CIAO DATE: 08/2008
August 2008
Human Rights & Human Welfare (University of Denver)
This paper argues that because institutions are different from individuals, we need different ethics in order to address the unique ethical risks associated with them. In particular, institutions run into unique ethical problems when no one individual is clearly responsible for an institutional outcome, what many scholars have called the “many hands” dilemma. The traditional approach to resolving such dilemmas has nevertheless been to attribute responsibility to individuals, either as persons or as agents. Since the traditional approach sets limits on the kinds of institutional ethical dilemmas that can be resolved, I turn to historical institutionalism (HI) in order to focus instead on the level of the institution as a step towards the case for holding international institutions accountable as institutions. HI can draw attention away from the detailed actions of individuals inside an institution, instead focusing attention on the evolutionary nature of the institution, making it difficult to change institutional practices. Based on this claim, in the second part I discuss two examples of institutions’ accountability structures and guidelines, the EU Code of Good Administrative Behaviour and the IMF Code of Conduct for Staff. By considering three different factors (location of the Code within the governance structure of the institution, relations with a public according to the Codes and language in the Codes), my objective is to show how these Codes illustrate the limitations of the traditional approach to the “many hands” dilemma. I close with a discussion of how this argument makes space for further research on institutional accountability.
Resource link: Can Historical Institutionalism Resolve the Limits of the 'Many Hands' Dilemma?: Institutional Accountability through the EU's and the IMF's Codes of Conduct [PDF] - 203K