1. INTRODUCTION:
THE STAGE IS SET. QUESTIONS AND ASSERTIONS. [1]

There is good reason to take a closer look at NATO. The former Cold War alliance has dominated the international arena for a considerable amount of time. Should NATO have been dissolved long ago? What are the reasons for NATO's revival? Not only is NATO expanding, it has also recently conducted a war in the very heart of Europe. What can this renaissance and hectic NATO-activity lead to? Many politicians, commentators and observers discern the development of a new cold war, not least because of the lack of Russian support for, and understanding of, NATO's bombings in the Balkans. In May 1999, a prominent Russian security expert alleged that "if NATO commits a mistake such as the bombings in Yugoslavia, there would be a risk of Russian retaliation with nuclear weapons.[2] Others, on the other hand, predict a collapse of the organisation as a whole because of internal disputes among the member states due to the extremely complex situation in the Balkans.

Some fundamental premises may, however, be established: ten years after the end of the Cold War, the most powerful military alliance in the world, NATO is more visible and more active than ever before. Its unchallenged leader is still the United States. Together, the USA, the remaining NATO allies and other American allies are responsible for approximately 85% of the world's total military expenditure. Furthermore, NATO has been engaged in a substantial military operation in the centre of the European continent. The German chancellor dubbed this operation "a political action with military means to obtain peace". It was a war which was not described as such, carried out by a defensive alliance not acting defensively.
Recently, NATO celebrated its 50th Anniversary. The celebration was characterised by the war, which is not a war. Efforts, however, were made to develop a sense of direction for the 21st century. Nothing less. The mantra was that "NATO, founded on the principles of democracy, individual freedom and the rule of law, remains the basis of our collective defence. It embodies the transatlantic link that binds North America and Europe together in a unique defence- and security partnership".[3]

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[2] Jyllandsposten, May, 12, 1999.

[3] Washington Summit Communiqué, April 24, 1999, Art. 1.

Why does a collective defensive alliance exist at a time when there is nothing to defend itself against? Why was NATO maintained when the Warsaw Pact, NATO's institutional counterpart during the Cold War, was abolished in 1999, thus to a very large extent removing the military threat to Western Europe? The Danish Defence Commission which recently concluded its work, determined as its security starting point "that Denmark currently enjoys a geo-strategic location with almost unprecedented security...in the next 10 years, there will be no direct conventional threat to Denmark" (Defense for the Future, 1998, p.7). This position is shared by many NATO-members as well as other Western European countries. There is no threat to NATO and an eventual, future menace is extremely distant.

It is often emphasised in literature pertaining to organisation-theory, that organisations have an inherent tendency to survive. The reason for this could be common inertia or narrow bureaucratic concerns for its individual organisational interests. But if this survival theory is valid, the end of the Cold War was exceptional. The collapse of organisations such as the USSR, the Warsaw Pact and COMECON was swift and effective. If the latter are the exceptions, then NATO could be the norm. It was not long before it was warned that NATO had to do something to ensure its survival. "NATO had", it was said, "to go out of area or out of business". The objective behind this statement must have been that the arguments justifying the continued existence of NATO were so weak that the assignment of new tasks was indispensable to its survival and perpetuation. As an organisation, NATO had foremost to secure its own survival.

However, another interpretation could be that amongst the NATO-members there were in fact vital interest in maintaining the alliance.
It could perhaps even be argued that if NATO did not exist today, it would be germane for the member states to invent it. There are good arguments substantiating this.

What, indeed, is NATO's fundamental purpose? Most analyses would point to NATO's first Secretary General, Lord Ismay's somewhat worn but precise statement that NATO has three purposes: to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down. Should one attempt to apply Lord Ismay's prescription to the present-day situation, one might say that NATO has three purposes: to keep the Americans in, the Russians attached and the Europeans together. The first purpose is identical, NATO remains the organisation that binds Europe and the United States. The second purpose,

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namely including Russia into a narrow partnership, is a novelty and so is the third, since the idea that not only Germany but also the new members should be bound by the narrowest possible military integration, represents a new and broader interpretation of NATO's raison d'être.

These considerations can be summarised as follows: it is the assertion that NATO will not only survive but will also gain strength. NATO is not only free of conventional military threats, it is also militarily superior, both regionally and globally. NATO's foremost purpose is to safeguard security and stability on the European continent with the United States as its leader. NATO has currently been conducting a comprehensive, asymmetric, "not-war" as a part of this effort to maintain European security. NATO is the most important display of the narrow transatlantic collaboration. NATO has spread to include all of Europe, its organisational network comprises even Russia and its tasks are of such importance that the organisation cannot be eliminated.

Consequently, the stage is set. But how can one argue for these view-points in an analytical fashion? What is NATO today? What will NATO's future be? How is this future connected to the international system of the 21st century? How can the current political events as well as the further developments be explained? It is the purpose of this article to answer these questions. The disposition will be as follows:

- First, a short characteristic of NATO and its position in the European security architecture.
- Next, a presentation and analysis of the results of the Washington Summit in April 1999.
- In addition, an examination of how much is new and what can be characterised as a continuity.
- Then an evaluation of the threats against NATO as an organisation.
- Finally, a contemplation of the future NATO based on considerations of the political, economic, societal and military/technological developments in the international system.

2. CHARACTERISATION OF PRESENT-DAY NATO

It is important to distinguish between two types of NATO: the NATO of the Cold War and the post-Cold War New NATO. In 1999, NATO has once again been rejuvenated, primarily in the areas of expansion and new missions.

The Continuous Expansion

NATO is an alliance of nineteen nations, established in 1949 by twelve Western European and North American countries. Since then there have been five waves of expansion: Greece and Turkey were admitted into the alliance in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982 and the GDR upon reunification with its Western neighbour was included in 1990. Finally, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were admitted in 1999. In addition NATO has expanded institutionally after the end of the Cold War, establishing a network with the surrounding non-NATO states. Termed the Partnership for Peace (PfP), this cooperation is both bilateral with NATO and multilateral through the EAPC. All European countries with the exceptions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro, Cyprus and Malta are affiliated with the PfP. As such, Europe has become NATO-ised.

More important perhaps, is that apart from being a PfP-partner, Russia was given its own special council in 1997, namely the Permanent Joint Council. This was set up by the significant NATO-Russia Agreement (The Founding Act) of May, 1997. The agreement was of course not an expression of Russian approval of the NATO expansion plans originally developed on American initiative in 1994. It was an institutional framework for cooperation in which Russia could realise that NATO had become a new NATO with new functions and tasks. Russia was to be closely tied to the alliance which would thereby also be rendered less antagonising.[4] The objective is that Russia and NATO cooperate to ensure a greater stability and security in Europe.[5] Similarly, an agreement has been concluded with the Ukraine whereby a NATO-Ukraine Commission was created. This arrangement is, however, less comprehensive than the partnership with Russia. Does this institutional expansion mean that Russia could become a member of NATO? In principle, yes. Nonetheless, geo-strategic reasons including the fact that Russia is not only the largest nation in the world but also a Euro-

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[4] See FKB, Appendix Volume 1, Appendix 2, p. 21.

[5] This work was put on hold due to NATO's military action in the Kosovocrisis.

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pean as well as an Asian power renders this implausible in the foreseeable future.

Which countries will then be the future members of NATO? There are two different groupings: On the one hand there are those who desire membership but who cannot immediately obtain it and on the other hand there are those who do not aspire to membership but who are eligible at present. The first group comprises those applicants currently being denied membership pending on further preparation through the Washington Summit's MAP-program. MAP (Membership Action Plan) includes NATO-help to individual, national preparation plans pertaining to political, economic, defence, security, legal, and resource aspects. In practice, MAP can be seen as a specification of NATO's accession criteria similar to the European Union's *Acquis Communautaire*, i.e. the EU's entire treaty foundation and legal obligations. The North Atlantic Treaty specifies in paragraph 10 that any European country can be invited into the alliance provided that it is able to promote the principles of the treaty and contributes to the security of the North Atlantic region. These criteria have now been extended into a comprehensive set of preconditions for the individual applicants, including organisational structure, political goals, defence configuration and strategic doctrines. These conditions are expressed in NATO's "legal fundament" and formulated in NATO's communiqués and in its strategic concept.

Within the first group of countries three subgroups were identified at the Washington Summit: The first subgroup of countries to be under consideration as members comprised Rumania and Slovenia in the South and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the North. The second is composed of Bulgaria and Slovakia. Finally, the third subgroup includes Macedonia and Albania.

The second group, which contains the countries which are politically close to fulfilling the NATO-criteria but which have not expressed any wish to join the alliance are Austria, Finland, and Sweden. These countries enjoy a special status in that they are all members of the PfP and the EU, being particularly active with respect to the Common Foreign and Security Policy- and defence dimensions of the EU as well as being observers in the Western European Union. When identifying potential future members of NATO, it is reasonable to assume that new members be found within this second group, regardless of a temporary sceptical sentiment due to the recent NATO-bombings.

And there will be further expansion. Why is NATO membership so desirable? There are several reasons for this, not least in the way NATO operates in light of its objectives.

Clearly NATO is an intergovernmental organisation and does not have a supranational feature similar to that of the EU. Nonetheless, NATO is also characterised by a drive to integrate, which served - and still serves - political ends. When Lord Ismay talked about "keeping Germany down," integration was precisely the means by which it was done: Germany had to be embedded. This was to prevent Germany from establishing its own independent military general staff with its own strategies and military doctrines. Furthermore, integration would ensure that in the event of war, NATO would function as a military entity. Integration thus served two purposes: binding the states together in times of peace, securing internal stability and an integrated, effective effort in crisis or war. This is even more valid for the New NATO.

With increased integration Article 5 has in reality become more binding. This article proclaims that an attack on one nation shall be considered an attack on all. The article does not necessarily commit the members to assist militarily. However, with as strong an integration as is established by NATO, it would be difficult to avoid offering military assistance.

In the New NATO no attack is expected and thus the internal integration principle has become more visible and important. Similarly to the way the EU binds the European states politically and economically, NATO must bind the Euro-Atlantic area militarily and with respect to security goals. But the shape of the two organisations is different: in principle NATO remains an intergovernmental organisation regardless of the fact that practice is based on comprehensive organisational integration. In contrast, the EU
practises increased supranational decision-making, regardless of the fact that the member states officially state that the EU is based upon agreements between fully sovereign states.

We are thus able to conclude that we are witnesses to an ever-growing NATO, a NATO which is expanding, becoming stronger, being given new missions, becoming more flexible, continuously adapting to new political conditions. How did this adaptation manifest itself at the Washington Summit in April 1999?

3. THE NEWS FROM THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT, 1999

The Washington Summit in April 1999 was intended to be a celebratory occasion, commemorating the 50th Anniversary of NATO. Simultaneously, the hitherto largest and most important wave of expansion was to be
solemnised. However, the summit was largely characterised by the unique situation of NATO's involvement in a war. Against this background, the issue of adaptation to the present political conditions became particularly relevant. These circumstances were expressed in a series of declarations and decisions, notably the communiqué from the Summit, the Washington Declaration signed by the heads of state, the Kosovo Declaration, the Membership Action Plan, NATO's strategic concept, the Secretary-
General's conclusions from the EAPC Summit in Washington, the declaration of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, and finally NATO's Defence Capability Initiative.

The communiqué stresses that "The NATO of the 21st century begins today, a NATO which retains the strengths of the past and has new missions, new members and new partnerships" (Article 4). What is new concerning NATO's missions and NATO's visions? New is primarily the alliance's strategic concept, marked by changes as well as continuity. The back-
ground is, however, conflict and consensus between the members.

The Strategic Concept: Conflict and Consensus
NATO is an organisation which, when viewed from the outside, is cha-
racterised by overall consensus. NATO has managed to step forward in the
international arena with great leverage, based on unanimity. But internally
there has been–and will continue to be–grave conflicts. An explanation for
this may be found in the organisation's structure and composition. It
encompasses two continents. The American superpower stemming from
one continent preserves the security of the other continent and is the born
leader. In Europe the alliance includes a military great power (UK), a poli-
tical great power (France) and an economic great power (Germany) as well
as a number of smaller states. This composition, with its diverse interests,
priorities and possibilities, makes the alliance prone to internal disagree-
ments and conflicts. In other words, there is a line of conflict between
Europe and the United States. In addition, there are also–and to an equally
great degree–lines of conflict between the European powers. Interestingly
enough, these intra-European lines of conflict are deeply connected to the
level of dependence on the United States.

In the Euro-American line of conflict, four major areas of conflict can be
identified. First and foremost are the questions pertaining to the nature of
new threats and risks and what NATO's new tasks should be as well as
what they should encompass in terms of content and geographic dimension.
Secondly, how should NATO's European pillar be defined, what should it
include, and what degree of independence should there be? Thirdly, how
will the burdensharing problem between Europe and the United States be
solved? And finally, in a long term perspective, should NATO be an organi-
sation that merely safeguards regional security or should it assume more
globally oriented responsibilities? These areas are extremely sensitive, and
bear the mark of the European reluctance to comply with American
dictums, ever-changing American political priorities coupled with fear of
the fluctuating level of American engagement, and recognition of the inter-
nal inability to present a united European policy or strategy. In addition,
these areas are characterised by the United States' aversion against enga-
ging herself in incalculable nationalistic and ethnic conflicts in Europe, and
the American annoyance at the European lack of will to establish the neces-
sary military capabilities.

These contradictions have left their mark on the Washington Summit and
on the strategic concept.

Changes and Continuity

First, a look back. In passing the strategic concept in November, 1991, NATO undertook major changes. First and foremost, unlike during the Cold War, the strategic concept was presented openly and officially. Secondly, it was a strategy that all countries, including France that previously had its own strategic concept, could adhere to. Thirdly, there was a perception that the earlier strategic principles such as flexible response, forward defence, and brinkmanship, were no longer relevant. Threats were replaced by security challenges and risks, enemies became partners and massive, armed conflict became conflict management, and conflict prevention. Indeed, although collective defence remained the primary aim of the alliance, dialogue and cooperation had become central issues.

This line has naturally been followed through. Large parts of the new strategic concept repeat–or are congruent with the 1991-concept and can therefore be termed an upgrading of the 1991-concept. Nonetheless, there are decisive new additions to the concept pertaining primarily to the purpose and missions of the alliance.

This process had been put forward, partly by the striking official declarations and partly by political practice. While the strategic concept was being discussed and received its final shape, NATO was engaged in a military action–which can hardly be described as anything but a war–which had been brought about without mandate from the United Nations, as part of the humanitarian intervention in the Balkans. Indeed, although the UN Security Council had sent clear signals to Serbia that its non-respect of human rights and practice of ethnic cleansing was unacceptable, it had been impossible to reach consensus on what countermeasures to adopt.

Some declarations characteristic of the debate leading up to the formulation of the strategic concept must now be presented. The U.S. Under-Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott[6] asserts that NATO's missions would have to be in accordance with the principles and goals of the UN and the OSCE. He adds, however, "at the same time, we must be careful not to subordinate NATO to an international body or compromise the integrity of its command structure….the alliance must reserve the right and the freedom to act when its members, by consensus, deem it necessary".

Striking manifestations have also been formulated in bearing with a North Atlantic Parliamentary Assembly (NAA) resolution, November, 1998.

According to this, the governments should "seek to ensure the widest international legitimacy for non-Article 5 missions and also stand ready to act, should the UN-Security Council be prevented from discharging its purpose of maintaining international peace and security". Furthermore, the UN Charter is evoked with respect to the right to individual and/or collective defence and it is asserted that it includes "defence of common interests and values, including when the latter are threatened by humanitarian catastrophes, crimes against humanity, and war crimes".

New Missions and Roles
The strategic concept is more carefully formulated than the NAA resolution. The concept is prone to multiple interpretations and characterised by the need for compromise. But the purpose cannot be misinterpreted: NATO is viewed as a larger and more substantial organisation with a larger area of responsibility. Indeed, while Article 14 of the Charter affirms, upon France's adamant insistence, that the main responsible for themaintenance of the international peace and security is the Security Council, a qualification was added concluding that NATO "as such plays a crucial role in contributing to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area". The determining factor is precisely that the strategic concept insists that NATO has the main responsibility for this "Euro-Atlantic area". The notion; "Euro-Atlantic area", is indeed important as it is present throughout the strategic concept without ever being clearly defined. The crucial element is the reference to the will and possibility to independently carry out "non-Article 5 crisis response operations".

An essential point is made in Article 48 of the strategic concept which asserts that "the maintenance of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area is of key importance. An important aim of the alliance and its forces is to keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises at an early stage. In the event of crises which jeopardise Euro-Atlantic stability and could affect the security of the alliance members, the alliance's military forces may be called upon to conduct crisis response operations. They may be called upon to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security by conducting operations in support of other international organisations, complementing and reinforcing political actions within a broad approach to security".

The grand openings are imbedded in these formulations for the new, inde-

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[6] www.unausa.org/issues/sc/simma.htm, p.12

pendently operating NATO within the broadly defined "Euro-Atlantic area". Indeed, what is new here is that there are no explicit requirements for a UN-mandate when "crisis response operations" are to be carried out within the Euro-Atlantic area. These operations would typically be conducted outside the member state's territory. With the deliberate choice of words used in the compromise, the road is open for an entirely new, independent role for NATO as a peacemaker with military resources.

Again, it is characteristic that a sense of continuity from the former strategic concept to the present is sought. The concept "a broad approach to security" is the essential and driving element in the 1991-doctrine. It deals with economic, social, and political difficulties as well as ethnic and territorial conflict in the immediate area. But the 1999 concept is far more comprehensive in that religious conflicts, incomplete or unsuccessful attempts at reforms, the violations of human rights, the dissolution of states, and crises which lead to human suffering or conflict have been added. It is precisely these types of incidents which will affect the security of the alliance and of the Euro-Atlantic area which NATO can now interfere in. Article 49 stresses that the alliance-forces are confronted with a complex and diverse spectrum of actors, risks, situations, and requirements, including humanitarian catastrophes. This demands special preparations, forces, training, and command structures all of which are dealt with in the strategic concept.

Furthermore, the concept is also new to another area: any reference to the strategic balance which could hint at a revival of the East-West conflict is gone. Russia is a partner which must be kept as close to the alliance as possible. When balance is mentioned it refers to the relationship between the United States and Europe, i.e. to burdensharing between the two regions of the alliance. The burdensharing problem was also on the agenda in 1991, when negotiations on the establishment of the European Union were at their peak. In the 1991 concept, the references to the European Security and Defence Identity, to the role of the WEU, and the strengthening of the European pillar within NATO were numerous. This was considered a positive European contribution to burdensharing.

Europe–USA
The alliance has always rested on two pillars–the American and the European. But it has always been the European part which needed protection or securing and USA has always been the dominant part. This asymmetry entails conflicts and disagreements. Occasionally, it also leads to European

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initiatives in the direction of greater autonomy or even independence. The Western European Union (WEU) has in different instances, notably during the 1980's, been a manifestation of this policy. The outlook after the Cologne Summit in June 1999 indicates that the WEU has been reduced to an almost empty shell and that the EU will attend to the WEU practical tasks, which until now have been limited. These tasks are mentioned in the Amsterdam Treaty: they primarily concern humanitarian actions, which can include military peacemaking operations. In practice, it is likely that NATO will be behind any larger military operation in Europe in many years to come.

What else is new in 1999? The description of relations between the two constituent parts, the European and the American, is far more detailed. It is characteristic that European integration within the EU has developed dramatically in the 1990's with the expansion, the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties and the establishment of the EURO-land; all processes that have been strongly supported and promoted by the United States. There has also been a number of substantial initiatives to strengthen the ESDI, not least the Franco-British proposal at the St. Malo-meeting in December 1998, leading up to the comprehensive decisions of the European Council in December 1999 in Helsinki.

Despite this "process of Europeanisation," NATO stands out as the organisation which has gained the most. NATO is not about to split into an American and a European part; this point was clearly made by the use of the terms "Euro-Atlantic area" and "Euro-Atlantic peace and security". It is obvious that Europe must take greater responsibility and bear a greater burden as it is after all in the European area–not the North American area–that security problems arise. A central formulation in the strategic concept does, however, illustrate how the nineteen countries understand EU-NATO relations. After mentioning the important steps taken by the EU towards a strengthening of its security and defence dimension, it is professed in Article 17 that, "the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) includes the progressive framing of a common defence policy. Such a policy as called for in the Amsterdam Treaty, would be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the Washington Treaty".

The clear juxtaposition of and connection between the EU's CFSP and NATO's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) are new and exem-

plify the future complex relationship between the two organisations. It more than hints to the fact that NATO has the superior position in matters of European security and defence. In this respect it is characteristic that the 1991-formulation stating that, "the presence of the United States'conventional and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe which is inseparably linked to that of North America", remains unaltered in the new strategic concept.

A Global Role

In the prelude to the Washington Summit, there were many indications that certain American interests pointed to greater global responsibility for NATO. Would NATO evolve into a globally oriented security organisation? Should NATO become a universal policeman, a GLOBO-COP? An evolution in this direction has generally been obstructed by the Europeans. Indeed, Europe is not ready to be drawn into the United States' globally oriented policy. In the outcome of the negotiations certain concessions are made to the Americans, specifically with regards to the broader definition of the area of responsibility. The term "periphery of the Euro-Atlantic area" and the lack of stability and predictability of this area are mentioned numerous times. But there are no allusions to an actual, global role of fundamentally greater dimensions than that already established in the 1991-paper. In the latter, global issues such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the disruption of the flow of vital resources, terrorism, and sabotage were mentioned. In the 1999-version, however, a number of new issues such as organised crime, and the "uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts" were added.

The new strategy demonstrates NATO's capacity to adapt to the new international environment in that, while building on the founding principles of NATO, priorities with respect to tasks and missions have been allocated in an entirely new fashion. In this way, NATO's own interpretation namely that the new strategy, is "an updating which is in accordance with the alliance's new security environment"[7] is reasonable. The support for the broad concept of collective defence and for NATO as the transatlantic link is stressed. The alliance has the will, the strength and the capability to safeguard and increase the stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic area. This will be done through partnership and dialogue including close cooperation with Russia, and by the development of forces that are "deployable, sustainable, survivable and able to engage effectively".[8]

Returning to the introduction: the strategic concept can be interpreted as a fulfilment of a simplified version of NATO's purpose, namely to keep the Americans in, the Russians attached and the Europeans together. A means by which this is done is, for example, to intervene militarily out of humanitarian concerns, based on the shared values which constitute European cohesion.

Result

To summarise, it must be noted that the 1991 doctrine was the inception of the new concept. Indeed to a very large extent, the old wordings have been used as the starting point but part of the compositional structure is preserved. But clearly, a new set of priorities are emerging. Ritual invocation of Articles 5 and 6 pertaining to the collective defence and to the concept of an-attack-on-one-is-an-attack-on-all, as well as to the basic concept of remote nuclear deterrence occurs. The central point of the alliance is, however, its capacity to adapt to meet the demands and challenges of the 21st century. In this new security environment, there are two central relationships which make a difference. First of all the enlargement, both in terms of membership and in terms of the organisation which, in and of itself, has a stabilising effect won through military integration. Secondly, the decision to intervene in crises and conflicts which do not specifically threaten the territorial and military integrity of the member states, but which do pose a serious threat to the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. In addition, the possibility and ability to carry out such an intervention independently and without the clear mandate of the United Nations or the OSCE is fundamentally new. In short: the strategic concept is first and foremost a strategy for non-Article 5 operations and missions, planned and carried out by NATO.

Operational Alterations

In addition to the aforementioned changes, the Washington Summit brought about a number of operational modifications. Amongst these was the launching of the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) in which it is stipulated, that NATO will continue to have the capabilities to counter massive aggression. But the probability of such a threat is minimal and the warning time is long. Potential threats arise from regional conflicts, ethnic feuds, and other crises outside territories of the NATO-members. To this must be added the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. Future NATO military operations, primarily non-Article 5 operations, will be less

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[7] Communiqué NAC-S(99)64, art.5

[8] Ibid

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comprehensive and take longer time than the operations planned during the Cold War. What must now be relied upon is cooperation with partner countries and other non-allied nations, based on NATO-procedures and infrastructures. This puts special demands on NATO and the member countries, especially with respect to interoperability and standardisation.

In addition, there is greater need for rapid deployment of considerable forces outside NATO-territory and the means and capability to maintain these forces for long stretches of time. Effective command and control, and information systems will also become necessary. It is therefore necessary to strengthen the development of these forces and structures amongst the NATO-members. To promote and oversee the implementation of these processes the High Level Steering Group (HLSG) has been established.

Another important factor is, as previously suggested, relations to the partner countries. Partner relations are dealt with within the framework of for example EAPC, which was created in 1997 and which contributes to political consultations and practical cooperation amongst members and partners. The purpose is to a very large extent, transparency in the political and military processes of the participants as well as the establishment of confidence by way of ever closer security and military integration. Furthermore, peacekeeping, humanitarian and de-mining operations, control of the transfer of "small" weapons, and the coordination of humanitarian aid are also being dealt with within the framework of EAPC. In addition, the importance of the PfP must stressed; not least the part of the cooperation which is dubbed "enhanced" PfP. Within the framework of this program, fifteen partner countries have participated in IFOR and SFOR missions in Bosnia. The Partnership Staff Officers work effectively in joint training sessions or in NATO-lead PfP operations. Enhanced PfP has also been the basis of NATO's operations in Albania and Macedonia.

The great advantage of the PfP-activities is that the stronger the cooperation, the smaller the difference between actual membership and maximum PfP-association. This can be–and is–perceived in different ways. Seen from certain perspectives, PfP is the optimal political solution, as PfP-association for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic States, and the CIS-states will not have as negative an effect on Russia as actual membership. However, seen from the aspiring members' perspective, it could be perceived as a way to unnecessarily prolong or even halt the process of enlargement.

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NATO after Washington

The Washington Summit must therefore be characterised as a substantial step in the direction not only of consolidation of the New NATO which was founded in the aftermath of the Cold War, but also as an indication that what emerges is a NATO that has been radically renewed in certain key areas. NATO now affects Europe as a whole. NATO is the 21st century's most essential security organisation, not only because of its functions and capabilities, but also because of its close ties to other significant organisations such as the EU, the WEU, the OSCE, the UN and the UN Security Council, G7-G8, and the Contact Group. In the majority of these cases there is in fact overlapping membership amongst NATO and the aforementioned organisations. NATO currently contributes substantially to crisis management and crisis prevention in Europe. In addition, NATO's European pillar is being further developed as is the process of enlargement and association within PfP, especially with respect to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Sweden, and Finland. Moreover, NATO's role in the Balkans is absolutely central and vital. At the Washington Summit, important meetings took place amongst the five NATO-members in the region

and Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

NATO's existence can therefore be seen as an essential factor in the establishment of European security and stability and in the effort to overcome the Cold War's partition of Europe. But is not precisely the opposite happening, caused by NATO's visions and missions? How can a war carried out by NATO create security and stability? By all appearances, the division of Europe between on the one hand NATO and its members, and on the other hand Russia, seems greater than ever. How does this pertain to security and stability in a "whole and free" Europe? And how is the situation within NATO itself where the different political priorities, first and foremost between the United States and the majority of the European states, and secondly amongst the European members, with the more activist Great Britain in discord with the more appeasement minded countries such as Greece, Italy and partially, the new member states?
These consequential questions will be reviewed in the following paragraph. Being one of the prerequisites for answering these questions, we will first analyse the concrete threats against NATO as a regional organisation.

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4. THREATS AGAINST NATO AS AN ORGANISATION

In the introduction, a series of considerations pertaining to the value of well-known organisational theories that there is an inherent tendency amongst organisations to survive regardless of the fact that their functions are no longer relevant were presented. Both the general interests of organisations and narrow bureaucratic interests can be at stake. The latter will stand in opposition to overarching political and distributive interests or to political demands from competing projects or organisations, desiring that the resources of the obsolete organisation be redirected in their direction. What type of organisation is NATO? Is it a common allianc, which following the disappearance of a collective enemy is looking for new justifications for its continued existence? Or has NATO in reality become a collective, regional security alliance or organisation?

Collective Defence or Collective Security
What is the difference? Collective defence is based on a defensive alliance with a "one for all–all for one" principle, which implies that an attack from the outside on a member is an attack on all members. Collective security on the other hand, is based on the existence of a form of regional or interna-

tional community which provokes collective action if someone in the community appears as a regional or international aggressor or violator of international law. The reaction of the international or regional body will therefore be action against this violator. The result becomes an "all against one"-action. The usual way of illustrating the difference between collective defence and collective security is precisely the difference between NATO and the UN. It must be added, however, that apart from being built on the idea of collective security, the UN is also open for the possibility of collective defence. It is characteristic that the North Atlantic Treaty refers specifically to the UN Charter's paragraph 51 pertaining to the right to individual or collective self-defence.

There is, of course, room for many interpretations. But the perception that NATO has moved from being a collective defence organisation to becoming a collective security organisation is not entirely deceptive. Perhaps it even contains valuable explanation possibilities. But there are problems with these explanations, such as the fact that the UN will probably never succeed in functioning as a collective security organisation as the UN Charter intended. Indeed, the latter presupposes the existence of an effective security council with an effective military commission, disposing of substantial military forces which are in principle stronger than those of the individual state and are in advance put at the disposal of the council and the military committee. If one were to point to one mission carried out on behalf of the United Nations, it would have to be the Gulf War 1990-1991. But the United Nations was not conducting war; rather it was a coalition led by the United States acting as an entrepreneur for the UN. Likewise, it must be stressed that NATO was never exclusively a collective defence organisation, rather as we have seen, it had other tasks and functions. As such, neither the UN nor NATO can be viewed as identical to the two ideal types of organisations or alliances presented previously.

Threat: The Missing Threat
If we were to look at the threats against NATO, i.e. that are able to threaten NATO's existence as an organisation, the first realisation would have to be that the greatest threat is precisely the lacking military threat. The rationale behind any defensive alliance would under normal circumstances be a concrete or potential threat from one or more states. In 1949 NATO was to a very large extent established to meet the threat posed by the Soviet Union, although this threat is not mentioned explicitly in the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO's counterpart, the Warsaw Pact that had an entirely different politi-

cal background and construction, was only established in 1955 as a reaction to West Germany's admittance into NATO. Nowadays, not only has the Soviet empire disappeared and with it the Warsaw Pact–the Soviet Union has also disintegrated. Why then, does NATO still remain?

The answer has to a large extent already been given above. First of all, apart from being a defensive alliance NATO is also an organisation promoting peace and stability within the alliance. The decisive tool is the security and military integration and the increased interdependence. Secondly, and as a result of the former, NATO also adopts the characteristics of a collective security organisation, organisationally enlarged to cover all European states and thereby establishing a special Euro-Atlantic identity, expressed in EAPC decisions and through NATO's CSDP. Thirdly, NATO is, in accordance with the postmodern societal evolution and with the New World Order, established at the close of the Cold War. It constitutes a world order and a societal structure in which no direct military threats aimed at the member states can be identified but which identifies the rise of indirect threats in NATO's immediate surroundings, characterised by instability, chaos, human suffering, oppression, and violations of human rights.

Threat: Internationalisation?

In the long term, another threat against NATO could be the general tendency toward increasing internationalisation and globalisation. Does an internationalised world leave room for narrow regional, intergovernmental organisations? The problem is not the challenge posed by the United Nations, the organisation whose international coverage is the largest due to the fact that in the case of the UN, internationalism is intimately linked with the notion of the nation-state. The UN must therefore be understood as an institution which itself is threatened by other globally oriented organisations, including private transnational groups. It should rather be viewed in the context of the evolution of the postmodern society, which increasingly points to the individual as a decisive political, economic, social and security actor.

Even if NATO is, in principle, an intergovernmental organisation, the above evolution has shown growing influence on the part of the individual, not least because NATO is composed of countries which stand out as the best when it comes to respecting the New World Order's globalised and general values of democracy, market economy, human rights and personal freedom. Seen from this perspective and in the context of the striking policy currently pursued by NATO in the Kosovo crisis where military intervention is

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justified solely by references to violations of human rights, ethnic cleansing, and expulsion, it must be said that NATO has overtaken a number of UN obligations and responsibilities.

All in all the question is answered negatively; globalisation and internationalisation in the broad sense do not threaten NATO as an organisation. On the contrary, NATO has proved capable of adapting to the circumstances in the new international system and the New World Order, which to a great extent seems to encourage regionalisation. Indeed, regionalisation on the institu-
tional plan appears to be rewarded and it does pay to be a NATO member.

Threat: Division through the WEU or the EU?
The third threat against NATO could in the first instance appear crucial. It is the threat that NATO could disintegrate or split if the WEU or the EU become established as independent defence organisations. Should this happen, it would probably be the end of NATO. This fact is caused by the following circumstances: one of NATO's purposes is to be a transatlantic forum and the only organisation of importance linking the USA and Europe. The United States primarily is responsible for Europe's security, not the other way around.

However, it is not apparent that such a threat will materialise. During the "coldest" years of the Cold War in the mid-1980's, there were visions of equipping the WEU with a European army as a manifestation of an independent, militarily strong Europe which could appear as a counterpart to the Unites States. However, with the end of the Cold War, the reunification of Germany, and the enlargements of the EU and NATO these visions have disappeared. NATO will not split up into two independent parts. The end result will be a European Union able to conduct minor military operations as part of humanitarian interventions. Basically, however, the EU remains subordinate to NATO in all vital issues involving security policy and the use of military forces.

The construction which is currently being developed is an outgrowth of the European security and defence dimension framework of NATO. There is no question of a European wish to free herself from the overarching American responsibility in safeguarding European security. Indeed, as previously mentioned, the vital importance of the American conventional and nuclear

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presence in Europe has been emphasised (100.000 troops, airborne nuclear weapons). It is therefore a clear indication from Europe to the United States that Europe is willing to alter the internal balance in the US-European relationship with respect to the disbursements and payments to the alliance. The burdensharing problem thus once again haunts.

The Anglo-French proposal to concretise the European defence identity must be seen in light of this. The proposal was entered into the conclusions of the European Council Summit in Vienna in December 1998. The background for this development is the decisions made at NATO's Berlin Summit in 1996 which included the possibility of a European NATO Commander and NATO headquarters for WEU-run operations in the context of an adjusted CJTF-concept.

The following decisions were reached at the Washington Summit:

-       That a strengthened ESDI is developed within NATO in view of
         crisis management.

-       That NATO enters into direct cooperation with the EU with
         regards to this.
-       That European crisis management will take place within NATO
         as crisis management operations through the EU, in practice
         will be utilising NATO-resources.

These provisions do therefore not point in the direction of a European army. Indeed, regardless of the fact that the WEU has been strengthened in certain areas such as the establishment of a military commission, the WEU will soon be incorporated into the EU either as an independent fourth pillar in the EU or more probably as a part of the second pillar, namely the Common Security and Foreign Policy. When this incorporation takes place, the EU's possibilities of acting in matters of defence-policy will probably be limited to purely humanitarian interventions. Under any circumstances, recent developments illustrate that the European NATO-members, most of which are also EU members, have increasingly demonstrated their willingness to manage internal crisis problems while NATO remains the general framework within which this is done.

There are several reasons for this evolution. First, there is the conclusive structural reason that the United States remains the superior guarantor of

European security. Secondly, the technological gap between the United States and Europe where one might claim that the USA is five to ten years ahead of Europe is growing. This signifies that European defence industries have great problems. Finally, the American defence expenditure is increasing and is nearly double the average European NATO-members' contribution in terms of percentage of GDP. This means that Europe will continue to be dependent on the United States with respect to lift capacity precision weapons and with respect to information- and intelligence gathering capacity.

Threat: Renationalisation?

The possibility of a renationalisation of the defence amongst individual NATO-members could challenge or threaten NATO as an organisation. As it stands, precisely the military integration is of vital importance to NATO. This integration takes place through common staffs, common infrastructure, common procedures, common training, and multinational corps, all processes that create transparency and foster mutual trust. Indeed, integration is one of NATO's distinctive features and one of its most important rationales. There have been growing tendencies in Germany towards a cer-

tain renationalisation. This is however, a product of the natural adaptation to a new normal, reunified Germany without the former East-West related limitations.

In practice, the development has gone in the opposite direction: increased integration and increased practical cooperation. This is primarily caused by the organisational expansion to the East, not only in terms of new member states that are bound to the NATO structure, but also through PfP, enhanced PfP, and EAPC. In addition, countries such as Spain that have hitherto stood outside the integrated command structure are now participating fully. Similarly, France is moving in the direction of full adherence. This indicates that the threat of renationalisation seems highly implausible.

Threat: Expansion?

An enlargement of NATO could be interpreted as a threat to the survival of the organisation. Indeed, enlargement could weaken the organisation simply by virtue of the fact that the greater the number of members, the smaller the sense of cohesiveness, communality, and common identity. On the surface it is difficult to refute such an assertion. However, one could ask the following question: Would it not constitute an even greater threat if NATO did not enlarge? Here, the argument would be that in the New World Order with only one superpower and where NATO has no enemies, the

maintenance of the Atlantic-Western European NATO would constitute an anomaly. It would be abnormal to preserve an exclusively Western European NATO-membership in a situation where the United States as the alliance's uncontested leader, would continue to cover the Western European part solely and refuse to spread its coverage to include all of Europe.

In addition, it is not clear that an enlargement would necessarily dilute the alliance. Both in theory and in practice, it appears that widening and deepening are compatible processes and it is thus possible in one way or the other to include more states in NATO while simultaneously increasing the level of integration. This is illustrated by the requirement of the special "NATO-acquis" which has been expressed in the MAP-project.

Threat: The Russian Influence?
An additional threat can be identified, namely that a disproportionately sized Russian influence could weaken NATO and perhaps even threaten its existence. The starting point here is the claim that through the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) also referred to as the NATO-Russia council, a possibility has been created for Russia through consultations to have direct influence on NATO's vital decisions. This problem was raised by the former U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. However, given the recent experiences with the PJC it is difficult to draw such conclusions. In fact, it is quite the opposite. Indeed, in protest against NATO's war against Serbia, Russia has suspended her participation in the Council. The threat could therefore rather be constituted by a lack of Russian influence in NATO. By loosing Russia in the process of cooperation, NATO would to an increasing extent be characterised as a "Cold War vitalisation-alliance", which could ultimately break the alliance.

The primary problem is therefore how to strengthen the bond with Russia in such a fashion that the association would come to resemble actual membership. This could perhaps take place in the context of NATO's development into an organisation which, while insisting on Article 5 mutual obligations of collective defence, focuses primarily on non-Article 5 operations, thereby leaning toward collective security. A series of liberal scholars in the fields of political science and international relations such as for example Charles Kupchan, have in recent years advised strongly against any future NATO enlargement, arguing that Russia would be alienated and isolated and European security and stability would thus be jeopardised. After this group of scholars and commentators have "lost" the debate on enlargement, the question of Russian membership into NATO as soon as

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possible has now been raised. Such an enlargement would, however, not only raise the question of NATO's survival but also a number of geopolitical questions, in that NATO would then become not just a Euro-American, but also an Asian organisation. The question of whether or not Russia should become a member will remain rooted in speculations for a long time to come. One thing is clear, however; in the long term, the question, "Under which circumstances will it be possible to bind Russia to NATO in the closest possible way, including the prospect of membership?" must be asked and answered.

Threat: Failure in the Balkans?
During the war in Serbia many politicians and scholars predicted that should NATO "lose the war" in Kosovo and the result be a striking failure, it would be the ruin of the organisation. The argument was that with all the vested prestige and with all the internal political bickering and subsequent political reproof that has taken place, NATO would lose its cohesiveness, and disintegrate. Thus, there are plenty of reasons to view this crisis with great concern. Indeed, in the past, far less grave crises have been interpreted as signs of internal dissolution. The introduction and debate around the concept of the Combined Joint Task Force, for example, was seen by many as the beginning of NATO's downfall.

NATO was and still is faced with critical problems. A lot could and can go wrong in military actions, be it war or implementation of peace agreements, regardless of how well planned they may be. Nonetheless, if the threat is assessed as non-consequential to NATO's survival it is simply because, even as a solution to the Kosovo crisis is extremely complex and render the future less predictable, the NATO-members' interest in the maintenance of the organisation overshadows the outcome of Balkan operations. The decisive part of the argument is ultimately that Kosovo is not of vital, strategic importance to the NATO-members, neither the smaller ones nor the dominating powers within the alliance.

The Fundamental Threat: A Weakening of the United States
What is the greatest threat to NATO as an organisation? There can be no doubt about the answer, namely a relative weakening of the United States. Indeed, if developments cause the downfall of the United States as a superpower it would not only weaken but also bring about the collapse of the alliance. This is the very essence of the problem:

First of all, NATO is clearly constructed around the United States as its uncontested leader, determining the agenda, structure, tasks, strategies, and policies of NATO. Without the USA behind the wheel determining on NATO's speed and direction, the organisation will come to a halt. There will be internal strives, and members would leave the organisation.

Secondly, it is the assertion that the arrangement of European security is rooted in a complementary relationship between the EU and NATO. In other words, NATO which is responsible for the European military and security order, is dependent on the EU to oversee the economic and political order. But perhaps more importantly the EU is dependent on NATO and it is difficult to envisage the EU without NATO. Indeed, it is because of NATO and therefore because of the American security overlay in Europe, that the individual European countries do not compete with one another in matters of security. War or preparations for war are impossible and it is under this security umbrella that the political and economic EU-integration is thriving and developing.

The entire construction is therefore dependent on whether the United States is in the process of decline. There are several different interpretations of this. It is the assessment of this analysis that the United States is not in the process of losing her superpower status let alone extremely pessimistic predictions of the USA digressing into Third World-status. On the contrary, it seems that the United States' position in the international system has been strengthened not least due to the collapse of its rival superpower, the Soviet Union. Additionally, a counterbalancing alliance of aspiring superpowers such as Japan, China, Russia, India, or the EU has not occurred and is hardly in the picture. It is thus the assertion here, that the United States'position is rather robust and therefore also very stable in the long run.

The above may be summarised in the following way: the most notable and plausible threats against NATO have been analysed and the conclusion is that they can all be rejected as directly realistic possibilities. Concrete political developments are difficult to predict, although it can be said that certain directions seem more probable than others. For NATO it appears that its future as an organisation is bright. This, however, does not imply that there will be a shortage of difficulties to overcome. On the contrary, it seems highly likely that the number of crises and conflicts in Europe and its periphery will increase. NATO is faced with a gigantic task in the Balkans. Not only will the considerable efforts with the NATO-led SFOR continue in Bosnia–an operation characterised by existing and future conflicts–

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the situation in Kosovo must also be solved,–a mission which is likely to draw heavily upon NATO-resources for many years to come. Moreover, there are the problems in the remaining part of the Balkans, which is being touched by instability and risks of disintegration and ethnic conflict. But apart from the Balkans, which can be considered an island of conflict, a strategic ghetto, created by the special circumstances surrounding the end of the Cold War, NATO must also pay attention to the security- and stability-oriented problems arising within a new regionalised Europe.

On the one hand Europe has become an increasingly NATO-ised and EU-ised united region. On the other hand, however, a process of subregionalisation can also be identified which unlike during the Cold War where the Iron Curtain separated Europe into East and West, is dividing Europe into South- Mid- and North European subregional zones. In this context it is worth mentioning that with respect to command structure NATO only operates with the Northern and Southern dimensions.

The Southern subregionalisation is strongly linked to the problems in North Africa and the Middle East and the problems in the Mediterranean, especially with respect to Greece and Turkey.

The Northern dimension is primarily characterised by the new situation in the Baltic Sea area where new security dimensions have appeared, not least because of the reestablishment of the Baltic States as independent nations. In this area, the United States has shown initiative in a number of fields, such as the Baltic Charter of 1998 and the concurrent American North-Eastern Europe Initiative. Also, this subregion comprising Northern Europe and the North Atlantic has gained renewed importance in the context of NATO.

Situated in the middle are the Central European countries – from France over Germany, Poland and Ukraine to Russia. This subregion is extremely important to NATO as it is the central, stabilising axis in Europe.

The New Forms of War: Asymmetry and Political Correctness
NATO aims its interest and its development toward concrete, potential, and probable conflicts. The latter are primarily found in smaller, often symmetric conflicts and tensions, which are religious, economic, or ethnic in nature but which all have a political dimension. This dimension often becomes military as well, which is why NATO is now preparing itself to wage asymmetrical wars, i.e. armed conflicts in which NATO is the vastly superior part. NATO uses its military potential as a political means–as a tool which only serves the purpose of preventing unacceptable violations of human

rights and of re-establishing stability. NATO inexorably chooses means, aims, and strategies for these armed interventions.

The decisive factor is that NATO, precisely for humanitarian reasons, must necessarily wag strongly limited wars. The asymmetrical war,
which is also the politically correct war, must, for obvious reasons, be bound to certain important self-applied limitations. Technology and political control must hinder unintentional destruction of civilians and civilian targets. It is equally important, however, that one's own forces avoid losses. This is synonymous with a further limitation put on the rough, often inexpedient method of war. On the other hand, it must be noted that in the international system, when all diplomatic and negotiation attempts have been exhausted, the international community can only resort to the difficult and rough dimensions of limited war. This means that things can go wrong, regardless of how much is done to maintain the political correctness of the war.

5. EXPLANATIONS

If the development surrounding NATO's importance, place and role is to be adequately explained, it is necessary to present certain simple theoretical notions and understandings.

Several attempts have been made at explaining NATO. A power-nature-culture explanation is claimed by Samuel Huntington, who sees NATO as a part of "The Clash of Civilizations". Many scholars have also used the liberal paradigm. The latter group includes Francis Fukuyama, who predicts the disappearance of NATO. Radical and neo-marxist models have also been utilised, regarding NATO as a capitalist organisation. In the reflectivist direction, constructivism, disconstructivism and discourse-analyses have flourished. In this case, we will attempt a simple structuralist model.

The starting point is the organisation of the international system. In connection with the actors and their interactions,which superior structure can be identified as the international system? As the situation stands after the end of the Cold War, bipolarity has been replaced by unipolarity and the two superpowers have been reduced to one: the United States of America. The

result is an international system which is widely different from the Cold War bipolarity. After the Soviet voluntary surrender and the abandonment of its dominant position in the world system, the United States alone remains. As such, the United States' position has clearly been strengthened.

There are no alternative superpowers. Actors which could potentially appear as aspiring superpowers do not have sufficient capability to emerge as such. As a result, no effective balancing of the United States is taking place. With this relative absence of balancing-attempts, the dominating states no longer play a zero-sum game, as was the case during the Cold War. Until now, coalitions that have been formed to counter the United States have not been convincing. For example, there was not much credibility behind the late 1998 Russian, Chinese and Indian attempt to declare a multipolar world with no hegemony. What is occurring in the international system is rather that all states group around the single pole, the United States, security being as one of their primary objectives. This tendency is at the base of the notion of unipolarisation. Those states which do not join in

are left isolated. The United States dubs these states "rogue states". They include North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Serbia.

In the absence of an alternative superpower, the United States is more or less alone in setting the international agenda and therefore also when it comes to advancing its own interests. These are not necessarily synonymous with narrow national interests. With the country's unique position, the USA has an innate interest in safeguarding large parts – and in principle all parts of the international system's security and existence. The simple reason for this is that with its dominating position in the international system, safeguarding the latter becomes synonymous with safeguarding herself.

But in this one-superpower system, a number of states have become more vulnerable. It is no longer possible to be an international free rider. It demands hard work to make oneself heard and secure the best possible position in the international system. Because the superpower's resources are limited, the increasing regionalisation and subregionalisation are natural developments. It is interesting, however, to note that this regionalisation is taking place on the superpower's terms.

Politically, the unipolarisation has all the aforementioned consequences.

But also in the area of values, there is a growing adherence to the principles of democracy, market economy, human rights and personal freedom. The global spreading of this set of values is also rooted in the socialisation of states, which lead them to seek to emulate the successful countries in the international competition. Indeed, to a very large extent the successful states appear to be states seeking to adhere to what has come to be understood as global values.

The United States utilises this globalisation of values as an important part of her general policy. The fundamental strategy is based on engagement (in various parts of the world) and enlargement (primarily the enlargement of democracy.)
Economically, the United States still has the largest economy in the world. The dollar is the main international currency and the American economy is expanding.
Militarily, the United States has committed herself to a win-win strategy, i.e. the ability to wage two regional wars simultaneously. In reality, this is what the United States has experienced recently. A war was being waged against Serbia concurrently with a protracted war against Iraq. The United States is fully prepared to go to war against North Korea. With all other larger powers, including the aspiring superpowers, the United States has either concluded direct defence agreements (including Japan and a number of countries in Asia and South America) or strategic alliances and partnership agreements (China and Russia).

Interpretation
Given these short considerations, it has become clear that NATO enjoys a central and still important place. The United States is the sole superpower, present on a global scale politically, militarily, economically and culturally. But the United States is also a direct European power, with 100.000 troops and nuclear weapons stationed on the continent. Additionally, the USA is an Asian power with roughly the same amount of American troops and nuclear weapons. That the United States is an American and Latin American power, is beyond doubt.

If the United States is indeed so engaged in Europe, if the USA leads an alliance the primary goal of which is to safeguard European security, if the USA is called a European power and wages war on the European continent, it is not for the benefit of the Europeans. When an American president has to explain this situation, he does so by evoking American national interests

in Europe. Nothing would be more harmful to the United States, than a fragmented Europe, than a Europe in which the dominant states are prepared to wage war against each other, a disintegrating Europe in constant crisis and instability. An American president will usually look to the past and evoke the United States' involvement in the two World Wars and in the Cold War. The United States wants a strong, rich and integrated Europe, as is materialised in the European Union, as an American partner. Seen from an American perspective, this is the best form of forward defence.

But there are other reasons for American involvement, namely the structural argument that by protecting Europe, the United States indirectly protects herself.
NATO is therefore an organisation which is founded on clear mutual interests: what the United States needs is a strong Europe, regardless of whether she is one of two superpowers or the lone superpower. And Europe needs a United States which can safeguard her security and stability. This explains why NATO was an extremely applicable organisation, facing the Soviet threat during the Cold War. Consequently, had NATO not existed before the 21st century, it would have been necessary to establish an organisation similar to the NATO we know today.

6. CONCLUSION: NATO IN CONSTANT RENEWAL

Not only will NATO survive, it will also become the most significant military security organisation for many years to come. In addition to the aforementioned structural arguments, not least the American leadership, the following arguments could be added:

First of all, NATO has displayed a surprising capacity to adapt to changing international and regional circumstances.

Secondly, NATO has survived under the most difficult of circumstances, such as, for example the nuclear and political problems in Europe during the 1960's which spurred on France's withdrawal from the integrated command structure, the bitter US-European relations during the détente period in the 1970's, and finally the equally difficult circumstances during the so-called Second Cold War in the 1980's, which demonstrated widely differing views between the two continents on Soviet politics. NATO is standing on the threshold of the 21st century, despite an extremely complex and obscure situation in Europe, where none of the NATO members have security or strategic interests at stake, yet where there is broad support for the new bold policy, with its entirely new humanitarian agenda.

Thirdly, that it has been possible for the individual NATO-members to avoid two processes, which are a load on and a source of concern for any alliance partner, namely entrapment and abandonment. Entrapment is the situation in which one is bound to collective political action which counters ones own national interests. On the other hand, abandonment is a situation in which one, when exposed to an exterior threat, is abandoned by the remaining members, who are unwilling to live up to their collective responsibility.

Entrapment has been avoided by great agility and flexibility on behalf of the alliance, where special interests have been tolerated such as for example "Denmarkisation".[9] Abandonment has been avoided because of the alliance's effective deterrence, a deterrence which continues to exist and work effectively, albeit under different circumstances and with different resources than previously.

Fourth, NATO functions as a unique combination of maintaining the sovereignty which is characteristic of an intergovernmental organisation on the one hand, and on the other, a functional organisational integration, based on the preparation of military operations, but operating in peacetime.

Finally, the fact that although no formal relations exist between the two organisations, NATO functions in deep, mutual dependence with the EU. This mutual dependence which can be identified structurally is naturally reflected in the concrete policy of the individual members.

The Future: A Prediction
NATO's practical policy in the future can concretely be characterised in the following way: Assuming that the United States continues to enjoy a dominant position in the international system, further elaboration of NATO will be probable: NATO will be characterised by becoming
- "softer"
- "looser"
- "wider"
- and yet "harder"

NATO will become "softer" primarily because genuine paragraph 5

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[9] The term "Denmarkisation" refers to a country tending to "free-ride" in the alliance, a consumer of security, unwilling to pay the economic and political costs. The model was Danish NATO-policy in the 1980's. See Bertel Heurlin:Danish Security policy, Cooperation and Conflict, XX,1984.

missions–which in fact have never been used–are becoming increasingly unlikely. Although paragraph 5 will remain at the formal core of the alliance, strategy, force posture, organisation and military exercises will move further and further away from paragraph 5.

NATO will become "looser," with growing importance being allocated not only to internal cooperation but also to cooperation with the PfP-partners and other potential allies. Notions such a Combined Joint Task Forces will gain an increasingly strong foothold. Smaller NATO-operations could also be based on the notion of a "coalition of the willing". Finally, new possibilities for operations with European organisations, be it the EU or the WEU, have opened up.

NATO will also become "wider". NATO will be further expanded and in one way or the other end up organisationally covering the entire Euro-Atlantic area. This will occur through traditional enlargement but also through organisational associations of various forms and shapes. On the political level NATO will also become "wider". NATO's influence will grow and as Europe becomes increasingly NATO-ised and as the international influence of such institutions and organisations as the UN, the Security Council, the G-7 and G-8, and the Contact Group, grows or regresses. With the growing level of international democratisation, which intensifies the individual human being's role as a political actor, NATO will emerge as a strengthened organisation, legitimised by strong democratic roots. NATO will gain international influence, although NATO's operations will be limited to the Euro-Atlantic area and its periphery.

Finally, NATO will become "harder". How does this relate to the assertion of a "softer" NATO? If NATO is perceived as "harder," this should be understood in connection with its evolution from a primarily "political" organisation, based on deterrence and nuclear retaliation and in which the weapons had a particular abstract political character, to an organisation which conducts employs weapons, military operations and humanitarian intervention. In this way, NATO functions as a collective, executive power, which uses military power in the shape of "politically correct" wars.

Concluding Arguments in Simple Terms:
NATO Before and After the Cold War

DURING THE COLD WAR　　　　　**NATO 2000**

General Characteristics

DURING THE COLD WAR	NATO 2000
- Collective defence	- Collective security
- Enimies	- Partners
- Article 5	- Non-Article 5
- Static	- Dynamic
- Exclusion	- Inclusion
- NATO-proper	- NATO-plus
- US-Western Europe	- US-Europe
- Symmetry	- Asymmetry
- Balance	- Supremacy
- Secure territory	- Secure values

The International Situation and the International Environment

DURING THE COLD WAR	NATO 2000
- One out of two dominating alliances	- The dominating alliance
- Parity of strenght	- Hegemonic position
- UN-NATO relations: no connection	- UN-NATO: complimentarity relationship
- Global conflict	- Regional and subregional conflicts
- USA attached to Western Europe	- USA: a European power

Threat

DURING THE COLD WAR	NATO 2000
- Soviet strengthening	- American weekening
- Against the physical and political survival of the members	- NATO's lack of ability to promote stability and security

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Goal

- Keep the Americans in	- Keep the Americans in
- Keep the Russians out	- Keep the Russians attached
- Keep the Germans down	- Keep the Europeans together
- Military integration to increase military strength	- Military integration to secure political stability

Strategy

- Plans for symmetrical world war	- Plans for asymmetrical sub-regional operations
- Prepare total war	- Wage politically correct war
- Military deterrence	- Military intervention
- Defence against agression	- Securing stability
- Forward defence	- Stability projection
- Attack if attacked	- Intervene when necessary and opportune
- Nuclear weapons vital	- Nuclear weapons remote

Geography and Politics

- NATO: Strictly regional	- NATO: As part of the world, open to the world.
- NATO area	- NATO: out of area
- Musketeer principle: one for all and all for one	- Coalition of the willing–Combined Joint Task Force
- Independent European Defence Project, ESDI promoted	- European defence is a NATO pillar, ESDI promoted in accordance with NATO-common security and defence policy

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