The Uganda Defence Review

Learning from Experience

This report critically examines the experience of the Uganda Defence Review, which was conducted between 2002 and 2004 with the assistance of the United Kingdom. The achievements and challenges highlighted here offer fertile ground for learning that may help others navigate more effectively the difficult terrain of defence and security reviews, particularly where external assistance is involved.

The report is based on contributions from members of the Uganda Defence Reform Secretariat, the UK Department for International Development, the UK Security Sector Development Advisory Team, King's College London, and Makerere University—all of whom were involved in the Defence Review.

The report includes a summary of the key 'lessons' identified, for those with little time on their hands, as well as a detailed analysis of the issues related to conducting and managing a Defence Review, for those who would like to learn more about Uganda's experience. There is also a list of key documents of relevance to the Defence Review, which serve as an additional learning resource.

The report was published by the Conflict, Security and Development Group at King's College London, in partnership with Makerere University. An electronic copy of this report can be obtained through the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform at:

http://www.ssrnetwork.net/publications/uganda_def.php.

The Uganda Defence Review

Learning from Experience

September 2007

Copyright

Contents

Acknowledgements

This report is based on a meeting held at the Imperial Resort Beach Hotel in Entebbe, Uganda, from 12–14 December 2005. The focus of the discussion was the Uganda Defence Review, which was carried out between February 2002 and June 2004. The aim was to assess the experiences of those involved in the Review and to draw lessons from the Uganda case that can inform similar initiatives in other countries.

The Entebbe workshop was attended by representatives of various government ministries, security agencies, academic institutions, civil society and donor bodies, most of whom participated in the Review process. Dr Eboe Hutchful, Chair of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN)[1], presided over the event.

Uganda's Defence Reform Secretariat (DRS), the United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DFID), and the UK Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT) sponsored the workshop. Academics from King's College London and Makerere University acted as facilitators.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stephen Andrews, Dr Elijah Mushemeza, Edith Mwanje, Professor Dent Ocaya-Lakidi, Kevin Balaba, Captain Vincent Bitature, Arthur Kamya, Nyombi Kyeyune, and Lieutenant Ephraim Mugume prepared and presented background papers, which form the basis of this report.

Dylan Hendrickson of King's College London compiled and edited the report. Earlier drafts benefited from comments provided by the above authors as well as Jeremy Armon, Graham Carrington, John Dixon, Nigel Fuller, Dr Eboe Hutchful, and John Parr.

DFID commissioned and funded this report. The analysis and conclusions reflect the diverse range of perspectives and opinions expressed at the workshop, but they do not necessarily mirror the views and policies of DFID or other parts of the UK Government.

Acronyms

ASSN	Africa Security Sector Network
DAT	Defence Advisory Team (now SSDAT)
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DRS	Defence Reform Secretariat (previously DRU)
DRU	Defence Reform Unit (now DRS)
DSWG	Defence Sector Working Group
EAC	East African Community
EC	European Commission
ESO	External Security Organisation
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GDP	Gross domestic product
GoU	Government of Uganda
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISO	Internal Security Organisation
JLOS	Justice Law and Order Sector
LARP	Logistics and Accounting Reform Programme
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MTEF	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NRA	National Resistance Army (now UPDF)
NRM	National Resistance Movement
PMT	Project Management Team
PSC	Project Steering Committee
SADCC	Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference
SPF	Security Policy Framework

SSDAT	Security Sector Development Advisory Team (previously DAT)
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TMT	Top Management Team
UDES	Uganda Defence Efficiency Study
UDRP	Uganda Defence Reform Programme
UGX	Uganda Shilling
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UPDF	Uganda Peoples' Defence Force (previously NRA)

The structure of this report

This report is designed to be used in different ways by different people. For that reason, it is divided into three distinct parts:

- Part I briefly describes the Uganda Defence Review and lists the main lessons identified to date. This Executive Summary is for policymakers and others who do not have time to read the entire document.

- Part II contains more detailed coverage of the Review process, an analysis of the main achievements and challenges faced, and the primary lessons. This is for those who would like to learn more about Uganda's experience.

  Part II is structured as follows:

  Chapter 1: The importance of learning from Uganda's experience

  Chapter 2: Overview of the Uganda Defence Review process

  Chapter 3: Challenges and lessons identified:

  Section 1: National ownership;
  Section 2: Methodology;
  Section 3: Management of the process;
  Section 4: Technical assistance; and
  Section 5: Stakeholder involvement.

  Chapter 4: Outcome of the Defence Review.

- Part III comprises a list of key information resources related to the Defence Review, including background documents, national security legislation, reports produced during the Review, and the key outputs of the process. These will be of interest to those seeking additional information on the Uganda Defence Review.

The endnotes on p. 72 provide extra information that may be of assistance in reading this report.

PART I
Executive Summary

Background and lessons

The Uganda Defence Review was carried out between February 2002 and June 2004. The aim was to lay the ground for a significant change in how the country formulates and delivers its defence policy. The Review sought to do this through a comprehensive security assessment to clarify the requirements of the Uganda Peoples' Defence Force (UPDF) and its relationship with other security actors.

Uganda's Defence Reform Unit (DRU)[2], situated in the Ministry of Defence (MoD), coordinated and directed the Review. The United Kingdom (UK)'s Defence Advisory Team (DAT)[3], an adviser from King's College London, and a number of national consultants helped develop the methodology and assisted in the Review process.

The Defence Review comprised three Phases:

- **Phase 1** consisted of a Strategic Security Assessment that examined the military and non-military security challenges likely to affect Uganda in the future. The first output was a Security Policy Framework (SPF), clarifying the responsibilities of different Government of Uganda (GoU) agencies in responding to these security problems. The second output was a Defence Policy, identifying the specific role and missions of the UPDF and outlining a vision for its modernisation.

- **Phase 2** involved an analysis of the operational capabilities that the UPDF will require to meet these challenges and the supporting systems and structures that would be needed to ensure effective utilisation of these capabilities. The key output was four Strategic Options, specifying the level of human resources, equipment, and training needed to develop them in a particular manner, and the financial implications.

- In **Phase 3**, the findings of the Defence Review were submitted to senior military officers and the political leadership for evaluation. Their task was to decide on the future structure and capabilities of the UPDF, and to determine the level of expenditure required. The findings of the Defence Review were published in a White Paper on Defence Transformation, approved by the Cabinet in March 2004.

Following completion of the Defence Review in June 2004, the DRU now coordinates the production of an annual Defence Corporate Plan to turn Uganda's vision of defence transformation into a practical, costed reform programme that looks three years ahead.

Lessons identified

The lessons identified in this report should be of broad relevance to other countries thinking of conducting a defence review. While they are particular to a defence review, some could also be applied to a wider security review. This is certainly the case with a number of the issues concerning *process* that are addressed in the report.

Nevertheless, it is important to remember that each country will follow a unique path that should be determined by its own priorities and the review context. The lessons identified here, therefore, do not constitute a guide on *how* to perform a defence review, but rather, they seek to stimulate critical thought on the best way to address the complex issues that arise during a review process supported by external assistance.

> The lessons identified here . . . seek to stimulate critical thought on the best way to address the complex issues that arise during a review process supported by external assistance

These lessons will also be of value to Ugandans, particularly those working in the security domain, as they look to implement the findings of the Defence Review or undertake other security reviews of one form or another. In addition, the lessons should be of utility to donors interested in supporting a security review in a fashion that reinforces national ownership of the process.

The lessons span five areas:

1. National ownership

National ownership of an externally supported defence review is key to ensuring local actors' commitment to the process. The Uganda Defence Review was conducted jointly with the UK Government and occurred because of a shared interest in professionalising the country's defence forces. The Review was intended to provide a basis for determining the level of Government spending on defence and for developing a reform programme. Although this was a politically sensitive endeavour (both for the GoU and the donors), with views differing on priorities, all parties chose to engage in the initiative. In situations where ideal conditions for a defence review do not exist at the outset, it is particularly important that efforts are made to broaden and deepen national ownership over the course of the process.

Lessons identified

- The conditions in which a defence or security review takes place may rarely favour strong national ownership and an open, comprehensive, and inclusive process at the outset. This is particularly the case where: there is not a tradition of transparency and inclusiveness in

the conduct of security affairs; the review's political base is narrow; or where the over-riding impetus for the review is external in nature.

- In such circumstances, the broadening and deepening of ownership over the course of the process need to be top priorities. This means recognising that the development of open, comprehensive analysis of and debate on security issues may be just as important, if not more so, as producing a technically sound White Paper. This must be reflected in the model adopted for the process.

- In deciding whether to accept external assistance, of what kind, and from whom, a country needs to weigh carefully the expected benefits of external ideas, financing, and technical inputs against the impact these may have on its ability to meet its objectives. Giving up control of the pace and direction of the process may be necessary to secure resources and boost belief in achieving review objectives, although the implications for national owner-ship should not be overlooked.

- For their part, donors, before embarking on a review, should consider carefully the technical and political challenges that a partner government faces in undertaking such an exercise. Technical assistance may be helpful in addressing human and institutional capacity prob-lems, but differences over aims and weak ownership, for example, may require more meticulously developed approaches to mentoring, the building of relationships, and to create space for dialogue. These factors need to be reflected in the review methodology and in the overall political engagement.

- A review based on the principles of openness, comprehensiveness, and inclusiveness requires political confidence on the part of a government and its donor partners. There must be a willingness to accommodate alternative approaches and values, and acceptance of the fact that review findings and the outcome of the process cannot be predetermined.

- Given the political risks to both sides, a strong partnership between a government and its external partners is critical. This must be based on clear agreement on the goals, principles, time frame, and methodology that will guide the process, as well as a willingness to invest the political capital and resources required to make the process work, and a commitment to regular dialogue.

2. Methodology

How a defence review is conducted has implications not only for the quality of the analysis and its relevance to a country's needs, but also for whether political decision-makers accept the findings. The methodology for the Uganda Defence Review was based on a model out-lined by the DAT and adapted to Uganda's situation in cooperation with the DRU. The model was influenced by the UK's own experience of defence reviews as well as new thinking on SSR. The key challenges in developing the methodology were to ensure that: the approach

was informed by a broad understanding of Uganda's security requirements; there was wide cross-governmental participation in the process; the analysis was sufficiently comprehensive and rigorous to ensure legitimacy of the final product; and primary stakeholders responsible for implementation, particularly the political and senior military leadership, were consulted on major decisions.

Lessons identified

- A security review methodology should ideally be informed by holistic principles that span the overall machinery for providing security, although political conditions and government priorities will determine what is feasible. Where a narrower entry point is chosen, such as defence, it needs to be informed by an understanding of the roles of, and linkages to, other security actors.

- In determining what kind of methodology is appropriate, it is necessary to strike a balance between the inspiration and ideas that an external model can provide and the need for an approach that, among other things, is in harmony with local traditions. In cases where the methodology is imported, it needs to be adapted in close collaboration with national actors.

- The scope, complexity, and pace of a defence review should be tailored to reflect existing institutional capacity and the level of ownership which exists among key stakeholders. Investment in training for those who will lead the process may be required and is likely to increase their sense of ownership and control.

- When a review is conducted in a context of violent conflict, a two-pronged approach may be required, entailing trade-offs between meeting immediate security needs and satisfying longer-term institutional transformation. However, quick operational gains might make it more difficult to address the institutional reforms that underpin defence force transformation efforts.

- Due to the political sensitivity surrounding many aspects of a defence review, it may not be possible to cover all topics. Since some issues may have the capacity to destabilise, a government and its external partners need to agree at the start on which issues will be included in a review, and on any 'red lines' that external actors must not cross. A close partnership based on trust and dialogue is vital, as it is impossible to anticipate all scenarios that may emerge.

- Although a review process should ideally strive for a principled approach that is consistent with the overarching values of comprehensiveness, inclusiveness, and transparency, there is a need to be pragmatic. A flexible approach is required so that the process can adapt to unexpected challenges and obstacles. External observers/participants will need to appreciate and take account of local difficulties and dilemmas.

3. Management of the process

A defence review is a technically complex and politically sensitive exercise that needs to be carefully managed to secure the right outcome. In Uganda's case, a number of structures and tools were used to facilitate management of the Defence Review. They sought to: ensure that the Review progressed in line with the agreed ToR and completed on time; align the Review as closely as possible with wider governmental planning and budgetary processes; and keep senior military and political leaders informed about what was happening in order to secure their support. Various institutional and political factors affected the performance of these structures and tools, necessitating a flexible approach by the DRU and its advisers to keep the process on track.

Lessons identified

- In the context of a politically sensitive and technically complex security review, a robust set of project management structures and tools can help to keep things on track and on schedule, and can aid in resolving any problems that may arise. The country undertaking the review, and its external partners, should discuss and agree on them beforehand.

- Investment in national project management capacity needs to be an explicit component of an external programme of support for a security review. Adequate training and preparation of relevant staff can contribute to enhanced ownership of the process and ensure greater continuity, particularly when external advisers can only provide detailed support when in country.

- Development partners that decide to support a review process need themselves to ensure that they have adequate capacity in-country to fulfil this task effectively. This is particularly the case where advisory inputs come from a variety of external sources, and thus need to be coordinated. Substantial time and attention may also have to be devoted to building relationships with counterparts in government and with other development partners in order to ensure a coherent programme of external support.

- It is important at the outset of a security review to assess the factors that might affect the outcome. Stakeholder analysis tools to evaluate risks can be helpful in this regard, although they will prove irrelevant and ineffective if not used regularly and if strategies are not developed to mitigate identified dangers.

- When a security review adopts a narrow entry point (such as defence), the establishment of a high-level, cross-governmental management structure, involving, for example, representatives of different government ministries, can help to connect more effectively a security review with government-wide planning and budgeting processes or other relevant initiatives. However, it may not be necessary or desirable to create another formal management structure if bodies already exist in which issues can be raised and discussed.

The Amuka militia, an auxiliary force of the UPDF, parade during celebrations to mark 21 years of National Resistance Movement (NRM) rule, January 2007. © Hudson Apunyo/Reuters.

- There are limitations on what formal management structures and tools can achieve when a review does not take place in a supportive political environment. In such contexts, informal strategies may be useful for engaging stakeholders in the process and soliciting policy direction from key decision-makers.

- Nonetheless, in terms of institutionalising good practice in project management (a long-term endeavour), it should be recognised that excessive reliance on informal strategies carries risk. This is particularly true in a weak institutional context where not all stakeholders may share a commitment to the underlying principles of a review. This may make it more difficult to consolidate formal management structures.

4. Technical assistance

Technical assistance provided in support of a reform process—such as that received by the DRU from a number of external (notably the UK Government) and local sources—has mixed benefits. On the one hand, it enabled the Uganda Defence Review to be completed more quickly than might otherwise have been the case, and it helped to secure greater achievements. In addition, it permitted the transferral of important skills and knowledge to

DRU staff members, building capacity. On the other hand, reliance on technical assistance reduced control by the DRU over the pace and direction of the process, and it may have made it more difficult for its members to 'learn by doing'. Awareness of the pluses and minuses of technical assistance is important in gauging how a country can take full advantage of external support.

Lessons identified

- Technical assistance for a security review should strive to compliment, facilitate, and enhance nationally led efforts, yet stop short of carrying out tasks that national actors can fulfil themselves. This may be a difficult balance to strike, however, when national capacity is low. In such cases, external partners need to be particularly sensitive to how their involvement may influence attempts to broaden and deepen national ownership and control over a review process.

- Given the dilemmas inherent in the provision of technical assistance, one should try prior to the inception of a review process to assess national institutional resources in order to identify capacity gaps and the specific requirements for technical assistance. Ideally, an external partner and its national counterparts should jointly conduct this evaluation and it should inform the overall approach to the security review.

- An attempt should be made to ensure an appropriate match between the background and technical expertise of external consultants and those of national counterparts. Naturally, this will vary from case to case. In certain instances, a military officer may command more attention and respect than a civilian when delivering messages about operational military matters. By contrast, when the subject pertains to defence sector management, a lesson on democratic civil oversight may carry more weight if a civilian presents it.

- Where national capacity is very low, there is likely to be benefit in providing basic training to core staff before the process commences. While this may not fully address all capacity gaps, it can enhance the confidence and belief of local actors that they are in the 'driving seat' and enable them to learn more effectively as the Review unfolds. In the interest of avoiding delays, it is desirable that those who receive such training do not move to other jobs during the process.

- Similarly, there is a strong case for ensuring continuity among the external advisers who provide technical assistance, whether they are based in the country or visit occasionally. This helps to guarantee that advisers are knowledgeable about the context in which they are working and facilitates the development of trust and closer working relations between them and their local counterparts.

- Both parties should acknowledge at the outset the sensitivities involved when external advisers are involved in a security review process. They should agree, for instance, on how

sensitive information is to be handled. This may increase the confidence of a country under-taking a review that its sovereignty will be respected.

- In contexts where national ownership of a review process is weak, or there are acute sensitivities regarding external involvement, technical assistance may be more effective if it is backed up by regular dialogue at the political level between a country conducting a review and its external partners. This can help to ensure that each side's expectations are compatible and assist in anticipating problems that may undermine the effectiveness of technical assistance.

5. Stakeholder involvement

Wide stakeholder involvement in a security review is generally seen as desirable to ensure legitimacy and to enrich the analysis. During the Uganda Defence Review, views were solicited from a broad range of stakeholders from inside and outside of the GoU. While there was extensive governmental participation, particularly during the Strategic Security Assessment, involvement by non-governmental actors was generally limited, except for a small group of academics that were involved throughout. Furthermore, a parliamentary debate on the White Paper did not take place as anticipated. This variable participation by stakeholders reflects an assortment of factors, including the sensitivity of the Defence Review and resource and time constraints, all of which should be incorporated into planning at the outset.

Lessons identified

- The breadth and depth of stakeholder involvement has implications for the level of national ownership of a review process and of commitment to the implementation of its findings. It also influences how comprehensively the analysis captures the diverse range of security views of and realities facing a country's population. The degree of stakeholder involvement nonetheless depends on the circumstances surrounding a review, and will be affected by the time frame, methodology adopted and resources available.

- The extent to which stakeholder involvement can be broadened not only depends on a government's inclination to consult, but also on the willingness and capacity of relevant stakeholders to engage in a debate on security issues. In cases where there is not a tradition of open public debate on security matters, one should expect a trade-off between efforts to broaden stakeholder involvement and the time frame and resources required for a security review. Efforts to develop civil society capacity to engage in security debates may need to run concurrent to reform initiatives in the security domain.

- Given the sensitivity of security reviews, strategies should be adopted that enhance the capacity and confidence of stakeholders to engage in a debate on security issues without broaching topics that might be considered confidential. A South–South-type seminar

approach that taps into the experiences of other countries can be particularly useful in broaching security matters and legitimising any discussion.

- Defence reviews can generate excessive or unrealistic expectations among different stake-holders, including donors. These expectations may conflict and thus need to be managed to ensure that different groups have a realistic understanding of what a review can deliver in terms of practical change, without, simultaneously, reducing their incentive to support the process.

- Effective publicity early in a defence review, combined with wide dissemination of a defence white paper, may help to manage expectations and create momentum for implementation. Open discussion within parliament, army formations, and the media may also build confidence in other parts of the security sector that may be showing reluctance to go down the difficult reform path if there are no obvious benefits.

- It is likely that there will be different interests among actors in the donor community, not all of which will support the aims of a review process. External bodies that are providing assistance need to pay attention to these interests, invest resources to keep donor partners informed about objectives and to secure their backing. ∎

PART II
Analysis and Lessons

Chapter I: The importance of learning from Uganda's experience

Between February 2002 and June 2004, the GoU carried out a Defence Review with UK assistance. This was a significant undertaking for both countries, whose engagement in the process broke new ground.

For Uganda, the Review marked the first time that it had comprehensively assessed its defence needs, employing a rigorous and scientific methodology. The aim was ambitious: to lay the foundations for a significant change in how the country formulates and delivers defence policy. It sought to achieve this by anchoring defence planning more firmly in wider governmental budgeting processes with a view to ensuring that planning is based on an annual evaluation of needs, priorities, and affordability, as in other sectors. In the process, it was hoped that the Review would serve to augment public debate on defence and open up the sector to increased scrutiny by other parts of the GoU, as well as by donors.

The UK . . . decision to back the Defence Review stemmed from recognition that what happens in the defence sector affects national development and therefore should be of concern to Uganda's development partners

For the UK, this was the first time that it had supported a full review process in another country. Its decision to back the Defence Review stemmed from recognition that what happens in the defence sector affects national development and therefore should be of concern to Uganda's development partners.

The UK's own experience of defence reviews, as well as emergent thinking on Security Sector Reform (SSR), informed the methodology, while taking into account local needs. The UK recognised that the delivery of a developmentally sensitive programme of assistance to Uganda's defence sector would require close cooperation among the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and the MoD.

The Defence Review was a politically sensitive and demanding undertaking for Uganda and the UK. It came at a time when Uganda was facing a number of serious security problems. Consequently, it had to balance a complex process of strategic policy development with the

shorter-term demands of operational planning—a challenging feat in the circumstances. For DFID and its donor partners, engagement in defence reform was a very new area of activity, necessitating adequate preparation and a cautious approach. Hence, there were significant expectations on both sides, which needed to be carefully managed, about what the Review process would accomplish.

In spite of the testing conditions, the Uganda Defence Review recorded some notable achievements, which should be a source of inspiration to other countries and donors seeking respectively to undertake or support similar reviews. As this report underscores, however, significant work remains to be done to cement the initial gains. The numerous challenges encountered offer fertile ground for learning, which should help others to navigate more effectively the difficult terrain of defence and security reviews, particularly when external assistance is involved.

It was with all of this in mind that the Entebbe workshop, which gave rise to this report, convened in December 2005. Moderated by the Africa Security Sector Network (ASSN), the workshop brought together representatives of Uganda's civilian policy sectors, security forces, the donor community, academic institutions, and civil society, most of whom had been involved in one way or another in the Review process. The objective was to reflect critically on Uganda's experiences and to identify some lessons that would have broader relevance for other countries and donors.

> The numerous challenges encountered offer fertile ground for learning, which should help others to navigate more effectively the difficult terrain of defence and security reviews, particularly when external assistance is involved

Several caveats need to be applied when it comes to drawing lessons from Uganda's experiences. First, the lessons identified here are particular to a defence review and only partially relevant to a broader security review. This is especially the case with the methodology, which focused on delivery of a very specific set of recommendations for defence reform. However, when it comes to matters of *process*—that is, how to promote reviews that are comprehensive, inclusive, and transparent—much of what applies to defence applies to the wider realm of security.

Second is that the Uganda Defence Review took place in unique circumstances, including: the transition to multiparty politics, under way since the late 1990s, and the vigorous national debate on future constitutional arrangements; the ongoing conflict in the north between the GoU and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA); and the close but delicate relationship between the GoU and its development partners, which were funding, at the time, approximately 50 per cent of the national budget. Each of these factors had an impact on the conduct of the Review and are unlikely to be replicated elsewhere.

Members of the UPDF on patrol in Northern Uganda following an attack by the Lord's Resistance Army, February 2004. © AP/PA Photos.

Third, the Defence Review remains a work in progress. How the GoU and donors react to their experience of the Review will shape how defence reform evolves in Uganda. The concluding Chapter suggests that while the defence reform framework remains fragile, continued investment of energy, political capital, and resources in defence reform by the GoU and its development partners could have a beneficial effect if there is sensitivity to the challenges and lessons highlighted here. ■

Chapter II: Overview of the Uganda Defence Review

This Chapter examines the reasons for the Uganda Defence Review, its key aims, who was involved, and how it was conducted.

Why did Uganda undertake the Review?

Like most state institutions, the army, police, and other security agencies were badly affected by the political turmoil and violence that gripped the country in the 1970s and early 1980s. This political upheaval undermined the safety and security of Uganda's people as well as the country's overall stability and development.

When the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power on 25 January 1986, there was an urgent need to rebuild the security establishment. This effort started with the army, which had a lead role to play in safeguarding stability. Although the National Resistance Army (NRA) emerged victorious from the 'bush' war of 1981–86, it needed restructuring to meet the requirements of an army in the service of a modern, democratic state. Consequently, between 1986 and 2001, a number of important steps were taken to produce a framework for transforming the UPDF into a modern, professional, non-partisan army. Among the most significant were: the enactment of the 1992 NRA Statute, emphasising the 'pro-people' character of the army; the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution, providing a framework for governing the defence forces; the enactment of the 2000 National Security Council Act, providing a mechanism to coordinate the activities of all of the national security agencies, including the army; and the initiation, in 2001, of work on a comprehensive Defence Bill that would contain provisions regulating UPDF activities.

During the same period, the international donor community encouraged Uganda to undertake security-related reforms and lent its support. Notably, from 1992–94, Uganda embarked on a major demobilisation programme with external assistance, and in 1997 and 1998, the World Bank and DFID respectively backed two studies—the Logistics and Accounting Reform Programme (LARP) study and the Uganda Defence Efficiency Study (UDES)—to find ways of improving the management of defence resources. Both were driven primarily by donor concerns

about the rising level of defence spending in Uganda, although neither resulted in significant changes in the management of the defence sector.[4]

In 1999–2000, donors, led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), imposed an arbitrary two per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) cap on defence expenditure in a bid to stem further increases. This cap did not reflect an objective assessment of Uganda's security environment or needs at the time, including the war against the LRA in the north of the country. The GoU accepted it, therefore, with reluctance.

> By generating a better understanding of the security challenges confronting Uganda and its population, it was hoped that the Defence Review would assist the GoU in addressing them in a more cost-effective manner

In his 2001 re-election campaign manifesto, President Yoweri Museveni pledged to professionalise the UPDF. Uganda's development partners, led by the UK, promised to support the initiative. A two-day workshop, supported by DFID, was held in early 2001 to review the findings of the LARP study and the UDES. This formed the basis of the Uganda Defence Reform Programme (UDRP), the first phase of which was to be the comprehensive Defence Review.

In early 2002, the then UK Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short, and President Museveni agreed that the UK would provide financial and technical assistance for the Review. The terms of this agreement, including the general approach to the Defence Review, management arrangements, and expected outputs, were outlined in a Project Document.

What were the primary objectives?

The overall purpose of the Defence Review, as outlined in the Project Document, was:

> '*to re-assess Uganda's central security interests and to consider how the roles, missions, and capabilities of the armed forces should be adjusted to meet them. The aim is to make the UPDF and their supporting structures modern, professional, accountable and efficient. They also have to be affordable within a medium-term economic framework*'.

The Defence Review was supposed to provide a knowledge base for a longer-term reform programme (in Phases 2 and 3 of the UDRP), leading to improvements in the capabilities and management of the UPDF. By generating a better understanding of the security challenges confronting Uganda and its population, it was hoped that the Defence Review would assist the GoU in addressing them in a more cost-effective manner.

This could happen in one of two ways:

- by enhancing coordination between defence and other national security policy instruments in order to achieve a more integrated GoU approach to tackling national security problems; and

- by providing a framework for a more rational and open debate across Government, and between the GoU and donors, on how much spending was appropriate in the circumstances and on the earmarking of resources.

Because of long-standing differences of views, the GoU and donors were eager to introduce a mechanism to articulate the need for certain levels of expenditure.

Who were the key players?

The DRU conducted the Defence Review. Situated in the MoD, it comprised a mixture of civilian and military personnel and had a UPDF colonel at its head. Several of its 10 staff members were seconded from other departments, including the External Security Organisation (ESO) and the Internal Security Organisation (ISO). The Desk Officer in the Ministry of Finance and Planning with responsibility for defence also regularly provided advice to the DRU.

The UK's Defence Advisory Team, consisting of a range of military and civilian advisers, provided technical assistance to the Defence Review. A policy analyst from King's College London with development expertise aided the DAT. The UK consultants worked directly with the DRU team and reported to its Director-General, Colonel Robert Rusoke. In addition, the DRU was supported by a number of working groups, made up of military and civilian personnel from across the GoU, as well as by several local consultants and academics, principally from Makerere University and Nkumba University.

The GoU and DFID jointly funded and managed the Defence Review. Ugandan funding covered the operations of the DRU, whereas DFID funding covered technical assistance and a number of specific activities associated with the Defence Review.

Several management structures were tasked with offering policy direction to the DRU and with oversight to keep the Defence Review on track and on schedule. These included the Top Management Team (TMT), which already existed, and the Project Steering Committee (PSC) and the Project Management Team (PMT), both of which were established specifically for the Defence Review.

How was the Review carried out?

The Project Document outlined a number of specific criteria to guide the DRU and the external advisers:

Principles

First, it stipulated that the Review was to be guided by a number of principles. It should be:

- conducted in a comprehensive, logical and rational manner, with each Stage building on the previous one;

- followed through to completion and in accordance with the Terms of Reference contained in the Project Document;

- inclusive, consulting with individuals and organisations from within and without Government; and

- open and transparent, with the outcome of each Stage communicated as widely as possible.

In addition, the Project Document stated that decisions affecting the size of the defence budget allocation must be discussed with donors and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) prior to implementation. Furthermore, a clear record must be kept of all decisions made during the process so that an 'audit trail' existed and final recommendations could be fully explained and justified.

Outputs

The Project Document also identified a number of outputs that the Defence Review should deliver:

- a White Paper setting out strategic priorities for defence transformation and the resource implications;

- a fully costed Defence Corporate Plan to implement the agreed changes;

- an integrated MoD/UPDF structure, including appropriate defence policy and planning procedures;

- improved processes to strengthen transparency and accountability of the defence forces; and

- improved regularity and propriety in procurement and other procedures to ensure value for money and efficiency.

Process

The Defence Review was to be completed within 18 months, and was to be conducted in 10 Stages, broken down into three broad Phases of work (see Figure 1):

- **Phase 1: Development of the policy framework** The first step entailed a wide-ranging Strategic Security Assessment, examining the various military and non-military security challenges that Uganda was likely to face in the future. The first output was a Security

Figure 1 The Defence Review process

Phase 1: Development of the policy framework

Stage 1: Launch of the Review

Stage 2: Strategic Security Assessment

Stage 3: The foreign policy context

Stage 4: Security Policy Framework (SPF)

Stage 5: National Defence Policy

Phase 2: Assessment of defence requirements

Stage 6: Force development requirements

Stage 7: Supporting structures and processes

Phase 3: Political decision

Stage 8: Preparation of a Decision Paper

Stage 9: Assessment of defence options

Stage 10: Approval and publication of White Paper

Policy Framework (SPF) paper, clarifying the roles and responsibilities of different GoU agencies and departments in responding to these problems. The second output was a Defence Policy, identifying the role and mission of the UPDF and outlining a vision for its modernisation.

- **Phase 2: Assessment of defence requirements** The second phase involved an analysis of the operational capabilities that the UPDF would require to meet these challenges and the supporting systems and structures needed to ensure effective utilisation of these capabilities. The key output was four Strategic Options, specifying the level of human resource, equipment, and training needed to develop them in a particular manner, and the financial implications. The Strategic Options would provide planners with various alternatives for developing the defence forces depending on the quantity of resources available.

- **Phase 3: Political decision** Once the technical analysis was complete, the findings of the Defence Review were submitted to senior military and political leaders for consideration. Their task was to decide on the future structure and capabilities of the UPDF, and to determine the level of public expenditure that the GoU could devote to the defence sector. The findings of the Defence Review were published in the White Paper on Defence Transformation, in June 2004.

Following completion of the Defence Review in June 2004, the DRU produced a

An armoured UPDF vehicle escorts a World Food Programme (WFP) convoy in Pader district, Northern Uganda, January 2005. © Reuters Photographer/Reuters.

Defence Corporate Plan which provides a framework for turning Uganda's vision for defence transformation into a practical, costed reform programme. This action would become an annual routine, reassessing requirements and priorities against resources in a coherent manner to support management decisions for defence.

The following Sections discuss in more detail how the Defence Review was conducted, the challenges that arose, how they were addressed, and the outcome of the process. ■

Chapter III: Challenges and lessons identified

Section 1: National ownership

National ownership of an externally supported defence review is key to ensuring local actors' commitment to the process. The Uganda Defence Review was conducted jointly with the UK Government and occurred because of a shared interest in professionalising the country's defence forces. The Review was intended to provide a basis for determining the level of Government spending on defence and for developing a reform programme. Although this was a politically sensitive endeavour (both for the GoU and the donors), with views differing on priorities, all parties chose to engage in the initiative. In situations where ideal conditions for a defence review do not exist at the outset, it is particularly important that efforts are made to broaden and deepen national ownership over the course of the process.

The importance of national ownership

National ownership is vital to the success of any externally supported policy initiative.[5] What it means in practical terms is that national stakeholder groups that are involved in a policy initiative, such as a defence review, or that have a direct interest in its outcome—including the political leadership, security force personnel, civil servants, parliamentarians, and interested members of the public—accept the need for the initiative and external assistance. In addition, these groups assume primary responsibility for, and take the lead on, decisions about the objectives, strategy, and implementation of the policy initiative.

Accurate understanding of the constraints on ownership is crucial to developing an approach that will maximise national 'buy in' over the course of a review

As Uganda's experience of the Defence Review illustrates, however, there is often a tension between the ideal and the reality of 'national ownership'. In particular, there is a risk of conflating 'government' ownership with 'national' ownership and overlooking the fact that levels of ownership and commitment by other stakeholder groups may not be at the desired

levels when the process commences. Furthermore, it is frequently only one consideration that the political leadership takes into account when deciding to undertake a review. Consequently, accurate understanding of the constraints on ownership is crucial to developing an approach that will maximise national 'buy in' over the course of a review.

This Chapter examines how the Uganda Defence Review came into being in 2002 and the challenges that the context posed to the process. In so doing, it highlights the need for a pro-active and flexible approach to tackling the question of national ownership at the start of a security review.

Context for the Defence Review

The Ugandan and UK Governments first discussed the possibility of a Defence Review in 2001. At the time, the prevailing climate did not favour strong national ownership of a comprehensive, inclusive, and transparent process for a number of reasons. First, Uganda confronted a number of significant military threats. The most serious of these was in the north, where the LRA was leading a major insurgency. Uganda was also maintaining a military presence inside the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where it had intervened several years before.

Second, while President Museveni and the senior military leadership recognised that the transformation of the UPDF from a 'bush' army into a modern military was still incomplete, they took the position that, rather than addressing institutional inefficiencies, the GoU should focus on quelling the violence in the north. They argued that this would create the space and release the resources necessary for more fundamental UPDF reforms in the future.

The GoU was particularly interested, therefore, in how a Defence Review would enable it to meet its immediate security challenges. One of the defence establishment's top priorities was to raise defence spending in order to finance improvements in military/operational capability, primarily through weapon acquisitions. Furthermore, the GoU was under immense pressure to deliver tangible benefits to regular UPDF members, many of whom were serving in very difficult conditions. Significant enhancements in basic welfare and the terms and conditions of service were required if the war against the LRA was to be won.

Uganda's donor partners approached the question of defence professionalisation and modernisation, and its implications for the Review process, in a different way. The budgetary issue was a key point for them. In view of the persisting conflict in the north, most accepted the need to strengthen the UPDF's capabilities, although only if the additional resources could be used effectively. Most also felt strongly that any augmentation of defence capabilities should be financed, at least in part, by institutional reforms to promote efficiency, rather than simply an increase in defence spending.

Underlying this stance was a profound concern that any rise in defence expenditure would be at the expense of spending in other sectors, particularly health and education. It was feared that this could detrimentally affect the GoU's poverty reduction initiative, the central focus of

most donor aid programmes. A number of donors, including the European Commission (EC), the Governments of Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK, and the World Bank, had recently started providing the GoU with direct budget support. Therefore, they wanted assurance that the broader strategic priorities for public spending that had been agreed with GoU, and that formed the basis of their aid programmes, would be adhered to as closely as possible.

The primary interest of Uganda's donor partners was reforms that would lead to improved transparency, accountability, and efficiency in the use of defence resources. Such objectives are longer term in nature, involving complex organisational changes in governance of the defence sector. Areas where donors were particularly keen to see progress, and where it was believed that cost savings could be made, were policy and planning, logistics, procurement, financial management, and personnel management—with changes in the latter including the identification and removal of 'ghost soldiers' from the payroll. Donors believed that these institutional improvements would have positive multiplier effects on UPDF management and its operational capabilities.

The decision to undertake a Defence Review was therefore politically sensitive, both for the GoU and for its donor partners. The GoU agreed, following strong donor encouragement, to adopt a more strategic and scientific approach to defence sector planning. It recognised that the country's defence planning practices could benefit from new thinking and techniques. However, by inviting the UK to provide guidance on the process, it would have to open up the defence arena to an unprecedented level of internal and external scrutiny, including potentially difficult questions on the way in which the GoU managed its defence resources.

At the time of the Defence Review, Uganda was in the very early stages of its transition to multiparty politics, further heightening GoU sensitivity towards the process. Although President Museveni pledged to reform the army during his 2001 electoral campaign, many in the opposition still considered it to be the military wing of the NRM. The UPDF was thus under immense pressure to deliver results in the war against the LRA and to justify its reputation as a 'people's army', which had been earned during the liberation war of 1981–86. These sensitivities affected the room for manoeuvre of the GoU and those involved in the Defence Review to engage in a full, open, and transparent process.

Furthermore, there was a broad range of national actors, inside and outside of government, with either a direct or an indirect interest in the outcome of the Review. The positions of some within the defence establishment, in particular, were likely to be affected by the Defence Review and the subsequent reform process. Inevitably, this affected their receptiveness to the Review and impacted on the manner and degree to which they engaged with the process.

Selecting a Defence Review model

The nature of the technical assistance and the way it was delivered would be crucial therefore to efforts to address sensitivities and enhance national ownership of the Review. This was the

case since Uganda was particularly reliant on external advice to carry out the Review, which had implications for its control of the process. By agreeing to UK assistance, Uganda accepted that it would need to accommodate any differences that might exist between the two countries on how to tackle defence reform. For the UK, the critical issues were whether it had correctly read the challenging circumstances facing Uganda, and how its approach to providing technical assistance could best be tailored to meet Uganda's needs.

The nature of the technical assistance and the way it was delivered would be crucial therefore to efforts to address sensitivities and enhance national ownership of the Review

Questions were raised during the Defence Review as to whether the UK framework was appropriate for Uganda and whether greater consideration should have been given to alternative models and sources of assistance. It was argued that other African countries might provide models that were more suitable and sensitive to Uganda's unique political history and military culture. Such contentions, though, did not take into account that differences between African countries could sometimes be significant. When Uganda conducted its Review, South Africa was one of the few African experiences that could be drawn on. Its process had been overseen by a new administration and was more open and governance-oriented than was possible in Uganda at the time.

From the perspective of the GoU, therefore, the UK was a suitable choice as a partner for a defence review given its experience of conducting such processes, the reputation of its military as a modern fighting force and the close relationship between the two countries. Efforts were also made to learn from relevant aspects of South Africa's experiences, starting with the 'South–South' seminar organised at the outset of the Review by the DRU. Furthermore, during the Stage 6, a former South African military officer who had participated in his country's process was recruited to advise on the defence capability assessment.

The Uganda-UK partnership

Conditions for a Defence Review are rarely ideal in developing countries and in this case much depended on the quality and strength of the partnership between the Ugandan and UK Governments. This was built on a narrow, although shared, interest in achieving a more rational basis for dialogue on the defence budget. The partnership implied commitments and responsibilities on both sides, as well as an investment of significant time, goodwill, and political capital.

The UK, for its part, needed to recognise the immense challenges faced by the GoU in conducting its first Defence Review. It also had to keep its donor partners informed on progress and to manage expectations regarding possible achievements, given donors' many concerns about the functioning of the defence sector. Crucially, the aim of the Review was to provide a

framework for assessing Uganda's defence requirements rather than satisfying them. The latter would occur in subsequent phases of the UDRP, which would also need external support if they were to generate long-term benefits.

The highest level of the GoU, meanwhile, had to deliver a clear political message to relevant actors within the Government and the UPDF, including the DRU, that the Review should be taken seriously. In addition, it had to provide the DRU with appropriate resources to accomplish its tasks effectively.

Given that the ideal conditions for securing broad national ownership did not exist at the outset, both sides faced risks in being associated with the Defence Review. The GoU did not want to compromise its ability to make decisions on its defence forces and security, whereas donors were concerned that by accepting the Review as a basis for appraising and determining Uganda's defence spending needs, the outcome might produce unpalatable budgetary proposals, with potentially detrimental consequences for their aid programmes.

The Uganda–UK partnership implied commitments and responsibilities on both sides, as well as an investment of significant time, goodwill, and political capital

The building of national ownership thus became an explicit aim of the process, one that shaped technical assistance and the development of the methodology by the DRU and its UK advisers. Emphasis was put on two areas:

- broadening ownership of the process to include the rest of the army (not just President Museveni and the senior military officers who initiated the Defence Review), other security agencies, and parts of Government, Parliament, and civil society; and

- managing the partnership between the GoU and the UK (along with other donors), to ensure that any differences that might emerge regarding the direction, pace, and conclusions of the process did not undermine their shared interest in achieving a more rational basis for dialogue on the defence budget.

Efforts to strengthen national ownership faced various challenges, reflecting the complex institutional and political environment in which the process unfolded. Subsequent Chapters on the methodology, technical assistance, and stakeholder involvement, in particular, trace attempts to broaden ownership to include a wider group of stakeholders through an inclusive, consultative process.

Lessons identified

- The conditions in which a defence or security review takes place may rarely favour strong national ownership and an open, comprehensive, and inclusive process at the outset. This is particularly the case where: there is not a tradition of transparency and inclusiveness

in the conduct of security affairs; the review's political base is narrow; or where the overriding impetus for the review is external in nature.

- In such circumstances, the broadening and deepening of ownership over the course of the process need to be top priorities. This means recognising that the development of open, comprehensive analysis of and debate on security issues may be just as important, if not more so, as producing a technically sound White Paper. This must be reflected in the model adopted for the process.

- In deciding whether to accept external assistance, of what kind, and from whom, a country needs to weigh carefully the expected benefits of external ideas, financing, and technical inputs against the impact these may have on its ability to meet its objectives. Giving up control of the pace and direction of the process may be necessary to secure resources and boost belief in achieving review objectives, although the implications for national ownership should not be overlooked.

- For their part, donors, before embarking on a review, should consider carefully the technical and political challenges that a partner government faces in undertaking such an exercise. Technical assistance may be helpful in addressing human and institutional capacity problems, but differences over aims and weak ownership, for example, may require more meticulously developed approaches to mentoring, the building of relationships, and to create space for dialogue. These factors need to be reflected in the review methodology and in the overall political engagement.

- A review based on the principles of openness, comprehensiveness, and inclusiveness requires political confidence on the part of a government and its donor partners. There must be a willingness to accommodate alternative approaches and values, and acceptance of the fact that review findings and the outcome of the process cannot be predetermined.

- Given the political risks to both sides, a strong partnership between a government and its external partners is critical. This must be based on clear agreement on the goals, principles, time frame, and methodology that will guide the process, as well as a willingness to invest the political capital and resources required to make the process work, and a commitment to regular dialogue. ■

Section 2: Methodology

How a defence review is conducted has implications not only for the quality of the analysis and its relevance to a country's needs, but also for whether political decision-makers accept the findings. The methodology for the Uganda Defence Review was based on a model outlined by the DAT and adapted to Uganda's situation in cooperation with the DRU. The model was influenced by the UK's own experience of defence reviews as well as new thinking on SSR. The key challenges in developing the methodology were to ensure that: the approach was informed by a broad understanding of Uganda's security requirements; there was wide cross-governmental participation in the process; the analysis was sufficiently comprehensive and rigorous to ensure legitimacy of the final product; and primary stakeholders responsible for implementation, particularly the political and senior military leadership, were consulted on major decisions.

Ensuring a holistic analysis

The key methodological challenge faced when the Defence Review was launched was to balance the need for a wider holistic analysis of Uganda's security needs with the defence entry point that existed at the time. As discussed in the previous Chapter, defence reform (and the associated matter of management of military spending) was the central preoccupation of the GoU and its development partners. Even though they approached the challenge from different perspectives, there was agreement that it offered a useful entry point to address issues of mutual interest, relating to institutional reform in the security sector and management of the country's security problems. Furthermore, a donor-backed Justice, Law and Order Sector (JLOS) reform programme had been launched in 2000, involving, among other things, a review of policy in these areas.

> The key methodological challenge faced when the Defence Review was launched was to balance the need for a wider holistic analysis of Uganda's security needs with the defence entry point that existed at the time

Hence, while there was not a political opening for a wide-ranging security review, there was recognition that in examining defence needs there would be an opportunity to broaden the debate. Accordingly, the Defence Review methodology placed emphasis on:

- achieving a common understanding of the full range of security threats, military and non-military, that Uganda was likely to face in the future;
- clarifying the role and responsibilities of defence entities (in relation to other state security actors) in meeting these threats; and

- developing a defence professionalisation and modernisation plan set in a context of competing needs and resource constraints across the public sector.

In preparation for the Review, a two-day workshop was held to familiarise DRU staff with the methodology. The discussion involved, inter alia, an assessment of the possible risks and other challenges that might affect the Review, and how they could be evaluated and managed during the process.

The Defence Review comprised 10 Stages, categorised into three Phases (see Figure 1 on p. 27):

Phase 1: Development of the policy framework

Stage 1: Launch of the Review President Museveni launched the Defence Review on 14 June 2001 to demonstrate the highest level of political commitment and to encourage the wide involvement of GoU departments. As part of the launch activities, a 'South–South' seminar was organised by the DRU on 4–5 July 2002 in conjunction with SaferAfrica, a South African non-governmental organisation (NGO). The aim was to learn from other African countries that had introduced reforms in the defence sector. Ugandan delegates and senior defence officials, military officers, and parliamentarians from Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe attended the event in Kampala.

Stage 2: Strategic Security Assessment The analytical process commenced with a Strategic Security Assessment. Its objective was to develop a broad understanding of the military and non-military threats that Uganda could expect to face in the future and the options available to the GoU to address them. This involved developing a series of 'best-', 'worst-', and 'middle-case' scenarios on how Uganda might develop over the next 10–15 years and pinpointing some key 'drivers' that were likely to influence the security of the state and its people. Various generic security threats were identified, and then ranked according to likelihood of occurrence and probable impact.

Stage 3: The foreign policy context The Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a foreign policy baseline paper, which examined the contribution that defence could make to meeting Uganda's wider foreign policy goals, including assisting with regional peace-support operations. This was produced essentially to meet the needs of the Defence Review.

The SPF thus provided a framework that other GoU actors with an interest in security could use to conduct their own internal policy reviews

Stage 4: Security Policy Framework (SPF) This paper captured the outcomes of Stages 2 and 3, including a list of the major security threats that Uganda was likely to confront in the future. The SPF specifically addressed the matter of how to tackle these threats, including the roles and responsibilities of different

GoU departments and agencies. These were considered in November 2002 at a Permanent Secretary-level meeting, during which lead agencies were identified to respond to each type of threat. The SPF thus provided a framework that other GoU actors with an interest in security could use to conduct their own internal policy reviews.

The SPF was never intended to be a formal national security policy, although it provided a basis for a discussion on how Uganda could develop a more integrated cross-governmental approach to the provision of security. Furthermore, because Uganda already had a National Security Council, established by the NSC Act of 2000, a formal mechanism existed to coordinate the delivery of national security through a range of GoU actors.

Stage 5: National Defence Policy A new Defence Policy was produced in 2003 that drew on the SPF and clarified the roles and responsibilities of the defence sector in meeting Uganda's security needs. It describes five broad missions[6] that the UPDF must be prepared to undertake, and outlines a number of key 'modernisation themes'[7] on which reform should focus in order to establish the necessary defence capability.

Phase 2: Assessment of defence requirements

The aim of the second phase of work was to examine in more detail the military capabilities needed by Uganda and the cost implications. Two kinds of defence capability were assessed in parallel: the *operational capacity* required by the UPDF to execute its defence missions; and the supporting *institutional structures and processes* needed to deliver this operational capability effectively and efficiently.

Stage 6: Force development requirements The first step in determining the operational needs of the UPDF was to identify the most important 'military tasks' it would have to complete in responding to threats to Uganda in the future. The way in which each one might be tackled was then evaluated, along with the level of requisite resources. This appraisal involved distinguishing necessary 'force elements', such as an infantry or an armoured battalion. It culminated in various options for the future structure of the UPDF, including size, capability, and organisational requirements, together with associated running costs, for consideration by senior military officers.

In addition, several supporting studies were conducted under each of the modernisation themes. These papers examined the

> The purchase of additional equipment, no matter how modern or sophisticated, would have a negligible impact on defence capacity if used ineffectively

organisational changes required to achieve the desired operational capacity.[8] The analysis was guided by recognition of the fact that the purchase of additional equipment, no matter how modern or sophisticated, would have a negligible impact on defence capacity if used ineffectively.

Part II Analysis and Lessons

Effectiveness depends on well-trained personnel, good maintenance, sufficient logistics, and clear policy and operational guidance.

Stage 7: Supporting structures and processes This Stage considered the supporting institutional structures and processes needed to deliver the required level of military capability efficiently. Seven areas were covered: policy and planning; logistics, procurement and infrastructure; human resource management; roles and responsibilities; financial management; information technology; and accountability mechanisms and civil affairs. An assessment of the resources needed to develop and maintain these supporting structures and processes followed.

Phase 3: Political decision

Stage 8: Preparation of a Decision Paper Drawing on the analysis from Phase 2, four Strategic Options for defence transformation were developed and costed for presentation to President Museveni and other senior military and civilian decision-makers. The aim of the Strategic Options was to assist decision-makers in comparing defence spending requirements with other public spending priorities and, in so doing, to allow for a more rational discussion across the GoU and with donors about the country's defence expenditure. A Decision Paper was circulated among the Cabinet, the MoD, senior UPDF officers, and other relevant internal stakeholders.

Stage 9: Assessment of defence options The Decision Paper was discussed by the senior military and political leadership and revised a number of times. The GoU decided on its vision and priorities for defence transformation, which were incorporated into a White Paper.

Stage 10: Approval and publication of White Paper The original intention was to table the White Paper in Parliament for discussion and endorsement. In the event, however, it was determined that because the White Paper was not an official piece of Government legislation, it should be approved by Cabinet. The White Paper was subsequently presented to Parliament as a 'Reference Document'. Publication of the White Paper formally brought to an end the Defence Review, and set in motion a number of activities to implement its key findings.

Achieving broad participation

Representatives from across the GoU and academia, and, to a lesser extent, from outside government, participated in the Defence Review at various points in order to contribute to the analysis or to take a lead on it. Various different techniques were used to promote consultation, a common terminology, and a shared understanding of the issues.

Phase 1 witnessed an examination of all relevant policy instruments to address Uganda's security needs. Actors responsible for defence, finance, foreign policy, intelligence, justice, law, and order, local government, political and constitutional affairs, and social and economic affairs

were invited to meetings organised by the DRU. In practice, attendance by each sector varied greatly and some, such as the JLOS, were poorly represented.

A workshop format was adopted for the meetings, allowing:

- a number of specialist subgroups to present their findings on the main factors likely to affect Uganda's security environment;
- for discussion of the ideas offered by these subgroups and their consolidation into a number of key 'drivers' of security and the creation of an extensive list of security threats;
- for the prioritisation of these security threats based on an assessment of the likelihood of them materialising and the impact they would have; and
- for documentation of the discussion and the way in which decisions were arrived at in order to ensure the existence of a clear 'audit' trail.

Ugandans conducted the analysis during the Strategic Security Assessment phase and it was grounded in the country's unique historical, political, and strategic context.

Phase 2 saw a significant reduction in the participation of actors from outside of the defence sector, as expected, due to the sensitivity of the issues and the need for more specialist defence expertise.

Stages 6 and 7 occurred in parallel. A working group that included representatives of the ESO, the ISO, and the UPDF considered submissions from each functional military actor, such as artillery, infantry, and signals. These submissions formed the basis of the Strategic Options.

The DRU directed relevant Service Chiefs in the MoD—responsible for key areas of development, such as field logistics, operational command and control, and training—to prepare an institutional 'gap analysis' before implementation of the Review findings began. The aim was to ensure that those responsible for delivering a modernisation programme had adequately evaluated areas of deficiency within their departments and the actions required to remedy them.

With the exception of work on roles and responsibilities, led solely by the DRU, local consultants were hired to study the changes needed in each service area. In general, their recommendations described what needed to be done, but they did not address how these areas would be strengthened in practice. The DRU had to provide considerable input to refine the recommendations and to develop ideas for projects that could contribute to the enhancement of capacity. These projects were then costed.

Ugandans conducted the analysis during the Strategic Security Assessment phase and it was grounded in the country's unique historical, political, and strategic context

Ensuring rigorous analysis

The Defence Review methodology was logical and rational, with each Stage building on the previous one. The objective was to ensure coverage of all relevant issues in a systematic manner. Nevertheless, certain areas and issues received less attention than might have been desirable. There were three reasons for this:

- First, there was a difficult balance to strike between the long-term perspective required to inform a strategic approach to defence reform in Uganda and the shorter-term outlook necessary to deal with the war in the north. A 10–15 year focus was seen as essential to achieve real modernisation and professionalisation of the UPDF. Nevertheless, when priorities for the development of the defence capability were being considered in Stage 6, it became evident that there was a need for much better understanding of short-term operational requirements in the north. The Review, however, had thus far not formally examined in any detail the conflict with the LRA because it was viewed as beyond its scope.

- Second, some of the issues covered in Stages 6 and 7 were simply too sensitive to be examined in an open process. The Phase 1 threat analysis, for example, was largely conducted at a general level. Reference was not made to particular countries or internal groups that might be a security threat. To get around this problem, a special committee was set up to undertake a Military Capability Assessment to consider specific threats. Deliberations were classified.

- Third, time pressures and capacity limitations made it difficult to examine all issues in as much detail as was desirable. The time frame for completion of the Review was 18 months. The intention was for the final Stage of the process, when the GoU was to contemplate the findings, to coincide with the beginning of the 2004–05 budgetary process. The DRU and the external consultants were therefore constantly mindful of the need to stick to the schedule as closely as possible.

Each of these factors added to the difficulty of covering all of the issues that ideally should have been part of the Defence Review. For instance, certain perceived institutional problems within the defence sector, notably corruption, the role of the military in political life, the state of civil-military relations, intelligence, and defence budgeting and auditing processes, were seen as too sensitive to be broached in any detail. Issues relating to 'ghost soldiers' and various irregular security forces, such as militias and local defence units, also were not examined in great depth. Because of the focus on formal defence struc-

An additional challenge, from the outset, was to ensure that the methodology was effectively adapted to the institutional capacity of the DRU while at the same time maintaining a rigorous standard of analysis

tures, a number of structural problems, affecting UPDF performance, were not adequately addressed.

An additional challenge, from the outset, was to ensure that the methodology was effectively adapted to the institutional capacity of the DRU while at the same time maintaining a rigorous standard of analysis. The need for a structured approach was considered essential from the standpoint of maintaining the credibility of the process and its findings.

A related challenge was to draw people, who had different perspectives on security, in to a logically developed and common view of the issues. Agreement did emerge in the working seminar on the basic approach that was adopted. In particular, there was general appreciation among those involved in the Review that the external concepts and tools introduced by the advisers constituted a useful framework for assessing Uganda's defence requirements, and that a careful and systematic analysis was required to generate proof to support the conclusions that would be reached. In this regard, the Defence Review marked a departure from past policy planning methods, which were not as meticulous.

Nonetheless, two consequences of the relatively ambitious approach undertaken posed particular problems:

- First, the Review took longer than was desirable in the view of some within the GoU and the UPDF. Shortly after the process began, the GoU requested that it be speeded up to permit preliminary findings to be fed into the latter stages of the Financial Year 2003–04 budget process. The UK Government resisted this, believing that it would not allow enough time to analyse Uganda's long-term defence requirements effectively. Consequently, the Review did not meet the expectations of those who hoped that it would lead to immediate changes in defence spending or in UPDF operational capabilities.

- Second, the external advisers remained actively engaged in efforts to complete core analytical tasks and in managing the process. The DRU received basic training prior to the Review, but this proved insufficient to allow it to develop the analytical skills needed or to manage the process independently in the early stages. In the circumstances, the involvement of the external advisers was helpful in maintaining momentum, although it could be said that this may have limited DRU ownership of the process in certain ways.

The involvement of the external advisers was helpful in maintaining momentum, although it could be said that this may have limited DRU ownership of the process in certain ways

There were two areas where institutional capacity weaknesses were particularly apparent. During Stage 6, responsibility for the supporting papers required to assess the 'modernisation

themes' was allocated to various MoD departments likely to be involved in implementing the findings. In certain instances, draft papers were written by officers without staff course training and did not critically examine the issues in sufficient detail. However, it was considered important to engage them in the process early on, in order to give them a greater stake in implementation.

The lack of specialist expertise and capacity was also problematic in relation to the costing component of the work. Staff from the finance branch of the MoD supported the exercise, working alongside a DRU member with a financial background, and several DRU staff who learned on the job. The costing was to underpin all of the financial projections and estimates pertaining to the four Strategic Options, and would ultimately influence how the GoU and development partners reacted to the Review's findings in Stage 9. Several of the strategic options were viewed as too aspirational in terms of their technical complexity and affordability. Hence, only the Strategic Option that was considered most likely to be selected was in the event costed. However, a number of uncertainties about the nature of the equipment that would be procured, such as whether it would be old or new, and maintenance prices, remained.

In light of these challenges, the methodology had to be dynamic and flexible enough to cope with unanticipated issues. While it would have been ideal if DRU personnel and other staff involved in the Review had received more training before the process began, the partnership with external consultants assisted them in 'learning by doing'. By the end of the Review, most had developed a strong understanding of the methodology and of specific techniques, such as project-focused planning, necessary for managing the project and that could be utilised in follow-on work.

Securing 'buy in' by principal stakeholders

A Defence Review is a major political act. It was recognised beforehand that the central challenge would be to ensure adequate 'buy in' to the methodology and findings by senior military and political leaders, including President Museveni. Their support, including regular engagement in the process, was necessary therefore to create the best possible conditions for implementation.

Following the assessment of defence requirements, a Decision Paper was submitted to the Defence Minister, Amama Mbabazi, for his consideration. Its preparation was difficult because of the considerable volume of data and analysis underpinning the Strategic Options. This information needed to be summarised and backed by a clear assessment of the case for the four Strategic Options being proposed to the GoU. The approval of Mbabazi and senior military officers had to be secured before presidential endorsement could be obtained.

To turn the Defence Review into a programme of reform it was important that it was widely understood by all political and military stakeholders. This was not achieved because many of the key stakeholders did not sufficiently understand the rationale behind certain recommendations, despite active attempts by the DRU to brief relevant service chiefs and directors on

the process. Consequently, when the time came to engage them in planning that would deliver a defence reform programme, there was resistance.

A similar problem of ownership also became apparent in relation to other security and GoU agencies that participated in the Strategic Security Assessment. It was hoped that the comprehensive evaluation of Uganda's security needs contained in the SPF would spur other departments and agencies with a security mandate into developing their own policies and plans. In practice this has not been widely attempted, although a number of other actors, including the ISO and the police, have since shown interest in conducting a strategic review of their own policies.

> A Defence Review is a major political act. It was recognised beforehand that the central challenge would be to ensure adequate 'buy in' to the methodology and findings by senior military and political leaders

Following completion of the Defence Review, the SPF was not assigned to another GoU department to take forward the task of developing a more integrated GoU response to security problems. Logically, this task should have gone to the Minister of State for Security[9] or the National Security Council instead of the MoD, even though the SPF emerged in the context of the Defence Review. However, neither of these actors is mandated in practice to lead a policy-level discussion on security (in the broadest sense). As a consequence, this may have created a perception that GoU's foreign and security policies are informed and driven by defence concerns rather than the other way around.

Lessons identified

- A security review methodology should ideally be informed by holistic principles that span the overall machinery for providing security, although political conditions and government priorities will determine what is feasible. Where a narrower entry point is chosen, such as defence, it needs to be informed by an understanding of the roles of, and linkages to, other security actors.

- In determining what kind of methodology is appropriate, it is necessary to strike a balance between the inspiration and ideas that an external model can provide and the need for an approach that, among other things, is in harmony with local traditions. In cases where the methodology is imported, it needs to be adapted in close collaboration with national actors.

- The scope, complexity, and pace of a defence review should be tailored to reflect existing institutional capacity and the level of ownership which exists among key stakeholders. Investment in training for those who will lead the process may be required and is likely to increase their sense of ownership and control.

- When a review is conducted in a context of violent conflict, a two-pronged approach may be required, entailing trade-offs between meeting immediate security needs and satisfying longer-term institutional transformation. However, quick operational gains might make it more difficult to address the institutional reforms that underpin defence force transformation efforts.

- Due to the political sensitivity surrounding many aspects of a defence review, it may not be possible to cover all topics. Since some issues may have the capacity to destabilise, a government and its external partners need to agree at the start on which issues will be included in a review, and on any 'red lines' that external actors must not cross. A close partnership based on trust and dialogue is vital, as it is impossible to anticipate all scenarios that may emerge.

- Although a review process should ideally strive for a principled approach that is consistent with the overarching values of comprehensiveness, inclusiveness, and transparency, there is a need to be pragmatic. A flexible approach is required so that the process can adapt to unexpected challenges and obstacles. External observers/participants will need to appreciate and take account of local difficulties and dilemmas. ∎

Section 3: Management of the process

A defence review is a technically complex and politically sensitive exercise that needs to be carefully managed to secure the right outcome. In Uganda's case, a number of structures and tools were used to facilitate management of the Defence Review. They sought to: ensure that the Review progressed in line with the agreed ToR and completed on time; align the Review as closely as possible with wider governmental planning and budgetary processes; and keep senior military and political leaders informed about what was happening in order to secure their support. Various institutional and political factors affected the performance of these structures and tools, necessitating a flexible approach by the DRU and its advisers to keep the process on track.

The Defence Review was supposed to be a time-bound project, delivering a clear set of outputs. From the start, it was recognised that it would require a mixture of skills and experience, as well as effective teamwork and project management structures.

Given the subject matter, sensitive issues were bound to arise. In Uganda, as in many other countries, the security domain has traditionally been considered a no-go area for non-security practitioners. Furthermore, support by a foreign country added another layer of sensitivity and complexity.

All of these factors made effective project management critically important. The Project Document provided for a number of management structures and tools to ensure the timely delivery of objectives and that potential obstacles were addressed.

Management structures

The DRU was primarily responsible for managing the process. Its mandate was to:

- manage, coordinate, monitor, and assess progress and to make sure that stakeholders supplied relevant inputs; and
- coordinate inputs from other GoU departments with a view to integrating the Defence Review into national planning processes.

The DRU had a flat management structure, allowing staff to report easily to the Director-General. It comprised senior UPDF and MoD officers and several staff who were hired externally or were seconded from other GoU bodies, including the ESO and the ISO.

Three other structures were assigned management and advisory roles. The first of these was the Top Management Team (TMT), consisting of the Minister of Defence, the Minister of State for Defence, the Permanent Secretary (Defence), the Army Commander, and the Chief of Staff. Its main job was to keep the Cabinet and the President informed of progress and to supply necessary defence-wide policy guidance to the DRU. The ToR for the DRU required it

to report to the TMT every month, and to the Commander-in-Chief, President Museveni, every two or three months, when a major output needed his approval. President Museveni's input was seen as crucial in validating progress and providing direction to the DRU as necessary on the next steps.

In addition, the TMT was charged with approving the recommendations made at every Stage of the Review. The DRU was to meet with the TMT at least once every month, although this could be more frequent if circumstances demanded.

The second management structure was the Project Steering Committee, comprising the Permanent Secretaries of the MoD (who chaired the PSC), the Office of the President, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Finance and Planning, as well as the DFID Uganda Head of Office and the Director-General of the DRU. The PSC's role was to monitor the overall progress of the Review, and to ensure strong linkages with wider governmental processes and reforms. It was to convene quarterly at the request of the Permanent Secretary of the MoD.

At the operational level, there was the Project Management Team, the third management structure. The PMT comprised those people who were actively involved in the day-to-day conduct of the Defence Review, including members of the DRU, the DAT, and other consultants, as well as the DFID representative responsible for managing UK sponsorship of, and involvement in, the process. The PMT's role was to measure progress against the logical framework contained in the Project Document and to assess any risks to the process that might arise. The PMT was to hold monthly meetings.

Assessment of management tools

The DRU used an assortment of tools to facilitate the management of the Defence Review. Microsoft Project software, for instance, was installed to track project activities. This is a very useful application, although it is relatively difficult to use effectively without adequate training and hands-on experience.

To help with assessing and managing risks likely to arise during the Review, the DAT introduced several risk management tools—which the DRU adopted—including:

The Risk Register This tool provided the DRU with a means of identifying relevant risks, monitoring them at every Stage, and mitigating them. For the Risk Register to be effective, the DRU team would have to update the risk log regularly and carefully analyse the various responses available to the DRU. Only if appropriate action were taken would it add value.

A Stakeholder Analysis An extensive range of 'stakeholders' either had a direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the Defence Review. This tool (see Table 1 on p. 59) enabled the DRU to:

- identify relevant stakeholders, including individuals and groups;
- understand their specific interests in the Defence Review;

- assess where interests were supportive and where they might conflict; and

- develop strategies for engaging with and managing 'priority' stakeholders whose backing was essential to the success of the Review.

The management structures and tools put in place for the Review performed variably. This had various ramifications for efforts to keep the process on time and on track, to preserve its alignment with wider GoU planning and budgeting processes, and to maintain the support of the senior military leadership.

Because there were several different reporting points, the DRU did not always receive clear strategic guidance on what it should be doing. The TMT's timely contribution and input to the Review was so crucial that sometimes failure to secure a quick response stalled subsequent activities. Delays arose mainly because the TMT was not scheduled to meet regularly and because it was difficult to convene a meeting at short notice when policy advice was required.

To get around this problem, the Director-General of the DRU, Colonel Robert Rusoke, resorted to meeting with TMT members on an individual basis to brief them and solicit their input. Although this did not allow for consensus among TMT members, it was a pragmatic response to a difficult situation, enabling work to progress. In addition, when more direction was needed, the DRU could seek guidance directly from the President, through its Director-General.

The use of informal sessions to brief and obtain swift responses from the President or TMT members reduced bureaucracy and saved time. The downside, though, was a failure to strengthen formal management processes, which may have provided a more systematic, strategic and sustainable basis for managing the reform process that followed.

The problem with the management structures was particularly apparent with regard to the PSC, which never convened. The main reason cited for this was that the Permanent Secretaries already had too busy a schedule. In retrospect, it would probably have been more effective to forsake this special structure and instead have the Permanent Secretary of the MoD report on progress in the Defence Review at the normal monthly meetings of the Permanent Secretaries. Even though the PSC did not assemble, a different formal mechanism to ensure input from other GoU departments was never established. As a result, the DRU was reliant on approaching relevant people in other ministries and agencies informally to engage them in the process. This may have adversely affected efforts to integrate defence into wider GoU planning and budgeting processes.

Part II Analysis and Lessons

The PMT was created to facilitate the day-to-day work of the DRU and its external advisers. As such, it was a particularly valuable assessment and planning tool. It met regularly during the early Stages of the Review at either the behest of the DRU Director-General, the DFID Project Adviser based in Kampala, or one of the external advisers. Later, it met less often, reducing opportunities for all of those involved to evaluate DRU activities jointly and systematically and to plan future tasks. This resulted in a less integrated UK Government approach.

On a more practical level, the decrease in the incidence of meetings hampered communication. DAT consultants reviewed the Project Plan with the DRU on every visit to Uganda, although the DFID Project Adviser was frequently not in attendance. As a consequence, the DFID Project Adviser was not always fully aware of the status of the Review and unable to provide guidance where needed, particularly during the absences of the DAT. This also made it more difficult for the DFID Project Adviser to coordinate the inputs of the external advisers from the DAT and King's College London who regularly travelled from the UK to Uganda.

A lack of continuity among DFID Project Advisers, who changed three times during the course of the Defence Review, compounded the problem. Every time there was a new appointment, the replacement had to be given time to settle in and to get on top of the issues.

Limitations of management tools

The Risk Register and the Stakeholder Analysis provided opportunities for the DRU to analyse risks and design appropriate mitigation measures. In practice, neither was employed systematically following the initial Stages of the process. The main reason was because the actions identified by these management tools had resource implications for staffing levels and the project budget, which were difficult to meet. Although it was not always possible for the DRU to follow-up on the risks which were identified, it continued to engage with key stakeholders as part of its bid to secure support for the Defence Review. Over time, the tools lost value from a project management standpoint.

Notwithstanding the limitations of these tools, they enhanced awareness of the need for effective communication between stakeholders in light of the sensitivity of the Defence Review process. The DRU believed that enhanced public visibility would help to create a broad constituency of support for implementation once the Review was complete. Media representatives were invited to a number of workshops during Phase 1, but their interest quickly waned and the DRU had thus to develop a new publicity strategy, comprising press briefings and wider public consultation. Its media-led education programme focused on radio and press agencies in Kampala, but it was ultimately constrained in establishing national reach by inadequate funding.

On the project management side, the use of the sophisticated Microsoft Project application enabled the DRU, with the support of its external advisers, to undertake a complex array of analytical tasks, sometimes in parallel. The software permitted the team to plot various streams of activity, including timelines for the work, required inputs, and expected outputs. More important, it enabled the DRU to adjust the schedule when delays occurred or when changes in policy direction called for the addition of new initiatives to the Review process.

However, DRU staff members, including the Programme Manager, did not have sufficient skills to take full advantage of Microsoft Project on their own. They relied largely on the DAT advisers who were not permanently in Uganda, although regular visitors, and their absence restricted DRU progress.

Despite the limitations of the management structures and tools, the Defence Review was able to progress and finally deliver a White Paper virtually on time. That this was able to happen owed much to the flexibility and resourcefulness of the DRU, including its ability to compensate for some of the deficiencies in formal management structures. Of particular importance were the 'behind-the-scenes' discussions between the DRU and various actors, from within the GoU and the donor community, whose support for, and input to, the Review were crucial.

This informality was not without risks, however, as it made it more difficult to consolidate the formal management structures put in place to guide the process. In some ways, therefore,

Members of the UPDF protect President Museveni during his final rally in Kampala before general elections, February 2006. © AP/PA Photos.

it is likely that this approach reduced the level of debate on, and transparency of, major decisions taken during the Review, making it difficult to understand fully the motivations for policy changes.

Lessons identified

- In the context of a politically sensitive and technically complex security review, a robust set of project management structures and tools can help to keep things on track and on schedule, and can aid in resolving any problems that may arise. The country undertaking the review, and its external partners, should discuss and agree on them beforehand.

- Investment in national project management capacity needs to be an explicit component of an external programme of support for a security review. Adequate training and preparation of relevant staff can contribute to enhanced ownership of the process and ensure greater continuity, particularly when external advisers can only provide detailed support when in country.

- Development partners that decide to support a review process need themselves to ensure that they have adequate capacity in-country to fulfil this task effectively. This is particularly the case where advisory inputs come from a variety of external sources, and thus need to be coordinated. Substantial time and attention may also have to be devoted to building relationships with counterparts in government and with other development partners in order to ensure a coherent programme of external support.

- It is important at the outset of a security review to assess the factors that might affect the outcome. Stakeholder analysis tools to evaluate risks can be helpful in this regard, although they will prove irrelevant and ineffective if not used regularly and if strategies are not developed to mitigate identified dangers.

- When a security review adopts a narrow entry point (such as defence), the establishment of a high-level, cross-governmental management structure, involving, for example, representatives of different government ministries, can help to connect more effectively a security review with government-wide planning and budgeting processes or other relevant initiatives. However, it may not be necessary or desirable to create another formal management structure if bodies already exist in which issues can be raised and discussed.

- There are limitations on what formal management structures and tools can achieve when a review does not take place in a supportive political environment. In such contexts, informal strategies may be useful for engaging stakeholders in the process and soliciting policy direction from key decision-makers.

- Nonetheless, in terms of institutionalising good practice in project management (a long-term endeavour), it should be recognised that excessive reliance on informal strategies carries risk. This is particularly true in a weak institutional context where not all stakeholders may share a commitment to the underlying principles of a review. This may make it more difficult to consolidate formal management structures. ■

Section 4: Technical assistance

Technical assistance provided in support of a reform process—such as that received by the DRU from a number of external (notably the UK Government) and local sources—has mixed benefits. On the one hand, it enabled the Uganda Defence Review to be completed more quickly than might otherwise have been the case, and it helped to secure greater achievements. In addition, it permitted the transferral of important skills and knowledge to DRU staff members, building capacity. On the other hand, reliance on technical assistance reduced control by the DRU over the pace and direction of the process, and it may have made it more difficult for its members to 'learn by doing'. Awareness of the pluses and minuses of technical assistance is important in gauging how a country can take full advantage of external support.

When Uganda decided to conduct a Defence Review with UK support, it was apparent to both parties that technical assistance would be needed to close capacity gaps among Ugandan personnel who would lead the process. Within the MoD there was limited capacity to conduct and manage an exercise of the intended nature and magnitude, much less to implement the defence reform programme that was expected to ensue. The UK agreed to provide technical assistance in the form of advisers, as well as to help prepare the new DRU team through the provision of some basic training.

With UK support, a number of MoD and UPDF staff members were able to attend a two-week intensive workshop on security and defence matters convened by Cranfield University (a British academic institution) in Entebbe, Uganda in late 2001. This event was designed to familiarise participants with the basic concepts of defence that exist in a democracy and other issues of general relevance to defence reform. Furthermore, efforts were made to ensure that DRU personnel would be selected from among the participants. Most of those who received training, however, were appointed to other positions.

As a result, a number of DRU staff members had to be recruited from outside of the GoU or seconded from other national security agencies. Few had the specific background and skills required to manage and conduct a Defence Review of the scope and complexity envisaged. In a bid to develop their skill sets prior to the Review, the team was brought to the UK for a week of communication and change management training. UK advisers would transfer other requisite skills through mentoring and on-the-job training once the process got under way.

Nature of technical assistance

The DRU received technical assistance from a range of external and local sources:

External technical assistance

External support for the Defence Review came primarily from the DAT, which included a serving military officer and a MoD (UK) civilian adviser. A staff member of King's College London

provided additional support. The aim was to create a team that could supply the DRU with a mixture of military, defence management, and governance advice. The role of the external advisers was to work with the DRU, reporting to the Director-General, to determine the approach required and to help carry out the Review.

The decision to deploy the DAT, formed in 2001, and to charge it with providing technical support followed a direct request from the GoU. The DAT had a specific mandate to support defence-related reform initiatives of this nature in countries where the UK had assistance programmes. The GoU incurred no expenses as the UK Government covered the salaries and travel costs of all of the advisers.

The DRU also received support from a number of UK Government staff in Uganda, including the DFID Uganda Head of Office, and a Project Manager, who were responsible for administering the UK side of the programme and liaising with the DRU, and the British Defence Adviser at the High Commission. In addition, the UK Government provided the necessary international recognition for the exercise by agreeing to co-finance the project through DFID-Uganda, including the South–South seminar, which highlighted how several Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) countries had addressed the challenge of defence reform.

Local technical assistance

The DRU relied on two types of local technical support during the Review. The first came from a number of academics, primarily from Makerere University and Nkumba University, who were on retainers and were asked to contribute to the process as and when required. During the Strategic Security Assessment, they prepared background papers that informed the discussion of factors likely to affect Uganda's security environment in the future.

During Phase 2, six local consultants from various other institutions were hired to evaluate the institutional systems and structures required to support the development of a defence capability. Specifically, work was done on:

- policy and planning;
- financial management;
- defence procurement and logistics;
- human resource management and welfare;
- accountability; and
- information technology.

The Desk Officer responsible for defence in the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development provided guidance throughout the analytical Stages of the Review.

Mixed benefits of technical assistance

Technical assistance challenged DRU staff to consider new ways of thinking about the security problems likely to confront Uganda in the future and how best to address them. The SSR concept, which only emerged in Europe in the late 1990s, provided a holistic analytical approach.[10] In particular, it encouraged a more comprehensive analysis of the institutional actors within the GoU—of which the military was only one—that have a role to play in providing security. The use of threat analysis and scenario building opened up a new perspective on policy development in the defence arena, which drew on strategic planning approaches common in other spheres of public policy.

In terms of process, the methodology adopted by the UK advisers promoted a more consultative, inclusive, and transparent approach. This was reflective of open societies in the West where the public is often actively involved in debates on defence and security issues. For Uganda, where defence had hitherto been a no-go area for non-security experts, this contributed to the demystification of security and the heightening of public interest and involvement in the Review.

> The use of threat analysis and scenario building opened up a new perspective on policy development in the defence arena, which drew on strategic planning approaches common in other spheres of public policy

Although the UK supplied technical assistance throughout the Review, it played a more critical role in certain phases than in others. For example, it was particularly useful during the initial Stages when the DRU was developing the methodological approach and planning for implementation of the Review.

In addition, initial analytical activities under the Strategic Security Assessment were particularly complex and therefore were led by the external advisers. They included advising Ugandan participants on how to: analyse the factors likely to affect the country's security in the future; develop 'best-', 'worst-', and 'middle-case' scenarios; and identify and rank security threats, all of which fed into the development of the SPF.

Subsequent work that was technically complex and therefore required the active involvement of the external advisers included the assessment of the capability and force options, the development of the Strategic Options for consideration by decision-makers, and, especially, the costing exercise. In other areas, where capacity and experience was available, DRU staff members took the lead and external advisers offered assistance with the drafting of primary written outputs, including the new Defence Policy, the SPF, and the White Paper on Defence Transformation.

While the DAT facilitated the main workshops during the Strategic Security Assessment, the DRU increasingly took charge as the Review progressed. This was significant in that it gave

the DRU greater control over the direction of the process and enhanced its credibility in the eyes of its GoU counterparts. This was highly desirable from the standpoint of Ugandan ownership, although the active involvement of external advisers generated confidence within others in the GoU and in the donor community that Review objectives would be met.

External technical assistance was important, therefore, given the ambitious nature of the Review and the imperative to produce a final product that was methodologically sound and could be implemented in a rigorous manner. Its advantages, however, need to be weighed against its disadvantages, particularly because the methodology required that advisers be actively engaged in coordinating and managing the process.

Enhancing DRU leadership

One challenge was how to sustain the process when the external advisers were absent. It was decided at the outset that the advisers would not be permanently based in Uganda, visiting on average every one or two months for several weeks at a time. The intention was to establish conditions whereby this could genuinely become a Uganda-led process as the capacity of the DRU was enhanced. Unlike in other GoU ministries, such as finance, where foreign advisers are present on a full-time basis, with the risk that the foreign adviser undertakes the majority of the work, the Ugandan and UK Governments preferred the part-time arrangement. It also served to keep down the cost of technical assistance.

The lack of full-time advisers, though, may have made it more difficult to guarantee the consistent progression of the Review. To address this, the DRU and the advisers stayed in regular contact when the latter were out of the country, and the Kampala-based DFID Project Adviser and the High Commission provided additional support. The partnership was at its strongest, however, when the DRU and the advisers could sit down in person and collaborate.

In the circumstances, the objective became to achieve the best balance between cost and benefit. More technical assistance could have been acquired for the same price by drawing on local consultants or advisers from other African countries, such as South Africa. This may have yielded certain advantages, principally because Africans tend to have greater 'local knowledge' of institutional dynamics, politics, and security problems, which is invaluable in an exercise of this type.

However, UK advisers were able to introduce new concepts and models of security sector governance. At the time, this met a professed wish of the GoU to adopt an approach based on a more comprehensive, inclusive, and transparent process. While the inclusion of the DAT from the outset in the UK package of assistance precluded a discussion of whether another source of technical assistance might have been better suited to Uganda's requirements, no other donor countries or United Nations (UN) bodies were interested in or able, in 2001, to provide such support.

Need for a strong partnership

Maximisation of the benefits of external assistance nonetheless depended on a strong and open partnership between the DRU and the advisers. It was important that the DRU was confident that it was receiving the best possible independent advice. Because a significant portion of Review funding came from the UK, there was a risk that the advisers might be perceived as being under pressure to place greater emphasis on aspects of the Review that satisfied donor priorities in Uganda as opposed to those of the GoU. This was inevitable, but the risk was mitigated to an extent by the advisers limiting themselves to the provision of a framework of analysis within which Ugandans could subsequently make choices and decisions. The advisers, though, also needed to work constantly to demonstrate the objectivity of their evaluations and to maintain an open, constructive dialogue with DRU staff to preserve their confidence.

> Maximisation of the benefits of external assistance nonetheless depended on a strong and open partnership between the DRU and the advisers

The presence of external advisers was also beneficial in enabling the DRU to fulfil its own mandate more effectively. The DRU was charged with conducting what was essentially a technical, analytical exercise, culminating in a set of clear, evidence-based recommendations for the GoU. Nevertheless, it came under pressure from various quarters to adjust the tempo and focus of the Review in order to satisfy different political objectives. The external advisers, who insisted that the Review be conducted according to the agreed principles and timeline, were a source of support for the DRU, when required and desired. By the same token, this created a situation where it was more difficult for the DRU to adjust the Review process in ways that it considered to be in the national interest.

While the external advisers and DRU staff enjoyed a close, collegial working relationship and shared a common understanding of the aims of the Defence Review, they were ultimately constrained by the broader interests and policies of their respective Governments. Consequently, it was not possible for the DRU to share sensitive information. This was particularly the case in the latter Stages when different views emerged between the GoU and its donor partners on the desired level of the Financial Year 2004–05 defence budget and the intended emphasis of the defence reform programme.

At a more general level, there was always a danger that the active involvement of the external advisers might hamper the initiative of, and learning by, DRU staff. In keeping with the timeline agreed between the Ugandan and UK Governments, the external advisers were under pressure to ensure that the Review was delivered on schedule and in a particular format. Hence, there was a risk that they might be tempted to take on more of the core work than was desirable, instead of allowing DRU staff to take the lead. Conversely, at times, it was easier for DRU

UPDF soldiers prepare for deployment to Somalia as part of the African Union peacekeeping force, March 2007.

staff members to let the advisers fulfil tasks that they were not sure that they had the confidence or skills to complete adequately.

That the advisers were not permanently resident in Uganda decreased this problem to a degree, even if in some cases, DRU personnel did not enjoy as much support as they might have wished. This resulted in growing independence and confidence among DRU staff as the programme progressed.

In sum, external technical assistance produced mixed results. It allowed for the mentoring and development of DRU staff by external advisers and was instrumental in Uganda completing the Defence Review within a time frame acceptable to the donor community. However, it restricted the DRU's ability to put stress on certain aspects of defence reform that may have been more in keeping with Ugandan political priorities. Furthermore, the imperative to deliver a final product that would be seen as based on a scientific methodology, and that would be implemented in a rigorous manner, restricted the space available to the DRU to 'learn by doing' and increased the pressure on the external advisers to lead the process.

Lessons identified

- Technical assistance for a security review should strive to compliment, facilitate, and enhance nationally led efforts, yet stop short of carrying out tasks that national actors

can fulfil themselves. This may be a difficult balance to strike, however, when national capacity is low. In such cases, external partners need to be particularly sensitive to how their involvement may influence attempts to broaden and deepen national ownership and control over a review process.

- Given the dilemmas inherent in the provision of technical assistance, one should try prior to the inception of a review process to assess national institutional resources in order to identify capacity gaps and the specific requirements for technical assistance. Ideally, an external partner and its national counterparts should jointly conduct this evaluation and it should inform the overall approach to the security review.

- An attempt should be made to ensure an appropriate match between the background and technical expertise of external consultants and those of national counterparts. Naturally, this will vary from case to case. In certain instances, a military officer may command more attention and respect than a civilian when delivering messages about operational military matters. By contrast, when the subject pertains to defence sector management, a lesson on democratic civil oversight may carry more weight if a civilian presents it.

- Where national capacity is very low, there is likely to be benefit in providing basic training to core staff before the process commences. While this may not fully address all capacity gaps, it can enhance the confidence and belief of local actors that they are in the 'driving seat' and enable them to learn more effectively as the Review unfolds. In the interest of avoiding delays, it is desirable that those who receive such training do not move to other jobs during the process.

- Similarly, there is a strong case for ensuring continuity among the external advisers who provide technical assistance, whether they are based in the country or visit occasionally. This helps to guarantee that advisers are knowledgeable about the context in which they are working and facilitates the development of trust and closer working relations between them and their local counterparts.

- Both parties should acknowledge at the outset the sensitivities involved when external advisers are involved in a security review process. They should agree, for instance, on how sensitive information is to be handled. This may increase the confidence of a country undertaking a review that its sovereignty will be respected.

- In contexts where national ownership of a review process is weak, or there are acute sensitivities regarding external involvement, technical assistance may be more effective if it is backed up by regular dialogue at the political level between a country conducting a review and its external partners. This can help to ensure that each side's expectations are compatible and assist in anticipating problems that may undermine the effectiveness of technical assistance. ■

Section 5: Stakeholder involvement

Wide stakeholder involvement in a security review is generally seen as desirable to ensure legitimacy and to enrich the analysis. During the Uganda Defence Review, views were solicited from a broad range of stakeholders from inside and outside of the GoU. While there was extensive governmental participation, particularly during the Strategic Security Assessment, involvement by non-governmental actors was generally limited, except for a small group of academics that were involved throughout. Furthermore, a parliamentary debate on the White Paper did not take place as anticipated. This variable participation by stakeholders reflects an assortment of factors, including the sensitivity of the Defence Review and resource and time constraints, all of which should be incorporated into planning at the outset.

Numerous Ugandan stakeholders had an interest in the outcome of the Defence Review. From the start, therefore, the DRU made the enhancement of stakeholder participation in the process a priority. The intention was to strengthen the Review's legitimacy in the eyes of the public as well as to increase the sense of ownership of the subsequent reform programme among those who would be charged with its implementation. Broad stakeholder involvement was also seen as key to guaranteeing that there would be a comprehensive analysis of Uganda's security needs before critical policy choices were made about the future size, structure, capability, and management of the country's defence forces.

Identifying relevant stakeholders

Various categories of stakeholders were involved in the Review, namely political leaders, civil servants, the military, the police, intelligence agencies, civil society organisations, the general public, academia, the media, and the donor community. At the beginning of the Review, the DRU conducted a Stakeholder Analysis to catalogue these actors in terms of their interest in the Review and the impact that they might have on its implementation and outcome. Table 1 provides an example of such a Stakeholder Analysis.

The labelling of stakeholders as 'high-', 'medium-', and 'low-impact' was not supposed to downplay the interest of any particular group in the outcome of the Review—it was recognised that security is a universal need among Ugandans, particularly the more marginalised sections of the population. Rather, this endeavour sought to help the DRU to prioritise its consultative activities given time and resource constraints, and to allow it to concentrate on those whose support was deemed most crucial to the satisfactory completion of the Review.

The Stakeholder Analysis, although it was not regularly updated over the course of the Review, was particularly useful in identifying:

- who should be invited to participate in the series of seminars that made up Phase 1 (Strategic Security Assessment); and

Table 1 An example of a Stakeholder Analysis

59

Stakeholders	Reason(s) for interest in the project	Strategies to obtain support or reduce obstacles
A. High-impact stakeholders		
Commander-in-Chief	Military reform is a central pledge in his political manifesto	• Solicit his input on/vision for the Review • Regular briefings (formal and informal) • Achieve 'buy-in' to four key outputs
Top Management Team (including Minister of Defence, Permanent Secretary (Defence), Chief-of-Staff, Army Commander)	Tasked by Commander-in-Chief with implementing the Review	Frequent briefings and consultations
Members of High Command	–	Regular briefings and consultations
Army Council	–	Regular briefings and consultations
Permanent Secretary (Defence)	Financial accountability	Regular, detailed briefings on project expenditure
Ministry of Internal Affairs	Review may impact on future role of the police	Regular briefings and consultations
Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs	–	–
Minister of State for Security	–	Regular briefings and consultations
ESO and ISO	–	Regular consultations
Parliamentary Select Committees • Budget • Public Accounts • Defence and Internal Affairs	Will be asked to endorse the final product–White Paper	Invite them to key meetings and keep them well briefed
Army Spokesman	–	Provide with regular progress reports
Ministry of Finance	Budgetary issues	Involved in Steering Committee and represented at all workshops/consultations
Donors • UK Mission • EU • World Bank/IMF • United States	A number are uncertain about objectives and rationale for the Review. Need to be convinced that the process is robust.	Briefings/consultations in advance of launch Involve TMT in briefings Briefs at monthly meetings of donors Involve in Strategic Security Assessment Stage Involve donors in SPF Stage Keep the Permanent Secretaries of the MoD and the Ministry of Finance briefed on issues to be raised with donors
B. Medium-impact stakeholders		
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Has a central role to play in Uganda's external relations	Involve in the Strategic Security Assessment

Office of the President	Concerned about linkages between the Review and other national reforms	Keep briefed
Ministry of Public Service	Wants to see defence reforms integrated into wider public sector reforms	Get early 'buy-in' through regular briefings and consultations
Ministry of Environment	–	Regular briefings and consultations
Ministry of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees	Wants clarity on military role in responding to civil disasters	Regular briefings and consultations
Police Department	–	Keep informed
Unit Commanders	–	Keep informed
Civil society and general public Uganda Debt Network Human rights groups	Have an interest in all aspects of national security policy	Regular briefings; invite to South-South seminar and solicit feedback on key outputs
Media	Will carefully scrutinise the conduct of the Review and its outcome	Develop information dissemination policy Regular press briefings • Press releases • Talk shows • Interviews • Invitations to major events Keep Army Spokesman well briefed
C. Low-impact stakeholders		
Neighbouring countries: DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania	Concerned with how the Review will affect relations with Uganda	Keep local missions informed; work through Ministry of Foreign Affairs
East African Community (EAC)	–	Keep briefed through Military Liaison Officer
Academia (Makerere University and Nkumba University)	–	Use academics as subject matter experts
Business community (national and international) • UPDF suppliers • Private sector groups	–	Targeted publicity

- where the DRU, especially its Director-General and Directors, should direct its 'lobbying' efforts to secure adequate political support for the Defence Review through to its logical conclusion and to create a constituency that would back subsequent reform efforts.

Assessment

Political leadership

The core of the political leadership responsible for defence comprised: the President of Uganda and Commander-in-Chief of the UPDF; the Minister of Defence; the Minister of State for Defence; and the Minister of State for Security. The DRU enjoyed access to the Commander-in-Chief, whose direct involvement lent political support to the Review and hastened the decision-making process.

The Minister of State for Security participated in key workshops that provided the process with the political backing it needed in the early Stages. In the latter Stages, the Minister began to engage directly in the discussions on force options and budgetary requirements.

Uganda People's Defence Forces

The formal involvement of the UPDF in the Defence Review was achieved in several ways. First, under the auspices of the military's policy making organs (namely the High Command and the Army Council), senior officers with expertise in various aspects of security contributed to the debate and to analytical exercises during all Stages of the Review. Second, various military formations attended sensitisation seminars, providing an opportunity for middle-ranking officers and the rank-and-file to share their views. A number of UPDF officers were instrumental in shaping the analysis during Stage 6 work on operational requirements and Stage 7 work on supporting systems and structures.

Other GoU security actors

The Review benefited from the input of other government security actors, particularly knowledgeable intelligence officers from the ESO, the ISO, and Military Intelligence.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs, particularly the Police Department and the Prison Department, actively participated in crucial workshops on Uganda's security environment, threats to the country, the organisation of forces, and other troop deployment issues. It was recognised that the UPDF's ability to meet its missions effectively would be constrained unless its counterparts, including the police and the prison system, were able to work effectively together.

A major actor missing from the debate was justice, in particular representatives of the JLOS reform programme. Although there was clear relationship between what the JLOS programme and the SPF process were trying to achieve, the latter was driven by defence and was not officially recognised by either the GoU or donors as a cross-governmental endeavour—even if that was what it was supposed to be.

> It was recognised that the UPDF's ability to meet its missions effectively would be constrained unless its counterparts, including the police and the prison system, were able to work effectively together

The omission of justice was particularly notable during the discussion of roles and responsibilities, when designation took place of the lead GoU actor charged with dealing with each of the major security threats. Consequently, the justice dimensions of security did not receive as much prominence as they might have in consultations on how to define Uganda's security needs and interests, or on operational responses to the security threats.

Other GoU agencies and departments

The Review involved other GoU agencies and departments with links to the security sector, namely the Ministries of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees, Finance, Internal Affairs, Local Government, and Public Service; the Office of the President; and the Judiciary and Human Rights Commission (although only briefly during the Strategic Security Assessment). This was important because Uganda's defence and security policies need to lend support to the GoU's wider development policies. The involvement of these stakeholders strengthened the idea underpinning the development of the SPF: all GoU security policies should be consistent with each other, and with sectoral policies in the economic and social domains.

Parliamentarians

Representatives of the two most relevant parliamentary committees, the Defence and Security Committee and the Presidential and Foreign Affairs Committee, participated in the Phase 1 workshops organised by the DRU. At the time of conception of the Defence Review, it was anticipated that Parliament would appraise and formally endorse its key findings. However, Parliament never discussed the White Paper, despite its tabling as a Reference Document. The reason cited was that the White Paper was not a piece of formal GoU legislation, requiring debate by the legislature. Moreover, Parliament had already been tasked with approving the Defence Bill, which was occurring concurrent to the Defence Review. Hence, there was a view that the White Paper was of secondary significance.

Nonetheless, a high-profile discussion within Parliament would have helped to stimulate a national debate on the results of the Review. Experience in other policy areas supports the argument that discussion in Parliament can set agendas for broader, sustained debate in the media and among members of the public. The lack of open deliberation on the White Paper led to speculation that the GoU still considered the future of the defence sector too sensitive an issue to discuss openly. This ran counter to one of the core ideas that emerged during the Review: that security was a policy matter of concern not only to most GoU agencies and departments, but also to the general public.

Non-governmental stakeholders

Non-governmental participation in the Review was quite limited. More than 200 Ugandans and international delegates attended the formal launch of the Defence Review on 14 June 2002. The objective was to inform GoU agencies and departments and the public about the steps that the MoD would be taking to translate President Museveni's pledge to professionalise and modernise the UPDF into reality. This launch was accompanied by a campaign to publicise the Review, including double-page spreads in national newspapers.

Following the launch, a South–South seminar was convened, during which a number of SADCC countries shared their experiences of defence policy management with the DRU in the hope of providing it with inspiration. The SADCC participants offered valuable insight into how Uganda should address its security challenges. The output of the seminar was not widely disseminated, however, and an opportunity was lost to start a broader public debate on defence issues at a very early point in the Review.

A number of academics served as subject matter experts, ensuring a critical and independent perspective in Phase 2. In addition, various steps were taken to solicit views on defence from a small number of civil society organisations that had specialist expertise and knowledge. Save the Children, for instance, had an advocacy programme on child soldiers and fed in its views on this topic. Meanwhile, the general population's views on security were collected through their elected representatives in DRU-organised workshops.

The DRU recognised that while wide consultation was desirable, it was not practical to interact with community-based organisations or local government actors on a systematic basis because of resource and time constraints and political sensitivities. However, it did arrange several regional workshops for district-level administrators. In general, participants were enthusiastic in expressing their views on security and made clear their wish to be part of a national debate on how Uganda should meet its security needs.

During Stages 6 and 7, non-GoU stakeholders were involved on a selective basis. DRU staff and military officers conducted Stage 6 work. A number of local consultants recruited from within and without of the GoU carried out studies on areas of relevance to Stage 7. The academics recruited as subject matter experts were largely absent during the examination of the UPDF's operational requirements and the assessment of defence options. They only became engaged again during the drafting of the White Paper. Their absence stemmed from the sensitivity surrounding these areas of analysis, as well as because of a view that the issues required specialist military expertise. In hindsight, however, greater involvement by the academics may have put more attention on the governance dimensions of defence reform, which were downplayed due to the GoU's focus on capability enhancements.

From a starting point of the GoU being reluctant to discuss its defence reform plans in public, the Review marked a notable step forward in policy transparency

Through announcements in the written press and a number of radio talk shows, the DRU was able to publicise to an extent work on the Defence Review and highlight some of the key findings in the White Paper. Although the White Paper was not widely disseminated, from a starting point of the GoU being reluctant to discuss its defence reform plans in public, the Review marked a notable step forward in policy transparency.

Development partners

The UK Government was the only donor who was actively involved in the Defence Review. Most of the other donors watched from the sidelines, content to be briefed on progress by the UK and to follow its lead when it came time to deciding how to respond formally to the White Paper and to the GoU's proposal to increase defence spending in Financial Year 2004–05.

On a number of occasions during the Review, the DRU provided those donors who were interested with a formal update on progress. Most, though, were more concerned about the budgetary implications of the Review than they were in the details of the proposed defence reform programme. In particular, there was anxiety that the Review might result in higher levels of defence spending that would negatively affect other areas of public expenditure on which donor support programmes were concentrating. Thus, there was a divergence of opinion between the GoU and the donors on what the Review was supposed to deliver. More active donor engagement might have led to more realistic expectations about what the Review could achieve.

In sum, over the course of the process, there was a broadening and deepening of national ownership of the Uganda Defence Review, although not in a very even way. The DRU, which was mandated to lead, manage and coordinate the process, gradually assumed control as its capacity and confidence were enhanced. Following completion of the Review, the DRU became the Defence Reform Secretariat in a bid to entrench its position in the MoD/UPDF and to mainstream the transformation process in the day-to-day business of defence.

Lessons identified

- The breadth and depth of stakeholder involvement has implications for the level of national ownership of a review process and of commitment to the implementation of its findings, as well as for how comprehensively the analysis captures the diverse range of security views and experiences of, and realities facing, a country's population. The degree of stakeholder involvement nonetheless depends on the circumstances surrounding a review, and will be affected by the time frame, methodology adopted and resources available.

- The extent to which stakeholder involvement can be broadened not only depends on a government's inclination to consult, but also on the willingness and capacity of relevant stakeholders to engage in a debate on security issues. In cases where there is not a tradition of open public debate on security matters, one should expect a trade-off between efforts to broaden stakeholder involvement and the time frame and resources required for a security review. Efforts to develop civil society capacity to engage in security debates may need to run concurrent to reform initiatives in the security domain.

- Given the sensitivity of security reviews, strategies should be adopted that enhance the capacity and confidence of stakeholders to engage in a debate on security issues without

broaching topics that might be considered confidential. A South–South-type seminar approach that taps into the experiences of other countries can be particularly useful in broaching security matters and legitimising any discussion.

- Defence reviews can generate excessive or unrealistic expectations among different stakeholders, including donors. These expectations may conflict and thus need to be managed to ensure that different groups have a realistic understanding of what a review can deliver in terms of practical change, without, simultaneously, reducing their incentive to support the process.

- Effective publicity early in a defence review, combined with wide dissemination of a defence white paper, may help to manage expectations and create momentum for implementation. Open discussion within parliament, army formations, and the media may also build confidence in other parts of the security sector that may be showing reluctance to go down the difficult reform path if there are no obvious benefits.

- It is likely that there will be different interests among actors in the donor community, not all of which will support the aims of a review process. External bodies that are providing assistance need to pay attention to these interests, invest resources to keep donor partners informed about objectives and to secure their backing. ■

Chapter IV: Outcome of the Defence Review

The Uganda Defence Review contributed to a significant increase in debate on and understanding of defence issues in the country. During the course of the consultative process, a number of GoU entities from outside the defence sector became involved in the security discussion. This process also enabled a range of non-governmental actors, including academics, civil society groups, the general public, and the media, to express their views on defence and security. In addition to the UK, a number of key donors actively followed the Defence Review and were briefed by the UK on its findings, including the European Commission (EC), the Governments of Ireland, the Netherlands, and the Nordic states, and the World Bank.

The most visible initial output of the Defence Review was the White Paper, published in early 2004, which set out Uganda's vision for defence transformation and specified how it would be fulfilled. The level of public debate on the White Paper, however, was less than expected. Dialogue on the policy and financial issues raised by the Review was largely restricted to the senior military leadership and the Cabinet, which formally approved the White Paper.

> The GoU's view was that, given its security concerns and regardless of affordability, resources should be found to fund a higher defence budget since the findings of the Defence Review provided a case for increased defence spending

A few donors, led by the UK, began to engage the GoU in a debate following completion of the first Stages of the Review in late 2003, with emphasis put on the proposed level of defence spending in Financial Year 2004–05. A figure had not been agreed in advance because it was considered important not to prejudice the outcome of the Review by imposing a ceiling on defence expenditure before military transformation requirements had been determined. The matter of what was affordable, therefore, was left until the latter Stages of the Review. Similarly, there was no agreement between the GoU and donors prior to the publication of the White Paper that the resources needed for defence transformation would be made available.

It was perhaps not surprising that there was a divergence of opinion between the GoU and development partners on the level of resources needed to finance transformation and the defence budget as a whole. The proposed 2004–05 defence budget, at UGX 390 billion, was significantly higher than that of 2003–04. The GoU's view was that, given its security concerns and regardless of affordability, resources should be found to fund a higher defence budget since the findings of the Defence Review provided a case for increased defence spending.

In contrast, the development partners stressed the issue of affordability of increased defence spending relative to other priorities for public expenditure, particularly in social sectors deemed key to poverty reduction. Following the announcement of the provisional 2004–05 budget in April 2004, development partners voiced concern that the GoU's spending and programming priorities for the defence sector did not accurately reflect the findings of the Defence Review. In particular, they were worried that defence spending would be skewed towards programmes designed primarily to improve the operational capacity of the UPDF.

This apprehension manifested itself for two reasons. First, in the preliminary version of the Defence Corporate Plan (produced in early 2004), less attention and resources than donors would have liked to have seen were devoted to institutional changes that would lead to more effective management of defence resources. Most donors accepted that the defence sector, like all other sectors, could benefit from more resources if they were used efficiently, yet they also felt strongly that some of these resources should come from savings in the defence sector. Donors pointed to problems in the areas of procurement and personnel management (including 'ghost soldiers'), where they believed there was considerable scope for improvement.

Second, differences between the GoU and its development partners were exacerbated by the lack of transparency on the 'classified' section of the defence budget. Donors found it difficult to assess whether planned acquisitions were therefore consistent with the findings of the Review and whether they would help overcome the operational challenges facing the UPDF. These information access constraints, which are quite common in the security domain of most countries, complicated efforts to reach a shared understanding of Uganda's defence requirements.

> Most donors accepted that the defence sector, like all other sectors, could benefit from more resources if they were used efficiently, yet they also felt strongly that some of these resources should come from savings in the defence sector

In June 2004 the GoU decided to reduce the 2004–05 budget to UGX 350 billion, from the initial UGX 390 billion. In addition, after a discussion between the GoU and its development partners about how to avoid a future stalemate on defence spending, agreement was reached in September 2004 on four key steps that could be taken to address concerns regarding the management of defence resources:

- First, the DRU would complete work on the Defence Corporate Plan in order to turn Uganda's vision for defence transformation into a practical, costed reform programme. The Plan would specify in greater detail: where defence fits within the wider Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF); the responsibilities of budget holders in fulfilling their respective parts of the Plan; the level of resources allocated to accomplish each portion of the programme; and the timeline for implementation.

- Second, the GoU would provide additional information on the content of the classified budget to a select number of donors,[11] permitting an assessment of its impact on defence reform and allowing the Corporate Plan to take it into account.

- Third, new GoU laws and procedures on finance and procurement, introduced in the public sector, would be extended to the defence sector.

- Fourth, a Defence Sector Working Group (DSWG) would be formed. It would be chaired by the GoU and provide a forum to meet regularly with development partners to discuss defence transformation priorities and progress, to understand better the challenges faced and how these were being managed and to evaluate how donors could assist with this process.

In October 2004, with the conversion of the DRU into a mainstreamed Defence Reform Secretariat responsible for implementation of the Review's findings, an institutional framework for defence reform was in place. This framework was relatively fragile, however, suggesting that significant investment by the GoU and its development partners would be required to institutionalise initial progress in defence planning and to deepen partner–GoU dialogue on defence issues.

The lessons identified in this report underscore the need for the planning of a defence or security review (particularly when external assistance is involved) to be grounded in a careful analysis of institutional and political dynamics. In addition, there is a need for realistic expectations on the part of the country undertaking the review and its development partners of the nature and pace of change that can realistically result from such a process. A defence review is not a *reform* programme per se. However, the way it is planned and conducted has important implications for whether any programme of reform that ensues is practical and politically acceptable and, hence, whether a country will be committed to implementation. ■

PART III
Information Resources

Key resource documents[12]

Background documents

- Logistics and Accounting Reform Programme (LARP) Report, September 1997
- Uganda Defence Efficiency Study (UDES)—Preliminary Study, May 1998
- Uganda Defence Efficiency Study (UDES)—Main Study, July 1998
- Uganda Defence Reform Programme (UDRP) Report, February 2001
- Uganda Defence Implementation Workshop, Ranch on the Lake, February 2001
- Justice, Law and Order Strategic Investment Plan for the Medium Term, November 2001
- Justice, Law and Order Strategic Investment Plan Mid-Term Evaluation, December 2004
- Vision 2025—A Strategic Framework for National Development, 1998–99
- The Uganda Poverty Eradication Action Plan (Version 3), December 2004

Defence Review project documents

- Joint UK Ministry of Defence–Department for International Development Needs Assessment Scoping Mission to Uganda, December 2001
- Uganda Defence Review: Project Document, April 2002
- Mid-Term Review of Uganda Defence Review Programme, February 2003
- DFID Output to Purpose Review of UK Support for the Defence Review, December 2004
- Internal (DRU) End-of-Project Evaluation of the Uganda Defence Review, July 2005

Ugandan security legislation

- Security Organisations Statute, 1987
- NRA Statute, 1992
- Police Statute, 1994
- Constitution of Uganda, 1995
- Policy (Amendment) Act, 1996
- Control of Private Security Organisations Regulations, 1997
- National Security Council Act, 2000
- Security Organisations Statute and Terms and Conditions of Service, 2000
- National Resistance Army (Amendment) Act, 2001
- UPDF Act, 2005

Reports of consultative exercises

- UPDF Sensitisation Meetings, June 2002
- District-Level Consultations in Nine Locations, August 2002
- Briefing of Parliamentary Select Committees, August 2002
- Briefing of Senior Members of the UPDF, September 2002

Workshop reports

- Report on the Launch of the Defence Review, June 2002
- South–South Seminar Background Report, June 2002
- South–South Seminar Conference Proceedings, July 2002
- Sensitisation Seminars for UPDF Divisions and Independent Units, July 2002
- Context Workshop Report, July 2002
- Threat Workshop Report, August 2002
- Security Assessment Workshop Report, September 2002
- Defence Review Threat Assessment Workshop for Senior UPDF officers, Ministry of Defence Officials, Chiefs and Directors, September 2002
- Threat Analysis and Mission Development Report, October 2002
- Military Capability Assessment Committee Report, January 2003

Supporting papers

- Uganda's Future Security Threats, September 2002
- Reserve Forces, July 2003
- Logistics, June 2003
- Financial Management and Budgeting, April 2003
- Policy and Planning Processes, April 2003
- Logistics, Procurement and Infrastructure, April 2003
- Human Resource Management and Welfare, April 2003
- Accountability Mechanisms and Civil Affairs, April 2003
- Analysis of IT Support Required for Key Non-Operational Areas, April 2003
- The Command and Control of Operations, June 2003
- Defence Strategic Options, July 2003
- Approach to Training, July 2003

Defence Review outputs

- Foreign Policy Baseline, September 2002
- Security Policy Framework, December 2002
- Defence Policy, August 2003
- Uganda Defence Review—Summary of Key Findings and Proposed Strategy for Defence Transformation (Internal Document), November 2003
- White Paper on Defence Transformation, June 2004
- Defence Corporate Fiscal Plan 2005/06–2007/08, May 2005

Endnotes

1 The ASSN has a mandate to support SSR processes in Africa, especially by facilitating the exchange of lessons and experiences between countries. For further information, see http://africansecuritynetwork.org/. The ASSN has regional chapters in West Africa, Southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, and East Africa.

2 Following completion of the Defence Review in 2004, the DRU became the Defence Reform Secretariat (DRS). This report refers to the DRU throughout.

3 The DAT is a multidisciplinary UK Government team that provides advice to foreign governments on various aspects of SSR. DAT became the Security Sector Defence Advisory Team (SSDAT) in 2004 after its mandate was widened to encompass security sector issues. This report refers to DAT throughout.

4 A number of initiatives to strengthen personnel management systems were launched in the wake of the UDES, including projects to reform the payroll system and to establish a military identification card system.

5 For further discussion of this concept, see Nathan, L. (ed.) (2007) *No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform,* University of Birmingham, Birmingham.

6 Ensuring the defence of the country and the Constitution; assisting with peacetime security; contributing to regional security; provision of support to the civil authorities; conducting defence diplomacy.

7 **Operational themes:** Equipped and trained for combat and peace support operations; Deployability; Sustainability and logistic support; Joint/combined operations; Technology and doctrine. **Non-operational themes:** Policy and planning; Financial management; Logistics, procurement and infrastructure; Personnel and welfare.

8 Supporting papers were prepared on the following themes: Operational Command and Control; Training; Operational Logistic Support; and Reserve Forces.

9 This ministry used to be under the Office of the Presidency. Headed by the Minister of State for Security, it enjoys Cabinet-level representation, and is primarily responsible for the coordination of intelligence.

10 For additional information on the SSR concept and practice, see the following document: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2007) *The OECD–DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice,* OECD, Paris. http://www.oecd.org/document/6/0,3343,en_2649 _ 33721 _ 37417926 _ 1 _ 1 _ 1 _ 1,00.html.

11 These included Ireland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

12 Most of these documents can be accessed through the Defence Reform Secretariat, Ministry of Defence, PO Box 3798, Kampala, Uganda.