



Lessons Learned from the Mozambican Peace Process

Anna Maria Gentili

Abstract

The Mozambican General Peace Accord became possible as the Cold War came to a close. Followed by a two years implementation process leading to multiparty free elections in 1994, it is considered internationally a success story for the resolution of civil conflicts. It was one of the first cases in which a robust agreement increased the complementarities between simple peacekeeping and peacebuilding priorities such as confidence building, demilitarization, electoral assistance, development aid, institutional support, and security sector reform. Third party mediation coupling power diplomacy with confidence-building facilitation proved to be the winning solution. Elements that have contributed to the success of the peace process were timing, credibility, impartiality, and the skill of the mediation team. Power diplomacy supported confidence building, ensuring that the political arrangements in the Accord were not left hanging through adequate political and economic incentives and coordinated institutional and financial support by a vast array of international and state donors.

Keywords: *Mozambique / Civil conflict / Conflict mediation / Conflict resolution / Confidence building / Peace process / Peace agreement*

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by Anna Maria Gentili*

Introduction

The Mozambican General Peace Agreement (GPA), followed by the ONUMOZ (United Nations Operations in Mozambique) implementation mission, is considered a “second generation” peace process test case, a multidimensional peacekeeping operation.¹ Its success is due mainly to policies which prioritized consensus-building between the parties to the conflict, negotiated through the mediation of a “third party” and supported by the international commitment to guarantee the country’s political and economic reconstruction by means of democratic development.²

The end of the Cold War in the ‘90s had given rise all over Africa to a wave of democratizations, preceded in the 1980s by the conditionality of austerity measures negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) in the name of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). Stringent commitments to reshape the economic structures and priorities defined a set of new development policies: these were the gradual phasing out of state intervention in the economy, asset privatizations, and free market reforms.

Democratization through “free and fair” multiparty competitive elections, the rule of law and institution building geared towards good governance, was considered the second fundamental step to stabilize and secure countries where economic development had

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¹ In 1992, the year of the signing of the General Peace Agreement, the Secretary General of the UN, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, who had been a key supporter of the negotiations, published the “Agenda for peace” that outlined the relevance of preventive diplomacy and the relationship between peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building, out of the recognition that the late 20th century conflicts affected civilians to a much greater degree. To build bridges between peace support operations and human security was to be an international responsibility. Peace-building was defined as the component that makes peace sustainable, preserving its gains in the medium and long terms. Very relevant for understanding the Mozambican case is the document declaring that the peace-building component of the peace process was to be implemented by the affected populations themselves chiefly with the support of the government and donor structures present in the country (international, bilateral donors, INGOs, business enterprises): Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992 (A/47/277-S/24111), 17 June 1992, http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf.

² Alex Vines and Dylan Hendrickson (eds.), *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*, London, Conciliation Resources, 1998 (Accord; 3), <http://www.c-r.org/accord/mozambique>. Conciliation Resources publishes a collection of essays on various aspects of the peace process and the fundamental documents on the peace process including the Nkomaty Treaty, <http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/primary-texts-accord-mozambique>. See also, European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa (AWEPA), *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, available at <http://www.open.ac.uk/technology/mozambique/p6.shtml>.

been blocked by authoritarian regimes. At the time, the West's engagement in helping to solve African conflicts was mainly dictated by the assumption that instability was the greatest impediment to economic and democratic development, meaning free market reforms and multiparty competition. The challenge was not primarily financial, but political and conceptual, as it laid in the realm of political relations between the different actors.

Rather than representing a model, the Mozambican process is considered a "test case", one in which the United Nations (UN) and the international community invested heavily to try to avoid the failure that for years had prevented peace in Angola. The process should be read as an experience that has added substance to the debates taking place in international, regional and national policy-making institutions on how to achieve sustainable solutions to civil conflicts. It was one of the first cases in which the agreement (GPA), followed by implementation, increased the complementarities between simple peacekeeping and peace-building priorities such as confidence-building, demilitarization of the political context, electoral assistance, financing, institutional support to government, and security sector reform.³

1. At the crossroads: the end of the Cold War and the changing context of pre-negotiations

An important reason for the Mozambican peace process success was that the whole period of pre-negotiations functioned like an international, regional and national workshop, where different positions and interests were gradually brought to support a peaceful negotiated solution. Last but not least, the parties to the conflict were from beginning to end the subjects, not the objects of the process.

Thus the first fundamental lesson we draw from the Mozambican "test case" is that there is no blueprint for conflict resolution, and therefore the decision to intervene and modes of intervention must be fully embedded, understood and applied in the context specific to particular countries, regions and international situations.⁴ There are no ready-made fast-track solutions. Knowledge and a thorough grasp of the complexity of root causes and interests involved in the conflict, time, adequate financing and the authority to apply innovative solutions to overcome stalemates are indispensable not to "buy" peace, but to create and stabilize the terrain and the conditions on which peace is going to be built, not by foreign intervention but by the parties themselves.

First of all, it is necessary to briefly contextualize the Mozambican case and the changes that took place in the country's politics and in the regional and international alignments. At the end of the 1980s, Mozambique had survived three decades of uninterrupted war and destabilization. It was, by any measure, the martyr country of Africa. The Mozambican conflict resolution became possible at the crossroad of a fundamental change in the international system dictated by the winding down of the Cold War.

³ United Nations, *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, New York, United Nations, 1995 (The United Nations Blue Book series ; 5).

⁴ Alex Vines and Dylan Hendrickson (eds.), *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*, cit.

Notwithstanding a heated and much politicized debate on whether the Mozambican case can be labeled a civil war or a war of destabilization, it is on the whole acknowledged that the causes and the development of the conflict were not solely the radical ideological opposition to the political choices of FRELIMO (*Frente de libertação de Moçambique*), aligned with the Soviet Union. Since the beginning of the 1960s, the national liberation and the antiapartheid struggles in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa had become a primary theatre of Cold War competition. Superpowers and neighboring countries⁵ vested political and ideological agendas had a primary responsibility in financing and supporting military and political, overt and/or covert dissident organizations and actions.⁶ Thus the war between the FRELIMO one-party State and RENAMO (*Resistência nacional moçambicana*) opposition supported by the minority rule government of Rhodesia, and after 1980 by apartheid South Africa, was embedded in the legacy of conflict between liberation movements and colonial and apartheid regimes.

As the end of the Cold War was approaching, the US and European priorities were to put an end to the militarization of Southern Africa in order to shelve the apartheid regime through a negotiated democratic process that would avoid a major deflagration in the country. The Lancaster House Agreement (1979) and the March 1980 elections brought an end to the white minority regime in Zimbabwe, through negotiated settlements under the umbrella of free market style democratization. It took another tragic decade of escalating wars to strike the first relevant success, the Namibia referendum (1989) that led to that country's independence through multiparty elections. The case of Namibia functioned internationally and regionally as a negotiation between the major players of the Cold War that paved the way towards an agreed fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa.⁷

The Mozambican government's decision to send the first accredited ambassador to the US at the end of 1982⁸ was a clear sign that the leadership of FRELIMO was becoming realistically aware of the changes dictated by the 1979 economic recession and by the election of Ronald Reagan to the US presidency. Economic realities, exacerbated by the "seca" (drought) that hit the country between 1981 and 1984,⁹ made matters more

⁵ The role of the South African regime commandos' murderous raids spanning the whole Southern African region and beyond is detailed in Peter Stiff, *The Silent War. South Africa Recce Operations 1969-1994*, Alberton, Galago, 1999.

⁶ Martin Rupiya, "Historical Context. War and Peace in Mozambique" and Fernando Gonçalves, "Ideological Shifts, Economic Imperatives: Southern African States and the Mozambican Peace Process", in Alex Vines and Dylan Hendrickson (eds.), *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*, cit., p. 10-17 and 18-25.

⁷ Chester A. Crocker mediated the negotiations between South Africa, Angola and Cuba that led to the New York agreements of 1988. These laid the foundation for the referendum and free elections for the independence of Namibia. See Chester A. Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa. Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood*, New York, W.W. Norton, 1992.

⁸ Valeriano Ferrão, *Embaixador nos Usa*, Maputo, Ndjira, 2007.

⁹ See João Paulo Borges Coelho, "Estado, comunidades e calamidades naturais no Moçambique rural", in Boaventura de Sousa Santos e Teresa Cruz e Silva (eds.), *Moçambique e a reinvenção da emancipação social*, Maputo, Centro de Formação Jurídica e Judiciária (CFJJ), 2004, p. 49-76. Borges underlines how the drought affected the rural areas making even more unworkable the policy of "socialização do campo". From 1983 Mozambique had to import basic foodstuffs and became a recipient of food aid coming from Western countries. The country's policy started to change because of this emergency. Similarly the severe

tragic and urgent. The application for membership to the WB and the IMF and the signature of the non-aggression Nkomati Treaty with South Africa on 16 March 1984, the erstwhile archenemy, followed rapidly.

With the demise of the Soviet Union, FRELIMO realized the need to use the government lines of credibility, especially with African friends as well as foes and European sympathetic countries, to have access to emergency aid and for a more decisive diplomatic support, while negotiating a new set of relations with the only remaining superpower: the United States.

The first of many secret meetings with RENAMO took place the same year. Both the internal and external parties to the conflict in the second half of the 1980s were reconsidering – slowly but firmly – their strategies in the light of the new emerging realities in Southern Africa and the world. Nonetheless, on both sides of the conflict various initiatives at the national, regional and international level towards a negotiated solution were not decisive to convince FRELIMO and RENAMO to openly accept the military stalemate and recognize that the only viable option was a bilaterally negotiated settlement. The intensification of diplomatic activity apparently did not help to ease the war; on the contrary the conflict reached its widest extent in 1986. And, on 19 October 1986, the government of Mozambique suffered a major blow when President Samora Machel was killed and with him many of his ministers and high officials, in a still not fully clarified aircraft crash on the border between South Africa and Mozambique. Machel was returning to Maputo after a regional summit with African leaders, that had been convened to seek the support of regional allies for a diplomatic solution to the country's crisis.

Joaquim Chissano, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, became President. Building on the still narrow overtures of the Machel era, Chissano cultivated better relations with the US as well as a relationship of trust with the Catholic and the Protestant churches. This meant the launching of an informal, and later on formal, church diplomacy persistently trying to build bridges between the two sides of the conflict. The government's bolder measures, such as the launch in January 1987 of a comprehensive economic and political reform process, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and the constitutional change (1990) that abandoned Marxism-Leninism as well as the single party regime in favor of a multiparty system and free elections, a free market and private property, civic and religious freedoms and a free press, were instrumental in winning financial and political support from several Western governments. But the reforms failed to convince RENAMO, which remained suspicious of liberal reforms administered and controlled by FRELIMO.

Although the US administration did not consider Mozambique a priority, the priority was South Africa, Herman J. Cohen, in charge of the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs (1989-1993) under President George Bush, and previously Senior Adviser for African Affairs to President Ronald Reagan, became a knowledgeable and efficient promoter of a policy of diplomatic intervention to push the Mozambican government towards liberal reforms. He worked mainly behind the scenes to round up consensus

drought that hit the country in the 1990's was a relevant factor in pushing the negotiations for the peace agreement.

and collaboration for a negotiated settlement from European and African interested parties alike.¹⁰ Although President Ronald Reagan had a soft spot for RENAMO he had always kept clear of any official endorsement. Not only, he gave his approval to the diplomatic effort in favour of negotiations accepting to receive President Chissano in 1988. Chissano was once again in Washington to meet President George Bush in March 1990. Cohen asserts that “the collaboration of two American presidents [Reagan and Bush] in helping Chissano break the political logjam in Mozambique [and] probably constituted the principal US contribution to this particular peace process”.¹¹

Regional powers too were seeking ways to promote a negotiated settlement. Pik Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, became very active in favour of negotiations, even though part of the South African military establishment continued to give support to RENAMO. Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe gradually came round to support negotiations. From the main regional and African ally of FRELIMO and provider of armed protection of the Beira corridor, Mugabe teamed up with Arap Moi of Kenya and Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, both friendly with RENAMO, to promote an African mediation to the conflict.¹² Foreseeing a turn to majority rule in South Africa, “Tiny” Rowland, chairman of the Lonrho conglomerate based in the United Kingdom and a supporter of RENAMO, offered his good offices and later a lot of money and logistical facilities to favour negotiations towards a settlement in order to protect his investments in the region.¹³

The liberation of Nelson Mandela on 11 February 1990 after 27 years of detention, followed by the opening of negotiations in the Multiparty Conference, signaled the foreseeable end of apartheid. But notwithstanding the scaling down of official South African military aid, RENAMO continued to demonstrate it was willing and capable of organizing major devastating attacks.

FRELIMO did not want to lose its hard won sovereignty by recognizing it could neither win the war, nor protect the population from murderous destructive attacks. Years of

¹⁰ See Herman J. Cohen, *Intervening in Africa. Superpower peacemaking in a troubled continent*, Basingstoke, Macmillan and New York, St Martin Press, 2000, p. 1: “The shackles of the East-West struggle no longer bound our hands in Africa”. According to Cohen, Mozambique had never really been an element in the US/Soviet competition, it was the issue of apartheid in South Africa that complicated the development agenda of the US. See also Victoria K. Holt and Michel G. Mackinnon, “The Origin and Evolution of U.S. Policy Towards Peace Operations”, in *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (February 2008), p. 18-34, <http://www.stimson.org/essays/the-origins-and-evolution-of-us-policy-towards-peace-operations>.

¹¹ Herman J. Cohen, *Intervening in Africa*, cit., p. 188. Cohen said also that “Our role as the world remaining superpower often makes the US imprimatur an essential contribution to a lasting settlement”. See Herman J. Cohen, *Peace-keeping and Conflict Resolution in Africa*, Statement before the Sub-Committee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington D.C., 31 March 1993, available in *US Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 4, No. 16 (19 April 1993), p. 260, <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1993/html/Dispatchv4no16.html>.

¹² Hasu H. Patel, “Zimbabwe’s Mediation in Mozambique and Angola, 1989-91”, in Stephen Chan and Vivienne Jabri (eds.), *Mediation in Southern Africa*, London, Macmillan, 1993, p. 117-142.

¹³ Alex Vines, “The Business of Peace: ‘Tiny’ Rowland, Financial Incentives and the Mozambican Settlement”, in Alex Vines and Dylan Hendrickson (eds.), *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*, cit., p. 66-74. Vines underlines how the stress on religious authority mediation has tended to obscure the central relevance of financial incentives both to build RENAMO’s confidence to step out of the bush and negotiate, and to make the settlement possible.

informal contacts had shown that a negotiation was impossible to arrange by the warring parties themselves. Distrust was running deep. FRELIMO never ceased to call RENAMO's members "bandidos armados", RENAMO never ceased to consider FRELIMO's government illegitimate.

RENAMO did not trust FRELIMO reforms towards democratization, but while proclaiming it took up arms in defence of democracy, the evidence was that the movement was supported by the more reactionary forces in Southern Africa and its actions were characterized by particularly grisly violence against the civilian population. Neither RENAMO nor FRELIMO was ready to relinquish arms without a strong credible guarantee that could only come from powerful third parties. To accept to sit at the table of negotiations implied for both FRELIMO and RENAMO that outside powers' self-interests became credible guarantees of the terms of a settlement. The road to negotiation required to find a "third party" mediator, which could be acceptable and trusted by both parties. The mediator could not be the US, nor any Western country previously involved in supporting one or the other side of the conflict, nor it could be an African power, be it Kenya and/or Zimbabwe, or Malawi, all involved in the various phases of the liberation struggles and suspected by one or the other side to harbour their own agenda; nor could it be Portugal, the former colonial power.¹⁴

Thus negotiations between two quite unequal parties – FRELIMO being a very united and organized party in power, supported by most of the relevant African countries and on the whole by most of the UN members; RENAMO considered to be a "contras" guerrilla movement known if only for its terrorist attacks – became a working reality only in 1990 as the Cold War came to a close, when following a skillful dynamic diplomatic effort, supported now also by the Soviet Union, a decision was finally taken by both sides to meet face-to-face. It was the beginning of a very difficult walk to peace. An arduous walk, which requested high diplomatic and political skills both at the Rome round table and on the field, in Mozambique and in the Southern African region.¹⁵

Through intensive talks in Rome and numerous rounds of negotiations, FRELIMO and RENAMO continued for a long time to be stuck in a game of deadlock, harboring deep mutual distrust, while attempting all along to advance their conflicting strategies to win exclusive political legitimacy.¹⁶ Up to the last day, when all protocols had been signed, the leader of RENAMO Dhlakama delayed his arrival in Rome threatening not to sign the final conclusive Accord. The signature, which was due on the 1st of October, was delayed to the 4th.¹⁷

¹⁴ In support of the relevance of Portuguese diplomacy in the peace process see Joaquim Chito Rodrigues, *Moçambique. Anatomia de um processo de paz. Contributo para a verdade*, Lisboa, ACD, 2006.

¹⁵ In Mozambique, very active and fundamental in resolving recurrent crisis was the action of the Italian Ambassador (since 1989) Manfredi Incisa di Camerana.

¹⁶ Tomás Vieira Mário, *Negociações de Paz de Moçambique. Cronica dos dias de Roma*, Maputo, Instituto superior de relações internacionais-Centro de estudos estratégicos internacionais (ISRI-CEEI), 2004.

¹⁷ Sérgio Vieira remembers that Dhlakama arrived in Rome with "Tiny" Rowland's plane. See Sérgio Vieira, *Participei, por isso testemunho*, Maputo, Ndjira, 2010, p. 723.

2. Mediation: confidence-building versus power diplomacy?

A “third party” mediation proved to be the winning solution: Italy with the unflinching support of the US, the Mozambican Catholic and Anglican and other Protestant Churches,¹⁸ whose quest for peace was strongly supported by the Community of Sant’Egidio, a movement of lay people started in 1968 in Rome. The combination integrated power diplomacy with confidence building.¹⁹ The Italian government appointed Mario Raffaelli as its representative, whose knowledge of Mozambican and regional politics and policies was deep and extensive.²⁰ Italy and Sant’Egidio made available a venue (in Rome), logistics, moral and financial support. While a galaxy of Italian aid workers or “cooperantes”, men and women who lived and shared the daily plight of the urban and rural people, voiced their yearning for peace.

At the time Italy was the main provider of aid and investment to the country. It also had a relevant cultural presence, which invested in human development through university cooperation and capacity-building programmes in sectors such as industry, transport, agriculture and service delivery in education and health. Missionaries and aid workers inevitably came in contact with RENAMO, mainly in the course of negotiations to save lives, to free kidnapped religious and civilian personnel, and to provide relief to all victims of the conflict. Theirs was a contribution to confidence building insofar as it helped to bridge the terrible divide of the civil war, to ease fears and prevent vendettas.

The mediation had vision, which was developed through the understanding of the different interlocking levels of the conflict. Critical were also the direct lines of communication not only with FRELIMO and RENAMO’s top brass and with the main power brokers in Southern Africa, Europe and the US, but also with the catholic and protestant churches on the ground, with a multitude of “cooperantes”, working in state services, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and entrepreneurs, and, above all, with grassroots Mozambicans. This aspect of confidence building, less known and less studied, is probably the most important. People of whatever persuasion were tired of war, wanted to go back to living a normal life. Death, displacement, destruction and violence had taken a tragic toll and the 4th October, when the peace accord was signed

¹⁸ Moises Venâncio, “Mediation by the Roman Catholic Church in Mozambique 1988-91”, in Stephen Chan and Vivienne Jabri (eds.), *Mediation in Southern Africa*, London, Macmillan, 1993, p. 142-159. See also Dinis S. Sengulane and James P. Gonçalves, “A Calling for Peace: Christian Leaders and the Quest for Reconciliation in Mozambique”, in Alex Vines and Dylan Hendrickson (eds.), *The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*, cit., p. 26-33, and Alex Vines and Ken Wilson, “Churches and the Peace Process in Mozambique”, in Peter Gifford (ed.), *The Christian Churches and the Democratisation of Africa*, Leiden, Brill, 1995, p. 130-147.

¹⁹ Roberto Morozzo Della Rocca, *Mozambique: Achieving Peace in Africa*, Washington, Georgetown University, 2003; Cameron R. Hume, *Ending Mozambique War. The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, Washington, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996.

²⁰ The four mediators were Mario Raffaelli, the Archbishop of Beira. Jaime Gonçalves, Andrea Riccardi and Matteo Zuppi from Sant’Egidio. The US, France, Portugal and the UK were there as observers. All possible stakeholders in the process had their representatives present throughout the process. On 4 October 1982 the GPA was signed at the presence of President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Masire of Botswana, the vice-president of Kenya, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs Pik Botha, the Malawian Minister in the Office of the President John Tembo and Ahmed Haggag, Assistant Secretary General of the UN.

was a day of joyous celebration. “Never again” was the slogan most heard on all sides.²¹

The lessons of the Mozambican mediation experience have helped advance and refine the theory and practice of mediation.²² Mediations are more likely to be successful if there is adequate institutional support founded on up-to-date information and effective lines of communications with all interested parties and supporters. Above all impartiality and neutrality must be maintained if the process is to be based on confidence building. Indeed, confidence building would have been neither attainable nor sustainable if the power diplomacies had not backed up the political will and skills of the mediators. The winning formula of the Mozambican mediation was confidence building coupled with power diplomacy. It was power diplomacy that ensured that the political arrangements in the GPA were not left in the vague or undefined and that democracy was to be supported by adequate political and economic incentives. Consensus was reached and maintained because of the willingness of third parties, superpowers, international and bilateral donors and their constituencies, to assure the support and bear the necessary costs.

Negotiations fail because adversaries do not have the guarantee that terms will be fulfilled, promises kept. Although Italy funded most of the Rome expenses, the US was always in the background throughout the negotiations. From “visiting supporter”, Washington eventually became an official observer providing essential financing and technical support to the peace process, ready all along to intervene with persuasive diplomatic tactics to convince the parties that the end of conflict and the easing of distrust would open an era of rewarding economic development backed by the US and Europe.

The UN was brought into the negotiations in August 1992 to participate in the commission responsible to supervise the implementation of the peace accord. This early involvement reinforced the commitment of the international community and proved to the parties the steady support of the Security Council. Thus when deployment of peacekeeping and political personnel started, the specific problems of the transition were well known. Pre-implementation aid for social and economic reforms, designed to soften the effects of structural adjustments, in particular on the side of service delivery, had been deployed since 1988.

The UN's early involvement in the process made for a better strategic assessment concerning the implementation mission. As a result, questions of socioeconomic instability were dealt with special attention. The lesson to be drawn is that a guarantee

²¹ See Carolyn Nordstrom, *A Different Kind of War Story*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997. Nordstrom book is on how the Mozambican survived violence and destruction and how they found innovative ways to “unmake the violence” and reconstruct their lives.

²² “Mediation is perceived mainly à la Kissinger, as “tough diplomacy”. Therefore, mediators are often appointed on the basis of their political status rather than their competence. A strict commitment to non-partisanship was one of the reasons of the success of Sant’Egidio”. Cfr Laurie Nathan, *Mediation in African conflicts: The gap between mandate and capacity* (paper presented at the Oslo forum Africa Mediators’ Retreat 2007, Zanzibar 23-25 April 2007), Geneva, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 23 April 2007, <http://www.hdcentre.org/publications/mediation-african-conflicts-gap-between-mandate-and-capacity>.

will only be as effective as the political will of its backers, as long as the commitment to bear the costs is not left undefined.

“Peace costs a lot of money”, “Tiny” Rowland used to say. Mozambique’s sustainable success, even with the problems experienced in these 20 years, proves that money was necessary to comply with the terms of the agreement on which confidence-building was based. A fair assessment of the asymmetry between FRELIMO and RENAMO was also essential. The former maintained sovereignty as the legitimate government of the country throughout the transition to the elections. The latter had to be enticed to come out of the bush and helped to become an organized legitimate party, able to participate in the democratic process.²³

The Mozambican case shows how long-term costs can be greatly reduced if integrated with peacebuilding measures to achieve lasting solutions. If we consider the cost-benefit analysis, twenty years of peace are worth the price.

3. The GPA: a “robust” guideline for peacekeeping and peacebuilding

The inspiring principle of the Accord was that it was owned by the Mozambicans and it was their will, determination and sense of responsibility that could make it work or fail. The Accord was a detailed document, backed by credible commitments to build a platform for implementation on which both parties could agree.²⁴ It was followed by the ONUMOZ implementation mission, which was deployed towards the end of 1992, not without political and bureaucratic wrangles and delays. The mission ended in 1995, after successfully monitoring the demobilization and reintegration of soldiers, and supporting institution building, the organization of the first multiparty elections, besides the coordination of humanitarian emergencies through the collaboration of a vast array of donors. The UN underwrote the mechanisms as well as the financial and organizational resources for the promotion of multiparty democracy, governance and economic reforms.

The GPA and its implementation are judged by all observers as one of the most successful post-Cold War peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes. Analysts agree on the elements that have contributed to it: timing, credibility, impartiality, and skill of the mediation team; alongside the coordinated institutional and financial support of the international donor community led by Italy, and supported by the US, UK, France, Germany, Canada, the Nordic countries, Switzerland and the Netherlands.

The GPA produced a “robust”²⁵ mandate for implementation that had the strong support of the then Secretary General of the UN, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, whose special

²³ Alex Vines, *RENAMO: from Terrorism to Democracy in Mozambique?*, Revised ed., York, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York in association with James Currey, 1996.

²⁴ See Richard Synge, *Mozambique. UN Peacekeeping in Action 1992-94*, Washington, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997. Synge points out that the main assets of the peace implementation were the fact that it was supported by a viable agreement, a credible formula, a closely monitored cease-fire and strong outside support. Less satisfactory, in his opinion, was the capacity building component.

²⁵ The concept of “robust peacekeeping” emerges later, in response to the failures of the UN in Rwanda and Bosnia Herzegovina. It is used here because the GPA represented a case of a strong detailed

representative Aldo Ajello proved to be exceptionally capable to walk the tight rope between the parties, easing differences and diffidence, finding inventive solutions to keep the process on track with flexible priorities on tasks and financing.

The implementation mission was supported by a vast array of international and bilateral donors, most of which knew the terrain thoroughly and were willing to contribute, not only in emergency situations, but also to lay the foundations for social and economic development. Last but not least, Mozambique was not a failed state. Though weakened by the war, the government proved capable of executing the tasks required by the GPA.

4. Organization hazards and UN Security Council willpower

The time of greatest uncertainty comes after the signing of a peace agreement. The Angolan parallel process, which had been under-funded and over-hyped, failed in the same days as the Mozambican was getting on track. Even if the GPA was an early example and a model of a “robust agreement” as later advocated in the Brahimi Report, the danger of failure loomed: bureaucratic and organizational problems at UN headquarters delayed the mandate of ONUMOZ, which was signed only on 3 December 1992. One of the lessons was how the UN budget approval process delayed the deployment of troops essential to carry out the monitoring of the ceasefire, the demobilization, and the departure of foreign troops from the Nacala, Beira and Maputo corridors, and the organization of multiparty competitive elections.²⁶ Without the deployment of the UN military component, the political component of the Accord was stalled, while the humanitarian efforts were rendered more difficult. The most vulnerable parts of the population could not be reached and the return and resettlement of the refugees and displaced populations was hindered.

The process was saved by the fact that the UN Security Council, the Secretary General and all the parties to the GPA were determined to deliver, and in continuity with the spirit of negotiations, got the parties finally to live up to their commitment to peace.

5. Ownership, coordination, flexibility and innovative financing

Aldo Ajello, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG), was given full responsibility for monitoring the implementation of the GPA. His tasks were to manage the input of the Secretariat, mobilize the support of the operational funds and programmes for humanitarian and development activities, and lead the team of

agreement supported by implementation measures which showed the necessary flexibility to work out a dynamic set of relationships among multiple actors, not only the signatories to the agreement, but all the stakeholders in the peace process.

²⁶ At the level of the UN headquarters, the relationship among the Security Council, the Peacebuilding Commission, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and the Peacebuilding Support Office remain inadequate to this day, judged by the UN itself not yet working in coordination and integration. Add to that, the peacekeeping burden has grown substantially. The budget of UN peacekeeping in 2010-11 stood at US dollars 7.83 billions, due not so much to the increase of civil wars but to the expanding nature of the peacekeeping mandate to peace-building activities.

autonomous specialized agencies. On the basis of detailed guidelines, with the support of Boutros-Boutros Ghali and negotiating skillfully with the concerned parties, first of all the government and RENAMO, the SRSG found flexible and innovative ways towards implementation, working in coordination with the donors to organize financial and material support.²⁷

Flexibility meant that rules and procedures had to adapt to reality in the field. It was necessary to raise RENAMO's stakes in the peace process, given the asymmetrical situation in which FRELIMO held the reins of the government and controlled state institutions, while RENAMO had to be supported in converting from armed guerrilla to a legal political party thus able to contest elections. The innovative instrument was the establishment of a trust fund of some 15 million US dollars, financed mainly by Italy and another trust fund for other parties' organizations.

Demobilized soldiers obtained monthly stipends for a two-year period, so that they could go back to civilian life with some savings to start a new life.

Elections that were scheduled to take place in 1993 were postponed by one year, as a result of the delay in deploying the 7,000 strong UN monitoring force for demobilization and integration of the two armies. Quick elections ignoring the context is a recipe for disaster. The basic principle here too was local ownership: all measures had to be agreed by the government and the RENAMO leadership, as more time was necessary to demobilize the soldiers, to involve the population, and to advance the process of reconciliation in the country at large through local initiatives.

Ajello's success in prioritizing goals and getting the parties to live up to their commitment to peace was largely due to his style of direction and coordination. Following the methodology of the Rome negotiations, decisions were taken in consultation with all parties. Grievances were balanced with commitments already made. Essentially and realistically, all the possible spoilers of the Accord were to be aware that the consolidation of democratization and the protection of human rights had little chance to progress without demobilizing armies, disarming troops, financing the return of soldiers to civilian life, transforming an armed movement into a legal and legitimate party, supporting civilian security through police and judicial reform, and local capacity-building for human rights and reconciliation. Also, the demilitarization of politics and society needed inventive financing and methods tailored to the reality at hand, as a prerequisite for organizing successful elections, refugee repatriation and the support for civil society reconciliation.

Overall, the Mozambican case provides insight into the complex interactions among outside actors during the peace implementation process. The humanitarian mission, led by the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC), which was to serve as an instrument of reconciliation, and to assist the return of displaced persons, was hampered by bureaucratic and financial problems, thus the capacity and willingness of donors to step in was an essential contribution to peacemaking and stabilization.

²⁷ Aldo Ajello, *Brasiers d'Afrique. Mémoires d'un émissaire pour la paix*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2010, p. 11-59.

International donor activism and financial support set a precedent in peacekeeping and peacebuilding.²⁸ For example, after extensive discussions with Mozambican government officials, donors decided to increase the resources available for demobilization by an additional 35.5 million USD, in order to extend cash payments to demobilized soldiers for other 12 months.²⁹ Government and donors worked together to facilitate the return of 1 million refugees from outside the country and 2 million displaced persons from within it. Flexible, intensive and coordinated efforts of major donors, all committed to making peace work, fostered mutual trust and lowered uncertainty, giving international actors a deep understanding of the priorities and conditions that were necessary to successfully establish peace in Mozambique.

6. Nothing is permanent: democratic consolidation needs a shared understanding of all stakeholders

Democratization was the key factor in the confidence building and Mozambique was one of the first cases in which donors provided relevant financial support for the establishment of viable political parties as a pre-condition of the organization of free and fair elections.³⁰

Highlighting the fundamental contribution of donors to the stabilization of peace through flexible, coordinated efforts to support the implementation of the peace accord activities, Carrie L. Manning³¹ considers bilateral donors to have been the most effective peacemakers. Most of them had a longstanding friendly relation with the FRELIMO government and were aware of the financial and resource constraints of the state. They insisted in investing in humanitarian as well as in development projects and in institution-building, laying the basis for the sustained post-war reconstruction of legitimate and effective governmental institutions. To date, donor contributions are essential for budget support, while aid continues to be indispensable to safeguard the livelihood of the most vulnerable. Private sector investments are increasing at a sustained pace, and considering their long term interests they could and should play a crucial role in a more equitable development, not only investing in good practices, but reaching a common platform to prod and/or support government reforms towards

²⁸ Aldo Ajello, "Mozambique: Implementation of the 1992 Peace Agreement", in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Olser Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.), *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*, Washington, United States Institute of Peace, 1999, p. 615-642.

²⁹ Sam Barnes, *Reintegration Programs for Demobilized Soldiers in Mozambique*, Maputo, United Nations Development Programme/Reintegration Support Services Report, March 1997.

³⁰ Thirteen countries, plus the European Commission (EC), contributed to that fund. Italy made by far the largest contribution, over 11 million USD. Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Norway contributed a combined total of over 1.96 million USD to RENAMO's trust fund (twice the contribution of the United States), with the Netherlands the fourth largest single contributor, second to Italy, the EC, and the United States. The contributions of these donors make clear how important these donors believed it was to secure RENAMO's full participation in the political process and the lengths to which they were willing to go to underwrite success.

³¹ Carrie L. Manning, *The Politics of Peace in Mozambique. Post-Conflict Democratization, 1992-2000*, Westport and London, Praeger, 2002; Carrie Manning and Monica Malbrough, "Learning the Right Lesson from Mozambique's Transition to Peace", in *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (July 2009), p. 77-91, <http://www.tfd.org.tw/docs/dj0501/077-092-Carrie%20Manning.pdf>.

improvements in labour legislation on working conditions, salaries and welfare provisions, in all economic sectors, not excluded the often marginalized agricultural sector.

Twenty years have passed since the signing of the GPA in Rome. Since then there have been no major disruptions to peace. The state has held on to its unity. Since 1994, multiparty national and administrative democratic elections have been held regularly. The government has promoted the most extensive privatization of state assets in Africa, while the economy is experiencing high growth rates and on the whole has continued to enjoy the confidence of donors and of an increasing number of investors.

The peace accord has been a success for what it was meant to accomplish: to end the war and stabilize a common ground for reconstructing the nation-state through a new economic and political strategy based on economic liberalization and representative democracy. The Mozambican case was a success mainly because of the exceptional circumstances provided by the end of the Cold War. But also because the mediators were capable of negotiating a credible formula of conflict resolution and the implementation was achieved through innovative and capable stakeholders. The success was also due to a strong, united, and authoritative external diplomatic and financial actors, including major and mid-sized powers, the United Nations, African regional actors, religious authorities, donors, international and non-governmental organizations. But above all it was a success because all the population, who had been the victim of a war it did not choose to wage, has consistently reacted with utter rejection and dismay to any threats to revert to conflict.

Nevertheless there is in Mozambique a pervasive disillusion with the rewards of these 20 years of peace. Recently RENAMO's leader Dhlakama has left Maputo for Nampula. He then retreated in the former guerrilla stronghold of Gorongosa threatening to resume war. He is protesting against the "occupation" of power by FRELIMO, claiming that the Peace Accord was never really respected and therefore that it should be renegotiated. Recently a bilateral commission was set up to discuss RENAMO's grievances. In reality very few are worried or believe that there could be a return to violence. RENAMO has been all the way certainly outmaneuvered by the more expert FRELIMO, but it is also the victim of its own lack of internal democracy. While FRELIMO has been skillful in strategies of reconciliation with former hostile forces, in the parliament and in the provincial polities the two parties have been locked in constant confrontation.

Internationally, and specifically after the 9/11 attacks, the priority has concentrated on security as a precondition of development. The Mozambican case sheds light on how the leadership and the population of a very underdeveloped country endorsed and were able to support a fair measure of democracy for more than 20 years. But, as evident from many interlocked episodes of violent protest and local conflict, it is high time to go to the root causes of political unease and social insecurity. When growth is not accompanied or followed by an adequate trickle down in the redistribution of resources, social conflict looms large.

Democracy in the Sub-Saharan Africa of the 1990s was endorsed as a new “revolution of rising expectations”. Similarly to the Arab spring, protests and revolts were against leaderships that had not been true to the hopes and the promises of independence. Now the legitimacy of the Mozambican government appears to be strong because the economy has been growing at a sustained pace, but what is worrying is the prevalent culture of “winner takes all”, a situation in which the trickle-down effects of economic growth are not felt by those who do not have or have limited access to the networks of power. The reality and the perception of growing inequality has already demonstrated in various occasions, in the capital and in the provinces, its disruptive effects on the national and local body politics. The unfair distribution of growth assets, not poverty *per se*, is the main cause of protest and revolts that could once again become politicized. And politicized inequality is more important than poverty in driving conflicts in the social and political body.

In Mozambique there is a wide-ranging and overt debate in academia, civil society, the donor community and the media concerning the consolidation of inclusive democratic stability and its functioning at the national and local levels. This debate is welcome if it calls for an honest assessment by the ruling party and the government on how democracy has been consolidating and on how rising inequalities came about and could be tackled.

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