups discussed was able to buy tickets and/or check in at lower-cost Indonesian airlines under false names. Extremists are not the only ones who take advantage of lax security, but everyone would be safer if airline employees were better trained to conduct identification checks, and clear procedures were in place to alert officials to suspicious documents.

F. MORE ATTENTION TO INTERNATIONAL LINKS

The narrative of post-Aceh developments shows how parochial for the most part Indonesian extremists have become, but there are some major exceptions, and international linkages should not be ignored. The Abu Umar group’s ties to the Abu Sayyaf Group in the southern Philippines are ongoing, and there are almost certainly remnants of the network in Sabah. It is sobering to realise that two of the most wanted terrorists in South East Asia, Dulmatin and Umar Patek could return to Indonesia and live quietly for over two years, in Dulmatin’s case, or more than one, in Umar Patek’s, without the Philippines knowing they had left or Indonesia that they had arrived – and, in Patek’s case, left again for Pakistan. His arrest in Abbottabad, Pakistan in January 2011 may have been blown out of proportion retrospectively – there is nothing to suggest he knew Osama bin Laden was living there – but the online connections that got him that far suggest that other such linkages exist.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Some definitional issues still need to be worked out, because some members of terrorist organisations have been charged with common crimes; some high-profile prisoners convicted of terrorism are kept in police custody rather than being entrusted to the prisons and are therefore not included; and the seventeen men of one group convicted of terrorism were never members of extremist organisations and should probably have been charged with manslaughter. This means that any data from the Corrections Directions has to be treated very carefully. As of May 2012, for example, the database showed 203 persons serving sentences for terrorism, including 77 in Jakarta, 36 in Central Java (including in Indonesia’s maximum security penal complex on the island of Nusakambangan, off the coast of Java), 27 in Central Sulawesi, 22 in North Sumatra, eighteen in East Java, nine in Banten, six in South Sumatra, two in Yogyakarta, two in Papua, and one each in South Sulawesi, West Sulawesi, West Papua and West Java. It is not clear who the men in Papua and West Papua are, but they may be men arrested for selling arms to the insurgent Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) in 2011. See smslap.ditjenpas.do.id/public/krl/current/monthly/year/2012/month/5.

¹⁰⁰ Email correspondence from Leo Sudaryono, Asia Foundation, 25 June 2012.

¹⁰¹ See, for example, the appeal for funds on behalf of a man detained after Aceh on <http://idc.voia-islam.com/read/idc/31/sang-mujahid-menderita-kelumpuhan-di-penjara-mari-bantu/>.

¹⁰² Mohammad Jibriel, self-styled “Prince of Jihad”, arrested and convicted of trying to raise funds in Saudi Arabia for the project that became the 2009 hotel bombings, was also in touch through e-mail chatting in 2008 with a contact from the al-Qaeda media unit in Waziristan, who mentioned that he was also in touch

Then there is Yemen, where Indonesian students have had a long, fruitful relationship with traditional Islamic schools in the Hadramaut, the area of the country to which most Indonesians of Arab descent trace their ancestors. A handful of Indonesians, however, have attended more radical schools; the field coordinator for the 2009 bombings, now dead, told his family he had been radicalised while attending al-Eman University in Sanaa in the late 1990s.¹⁰³ The worry is that given the upheaval in Yemen and the possibility that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) will gain more ground there, a few Indonesians could be drawn into international extremist circles in a way that could strengthen the capacity of their contacts at home.

The inward focus of extremists now should not blind Indonesian authorities to the possibility that stronger international ties could develop in the future.

G. MORE LINKS BETWEEN RESEARCH AND POLICY INSTITUTES

The developments outlined here suggest that more research is needed into how terrorists regroup under pressure; the role of extremist chat forums; marriage-brokering within extremist networks; and the links between jihadi groups and hardline advocacy organisations, among other things. Indonesian students both at home and abroad are engaged in much relevant research, but there is no central online source where Indonesian theses or academic research is listed, so even if policy institutes wanted better input, it would be hard to find it. The BNPT should put more thought into defining a research agenda that can ensure that programs are based on solid data and top quality analysis.

H. EVALUATION OF EXISTING DERADICALISATION, DISENGAGEMENT AND COUNTER-EXTREMISM PROGRAMS

Donors have spent a huge amount of money over the last decade funding seminars, training programs, publications, study tours, advocacy and research on counter-terrorism and “deradicalisation”. No one has tried to pull together an evaluation of these initiatives and examine what has worked, what has not and why. Before another decade of grant-making takes place, it would be useful to have such an evaluation in place.

with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s son, Abdul Rahim. See case dossier of Muhammad Jibriel, South Jakarta District Court, 2010.

¹⁰³ Syaifudin Zuhri bin Ahad Jaelani studied in Sanaa from 1995 to 2000, where he seems to have overlapped with Abdul Rahim Ba’asyir. See “Syaifudin Zuhri Masuk Al Qaeda Saat Sekolah di Yaman”, detik.com, 29 September 2009.

XII. CONCLUSION

The threat of extremist violence in Indonesia is not over, even though the last two years have seen major successes in breaking up extremist networks. One by one, men on the police most-wanted list have been tracked down, arrested, tried and imprisoned. The police have been good, but they have also been lucky. The would-be terrorists have been poorly trained, poorly disciplined and careless. The last major attack in Jakarta was in 2009, and the total number of people killed by terrorists in 2011 was five: three police and two of their own suicide bombers. A familiar sense of complacency has set in that the problem is largely over.

This report shows, however, that even with so many strikes against them, extremists have been able to regroup under pressure and plot new operations, often drawing on friends in prison. A highly-skilled leader with more patience than jihadis have shown to date might still be able to pull a group together and build it up without detection; certainly the determination to try has not faded. The report also shows how adversity has brought most jihadi groups into contact with one another, in a way that undercuts some of the progress made by the police in breaking up individual cells.

Jemaah Islamiyah is a particularly interesting case. It may be derided as a puppet of the authorities and some of its members considered traitors to the cause, but its public face, Abu Rusdan, is still widely respected and his *taklim* draw crowds that include many of a more militant stripe. The alumni networks of the 50 JI schools continue to be critically important, and the schools also remain important for regeneration. It is no coincidence that Abu Umar’s children are attending one or that Abdullah Sunata, the imprisoned KOMPAK leader, is sending his to another. Even after JI has withdrawn from violence, many of the schools are still seen by most militant groups as a place where the spirit of jihad can be instilled.

Prisons may be the area where the government needs to do the most work. Relative to the number of arrests, the official recidivism rate for convicted terrorists remains fairly low – under 10 per cent – but evidence from the post-Aceh cases suggests that the number of released prisoners willing to play supporting roles behind the scenes in extremist circles is much higher.

In short, despite the major successes over the last ten years in counter-terrorism work, violent extremism remains a serious problem that deserves ongoing attention.

Jakarta/Brussels, 16 July 2012

APPENDIX A

MAP OF INDONESIA



APPENDIX B

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes *CrisisWatch*, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former U.S. Undersecretary of State and Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since July 2009 has been Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.

Crisis Group's international headquarters is in Brussels, and the organisation has offices or representation in 34 locations: Abuja, Bangkok, Beijing, Beirut, Bishkek, Bogotá, Bujumbura, Cairo, Dakar, Damascus, Dubai, Gaza, Guatemala City, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Kabul, Kathmandu, London, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Port-au-Prince, Pristina, Rabat, Sanaa, Sarajevo, Seoul, Tbilisi, Tripoli, Tunis and Washington DC. Crisis Group currently covers some 70 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in

Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, North Caucasus, Serbia and Turkey; in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Western Sahara and Yemen; and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti and Venezuela.

Crisis Group receives financial support from a wide range of governments, institutional foundations, and private sources. The following governmental departments and agencies have provided funding in recent years: Australian Agency for International Development, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Austrian Development Agency, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian International Development Agency, Canadian International Development and Research Centre, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Commission, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Federal Foreign Office, Irish Aid, Principality of Liechtenstein, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for International Development, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish International Development Agency, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Kingdom Department for International Development, U.S. Agency for International Development.

The following institutional and private foundations have provided funding in recent years: Adessium Foundation, Carnegie Corporation of New York, The Charitable Foundation, The Elders Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Humanity United, Hunt Alternatives Fund, John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Open Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, Rockefeller Brothers Fund and VIVA Trust.

July 2012

APPENDIX C

CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2009

Central Asia

- Tajikistan: On the Road to Failure*, Asia Report N°162, 12 February 2009.
- Women and Radicalisation in Kyrgyzstan*, Asia Report N°176, 3 September 2009.
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