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Are All Dictators Equal?

The Selective Targeting of Democratic Sanctions against Authoritarian Regimes

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Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have frequently used sanctions as a reaction to declining levels of democracy and human rights violations in authoritarian regimes. However, some of the world's most repressive authoritarian regimes have never been subjected to sanctions, while other more competitive autocracies have been exposed to repeated sanction episodes instigated by Western democracies as an attempt to enhance democracy and human rights. In this paper, we investigate how the United States and the European Union have selectively used sanctions as a tool to improve the level of democracy in targeted authoritarian states. Using a new dataset on democratic sanctions between 1990 and 2010, time-series–cross-sectional logistic regression and a number of strategically selected case studies, we find strong support for the suggestion that senders select economically and politically vulnerable targets where the expected probability of sanction success is high.

Keywords: democratic sanctions, authoritarian regimes, democratization, imposition, threats

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Article Outline

1   Introduction

The end of the Cold War initiated a rapid global wave of democratization. With a new unipolar world order dominated by the United States, democracy and human rights rose on the global agenda and Western states increased their pressure on authoritarian regimes to democratize (Levitsky and Way 2010).[1] This has seen the European Union and the United States

often respond with sanctions in states where elections have been rigged, opposition forces have been repressed or democratically elected leaders have been disposed from power.

Although sanctions have become an important tool to exert pressure on authoritarian regimes, there has been a general suspicion – both in the public debate and the academic literature – that sanctions have been used selectively. In the sanctions literature, several authors have argued that the "selection effect" associated with the imposition of sanctions have skewed the empirical results of studies focusing on the general effectiveness of sanctions (e.g. Drezner 1999; Lacy and Niou 2004; Morgan et al. 2009). In this study, we concentrate on sanctions that explicitly aim to improve the level of democracy or human rights protection (hereafter "democratic sanctions") in authoritarian regimes, asking the following question: What factors affect the likelihood that the US or the EU as the main global sanction senders impose democratic sanctions on authoritarian regimes?

This paper concentrates on the cost-benefit analysis of political decision makers in both the US and the EU, hypothesizing that Western senders are less likely to issue democratic sanctions if their own expected political or economic costs are high (Jing et al. 2003; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Simon 1995). Principally, unsuccessful sanctions come with domestic audience costs. In a globalized market, where countries are becoming increasingly interdependent, issuing democratic sanctions may be as costly for the Western sender as for the target. On the other hand, in the post–Cold War era, Western leaders have strong electoral incentives and experience pressure by their domestic audiences to issue sanctions on autocracies that infringe on human rights. The crucial variable mediating these diverging interests is – in analogy to Drezner's (1998) "conflict expectations" – the "democratization expectations" (i.e., the chances to instigate democratization in the target country). These are most fundamentally shaped by different economic and political dimensions of target vulnerability.

We use a newly compiled dataset of post–Cold War sanctions issued against authoritarian regimes in the period 1990–2010 to run a series of logistic regressions on US and EU sanctions. The results show that authoritarian countries are more likely to be targeted by democratic sanctions if their level of democracy is low or declining. More interestingly, authoritarian states are more likely to be sanctioned if they face strong internal protests, have many organizational ties with the sanctioner, a low level of economic development, high inflation or high dependence on aid from the sanction sender. All these variables serve as proxies for the economic and political vulnerability of the target state.

To complement the statistical findings, this paper uses logistic diagnostics to identify a number of case studies where the EU and the US have issued democratic sanctions against weak authoritarian regimes. By examining the cases of Niger, Guinea, Fiji, Peru, and Pakistan, we show how the willingness to issue sanctions is dependent on the target's vulnerability and, in turn, the expected probability of sanction success.

This paper proceeds as follows: After discussing the particularity of democratic sanctions and potential triggers for their use, we examine how target vulnerability and additional factors shaping the sender's expected costs and benefits affect the probability of democratic sanctions. We then present the data and the research design, followed by the discussion of empirical results from the statistical analysis and the case illustrations. We conclude with a discussion on the implications of our findings.

2 Democratic Sanctions and Triggers for Democratic Sanctions

It is a well-established finding that democratic sanctioners are more likely to target autocracies than other democracies (Lektzian and Souva 2003, e.g. 2007). "Western liberalism's triumph" (Levitsky and Way 2002: 61) meant that the US and its allies have become far more assertive in actively promoting democracy at the global level than they were during the Cold War (Burnell 2000; Carothers 1999).

Accordingly, more than 50 percent of all the sanctions directed toward autocratic regimes recorded in the new global dataset on post–Cold War sanctions (see below) explicitly aim to bring about democratization or to improve the level of human rights. Figure 1 shows that the US and the EU most often used the foreign policy instrument of sanctions in the beginning of the 1990s, just after the end of the Cold War. However, democratic sanctions still stand out, by far, as the most important sanction category with 14 authoritarian countries being targeted in 2010.

The literature distinguishes between minor and major sanction goals (Drezner 1999: 107–112; Drury and Li 2006; Hufbauer et al. 2007), where the latter are associated with a higher concession cost for the target. When talking about authoritarian regimes, there is no sanction category that introduces a higher political cost of concession than those demanding democratization. The instigation of democratic reform represents a significant threat to the survival of authoritarian leaders as they rely on various authoritarian measures to stay in power (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010; Marinov 2005).[2] As a consequence, the mere threat of sanctions is normally inadequate in changing the target's behavior (Drury and Li 2006; von Soest and Wahman 2013).

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[2]   We take it as axiomatic that actors in a position of power want to retain their position (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).

Figure 1: Number of Authoritarian Countries Targeted by Different Sanctions

Source: Authors' compilation.

From a sender perspective, democratic sanctions differ from many other sanction categories. Some sanctions, like those aimed at ending nuclear proliferation or at punishing regimes that harbor terrorists, are directly related to national security concerns. Democratic sanctions, on the other hand, are less directly connected to classic realist goals of international politics. We believe that the particular character of democratic sanctions – which affects the rational calculation of senders to impose sanctions and targets to give in to sender demands – warrant specific investigation, especially with regard to the selective use of this sanction category.

In order to examine democratic sanctions, it is necessary to shift the analysis to the micro-foundational level of sanctions (Kirshner 1997) and to identify the incentives for leaders to impose democratic sanctions. On the one hand, US and EU leaders find it difficult to ignore human rights abuses in authoritarian states; doing so leaves them vulnerable to domestic criticism by their political opponents, civil society and the media. On the other hand, ineffective sanctions would raise domestic questions about leaders' competence (Fearon 1994; Tomz 2007). Accordingly, self-interested democratic leaders are most likely to impose democratic sanctions on vulnerable targets where the chances of attaining the sanction goals are high.

There has been a clear – but largely unarticulated – conflict between scholars who stress the strategic selection of targets from a sender perspective (e.g. Drezner 1998, 1999; Jing et al. 2003; Morgan and Schwebach 1997) and those who focus on the strategic decisions of targets to concede to or reject the demands issued by prospective senders (e.g. Blake and Klemm

2006; Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000; Nooruddin 2002). Our theoretical expectations are in stark contrast to the latter of these two strands. According to this literature, target states accept the demands issued by prospective sanctioning states if they perceive the threats to be credible and potential sanctions to be costly (Hovi et al. 2005). As a consequence, we would expect to see fewer imposed sanctions in vulnerable countries where sanctions might actually be effective (Nooruddin and Payton 2010: 716, 718; Nooruddin 2002). Although this argument might be true for many sanction categories, we argue that the high costs associated with democratization for target states (i.e., compliance results in a concession of power, which decreases a regime's ability to stay in office) make the strategic selection of targets by senders more important than the strategic response by targets to sanction threats. Democratic sanctions against poor and economically isolated countries apportion hardly any economic costs to the sender. Therefore, Western senders might be far more inclined to take a stand against political repression in such countries by imposing sanctions and reaping the subsequent domestic political gains (Krustev 2010). In this context, target vulnerability *increases* rather than *decreases* the probability of democratic sanctions.

2.1 Triggers for Democratic Sanctions

The most evident explanation for the application of democratic sanctions is a prospective target's authoritarian behavior. Surprisingly, existing research analyzing the imposition of sanctions[3] has, however, almost exclusively focused on structural variables – be they related to the sender or to the target, or to the dyadic relationship between the two (for instance Nooruddin 2002) – and has neglected the actual autocratic behavior of the target.[4] There has not been a systematic analysis on how "trigger variables," such as a swift deterioration of human rights or a coup d'état, in addition to structural variables influence the decision to (not) impose sanctions.

It is also necessary to establish whether sanctions are more often used when democracy levels are declining or when democracy levels are constantly low. One strand leans toward dynamics rather than to low-level equilibriums (Laakso et al. 2007), whereas other research suggests that the most severe repressors are selected in the first place (Peksen and Drury 2010; Wood 2008). Based on this reasoning, we formulate the following hypothesis:

H1: *Low* and *decreasing* levels of democracy increase the probability of democratic sanctions.

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3   Despite notable exemptions (Cox and Drury 2006; Drezner 1998; Drury 2000; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2008; Krustev 2010; Lektzian and Souva 2007; Nooruddin and Payton 2010; Nooruddin 2002; Whang 2010), sanction researchers have predominately analyzed the effect of sanctions, while the dynamics that drive the decision to impose sanctions have received less attention.

4   This is obviously a simplified situation as more complex sanction networks might be at play (Cranmer et al. 2013) and as factors of the changing international system have also been mentioned (von Soest and Wahman 2013).

3   Senders' Focus on Target Vulnerability

According to H1, the US and the EU decide to impose democratic sanctions on authoritarian targets solely in response to low or decreasing levels of democracy in these states. A brief look at where democratic sanctions have actually been enforced demonstrates that this basic model is fundamentally underdeveloped. Figure 2 shows a map of authoritarian regimes and whether they have or have not been subjected to democratic sanctions in the period 1990–2010. The map reveals that some highly autocratic states, for example, Saudi Arabia have not been subjected to Western democratic sanctions, while other more competitive regimes have been targeted. For instance, Turkey (at that time an electoral, although illiberal, democracy) was subjected to EU aid sanctions as an attempt to pressure the country toward adopting a more liberal constitution (Crawford 1997). Clearly, the level of democracy among authoritarian states is not the only issue determining the application of democratic sanctions.

Our main argument in this paper is that the strategic use of democratic sanctions is primarily dependent on Western leaders' cost-benefit calculus, which is directly influenced by the chances of success (Drury 2000; Krustev 2010; Whang 2010). Therefore, senders are more likely to impose sanctions on weak targets where there is a high chance of changing target behavior. This instrumental argument is particularly relevant for the category of democratic sanctions.

Figure 2: Map of authoritarian states and imposed democratic sanctions

3.1 Political Vulnerability of the Target

Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000) demonstrate the importance of the target regime's instability for the duration of sanctions, which serves as an indicator to a potential sender of the vulnerability of an autocratic regime. An even more immediate signal to potential senders is provided by the occurrence of mass protests, particularly in electoral authoritarian regimes (Teorell 2010). In these cases, sanctioners can rationally expect that their measures will contribute to a further destabilization of autocrats (Licht 2011: 11). This may, in turn, contribute to improved democracy levels.[5] Lastly, we argue that the prospective target's political dependence on the sender is of key importance for its political vulnerability. A target with many organizational ties to the sender is more vulnerable if the sender withdraws its support from the target (Allen 2005; Whang 2010). It is also important to point out that senders who do not, at least symbolically, respond to authoritarian abuse of official allies would face high domestic audience costs. Based on this reasoning, we put forward the following hypothesis:

> H2: Politically vulnerable regimes are more likely to be targeted by democratic sanctions.

3.2 Economic Vulnerability of the Target

The effects of economic costs on sanction success is one of the most analyzed relationships in sanction research (Drury 1998; Early 2011; e.g. Hufbauer et al. 2007; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Whang 2010). Trade levels between the sender and the target largely determine the costs for both sides. Higher trade levels give more economic leverage to sanctioners but also increase their costs. However, the literature is inconclusive as to whether higher trade levels (including only imports or exports) increase the propensity for sanctions. A first set of studies assert that senders are more likely to impose sanctions on targets with weak trade links (Lektzian and Souva 2007; Nooruddin 2002). In contrast, other scholars demonstrate that higher trade dependency levels make sanctions more likely (Cranmer et al. 2013; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2008), with exports exerting a stronger effect than imports. For Cox and Drury (2006: 717), "increased trade ties may potentially create friction." From a conceptual level, the exports from the target to the sender should determine a target's economic vulnerability to a large extent.

From the sender perspective, not only should the dyadic trade dependency level (with target exports in particular) matter but also the general economic vulnerability of the target. To account for this, researchers regularly assess economic power, measured by the relative GDP per capita of sanction senders and targets (Cox and Drury 2006). In addition, we also test whether aid dependency, one of the prime indicators of asymmetric relationships between countries and gateways for influence on authoritarian recipients (Bermeo 2011; Wright 2009),

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5   The opposite may also be true as government repression might increase in response to sanctions (Peksen and Drury 2010; Wood 2008).

increase the propensity for sanctions. Economic target vulnerability can also arise due to deteriorating economic indicators, which may – in turn – significantly depress legitimation strategies and approval ratings for autocratic rulers and create divisions within the ruling elite (Geddes 1999; Lindberg 2009; Teorell 2010). We analyze economic growth and inflation as common indicators of economic development and posit the following hypothesis:

H3: Economically vulnerable regimes are more likely to be targeted by democratic sanctions.

4   Data and Research Design

This study utilized a sequence of time-series–cross-sectional logistic analyses where the dependent variable recorded whether a country was subjected to a US or an EU democratic sanction in any given year. In the main operationalization of the dependent variable, we recorded both the initial sanction year (the initiation) and subsequent country-years of a sanction episode. We used two measures to account for temporal dependence in the models. First, following Beck et al. (1998), we employed restricted splines based on the time since the last "event" in the data (i.e., the last democratic sanction by a given sender). Second, since the data displays repeated years of an "event" – which is in contrast to most event history data – we also added a lagged dependent variable to the models. Although a new independent decision on whether to sanction an authoritarian state is not taken every year, the decision to continue a sanction episode is also affected by the triggers and cost variables discussed earlier. However, as a robustness test, we also ran models excluding all country-years where there was already a democratic sanction in place at t-1. Specifying the model in this way, sanction initiation (Lektzian and Souva 2007; Whang 2010) rather than the existence of sanctions becomes the dependent variable. As a further robustness test, we also ran two models looking at nondemocratic sanctions to see whether the democratic triggers are specifically associated with democratic sanctions or whether these triggers are also able to explain sanctions aimed at achieving other goals. The results for US and EU sanctions are presented separately rather than in one pooled dyadic model. By testing EU and US sanctions separately, we are able to see whether our results are robust for the two senders and whether they engage in different types of sanction behavior. Moreover, we avoid the problem of biasing the results in favor of the more frequent US sanctions.

The sample consists of all authoritarian country-years in the period 1990–2010 as defined in the authoritarian regimes dataset by Hadenius and Teorell (2007) (updated by Wahman et al. 2013). In this dataset, all countries with a democracy score of less than 7.5 on a combined 10-point Freedom House and Polity IV scale were classified as authoritarian (see below, "Measurement of independent variables"). How best to distinguish democracy from autocracy has been the topic of intense debate within political science (e.g. Collier and Adcock

2001; Elkins 2000; Verkuilen and Munck 2002). As this papers uses a continuous rather than a dichotomous understanding of democracy (as displayed, for instance, in our operationalizations of the trigger variables), Hadenius and Teorell's (2007) regime categorization was the most suitable for our study. However, to ensure that the results are not dependent on our categorization of democracy, we also ran robustness tests using the dichotomous classification by Boix et al. (2013) (forthcoming).

Our sample does not include any democratic regimes, except for those that entered the democratic-regime category during a sanction episode.[6] All in all, the sample consists of 2,079 country-years; sanctions against an authoritarian regime were imposed in 532 of these country-years.

4.1 A New Dataset on Post–Cold War Sanctions

This article uses a new dataset on post–Cold War sanctions to measure the dependent variable (Portela and von Soest 2012). The dataset is composed of the entire universe of sanction regimes imposed by the US and the EU (the main global sanction senders) in the period 1990–2010, including those sanction regimes that were already in place in 1990 and ongoing episodes. Given that the investigation explores the sanctions against authoritarian regimes, the dataset neither lists measures against democracies nor includes sanctions directed at nonstate actors.[7]

The dependent variable measures whether a country has been subjected to democratic sanctions in any given year. We define a democratic sanction as one that explicitly aims to increase the level of democracy or human rights in the targeted country. This category includes those sanctions where the imposing documents or senders' statements contain the demand for:

1) new elections,
2) the modification of the constitution or the electoral code,
3) the admission of an international electoral observation mission,
4) the restoration of a democratically elected leader,
5) the recognition of electoral results,
6) the recognition of rights and freedoms directly linked to the electoral process (such as freedom of assembly and expression), and/or
7) the protection of other human rights (Portela and von Soest 2012).

Sanctions are also categorized as democratic when the sender expresses the explicit desire to bring about democratic regime change in the autocratic regime. Furthermore, the dataset recognizes a number of other goals, which include fighting narcotics, ending the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terminating bellicosity and establishing peace agree-

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6   These countries stay in the sample until the last year that sanctions were imposed.

7   The population of authoritarian regimes is also extracted from Wahman et al. (2013).

ments and fighting terrorism. These sanction categories were not included in the measurement of the dependent variable. Sanctions do, however, often pursue several goals simultaneously. We coded the dependent variable as "1" as long as at least one of the stated goals relates to democracy or human rights improvement.

4.2 Measurement of Independent Variables

We use this section to briefly account for the measurement and sources of information for the independent variables in the analysis (i.e., all the variables related to the political and economic vulnerability of the target).

Sanction Triggers: To account for *changes in the level of democracy*, we utilized a combined Freedom House and Polity IV score. Following Hadenius and Teorell (2005, 2007), we adopted the combined score to compensate for the individual shortcomings of the two indices.[8] The aggregate is derived by computing the average Freedom House political rights and civil liberties score (reversed and transformed to a 0–10 scale) and combining it with the revised combined autocracy and democracy score from the Polity IV data (also converted to a 0–10 scale). The *change in the level of democracy* is calculated as $demo_t - demo_{t-1}$. Beside the change in democracy, we also include the 0–10 democracy score in the models to account for the *absolute level of democracy*.[9]

Target Vulnerability: A number of variables are included in the models to account for the target's expected political vulnerability. To account for regime stability, we calculated the number of years a country has belonged to the same authoritarian regime type presented in Wahman et al. (2013).[10] We accounted for the number of popular protests by adding the number of antigovernment demonstrations, strikes and riots recorded in the Banks and Wilson (2012) dataset.[11] In order to measure the number of organizational ties with the EU and the US, we relied on the data collected by Pevehouse et al. (2004) and counted the number of organizations where both the sender and the target are full members. Since the data only went up to 2000, we updated the dataset for the last decade.[12] Following Pevehouse

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8   This combined FH/Polity IV outperforms all rival indices in an independent assessment (Hadenius and Teorell 2005).

9   Two potential triggers, which are not included in the models, are changes in and the absolute level of human rights. We have also run models using the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Index (2010) without substantially differed results. As Freedom House also includes civil liberties, there is a significant correlation between the combined Freedom House and Polity measure and the CIRI democracy index.

10 We have used Hadenius and Teorell's (2007) main regime type classification (separating monarchies, one-party, multiparty and military regimes).

11 Banks and Wilson (2012) count all incidents of antigovernment demonstrations or riots with more than 100 participants and strikes with more than 1,000 participants.

12 We have used the list provided by Pevehouse (2005) to determine relevant organizations. Admittedly, a potential problem is that we have not been able to include any organizations that were created between 2005 and 2009.

(2005: 69), we excluded financial, environmental, technical and cultural organizations. For the EU, we counted all organizations containing at least one EU member nation.[13]

We used conventional operationalizations in relation to the economic costs for the target. *Economic development* is regularly measured with GDP/capita, the data for which was taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) dataset. *Trade dependence* is calculated as the dyadic export flows from the sender to the target, the data for which was taken from Barbieri et al. (2009). Since no combined EU statistics exist for the period of interest, we approximate EU trade dependency by adding trade data from the five largest EU economies (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom). *Aid dependence* is calculated as the dyadic aid flows from the donor to the recipient as a percentage of the recipient's GDP (OECD International Development Statistics Dataset 2012).[14] Similarly to trade, we approximate EU aid dependency by adding the aid payments from the five largest EU economies and aid transfers directly from EU institutions.[15] *Economic growth* is measured as annual percentage growth in GDP/capita and *inflation* as the annual percentage inflation in the GDP deflator (World Bank 2011).

4.3 Control Variables: Sender Costs

In addition to a perceived lack of vulnerability of the target, senders may also be less inclined to sanction targets if they fear that their own economic costs would be high. This might be especially true of democratic sanctions as they are not directly tied up with the national security of the sender (see above). We also included a number of control variables in the models to account for the sender's economic costs. In relation to these expectations, we would assume senders to be more reluctant to target richer and economically closer countries. Following a commonly accepted procedure, we measure the *size of a target economy* as the (logged) total GDP in billions of US dollars (current prices).[16] It is important to note that this measure is different from GDP/capita, which is used to measure economic development. Earlier research has shown that trade (Early 2009, 2011; McLean and Whang 2010) and in particular foreign direct investment (FDI) (Lektzian and Biglaiser 2012) tend to be quickly replaced by other actors, often called "black knights," "sanction busters" or "counter-hegemonic powers" (Early 2011; Hufbauer et al. 2007; Jing et al. 2003). *FDI* is measured as the net inflow of foreign investments as a percentage of GDP/capita (WDI). Major economies such as the US or EU countries are reliant on oil imports for their industry and transport sectors. Hence, imposing sanctions on oil exporters could be potentially very costly for senders. *Oil production*

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13 We only counted countries that were in fact EU members in that particular year.

14 Due to missing data, additional models will be presented in the Appendix – including the control for aid dependence.

15 Missing values are imputed from Gleditsch (2002).

16 Data are taken from WDI.

is measured in millions of metric tons (Ross 2011). As outlined above, higher trade levels give more economic leverage to sanctioners but also increase their costs. As shown, high exports from the target should raise the probability of sanctions. The opposite should be true for high exports from the sender to the target; business representatives have a strong incentive to lobby against sanctions that cut off their export opportunities and existing business ties to an authoritarian country (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992). We use dyadic trade data to account for the importance of the *dyadic trade links* between the target and the sender.

5   Results

The sample includes all 2,077 country-years categorized as authoritarian by Wahman et al. (2013) in the period 1990–2010. The US carried out more democratic sanctions, both in relative and absolute terms, than the EU during this period. There are a total of 267 years with US democratic sanctions in the sample. In as much as 74 percent of all US sanction years, improved democracy and/or human rights were at least one of the stated goals. The EU imposed democratic sanctions in 167 of the sample's country-years and 70 percent of the EU sanctions were at least partially related to democratic demands. The overlap between US and EU democratic sanctions is not as high as one might expect. There were US democratic sanctions in 62 percent of the country-years where the EU had also implemented sanctions. Due to the higher number of US democratic sanctions, only 39 percent of the country-years with US sanctions were also covered by EU democratic sanctions.

To assess our hypotheses, we introduce a number of time-series–cross-sectional logistic models below. All models use a lagged dependent variable (LDV) to account for the significant serial correlation in the data (the decision to sanction a country in year *t* is not independent of whether a sanction was in place at *t*-1). Additionally, in accordance with the recommendations by Beck et al. (1998), we include a restricted spline based on the time elapsed since the last "event" in the data. To account for the fact that a sender's decision to sanction might not be independent from the actions of other senders, we also include a control in every model to identify whether the EU (in the US models) or the US (in the EU models) had sanctions against a country at *t*-1. All independent variables, with the exception of the democratic triggers, were lagged one year to assure temporal priority.[17]

In models 1–4 (Table 1), we show the impact of our democratic trigger variables (i.e., the change in a country's level of democracy and the absolute level of democracy). Models 1 and 2 demonstrate that both the US and the EU are significantly less inclined to use democratic sanctions against countries with positive democratic development or higher levels of democracy. These results might seem quite obvious and, indeed, to a certain extent they are. How-

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17 Lagging the independent variables might affect the predictive power of some of the independent variables, but it represents a conservative test of the hypotheses.

ever, it is possible to conceive of situations where Western powers use democratic motivations to justify sanctions primarily driven by other goals. Although such situations may well exist, the results in Table 1 indicate that democratic sanctions have generally been used when the (lack of) democratic conditions have justified such actions.

Table 1: Democratic Triggers of Sanctions

	Democratic Sanctions		Other (Nondemocratic) Sanctions	
	US	EU	US	EU
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
LDV	5.810***	6.160***	7.735***	5.570***
	(.424)	(.536)	(.639)	(.666)
Level of democracy	-.127*	-.150*	-.031	-.097
	(.076)	(.082)	(.115)	(.083)
Increase in level of democracy	-.560***	-.551**	-.188	-.052
	(.178)	(.220)	(.235)	(.475)
EU sanction t-1	.727	–	-.263	.561
	(.619)		(.551)	(.927)
US sanction t-1	–	.759	–	–
		(.349)		
Spline 1	-.442	.439	.413	-.424
	(.275)	(.271)	(.341)	(.727)
Spline 2	1.932	-1.622	-2.630	3.687
	(1.272)	(1.204)	(1.715)	(4.022)
Spline 3	-2.585	2.647	5.178	-21.140
	(.719)	(2.436)	(1.143)	(20.337)
Constant	-2.584***	-4.779***	-5.350***	-4.178***
	(.719)	(.971)	(1.143)	(1.562)
Country-years	1806	1887	1846	1846
Countries	119	123	120	122
Log pseudo likelihood	-176.728	-184.968	-101.856	-63.691
Pseudo R2	.648	.620	.752	.561

*p<.10; **p<.05; *** p<.01.
Note: Entries are logistic coefficients; robust standard errors clustered by country are given within parentheses.
Source: Authors' compilation.

Parts of the literature have suggested (e.g. Laakso et al. 2007) that democratic deterioration is a more important trigger for democratic sanctions than low absolute levels of democracy. However, our results show that the absolute level of democracy is as important as the change in the level of democracy. In fact, looking at the postestimations presented in Table 3 below, the standard deviation change in the absolute level of democracy has a larger impact on the probability of democratic sanctions than the standard deviation change in democratic development. The results in models 1 and 2 also suggest that the noninclusion of democratic triggers in previous research on sanction selection might have biased the coefficients, especially in regard to the immediate post–Cold War period, where a clear majority of all sanctions had

improved levels of democracy or human rights as an explicit goal. Lastly, models 3 and 4 demonstrate that it is indeed important to separate sanctions with respect to their explicit goals. The democratic variables do not have a significant effect on the probability of non-democratic sanctions, neither in the US model nor the EU model.[18]

Table 2 introduces the main models of the analysis. Model 5 and 6 show the relationship between democratic sanctions and different approximations of regime vulnerability. Models 7 and 8 introduce controls for the economic cost of the sender. Lastly, models 9 and 10 show the robustness of the results using the democratic categorization of Boix et al. (2013) rather than the classification by Hadenius and Teorell (2007) with data from Wahman et al. (2013).

There are differences between the EU and the US models, and not all variables for political regime vulnerability are significant. However, as can be seen in Table 2, H2 and H3 are generally supported. The results show that more vulnerable authoritarian regimes are indeed more likely to be subject to democratic sanctions. Most importantly, they show that target vulnerability *increases* and does not, as hypothesized in large parts of the literature (Jing et al. 2003; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Simon 1995), *decrease* the probability of democratic sanctions. The results are highly independent of whether we look at a larger sample (models 5 and 6), include the control variables for the economic cost of the target (models 7 and 8) or run the tests using the autocratic sample from Boix et al. (2013) (models 9 and 10).

Looking at the US models, we see a clear relationship between the economic vulnerability of the target and the probability of democratic sanctions. Countries with a low level of GDP/capita or high inflation are significantly more likely to be sanctioned by the US for democratic reasons. When holding all other variables at their mean (continuous variables) or mode (categorical variables), going from the minimum to the maximum level of inflation in the sample increases the predicted probability of a US democratic sanction by 60 percent. The corresponding marginal change when going from the minimum to the maximum levels of GDP/capita is -2.3 percent (see Table 3).

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18 Keep in mind that this is a rather conservative test. The dependent variable acknowledges whether there was a sanction issued against a regime in a given year where *at least* one of the goals were not directly related to democracy or human rights.

Table 2: Determinants of Democratic Sanctions

	US Main Model	EU Main Model	US Control Variables	EU Control Variables	US BMR Sample	EU BMR Sample
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
LDV	5.373*** (.495)	5.809*** (.575)	5.438*** (.528)	5.296*** (.552)	6.915*** (.783)	4.924*** (.333)
Level of democracy	-.319*** (.103)	-.398*** (.111)	-.357*** (.112)	-.341*** (.102)	-.347*** (.105)	-.372*** (.107)
Increase in level of democracy	-.503** (.225)	-.531** (.262)	-.525*** (.112)	-.488* (.256)	-.489** (.248)	-.475* (.251)
Protests t-1	.051 (.045)	.134*** (.042)	.056 (.049)	.142*** (.047)	.088 (.062)	.163*** (.051)
Regime stability at t-1	.005 (.031)	-.029 (.032)	.007 (.030)	-.020 (.034)	.004 (.029)	-.020 (.035)
Organizational ties US/EU t-1	.478*** (.141)	.226* (.124)	.517*** (.176)	.273** (.123)	.565*** (.167)	.289** (.119)
GDP/Capita t-1	-.000** (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000** (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000*** (.000)	-.000 (.000)
GDP/Capita growth t-1	.004 (.017)	.006 (.007)	.010 (.019)	-.020 (.018)	-.005 (.021)	-.020 (.022)
GDP Inflation t-1	.000** (.000)	-.007 (.007)	.000*** (.000)	-.006 (.006)	.000*** (.000)	-.006 (.008)
Exp US/EU (log) t-1	.009 (.076)	-.045 (.069)	.080 (.109)	-.115 (.195)	.093 (.110)	.107 (.143)
Imp US/EU (log) t-1	–	–	.115 (.168)	.187 (.165)	.348* (.191)	-.050 (.193)
FDI t-1	–		-.033** (.016)	.016* (.009)	-.030* (.014)	.014 (.010)
Total GDP (log) t-1	–		-.348 (.221)	-.215 (.215)	-.440* (.230)	-.222 (.229)
Oil production t-1	–		.004 (.004)	-.001 (.004)	.002 (.004)	-.000 (.004)
EU/US Dem. Sanc. t-1	.847 (.810)	.189 (.352)	.780 (.837)	.346 (.370)	.232 (.805)	.691 (.422)
Spline 1	-.433 (.321)	.425 (.306)	-.448 (.315)	.377 (.294)	.641** (.324)	.210 (.244)
Spline 2	1.861 (1.440)	-1.826 (1.397)	2.001 (1.404)	-1.433 (1.376)	-2.203 (1.371)	-.731 (1.097)
Spline 3	-3.683 (2.841)	3.147 (2.844)	-3.968 (2.772)	2.302 (2.822)	3.916 (2.662)	1.186 (2.183)
Constant	-4.700*** (.1.351)	-4.518*** (1.306)	-5.066*** (1.413)	-5.239*** (1.434)	-9.516*** (1.565)	-4.917*** (1.380)
Country-years	1638	1680	1505	1519	1533	1528
Countries	114	118	109	111	110	111
Log pseudo likelihood	-143.640	-160.083	-141.460	-148.140	-137.773	-152.262
Pseudo R2	.669	.616	.666	.570	.676	.572

*p<.10; **p<.05; *** p<.01.

Note: Entries are logistic coefficients; robust standard errors clustered by country are given within parentheses. Models 5 and 6 represent main models. Models 7 and 8 include controls for sender costs. Models 9 and 10 use the data from Boix, Miller and Rosato (2013) to determine the sample of autocratic regimes.

Source: Authors' compilation.

Table 3: Postestimation of Probability Change for Democratic Sanctions

	US		EU	
	Min-max change	μ ± sd/2	Min-max change	μ ± sd/2
Level of democracy	-.027	-.006	-.030	-.006
Increase in level of democracy	-.147	-.003	-.102	-.004
Protests t-1	.025	.001	.594	.003
Organizational ties with the US/EU t-1	.099	.006	.044	.005
GDP/Capita t-1	-.023	-.016	-.017	-.005
GDP Inflation t-1	.598	.001	-.018	-.055
FDI t-1	-.286	-.004	.678	.002

Note: The partial change is computed with the prchange command in the Spost add-on module for Stata (Long and Freese 2006). Only significant variables are presented. All probabilities are calculations keeping the lagged dependent variable at 0 and all continuous variables held at their mean. For the first seven variables, the predicted probability is calculated using logistic model 3 for the US and model 6 for the EU. The probability for aid is calculated based on models 5 and 8 and FDI is based on models 13 and 14.

Source: Authors' compilation.

The effect of economic vulnerability is less clear in the EU models, but here we clearly see the importance of political vulnerability. An especially important factor is the mobilization of the citizenry. Going from the minimum to the maximum number of protests increases the probability of EU democratic sanctions by 2.5 percent. The number of organizational ties is significant for both EU and US sanctions. Countries with more organizational ties to the sender are significantly more likely to be exposed to democratic sanctions, a finding that confirms Cox and Drury's (2006) results for sanctions in general. The relationship is strongest for US sanctions, where the predicted probability increases by almost 10 percent in any given year when going from the lowest to the highest density of organizational ties. Due to a problem of missing data, we present models including controls for aid dependence separately in Table 4 (Appendix). These models show further support for the idea that target vulnerability determines the probability of democratic sanctions. The models show a significantly positive correlation between US aid and democratic sanctions.

There are also a number of variables related to a target's economic and political vulnerability that fail to reach significance in both the EU and the US models. Democratic sanctions are not significantly more likely against countries with more exports to the sender or those with a low or negative GDP growth rate – inflation seems to be a better predictor. Similarly, our very rough proxy for regime stability does not achieve significance in any of the models.

Table 2 uses the full sample of sanction years, including countries with repeated events (i.e., sanction episodes lasting more than one year already in place). It is, however, possible that the factors triggering sanction onset are not the same as those affecting sanction duration. To ascertain whether there is a difference, Table 5 in the Appendix excludes repeated sanction years and only tests for the likelihood of sanction onset in a given year. As Table 5

shows, there are no substantial changes in relation to the importance of target vulnerability when specifying the model along those lines.

In regard to the control variables related to the expected costs to the sender, we find some evidence to suggest that these factors are also taken into account, although the results are somewhat ambiguous. There is a significantly negative relationship between US democratic sanctions and FDI, suggesting that the US is less inclined to use sanctions against countries that are more integrated in the global economy.[19] In model 9, using the Boix et al. (2013) data to derive the authoritarian sample, we also see evidence suggesting that US sanctions are less likely in relation to large economies. However, this relationship is not robust in model 7, which is based on the Wahman et al. (2013) sample. The fact that the relationship between the sender's economic costs and the probability of sanctions is weak does not necessarily indicate that senders do not consider the expected costs when implementing sanctions. As argued earlier in this paper, senders must think about both the economic and political costs of (not) implementing democratic sanctions. If sanctions are likely to be effective (i.e., the target is economically and politically vulnerable) the sender could expect long-term economic and political benefits, although the initial economic costs might be high.

All in all, these results support the claim that target vulnerability is of key importance for sanction senders when deciding on sanction strategies (H2 and H3). A number of proxies for economic and political vulnerability – such as high inflation, a high number of organizational ties to the sender, high frequency of political protests and a low level of GDP/capita – were significantly related to a higher probability of democratic sanctions from at least one of the two major Western sanction senders.

5.1 Case Illustrations

The statistical analyses have shown that both the US and the EU have been more likely to impose sanctions on vulnerable authoritarian states than on stronger ones. In this section, we offer a number of strategically chosen case studies to validate the statistical results and illustrate more fine-tuned causal mechanisms. Figures 3 and 4 identify what Seawright and Gerring (2007) label "pathway cases," which are cases where one specific explanatory variable or set of explanatory variables have great leverage on the outcome – in this case, the *onset* of sanctions.

Seawright and Gerring suggest residual analyses for identifying pathway cases in ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Because logistic regressions do not produce residuals, predicted probabilities can be used to perform this operation (Wahman 2011). We ran two sets of models to identify our pathway cases. First, we estimated the predicted probability of

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19 There is also a weakly significant relationship between EU sanctions and FDI in model 10. However, the relationship is highly dependent on the authoritarian sample used. In model 8, using the Wahman et al. (2013) sample, the coefficient is significant in the opposite direction.

democratic sanction onset based on a base model for both the EU and the US. These base models included the lagged dependent variable, the restricted splines and the two democratic trigger variables (i.e., level of democracy and the development in the democracy score). Second, we added the variables associated with target vulnerability in logistic models 7 and 8 (presented in Table 5, Appendix) to estimate the predicted probability for the onset of democratic sanction for every country-year in the data. Third, we calculated the difference in the predicted probability between the full model and the base model. Cases where the predicted probability increases sharply when including the variables approximating the expected vulnerability of the target are considered pathway cases.

5.2   EU Pathway Cases

As Figure 3 shows, the three cases where the economic and political vulnerability of the target had the largest impact on the imposition of EU democratic sanctions were Niger (1996), Guinea (2009), and Fiji (2006) – also a US pathway case.

Figure 3: Cases with EU Democratic Sanctions

Source: Authors' compilation.

Niger 1996

On 27 January 1996, Colonel Maïnassara Baré staged a successful coup and set about abolishing the constitution and dissolving parliament. Due to the "extreme dissatisfaction" with the

enduring economic crisis and the political standstill since the transition to multiparty democracy in November 1991, large parts of Niger's population and civil society initially supported the military coup (Davis and Kossomi 2001; Elischer 2013; Gazibo 1997; Issa Abdourhamane 1996).

In contrast, international actors and the EU in particular swiftly and univocally condemned the removal of Niger's elected government. The EU suspended all development cooperation with the country, except for humanitarian assistance, to induce the restoration of the constitution. Leading the European response was the former colonial power France (Gazibo 2005).

The sanctions were imposed on one of the most vulnerable and aid-dependent countries in the world. In the mid-1990s, France provided almost half of the country's budget, per capita income stood at only $200. The rural population had been recurrently hit by famine and droughts. In January 1996, just before the coup, a general strike brought Niger to a halt (Wegmund 1997). In addition, the diverse ethnic makeup and the tumultuous political history of the country increased the insecurity of the political leadership (Charlick 1991).

In the face of swift external pressure on Niger, Maïnassara created a "National Forum," which formulated a new constitution and resulted in a shortened intermediate period until new elections were held. However, despite prior assurances to the contrary, coup leader Maïnassara contested the July 1996 elections and was elected president. Three years after taking office, Maïnassara was assassinated by members of the presidential guard in April 1999 (Idrissa 2008). This second coup was followed by multiparty elections within one year. For Davis and Kossomi (2001: 86), the Niger example accordingly demonstrates that "the unwillingness of either the Nigerien public or international donors to countenance prolonged military rule bore fruit."

Guinea 2009

Immediately following the death of Guinea's President Conté at the end of 2008 after more than 24 years in power, the military – led by Captain Moussa "Dadis" Camara – took control on 23 December 2008.

Western donors' initial responses to the military coup were contradictory. As the chair of the EU at that time, France condemned the illegal seizure of power. However, earlier "more ambiguous statements from President Sarkozy … indicated that France was likely to treat the putsch more leniently than its EU counterparts" (McGovern 2009: 108); France continued security sector cooperation programs with Niger. However, most EU development aid was cut off after the coup, especially when Camara threatened to run for president. The Western donors took a more determined approach after the killing of 156 antiregime protesters and rape of more than 100 women by junta soldiers (Human Rights Watch 2012). The EU followed the US by imposing an arms embargo as well as implementing travel bans on junta members and freezing their assets (AFP 2009).

Similar to Niger, Guinea was (and still is) economically and politically vulnerable to sanction efforts, having previously been hit with EU sanctions from 2002 to 2006. The country's income from mineral resources is very unevenly distributed and poverty is widespread. With an average GDP/capita of $418, Guinea ranked 170th out of 182 countries listed on the Human Development Index in 2009 (McGovern 2009).

Junta violence and the continued socioeconomic and political failings of his government made Camara increasingly unpopular. Following an assassination attempt on Camara and his departure to Morocco for medical treatment, another junta – led by Sékouba Konaté – came under intense pressure to hold elections. In November 2010, long-standing opposition leader Alpha Condé was elected president in the country's first free elections (McGovern 2011).

Fiji 2006

On 5 December 2006, Fiji's military ousted the elected Qarase government in a bloodless coup. The coup leader, Commodore Frank Bainimarama, declared a state of emergency and instituted the National Council for Building a Better Fiji to sideline existing institutions and to foster exchange between different ethnic groups in the divided country (Lal 2007; Ramesh 2008). The coup of 2006 was the third in a ten-year period and demonstrated that Fiji politics is characterized by a "cycle of political instability and ethnic conflict" (Ramesh 2008).

The EU denounced Commodore Bainimarama's coup as a violation of the Cotonou Agreement and imposed travel bans on those involved in the putsch, suspended development aid and put preferential access of exports to the European market on hold. The US suspended $3 million in development aid to Fiji, whereas Australia and New Zealand stopped their military cooperation, imposed travel sanctions, and froze development aid of approximately $600 million (Hufbauer et al. 2007).

In addition to the country's tumultuous political history, sanctions hit the economically vulnerable country hard – which had already seen key industries (sugar and tourism) suffer due to the military coup (Lal 2007). Sanctions against Fiji remain in place because Bainimarama continues as prime minister and has abstained from carrying out promised political reforms.

5.3 US Pathway Cases

The predicted probabilities presented in Figure 4 highlight two further pathway cases for US democratic sanctions in addition to Fiji 2006: Peru (1991) and Pakistan (1999).

Figure 4: Cases with US Democratic Sanctions

Source: Authors' compilation.

Peru 1991

In August 1991, the US halted military assistance and development aid to Peru due to human rights violations by the Peruvian military in its war against the Shining Path guerilla group. Only after Peru's government agreed to better protect human rights was some economic aid and military aid released in December 1991 and January 1992, respectively (Hufbauer et al. 2007).

Peru's relations with its neighbors and the US deteriorated once again on 5 April 1992 when President Fujimori – in a military-backed self-coup (autogolpe) – dissolved Congress and regional governments, suspended the 1979 constitution, and dismantled the judiciary (Cameron 1997). He subsequently formed an "emergency government of national reconstruction" supported by the military and the police (Ferrero Costa 1993). The US reacted by freezing all nonhumanitarian development aid ($164 million) and military assistance; deliveries of military equipment and trade preferences were also suspended (Ferrero Costa 1993).

When the US government imposed sanctions in 1991 and 1992, Peru suffered from severe weaknesses: massive political and socioeconomic problems, guerilla terror and deep citizen distrust of the political elite. This "created a climate of ungovernability that legitimated – if it did not precipitate – the coup" (Levitsky 1999: 80 f). The suspension of international assistance exacerbated the existing budget crisis in Peru, which was already $22 billion in debt (Hufbauer et al. 2007).

"The signal from Washington and Western Europe was clear: there was a direct link be-
tween respect for human rights and democratic procedures on the one hand, and the
continuance of aid on the other."

(Ferrero Costa 1993: 35)

After ruling by decree for seven months, Fujimori held elections for a constituent assembly in
November 1992. Two and a half years later, he was reelected with an almost two-thirds ma-
jority (Levitsky 1999). At that time, Peru's political system could be described as electoral au-
thoritarian or competitive authoritarian (Levitsky and Loxton 2013). Despite indications of
massive electoral fraud in the April 1995 elections, the US government resumed development
aid and military cooperation with Peru.

Pakistan 1999

The US aid sanctions against Pakistan in 1999 were a response to General Musharraf's coup
on 12 October 1999 in which he ousted Prime Minister Sharif and declared a state of emer-
gency and suspended both parliament and the constitution. Pakistan's citizens, who had be-
come disenchanted with Sharif, widely welcomed the bloodless coup and Musharraf's an-
nouncements to politically and economically reform the country (Constable 2001).

   In contrast to European countries and the Commonwealth of Nations, which suspended
Pakistan's membership, the US was more hesitant to deplore Musharraf's coup. Publicly, the
Department of State called for the restoration of democracy. On 15 October 1999, the Clinton
administration invoked Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, which re-
quires US aid to be cut off to any country whose democratically elected head of government
is deposed by military coup or decree (Hufbauer et al. 2007).

   Yet having already imposed economic sanctions on Pakistan after its nuclear tests in 1998,
the US made no further move to punish the Musharraf government after the coup.

"In part, this was a reflection of the longstanding strategic ties between the two coun-
tries, especially their military and intelligence communities; and in part, it was a
recognition of Musharraf's domestic popularity."

(Constable 2001: 21)

On 22 September 2001, barely two weeks after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush suspended
the nuclear-related sanctions as an acknowledgement of Pakistan's cooperation with the US-
led "War on Terror." However, coup-related restrictions on development and military aid
remained in place (Hufbauer et al. 2007).

   In terms of vulnerability, Pakistan's situation is more ambivalent than that of the other
targeted countries. On the one hand, the country was economically and politically weak – ev-
idenced by decreasing democracy indicators, economic stagnation and a per-capita income
of $500 a year (Constable 2001: 17). On the other hand, with a population of 130 million and
nuclear capabilities, Pakistan was a powerful country in a world region of key geostrategic

importance. Accordingly, the leverage for this sanction episode was limited, as the US feared that more severe sanctions would lead to the collapse of this strategic partner.

It is widely acknowledged in the literature that the US response to Musharraf's coup was only lukewarm (Constable 2001: 21). Due to strategic considerations – historic ties and Pakistan's role as an ally in the War on Terror – the US administration restricted its sanction pressure and chose to signal its disapproval of the unconstitutional transfer of power in Pakistan, rather than overthrow the new government. Nevertheless, it is still noteworthy that the US imposed democratic sanctions on its partner at all – even if they were limited.

6 Conclusions

This paper has studied the selective targeting of international sanctions against authoritarian states, focusing especially on those sanctions used to enhance the target's level of democracy or human rights protection. Although the so-called selection bias of international sanctioning has been described as a fundamental problem in the study of sanction effectiveness, the literature reveals conflicting expectations of how this selective use of sanctions biases the results of empirical research. Moreover, there has been little discussion about the fact that international sanctions are designed to accomplish varying types of behavioral change by the target. When making the strategic decision to (not) impose sanctions, it is important for the sender to account for the target's actual behavior and to consider the economic/political costs and benefits to itself. Furthermore, the rationale of both the sender and target differs according to the goals of the sanctions.

In this paper, we show that democratic sanctions are most probable in contexts where they are likely to be successful. We have shown the causes for EU and US sanctions to be similar and that both senders have had a general tendency to sanction countries that are vulnerable (i.e., economically deprived, aid dependent, high levels of popular contestation and strong organizational ties with the sender nation). Our analysis also runs counter to the idea that high-cost democratic sanctions do not generally materialize due to target states' early compliance to threats. Although this might be the case when sanctions are connected to less salient demands (Drury and Li 2006), the evidence from this study – which focuses on democratic sanctions against authoritarian regimes – suggests the opposite.

These results have implications for comparative democratization research. Those wishing to study the effect of international factors in domestic processes of democratization must be aware of the potential endogeneity problem. Western nations are likely to put less democratization pressure on regimes expected to be stable than countries with high vulnerability. Ineffective, drawn-out sanction episodes against stable authoritarian regimes come with high economic and political costs for the sender and thus diminish popularity returns for the imposing government. The long and fruitless US sanction episodes against the autocratic regimes of Iran and Cuba are two contemporary examples that illustrate this point.

This study was carried out with a large sample of cases covering an extensive period of time. In the future, more qualitative case study research is needed to study democratic sanction decisions in greater detail, which should help uncover causal mechanisms and enhance our understanding of specific sanction senders. As sanctions have become one of the most important tools with which to push authoritarian states toward democracy, understanding how this tool has been used in the post–Cold War era is key for comparative politics analysis focused on democratization and international relations research concerned with the effects of sanctions.

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Appendix

Table 4: Determinants of Democratic Sanctions including Aid

	US Control Variables	EU Control Variables
	(11)	(12)
LDV	5.439*** (.554)	5.254*** (.547)
Level of democracy	-.376*** (.117)	-.345*** (.103)
Increase in level of democracy	-.563** (.225)	-.484* (.256)
Protests t-1	.073 (.060)	.142*** (.047)
Regime stability at t-1	.007 (.036)	-.020 (.035)
Organizational ties US/EU t-1	.484** (.201)	.280** (.127)
GDP/Capita t-1	-.000** (.000)	-.000 (.000)
GDP/Capita growth t-1	.008 (.015)	-.022 (.019)
GDP Inflation t-1	.000** (.000)	-.007 (.007)
Exp US/EU (log) t-1	.105 (.114)	-.188 (.168)
Imp US/EU (log) t-1	-.017 (.153)	-.141 (.207)
FDI t-1	-.033** (.017)	.016 (.010)
Total GDP (log) t-1	-.238 (.220)	-.190 (.209)
Oil production t-1	.007 (.006)	.001 (.004)
US/EU aid t-1	5.794* (3.274)	1.093 (2.177)
EU/US Dem. Sanc. t-1	.963 (.795)	.326 (.372)
Spline 1	-.558* (.305)	.356 (.292)
Spline 2	2.429* (1.372)	-1.312 (1.369)
Spline 3	-4.769* (2.719)	2.053 (2.816)
Constant	-4.349*** (1.447)	-5.259*** (1.477)
Country-years	1338	1390
Countries	103	106
Log pseudo likelihood	-134.894	-147.324
Pseudo R2	.670	.561

*p<.10; p<.01 **; p<.05 ***.

Note: Entries are logistic coefficients; robust standard errors clustered by country are given within parentheses.
   Models 11 and 12 replicate models 7 and 8 but include control for aid dependence.

Source: Authors' compilation.

Table 5: Determinants of Democratic Sanctions Onset

	US Control Variables	EU ControlVariables
	(7)	(8)
Level of democracy	-.668*** (.223)	-.377*** (.128)
Increase in level of democracy	-1.403*** (.292)	-.891*** (.247)
Protests t-1	.125 (.131)	.106** (.052)
Regime stability at t-1	-.004 (.028)	-.051 (.036)
Organizational ties US/EU t-1	.969*** (.283)	.394*** (.146)
GDP/Capita t-1	-.000** (.000)	-.000 (.000)
GDP/Capita growth t-1	-.021 (.018)	-.030 (.028)
GDP Inflation t-1	.000*** (.000)	-.004 (.003)
Exp US/EU (log) t-1	.124 (.111)	.054 (.190)
Imp US/EU (log) t-1	.555*** (.207)	-.153 (.190)
FDI t-1	-.026 (.020)	.002 (.017)
Total GDP (log) t-1	-.880*** (.2308)	-.109 (.238)
Oil production t-1	.005 (.010)	-.001 (.004)
EU/US Dem. Sanc. t-1	2.218* (1.123)	.481 (.672)
Spline 1	-1.599*** (.378)	-1.168*** (.323)
Spline 2	6.949*** (1.817)	5.229*** (1.703)
Spline 3	-13.318*** (3.609)	-10.515*** (3.608)
Constant	-1.522*** (1.731)	-1.583 (1.586)
Country-years	1387	1435
Countries	109	111
Log pseudo likelihood	-66.685	-92.386
Pseudo R2	.431	.290

*p<.10; p<.01 **; p<.05 ***.

Note: Entries are logistic coefficients; robust standard errors clustered by country are given within parentheses. Cases where the ldv=1 are excluded from the model.

Source: Authors' compilation.

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