Church and State:
Leaders and Legitimacy, A Theoretical Review

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This paper represents an introductory and partial review of the literature on elite politics and their use of myths and symbols for legitimacy. My full project will explain the connection (or relationship) between religious elites and political elites, the use of religious myths, symbols or ritual to generate nationalism, and political legitimacy. This project requires that I bring together a number of different fields that examine elites and nationalism, as well as the literature on myths and symbols. This includes work in

international relations, comparative politics, culture/ethnicity, and religion. The starting

point of most of the literature that looks at elite politics and nationalism (whether this is

stated or not) is that politics becomes problematic when political institutions are weak. I

will provide an overview of this broad literature to start with; then I will give a condensed

look at some other positions that examine why competitive elite politics may generate

nationalism; where nationalist symbology comes from; and the different roles religious

elites may play in nationalist conflict; and finish with a description of how I see the

relationship between religion, politics, myths and nationalism. You will see that my

position is unique, yet combines elements from the other fields of inquiry.

The Effect of Weak Institutions

The common story of ethnic difficulties and nationalism starts with the

examination of the effects of problematic political institutions. Often these are

discriminatory institutions, other times they are just weak and ineffective in moderating

divisive issues. The literature in comparative politics is rich in the exploration of how the

set-up of the political system can significantly impact the ability of governments to

handle the stresses and strains of everyday politics. For example, David Waldner looks at

the economic implications of elite conflict and says,

> "Elite conflict [in Syria and Turkey] was resolved only when sectors
> of the elite in each country mobilized popular-sector support as a means
> of providing a social base for vanquishing their opponents and
> consolidating their rule. Popular-sector incorporation, in other words,
> was a function of the level of elite conflict: intense elite conflict
> lowered elite resistance to popular incorporation, making it a
> more preferable strategy then it would have been under conditions of
> elite unity." (Waldner 4)

His argument points to the economic implications of elite conflict, but also the

importance to elites of mobilizing the masses. The need for mobilization by embattled

elites often leads to the use of myths and symbols, though Walder does not directly address the forms of mobilization in his cases.

Likewise, Barbara Geddes says that the failure of many states can be attributed not to a lack of state autonomy from powerful interest groups in society, but rather she says these failures have been "caused by the policies political leaders chose when attempting to respond to international threats and at the same time gain an advantage in the struggle with domestic political rivals." (Geddes 9) These struggles internally lead to the "politician's dilemma". That is, the politician's awareness that things need to be done in the government and/or economy to make it work more efficiently, but in order to get these things done they need to stay in power. To stay in power though, often means doing things that aren't good for the government of the economy. Hence, how the political system is structured (two-party system or not, open-list voting or not, etc) shapes the behavior of the political elites and helps determine the level of cooperation or conflict. As Geddes puts it, " . . . in order to understand state behavior, one must understand the behavior of these individuals, as shaped by the political institutions that determine the costs and benefits of the different actions they choose"(Geddes 182). Geddes' writing also does not directly address the forms political mobilization by competing elites may take. Others writing in this vein include Mainwaring and Shugart; Linz and Valenzuela; and Haggard and Kaufman, all agree that institutions shape the incentives of political elites and hence the chances for cooperation or conflict among elites. Dysfunctional or weak institutions are conducive to elite competition. Though not addressed by this body of literature the unstated next step is the understanding that

political competition necessitates the use of any means available to mobilize forces to your side, these means often include the nationalist use of myths and symbols[1].

Instrumentalism and Independent Elites

Others take the story forward from these problematic political institutions and point out that political elites and their relationships and reactions can have ethnic, or nationalist manifestations. For authors like Michael Brown, Jack Snyder and Stephen Van Evera, these political elites are the factor that can turn a problematic political situation into full-blown internal or external nationalist conflict. In Jack Snyder's book, Myths of Empire, he sees imperialist elites turning to nationalist myths and symbols to rally support, especially in "cartelized" political systems[2] (Snyder 31-32). In this type of system Snyder says logrolling occurs among a few interested groups who then justify their policies by mythmaking (Snyder 40). He sees myths as instrumental in origin and says that the effectiveness of the propaganda depends on the vulnerability of the target as well as the propagandist's advantages (Snyder 36). This approach does not address the source of the myths, nor does it attempt to tell us why the population might be "vulnerable" to it.

There are a large number of noted authors in the field of nationalist studies who also subscribe to the notion that nationalist myths are merely instrumental. These include Hobsbawm, Anderson, Gellner and Kedourie. Hobsbawm says, " 'Invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of

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[1] The majority of this literature is focused on how best to structure institutions so that these dysfunctional effects don't occur. Hence, the form mobilization takes is a secondary concern at best.

[2] "Cartelized" meaning a system in which power assets are concentrated in the hands of one group (or a small number of groups) that have a very narrow interest in a specific economic sector or bureaucracy (Snyder 31).

behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past"(Hobsbawm

1). He then goes on to say the "invention" of new tradition often occurs in periods of

rapid social change when rulers find it increasingly hard to maintain obedience, loyalty

and cooperation from their subjects (Hobsbawm and Ranger 264-65).   In his 1990 book,

Nations and Nationalism Since 1790: Programme, Myth and Reality, Hobsbawm says

that nationalism in the late 20th century is no longer a "major vector of historical

development" (Hobsbawm 1990, 163). This idea of "invention", as well as downplaying

the independent importance of nationalism in the generation and sustainment of

legitimacy, is a hallmark of instrumentalist or "modernist" views of nationalism.

Anthony Smith, a noted nationalist author, characterizes this "instrumentalist", or

"modernist", view of nationalist mythmaking as regarding ". . . nations and nationalism

as functional for industrial or capitalist modernity, and leave[ing] little room for

collective choices. As a result, they appear to make detailed historical investigation of

elite or collective actions irrelevant" (Smith 7). Smith accuses modernist authors of

failing to consider the "pre-modern roots of modern nations". Nor do they address why

nationalism can have such a popular emotional appeal (Smith 7-8).

These instrumental authors recognize the importance of myths in generating

support for elites, but they are either uninterested in, or unaware of, the source of the

myths and symbols.

The Ethno-Symbolic Approach – "Cultural Elites"

These instrumental authors do not show us where the myths and symbols that

generate nationalism, support, and even legitimacy, come from. Are these myths and

symbols really "invented"? Pulled out of thin air? It seems clear that the myths must

come from somewhere and they must resonate with the population if they are to be effective.

The "ethno-symbolic" cultural literature on ethnicity and nationalism is especially useful in this area. Anthony Smith differentiates between primordialist, modernist and ethno-symbolic nationalism. Of most import here is the difference between modernist (or instrumentalist) views, which I discussed above, and the ethno-symbolic view as portrayed by Smith.

Smith presents the "ethno-symbolic" alternative as a way to examine what gives nationalism its power. He says it is the "myths, memories, traditions and symbols of ethnic heritages" (Smith 9). Some of the claims Smith makes for this approach is that includes the following:

1) the idea of "reappropriation" in which intellectuals reach back into the ethnic past to obtain the "authentic materials and ethos for a distinct modern nation"(Smith 12);

2) they note the powerful link between modern nations and pre-existing, and often pre-modern, ethnicities;

3) the associated cultural and symbolic components of an ethnic community affect individual's perceptions, beliefs, memories and values, but also produces a "structure of relations and processes independent of those beliefs and perceptions" (Smith 14);

4) the awareness that ethnic myths and symbols may be missionary or covental in nature. The myths may also be tied to "ethnoscapes" – landscapes endowed with poetic ethnic meaning " . . .often associated with crucial events

and personages in the history of the ethnic community and [it] may be invested with sacred significance . . ." (Smith 16);

5) the nature of "ethno-history" in which ethnic members are not dispassionate or objective in trying to understand their communal past, but in fact that history is reinterpreted. And finally,

6) he points out that nationalism is a "recurrent phenomena" and that its frequency and intensity is in part a product of its ability to draw on pre-existing memories, myths and symbols (Smith 19).

The ethno-symbolic literature hits on some key points that are missing in the modernist and instrumentalist examination of nationalism, but even this literature underplays the importance of certain non-political elites and non-political institutions. John Hutchinson (an ethno-symbolic writer) says there are two kinds of cultural nationalist intellectuals, "those (mainly historical scholars and artists) who formulate the cultural ideals of the movement, and those (generally journalists and politicians) who transform the ideals into concrete political, economic and social programmes" (Hutchinson 3). What is left out is the important role that religious institutions and religious elites play in which course nationalist mythology and symbology takes in some countries.

Religion and Conflict Mediation

In a slightly different vein, Douglas Johnson and Cynthia Sampson's book Religion the Missing Dimension of Statecraft examines the role religious elites can play in mediating conflict. Johnston, and his fellow writers in this edited book, focus on the role religious leaders (both institutional and lay) can play in the mediation of conflict. They point out that churches can often be perceived as "neutral" in a conflict and may

also be seen as representing something higher than political motivations. I am more interested in how and why some churches <u>don't</u> remain neutral, an issue only touched on briefly in this book. In addition, the role religion can play in the myths of nationalism is not addressed either, though the importance of religion in conflict is noted. Likewise R. Scott Appleby investigates the role of non-violent "religious militants" who serve as peacemakers in conflict zones around the world (Appleby 6). While he acknowledges that "religion . . . often inspired, legitimated, and exacerbated deadly conflicts", he also argues that "religious peacebuilding" is transforming conflict resolution (Appleby 7). Again, I am more interested in investigating modern examples of religious legitimation of unstable regimes and the often concurrent rise of nationalism that utilizes religious symbology and myths. Though this legitimation may be in support of a counter-hegemonic political elites as happened in Poland with the Catholic Church's support of Solidarity.

Religious Politicians and Religious States

There is also a growing body of work that examines the rise of politically active religious leaders in the world. A leader in this field is Mark Juergensmeyer whose book <u>The New Cold War</u>, singles out "members of religious groups that actively criticize the secular political order and attempt to replace it with one founded on religious principles" (Juergensmeyer, 4). This is actually outside the scope of my interest, I am looking at the role of religious elites who don't want to supplant the state leadership, but rather they have some kind of relationship with the political elite (good, bad or indifferent) in terms of their control of politically legitimating myths, rituals or symbols. One of my potential case studies is South Africa and the role of the Dutch Reformed Church and the myths surrounding Afrikaner supremacy embodied in the Battle of Blood River mythology.

This case comes closest to Juergensmeyer's approach, since many of the leaders in South Africa were also active laymen in the Church that legitimated the Afrikaner's rule. But this is not quite the same as looking at cases where it is the primary religious leaders who want to be political rulers as well.

Religious Elites, Myths, Symbols and Political Legitimization

Jonathan Fox writes that "religion has four basic functions . . .[t]o provide a value-laden worldview; to supply rules and standards of behavior based on that worldview; to organize adherents through institutions; and to legitimate actors, actions and institutions" (Fox, Effects 43). David Little writes that ". . .there is something interesting and worth examining about the recurring correlation of religious belief with ethnicity and nationalism" (Little 1) Douglas Johnston in Religion, the Missing Dimension of Statecraft, tells us that religion can "cause conflict, or it can abate it" (Johnston and Sampson 260). And Barry Rubin in the same book says "[t]o neglect religious institutions and thinking would be to render incomprehensible some of the key issues and crises in the world today" (Barry in Johnston/Sampson 33). It is the role of churches and their relationship with politics that I wish to explore.

By combining elements of all the above literature it is my contention that given bad or problematic domestic political institutions that political elites often resort to nationalism for purposes of legitimation or power. In contrast to the instrumentalists, and in keeping with the ethno-symbolists, I see that these myths are not created out of thin air, but must have some relevance and resonance with the targeted population (some basis in the pre-modern history, to put it in Smith's terms). I differ with Smith though on who provides the "authentic materials". The instrumentalists see the politicians as the key actors, and see the myths as merely a reflection of the needs of the politicians who are

facing some crisis. Other relevant players are never addressed, nor is the source of the nationalist, or mobilizing, myth's legitimacy ever questioned. The ethno-symbolists on the other hand, see the intellectual as the important medium. Those looking at the role churches can play (both as institutions and the leaders) in conflict mediation are not looking at the problem in quite the same way I am. They focus on religion as a potential conflict mediator. Nor am I interested in examining cases where religious elites are in contention with political elites for control of the state. Instead, I contend that in many cases religious institutions are the "keepers of the flame", and hence the religious elites in these societies are the key to determining the direction and intensity of nationalism, not neutrality. For the cases that I am interested in, religious elites appear to be either co-opted, made to acquiesce, or made to actively cooperate in order for the political elites to successfully promote a nationalism that the people will respond to and act on behalf of. (In effect providing the "legitimation" role that Jonathan Fox talks about [Fox, Effects 43]). (See Annex A for a graphic depiction of my argument). While not denigrating the interesting cases of states where religious leader wish to de-secularize the state and become the leaders, I feel that is a different issue than the use of religious mythology by a secular elite with the support of a religious elite. Especially interesting will be the relationship between religious elites who refuse to be co-opted or intimidated and who collaborate (provide legitimation for) alternative political elites. By recognizing that religious elites have a vested interest in politics we perhaps begin to better understand the phenomena of ethnic nationalism in those countries where it exhibits a religious element.[3]

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[3] Several authors in Religion the Missing Dimension of Statecraft note that unlike the US separation of Church and State, many countries are characterized by an intimate relationship between religion and politics (Johnston, 5; Luttwak, 9; Rubin 20). Part of my goal is to better identify for US policy makers the role religion does play in the creation of tensions and conflict.

It is the intricacies of this proposed relationship that I intend to explore in my later research.

Potential Cases – A Brief Look

For the remainder of this paper I will present a few elements of the case studies that are worth further exploration using my negotiation/legitimation model. Because this paper represents an initial attempt to create a theoretical framework for my doctoral dissertation I wanted to present two of the potential case studies. These are the Battle of Kosovo and the Battle of the Boyne. I chose these particular cases for initial study because of their relevance and accessibility. Both Kosovo and the Boyne are involved in recent and re-current episodes of violent ethnic nationalism, therefore, there is a large body of work available for reference. These choices do not preclude additional case selection at a later date. Other potential cases I am considering are the battle of Blood River and the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa and the Black Madonna myths of the Polish Catholic Church. I believe there is fertile ground for additional cases exemplifying the connections between political and religious elites, nationalist myths and symbols and nationalism.

Serbia and the Battle of Kosovo

A brief historical review of the Serbian case shows that the Battle of Kosovo (1389) myth originated in religious sermons and eulogies[4]. In these sermons and eulogies Prince Lazar is depicted as a martyr for the faith (Emmert 64). The church also appears to have played a large role in establishing the "cult of Lazar",[5] which in turn, illuminates

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[4] Rebecca West has a wonderful version of the Kosovo myth in her book <u>Black Lamb and Grey Falcon</u>. Her presentation has all the key elements of the myth, and for useful background I reproduced the relevant passage in its entirety in Appendix B.
[5] It is interesting to note that even today pilgrims visit the bones of Prince Lazar at a nearby Kosovo monastery.

some of the later, and long lasting, aspects of the "cult of Kosovo". In particular, the glory of Serbia prior to Kosovo, the struggle of good against evil, the essentially Serb link to Christianity, and the ethic of self-sacrifice for the faith and for Serbia (Emmert 75). These are all elements which are evident in the above quoted passage, and which re-occur in any discussion of Serbian ethnic nationalism.

The church's role, and perhaps justification, for the initial myth making can also be seen in two other aspects of the story. First, prior to the Battle of Kosovo, the Serbian Patriarchate was centered in the territory of Prince Lazar, which after the Battle of Marica in 1371 was one of the "last Christian refuges in the Balkans" (Emmert 32). In addition to protecting the Serbian Orthodox Church, Lazar had risen to prominence by mending the schism between the Serbian and Byzantine churches which had existed since 1350, thus giving the Serbian Orthodox Church legitimacy. These facts are interesting for two reasons. First, the position of the church in Lazar's territory and under his protection is logically tied to the church's eulogies and cult promotion of Lazar after his untimely death. This is supported by the fact that Serbian eulogists saw the greatest tragedy of Kosovo as the loss of Serbia's "God-appointed shepherd" without whom Serbian society was "paralyzed". This loss of leadership is then directly linked to the domination by the Turks in 1459, followed by centuries of Serb suffering (Emmert 77). The second reason I find the position of the Church in Lazar's domain interesting is the early establishment, by the church, of Lazar's connection with the Nemajic dynasty of Dusan (who was the leader of Serbia's "golden age"). This allowed the church to establish Lazar's legitimacy as ruler of "Serbia", and hence furthered the importance of his death to a wider audience,

and logically extended the influence of the Serbian church (Emmert 68).[6] Again, all this

early church myth making perpetuated the myth of Kosovo far beyond its original

potential audience. It allowed the Serbian Orthodox Church to enlarge their constituency,

and the audience for the myth. This in turn perhaps permitted a larger ethno-national

group to emerge in the Balkans, than might have been the case if the Serbian Orthodox

Church had remained small and relatively isolated in the region.

The church writers were the earliest mythologizers, and encouraged the Serbians

to carry on the memory of an independent Serbian state after the establishment of

Ottoman rule in the Balkans (by 1459 the Balkans were fully under Turkish dominion).

To this end, a tradition of oral and epic poetry was an important vehicle for expression of

the Kosovo memory during the centuries of Ottoman rule. Evidence suggests that the

initial impetus for the oral and epic poetry was the result of "reciprocity between the

written [religious] and oral traditions" of the Balkans (Simic 8). The church writing and

sermonizing, as well as oral epics encouraged by the church, were joined by popular

literature and art by the 19th century.[7] Inspired by the wars for liberation and previous

work, dramatists, poets and painters depicted Kosovo and its enduring message of

martyrdom, sacrifice and glory. It was also in the 19th century that Kosovo first became

politicized by leaders and intellectuals as a potential source of Serbian strength and unity

in the wars for liberation.[8] I argue that this source for mobilization would not have been

available in the 19th century if the religious institution of the Serbian Orthodox Church

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[6] This is also interesting in light of the fact that it was under early Nemajic rulers that the Serbian Orthodox
Church first became autocephalous (1219) and later became a Patriarchate (1346).

[7] Though I think it is also important to note the prevalence of Prince Lazar in early church art as well.
Emmert reproduces two Lazar monastery paintings, one from the 14th century and another from 1667
(Emmert 252-53).

[8] This is the story that writers in the ethno-symbolic cultural arena present – the intellectuals as key.

had not preserved and perpetuated a tradition of Kosovo that evoked specific concepts and ideals for the preceding 400 years.[9]

This establishes the Church's proprietary (or "keeper") function of the myths and symbols of Kosovo. So in 1986, when political institutions in Yugoslavia became problematic and political elites turned to nationalism, the myth of Kosovo was a well-kept flame. It is clear that Milosevic utilized this mythology to galvanize the Serbian people. His nationalist brand of leadership was framed by his 1986 rally at the Kosovo battle site. What I intend to explore more thoroughly is whether or not Milosevic made this nationalist myth alone, or with tacit (or explicit) acceptance by the Serbian Orthodox leadership. The traditional story would have it that Milosevic was a cultural entrepreneur, I believe this is too simplistic an answer and worth exploring further. In addition, what role the Serbian Orthodox Church played in Milosevic's downfall and the institution of "democratic" government in 1999 will be interesting. Did the Church "switch" sides and take the legitimating myths away from Milosevic? What is the relationship between the Church and the new leadership? All interesting questions that will help us better understand how religion is key to nationalism and its form.

Irish Protestants and the Battle of the Boyne

The Battle of the Boyne (1690) was key to the firm establishment of a Protestant monarchy in England, and hence Protestant domination in Northern Ireland. In 1690, in order to consolidate his control of the throne, King William of Orange had to prevent largely Catholic Ireland from being a counter-invasion route for the Catholic King James

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[9] I should note here that churches associated with one ethnicity are of particular interest to me in this research. These churches (like the Serbian Orthodox) already have a vested interest in a certain sector of society, which may make their involvement in politics more obvious. Larger, more universal churches do often take sides (such as the Catholic Church in Poland), but because of its wider audience and membership the type of nationalism produced may be less virulent.

Stuart.[10] The Protestants in Ireland also wanted to prevent a return of a Catholic monarch, but for reasons more associated with personal gain. To this end they wholeheartedly supported "King Billy". The Protestants routed the Jacobites, supporters of King James, at the Boyne, and while the Catholics continued to fight the English until the Treaty of Limerick in 1691, the Protestant ascendancy had been determined. The Protestants managed to appropriate substantial acreage from the defeated Jacobites and also managed to significantly alter the terms of the Treaty of Limerick to their advantage based in large part on their decisive victory at the Boyne (Shepherd 146). King William became the "icon of a tradition in Ireland, a symbol of [Protestant] fundamental rights and [Protestant] solidarity" (Shepherd 199).   This legacy had become surrounded by myth and ritual that is in great contrast to the legacy of King William in England of "continental war and heavy taxation" (Shepherd 200). By reference to the wonderful victory at the Boyne, and its perpetuation in Irish memory through stories and commemorations led by the Orange Orders, the Protestant Northern Irish have preserved their perception of themselves as the backbone of the British Protestant monarchy, as well as justifying their political and economic domination.

Not only do the Protestants celebrate the Battle of the Boyne victory in paintings, tapestries and statues, but also 12 July is a major holiday in Northern Ireland for the Protestants. The Battle of the Boyne, King William and the Protestant succession are all intimately linked in Irish Protestant mythology and symbology. As early as 1702 the practice of putting orange cockades[11] in their hats and marching through the streets, preceded by drums and trumpets was part of the Protestant Boyne celebrations (Shepherd

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[10] King James II was forced to flee England in 1688 in large part due to his Catholicism. King James' Protestant son-in-law William of Orange was then "invited" to invade England and occupy the throne.

[11] Orange ornaments or rosettes in honor of William of Orange their Protestant "savior".

200). These cockades were eventually replaced by the wearing of orange sashes. Until

the late 1770's, the Boyne mythology was perpetuated by less structured religious

institutions of Protestantism (actively encouraged by the church?). In the 1770's though,

more structured religious institutions arose which perpetuated the message of Protestant

domination inherent in the Boyne mythology. These institutions were formalized due to

fear of foreign invasion, recession, and domestic (Catholic) unrest which resulted in the

reemergence of the Volunteers – a Protestant paramilitary corps, organized along the

liberal and radical ideals associated with King William (Shepherd 207). In 1795, the

Orange Order (a direct descendent of the Volunteer organizations) was officially

established in Ulster, with local "orange lodges" based throughout the country. These

Protestant lodges promoted the mythology of King William, the Battle of the Boyne and

Protestant ascendancy. This focus on the Protestant monarchy and not Parliament, as the

symbol of the British State highlights a difference between "civic" and "ethnic"

nationalism.

It is also interesting to note that Orange Lodges were also spread throughout

Britain in the early 1800's, but as a result of a determined political campaign against

them by the British government in England (and lack of support by English churches?),

they grew only in northern Ireland and were eliminated elsewhere. This includes

southern Ireland where there were fewer Protestants anyway (Shepherd 209). In addition,

after WWI and Irish independence, the Williamite monuments in southern Ireland were

destroyed. In contrast, north of the new border, myths of the Boyne and King William

continued to be used as powerful instruments of unity for the Protestants. There, "the

imagery of the Boyne, King Billy and the siege (of Londenderry) are embedded in Ulster

Protestant folklore. These images had been refashioned in the upheaval of the 1790's,

revivified in the struggle against Home Rule, and sanctified in the blood-sacrifice [of the Ulster Division] at the Somme. After partition, they flourished as a potent expression of Protestant solidarity, a badge of identity in the face of perceived threat" (Shepherd 219).

Further Lines of Inquiry

Two interesting lines of inquiry arise from this brief examination of the Battle of the Boyne mythology. First, what official role, if any, did the Protestant churches play in reifying the Battle of the Boyne?[12] Or was it left to less structured Protestant organizations to initiate the reification? Second, what were the circumstances or contexts of the "refashioning", "revivification" and "flourishing" of the myth? Was it the leaders of the religious institutions or more secular institutional elite driving the changes?[13] Several key issues arise from these two questions. First the issue of falsification. My hypotheses about the importance of religious institutions would be falsified if, in fact, my study shows that it was secular elites who led the mythmaking and its modifications with no input or legitimizing role for the religious elites. Second, the Irish case highlights the importance of the precondition of problematic political institutions in the creation of elite politics and the need for politicized myths and symbols. Hence, the need to negotiate with religious institutions that have been "keepers of the flame". Again, this is where I believe the study of religious institutions will add to the already existing work on conditions for nationalism. This interplay between the political and religious elites is crucial for understanding when myths and symbols will resonate with a given population or not, and hence can help explain why some situations explode and others do not.

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[12] It is interesting to note that Douglas Johnston says that ". . . outside analysts consider religious institutions to be major contributors to the ongoing tensions in Northern Ireland" (Johnston and Sampson 324). This seems to make my question a valid one.

[13] Here I note that elites exist in all institutions. What differentiates my proposal from that of Hutchinson or Smith, is my focus on the elites of the religious institutions and not the secular institutions.

Conclusion

The link between the state of existing political institutions; negotiations between political and religious elites; relevant myths and symbols; and ethnic nationalism is an interesting one, with great relevance to understanding nationalism and its potential for violence, in the world today. Here I will give some speculative answers to the questions I proposed at the beginning of this paper. I believe religious institutions commemorate certain myths (often key battles) because the myth somehow supports, reinforces and/or strengthens its position within a society.[14] The myths are perpetuated and modified by the institution in response to necessity over time, either of the institution or of the population. Then, in many states problematic political institutions set the stage for political competition. Politically threatened elites are prone to nationalist tactics to shore up support and this includes nationalist myth making and symbology. The church is often the key repository of the most relevant and emotional myths. Therefore, I hypothesize that the political elites must somehow negotiate with the religious elites (who have their own interests and agendas) over the legitimate use of a given myth or symbol. It is this proposed relationship that I look forward to exploring further. Related issues include, specification of the causal mechanism linking political and religious elites, myths and ethnic nationalism and determining what circumstances can modify or break that connection. What determines if religious elites are co-opted, cooperative, acquiescent or actively oppose the ruling political elites?[15] To answer these questions

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[14] In keeping with that idea, Jonathan Fox notes that perceived threat to religious institutions can lead those institutions to become involved politically (Fox, Status Quo 131).

[15] This is similar to the question Jonathan Fox asks in his article "Do Religious Institutions Support Violence of the Status Quo?" (Fox, Status Quo 126). That is, the question of when are the churches a force supporting the political elites and when are they a source for change? While he uses quantitative methods to examine the question across a Large-N, I am more interested in examining case studies to try and determine casual links. (Which then might be tested across a Large-N population).

requires cross-discipline analysis, incorporating elements of history, anthropology,

sociology, religion, international relations and comparative politics. I am looking

forward to clarifying the connections further, and exploring the implications of the study.

"Battle Myths and Divisive Political Institutions in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict" – graphic representation

Traditional IR/Comparative Literature	Cultural/Religious Literature

Problematic Political Institutions

Religious Institutions

Political Elite Politics

Religious Myths And Symbols

Cooperation/cooption/acquiescence

Politicized Myths and Symbols

Religious Elites

Ethnic Nationalism

Conflict

····▸ Precondition
--▸ Directly Related
--▸ Negotiating Link

Permissive Conditions

Causally Linked

Annex A

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Appendix 2

From <u>Black Lamb, Grey Falcon</u>

"Constantine stood up and called to Dragutin, who was now munching his way back to us, 'Think of it, she had never heard of our poem about the grey falcon!' "Shame!' cried Dragutin, spitting out some pips, and they began chanting together:
'Poletio soko titsa siva, Od svetinye, od Yerusalima, I on nosi titsu lastavitsu . . .'
'I will translate it for you,' said Constantine. 'In your language I can not make it as beautiful as it is, but you will see that at any rate it is not like any other poem, it is peculiar to us . . .

There flies a grey bird, a falcon
From Jerusalem the holy,
And in his beak he bears a swallow.

That is no falcon, no grey bird,
But it is Saint Elijah.
He carries no swallow,
But a book from the Mother of God.
He comes to the Tsar at Kossovo,
He lays the book on the Tsar's knees.
This book without like told the Tsar:
'Tsar Lazar, of honourable stock,
Of what kind will you have your kingdom?
Do you want a heavenly kingdom?
Do you want an earthly kingdom?
If you want an earthly kingdom
Saddle your horses, tighten your horses' girths,
Grid on your swords,
Then put an end to the Turkish attacks!
And drive out every Turkish soldier.
But if you want a heavenly kingdom
Build you a church on Kossovo;
Build it not with a floor of marble
But lay down silk and scarlet on the ground,
Give the Eucharist and battle orders to your soldiers,
For all your soldiers shall be destroyed with them.'

When the Tsar read the words,
The Tsar pondered, and he pondered thus:
'Dear God, where are these things, and how are they!
What kingdom shall I choose?
Shall I choose a heavenly kingdom?
Shall I choose an earthly kingdom?
If I choose an earthly kingdom,
An earthly kingdom lasts only a little time,
But a heavenly kingdom will last for eternity and its centuries.'

> The Tsar chose a heavenly kingdom,
> And not an earthly kingdom,
> He built a church on Kossovo.
> He built it not with floor of marble
> But laid down silk and scarlet on the ground.
> There he summoned the Serbian Patriarch
> And twelve great bishops.
> Then he gave his soldiers the Eucharist and their battle orders.
> In the same hour as the Prince gave orders to his solders
> The Turks attacked Kossovo.

There follows,' said Constantine, 'a long passage, very muddled, about how gallantly the Tsar fought and how at the end it looked as if they were to win, but Vuk Brankovitch betrayed them, so they were beaten. And it goes on:

> All was holy, all was honourable
> And the goodness of God was fulfilled.'

I said, 'So that was what happened, Lazar was a member of the Peace Pledge Union'" (West 909-11).