

INDONESIA: THE DEADLY COST OF POOR POLICING

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INDONESIA: THE DEADLY COST OF POOR POLICING

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Indonesian communities are increasingly turning to violence to retaliate against the police for abuses, real or perceived. Some 40 attacks on police stations and personnel since August 2010 are clear evidence that community policing, the centrepiece of the police reform agenda, is not working; police are too quick to shoot, usually with live ammunition; and little progress has been made toward police accountability. In the absence of urgent reforms and mechanisms to address local grievances, public hostility is likely to grow. Police are supposed to be helping prevent conflict but too often they are contributing to its outbreak.

Cultural, structural, individual, financial and educational barriers within the institution hinder behavioural change. Applicants join the police to wield power and earn money, and once on the force, there are few incentives, financial or professional, to build rapport with the communities they are supposed to serve. Policy directives on community policing from 2005 and 2008 have not trickled down to the sub-district precincts (*kepolisian sektor, polsek*), and those field officers who are committed to building good relations have limited impact because of frequent rotations.

Community hostility is the cumulative result of police brutality; unwarranted demands for money; perceived arrogance; and lack of accountability, especially in cases of fatal shootings. Failure to investigate or punish errant officers triggers mob action, often involving arson, while community resistance to the arrest of those responsible for such violence intensifies if the police in question go free.

The problem is compounded by the staffing of precincts with poorly-trained graduates of provincial police schools who receive inadequate firearms training, let alone instruction in community policing. In many cases, local elected officials have to take on the burden of negotiating a way out of the police-community standoff because there are no available institutional mechanisms to resolve grievances.

This report looks in detail at three cases of community attacks on police stations that occurred in 2010 and 2011. All started from complaints about excessive use of force.

In Buol, Central Sulawesi, citizens destroyed police facilities and forced police families to leave town after seven men were shot dead during a mass protest against the death

of a teenager in police custody. This is one of the few cases in which officers were brought to court, but only because of the high death toll and media attention. One was acquitted, two were given slap-on-the-wrist sentences, and some two dozen others faced minor disciplinary sanctions. Many questions remain unanswered.

In Kampar, Riau, residents vandalised a precinct after the arrest and beating of an innocent clan elder at a market. He was accused of illegal gambling because he was jotting numbers on a piece of paper, when in fact he was noting product prices. Trivial arrests like this frequently occur because police are rewarded for favourable crime statistics: the more arrests they make, regardless of the severity of the crime, the better they are seen to be doing their job.

In Bantaeng, South Sulawesi, villagers attacked a precinct after a deadly police raid on alleged gamblers at a wedding party that killed one. The raiders did not come from that precinct, but it was the nearest one to the dead man's home. Police claim they opened fire because they believed anger among the wedding guests over the gambling arrests put their commander's life in danger. In fact they seem to have shot wildly in the dark without being able to see what they were shooting at.

These incidents are emblematic of a much broader problem; the Indonesian government should stop treating them as isolated incidents. They represent a systemic failure which will continue to undermine the credibility of the police pledge to "serve and protect" the people and encourage further deadly violence unless the underlying causes of community hostility are addressed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Indonesian authorities:

To address the underlying causes of community hostility to the police

1. Apply far stricter oversight and auditing to the police budget.

2. Impose higher standards and stricter requirements for officers' acquisition and use of firearms.
3. Institute better training in non-lethal methods of crowd control.
4. Set up tangible incentives and a merit system that encourage better relations with the public and stronger teaching of community policing.
5. Review autopsy procedures for cases involving police to ensure independence and transparency.
6. Devote serious attention to improving the curriculum and training methods in the national police academy and even more importantly in provincial police schools, including eliminating all use of corporal punishment.
7. Establish a civilian oversight commission that can receive and aggressively act on public complaints.
8. Make more use of the criminal courts rather than disciplinary proceedings in cases where serious police abuse is alleged.

Jakarta/Brussels, 16 February 2012

INDONESIA: THE DEADLY COST OF POOR POLICING

I. INTRODUCTION

A rash of attacks by angry mobs against police stations and personnel in Indonesia suggests that despite a decade of investment in community policing, there is little trust between law enforcers and the people they are sworn to serve and protect.¹ Such mob violence is usually triggered by an instance of perceived police brutality. The absence of any effective mechanism to address public complaints or resolve disputes leads locals to take justice into their own hands, and the panicked response by poorly trained and often inadequately equipped police is frequently to open fire in self-defence, with disastrous consequences.

At least 40 cases of such attacks occurred between August 2010 and January 2012. In the most recent, on 25 January in Tulangbawang, Lampung, a police station was torched two days after police shot and killed an alleged robbery suspect. They had apprehended the man and his two friends late at night following a party, shot at them in the dark to prevent them escaping and left the wounded man to die without seeking medical assistance or informing his family. The friends were not hit, and it was their information that led villagers to the body. The frequency of community violence against police should be a wake-up call that many police reforms instituted as part of Indonesia's post-1998 democratisation are not working as intended.

This report does not examine attacks on police in long-standing regional conflicts, such as Papua, or the tit-for-tat killings by violent jihadis who have identified police as legitimate targets in their eyes because they are infidels (*kafir*) or oppressors (*thaghut*).² It looks rather at three cases of attacks against police facilities and personnel in 2010 and 2011, all rooted in community grievances. In Buol, Central Sulawesi, the death of a motorcyclist in police custody in August 2010 led to clashes that killed seven people and left a populace still angry more than a year

later. In Kampar, Riau, the arrest of an innocent man in February 2011 led to a six-hour siege and attack on a police precinct.³ In Jeneponto, South Sulawesi, a police raid on a wedding party in June 2011 killed a community leader and prompted arson attacks on a police station in the neighbouring district of Bantaeng. Police need to study these cases seriously, understand what went wrong and analyse how similar violence can be prevented.

¹ For related reporting on police and security reforms, see Crisis Group Asia Reports N°13, *Indonesia: National Police Reform*, 20 February 2001; and N°90, *Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security Strategy*, 20 December 2004; and Briefing N°124, *Indonesia: Debate over a New Intelligence Bill*, 12 July 2011.

² See Crisis Group Asia Report N°132, *Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon*, 26 January 2012.

³ Precinct refers to the police station that covers an Indonesian sub-district or police sector (*kepolisian sektor, polsek*). In rural areas, a *polsek* can cover more than two sub-districts. It may have five to 50 officers, depending on the resources and size of population. A *polsek* reports to district or resort police (*kepolisian resor, polres*), a unit that usually covers an administrative district (*kabupaten*). A *polres* reports to provincial or regional police (*kepolisian daerah, polda*).

II. REFORMING THE POLICE

The Indonesian National Police (Kepolisian Negara Indonesia, Polri) formally separated from the armed forces in 1999 and gradually has taken over primary responsibility for public security from the army.⁴ Before the split, the police were relegated to criminal investigation and traffic management. Some critics believe they have not risen to the occasion. “Police have taken over the privileges and patronage systems that were in the hands of the military but have failed to win the public respect that should go with them”, a former defence minister said.⁵

Police are aware that to win that respect and carry out new responsibilities they need to shed the culture acquired from three decades as part of the military. The idea of community policing (*pemolisian masyarakat, polmas*) became a key element of the transformation and the flagship approach to reform. Turning the idea into reality, however, has been a challenge.

Community policing focuses on systemic partnerships with neighbourhood groups, local service providers, small businesses and individual members of the public to develop solutions to local problems and increase trust in the police.⁶ The concept recognises that police cannot solve all public safety problems by themselves. Therefore, structures and strategies must be geared to boosting cooperation and proactive problem-solving, including geographic assignment of officers and infusion of the principles of community policing into all forms of recruitment, hiring, selection, training and evaluation. The problem is that, institutionally, Polri is still highly centralised, whereas community policing requires decentralisation, and individual officers in the current system have little incentive to break with practices of the past.

⁴ Law no. 2/2002 on Indonesian Police, Article 13. The main duties of Polri are public security and maintenance of order; law enforcement; and public protection and service to the community.

⁵ Crisis Group interview, Juwono Sudarsono, 21 March 2011. Sudarsono was the first civilian to serve as defence minister in 50 years, initially under President Abdurrahman Wahid from 1999 to 2000, then again under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono from 2004 to 2009.

⁶ This definition comes from the U.S. Department of Justice which has been involved in capacity building of Polri since the 1999 separation. “Community Policing Defined”, Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice, April 2009.

A. HISTORY OF COMMUNITY POLICING

In 1999, a year after Soeharto resigned, the former national police chief, Awaloeddin Djamin, launched a book that initiated the drive to reform Polri.⁷ The “Blue Book”, as it is popularly known within Polri, generated extensive internal discussions on how to make police more responsible to the community, culminating in the issuance by the then police chief, General Sutanto, in June 2005 of a grand strategy for the next twenty years.⁸ It stressed in particular the need to focus the first five years (2005-2010) on building trust in the community.⁹ It explained that there was a “crisis of trust” in Polri that made the public unafraid to violate laws, and officers were only respected because of their weapons and formal authority. It also said, “people with money” believe the police can be easily manipulated, while the increasingly free press will “reveal more police abuses, worsening the image of Polri”.¹⁰ Community policing was second only to enforcing justice in the priorities outlined in the strategy.

In October 2005, Sutanto issued a new directive on community policing that included an assessment of shortcomings. It acknowledged that the police had “a tendency to see themselves as wielders of authority and the police institutionally as a tool of the state so that repressive behaviour often coloured their approach to their jobs”.¹¹ They also tended to see themselves as a formal body, separate from and superior to other members of the community. In the long run, this could lead to “the waning of police legitimacy in the eyes of the public”, “the decline of public support for police work” and “the worsening of the police’s public image”.¹²

⁷ Awaloeddin Djamin, *Menuju Polri Mandiri yang Profesional [Towards a Professionally Independent Polri]*, (Jakarta, 1999). The book embraced ideas that had been written and discussed earlier by progressive mid-ranking officers who lacked clout within the institution. Djamin provided the much needed weight.

⁸ “Grand Strategi Polri 2005-2025”, Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, 2005.

⁹ Ibid. The other time periods are “Partnership Building” (2011-2015) and “Strive for Excellence” (2015-2025).

¹⁰ Ibid. After decades of government repression of the media, the post-1998 Indonesian press has become the freest in South East Asia. The mushrooming of outlets has been the natural effect of this trend, with the opening of community-based publications across the country. News on crime and police conduct has become one of the more popular headlines.

¹¹ Kebijakan dan Strategi Penerapan Model Perpolisian Masyarakat Dalam Penyelenggaraan Tugas Polri, Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, October 2005, Article II(1)(b), p. 4. This document, SKEP/737/X/2005, is the first official policy exclusively on the introduction of community policing within Polri.

¹² Ibid.

By then, community policing had become a fashionable aid program for donors but without clear nationwide direction. Training programs for the police on how to interact with the public took place in a few areas in 2000 but had little impact on overall policy.¹³ In 2001, the UN-funded Partnership for Governance Reform launched Indonesia's first community policing project in West Nusa Tenggara province; it was followed by several programs linking donors to specific regional police commands.¹⁴ Each project focused on a different form of community policing, often influenced by practices in the donor country, and most took the form of "training of trainers". The 2005 directive noted that these programs "were based on individual perceptions from the respective project organisers, triggering lack of coordination in their implementation".¹⁵

The directive laid out a clear vision. Community policing was seen as "an equal partnership between *polmas* officers and local communities in resolving and overcoming every social problem threatening public security and order".¹⁶ The operational principles included a drive to prioritise personal communication and assign officers on long-term or even permanent postings to give room for the development of rapport with the community within a demarcated jurisdiction. Community policing would be inserted into the curriculum in all post-secondary police educational institutions – the National Police Academy (Akademi Kepolisian, Akpol) and the regional police schools (Sekolah Polisi Negara, SPN). The directive led to plans to train 70,000 officers across the country, monitored by 7,000 supervisors, and to establish a special centre to provide manuals and videos on community policing from the constable in the field to the most senior officers in Jakarta.¹⁷

A community policing model was outlined that centred on the establishment of a Police-Community Partnership Forum (Forum Kemitraan Polisi Masyarakat, FKPM) in each precinct, able to cover one or more sub-districts. At least one officer was to be assigned to that forum, with the

precinct chief in charge. The new policy was to be disseminated in 2006, initiated in 2007 and fully functional by 2009, but it soon encountered problems.¹⁸

In 2008, the police issued a regulation, known as Perkap N°7, that was supposed to be the basic manual for implementing community policing.¹⁹ It said the concept should include the intensification of patrols and face-to-face interaction with the community, as well as the execution of the FKPM scheme introduced in 2005. But it also said each region could decide what model was best suited to its community, taking into consideration the diverse foreign-funded projects already in operation. Perkap N°7 listed 41 such models, including the Japanese *koban* system that was introduced with mixed results in Bekasi, east of Jakarta, in 2004.²⁰

The proliferation of models might be seen as a way to experiment to discover what worked best for Indonesia, but it also ran counter to the original directive that aimed at improved coordination. A drafter of the directive said there was resistance and confusion on the part of officers in the field when Polri decided to accommodate models that had local or donor backing.²¹

The 2008 document, like the 2005 directive, stressed the need to change police behaviour, saying it was necessary to shift from a hierarchical command system to a participatory one; from a habit of following ingrained practices to one of questioning their effectiveness; from a preference for waiting for orders to one of taking initiative; and

¹³ Adrianus Meliala, "Perilaku Kekerasan dan Tindak Anarkis", *Jurnal Kriminologi Indonesia*, vol.1, no. III, June 2001, pp. 10-12.

¹⁴ Other foreign-funded community policing programs include International Organisation for Migration (IOM) projects with the West Kalimantan, East Java and West Java provincial police offices, the programs in Bekasi and Jakarta financed by the Japan International Coordination Agency (JICA), and Asia Foundation assistance to the Yogyakarta provincial police. The Asia Foundation claimed Sutanto issued the national directive after acknowledging the achievements of the foreign-funded programs. See "Perpolisian Masyarakat di Indonesia", The Asia Foundation, 2007.

¹⁵ SKEP/737/X/2005, Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, op. cit.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ T. Hari Prihatono and Jessica Evangeline, *Police Reform: Taking the Heart and Mind* (Jakarta, 2008).

¹⁸ In some areas the FKPM is seen as an extra layer of authority, breeding more suspicion than trust. In some cases members of the public have participated on the assumption that they would receive police powers and privileges. See Mario Humberto, "Pokdarkamtibmas Pamulang Sebagai Implementasi Kemitraan Dalam Konteks Community Policing", *Jurnal Kriminologi Indonesia*, vol. 7, no. 1, May 2010, pp. 60-62. A neighbourhood watch group in Greater Jakarta is more popular than the local FKPM because it has selective membership, hymns and militaristic attributes. There are indications that many FKPMs reported by precinct chiefs to their superiors are made up to meet numerical targets.

¹⁹ Peraturan Kepala Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia no. 7/2008 tentang Pedoman Dasar Strategi dan Implementasi Pemolisian Masyarakat Dalam Penyelenggaraan Tugas Polri. These guidelines, in the form of an internal police regulation, came out a week before Sutanto's tenure as national police chief ended.

²⁰ Ibid. *Koban* is a round-the-clock, one-room post that can quickly address community issues. It requires the police to be present at the post at all times and regularly patrol the area. See "Koban' Gets Mixed Response from Residents", *The Jakarta Post*, 7 November 2007.

²¹ Crisis Group interview, Wahyu Rudhanto, lecturer on community policing, Polri's College of Police Science, 1 December 2011. Another draft was developed in 2007 to push forward SKEP 737, but it was deemed too weak.

from a culture of going along with the group to one of professionalism. It encouraged each police region to “build cooperation” with donors and work with the regional governments so that the community policing program could get local funding.²²

The lack of an external body evaluating the pace and direction of reforms allowed changes of leadership dictate the drive. Sutanto’s successors have not shown the same vigour in pushing the community policing agenda although each has kept the rhetoric.²³ In retrospect, community policing was thought to provide the panacea to police problems but overshadowed the real issues of accountability and the institution’s aversion to external oversight. When it evolved into a slogan, the community policing program became the band-aid to deter efforts to put the newly emancipated body under scrutiny. In reality, without robust state and public evaluation, community policing, like other police actions, will be ineffective because it becomes hostage to police trends and preferences.

B. THE BARRIERS

Seven years after the original community policing directive, the program is still inadequately understood by officers and the communities they serve. Many neighbourhoods, especially outside the main island of Java, have little idea what it is, as implementation has been erratic. The police tendencies that have become major internal barriers to the agenda can be categorised as cultural, structural, individual, financial and educational.

1. Cultural

Condescending attitudes of officers toward the public have not changed much. In 2009, the National Police Commission issued a review on *polmas* programs in three provinces and found the desire for career advancement to be impeding change. It noted: “With more powers in law enforcement, it is difficult to change the officers from behaving with superiority to becoming the partner or even servants of the community”.²⁴ The study reported that many actually seek this “superior” status when they sign up and that the attitude has become more obvious with the increase of personnel. Polri has more than doubled its pre-1999 strength to around 400,000, which makes the police-population ratio a respectable 1:600.²⁵ Most recruits, who

come from the local police schools for non-commissioned officers, can be deployed to local stations only after five months of training.

Community policing is often seen as a burden, hampering advancement in the ranks, which is more likely to come from showing deference to superiors, attending official ceremonies or competing to show favourable crime statistics.²⁶

In connection with the latter, officers often seize on easy-to-prove misdemeanour cases against poor and vulnerable members of the community that simply cause more hostility and offend the public’s sense of justice. On 27 May 2011, for example, police in Palu arrested and allegedly beat up a fifteen-year-old boy who stole an officer’s plastic sandals worth Rp.30,000 (about \$3.30); the court found the minor guilty and made no comment on his treatment.²⁷ Similar cases have involved arrests of the poor for such offences as the theft of a piece of fruit or a banana plant.²⁸ In the effort to score quick wins, investigators tend to rely on weak information and torture to secure witness testimony and extract confessions.²⁹

2. Structural

Community policing demands decentralisation, and Polri’s grand strategy envisions shrinking the national headquarters’ authority and empowering districts (*polres*) and precincts (*polsek*).³⁰ In reality, however, the police retain a militaristic rank and structure, with a top-heavy group

Reform, op. cit. pp. 5-7. The ideal ratio is 1:500 according to the UN, but Indonesia’s ratio is far better than most developing countries. In many districts on its less populated islands, the ratio more than meets the ideal, for example the Tebingtinggi district police in North Sumatra boasts a ratio of 1:260.

²⁶ Eko Prasetyo and Suparman Marzuki, *Evaluation Report on Community Policing Related Project Supported by Donors* (Yogyakarta, 2005). Most foreign-funded community policing training only reaches the higher levels of Polri. Top graduates and career-minded officers avoid positions in the Public Guidance unit (Bimbingan Masyarakat, Bimmas), which is tasked to advise the community on security issues and should be the focal point of community policing.

²⁷ “Polda Didesak Minta Maaf”, *Mercusuar*, 5 January 2012.

²⁸ “Hakim Tersedu-sedu Bacakan Putusan Nenek Minah”, *Republika*, 20 November 2009; “Indonesian Law Goes Bananas Again as 76-year-old Jailed for Fruit Theft”, *Jakarta Globe*, 9 December 2009.

²⁹ A study in 2008 showed that around 80 per cent of the 400 prisoners and former prisoners interviewed in Jakarta had been tortured after arrest; a 2011 study that covered other cities produced similar results. See “Uncovering Crime with Crime: Survey of Torture at Detention Centers in 2008”, Jakarta Legal Aid Institute (Jakarta, 2008), and “Mengukur Realitas dan Persepsi Penyiksaan di Indonesia”, Partnership for Governance Reform (Jakarta, 2011).

³⁰ “Grand Strategi Polri”, op. cit.

²² Peraturan Kepala Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia no. 7/2008, Article 41.

²³ Bambang Hendarso Danuri replaced Sutanto in 2008, a few weeks after Perkap no. 7.

²⁴ “Polri dan Pemolisian Demokratis”, Komisi Kepolisian Nasional, (Jakarta, 2009), pp. 180-182.

²⁵ “Jumlah Polisi di Indonesia Belum Ideal”, *Kompas*, 27 May 2011. Also see Crisis Group Report, *Indonesia: National Police*

of two- and three-stars (commissioner and inspector generals) in Jakarta, one-stars (brigadier generals) at the helm of regional offices and an elite club of officers mostly from Akpol at middle management.³¹ More than 90 per cent of the force are non-commissioned officers with a few months of training right after high school. Akpol graduates are treated as the cream of the crop and go on tours of duty from one region to the other that can range from six months to four years.³² They have the best chance of getting community policing training and power to implement it on the ground, although they have the least local knowledge.

Rotation militates against the sustainability of whatever innovation these officers can launch. A lecturer at the police officer training college said:

The concept of community policing is understood differently by students. If one local police chief with good understanding is replaced by someone better, that's fine, but if his successor has no enthusiasm for the program, it will quickly evaporate, especially if the new person comes from the intelligence or criminal divisions, who tend to see community policing as second-class work.³³

Districts and precincts also lack equipment to handle community unrest. When the situation escalates, they usually call up the Mobile Brigade (Brigade Mobil, Brimob), the paramilitary force that has a unit in every provincial command, to back up the local police. These units are equipped with water cannons, tear gas and heavier weapons such as assault rifles, but when they are sent in as reinforcements during crises, they often bring only the latter.³⁴ Brimob troopers have little contact with the community and are trained to halt disturbances with force. They are widely feared, and while their presence may quell unrest, it can also widen the public-police divide.

The gender gap may also be a factor in the failure of community policing to take hold. Women constitute just over 3 per cent of the police and are often relegated to administrative roles.³⁵ The Women and Children Service Units (Unit Pelayanan Perempuan dan Anak, UPPA), set up since 1999, have been better received than other parts of the police in the limited number of places they are functioning, suggesting that moving more women into management positions might be good for community relations more generally.³⁶

3. Individual

All directives on community policing call for more patrolling, which means walking, stopping and talking to ordinary citizens. This carries little reward for officers and requires extra physical effort, time and communication skills. In 2005, Polri, working with the U.S. Department of Justice, found out that in many local stations, personal loyalties to superiors trumped professional accomplishments, breeding a lack of motivation among lower-rank officers. Rotations and transfers were seen as the real rewards or punishments, depending on the level of comfort or access to material gains at a location.³⁷ In such situations, showing up at events and ceremonies is likely to win more points than spending time with locals and listening to their concerns. Leadership is critical: according to a study, the frequency of community visits by officers depended on the extent to which a provincial police chief urged his force to make them.³⁸

Without an incentive system for conducting patrols, officers rarely go out on foot. In 2009, the National Police Commission found that many do not comprehend the need to walk around if vehicles are available.³⁹ In sparsely populated rural areas, where a precinct covers a large region

³¹ The names of the ranks have been changed since 2000, but the number of levels as well as the clear differentiation between officers and non-commissioned officers are the same. The title "general" is still used for the four highest ranks along with the symbol of stars. See Awaloeddin Djamin et al., *Sejarah Perkembangan Kepolisian di Indonesia* (Jakarta, 2006).

³² Akpol accepts between 300 to 400 students every year.

³³ Crisis Group interview, Wahyu Rudhanto, Jakarta, 1 December 2011. Officers from crime division and police intelligence have less direct interaction with ordinary citizens, as they mostly deal with criminals and those seen as security threats.

³⁴ Bomb disposal and counter-insurgency are among the tasks assigned to Brimob; its quasi-combat role has given it the tendency to see policing targets as "enemies". There have been efforts to train Brimob in human rights and community policing, but incidents of excessive use of force are still rife. "Mereformasi Brigade Mobil", *Kemitraan untuk Pembaruan Tata Pemerintahan di Indonesia*, 2004.

³⁵ "Jumlah Polwan Masih Kurang", *Media Indonesia*, 15 August 2011.

³⁶ For more on these units, see "Unfinished Business: Police Accountability in Indonesia", Amnesty International (London, 2009), p. 33.

³⁷ "South Sulawesi's Police: Acting Locally, Thinking Nationally with a Global Perspective", Indonesian National Police and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, December 2005.

³⁸ According to the research, conducted by the University of Indonesia for Polri, more than 67 per cent of respondents in Central Java province said the police rarely or never visited residents, while more than half those in North Sumatra felt the officers tried to visit community leaders regularly. It turned out that the North Sumatra police chief at the time of the study had instructed his community policing officers to meet at least twenty local elders in a month, suggesting that the frequency of visits was more influenced by loyalty to the superior than professional reasons. "Polri dan Pemolisian", op. cit., pp. 167-170.

³⁹ Ibid.

with far-apart neighbourhoods, foot patrols may be impossible, and motorcycles become essential.⁴⁰ In these cases, proactive patrols require much fuel, which is prohibitively expensive.

4. Financial

Corrupt practices within Polri and the dependence on external sources of funding for the institution and its members hinder many reforms, including community policing. Promotions, geographical postings, assignments, investigations, traffic inspections, paperwork, arrests, raids and shifts are all widely seen to be subject to corruption and patronage.⁴¹ In such an environment, decisions about work tend to be made on the basis of financial gain rather than commitment to duty. Foot patrols and community meetings, especially in deprived areas, have little financial pull. Rent-seeking practices, such as guarding the assets of big businesses or stopping motorists to look for out-of-date licenses or number plates, are often far more attractive.⁴²

A former Polri chief noted:

Imagine someone who wants to become a police officer. It's an open secret that he needs to pay to get good grades. After graduation, he needs to pay to get a position at a certain place. If he gets that place, he needs to pay to get into the traffic division. In the traffic division, if he does not want to work out in the sun, he needs to pay to get a place in the registration and identification department.⁴³

An active general warned that if this cycle continues, an officer's main focus will not be on policing but instead on how to recoup his or her investment.⁴⁴

The "open secret" of widespread corruption triggered the call in Polri's 2005 grand strategy for transparency in career advancement and its stress that a bribery-free lifestyle for superiors is important to improve internal trust.⁴⁵ Practices like payments or gifts from younger officers to their superiors, however, reportedly remain common.⁴⁶ Income from illegal levies is allegedly not just used for personal gain but also for underfunded local stations. Indeed, it can be used for everything from fuel for patrol cars to stipends for officers who have to guard rallies. "Without pocket money, don't expect a police officer to move", said a district police chief who had to raise off-budget funds to get reinforcements when an election-related riot broke out in his jurisdiction in 2010.⁴⁷

In 2009 in North Sumatra and Central Java, provincial police chiefs were allotting small bonuses of Rp.100,000 (\$11) a month to officers making community visits.⁴⁸ This would have been a poor incentive – but in a system that works there should be no special payments at all. It is perhaps not surprising that one area where a community policing program has worked is Tamansari, a crowded Jakarta red-light district, because police officers there can find material gain in patrolling small shops, hotels that rent rooms by the hour, bars and massage parlours-cum-brothels.⁴⁹

5. Educational

While many books and materials on community policing have been published for training purposes, they are in limited use.⁵⁰ A police general said officers "are too lazy to read guidelines, and they'll tell you they've never seen them, because they just don't care".⁵¹ At the 26 provincial police schools, there is no compulsory class specifically

⁴⁰ Polri has plans to equip rural precincts with at least two motorcycles each, urban precincts with two cars each and each district police office with one anti-riot truck. T. Hari Prihatono and Jessica Evangeline, op. cit., pp. 245-246.

⁴¹ See "South Sulawesi's Police", op. cit.; Grand Strategy Polri 2005-2025, Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, 2005; Kunarto, *Kapita Selekta Binteman Polri*, (Jakarta, 1999); "Unfinished Business: Police Accountability in Indonesia", Amnesty International, op. cit.; "Persepsi Publik atas Praktek Mafia Hukum di Lembaga Penegak Hukum", *Lingkaran Survei Indonesia*, January 2011; and Crisis Group interviews, former and active police officers, June-September 2011.

⁴² In 2004, a police-sanctioned report discovered 40 types of corruption in Polri. Raiding "entertainment" centres and fussing over traffic documents are among them. It also found that patrols could be seen as lucrative if the area of duty has many potential law violators. See "Polri and KKN", Partnership for Governance Reform (Jakarta, 2004).

⁴³ Kunarto, op. cit.

⁴⁴ Crisis Group interview, police general, Sumatra, September 2011.

⁴⁵ Grand Strategy Polri 2005-2025, op. cit.

⁴⁶ "Unfinished Business", op. cit.

⁴⁷ Crisis Group interview, Sulawesi, September 2010.

⁴⁸ "Polri dan Pemolisian Demokratis", *Komisi Kepolisian Nasional* (Jakarta, 2009), pp. 180-182.

⁴⁹ Crisis Group interview, police lecturer, Jakarta, December 2011. In Tamansari and other red-light districts, police often turn a blind eye to prostitution and other vices in exchange for security money and guarantees of public order. "Entertainment" establishments can still be the target of police raids when there is pressure from morality groups, need for more money or an order from a new superior, but these raids are sporadic, sometimes staged, and after a while, it will be business as usual.

⁵⁰ The glossy volumes, funded by Western donors decry all torture, explain human rights and teach how to build communication with the public. One is *Buku Panduan Pelatihan Untuk Anggota Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia: Perpolisian Masyarakat* [Guide Book on Training for Members of the Indonesian National Police: Community Policing], (Jakarta, 2006).

⁵¹ Crisis Group interview, police general in Sulawesi, July 2011.

on community policing.⁵² Students who choose the patrol (*samapta*) track over intelligence or criminal investigation tracks may be exposed to theories of community policing buried in courses on negotiations, crowd control and quick response methods.⁵³ Too often, newly deployed officers learn on the job about interaction with the community from seniors who still cling to old norms and dismiss progressive values as ideas that do not profit. The emphasis on quantity over quality in recruitment has also pushed community policing instruction to the side.⁵⁴

The police education system is marred by corruption, nepotism and “the culture of shame”. Despite explicit criteria for recruitment and better supervision of the process than in the past, selectors still can turn a blind eye when the applicant has police parents. Children of high-ranking officers have a better chance than others to enter Akpol. In the academy, cadets encounter seniors who physically abuse them outside class hours, including through use of electric shocks, for the simplest missteps.⁵⁵ Survival of the fittest and use of force to ensure status begin early inside Polri, instilling values that are diametrically opposed to the ideals of community policing.

C. STALLED REFORM

All these barriers frustrate the implementation of community policing. The Polri leadership has been inconsistent in its commitment to the concept, confusing officers who directly interact with the public. Cultural changes need not only time but also continued promotion of the new values from the top. While the number of recruits from SPNs is far higher than in the past, so that more officers are assigned to their own areas, they tend to adopt the same culture as their superiors and lose their regional loyalty for the sake of fitting into the institution. The advantage to recruits of coming from the neighbourhood is also limited when their commanders are transferred so frequently and put low priority on ties to the community. The lack of direct incentives for officers, either financial or profes-

sional, for developing good community relations means that other priorities will take precedence.

Many officers underestimate how deep public distrust has become or how many ordinary citizens are convinced they have no option to get redress for grievances other than through violence. In the three cases in this report, there were no community policing programs before the violence erupted, although some were put in place afterwards. All could have been avoided if the police had better relations with the community.

⁵² The official SPN training is eleven months, the last six of which are at a police station for on-the-job training. There are 26 SPNs for 33 provinces. Some new provinces, like West Sulawesi and West Papua, have neither an SPN nor even a separate provincial command.

⁵³ The 2011 curriculum of the Central Java police school in Purwokerto is posted at <http://spnpurwokerto.blogspot.com>. Negotiation, crowd control, quick response and riots courses each last for six days.

⁵⁴ Sabrina Asril and I Made Ashdiana, “Kapolda Akui Arogansi Aparat Kepolisian”, *Kompas*, 1 July 2011.

⁵⁵ “Tradisi Brutal di Akademi Perwira”, *Tempo*, 9 October 2011. This was an investigative report that revealed the abuse of junior cadets at the national police academy. The magazine graphically showed ten basic forms of physical abuse.

III. CASE ONE: BLOODBATH IN BUOL

From 31 August to 1 September 2010, residents in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol destroyed police facilities, forced police families to flee and prompted half the local force to ask for transfers.⁵⁶ The rioting was triggered by the death of a man in police custody; suspicion that he was tortured to death led to the protests in which seven more people were shot and killed. Television coverage of the mayhem pushed President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to demand police accountability, and Polri's second-highest officer visited the region vowing a full investigation.⁵⁷ As of early 2012, 26 police have been disciplined for minor infractions and two given light sentences of a year in prison minus time served for assault – which is further than Indonesian justice ordinarily gets in cases involving police. Many questions, however, remain unanswered.

Buol district is one of the most deprived in Central Sulawesi.⁵⁸ It has more than 200km of coastline facing the Sulawesi Sea, but its tiny hub is centred on a junction of two imposing four-lane highways, surrounded by narrow alleys, many of them dirt.⁵⁹ Most buildings are in a state of crumbling disrepair, including new government offices abandoned in mid-work. The provincial capital, Palu, is an eighteen-hour drive away via a road, marred by potholes and collapsed bridges that slices through steep, jungle-covered hills. Buol produces nothing to boast of. People in the neighbouring clove-growing district of Tolitoli joke that Buol is an abbreviation for *bukan untuk orang lain* (not for anyone else).⁶⁰

A. DEATH AT THE PRECINCT

Around midnight on 28 August, during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan, Kasmir Timumun, aged nineteen, was riding a motorcycle down a mountain road with a friend. He crashed into a policeman who had tried to stop him, breaking the officer's leg.⁶¹ The friend fled, and other officers at the scene brought Timumun to the nearest precinct, in Biau sub-district. They tried to portray him as an irresponsible street racer, since informal motorcycle racing on Saturday nights is common among teenagers in rural areas. Nobody believed them, as the road down the mountain was too dangerous. An officer later acknowledged that the injured policeman had been trying to carry out a province-wide order to crack down on racers by stopping as many motorcyclists as possible, since showing right numbers to superiors is vital for career advancement. "Districts competed to show the province who can stop the most racers", he said.⁶² Street checks are also a source of income for police, and the teenager may have been trying to avoid paying.⁶³

All agree that Timumun was beaten in custody. Multiple officers, mostly from the traffic unit, struck him to avenge their injured colleague.⁶⁴ Cell guards at Biau precinct did not try to prevent this.⁶⁵ Police never informed Timumun's family that he had been detained; they learned this from his friend. On 29 August, relatives visited Timumun several times. He told them repeatedly, "I will die here if this goes on".⁶⁶ The next day, after lunch, his brother saw he could no longer walk. In the evening, police summoned relatives and showed Timumun dead, hanging from the

⁵⁶ Crisis Group interviews, police officers in Palu and Buol, September 2010, July 2011 and September 2011; and several media articles, including "Buol Remains in Critical State After Deadly Clashes", *The Jakarta Post*, 3 September 2010 and "Warga Serbu Kantor Polisi, 7 Tewas", *Koran Tempo*, 2 September 2010.

⁵⁷ The Polri deputy chief then was Commissioner General Jusuf Manggabarani. "Minutes of Multi-Party Meeting After the Shooting in Buol", obtained from Indonesia's Human Rights Commission, 2 September 2010. Also see "Wakapolri Minta Maaf", *Mercusuar*, 3 September 2010 and Ruslan Sangadji, "Police Apologises for Buol Tragedy as Death Toll Tops 8", *Jakarta Post*, 6 September 2010.

⁵⁸ Law no. 51/1999 on the Division of Kabupaten Buol Tolitoli split the district into two new ones – Buol and Tolitoli. The old district centred in Tolitoli, which is traditionally the hub of the northern coastline communities of Central Sulawesi province.

⁵⁹ Buol has an area of 4,044 sq km and 132,000 people. The population density is 33 people per square kilometre, but that of the district capital, Biau, is three times as dense.

⁶⁰ Crisis Group interview, Tolitoli residents, September 2010. While Tolitoli has an ethnically mixed population, the remoteness and lack of economic activity made Buol unpopular for migrants.

⁶¹ Accounts from police, fact-finding team, court documents and residents all agree that the collision triggered the tragedy. The officer, First Sergeant Ridwan Majo, suffered a fractured leg. "Buol Kembali Mencekam", *Kompas*, 3 September 2011.

⁶² Crisis Group interview, police officer on the disciplinary panel against Buol traffic officers, Buol, 25 July 2011.

⁶³ Crisis Group interviews, Buol residents, 25-27 September 2010 and 24-27 July 2011. Residents claimed police would ask for the blue card, a signal for Rp.50,000 (\$6), to escape a ticket for not wearing a helmet or taking the wrong lane and the red card, referring to the Rp.100,000 (\$12) bill, to avoid punishment for failing to show a driver or motorcycle license. Also see "Ketika Senjata Api Mengoyak Buol", *Kompas*, 6 September 2010.

⁶⁴ Crisis Group interviews, Central Sulawesi police chief, Brigadier General Dewa Parsana, Palu, 28 July 2011; and the defendant, First Inspector Jefri Pantouw, who was also the head of the Buol police traffic division, Palu, 20 September 2011.

⁶⁵ This is the statement of the Biau precinct chief, Zakir Butudoka, in a police disciplinary hearing, October 2010. See "Tiga Polisi Divonis Kurungan 21 Hari", *Kompas*, 14 October 2010.

⁶⁶ Relatives issued their own report of the accounts surrounding the death of Kasmir Timumun. "Laporan Kronologis Korban Penganiayaan oleh Oknum Kepolisian", September 2010, pp. 2-3.

cell door with a noose made from a sarong.⁶⁷ During his almost three days of detention, police did not officially charge, interrogate or name him as a suspect in any crime.⁶⁸

The Biau precinct chief, First Inspector Zakir Butudoka, immediately declared his death was suicide, although no post-mortem had taken place.⁶⁹ Officers then took the body down and whisked it to the local hospital without family consent.⁷⁰ Doctors failed to conduct an autopsy that night because of a power outage.⁷¹ Finally, relatives took the bruise-covered body home where a waiting crowd had gathered after hearing the news of Timumun's death. Public opinion began to build that police had murdered the teenager, who was poor but linked to some of Buol's most prominent clans.⁷² Protesters threw rocks at the Biau precinct, prompting warning shots and tear gas. The Buol district police chief, Amin Litarso, promised an autopsy to avert a clash.⁷³

On 31 August, after the autopsy by Buol state hospital, Timumun was buried, stirring emotions. In the afternoon, it announced that he had died of breathing problems due to pressure on the neck.⁷⁴ The leading examiner told relatives it was suicide, but the family believed that, if so, he

had been driven to it by the beatings.⁷⁵ At 7pm, Chief Litarso, in the town's main mosque, asserted again that it was suicide, with no remorse or acknowledgment of the treatment Timumun had received at police hands.⁷⁶ The fact that Timumun died when he was fasting disturbed the predominantly Muslim community, and that night, the police claim of suicide was the talk in mosques across town. After evening prayers, thousands marched to the Biau precinct, demanding an explanation from the officers who had detained Timumun. Chief Litarso, rather than face the crowd, went back to Buol district station, located on a hill outside town, thereby avoiding the growing chaos. On the ground, his deputy, Ali Hadi Nur, took control.

B. THE PROTEST TURNS VIOLENT

Buol had been tense long before Timumun's death. Protests against the district chief (*bupati*), Amran Batalipu, had been underway since early 2010, led by civil servants who accused him of corruption and demanded his ouster.⁷⁷ Around 100 Brimob officers from Palu had already been in Buol for months to protect government facilities from vandals. Some of the protestors had been jailed, but this led to more anger against the police and accusations that they were trying to shield a bad government from public protest.⁷⁸ Batalipu's office is beside the Biau precinct. After months away from home facing rowdy protests almost daily, the fatigued Brimob forces had little tolerance for a crowd that demanded explanation from the precinct over the suicide claims.⁷⁹

From 9pm on 31 August, Brimob forces, Buol police led by Hadi Nur and some plainclothes officers carrying guns tried to stop protesters from reaching the precinct.⁸⁰ Officers later claimed that anti-Batalipu protesters merged with the crowd, shouting anti-police rhetoric that mixed politics and sympathy for Timumun. Unable to reach the precinct, residents threw rocks and Molotov cocktails at the police, prompting tear gas and warning shots. Tension rose when police taunted protesters with ethnic slurs like

⁶⁷ "Laporan Tim Pencari Fakta Insiden Berdarah 31 Agustus 2010", October 2010, p. 10. This is the result of the fact-finding team formed by the local government.

⁶⁸ Crisis Group interview, Buol police chief Hari Suprpto, Buol, 26 July 2011.

⁶⁹ Laporan Tim Pencari Fakta, op. cit., p. 10. In court, Butudoka testified he did not know of the presence of Timumun at his precinct until the day of his death, because no report had reached him. See Surat Tuntutan no. Pdm 86/PL/Ep.1/03/2011, Kejaksaan Negeri Palu, 4 August 2011. This is the document used by prosecutors in demanding a sentence for Amirullah Haruna, the only police officer formally charged for shooting a man related to the riots. The victim survived, and Haruna walked free.

⁷⁰ Laporan Kronologis, op. cit., p. 6.

⁷¹ Autopsies in Indonesia are usually carried out by state medical institutions like regional general hospitals (*rumah sakit umum daerah*, RSUD) or, in big cities, by police forensic doctors. There is a widespread perception that doctors tend to take the police side in cases of police brutality, and families are denied information about the real causes of death.

⁷² Ibid, pp. 6-7.

⁷³ "Laporan Penyelidikan Komnas HAM atas Bentrok Masyarakat dengan Aparat Kepolisian di Kabupaten Buol, Sulawesi Tengah", National Human Rights Commission, September 2010, p. 4. This is the result of the commission's investigation in Buol. Litarso's rank is adjutant chief commissioner (*ajun komisaris besar polisi*, AKBP), equivalent to lieutenant colonel.

⁷⁴ Prosecutors, residents, legislators, local government fact-finding team and community leaders all said the autopsy report did not explicitly conclude that Timumun's death was suicide. All police officers claimed the opposite. Police refused to show the original autopsy report to Crisis Group. Crisis Group interviews, Buol, Palu and Jakarta, September 2010, July 2011, September-October 2011.

⁷⁵ Laporan Kronologis, op. cit., p. 8. The family did not receive the post-mortem report immediately and had to plead for it for weeks.

⁷⁶ Laporan Tim Pencari Fakta, op. cit., p. 12.

⁷⁷ Many civil servants protested against Batalipu for giving family members favourable positions while sending rivals to postings in the most remote parts of the district. Crisis Group interview, a veteran civil servant, Buol, 25 September 2010.

⁷⁸ Crisis Group interview, Central Sulawesi police chief, Brigadier General Dewa Parsana, 28 July 2011.

⁷⁹ Brimob members usually stay two to three weeks at a time away from their base in the provincial capital. Districts are usually asked to cover their board and meals, although funds for this purpose are supposed to be allocated from the provincial command.

⁸⁰ Laporan Tim Pencari Fakta, op. cit., pp. 12-14.

“Buol people are animals” and “sago eaters”.⁸¹ At some point, the power went off, and residents stormed the precinct from all directions in the dark. In response, police shot at random into the crowd, and the chaos continued until dawn when fasting resumed.

Six residents died of bullet wounds that night. They all fell in places more than 100 metres from the precinct, most of them on different blocks.⁸² If shots had come from the Brimob forces who stuck to the area immediately around the precinct, there would have been injuries at the front of the crowd, but there were not. A fact-finding team, formed by the local government, concluded that officers must have chased down protesters for blocks and attributed the deaths to “rogue squads outside the Biau precinct that meant to kill”.⁸³ The Central Sulawesi police chief, Brigadier General Dewa Parsana, rejected the report but did not offer alternative theories.⁸⁴ Other police officials admitted armed officers went at least a block away from the precinct when they pushed back the mob.⁸⁵ A seventh casualty, shot 300 metres from the precinct, died four days later.

Residents believe shooters must have been police, because nobody else carries firearms in Buol.⁸⁶ The local police had 260 guns and were short at least 15,000 bullets on 16 September, more than 80 percent of them live rounds.⁸⁷ Amid chaos, many bullets were taken from the depot without registration.⁸⁸ Autopsies of the victims and information from the wounded might have helped clarify the nature of the firing. In a pitch-black town, however, officers were scared to come near the bodies, while relatives quickly buried them, and other residents collected the shells littering town as souvenirs. Police holed themselves up at

the precinct and distributed guns and ammunition from the armoury to prepare for the next day.⁸⁹

C. THE POLICE EXODUS

On 1 September, locals retaliated, destroying any police symbol they could get their hands on outside Biau precinct. They stormed into the house of deputy chief Hadi Nur, looting his possessions and setting everything else ablaze.⁹⁰ They attacked the less-heavily guarded Momunu precinct, burning it to the ground along with the dormitory for officers behind the station and causing about Rp.2 billion (\$220,000) of damages.⁹¹ Residents also blocked the main four-lane road with boulders and slabs of wood to prevent the movement of police trucks and went door-to-door looking for police.⁹²

The police intelligence unit circulated a text message to colleagues saying, “relatives of victims are preparing arrows, Molotov cocktails to seek revenge for last night and indiscriminately searching for members of police families to take hostage”. Moved by it, Hadi Nur rejected Litarso’s order to stay at the precinct without firing another shot and left the Brimob forces there as he rallied support for the besieged police families. Near dusk, he led a group of police families out of town under tight guard, amid showers of rocks from residents. He defended his insubordination as a necessary “retreat” and said, “if we had stayed, there would be more victims, and I could not control my men”.⁹³

Some officers who cleared the blockades, however, fired shots to open the way.⁹⁴ Hadi Nur claimed they had to do

⁸¹ Transcript of Multi-Party Meeting, op. cit. Sago is considered food for the poor and has a backward connotation.

⁸² Laporan Tim Pencari Fakta, op. cit., pp. 15-21.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Crisis Group interview, Central Sulawesi police chief Brigadier General Dewa Parsana, 28 July 2011.

⁸⁵ See interrogation deposition of Brigadier Prendi Rahmawan Saputra, a police intelligence officer, 18 September 2010. He claimed Brimob officers already started to fire shots fifteen minutes after the crowd reached throwing distance from the precinct. He said there was no negotiation, because both sides attacked before negotiators could meet.

⁸⁶ Crisis Group interview, Rahim Yamin and Adil Suling, members of the Buol government fact-finding team, Buol, 25 July 2011.

⁸⁷ The other slightly less than 20 per cent consisted of rubber bullets and blanks. This count does not include the Brimob ammunition or suggest that all those bullets were used for shooting. Some may have been pilfered. It is an indication of how rare serious inspections of firearms and ammunition are. See interrogation deposition of Idham Tomagola, head of logistics at Buol district police, 18 September 2011. For more on arms inspection in Indonesia, see Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°109, *Illicit Arms in Indonesia*, 6 September 2010.

⁸⁸ Interrogation deposition of Idham Tomagola, op. cit.

⁸⁹ Interrogation deposition of police officer Ricky Jeniver, 21 September 2010. The 21-year-old did not receive an order from superiors to take firearms but took a gun and bullets anyway after signing the register.

⁹⁰ National Human Rights Commission, op. cit., pp. 10-11 and Crisis Group interviews, witnesses of violence including Palu-based cameraman Iwan Lapasere, who was among the first group of journalists that reached Buol, and Syamsuddin Monoarfa, who lost his right eye due to bullet shrapnel, Palu and Buol, 23-28 July 2011. The damage included one dormitory, two precincts and seven motorcycles burned, as well as 25 houses, one precinct, one police post and one police-owned kindergarten vandalised.

⁹¹ Laporan Tim Pencari Fakta, op. cit., pp. 22-23.

⁹² Interrogation deposition of Biau precinct chief Zakir Butudoka, 8 September 2010.

⁹³ Interrogation deposition of Buol district police deputy chief Ali Hadi Nur, 7 September 2010.

⁹⁴ Interrogation deposition of Ichsan Mangge, 9 September 2010. Ichsan was shot in the buttocks but survived. He did not know the shooter but could cite a few physical traits. He claimed he was just walking toward a crowd when suddenly he heard gunfire and felt the bullet, and some officers who fired were wearing plainclothes.

it because soldiers, who had come in the morning as reinforcements, allowed the public pelting and looked as if they were “protecting” the mob.⁹⁵ A witness identified a police officer firing a rifle at the crowd as Chief Sergeant Amirullah Haruna, because he was wearing a bright red jacket with a large Manchester United logo.⁹⁶ Haruna became the only police defendant in the Buol shootings.

On 2 September, the deputy national police chief, Commissioner General Jusuf Manggabarani, arrived from Jakarta and gathered the Buol community in a meeting, at which he apologised for police shortcomings in protecting the public and promised police would find those responsible for the deaths. However, he also stressed the death was a suicide, Timumun was a racer, and there were no provocateurs, all of which contradicted public opinion.⁹⁷ While community leaders appreciated his visit, they told him it would be better to allow the military to guard Buol.⁹⁸ In the weeks that followed, 200 soldiers from Tolitoli and Palu, along with 200 new Brimob troopers from Jakarta, were assigned to the town and cleaned up the mess left behind by the rioting.⁹⁹ A Brimob commander said his men were mostly idle and played sports with locals during their stay.¹⁰⁰

Openly despised, half of Buol’s 400-strong local police force requested transfer.¹⁰¹ The three most hated officers, Butudoka, Hadi Nur and the traffic unit head, First Inspector Jefry Pantouw, immediately moved to Palu for questioning, but Litarso stayed until March 2011.¹⁰² The new

chief, Hari Suprpto, said he inherited a demoralised force. “Police were afraid to live in Buol. If transfer requests could easily get accepted, everyone would move out”, he said, adding the region’s remoteness was in any case a deterrent to getting better officers. He called the local Buol force “third-class people who got thrown here because they could not get anywhere better”.¹⁰³ One of his first policies was to replace underperforming officers from outside Buol, especially those in the traffic unit, with natives to the area.

D. LAWLESSNESS

A year after the riot, Buol residents were still using it as a reason to violate laws and disobey the police. Motorists were ignoring traffic rules. Motorcycle races, which police used as the pretext to stop Timumun, had increased around the main four-lane road and even in front of the district station. Police would risk sparking a fight if they tried to prevent them. Officers were frequently punched.¹⁰⁴ A new recruit who came after the conflict said:

I only feel safe being a policeman here when I do not need to do any police work. Whenever I try to stop people without helmets, I face resistance. When I tell them it is for their own safety, they will answer back saying it is none of my business if they want to crack their heads. A colleague once scolded a helmetless motorist, and people started to shove him around. We had to pull him away and flee. The other day, a motorist spotted us on the street and called his friends, who came with sharp weapons. Again, we had to head back to the station. I don’t know when I can leave Buol and return to Java where I can find a girlfriend. How can I meet a girl in Buol, when her family does not trust the police?¹⁰⁵

Residents seem bent on picking fights. In July 2011, a public order official brawled with a policeman, attracting a small crowd that was ready to jump on the latter. A bigger melee was only narrowly averted by the intervention of the first man’s boss.¹⁰⁶ On 17 August, a police motorist hit

⁹⁵ Interrogation deposition of Buol district police Deputy Commissioner Ali Hadi Nur, 7 September 2010.

⁹⁶ Interrogation deposition of Syamsudin Boroman, who identified the shooter as Chief Sergeant Amirullah Haruna, 16 September 2010. He claimed Haruna, who once lived in his neighbourhood, was the only one who fired shots at the crowd, while the others pointed their rifles and handguns upwards. The witness, though, did not see who was shot but found out later at the hospital that a man called Ichsan Mangge was injured in the incident. See also interrogation deposition of police officer Mohammad Fahri, who hid the jacket afterwards, 21 September 2010. Manchester United is an English football team popular in Indonesia.

⁹⁷ Transcript of Multi-Party Meeting, op. cit.

⁹⁸ Crisis Group interview, Ibrahim Turungku, known as the “king of Buol”, 25 September 2010.

⁹⁹ See “Masyarakat Minta Bantuan TNI Melakukan Pengamanan di Buol”, *Radar Sulteng*, 4 September 2010 and “Police Vow Transparency in Buol Clash Investigation”, *Jakarta Post*, 4 September 2010.

¹⁰⁰ Crisis Group interview, Sadito, a Brimob company commander from the unit’s main base in Jakarta, 26 September 2010.

¹⁰¹ Crisis Group interview, Buol police chief Hari Suprpto, Buol, 26 July 2011.

¹⁰² “Tiga Perwira Polres Buol Dicopot”, *Indopos*, 18 September 2010. Most people interviewed in Buol and lawyers who assisted in their appeal against police named those three as the respon-

sible parties. Crisis Group interview, Buol residents, July and September 2011, and lawyer Ferry Anwar, 22 September 2011.

¹⁰³ Crisis Group interview, Buol police chief Hari Suprpto, Buol, 26 July 2011.

¹⁰⁴ “Anggota Polres Buol Dianiaya Pemabuk”, *Mercusuar*, 3 July 2011.

¹⁰⁵ Crisis Group interview, police officer, Buol, 25 July 2011.

¹⁰⁶ Crisis Group interview, Yamin Rahim, head of the public order agency in Buol, 25 July 2011.

a pedestrian.¹⁰⁷ The officer fled as a crowd began to gather, leaving behind his bike that was then set ablaze.

Since his arrival, Police Chief Suprpto has told subordinates to take a soft approach, using persuasion and social psychology rather than force, and learn “how to smile”. “Someone who uses force means he has no other solution to the problem. We need to win hearts”, said Suprpto, who has a bachelor’s degree in social sciences from the respected Gadjah Mada University.¹⁰⁸ He acknowledged that training in persuasive techniques is given only to mid- to high-ranking officers, leaving those on the ground clueless what to do when facing mobs or threat of violence.

The incident also has triggered a renewed focus on community policing. Central Sulawesi police have pushed district chiefs to form partnership forums, called Village Security Help (Bantuan Keamanan Desa, Bankamdes), similar to the FKPM model described above.¹⁰⁹ These forums are designed to handle small disputes directly and work with police on more serious cases.¹¹⁰ Buol has become a place to test the model, because dislike of the police is so intense, but it lessens with distance from the town. Suprpto spent his first months going from hamlet to hamlet opening these forums and ordering each officer to have 25 non-police contacts for the sake of networking with the community. For internal improvement, the regional office issued a checklist of police behaviours that should change, topped by “looking for misdemeanours on the street as a way of getting money”.¹¹¹

The charm offensive has worked for some. Community leader Ibrahim Turungku, known as the “king of Buol”, has softened his criticism of the police, especially after they made him an honorary officer. The septuagenarian could not remember any time police had given elders like

him a similar token. Politicians and government officials in Buol and Palu think more needs to be done to prevent a repeat, but they are not sure what.¹¹² Residents say Buol citizens will continue their disobedience until justice is served or they can get back at police.¹¹³ A popular line is “Buol is losing 8-0 to the police, and people want to even the score”.¹¹⁴

E. ACCOUNTABILITY AND CLOSURE

On 6 September 2010, the local government formed a fact-finding team that included district officials, community leaders and social groups, but not the police. In less than two months, the team concluded gross human rights violations had occurred, and police had used live rounds to stop protesters, resulting in many deaths.¹¹⁵ It demanded police accountability and transparency. Since the report came out in late October 2010, there has been no serious follow-up, although it was sent to various institutions, including the president and national parliament. Police called the team’s work “out of control”, using “findings that expose police flaws but without facts”. The team leader doubted the report would result in any action.¹¹⁶

By the end of 2011, 26 police officers had received disciplinary punishments for a wide range of acts in Buol, from illegal traffic stops to breakdown in the chain of command.¹¹⁷ These internal sanctions varied from delays in promotions and salary cuts, as police chief Litarso received, to the maximum detention of 21 days given to Butudoka, Hadi Nur, Haruna and Pantouw.¹¹⁸ No one was fired or faulted for violence against the community, reinforcing the original police claim that they fired in self-defence.¹¹⁹ Three of the 26 faced a civilian court. Traffic

¹⁰⁷ “Menabrak, Warga Buol Bakar Motor”, *TribunPalu.com*, <http://palu.tribunnews.com>, 18 August 2011. Central Sulawesi police chief Brigadier General Dewa Parsana immediately released an official apology and promised reparations.

¹⁰⁸ Crisis Group interview, Buol police chief Hari Suprpto, Buol, 26 July 2011. Suprpto is the rare case of a graduate from a respected university who joined the police. Such individuals are usually middle management in the force, seldom reaching the top positions reserved for Akpol alumni.

¹⁰⁹ See its official website, www.bankamdes.net/.

¹¹⁰ Crisis Group interview, Central Sulawesi police chief Brigadier General Dewa Parsana, Palu, 28 July 2011.

¹¹¹ “Polda Sulteng Mau dan Sedang Berubah”, *Kepolisian Daerah Sulawesi Tengah*, June 2011, a pamphlet distributed to all districts. Asking for money on the street is the top sin; other bad behaviour includes arrogance during stops; doctoring a case to get bribes; pitiless investigations; verbal and physical abuse against detainees and community; moral vices, including impregnating women without accountability; adopting an apathetic attitude toward community leaders; improper use of police vehicles; and firearms abuse.

¹¹² Crisis Group interviews, Central Sulawesi provincial legislator Huisman Brandt and former Buol *bupati* Karim Hanggi, Palu, 27 July 2011 and officials in Buol, 25 July 2011.

¹¹³ Crisis Group interview, Buol residents, including a man injured during the chaos and a victim’s child, 25 July 2011.

¹¹⁴ Crisis Group interview, former Buol district chief Karim Hanggi, Palu, 27 July 2011. He governed from 1999 to 2007.

¹¹⁵ Laporan Tim Pencari Fakta, op. cit., pp. 30-31.

¹¹⁶ Crisis Group interviews, Central Sulawesi police chief Brigadier General Dewa Parsana, 28 July 2011; Adil Suling, head of the Buol fact-finding team, 25 July 2011.

¹¹⁷ The maximum punishment for a single or cumulative disciplinary violation is 21 days in detention. Three disciplinary actions can lead to dismissal. See Government Regulation no. 2/2003, Disciplinary Regulations for Members of the Indonesian National Police, Articles 9 and 13.

¹¹⁸ See “Terkait Kerusuhan Buol, Brigadir Amirullah Dihukum 21 Hari”, *Antara*, 15 October 2010; and “Wakapolres dan Kapolsek Hanya Dihukum 21 Hari”, *Mercusuar*, 14 October 2010.

¹¹⁹ Siaran Pers Tentang Penanganan Kasus Kerusuhan di Buol, Divisi Humas Polri, 28 September 2010. This is the official

police First Inspector Jefry Pantouw and Sergeant Major Sukirman each received relatively lenient sentences of one year in jail (minus time served) for light battery against Timumun.¹²⁰ Haruna walked free after judges ruled the witness who identified him shooting said he did not know for sure whether his shots injured the victim named in the indictment.¹²¹ Throughout the trial, his lawyers painted the witness as a bitter rival of Haruna's moonlighting poultry venture who wanted him out of business.

The code of silence was in play. Pantouw said he was on trial because he owned up to slapping Timumun after keeping it to himself for a month, while others steadfastly denied seeing or doing anything wrong. Since his admission, colleagues have apparently ridiculed his honesty, and superiors have ignored him.¹²² Hadi Nur, on the other hand, is a hero among peers for rescuing police families and taking the 21-day detention but revealing little in court.

The entire investigation and trial process took place in Palu for security reasons, which caused Buol residents to feel cut off from information. Many police witnesses failed to show up. Hadi Nur, who worked at the regional base and lived in a police compound in Palu, both steps away from the courthouse, only testified after the third summons. After court attendance dropped rapidly due to travel difficulties, even the media lost interest in the case.

Police argued that they could not build a case against those responsible for the seven deaths without supporting testimony and evidence.¹²³ While ballistic tests have been done on many of the guns, there has not been any matching process, because bodies were buried without taking out the bullets, so police could not find the fatal shells. The official line is still that there is no proof either of murder in the cell, excessive use of force in quelling the protest or deadly police shooting during the clash. Instead, peers blamed Litarso for his failure to build communications with the community and media for the bad press.¹²⁴ The Central Sulawesi police chief, Parsana, and

his deputy, Ari Dono Sukmanto, conceded only that officers beat up Timumun, but not fatally. The head of the regional internal unit in charge of investigating police professional violations was more defensive:

When Timumun was in detention, other traffic police tried to question him. There was no assault. Our law is weak, because it focuses on the action, not the motivation. One or two slaps are then considered assault [because he died], without considering the real reason. The boy who was used to acting freely was then locked in a cage like a bird. He became stressed and hung himself.¹²⁵

While the trials and disciplinary proceedings produced outcomes that many in Buol considered unsatisfactory, they did provide a sense of closure. Anti-police sentiment remains, particularly among the families of the victims, who believe the police have not kept their promise to take care of them.¹²⁶ That said, the forums instituted by Suprapto have improved relations, and the worst nightmare of the "king of Buol" is that the scholarly police chief will eventually be replaced by someone of the old mold, like Hadi Nur, undoing the community policing overtures.¹²⁷ The district elections in mid-2012 will test how well they have worked. A campaign, backed by vigorous anti-corruption movements, to deny Batalipu, the incumbent head, a second term could spark violence; the police will need to be extra careful to ensure that their handling of protests and demonstrations does not reopen old wounds.

press release from the Indonesian police after officers were named as defendants in disciplinary hearings.

¹²⁰ "Dua Polisi Kasus Buol Divonis Setahun Penjara", *Antara*, 22 September 2011.

¹²¹ "Terdakwa Penembakan Divonis Bebas", *Mercusuar*, 26 October 2011.

¹²² Crisis Group interview, First Inspector Jefry Pantouw, Palu, 20 September 2011.

¹²³ Crisis Group interview, Ari Dono Sukmanto, deputy chief of Central Sulawesi police, Palu, 20 September 2011.

¹²⁴ Crisis Group interview, Central Sulawesi police chief Brigadier General Dewa Parsana and other Central Sulawesi police officers, Palu, 27 July 2011. Ironically, Litarso became the head of the evidence and detention division at the regional base after his Buol stint – a demotion from a command point of view

but a post closer to the regional power structure and farther from public scrutiny. Some officers called it a promotion.

¹²⁵ Crisis Group interview, Commissioner Bambang Suryadi, Palu, 20 September 2011. The officer's explanation is strikingly similar to that given by police in Sijunjung in December 2011 after two teenage brothers were found hanged in their cells. Their families are convinced from the marks on their bodies that they were beaten to death. See "Diduga Dibunuh, Dua Tahanan Polsek Tewas", *Haluan Padang*, 28 January 2012; also, <http://dpopolri.blogspot.com/2012/01/kakak-adik-tewas-dianiaya-lalu.html>.

¹²⁶ Crisis Group interviews, Verawaty Kapuung, daughter of slain victim Saktipan Kapuung, and Syamsuddin Monoarfa, who lost his right eye in the clashes, Buol, 25 July 2011. While police paid for medical treatment immediately after the incident, the injured victims said they received no help with continuing outpatient fees, and families of the dead want more compensation.

¹²⁷ Crisis Group interview, Ibrahim Turungku, Buol, 25 July 2011.

IV. CASE TWO: SIEGE IN KAMPAR

The second case shows how public anger against police can also arise in an affluent area an hour away from a big city.¹²⁸ In February 2011, members from the local Air Tiris clan attacked a police precinct in resource-rich Kampar district, Riau for six hours after police used force to arrest an innocent man for gambling.¹²⁹ Jittery officers fired warning shots during the attack, wounding two but causing no deaths.¹³⁰ Afterwards, community and police agreed to negotiate as equals, and while there was no legal accountability for the vandalism or abuse, a public-police partnership in rebuilding the precinct has eased tensions.

A. THE MARKET ARREST

On 23 February 2011 around 4pm, three police officers from the Kampar precinct confronted a man at the busy Air Tiris market who was holding a piece of paper with numbers. At this point the accounts of police and residents diverge. According to the witnesses at the market, police brutally arrested Zulkifli, a fish hook trader known for being quiet and pious, on suspicion of illegal gambling, when he was in fact jotting down serial numbers of products.¹³¹ Zulkifli said officers sharply ordered him to surrender the note that they thought was a list of bets and manhandled him when he resisted.¹³² He said officers roughly wrestled him to ground and stomped on his body before tying his hands, confiscating his motorcycle keys and placing him horizontally on the bike. With blood dripping from his face, officers took him to the precinct a mile away on the road connecting Riau's main cities of Pekanbaru and Bangkinang.

Zulkifli cried for help during the ride, attracting attention of neighbours and fellow traders who witnessed the arrest. News spread fast that police had publicly humiliated

an upright member of the Air Tiris clan and carried him like "a slaughtered pig".¹³³

According to the police, officers following a tip tried to ask Zulkifli about the paper, but he scoffed at them.¹³⁴ Police led him to a motorcycle so they could conduct questioning at the precinct, but he jumped to flee, tripped and fell. From the Riau police commander to the lowest-ranked constable in Kampar, all officers insisted there was no assault, and Zulkifli accidentally hit his head on the ground.¹³⁵ They also said Zulkifli sat during the ride to the precinct because it was impossible for the police to carry a man horizontally on a motorbike. Officers believed Air Tiris clan members marched to the precinct on the basis of rumours spread deliberately to discredit the police.

Regardless of the truth, both sides agreed the incident provided an outlet for existing anti-police sentiment. Within 30 minutes, hundreds of protestors had reached the precinct.¹³⁶

B. THE SIX-HOUR SIEGE

Police blunders continued at the precinct. Officers stripped Zulkifli to his underwear in a vain search for evidence that could justify their actions. The protesters, knew the trader was no gambler and shouted that the officer in charge of the arrest, Warrant Officer Edi Chandra, was the one with connections to bookies.¹³⁷ The commotion prompted the district police chief, Zainul Muttaqien, to head for the precinct from his office in Bangkinang, but before he got there, officers had already released Zulkifli for lack of evidence. No one from the police accompanied him when he went to hospital afterwards, an omission that the community interpreted as lack of compassion.

For the protestors, Zulkifli's release was not enough; they demanded the cell keys to lock up the arresting officers. Many residents had problems in particular with Chandra, a non-commissioned officer who led the precinct's crime unit – a position usually given to officers of higher rank.¹³⁸

¹²⁸ The prosperous oil city of Pekanbaru is an hour away from the precinct via a very busy, flat two-lane road connecting it to the city of Bangkinang, the district seat of Kampar.

¹²⁹ Geographical names can be confusing in this case. Kampar is the name of the district and one of its rural sub-districts. The Kampar precinct (Polsek Kampar) that oversees the sub-district reports to the Kampar district station (Polres Kampar), which is located in the prosperous Bangkinang city. These are all administrative names. On the ground, people in Kampar sub-district call the area and themselves Air Tiris, referring to the traditional Malay name, which means "cold water".

¹³⁰ "Serang Polsek Kampar, 4 Warga Terluka", *Media Indonesia*, 24 February 2011. Rubber bullets injured two men while the others bled from broken glass.

¹³¹ Crisis Group interviews, Kampar residents, including victim Zulkifli and incumbent *bupati* Burhanuddin Husin, 24 September 2011. The gambling coupons are called "Sie Jie" in Riau.

¹³² Crisis Group interview, Zulkifli, Kampar, 24 September 2011.

¹³³ The pig reference emerged in almost all conversations with pre-dominantly Muslim Kampar residents, underlining their disgust over the treatment. Crisis Group interview, Kampar residents, 23 September 2011.

¹³⁴ Crisis Group interview, Edi Renhar, Kampar precinct chief during the incident, 25 September 2011.

¹³⁵ Crisis Group interview, police officers, Kampar and Pekanbaru, 23-25 September 2011.

¹³⁶ "Ribuan Warga Serang Markas Polsek Kampar", *Tribun Pekanbaru*, 24 February 2011.

¹³⁷ Crisis Group interview, Zuhendri Zainur, a youth leader who was later accused to be an instigator of the protest, Kampar, 24 September 2011.

¹³⁸ Crisis Group interviews, Air Tiris elder Syahrundi Datuk Padukomajo, youth leader Zuhendri Zainur and local politician Nurmailis Syaiful, Kampar, 24 September 2011.

When Muttaqien arrived, he calmed the crowd, including, protestors later said, by promising to detain Chandra. He then left for the hospital to take care of Zulkifli's medical fees. Around 6pm, news that the three arresting officers had been quietly taken out the back door and transferred to Bangkinang angered the mob, which clamoured to see them behind bars. The Riau provincial commander, Brigadier General Suaedi Husein, later chastised the district chief for failing to foresee escalation and leaving the scene.¹³⁹ The commotion caused a traffic jam that stretched miles in the direction of Pekanbaru and Bangkinang. Hundreds quickly turned into thousands, as people left their cars to see what was happening, and spectators flocked to the site.

Near 8pm, two incidents paved the way for violence. Amid heightening tension and intermittent rock-throwing, power went off, giving the protestors a chance to storm the precinct. Coincidentally, a truck carrying gravel pulled up, so they had plenty of ammunition to hurl at the station.¹⁴⁰ Police shields could no longer hold back the crowd, and officers began to fire warning shots. Muttaqien returned, only to become a target of rocks. For more than an hour, both sides pushed back and forth. Damage included broken windows and roof tiles, smashed televisions and computers, vandalised police cars and impounded motorcycles. Police picked up four people considered provocateurs, but this only increased tension.¹⁴¹

The arrival of 100 soldiers around 9pm curbed the violence.¹⁴² They did not fire a shot but went inside the crowd to persuade the protestors to calm down. Nobody in the mob had grievances against the army, so they agreed to disperse. They were about to leave when police, fed up with being holed up in the precinct for hours, began to fire randomly into the dark. Two people were hit by stray bullets, one on the hand.¹⁴³ The precinct chief, Edi Renhar, argued afterwards that his men saw people carrying petrol jerrycans and tried to prevent an arson attempt.¹⁴⁴ The shooting triggered new anger, and the soldiers had to act as a buffer between the police and protestors, who kept shouting their demands for Chandra. The twelve elders of the Air Tiris clan tried throughout to defuse anger, but without their leader, Syahtuni Datuk Padukomajo who

was in Jakarta, nobody listened. Around 9pm, they initiated a meeting with Chief Muttaqien at a house across from the precinct.

C. NEGOTIATING A WAY OUT

As the negotiation between police and community began, clan elders made it clear that they wanted the arresting trio punished; police wanted to build a case against the four alleged provocateurs of the violence. They failed to find a compromise until 10pm, when the Riau police commander, Suaedi, arrived, relieving the embattled Muttaqien. The general promised the three officers would face disciplinary hearings but said the community should cover the damage to the station. The elders insisted the four detainees should be released first. Kampar's *bupati*, Burhanuddin Husin, arrived and promised to foot the bill for the damage in exchange for the releases.¹⁴⁵ For the sake of avoiding police retaliation against recognised vandals and a protest movement to free the four, Suaedi and the elders struck a deal allowing all detainees go home while investigations continued.¹⁴⁶

The protestors agreed to leave after being informed that negotiations were underway. When heavily armed Brimob reinforcements from Pekanbaru finally reached Kampar around 10pm, they found nothing to do but clear the precinct of rocks and projectiles.¹⁴⁷ Many, including the *bupati*, believed the situation would have been far worse had Brimob arrived sooner and seen the police under attack.

Tension remained the next day, as both sides failed to fully meet the terms of the agreement. Residents found out that only one of the four arrested men reached home safely – a youth leader who was part of the *bupati*'s re-election team; the others were still in prison.¹⁴⁸ The community produced no clear plan for repairing the station, now guarded by Brimob forces.

On 25 February, the head of the Air Tiris clan, Syahtuni Datuk Padukomajo, arrived home to an upset community, with some elements wanting to attack the police again. During Friday prayers at the neighbourhood mosque, he showed Zulkifli, who had just been discharged from the hospital, to the congregation and begged residents to avoid further fights with the police. Zulkifli said police had paid for his medical treatment. Syahtuni announced the clan

¹³⁹ Crisis Group interview, Suaedi Husein, Pekanbaru, 25 September 2011.

¹⁴⁰ Crisis Group interviews, Kampar witnesses and journalists, 23 September 2011.

¹⁴¹ "Empat Perusak Kantor Polsek Kampar Ditangkap", *Media Indonesia*, 24 February 2011.

¹⁴² Glori Wadrianto, "Kronologi Kerusuhan di Mapolsek Kampar", *Kompas*, 24 February 2011.

¹⁴³ "Ada Warga Kena Tembakan Peluru Nyasar Anggota Polisi", *Riau Info*, 24 February 2011.

¹⁴⁴ Crisis Group interview, Edi Renhar, Kampar, 25 September 2011.

¹⁴⁵ Crisis Group interview, Burhanuddin Husin, Kampar, 24 September 2011.

¹⁴⁶ Crisis Group interview, Suaedi Husein, Pekanbaru, 25 September 2011.

¹⁴⁷ "Pasca-Penyerangan, Mapolsek Kampar Dijaga Ketat", *Metro TV*, 24 February 2011.

¹⁴⁸ "Empat Warga Dimintai Keterangan, Tiga Polisi Ditahan", *Dumai Pos*, 25 February 2011.

would cooperate with the local government and pool Rp.42 million (\$5,000) for the repairs, if Brimob troopers agreed to leave the region. A pact to this effect was signed by injured victims, local officials, police, army and the elders.¹⁴⁹ Then, Syahtuni went to Pekanbaru to visit Suaedi and negotiated a release for the other three.

On 2 March, 100 residents and 30 police repaired the station together.¹⁵⁰ A feast and traditional peace ceremony followed, but not everyone was satisfied. Many residents felt they got the worst of the deal, because they had to compensate the police. Zulkifli felt the elders, worried about continuing tension, forced him to sign although he originally wanted to bring the police to court.¹⁵¹ His wife several times went to the police for medical compensation for outpatient and psychological treatment, but after making an initial payment of Rp.2.5 million (\$300), officers were not prepared to give more.¹⁵² The three arresting officers moved out of the precinct and received demotions but escaped legal proceedings.¹⁵³ Nevertheless, compared to Buol, Kampar seems to be out of danger. Contacts and collaboration, no matter how imperfect, worked to prevent lingering hostility.

The attitude of the precinct chief, Edi Renhar, suggests there is a long way to go. He blamed the Air Tiris community for the dysfunctional relations and claimed police approaches had been frequent. In response to the suggestion that foot patrols might be a good idea, however, he said, “there’s no way police officers are going to walk from the precinct to market. Do you know any police officer who likes to walk? Even to buy cigarettes across the street, officers take their motorcycles”.¹⁵⁴

Commander Suaedi admitted a working community policing program would have prevented the violence and claimed afterwards he told his force to adapt:

The precinct is the frontline serving the community. If the frontline cannot make the community smile, how can police become the protector and servant of the people? That would be lip service. If we like to say we are the guardians, we must show that every single day or stop being police.

He acknowledged that had the officers been less arrogant and on better terms with the community, they would have known that a case involving someone of Zulkifli’s reputation required delicate handling. But he also said the community needed to learn to distinguish between individual problem officers and the police as an institution.¹⁵⁵

¹⁴⁹ Crisis Group interview, Syahtuni Datuk Padukomajo, Kampar, 24 September 2011. Crisis Group obtained a copy of the 25 February 2011 pact from Zulkifli.

¹⁵⁰ “Polri, Pemkab, Ninik Mamak, Masyarakat Air Tiris Gotong Royong”, *Riau Info*, 3 March 2011.

¹⁵¹ Crisis Group interview, Zulkifli, Kampar, 24 September 2011.

¹⁵² Crisis Group interview, Edi Renhar, Kampar, 25 September 2011.

¹⁵³ “Tiga Polisi Ditahan Akibat Insiden Polsek Kampar”, *Antara Riau News*, 1 March 2011.

¹⁵⁴ Crisis Group interview, Kampar precinct chief Edi Renhar, Kampar, 25 September 2011. He moved away after the incident.

¹⁵⁵ Crisis Group interview, Riau police commander Brigadier General Suaedi Husein, Pekanbaru, 25 September 2011.

V. CASE THREE: ARSON IN BANTAENG

This South Sulawesi case shows how the community sees police as a monolith without differentiating among individuals or jurisdictions. A group of police from Jeneponto raided a wedding party in a remote corner of the district. In the course of making arrests for gambling, they shot dead a community leader who lived across the river in neighbouring Bantaeng district. The man's friends retaliated by burning the closest precinct station available, in Uluere sub-district, Bantaeng, although it had no connection to the raiders. Both police and those responsible for the arson escaped prosecution after the Bantaeng *bupati* immediately rebuilt the precinct and compensated the families of the dead and injured. Residents have been told to forgive and forget.

A. RETALIATION AFTER A WEDDING RAID

On 2 June 2011, seven Jeneponto police headed for a village in Rumbia sub-district on a tip that people wanted for motorcycle theft would be attending a wedding there. Although within their jurisdiction, they had no idea where it was. Rumbia is a large, remote sub-district in the mountains with no precinct of its own. It falls under the Kelara precinct 10km downhill.¹⁵⁶ The plainclothes officers had to ask directions from colleagues at the Uluere precinct. Around 10pm, they reached the home of the bride, a wooden house on stilts. Among the hundreds of guests, they found a group of men playing cards in a backyard hut and tried to seize them on suspicion of illegal gambling.¹⁵⁷ The officer in charge went to the house to calm the guests and ordered the card players to surrender.¹⁵⁸ Ignored, he fired warning shots that made people run from the house.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁶ In many rural districts, police precincts can cover more than two sub-districts, due to lack of resources and funds for building stations. Normally, each sub-district should have a precinct that can have from five to 50 officers, depending on resources and the size of population.

¹⁵⁷ "Laporan Monitoring Penembakan Warga Sipil di Desa Loka, Rumbia, Jeneponto", KontraS Sulawesi, June 2011. This is the report from the Sulawesi branch of the Jakarta-based human rights group KontraS, p. 6.

¹⁵⁸ Playing cards for money is common entertainment in the remote highlands of Bantaeng and Jeneponto, especially after a good harvest or during festivities. However, the organised gambling that can be found in the coastal, urban parts of the two districts is rare. If police come by and introduce themselves, residents often give them crops or other gifts so that they look the other way. Crisis Group interview, Bantaeng and Jeneponto residents and journalists, September 2011.

¹⁵⁹ Laporan Kejadian No. LK/56/VI/2011 tentang Pengrusakan dan Pembakaran Polsek Uluere, Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, 2 June 2011. This is the official police report of the incident.

As most lights went out, the officer's men believed he was in danger and fired randomly into the dark, hitting four people, including the community leader, Daeng Talla. The police then hauled the alleged gamblers into their van and sped away, neglecting the wounded.

Some 300 angry protesters headed for the Uluere precinct, disregarding the fact that the police involved were from Jeneponto, and that precinct has no jurisdiction over the raid location. Others wanted to find medical help for the injured, all from villages in Uluere. Coincidentally, the only doctor in the mountainous area lived adjacent to the precinct station. When the crowd on motorcycles and cars reached Uluere's one-street centre around 11pm, nobody was manning the eight-officer precinct, and the doctor said victims should get treatment at Bantaeng's hospital, an hour drive downhill. Before the entourage got far, Daeng Talla, died.¹⁶⁰

There were two groups in the mob – Rumbia marchers, who wanted to burn everything linked to police, and Uluere residents, who were as angry but did not want the doctor's house and clinic surrounding the precinct to be damaged.¹⁶¹ The latter also knew the precinct compound was not police-owned. Bantaeng's *bupati* had allowed police to build a temporary office on local government land earmarked for health facilities. The attackers stripped the precinct's wooden panels and pillars and dragged the office furniture and police documents out to the street and burned them.¹⁶² Officers hid themselves and their weapons as soon as they heard that a mob, including women and children, was on the way. By midnight, the office was ruined, but other public service buildings stood intact.

B. RESPONSES FROM THE *BUPATI*

The Bantaeng *bupati*, Nurdin Abdullah, a former academic-turned-businessman who has turned his district from a deprived area without a doctor into a medical centre and source of fresh agricultural produce, had no intention to see conflict tarnish development. He envisions Uluere as an agro-tourism centre with Japanese investors lining up.¹⁶³ As soon as he heard about the violence, he went up to the hills to console the community. He believes political rivals might have played a role in the violence to destabilise his

¹⁶⁰ "Satu Tewas, Massa Amuk Kantor Polisi", *Seputar Indonesia*, 3 June 2011.

¹⁶¹ Crisis Group interview, Daeng Kasman, a Bonto Marannu village chief, Bantaeng, 16 September 2011. He lives across the street from the Uluere precinct. Bonto Marannu is Uluere's central village.

¹⁶² Crisis Group interview, Bantaeng police chief Feri Handoko, Bantaeng, 16 September 2011.

¹⁶³ Uluere is Bantaeng's leading producer of strawberries, carrots, apples and flowers. Greenhouses and orchards dot the area.

administration.¹⁶⁴ He also argued against the deployment of Brimob forces to Uluere although they were already dispatched.¹⁶⁵ The Bantaeng district police chief, Feri Handoko, took the advice and called them back after dismissing rumours that the crowd planned to hit police targets outside Uluere.

In the morning, the *bupati* accompanied the dead man's family to the police hospital in the provincial capital, Makassar, for an autopsy that found the bullet shell. When they returned to Uluere, he arranged for immediate burial to cut short grieving that could stir emotions. Chief Handoko was known as a man who liked to hold meetings with locals; the community was still angry and demanded that he replace all eight members of the station, which he eventually did. Even though the Jeneponto men had conducted the raid, Uluere residents believed the local police were also involved. The community also demanded the release of five wedding guests arrested in the raid, but because the Jeneponto police were responsible, the *bupati* and police chief of Bantaeng had no authority to make that happen.¹⁶⁶

The responsiveness of Bantaeng officials was not matched in Jeneponto. The police there released two detainees from their own district for lack of evidence but kept three Uluere farmers behind bars. The Jeneponto *bupati* had no intention of interfering in police matters, but community leaders continued to lobby for their release.¹⁶⁷

On 6 June, the Bantaeng *bupati* paid Rp.20 million (\$1,800) from his own pocket to finance the rebuilding of the precinct station.¹⁶⁸ He did not want the ruins to become a reminder of instability. The reconstruction was finished in a week under the management of local elders, who insisted that the Jeneponto police release the three residents before their colleagues in Uluere could return to work. On 17

June, the men were freed after two weeks of detention on no clear grounds or explicit charges.¹⁶⁹

C. NO LEGAL PROCESS

The Bantaeng *bupati*'s responsiveness prevented further violence, but residents nevertheless regretted his stance on legal accountability.¹⁷⁰ No one among the Jeneponto police involved in the original raid faced trial, even though the head of operations of the South Sulawesi provincial police called the shooting unwarranted and said officers that night had "shot at their own ghosts".¹⁷¹

In June 2011, South Sulawesi police began investigations against the seven raiding officers without disclosing their names to the public.¹⁷² In the official police report, only the leader of the group is explicitly named. It also said the men fired warning shots twice and announced their presence, which residents reject.¹⁷³ A police officer in Makassar said while there was disciplinary misconduct during the raid, police opened fire when they thought their commanding officer was in danger, which was made more plausible because many men attending the wedding would have been carrying machetes as a matter of course.¹⁷⁴ According to police procedures, there was thus a legitimate reason for the use of firearms.¹⁷⁵

The raiders received several days of detention for ill discipline, but the whole process was kept internal. There were no witnesses who could identify the shooters, because no one could see the faces of the officers in the dark. Bantaeng police had also tried to build cases against five men whom they believed led the mob involved in the arson attack, but they dropped the attempt for the sake of good community relations. Chief Handoko said:

¹⁶⁴ Other sources, including the police, noticed the presence of provocateurs during and after the torching but could not conclude they had anti-*bupati* political motives.

¹⁶⁵ There were 150 heavily-armed Brimob troopers, who came from the provincial capital, Makassar, to Bantaeng, a five-hour drive. On the afternoon of 3 June 2011, they camped at a foothill village fifteen minutes from Uluere. Laporan Kejadian, op. cit.
¹⁶⁶ "Keluarga Korban Penembakan Bantaeng Tolak Polisi", *Tribun Timur*, 5 June 2011.

¹⁶⁷ While Bantaeng is known for clean governance and rapid development, Jeneponto remains a poor area with a *bupati* who often faces corruption allegations and protests from anti-graft groups. His strongest political rival is a predecessor who spent time in jail for embezzlement. "Germak Sulsel Laporkan Kasus Dugaan Korupsi Bupati Jeneponto", Makassar TV, 23 September 2010.

¹⁶⁸ Crisis Group interview, Nurdin Abdullah, Bantaeng, 16 September 2011. Also see "Mapolsek Uluere Segera Direnovasi", *Tribun Timur*, 7 June 2011.

¹⁶⁹ KontraS Sulawesi, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

¹⁷⁰ Crisis Group interview, Daeng Kasman, Bantaeng, 16 September 2011.

¹⁷¹ Crisis Group interview, Aziz Samosir, head of operations at the South Sulawesi provincial police, Makassar, 15 September 2011. He oversees the field operations of all districts in South Sulawesi, including Bantaeng and Jeneponto.

¹⁷² "7 Anggota Polres Jeneponto Diamankan", Kompas.com, 7 June 2011.

¹⁷³ Laporan Kejadian, op. cit. The leader of the group is Second Inspector Agus Tri Putranta.

¹⁷⁴ Crisis Group interview, South Sulawesi police officer, Makassar, 15-16 September 2011. Male farmers in South Sulawesi traditionally carry machetes outside their houses. In ceremonies such as a wedding, the sheaths are decorated.

¹⁷⁵ Prosedur Tetap Kepala Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia No. Protap/1/X/2010 tentang Penanggulangan Anarki. This is the main police document on crowd control. Shots to non-fatal targets are allowed when those who present "clear danger" ignore warning shots. Among the examples of "clear danger" are resistance or insulting an officer with or without weapons.

Not all cases should go to the court. If it does not provide a sense of justice, why should we push it? They have already apologised for the damage and asked for the case to be dropped. If we try to hound suspects in the community, that will only breed sentiment against officers who are stationed at that remote precinct. And at the end of the day, they also need police.¹⁷⁶

VI. CONCLUSION

These cases of community violence against the police in retaliation for perceived wrongdoing – and dozens of similar cases across the country – show three indisputable facts: police are self-protective when the community demands answers; police are too quick to shoot, too often with live ammunition; and accountability for suspected police wrongdoing only occurs in the face of widespread media coverage and even then is usually partial and unsatisfactory.

All these issues are exacerbated by corruption and the imposition of illegal fees by police. Officers argue that their budget does not cover operating costs and money is needed for operations to meet numerical targets, and it is true that most lower-ranking police do not earn a living wage – hence their eagerness to set up checkpoints such as the one in Buol to stop motorcycle racers. But as one analyst writes:

Police emphasise that to investigate cases or secure protests, they must levy unofficial “taxes” and take “donations” from the community. They want Indonesians to think about the off-budget economy as kind of shadow budget that makes up for the deficiencies of the state, rather than seeing it as all-out corruption. But analyses of the police’s financial system reveal a much more complicated picture. The problem lies in poor budgetary prioritising, constipated financial transfers and chronic embezzlement.¹⁷⁷

Senior police officers frequently argue that the main reason behind the frequent outbreaks of violence is the lack of adequate personnel or equipment, particularly in remote areas. There is no question that many precincts have insufficient personnel and outdated equipment, but this is only part of the story. So much money is diverted in Jakarta that “transfers from HQ to stations across the country [are] deliberately, painfully slow and whittled down to nothing by the time they arrive”.¹⁷⁸

Other problems identified in this report are also linked to corruption. Poor training is a natural consequence of a system where, as noted at the outset, entry into police schools, assignments and advancement in the ranks are all obtainable through pay, not merit. And all too often, one-off payments to victims become a substitute for serious investigation into possible police wrongdoing. For all the directives and work plans on community policing since 2005, the police are still widely hated.

¹⁷⁶ Crisis Group interview, Feri Handoko, Bantaeng, 16 September 2011.

¹⁷⁷ Jacqui Baker, “Bribes and Bullets: Police Corruption Linked to Violence at World’s Biggest Mine”, www.theconversation.edu.au, 18 November 2011.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

A. THE US VS. THEM MENTALITY

Several policy implications flow from the analysis of the case studies and the barriers to community policing identified in Section II. Many of these require major reforms at the centre, which began under the former national police commander, Sutanto, but seem to have fallen by the wayside since. They include:

A major overhaul of police financing and auditing to begin to eliminate the culture of rent-seeking at a local level, because imposition of fees is probably the single biggest cause of hostility toward the police. This is not a question of increasing the budget; it means serious reform in how funds are allocated, how they are transferred, how they are proposed, and what kind of oversight takes place. Recommendations along these lines have been made repeatedly by different organisations to little effect, but unless this fundamental problem is addressed, other reforms will be hampered. Field stations also should have better financial management and staffing.

Serious attention to improving the national police academy and provincial police schools, focusing on the entry requirements, curriculum reform and teaching methods. Particular attention should be paid to eliminating the kind of hazing and physical punishments that officers simply transfer to the public when they graduate. The recommendations from 2005 and 2008 for more patrols and interaction with the community have gone unheeded at the local level. The need for the Central Sulawesi police to issue a checklist of unacceptable police behaviour after the Buol incident shows that many of the problems are recognised, but there is no political will to fix them until trouble happens, and even then, the attention lasts only as long as the incident is in the media spotlight. The culture of superiority inculcated in police academies and training institutes also needs reform; this requires an in-depth evaluation by an independent team of a few of these schools to understand how the attitude is transmitted and how it could be changed.

Development of a clear incentive structure at the local level for implementing community policing concepts. Unless there is a system of rewards for good relations with the community, in terms of recognition, promotion or salary increases, no one is going to be interested in changing the current system in which currying favour with one's superiors brings the highest returns.

More policewomen in management positions. In Kamar and Bantaeng, many protesters were women and children. On the police side, there was an absence of female officers who could have understood better the sentiments within the community from a family-oriented perspective. Policewomen could also build networks with the many

existing female-only groups in the society, as their presence would give a different, less harsh face to police initiatives.

B. CHANGING THE “SHOOT FIRST” APPROACH

One consequence of community hostility toward the police is that local stations are frequently confronted by mobs, creating situations in which panicked officers too often reach for their guns. The goal should be to eliminate the causes of the mob action in the first place, but at the same time, a number of changes could be instituted, including:

Stricter requirements in terms of training and proof of skills for acquiring and maintaining weapons. The firearms training given to police cadets in provincial schools is rudimentary at best. No one should be assigned a gun as a matter of course. There should be a review of training and testing procedures to improve professional standards, accompanied by thorough interactive study of the 2009 police directive on human rights.¹⁷⁹ In the Bantaeng case, the police argued that they opened fire because they believed their commander was in danger, but they fired blindly in the dark, transforming what might have been a legitimate rationale into an act of folly. Better training could prevent such behaviour. In addition, any misuse or abuse of a weapon should be subject to demotion or other measures severe enough to act as a deterrent. As noted in an earlier Crisis Group briefing, much stricter control should be exerted over police gun and ammunition stocks.¹⁸⁰

Better training in non-lethal methods of crowd control. Police need to seriously rethink the overuse of live ammunition by their personnel across the country. If violence involving police is so widespread, it should be common sense that resort to live fire should be avoided at all costs. Even in conflict or former conflict areas, like Papua and Ambon, where the use of rubber bullets is supposed to be standard procedure, live bullets are almost always used (and abused) to quell unrest. This may be in part the result of bringing in reinforcements from outside, but there should be a thorough evaluation, again by an independent team, of how rubber bullets are distributed, what the stocks are in local stations and what instructions are in place for their use. Very few stations at the sub-district level have

¹⁷⁹ “Peraturan Kepala Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia No.8/2009 tentang Implementasi Prinsip dan Standar Hak Asasi Manusia dalam Penyelenggaraan Tugas Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia”. This is the directive for how officers should implement human rights values.

¹⁸⁰ See Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°109, *Illicit Arms in Indonesia*, 6 September 2010.

access to tear gas or water cannons or the knowledge and training of how to use them.¹⁸¹

Need for revision of the 2010 directive on anarchic behaviour. In October 2010, after a Jakarta street brawl between gangs with guns injured three officers, police issued a procedural directive, no. 1/X/2010 on confronting “anarchic behaviour”. It was in effect a license to shoot on sight, rather than guidelines emphasising non-lethal methods or encouraging police to take measures earlier that might prevent a mob from gathering in the first place. The directive was widely criticised, but as of early 2012, it had not been revised.

C. ACCOUNTABILITY

The lack of police accountability is not a new story, but very little progress has been made in the last decade toward improving it. Officers are generally punished for abuse of detainees only if a case reaches the national media and even then only with disciplinary proceedings. Cover-ups are common, and the sense of injustice that this creates perpetuates community hostility. The question is how to break the “wall of silence” and get serious independent investigations into allegations of police abuse.

If such investigations were to take place, it would be easier to ensure the prosecution of arsonists and others who commit violence against the police. As it stands, when trouble between the community and the police erupts into violence, the burden often falls on local elected officials to negotiate a temporary way out, in a way that leaves everyone dissatisfied and grievances festering. A responsive *bupati* like the one in Bantaeng can end a crisis, but serious crimes should not be left to negotiation and compromise.

Among the changes needed are:

Establishment of a civilian oversight commission. The National Police Commission set up under the 2002 police law was initially seen as a body that could receive complaints, but its scope and power were gradually diluted, and it has no such role under its current mandate. Indonesia has an NGO called Police Watch, but it has no authority for investigation. The frequency of police-community violence underscores how much an oversight commission is needed. If the police truly believe they are a civilian force, they should be willing to face civilian review.

More use of the courts in cases where serious crimes, such as murder or torture, are alleged. The failure to

use the courts to prosecute possible police crimes sustains distrust, because it suggests that police are above the law. The fact is that no one trusts internal police investigations, in part because they are not transparent, and no one has a chance to see what evidence was produced or how decisions were reached. In the Buol case, the legal process was far from satisfactory, but at least it was open to scrutiny.

More effective and powerful fact-finding missions. The local government fact-finding team in the Buol case never had clout, because neither the police nor any national agency was directly involved. Nobody outside Buol took the results seriously. Fact-finding missions to work need to be composed of individuals or representatives of agencies that wield influence at the highest levels of government and push for implementation of recommendations. While police-only missions are not a good idea, police involvement in fact-finding teams is essential, because respected former or active officers can open doors to information and help ensure that recommendations are implemented.

Better autopsy procedures. The Buol case illustrates the need for independent autopsy procedures in cases where police officers are alleged to have been involved in deaths of suspects or detainees.

More resources put into “justice journalism”. “Peace journalism” has become a field of its own, recognising the important role the media can play in reducing conflict simply by accurate reporting and quelling of rumours. The importance of the Indonesian media in pressing for security forces accountability in many cases suggests that one route to justice, in the absence of serious police reform, would be to put more resources into “justice journalism” at a local level, so as to ensure that there are more trained investigative journalists to look into allegations of abuses in far-flung areas. Reporters with a police beat are often overly close to the officers they cover. A program called “Suara Keadilan” (Voice of Justice) on the national television station TVOne shows how effective media coverage can be; it also shows how many cases of abuse of ordinary villagers take place that would never come to public attention unless journalists were out looking for them. Recent cases of police brutality in Bima, Sumbawa and Mesuji, Sumatra show that action only comes after gory video footage reaches the nation’s living rooms.

The problems between police and communities are symptomatic of many larger ones facing Indonesia, including corruption and a dysfunctional legal system. Community policing is not a panacea, but if the government wants to reduce violent attacks on the police, it needs to start by understanding why hostility toward the police remains so high.

Jakarta/Brussels, 16 February 2012

¹⁸¹ Crisis Group interviews, Buol police chief Hari Suprpto, Buol, 26 July 2011; Bantaeng police chief Feri Handoko, Bantaeng, 16 September 2011; and Kampar police chief Trio Santoso, Bangkinang, 23 September 2011.

APPENDIX A

MAP OF INDONESIA



APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Akpol	Akademi Kepolisian, National Police Academy, the four-year tertiary school that produces commissioned officers groomed for top positions.
Bankamdes	Bantuan Keamanan Desa, Village Security Help, a community policing program in Central Sulawesi that handles small disputes and works with police on serious cases.
Bimmas	Bimbingan Masyarakat, Public Guidance, a unit that is tasked with advising the community on security issues and should be the focal point of community policing.
Brimob	Brigade Mobil, Mobile Brigade, the police paramilitary force that has a unit in every provincial command.
Bupati	Head of a <i>kabupaten</i> (district), also known as a regency, the level below a province.
FKPM	Forum Kemitraan Polisi Masyarakat, Police-Community Partnership Forum.
Koban	Japanese-style neighbourhood police station, a form of community policing implemented in Jakarta and Bekasi.
Kompolnas	Komisi Kepolisian Nasional, National Police Commission, a body that reports to the president, tasked to receive complaints on police but without powers to demand accountability from the police.
Perkap	Peraturan Kapolri, a regulation issued by the national police commander.
Polda	Kepolisian Daerah, the provincial command that reports to headquarters in Jakarta. Its chief is known as Kapolda.
Polmas	Pemolisian masyarakat, community policing.
Polres	Kepolisian Resor, command at the district level that reports to Polda and covers one district (<i>kabupaten</i>). Its chief is known as Kapolres.
Polri	Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, Indonesian National Police. Its chief is known as Kapolri.
Polsek	Kepolisian Sektor, Sector Police, covering one or more sub-districts (<i>kecamatan</i>) and reporting to the polres. Its chief is known as Kapolsek.
Protap	Prosedur Tetap, procedural directive.
SKEP	Surat Keputusan, a decree.
SPN	Sekolah Polisi Negara, State Police School, the school that produces non-commissioned officers after eleven months of training, the last six of which are on-the-job.
UPPA	Unit Pelayanan Perempuan dan Anak, Women and Children Services Unit, a police division that handles crimes related to women and children but exists only in big cities.

APPENDIX C

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