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For a Renewed Consensus on UN Peacekeeping Operations

Edited by Thierry Tardy

GCSP

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Introduction – For a Renewed Consensus on UN Peacekeeping Operations

Thierry Tardy

Contrary to some predictions of decline in United Nations (UN) involvement in peacekeeping (alongside the increasing role of regional organizations), the last decade has been characterized by a constant increase in personnel deployed in UN peacekeeping operations, demonstrating both the legitimacy of the UN for this type of activity, and its flexibility and adaptability. More precisely, the wide range of instruments at the disposal of the UN in the field of conflict management makes it a permanent option as well as a facilitator of burden sharing among organizations.

Learning the lessons of the 1990s operations, the UN has also gone through a process of reform and rationalization that has enhanced its comparative advantage, at a time when other security organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), are facing difficulties in adapting to the new environment.

In the meantime, contemporary UN peace operations are faced with obstacles that pertain, *inter alia*, to their political and operational nature. At the political level, peace operations are dependent on states' policies and their propensity to provide the type of support required, be it in the Security Council or among Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TCCs/PCCs). At the operational level, UN operations' success is largely determined by the clarity of their mandates and underlying strategic objectives, the nature and quality of military and civilian capabilities provided, and the ability of the UN Secretariat to plan and run the operations.

Furthermore, the overall effectiveness of peace operations is derived from the cohesion of different types of stakeholders that may have different agendas and constraints. The 2009 "New Horizon" non-paper underlined the need for "a shared understanding among all stakeholders of the objectives of UN peacekeeping and the role that each plays in their realization".[1] This shared understanding

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1 "A New Partnership Agenda. Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping", DPKO-DFS, United Nations, New York, 2009, p. iii.

has been challenged by the evolution of peacekeeping over the last decade, as peace operations became increasingly complex and the range of stakeholders and their visions and perceptions of peacekeeping changed.

This *Geneva Paper* is an edited volume of presentations delivered at a seminar organized by the GCSP at the request of the Delegation for Strategic Affairs of the French Ministry of Defence and hosted by the International Peace Institute (IPI) in New York on 16-17 June 2011. The seminar aimed to bring together scholars, UN officials and member states' representatives to analyse some of the constraints of UN peacekeeping operations; to exchange perspectives on national policies; and to examine the implications of increasingly complex mandates on the oversight of operations and the type of capabilities required for current and future missions.

National Policies and Peacekeeping: the Long Way to a "Shared Understanding"

National policies *vis-à-vis* peacekeeping operations have evolved considerably over the last fifteen years. First, Western states have developed a tendency of staying away from UN-led operations (with the noticeable exception of United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon [UNIFIL]), while favouring what they see as more effective security institutions, particularly the EU and NATO. Meanwhile, they remain the most important financial contributors to the UN peacekeeping budget (though China is now the 7th largest financial contributor, accounting for 3.94 percent of the total peacekeeping budget in 2010-12),[2] and play a central role (at least those that are permanent members of the Security Council) in the decision-making process.

As a consequence, peacekeeping operations have been primarily implemented by countries from the Global South, most of which are not seated on the Security Council.[3] In this picture, particular attention needs to be paid to the policies of emerging powers – in particular China, India and Brazil – that have become increasingly involved in peacekeeping over the last ten years (although India has always been one of the top contributors), raising the issue of the impact of their contribution on the underlying philosophy of UN peacekeeping.

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2 "Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 55/235 and 55/236", Report of the Secretary-General, A/64/220, 23 September 2009.
3 The first ten TCCs/PCCs were in June 2011: Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Egypt, Nepal, Jordan, Rwanda, Ghana, and Uruguay.

The debate on national policies towards peacekeeping leads to two types of questions. First is the issue of support that peacekeeping operations get from their key member states, be it political – at the Security Council in particular – financial, or operational (i.e. through capacities made available by the main TCCs/PCCs). At the operational level, the work of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) has recently focused on the necessity of improving the quality of units provided (with the "capability-driven approach"), but also on the issue of robust peacekeeping, particularly in the context of civilian protection. In order to prevent situations where peacekeepers would become hostage to spoilers or the passive witnesses of massive violations of human rights, the idea of giving the peacekeepers the means to implement their mandates, including by resorting to force at the tactical level if need be, has become increasingly debated (although no consensus has emerged from these debates). However, robust peacekeeping is also about the role of the Security Council, as it implies the political backing and unity of the Council.

Second, the typology of financial and troop contributors has led to a dichotomy between two categories of states (Western/Northern vs. Southern, represented in UN bodies by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)) that now characterizes UN peacekeeping operations and that developed at the expense of the idea of a shared understanding on the function and constraints of peacekeeping. This dichotomy opposes countries that finance peacekeeping operations and – for some of them – design their mandates at the Security Council but do not deploy troops and countries that contribute personnel but that are marginalized in decision-making.

David Haeri and Rebecca Jovin state that, "Western states contribute less than 8 percent of total uniformed peacekeeping deployments [while] contributions to missions in sub-Saharan Africa by Western states make up less than 0.7 percent of total uniformed deployments to the region".[4] Yet the idea of partnership in the "New Horizon" non-paper implies a large participation of UN member states to peacekeeping operations, including Western countries. As stated by Alain Le Roy, "an organization based, as the UN is, on a collective response to a common threat, cannot sustain the situation where those who mandate, those who contribute personnel and those who finance are – with a few exceptions – such substantially separate groups".[5] These debates have been echoed in the recent work of the

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4   See Haeri and Jovin's contribution in this volume.
5   See Le Roy's contribution in this volume.

Special Committee of Peacekeeping Operations (C-34). Both the 2010 session (debate on robust peacekeeping) and 2011 session (debate on reimbursement rates of personnel deployed in operations) led to open friction between two groups of states whose responsibilities and visions of peacekeeping diverge. Beyond the suspicion of neo-colonialism through increasingly intrusive peace operations and a deleterious politicization of debates, the argumentation put forward by the NAM reflects genuine concerns about the unrealistic evolution of peacekeeping operations. More specifically, NAM countries point to the operational and financial difficulties they face in the implementation of ambitious mandates with limited resources.

The "New Horizon" non-paper warns against the proliferation of tasks in peacekeeping mandates, arguing that "multiple, detailed tasks can obscure the overall objectives that the Council expects peacekeepers to achieve".[6] In the end, peace operations create expectations both within the "international community" and local actors that are known to be impossible to match, and that therefore inevitably undermine the credibility of the missions. It is in the context of these inherent constraints that the North-South tensions on "who is doing what?" in peacekeeping develop. For if expectations are high, presumably they can only be met through the largest implication of the community of states.

The seminar first looked at Brazilian and African strategic motivations in UN operations. It then turned to France as one country that plays a central role in mandate design but whose troop contribution has constantly decreased over the last two decades.

Brazil is a large TCC/PCC, especially considering its contribution to MINUSTAH in Haiti. Brazil, which ranked 13th of the TCCs/PCCs in June 2011, is second of Latin America's countries after Uruguay, and acts as chair of the country-specific configuration for Guinea-Bissau at the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). Along the same line as other emerging powers, Brazil's peacekeeping narrative invokes a certain conception of an "international order ruled by norms and institutions, rather than force"[7] and based on the respect for the UN Charter and its key principles, such as those of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of states.

Brazil's understanding of the concept of state sovereignty is defined by a relatively strict adherence to the three peacekeeping principles (consent of the host state, impartiality, and non-resort to force except in self-defence), and a general

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6   "A New Partnership Agenda. Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping", p.10.

7   See Ramalho's contribution in this volume.

opposition to the conceptual overstretch that characterizes them. The insistence on state sovereignty is not only driven by a certain conception of international relations, it also shapes Brazil's vision of the level of ambition of peace operations. For Antonio Ramalho, peacekeeping operations cannot suffice in the long-term maintenance of peace and security, which can only be the result of a "combination of peacebuilding and sustained efforts to materialize social improvements".[8] Hence the insistence on local ownership and on the necessity to avoid a prolonged presence and its inherent unintended consequences. In these debates, Brazil puts forward its experience in the fields of development and security that the UN is invited to benefit from.

In the meantime, the country's policy in Haiti, where the Brazilian forces acted quite robustly in the slums of Port-au-Prince and where Brazil pushed for more intrusiveness for the MINUSTAH, tends to nuance the official narrative about the centrality of the three peacekeeping principles.

Beyond these issues, Brazil's strategic motivations relate to both international and regional considerations. Contributing to peacekeeping operations enhances Brazil's international profile while demonstrating political, economic and military strength. It simultaneously helps assert Brazil's position of regional leader as well as serving international objectives, among which is the aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

African states are directly concerned by the evolution of peacekeeping and the related debates on its methods and objectives. Not only because two thirds of UN peacekeepers are deployed in Africa, but also because African TCCs/PCCs provide 40 percent of UN uniformed personnel and half of the top ten TCCs/PCCs. Alhaji Sarjoh Bah puts forward three types of strategic motivations to explain the African participation in peacekeeping: first, a commitment to the values of the UN and the legitimacy it provides, despite the absence of Africa on the Security Council; second, a sense of solidarity among African countries, also reflected in the idea – defined in the African Union (AU) context – of non-indifference towards peoples in need; and third, the quest for regional stability that is to be achieved through UN efforts as well as through other institutional frameworks such as the AU.

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8   See Ramalho's contribution in this volume.

This being said, the discussion that followed confirmed the differences in perceptions between the North and the South *vis-à-vis* peacekeeping. Some participants pointed to the financial gains that most African countries get out of their contribution. On the other hand, Bah stressed that UN peacekeeping has "reinforced the notion of 'small' and 'big' wars", which "explains why the United States and its NATO allies can afford to spend over USD 3 billion a week in Afghanistan but complain about the UN's peacekeeping budget, which is under USD 8 billion per annum".

It is in this context that the evolution of Western states' policies towards peacekeeping needs to be analyzed. In particular, as mandates become increasingly complex and require high-quality resources, the question is posed as to the conditions under which Western states could come back to UN-led operations, in a post-Afghan era, for example. As European states start looking ahead and pondering their conflict management policies following a drawdown from the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan, how can the UN be a part of the different institutional options? What are the political and operational conditions for such an evolution? How shall the UN adapt to allow for this hypothetical return?

For Haeri and Jovin, the post-Afghan era indeed gives hope that the "militaries engaged there will shift their focus to UN peacekeeping operations". Furthermore, they stress that the UN of the second decade of the 21st Century is different from the one that Western states moved away from following the Bosnian and Rwandan crises in the mid-1990s. The UN has demonstrated a "genuine commitment to improving the effectiveness of operations in the field", and has, through various reform processes, strengthened the "management and oversight" of operations as well as the "effectiveness and reliability of support provided to personnel on the ground".[9]

Faced with these evolutions, the French perspective may not be as forthcoming as some would expect. Ranking 19th of the TCCs with 1,466 personnel as of June 2011, with almost all deployed in UNIFIL in Lebanon, France is the second largest troop contributor among the permanent members of the Security Council (after China which ranks 15th with 2,036 personnel, well ahead of the United Kingdom (45th with 282 personnel), Russia (51st with 237 personnel) and the United States (61st with 110 personnel)).[10] France is also the 5th largest financial contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget with a share of 7.55 percent.

9   See Haeri and Jovin's contribution in this volume.
10 See "Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations", 31 May 2011, available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/may11_2.pdf accessed on 18 July 2011.

However, the French presence in Lebanon does not hide an overall absence from UN operations beginning in the mid-1990s, which makes France, as permanent member of the UN Security Council, one of the key actors of the North-South debate. In the discussions, France puts forward two types of arguments: first, that it is an important financial contributor; second, that it participates in many UN-mandated (if not UN-led) operations, such as operation Licorne in Cote d'Ivoire or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, demonstrating a general commitment to the broad efforts of maintaining international peace and security.

More precisely, France has drawn the lessons of the early 1990s operations (Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular) and since then tends to consider that the UN does not offer the guarantees necessary to allow French forces to be put under UN command. The French position is expressed by a form of distrust vis-à-vis the UN command and control structure that has not been significantly altered by the various reform processes. It is with this mindset that the deployment of European troops in UNIFIL 2 in 2006 was accompanied by the establishment of the Strategic Military Cell within DPKO, the added value of which, was in the end questioned even within the French military (as well as by participants in the seminar).

In parallel, France has pushed, together with the United Kingdom, for a series of reforms related to the strategic direction of peacekeeping operations.[11] The three main issues of the initiative relate to the strategic oversight of operations, the implementation of mandates, and the insertion of peacebuilding tasks (with the definition of benchmarks) into exit strategies.

A possible interpretation of these initiatives is that France wishes to create the conditions of its possible return in UN-led operations, in a post-Afghan perspective. However, the French approach remains extremely prudent in this respect. Not only the mistrust vis-à-vis the UN, notably among military officers, remains important, but operational and financial constraints are such that the perspective of new military deployments in UN-led operations appears unlikely. Emmanuel Bonne insists on the "fatigue" that Afghanistan has created "in the public opinion of many Western countries", to conclude that "it is not guaranteed that the experience of Afghanistan and the entry into a post-Afghan era… will produce any dramatic change in the way Western countries, at least France, approach peacekeeping".[12]

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11   See Franco-British non-paper on Peacekeeping, January 2009, available at http://www.franceonu.org/IMG/pdf_09-0116-FR-UK_Non-Papier_-_Peacekeeping_2_-2.pdf accessed on 18 July 2011.
12   See Bonne's contribution in this volume.

For France, Operation Licorne in Cote d'Ivoire in support of the UN Operation (UN-OCI) or the various EU-led operations deployed alongside UN missions or as bridging operations (in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2003 and 2006 or in Chad in 2008-09) provide examples of the kind of frameworks that match the French conception of crisis management activities. An involvement in a UN-led operation is not excluded *a priori*, but does not constitute a first option.

Improving the Effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations: From Strategic Oversight to Capabilities

Following difficulties encountered by some missions (by the MONUC in particular when facing combats between the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) and the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) in November 2008), the issue of strategic oversight in peacekeeping operations has over the last three years become a key dimension of their effectiveness. The idea of a better strategic direction is developed in the "New Horizon" non-paper (and in its Progress Report[13]) and was addressed by the 2009 Franco-British initiative. It was also debated by the Security Council on several occasions.

As underlined by Lieutenant General Gaye, the notion of strategic oversight is not clearly defined in the UN. In general terms, it includes:

- Oversight by the Security Council (mandate design, frequency of meetings on on-going operations, nature of the briefings to the Security Council, field missions and interaction with the SRSGs and Force Commanders);

- Trilateral dialogue between the Security Council, the Secretariat and the TCCs/PCCs (key priority of the "New Horizon" non-paper);

- Integrated planning by the Secretariat;

- Political and operational direction by the SRSG and the Force Commander or Police Commissioner;

- Information sharing and reporting practices between the field and Headquarters;

- Definition of exit strategies and identification of benchmarks;

- Accountability mechanisms;

- Oversight by the General Assembly and the C-34;

- Nature of the military expertise within the Secretariat.

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13 "The New Horizon Initiative", Progress Report No.1, DPKO-DFS, United Nations, October 2010.

While the seminar participants agreed that a better strategic oversight of operations was important, what it implies as well as the range of activities and actors involved led to a series of questions.

There is first the issue of realistic and achievable mandates, presented as a key requirement since at least the Brahimi Report, but in reality difficult to guarantee. As illustrated by the MONUSCO in the DRC, which contains no less than forty-five tasks in its mandate, among which is the protection of civilians in a territory the size of Western Europe, mandates are often so complex that most observers question their feasibility. The complexity of mandates directly impacts the nature of oversight as it raises the issue of the evaluation of operations' performance.

Second, if a lot has been accomplished in the field of trilateral dialogue between the Security Council, the Secretariat and TCCs/PCCs over the last ten years,[14] and if the strengthening of this dialogue is a priority of the "New Horizon" process, the association of TCCs/PCCs to decision-making and strategic oversight remains a source of tension and recrimination from the main troop contributors. The effectiveness of strategic oversight largely depends on a common vision from the main stakeholders, in particular in the implementation of politically or militarily sensitive tasks that require a convergence in views of the three poles of the triangle. For some of the main TCCs, the various efforts of the trilateral dialogue fall short of giving them the appropriate level of oversight over missions.

Third, several participants underlined that the definition of exit strategies and the identification of benchmarks were conditioned upon the existence of a consensus within the Security Council and with local actors on the end-state. The association of the UN Country Team that stays after the departure of the peacekeeping mission is equally essential to these discussions. However, disagreements are often important between an operation leadership and local authorities on the timetable and on the way benchmarks are used to justify the maintenance of a mission or on the contrary, its drawdown. Lieutenant General Gaye made the point that "reform by different but interdependent components [of a peacekeeping/peacebuilding presence] progresses at different and incongruent paces that can inhibit the achievement of benchmarks". Furthermore, while benchmarks are supposed to allow for the evaluation of progress and therefore for the assessment of the effectiveness

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14 With, among others, TCCs/PCCs regularly briefed before mandate renewals; meetings with relevant member states before and after assessment missions; consultations on specific issues, including in crisis situations. See Mulet's contribution to this volume.

of peacekeeping activities, they also raise the issue of their measurability. Benchmarks that are good for the recipient country "may not be appropriate for tracking a mission's performance",[15] but they can also be, methodologically speaking, difficult to measure and therefore lead to fallacious interpretation.

In this debate, participants also underlined a certain mismatch between the Security Council's and the Secretariat's approach to strategic oversight, with the Council being more concerned with the end-state while the Secretariat cares more about the availability and efficiency of resources and personnel's safety and security.

Finally, the increasing complexity of peacekeeping mandates, with, inter alia, the necessity to protect civilians in a growing number of operations, but also the evolving role of civilian personnel operating at the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, directly impact the type of capabilities required. DPKO has thus started a reflexion on a "capability-driven approach" that, as stated in the "New Horizon" non-paper, "moves away from a 'number intensive' strategy to one that focuses on the skills, capacity and willingness of personnel, as well as materiel, to deliver required results".[16]

What is at stake is the ability and propensity of UN member states to actually contribute the type of required assets and also to clarify what those assets are. The main TCCs/PCCs provide some critical enabling capacities, yet some shortfalls are recurrent, in the fields of airlift, engineering or medical units. The idea of the capability-driven approach is to identify these critical capability gaps and to ensure that TCCs/PCCs are "adequately prepared, equipped, and enabled to deliver against reasonable performance expectations". As an example, the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) of DPKO is developing standards (infantry battalion, field hospital and Staff Officers) in order to facilitate TCCs' preparation and accountability.

It is here assumed that the ability of an operation to implement its mandate depends a lot on the way its constituting units are selected, prepared, trained, equipped, deployed, monitored and commanded. Quality seems to prevail over quantity. In this respect, several participants made the point that a qualitative approach should not be a substitute for a quantitative one, with the underlying assumption that the difficulties encountered in contemporary peacekeeping operations would be solved through the sole improvement of resource quality.

This leads back to the issue of the mandates and their realism. Some partici-

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15 See Gaye's contribution in this volume.
16 "A New Partnership Agenda. Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping", p.29.

pants stated that the accumulation of tasks in multidimensional operations' mandates is the result of the Security Council overlooking real available capacities. As an example, the fact that some operations were mandated to contribute to the implementation of sanctions (voted by the Security Council), "including by inspecting… the cargo of aircraft and of any transport vehicle using the ports, airports, airfields, military bases and border crossings,"[17] illustrates the discrepancy between the mandate voted and the means available to implement it.

In the same vein, if mandates dealing with the protection of civilians are clear in the identification of the targeted population (although the identification of civilians at risk is not always easy on the ground), they are less clear about the way protection is to be implemented. The wording regarding the protection of civilians "with all necessary means" may lead to different interpretations, in particular on the level of protection that the operation must guarantee. Within the MONUC for example, Alan Doss reported that violence against civilians perpetrated within a few dozen kilometres from UN bases was often presented as a failure of the operation to implement its protection mandate, while the type of resources available combined with the caveats of TCCs (to which one needs to add the difficulty of the terrain) made nearly impossible the implementation of the mandate. This raises the question of expectations to be met by an operation as well as that of the way the Security Council communicates – formally and informally – on those expectations to heads of missions.

Finally, the notion of capabilities must be examined in the political context of UN missions and the propensity of troop contributors to use available resources to the maximum of their potential. Doss distinguished between capacities and capabilities. Capacities are the number and type of UN forces authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution, but they are "not necessarily front line capabilities", as "policy and procedural constraints can impede or hinder a mission's ability to transform a *latent capacity* into an *operational capability.*"[18] Key to this debate is the issue of political will, which makes it so that available resources are indeed used – or not used – in the implementation of a mandate. In the field of the protection of civilians or robust peacekeeping for example, if the nature of capacities impacts the implementation of potentially dan-

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17   Quoted in Alan Doss's contribution.
18   See Doss's contribution in this volume.

gerous tasks, the will of troop contributors to engage their resources (including their personnel) in those actions is essential. In practice, the correlation between the quality of resources and the will to take risks is never guaranteed.

When looking ahead, it is likely that the comparative advantage that the UN displays in terms of legitimacy, integrated approach, or flexibility, will continue to be central to the broad conflict management efforts. As Alain Le Roy said, the UN will remain "the organization of last resort, [solicited] when others either cannot gain the necessary consensus, or maintain the staying power over the long term, or indeed where no one major actor has enough abiding interest but the world must nevertheless act".

In this context, particular attention will need to be paid to the following elements:

- Necessity for multidimensional peacekeeping to commit over long periods of time in support of fragile states, and therefore to better articulate the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus;

- Necessity to improve the operations' cost effectiveness;

- Necessity to develop further the integration of missions and partnerships with other crisis management actors;

- Development of new technologies (communications, drones, etc.) in peacekeeping operations;

- Increased complexity of mandates, in particular with the protection of civilians;

- Necessity to adopt flexible country-specific and not standardized approaches;

- Necessity to place any peacekeeping operation in a broader political context.

When paying attention to these parameters, it will be essential to ensure that the UN represents the "international community"; that what the UN does is the reflection of a broad consensus among the main stakeholders of UN peacekeeping operations about the purpose and methods of operations, as well as of the level of commitment of UN member states. It is difficult to imagine effective and efficient peacekeeping operations in the absence of such a consensus.

Looking Forward:
Peace Operations in 2020

Alain Le Roy

It is unwise to predict the future in the field of peacekeeping, but certainly one important place to start is to consider the factors that have brought us to the present.

At the beginning of the last decade, after the crises and failures of the 1990s, many predicted that the high point of UN peacekeeping had passed. The future of peacekeeping was slated to be through regional organizations. Yet this prediction was only partly true. Peacekeeping by regionally based organizations did indeed grow in importance and brought vital new resources and renewed political will to the disposal of the international community. However, predictions of the demise of UN peacekeeping proved unfounded, and instead we saw precisely the opposite – an uninterrupted surge in demand over the last decade, bringing total deployment levels from around 30,000 to 120,000 personnel in 2011. It is worth recalling what sustained this surge, asking if these same attributes will remain driving forces for the future, and considering if new factors might weigh more heavily.

Some of the factors underlying the surge of the past decade were the UN's unique role and legitimacy as the universal organization, the UN's capacity for burden-sharing, its comprehensive tool box and its important attributes of flexibility and adaptability.

Firstly, and most importantly, the UN is the only truly global organization. The fact that it can draw on the Charter, the role of the Security Council and the resources and support of the General Assembly, gives UN peacekeeping a great store of legitimacy, buttressed by its universal membership and the deployment of troops from disinterested nations. There are of course instances where regional actors are the best placed to shoulder the burden, and the UN must be ready to assist how ever needed. But it is probably inevitable that the UN will be the organization of last resort, when others either cannot gain the necessary consensus, or maintain the staying power over the long term, or indeed where no one major actor has enough abiding interest but the world must nevertheless act. One

could argue, for example, that in 1999 in Kosovo the UN was asked to take on the transitional administration because it remained the one organization that all key stakeholders had in common, and could serve as an umbrella whereas any regional actor alone would have been contested.

In the same vein, the UN remains an unmatched platform for burden-sharing as it can draw on the broadest range of troop and police contributors, and harness the mechanism of the assessed budget, by which all member states share some part of the costs. This is one reason why the UN was called upon to take over in situations where other organizations, or lead nations, could not sustain longer term engagement. This was the case for the United Nations Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT), for example, and in 2000 in Timor Leste when UN peacekeepers took over after the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) had secured the ground.

Increasingly throughout the last decade, the UN showed that it can bring together a wide range of political, security, human rights, humanitarian and development instruments within an integrated, multi-dimensional response. These attributes meant that the UN has been called upon to help build and sustain peace, in some cases taking on and extending gains made by others – one thinks of the role of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) following the 2000 United Kingdom's intervention. In other cases, this range of effort has allowed the UN to follow and support an extended political, security and peacebuilding process, such as in Liberia, Timor, Burundi, and Haiti. From transitional administrations to multi-dimensional peacekeeping to civilian assistance missions, the UN has shown it can configure in a wide range of structures and provide a wide range of assistance.

In none of these areas has the UN record been perfect, and indeed we have had to learn as we went along, from trial by fire and sometimes, sadly, through avoidable errors. Indeed, one critical reason for the resurgence of UN peacekeeping was that the UN was able to draw upon the painful lessons of the 1990's – with the Secretary-General's reports on Rwanda and Srebrenica – and from those humbling experiences to articulate the requirements for success in peacekeeping – so famously put in the 2000 Brahimi Report. The scrutiny the UN is constantly under may sometimes feel like a burden, but it is in fact one of our great assets, as we are always called upon to learn from our experiences, to meet the renewed

expectations of those who depend on us. This capacity to learn and adapt is critical. The range of responses available to the UN today, as compared to a decade ago, is in part a reflection of this adaptation and learning. Independent studies have shown that countries that have had peacekeeping missions are far less likely to revert to conflict than those which have not, and this surely is one reason why the surge of the past decade occurred.

Looking Ahead

Looking to the future, will we continue to be called upon? Unfortunately, one must assume that conflict will remain part of the international scene. Land and resource scarcity, multinational crime and terrorism, migration and inter-ethnic tensions, poverty, the age-old quest for fair political representation and freedom will all continue to be potential drivers of conflict. The Arab Spring has shown once again that we cannot always predict when and how it will come. But when conflict does arise, the factors of legitimacy, burden-sharing, comprehensiveness and flexibility will mean that the UN will continue to be called upon to deploy peace operations, sometimes alone, sometimes with other partners.

If peacekeeping of the past was about interposition of Blue Helmets between opposing forces after a ceasefire, and if peacekeeping of the past two decades has been characterized by multi-dimensional, more civilian oriented missions that also address peacebuilding tasks, what will tomorrow's peacekeeping look like? One can assume it will have at least a few characteristics that have already emerged.

First, peacekeeping must be able not only to help countries achieve some measure of reconciliation and national cohesion but also to reach the first, legitimate democratic government. UN missions will often be called on to remain, and reinforce nascent government structures, to help them overcome shocks, avoid crises and extend their legitimate authority. This is already observed in the DRC, for instance.

Second, peacekeeping must be able to draw on new technologies that will make it more flexible and potentially more cost effective. For example, the possible use of drones to provide tactical level intelligence for force protection has been discussed with member states.

Third, peacekeeping will need to show cost effectiveness. While UN peace-

keeping is comparatively cost effective, as independent studies have shown, it remains a costly undertaking and it is imperative to maximize its efficiency as much as possible.

Fourth, peacekeeping will need to continue ongoing efforts to achieve a coherent and integrative approach with both the UN and other actors on the ground if it is to play its role effectively as part of a peacebuilding continuum. The World Bank's 2011 World Development Report underscores the inter-related nature of humanitarian, security and development challenges.[1]

What then, might we need to succeed in the future? First, we must ensure that the peacekeeping partnership is strong. Peacekeeping is a partnership that brings together the Security Council, the Secretariat, and the troop and police contributing countries. One could also add the host authorities. When I joined the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, that partnership was fraying under the pressures of operational and support demands, differences in perspective on key mandated tasks and the challenges facing some missions which lacked a peace to keep, consensus in the Security Council on the overall direction, and limited consent from the host governments. The "New Horizon" reform process which has ensued has primarily been a dialogue with member states on how to address these challenges. We have gained some ground in addressing these concerns. Closer dialogue between the Security Council, TCCs and the Secretariat prior to mandating operations has been one important initiative to strengthen the partnership.

The partnership must continually be tended to by all stakeholders. One area of concern is that of broadening the base of troop and police contributing countries. The UN has been privileged to have a number of stalwart troop and police contributors – and some newer ones – which have shouldered the majority of the burden of meeting the surge in demand. However an organization based, as the UN is, on a collective response to a common threat, cannot sustain the situation where those who mandate, those who contribute personnel and those who finance are – with a few exceptions – such substantially separate groups. If the situation is maintained where these groups are seen as distinct, then as mandates become ever more demanding and dangerous, tensions and divisions may be created within the UN. One cannot help thinking here of the issue of troop costs and

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1   "Conflict, Security, and Development", *World Development Report 2011*, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2011.

reimbursements which have recently divided the UN membership. While this is a matter for the member states to decide, the issue of compensation is an important one which can have serious ramifications for the peacekeeping partnership. It deserves to be taken seriously and as part of the overall discussion held over the past years on performance and capabilities required for peacekeeping missions.

In terms of mandates, one can see the trend towards a greater range of complexity of demands. It is likely that there will continue to be increased emphasis on the protection of civilians, especially women and children. People caught in conflict will continue to expect that peacekeepers will offer some level of protection, and they must be ready for these tasks. However, expectations will also need to be managed to ensure that peacekeepers have the necessary mandates and resources and that the host authorities shoulder their primary responsibility. Furthermore, a distinction will need to be maintained between protection in peacekeeping and actions that are undertaken to enforce peace. Some have noted a trend in the increasing need for robust action, and the UN needs to be prepared to defend the missions and their mandate. However, the basic consent of the parties will remain required in peacekeeping, as much as impartiality will be essential to success. UN peacekeeping is not configured for enforcement action.

On the military side, we must ensure that we have the capabilities needed to deploy into increasingly complex and high tempo environments. In military terms, this will mean not only the right numbers of troops, but also the right capabilities. Aviation, information, logistics, and communications are enablers that are critical in order for our deployments to be flexible and nimble enough to meet evolving challenges on the ground. We are developing capability standards for UN military and police units that will inform training, force generation and evaluation efforts, and are also looking at more scenario-based training to better prepare UN peacekeepers. The lessons from the assistance given to the UN by the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone (2000), by the EU's Operation Artemis in Ituri (DRC, 2003), and by the French Licorne force in Abidjan (2011) will also have to be drawn. Robust action, even in peacekeeping, requires the ability to manage escalation, and the UN will need reliable quick reactions, reserve and over-the-horizon capabilities. One must also hope that the promise of the EU Battle Groups and the AU's Standby Force is fully realized.

On the logistics and support side, we will also need to be more flexible. Al-

ready, the Department of Field Support is engaged in direct support with large UN operations, the AU operation in Somalia, as well as a range of smaller political missions and presences. They will need the necessary flexibility in financial and administrative systems to support this range of demand effectively, while ensuring accountability.

The importance of regional organizations acting under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter has already been mentioned. The past decade has seen the UN and regional organizations working in various configurations together in the same theatre: side by side, one taking over from the other, and even in hybrid command. While the latter is not something we recommend repeating, it is abundantly clear that to be successful in peace operations in 2020, we will have to be much more interoperable with a range of regional organizations. Better communications and liaison, more insight into each other's planning processes, and stronger links at the strategic level will be needed.

Looking to 2020, the increased attention to peacebuilding issues will also need to be translated into more coherent operational impact. Peacebuilding must start as early as possible, certainly during the peacekeeping phase. The necessary capacities, including strong political and technical expertise, especially in key areas such as the rule of law and governance will be required so that national institutions can be supported and the UN can help to extend the legitimate authority of the state. Through the Civilian Capacity Review[2] and other human resource efforts we are working to ensure the availability of the necessary civilian personnel, drawn from across the world to carry out the widening range of civilian tasks. We will also need to be more flexible and to draw on and build local capacity more effectively. Likewise, the work of ensuring that the UN acts as one will undoubtedly need to continue and extend to the World Bank and other key players. We will need to better tailor the peacebuilding assistance to each situation and become less "supply-driven". Further, responsibilities and accountabilities across the whole of the international communities' peacebuilding efforts will need to be better aligned, lest fragile host institutions are subjected to what the World Bank has called "policy stress".

Finally, looking back to the Brahimi Report as much as forward, one must never lose sight of the fundamental fact that ultimately, UN peacekeeping is in

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2   Report of the Senior Advisory Group to the UN Secretary-General, "Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict", United Nations, A/65/747-S/2011/85, 22 February 2011.

the business of achieving peace. In other words, the success of peace operations in 2020 will depend, as much as it does today, on whether operations are accompanied by a viable political process, a path to sustainable peace, and whether there is enough diplomatic support to achieve it. This simple point remains one of the most difficult to retain in the heat of crisis; yet it will remain as relevant in 2020 as it is today.

Traditional and New Contributors to UN Operations: Brazil's Strategic Motivations

Antonio Jorge Ramalho

Contexts and Values:
Political Constraints to UN Peacekeeping Operations

This paper examines Brazil's approach and current policy in UN peacekeeping operations. It also contextualizes the issue against the backdrop of these operations' dilemmas, as well as of the general orientation for the Brazilian foreign policy. Its main argument is that the country sees these operations as means to help build an international order based on rules and institutions, rather than on *realpolitik*. Brazil thinks that if it succeeds in helping achieve this end it will emerge as a more influential global player, since such an order will probably be more stable and prosperous, and certainly less unfair. However, numerous obstacles lie ahead, which explain the country's efforts to inform UN operations with values such as tolerance and solidarity. This position bets on the continuous enhancement of global institutions and on permanent efforts to redistribute wealth in the long run.

The 2009 DPKO/DFS "New Horizon" non-paper calls for "a shared understanding among all stakeholders of the objectives of UN peacekeeping and the role that each plays in their realization".[1] This call may set parameters for political negotiations, but it offers no roadmap for action. It is broad in scope and difficult to materialize through public policies on the ground. Like other political documents, the "New Horizon" non-paper uses a language carefully crafted to allow for consensus, reproducing the political exercises from which peacekeeping operations' mandates emerge. Diplomatic documents tend to be ambiguous; their language has to allow for different interpretations by those who have to defend the approved texts back home. Ambiguities are precisely what allow for reconciling different, perhaps opposed, interests of governments that cannot avoid being accountable to their domestic constituencies while engaging in collective action abroad.

Hence, mandates will continue to be ambiguous while Special Representatives

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1 "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping", DPKO/DFS, United Nations, 2009, p. iii.

of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and military in the terrain will continue to call for precise definitions of purposes, means, and support to deepen political involvement in local contexts. However, most of them do not expect this to occur. They call for a precision that will not come to hedge against critics of occasional failures. This call also points to improvements in the road ahead and clarification of the lessons learnt, often at a bloody price.

UN operations face such ambiguities in areas other than their mandates: they instantiate contradictions inherent to the UN system and its functioning in current international relations. By launching UN operations, governments incoherently employ a legal system and a political apparatus conceived to reinforce states' identities and reconcile their interests to protect individuals. The structure of incentives that inform governments' calculations at the UN Security Council (UNSC) pertain to the dynamic interaction between political communities, which are essentially different from those that inform political relations within those polities. Throughout history, sovereigns have shown peculiar ways of settling their disputes, wars being perhaps the most recurrent among them. But they also built sophisticated ensembles of norms, institutions, and decision-making patterns that help manage the anarchical societies in reasonably predictable ways.

In this process, the UN emerged as an institution embedded with devices designed to prevent failures observed in other circumstances. It assured that the Security Council would not be used by certain great powers to legitimize collective action against others and enshrined innovative concepts, such as relating development and some sense of fairness to promote peace among nation states.

The winners of World War II designed these institutions to frame their future relations in an order whose liberal content was supposed to help reduce the risks of a nuclear conflict and to promote prosperity through trade and economic development. But this worldview has at its core the idea of individual rights and duties, whose protection and enforcement, respectively, are the purpose for which political institutions have been conceived and improved, according to modern Western political thought. Not by coincidence, the UN Charter echoes the US Declaration of Independence and is often interpreted in tandem with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Both assume that political systems exist to harmonize public and private aims; both presume that governments exist to serve their citizens.

Put differently, the UN is a contradictory system: its norms and institutions are a Grotian construct informed by a cosmopolitan logic, an inconsistency hard to reconcile. The institutional and normative structure builds on the underlying assumption that sovereigns represent their citizens' interests – which is a debatable assertion. This may be true for some states, which value the protection of human rights, making it a foreign policy goal. When successful, they shift this to the UN's agenda, producing peacekeeping operations that are implemented for humanitarian reasons, despite the fact that the UN Charter only authorizes interventions "to maintain or restore international peace and security" (Article 42). Haiti in 2004 and Libya in 2011 are the most recent cases in which there were clear risks of bloodbaths, humanitarian catastrophes, or even of waves of immigrants to neighbouring countries; but there was no risk of war or threats to international peace.

By legitimately addressing humanitarian threats in such circumstances the international community may occasionally operate in an area where the interests of individuals and states overlap, but it also establishes precedents for interventions with the interstate apparatuses on behalf of threatened individuals – no matter where they are and what peril they face. This leads sovereigns to perceive the risk that these precedents may be used to help legitimize future international interventions elsewhere, perhaps in their territories, preventing them from enthusiastic engagement in such operations.

More often than not, political actions aiming at protecting citizens observe a contradiction between the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, on the one hand and, on the other, the protection of human rights. Nevertheless, UN operations rarely admit their interference in local political processes. When the UNSC launches them it may be obvious that the cost of inaction is much higher, which may justify disrespecting the former principle. But operations continue in time, occasionally for decades, through which mandates, official documents, and speeches keep stressing the commitment to impartiality. This rhetoric (for some a conviction) rarely connects to reality, at least from the standpoint of local political groups. Acknowledging a certain degree of interference in domestic political processes and adopting clear standards would help improve the accountability of UN operations and their efficacy on the ground.

After all, in reality the agenda of complex UN operations often propose objectives that in many cases have never been tried in the polities where they operate. Many

of the UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that join efforts to materialize this agenda have in fact been in these places for decades but take no responsibility for the poor conditions they now try to transform. At the political level, once the UN launches an operation it tends to concentrate on goals that are alien to many political cultures and in the best cases, have previously been attempted through negotiated programs such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Not surprisingly, mandates are unrealistic, particularly if one considers how poorly resourced and under-staffed the missions responsible for their implementation are. With the passage of time local political actors use UN operations either as sources of material wealth or as shields for their inefficiencies. They are occasionally presented as the very source of difficulties, since their prolonged presence serve both to reinforce xenophobia and to produce confusion among the population regarding who is responsible for delivering basic public services. Indeed, the mere possibility of such an intervention taking place is sufficient to inform the calculations of local leaders, who take advantage of this to advance their own interests – which do not necessarily coincide with those which UN mandates have ambiguously established.

Brazil's Motivations:
A Rule-Based System and Permanent Skillful Negotiations

Understanding Brazil's motivations and the logic of its engagement in UN operations requires considering the incoherence and occasional contradictions inherent to these operations. As a developing country that has never held important military capacities and defends an international order ruled by norms and institutions, rather than force, Brazil stresses the respect for principles such as sovereignty, non-intervention, self-determination, and respect for international law and institutions. This explains Brazil's emphasis on asserting that only the UN has full legitimacy to implement peacekeeping operations, either by itself or in partnership with or in support to regional organizations.[2] As a state that has witnessed numerous interventions in the Southern Hemisphere, it reinforces the principles consecrated in Westphalia,

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2   See Foreign Minister Celso Amorim's conference at the Mexican Council of International Affairs, 28 November 2007: "Brazil was right about sending troops and assuming the military command of MINUSTAH because, in the first place, it was a mission decided by the UNSC, the only organ with the legitimacy to determine the presence of foreign troops in a sovereign country". Available at http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/discursos-artigos-entrevistas-e-outras-comunicacoes/embaixador-celso-luiz-nunes-amorim/943269273701-discurso-do-ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores, accessed on 2 May 2011.

which in Latin America were reinforced by the Calvo and the Drago Doctrines.[3]

Despite considering the UN as the sole existing apparatus that comes close to what would be a legitimate system for global governance, Brazil calls for its reform, on the grounds that its structure should mirror the current distribution of power and influence in the international realm. It argues that reforms are necessary precisely to avoid losing the legitimacy that the UN still has in world affairs. Hence, Brazil tends to consider peace operations conducted beyond the auspices of the UN as military actions or alliance-like concerted aggressions, rather than genuine initiatives by the international community to reaffirm the values expressed in the UN Charter. Accordingly, in official discourses the Brazilian government carefully avoids the imprecise concept of "peace operations", preferring the terms "peacekeeping" or "peacebuilding" operations, which are consecrated in UN language. Recently it has also characterized these operations as a means to reinforce the UN's legitimacy and to advance justice in the international order.

In the same vein, Brasilia sees the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as an important instrument to promote local development and to coordinate initiatives undertaken to consolidate peace in post-conflict societies. As important as it shall be to missions on the ground, the PBC shall also help strengthen the ties between the UNSC and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), ensuing a more permanent condition for the latter to fulfil its commitment of "promoting higher standards of living, full employment, and economic and social progress".[4] After all, improvements in these areas are obvious requirements for durable peace both within countries and between them, the Brazilian official discourse purports. Indeed, by linking humanitarian assistance to long-term structural planning, for instance,[5] it aims to help the UN system learn from its own experiences. It is undeniable that previous operations perhaps avoided humanitarian catastrophes in

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3 Known as the Calvo Doctrine, on behalf of the Argentine jurist and diplomat Carlos Calvo, who systematized its core ideas, this set of principles and norms affirm the equivalence of states regarding their right to define the rules that apply to the administration of properties in their territory. The practical implication of this doctrine was to prevent more powerful countries from intervening in domestic affairs on the grounds of protecting their citizens' interests or of collecting indemnities. The argument aimed at reducing the scope and increasing the costs of US interventions in the region. The Drago Doctrine was developed roughly three decades later by another Argentine diplomat, Luis María Drago, who built on this reasoning to condemn possible armed interventions justified by the interest of recovering public debts.

4 See ECOSOC – Background information, available at http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/about/index.shtml, accessed on 26 July 2011.

5 See http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas/acao-contra-a-fome-e-assistencia-humanitaria/assistencia-humanitaria/view, accessed on 26 July 2011.

polities marked by poor socioeconomic conditions, but they have not prevented new, often more violent conflicts, from happening in these places.

Only the combination of peacebuilding and sustained efforts to materialize social improvements will succeed in producing permanent changes. The PBC has thus also a role to play as a catalyst to bridge the gap between UN operations and its agencies, funds, and programmes, between the UNSC and the UN organs responsible for promoting structural changes in underdeveloped societies, be they post-conflict or not. In brief, in Brazil's view, peace, security, and development are intertwined.[6] It follows that the country's strategic motivations to engage in UN operations relate to its views of a rule-based international order that needs a legitimate institution to be responsible for both coordinating long-term structural development and responding, promptly and effectively, to humanitarian crises.

Such operations are considered exceptional, not an instrument to promote regional stability. Robust as they occasionally need to be, they shall not lose sight of their main purpose: to help local authorities establish a sustainable and prosperous society in harmony with the international community. If they manage to encourage joint technical cooperation projects, they may function as vehicles for states interested in projecting an image of deep coordination among themselves and as an opportunity to improve political coordination. This explains why the Brazilian battalion in MINUSTAH also engages the military from Bolivia and Paraguay on a regular basis, besides promoting concerted actions with other South American troops on the ground. Such articulated initiatives in Haiti emerge as opportunities for political cooperation, which are seen as complementary to the process of economic integration in South America. Ultimately it may also help address social demands in both spaces, opening room for a more just international order, which would be in everyone's interest.

Brazil's technical cooperation policy helps bring about these objectives. The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) has increased its budget from 4.5 million Brazilian Real (R$) in 2003 to R$ 52.5 million in 2010 to R$ 92 million in 2011.[7]

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6   See Ambassador A. Patriota's speech, UNSC's High Level Debate on Security and Development, 11 February 2011, available at http://www.un.int/brazil/speech/11d-AAP-Maintenance-international-peace-security.html, accessed on 1 June 2011.

7   See M. Farani, Speech at the launching of the study entitled "Cooperacao brasileira para o desenvolvimento internacional: 2005-2009", IPEA/ABC, 2011, available at http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6747&Itemid=4, accessed on 26 July 2011. The study is available at http://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/Book_Cooperao_Brasileira.pdf

It focuses on agriculture, health and bio-fuels, imposes no conditionality, and stresses the idea of solidarity and local ownership, presenting itself as a way to take responsibility for reducing inequalities in the global sphere. Due to its role in MINUSTAH, Brazil's approach in Haiti is long-term oriented: it has implemented 10 projects, having another 17 ready to start in 2011 and 12 under appreciation in different areas. This does not include the immediate humanitarian assistance after the earthquake, which amounted to USD 220 million. Alone, Haiti accounted for over 13 percent of Brazilian expenses with technical cooperation between 2005 and 2010, the fourth highest budget, behind Mozambique (15.78 percent), East Timor (15.16 percent), and Guinea Bissau (14.43 percent).[8]

The general view is one of engaging in the construction of an international order that is less unfair on the basis of existent international institutions, norms, and practices – all of which are in need of improvement. In this process, states that see themselves as capable of producing consensus, of building bridges between possible contenders, and of bridging gaps between the rich and the poor will be able to improve their position in relation to traditional powers. Institutions need improvements because they structure an increasingly interdependent world in which technologies empower individuals and strengthen their position *vis-à-vis* their respective governments. In this order, sovereigns will be influential if they are capable of inducing political processes conducive to the simultaneous promotion of peace, security, and development.

Against this backdrop, Brazil arguably has a particular capacity to help build a prosperous global order that tends to be more legitimate and stable because its governance acknowledges the need for it to become more equitable. Brazil's credentials to play such role would come from over 150 years of peaceful coexistence with neighbouring countries, despite the huge imbalances in its favour, and from a respected diplomacy, traditionally dedicated to words and deeds in favour of consistent international rules and institutions. Moreover, its perception of the UNSC as a political organ whose main responsibility is to solve political differences short of war – instead of operating as a body that legitimates the use of force by the international community – stresses this attachment to the values of

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8 *Ibid*. Moreover, according to ABC's Director, the Agency's budget increased over twentyfold in the last nine years and records neither the expenses with the technical hours given by Brazilian public agencies nor those paid by the Brazilian National Economic and Social Development Bank. Had these costs been recorded, the Brazilian budget for technical cooperation would be far higher.

tolerance and conciliation as key parameters for international action.

The success in addressing its own domestic social challenges in recent decades supports its claims for reducing inequalities at the global level. Economic stability and growth substantiate Brazil's technical and financial cooperation, materializing the solidarity asserted in its discourse. A discourse that has yet to be articulated theoretically, despite its coherence with Brazil's traditional behaviour, and favours political actions in the gray zone inherent in UN operations. It acknowledges the need for international intervention only under the auspices of the UNSC and when asked by local governments. At the political and strategic level, these conditions frame the specificities of Brazilian engagements in peacekeeping operations: they reconcile the respect for the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs with attention to human rights, addressing the needs of individuals, now enveloped in the concepts of solidarity and non-indifference. At the operational level, the specificities focus on more humane approaches by the military on the ground and on poverty-reduction initiatives.

Hardly a newcomer to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations – it started in Suez, in 1956 – Brazil insists that developing countries may also take up responsibilities in the international arena. Its ideology resembles those of countries like India or Egypt, but it carefully selects the operations it accepts to play important roles in. Until the case of Haiti, due to its commitment to the principles of self-determination and non-intervention in internal affairs, Brazil had resisted mandates under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It now ranks 13th in troop contributors, behind Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Egypt, Nepal, Jordan, Rwanda, Ghana, Uruguay, Ethiopia and Senegal, and is followed by South Africa and China.[9] The list suggests an important contrast with the top ten providers of assessed financial contributions to UN operations (2010-12), which account for over 81 percent of the overall peacekeeping budget.[10] The G-7 alone accounts for over 71 percent of the budget.[11]

Such imbalance between troop-contributor countries and donors raise serious concerns, as it may help spread the perception that UN operations serve as a device to establish a division of labour between the have and the have-nots. The

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9   See *Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations*, 30 April 2011, available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/apr11_2.pdf, accessed on 3 June 2011.

10   United States: 27.17%; Japan: 12.53%; United Kingdom: 8.16%; Germany: 8.02%; France: 7.56%; Italy: 5.0%; China: 3.94%; Canada: 3.21%; Spain: 3.18%; and Republic of Korea: 2.26%.

11   See *United Nations Peace Operations. Year in Review 2010*, UN Department of Public Information, 2011, p.81. Available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/yir2010.pdf, accessed on 16 July 2011.

fact that most developed countries are not enthusiasts of discussions at the C-34 also emerges before Brazil's eyes as a possible sign that they perceive UN operations as proxies to direct intervention, rather than as legitimate initiatives whose contents shall be negotiated with all relevant members of the international community.

In Brazil's view these efforts are necessary to engage in UN peacekeeping operations in helping to build an international order based on rules and institutions, rather than on power politics. By adding these exceptional measures to the permanent effort of improving the UN, sovereigns may succeed in their attempt to materialize a world whose structures are informed by the values of tolerance and solidarity, perhaps ensuing an epoch of prosperity and stable, legitimate, global governance.

Understanding the Strategic Motivations of African Contributors to UN Peace Operations

Alhaji Sarjoh Bah

This paper reflects upon the strategic motivations of African contributors of uniformed personnel (military and police) to UN peace operations. It identifies the key principles underpinning African contribution of UN peacekeeping since its inception over six decades ago. In doing so, it highlights areas of convergence and divergence between the principles underpinning African contributions to another key contributor to UN peacekeeping, Brazil.

There are three key principles that support the strategic motivations of African troop and police contributors. While the level and degree of emphasis vary from country to country, the three crosscutting principles are: commitment to the values of the UN, solidarity, and quest for regional stability.

Commitment to the Values of the UN

First, as with Brazil, most African troop and police contributors are not new to UN peacekeeping. If anything, African countries have been among the most consistent contributors to UN peacekeeping over the past sixty years. In contemporary terms, this is manifested by the fact that Africa accounts for over 40 percent of all UN uniformed personnel in the field and about half of the top ten contributors to UN peacekeeping are African. Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, Senegal, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco and Rwanda among others, constitute the core of African peacekeeping.[1] Respect for the primacy of the UN as the world's only truly global entity is at the heart of the principles underpinning the contributions of these and other African countries. These states subscribe to the universal values that the UN represents, hence their continued commitment of personnel to operations despite the unrepresentative nature of the Security Council. That the Security Council, especially its Permanent Five, are not reflected in the uniformed personnel serving

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1   For further details, see *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2009*, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, Lynne Rienner, Boulder Colorado, 2009.

under its command has not dampened the commitment of African contributors. However, the absence of troops from the Permanent Five, with the exception of China, which has recently increased its contribution of finance and uniformed personnel, in UN-led peace operations is an anomaly that should be rectified if the kind of "international social and political justice" that Brazil hopes for is to be achieved.[2] Perhaps, some African contributors share in Brazil's hope that by contributing to UN peacekeeping, a rules-based international system will emerge, leading to political and social justice that is not shaped by power politics.

Unfortunately, this optimism is not shared by the author because sixty years of peacekeeping have had the unintended effect of reinforcing the North-South divide by perpetuating what the author refers to as a "blood-treasure" dynamic, whereby the developed North provides the treasure in the form of assessed contributions for peacekeeping, while the underdeveloped South provides blood in the form of uniformed personnel. This division of labour, if one could call it that, has unfortunately contributed to fostering a view in some quarters that some lives are more important than others, a view that would undoubtedly undermine the quest for consensus especially in regards to robust mandates that are not matched by the resources to implement them.

At another level, UN peacekeeping has reinforced the notion of "small" and "big" wars, an irrelevant dichotomy for the victims of conflicts, big or small, but one that exists nonetheless. The notion of "small" and "big" wars explains why the United States and its NATO allies can afford to spend over USD 3 billion a week in Afghanistan but complain about the UN's peacekeeping budget which is under USD 8 billion per annum. The United States alone is estimated to be spending USD 2 billion dollars a week in Afghanistan in the face of a faltering economy at home, and a wider global economic and financial crisis.[3]

The Principle of Solidarity

Solidarity is the second major strategic imperative that drives African contributions to peace operations. It is critical to point out that the principle of solidarity has a long-standing tradition in African diplomacy dating back to the anti-colonial

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2   See A. Jorge Ramalho's contribution in this volume.
3   "US Spends Two Billion Dollars a Week in Afghanistan", The Reality of Life in Afghanistan (RAWA) News, 6 June 2011, available at http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2011/06/06/us-spends-two-billion-dollars-a-week-in-afghanistan.html, accessed on 30 June 2011.

struggle including the fight against apartheid to the African Union's (AU) current peacemaking efforts in Somalia, the most hostile peacekeeping environment anywhere in the world. Providing support to fellow human beings both in Africa and beyond is a core principle that cuts across both old and new African contributors to UN and African-led peacekeeping. Africa's broad and universal application of the principle of solidarity is manifested by its contributions to peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans, East Timor, the Middle East and within Africa itself, where along with South Asia, it carries the bulk of the UN's peacekeeping responsibilities.

The shift in emphasis from non-interference to non-indifference by the AU is perhaps the most glaring demonstration of the principle of solidarity in normative terms. Article Four (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act provides for the AU to intervene in a member state either at the invitation of that state or if it is established that crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide are being committed.[4] That this was adopted three years before the adoption of the principle of Responsibility to Protect by the 2005 World Summit, demonstrates the proactive thinking in Africa. The AU's willingness to deploy peacekeepers even where *there is no peace to keep*, as was the case in Burundi (2004), Darfur (2004) and its ongoing mission in Somalia were driven by the principle of solidarity. These missions have revealed a major doctrinal difference between the AU and the UN, as the latter does not deploy peacekeepers where this is no peace to keep. Given the growing trend of partnership including the hybrid AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), it is hoped that the two institutions will engage in meaningful dialogue to address this doctrinal difference and its implications for future partnerships.

Quest for Regional Stability

Thirdly, nearly all African troop and police contributors, while acknowledging the central role of the UN in peacekeeping, are equally committed to regional peacekeeping, if the UN is unwilling or unable to act. This is perhaps the most pronounced divergence between Brazil and the bulk of African states. While the central role of the UN in peacekeeping might not be negotiable in Brazil, this is certainly not the case in Africa where regional peacekeeping is encouraged and practised. There are at least two reasons for Africa's strong inclination towards

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4   See Constitutive Act of the African Union, Durban, South Africa, 2002.

regional peacekeeping. First, there is a growing realization in Africa that the UN cannot respond to all conflicts on the continent on a consistent basis. Thus, the unpredictable nature of how the UN responds to a given crisis has reinforced Africa's determination to undertake regional peacekeeping with or without the UN. Here, it is worth mentioning that the genocide in Rwanda was a turning point in Africa's embrace of regional peacekeeping. However, even before that, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) had launched peace enforcement missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the early 1990s.

At another level, Africa's embrace of regional peacekeeping is informed by its desire for self-reliance in the security sphere. While some might question the viability of this approach, there is no doubt that the continent is moving towards developing a collective security architecture that includes the capabilities for a range of peacemaking and peace enforcement measures. Efforts are underway to operationalize the African Peace Security Architecture (APSA) as a comprehensive instrument for managing the security challenges on the continent. So far, progress in operationalizing the APSA has varied from region to region, with West, East and Southern Africa more advanced than North and Central Africa.[5] Thus, the determination to maintain regional stability even if it means doing so outside the UN framework is a core strategic consideration of all African countries.

There are of course a range of other considerations such as professionalization of their security services, national pride, global and regional hegemonic ambitions and financial rewards among others that inform the decisions of individual African contributors to UN operations, but these are country-specific. While there is no doubt that both governments and individual personnel benefit financially through reimbursement and remuneration, it is unfair to argue that African or Asian TCCs and PCCs are purely motivated by monetary gains. It is impossible to put monetary value on the lives of peacekeepers fallen in the line of duty. Commitment to the universal values of the UN, adherence to the principle of solidarity and the quest for regional stability are the consistent threads that run across the African contributors when it comes to UN and regional peacekeeping.

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5   For details on the APSA, see "APSA Assessment 2010", A Report of the AU's Peace and Security Department, November 2010.

Partnerships: the Way of the Future

In this context, if the international community is to develop consensus around peacekeeping as an international peacemaking tool, we have to start talking to each other and stop *whistling pass each other*. It is only by engaging in open dialogue and getting the politics right at the various levels – national, regional and international – that one can realistically expect positive outcomes from peacekeeping engagement. While this might sound like stating the obvious, it is important to reiterate it because it is only by getting the politics right that the end-state of peacekeeping, which is to complement peacemaking efforts, can be realized in a timely fashion.

Partnership between the UN and regional entities is the path to the future. Anything short of that would lead to endless and undesirable peacekeeping undertakings. On the question of partnership, one would cite the remarkable collaboration between the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) in managing the referendum on the status of South Sudan in January 2011. Most cynics had predicted doom but thanks to the collaboration between the UN, AU and others, the process went reasonably well. Although we now face challenges in Abyei, South Khordofan and some of the other transitional areas, there is reason to believe that those challenges, like the ones associated with the referendum, can be resolved if a solid partnership is developed and sustained. For instance the fact that the Security Council authorization of the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA) resulted from an agreement between the Government of Sudan and its counterpart in the South following an emergency Summit between the two sides convened by the AUHIP, is a glaring example of the value of the continuing partnership. In practical terms, it demonstrates the utility of harnessing the advantages that the UN enjoys due to its universal character and those embedded in the AU due to its regional dimension. However, for such a partnership to succeed in the future it should be underpinned by mutual respect. In fact, for any partnership to succeed, the partners should have the option of asking why they are being asked to jump, and not just jump as they are told.

This leads to the Libya situation. The way the crisis has been handled will have far reaching repercussions on peacekeeping and wider international conflict management initiatives. There is an emerging view in some quarters of Africa

and elsewhere that the methods of enforcing UNSC resolution 1973 (2011) has turned the concepts of the Responsibility to Protect and civilian protection on their heads. And we are starting to feel the impact as the UN is unable to discuss current developments in Syria in a serious way, due to what is perceived by key members of the Security Council as the blatant abuse of resolution 1973 by NATO members. The handling of the Libyan crisis has opened all sorts of rifts between the UN and various actors, including the AU whose peacemaking efforts in Libya have been consistently frustrated by some NATO members who are increasingly bent on regime change in complete contravention to resolution 1973. How the UN deals with these divisions will determine whether there will in fact be a renewed consensus on UN peacekeeping operations, especially if the concerns and viewpoints of key contributors are ignored, as is often the case.

Western States and UN Peacekeeping: What Participation in a Post-Afghan Era?

Emmanuel Bonne

This paper does not pretend to speak for the West or to be able to anticipate the post-Afghan era and how the West will adapt. However, it can present a French perspective of UN peacekeeping, assuming that it more or less reflects concerns and objectives of other Western actors, in particular EU partners.

To start with, it is not certain that there is a specific Western approach to peacekeeping. Some countries contribute troops, some provide a large part of the funding, a few sit at the Security Council, and many others do not. Also it seems that there now exists a strong level of consensus on what peacekeeping is, what it requires and what it can deliver. This means that differences between Northern and Southern countries, Western and others, have clearly diminished in the recent years. Indeed, the community of peacekeeping actors has multiplied and diversified. In this context, what Western countries, France at least, can do depends not only on their own resources and priorities, but also on what other UN members and peacekeeping actors are ready to do. Western or French policies cannot be isolated from the broader UN context.

This said, here are a few points on France and contemporary peacekeeping.

Lessons Have Been Learnt

France has learnt from the difficulties encountered by peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda. In 1998, a French parliamentary inquiry drew the following main recommendations after the French participation in operations in Rwanda:

- "Give our forces real self-defence or combat capabilities, to enable them to cope with any change in circumstances";

- "Allow the French government to be fully informed of policies and decisions regarding our forces when they are engaged in a mission";

- "In case of a deterioration of the situation or a violent crisis, the use of Chapter VII [of the UN Charter] must be a condition to our participation in an intervention to restore peace".[1]

One should not forget that Western countries provided large contingents to peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, to the extent that they were the main troop contributors. In 1990, they represented 70 percent of the 10,300 troops deployed. In 1993, France was the first troop contributor with 9,000 peacekeepers.

There is no doubt that Western states have adapted their contribution as a result of their experience in the 1990s. For many, including France, reform became a prerequisite to preserve the credibility of UN peacekeeping. The conclusions of the 2000 Brahimi Report were welcomed as they marked a first major turning point in this direction. Reform is a long and multi-facetted process. France is committed to advancing it as demonstrated by the initiative launched with the United Kingdom at the Security Council in 2009.

Three issues are particularly important. First, the strategic conduct of operations. France has called for improvements in how mandates are drafted, how they are coordinated with planning, how goals are set and how benchmarks for success are established. We support the idea of strengthening command and control mechanisms, in particular at the level of the Secretariat. We also have done our best in the Council to improve dialogue among the main partners during the planning and implementation of operations. These efforts have been complemented by the reinforcement of the military expertise of the Secretariat. The UN is not a military organization but there remains the need to improve our practice.

Second, the implementation of complex mandates. In this respect, France fully supports the idea that the UN should be in a position to undertake robust efforts. In Cote d'Ivoire for example, we provided military support to the action of UNOCI to prevent more violence. These efforts have proven successful. In general, we think it would be a mistake to prevent the UN from carrying out robust peacekeeping. In 2006, France conditioned its commitment to UNIFIL II to the definition of clear rules of engagement and the creation of the Strategic Military Cell (SMC) to provide the Force all the necessary capabilities of intervention. We think this has greatly contributed to the credibility of UNIFIL in a volatile environment.

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1 "Rapport d'information sur les opérations militaires menées par la France, d'autres pays et l'ONU au Rwanda entre 1990 et 1994", National Assembly, Paris, n°1271, 1998.

Beyond UN operations, the contributions of countries deeply involved in robust operations – not necessarily using Blue Helmets but nevertheless mandated by the organization – such as in Afghanistan must be acknowledged. As for Libya, we do not ignore the debate around the implementation of UNSC resolution 1973 (2011). In the meantime, we note that for the first time the Security Council has directly given member states a robust mandate to protect civilians with their own means and we believe this is an important step forward.

Third, the early integration of post-conflict reconstruction into our strategies. With respect to mandate priorities, a significant effort has been made and should be pursued. In the case of MONUSCO in the DRC, we have rationalized a highly ambitious and complex mandate and we have also worked closely with the Congolese authorities to elaborate a kind of contract for the mid and long term. We believe this kind of demarche must be encouraged. To be successful, UN missions need visibility and predictability from the host country. Our initiative has received wide support and it has been followed up with DPKO and DFS. We now have what we need in terms of concepts, political support and perspectives for the future of peacekeeping. More important is to translate good intentions into visible results in the field. Our common ability to show that reform brings benefits is certainly the best incentive for Western states as well as others to invest in UN peacekeeping.

Expectations Remain High

UN peacekeeping is indispensible to the maintenance of international peace and security. In most cases peacekeepers are dispatched to regions where only the UN is able or willing to intervene. This makes their role even more important. If they leave, nobody replaces them. Therefore criticism is too easy. France acknowledges its responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council and a Western country. This is a reason why our expectations are high. They reflect and complement principles exposed in our initiative at the Security Council, in particular in the following areas.

Protection of civilians: it has clearly become the number one priority. It is both a lesson from the past and an operational necessity. When facing public opinion in countries where the UN operates, the ability of the organization to protect

civilians is the standard by which the operation will be judged. We have shown in Cote d'Ivoire that we are ready to assume our responsibilities in this regard.

Peacebuilding: the issue of sequential implementation of mandated tasks deserves consideration. It is difficult to give a new mission too many tasks. One must therefore avoid that in prioritizing urgent tasks, structural elements necessary both for an exit strategy and to ensure that conflicts do not recur or become prolonged are overlooked. The establishment of the rule of law and the setting up of security forces fall under that category. These are priority tasks which require a long and sustained investment by the UN in coordination with many different partners. In this respect, EU programmes and operations have often proved to be both highly relevant and well-managed, as for example, the EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Sector Reform (EUSEC) and the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) programmes in the DRC. France is part of these efforts and can also complement them on a national basis as in the DRC.

Effectiveness: an integrated approach remains needed in many operations. In that regard, concrete guidelines aimed at system-wide coherence are crucial. There are important benchmarks that allow potential donors and/or partners of UN operations – including France – to elaborate their own contribution. Cohesiveness, effectiveness and coordination of international efforts will be crucial in addressing two of the biggest challenges the UN will face in the near future: capacity-building in South Soudan, and post-conflict stabilization in Libya.

The Need to Adapt to New Realities and Constraints

France is one of the main contributors to UN peacekeeping operations, to which it is the fifth largest financial contributor. France also provides 1,500 Blue Helmets and Berets. We also contribute more than 12,000 men to operations under UN mandates in the framework of the EU, NATO or at the national level. This is to say, that the French commitment to peacekeeping is firm. Nevertheless, we must adapt not only to new needs and constraints in the UN system but also to changing realities on the ground. Several challenges for the UN, with a potential impact on what France and probably other Western countries can do, can be identified.

Financing: in a sense peacekeeping is a victim of its own success. With close to 100,000 personnel (more than 120,000 with the civilians) in the field, it is

hardly sustainable as a financial model. Some argue that peacekeeping would be cheaper if the Security Council was not so prompt to decide new operations. It is true, but demand for peacekeeping is high. Still, when appropriate, we must be able to close operations and replace them with more relevant tools. Therefore, work on exit strategies must lead to operational decisions.

The French Presidency of the Security Council organized a debate on exit strategies in February 2010. To our surprise it was very difficult to reach an agreement on anything like benchmarks and timetables. Indeed it is sometimes easier to start a mission than to end it. But we think there is potential for rationalizing missions. In this regard, we appreciate the Global Strategy and the initiatives DFS has taken to promote better support policies.

As most Western countries are facing the consequences of the financial crisis and governments have to make difficult decisions on where to cut expenditure, it is clear that the issue of financing operations is serious. We strongly believe that the burden must be shared in a more equitable manner. Western states can no longer be the only ones to assume expenses in the current proportions (the EU contributes 40 percent of the UN regular budget (USD 2.1 billion per year), and is the first contributor to the peacekeeping budget with USD 3.2 billion annually).

Civilian capacities: our approach to peacekeeping should be a global and multidisciplinary one. Such a comprehensive approach implies that we look beyond mere crisis management and bring together different instruments including diplomacy, development and capacity-building into a single, sustainable political strategy. That is a major task we are facing. In this regard, the senior advisory group on "Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict"[2] has produced an excellent report on which we can build. The debate on how to implement its recommendations is just starting, and we must help the Secretariat to turn the panel's recommendations into executive decisions. There is a growing demand for civilian capacities as conflict and post-conflict situations tend to be more complex. This requires reactivity and flexibility and also strict management of financial and human resources. It also requires coordination with relevant organizations. In this regard, France and its European partners offer a wide array of instruments to support UN actions.

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2   Report of the Senior Advisory Group to the UN Secretary-General, "Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict", United Nations, A/65/747-S/2011/85, 22 February 2011.

Partnership with other organizations: the UN cannot do everything by itself. The case of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is emblematic of the AU providing the troops, the UN providing and funding the "logistics package", the EU ensuring the payment of the contingents and NATO providing strategic airlift. UN coordination with other organizations, enshrined in Chapter VIII of the Charter, is an indispensible tool to bring additional resources to the UN, given the large number of operations currently deployed. The large involvement of the AU in Africa, the heavy commitments of NATO in complex theatres (Afghanistan and Libya in particular) have demonstrated that the UN can be properly relayed by other regional organizations or collective security organizations.

The role of the EU: supporting effective multilateralism and contributing to UN efforts in peacekeeping is at the forefront of the EU engagement in the field of crisis management. This principle has been translated into concrete action. The very first EU crisis management mission, EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina, took over in 2003 from a UN operation (International Police Task Force). The very first autonomous EU military operation, Artemis, was deployed in 2003 in the DRC in direct support of the UN. Since then, European Union Force (EUFOR) DRC (2006), EUFOR Chad/CAR (2008-09), EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) Kosovo (since 2008) and Atalanta (since 2008) have all been examples of a fruitful EU-UN cooperation. There are currently three EU military operations (EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia, EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Atalanta) and ten civilian operations. Since 2003, the EU has run more than 20 operations. In addition, another important aspect of what the EU can do was reflected in the decision to create a financing instrument to facilitate the implementation of peacekeeping operations by the AU and/or African sub-regional organizations and strengthen their capabilities. Since 2003, the African Peace Facility has been a substantial and unique source of predictable funding for African peacekeeping operations.

The growing cooperation between the UN and the EU is facilitated by the close vision that both organizations share about the role of the international community in crisis management. Inter-institutional cooperation is a source of enhanced legitimacy for both organizations: EU operations benefit from the political legitimacy conferred by the mandates given by the UN Security Council, while the UN takes advantage of the credibility and operational resources provided by the EU.

Conclusion

UN peacekeeping has often been described as under-resourced or over-stretched. Failures and shortcomings have been pointed out more than achievements and successes have been analyzed. Peacekeeping is not a perfect science but it is changing and we are confident that it is improving. At the end it remains our most efficient tool for the maintenance of peace and security and it is absolutely irreplaceable as crises tend to be more and more complex and require so many different capabilities that only the UN is able to assemble.

In this context, how will Western countries re-formulate their approach to UN peacekeeping in the post-Afghan era? It is true that operations in Afghanistan have produced a kind of fatigue in the public opinion of many Western countries. It is also true that capacities to project forces are strained and have probably reached a limit in Afghanistan. France, for example, currently has 12,500 soldiers deployed in overseas operations. But in the end, it is not guaranteed that the experience in Afghanistan and the entry into a post-Afghan era – which for now remains elusive – will produce any dramatic change in the way Western countries, at least France, approach peacekeeping. The main factors shaping our decisions will remain the need to tackle crises when they happen, the possibility for the Security Council to deliver clear and robust mandates, the ability of the UN to provide integrated and sustainable plans for action, and the coordination of UN action with regional or collective security organizations. This is the only way forward.

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Why We Need the West in UN Peacekeeping

David Haeri and Rebecca Jovin[1]

The evolution of peacekeeping operations since the end of the Cold War has revealed the UN's capacity to learn from the past, as exemplified by the 2000 Brahimi Report and the reform efforts that followed; its inherent flexibility and adaptability, allowing for diverse configurations of military, police, and civilian assets deployed in response to a wide range of crises; and, perhaps most importantly, its capacity for burden-sharing and its unique legitimacy as the only universal organization.

We understand today that a strong peacekeeping partnership among member states, the UN Secretariat, and partner organizations is the foundation and indeed a pre-requisite for successful peacekeeping. The question of *who* participates in UN peacekeeping therefore is a particularly pertinent one. Specifically, will Western countries increase their deployment of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations?

Those Who Mandate vs. Those Who Contribute

As stated by Alain Le Roy in his presentation, the surge in demand for peacekeepers over the last decade has been met by the contribution of a number of stalwart troop and police contributors, whose essential contribution in increasingly dangerous environments deserves recognition. Yet, the UN cannot sustain a situation in which those who mandate, those who contribute personnel and equipment, and those who provide the bulk of peacekeeping financial support are – with a few exceptions – distinct groups.

Of course, support to UN peacekeeping is not measured in deployment of uniformed personnel alone. One cannot discount the considerable capacity-building assistance many member states, particularly from the West, provide voluntarily to contributing countries. This support is central to sustaining peace-

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1   The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily represent the views of the United Nations Organization and should not be taken as an expression of UN official policy.

keeping and also deserves recognition. It is equally important to acknowledge the support countries provide to UN peacekeeping through payment of their peacekeeping assessed dues. These are often substantial sums, for which countries are accountable to their taxpayers. Still, payment of peacekeeping dues is a Charter obligation, shared by all members of the UN.

UN peacekeeping's viability and legitimacy hinge equally on broad member state participation. The need for burden-sharing is heightened by the complex challenges facing peacekeeping operations today. Diverse mandate tasks, volatile operating environments, vast deployment areas, and ever-present spoilers are characteristic of many modern-day peacekeeping missions. What does this mean for the capabilities required to ensure mandates are implemented to maximum effect?

First, today's peacekeeping realities suggest the need for increased specialization and targeted preparation. Peacekeepers – both uniformed and civilian – must be well-prepared, equipped, and enabled to respond to growing demands, often under tremendous pressure. In fulfilling a myriad of tasks, they must act flexibly and with initiative. Second, equipment and support systems must be sufficiently agile to enable peacekeepers to respond to rapidly changing circumstances and to buttress a wide range of mission types and requirements. Finally, there is a requirement for critical enabling capacities, from aviation assets to engineers, medical support, and police trainers. To understand the dimensions of the challenge facing peacekeeping today, one need only to examine the particular needs associated with protection of civilian mandates: mobility, rapid reaction, robustness, and over-the-horizon capabilities.

The "capability-driven" approach, which has become a shared priority of the Secretariat and member states in the past year, is an effort to respond to these realities in the field, to fill critical gaps, and to give individual peacekeepers and missions the tools to successfully execute their mandated tasks in a wide range of different scenarios and settings. The UN Secretariat is currently developing capability standards for select peacekeeping components to inform preparation and training, performance expectations, and force generation.

Expanding participation in peacekeeping is also an integral part of the capability-driven approach. While there were officially 114 countries contributing uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping operations as of the end of May 2011,

most contributions were and in recent years have been made by countries from the Global South. Roughly one third of uniformed deployments to UN peacekeeping operations today come from the top three troop contributors Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India alone. Everyday, troop and police contributing countries provide hope to millions trapped in conflict and support states in complex transitions from conflict to peace. Many have made the ultimate sacrifice in the line of duty, and yet these dedicated contributors too often do not receive the recognition they deserve.

While demands on peacekeeping have grown during the past decade with more expansive mandates and more challenging operating environments, contributions from Western countries have declined. This imbalance encourages the perception that only a limited few bear the burden of implementing increasingly complex peacekeeping mandates.

UN peacekeeping has not always been this uneven. At the start of the 1990s, more than half of the top 20 troop and police contributing countries came from within the "Western European and Others Group" (WEOG), including seven of the top ten contributors.[2] At this time, the WEOG share of total uniformed deployments to peacekeeping operations was more than 71 percent. From this highpoint, the decline in Western participation has been dramatic. By 2000, the number of WEOG contributors in the top 20 was down to five. Today, there are only two WEOG members among the top 20 contributors,[3] and Western states contribute less than eight percent of total uniformed peacekeeping deployments. Contributions to missions in Sub-Saharan Africa by Western states make up less than 0.7 percent of total uniformed deployments to the region. Increased troop and police contributions from Western states are therefore critical to maintaining UN peacekeeping as a diverse enterprise and an effective tool in support of international peace.

Of course, it is important to acknowledge that many Western countries are indeed engaged under UN mandates and shouldering considerable burden in countries like Afghanistan, even if they are not wearing blue helmets or berets. Many are working alongside UN deployments, have taken over from the UN at the conclusion of peacekeeping operations, or have laid the foundations for the UN to come in subsequently. Others yet have stepped in to diffuse crises. The recent

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2   This included Canada, Finland, Austria, Norway, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Sweden.
3   As of 31 May 2011, Italy and France were ranked at spots 17 and 19 in terms of total uniformed contributions to UN peacekeeping operations.

resolution of the post-election stalemate in Cote d'Ivoire would have been diffi-cult to imagine without the presence of the French Licorne force. The EU operation Artemis in the DRC and the deployment of non-UN forces from numerous countries to Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquake were similarly indispensable. These are but a few examples of UN partnership with other actors in the face of crisis.

In reality however, this type of support has remained ad hoc, and most UN peacekeeping missions have no sustainable reserve for emergency situations or short-notice mission needs. This underscores the significant challenges faced by peacekeeping missions as a result of limited in-mission surge capacity and the lack of a strategic reserve.

Peacekeeping Reformed: the UN Ready for a Western Come Back

Now that the international community's presence in Afghanistan and other areas is diminishing, it is hoped that the militaries engaged there will shift their focus to UN peacekeeping operations. Indeed, many of these countries have the capabili-ties and operational experience to lend critical support to UN operations.

Participation of these states is important not only for reasons of legitimacy and genuine partnership, but also due to the increasingly diverse and special-ized requirements of peacekeeping. The UN top contributors today bring to bear significant capability, and their continued support is vital to the viability of peacekeeping. Still, in spite of the strong commitment of many current contributors, substantial capability gaps remain across missions. This is particularly true in niche areas such as aviation, engineering, and medical units. Western contributions of such enabling capabilities, while not necessarily large in numbers, could therefore have a significant force multiplying effect when combined with other troops.

Such deployments are also not just a practical and operational step. The polit-ical impact of engagement – or, more accurately, re-engagement – of Western countries in UN peacekeeping is not to be underestimated. When troops arrive in theatre from a broad and diverse group of member states, the statement made is a powerful one. It is effectively a demonstration of international will and commit-ment and is often instrumental to deterring warring parties from backtracking on their commitment to peace.

So why then do Western countries remain largely absent from UN peace-keeping today? A frequent explanation relates to the peacekeeping failures of

the 1990s and concerns among numerous previous contributors that the UN is unable to manage and support their personnel in the field, particularly in crisis situations. It would be disingenuous to claim that the peacekeeping record since the 1990s has been unblemished. This is not the case. UN operations have, at times, struggled to implement complex mandates and have not always succeeded. Nonetheless, the UN has managed to mount challenging deployments in response to diverse scenarios and threats, in no small part due to continuous improvements of systems, training, and development of civilian and military leadership. It is a tool on which the international community has called time and time again over the course of the past decade.

As such, peacekeeping has learnt, evolved, and, indeed surged since the failures of the 1990s. The Brahimi Report and the reform initiatives that ensued recognize these failures and demonstrate a genuine commitment to improving the effectiveness of operations in the field. This includes significant emphasis in the Secretariat's "New Horizon" reform agenda and Global Field Support Strategy on strengthened management and oversight and on the effectiveness and reliability of support provided to personnel on the ground. Still, the views of UN peacekeeping in many Western capitals may remain indelibly tied to the experiences of the 1990s, shaping the political decision-making process of whether or not to engage in UN peacekeeping.

The data of Western peacekeeping participation in the 1990s defies the logic that Western countries are more accustomed to working through non-UN security arrangements and therefore choose regional or other arrangements over UN operations. A deterrent to participation may however be a perceived lack of efficiency and return on investment in UN peacekeeping. Yet, in spite of an annual budget of roughly USD 7.8 billion, UN peacekeeping is, in relative terms, a highly cost effective and efficient tool. A 2006 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of peacekeeping in Haiti, for example, estimated that a unilateral US operation comparable in size and duration to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) would cost the United States roughly twice as much as the mission's budget.[4] UN peacekeeping has been

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4   United States Government Accountability Office, "Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical US Operations in Haiti", Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, February 2006, accessed at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06331.pdf on 18 July 2011.

shown to bolster gross domestic product (GDP) growth in conflict-affected areas and is proven to reduce the likelihood of resurgence of conflict.[5]

The UN's decentralized decision-making structure contributes to this overall cost effectiveness. This devolved decision-making approach also presents operational benefits in the form of flexibility and diversity of experience. The UN does not maintain separate operational headquarters and instead empowers mission leaders on the ground with the necessary agility to adapt their mission and/ or units to rapidly evolving circumstances. In that respect, the United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ) provides overall and mission-specific support through strategic guidance, allocation of resources, and oversight. The multi-dimensional nature of UN peacekeeping allows each mission to simultaneously pursue a wide range of complex political and security objectives, under the overall leadership of the civilian head of mission, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). However, within these structures, Force Commanders maintain operational control of uniformed personnel.

Based on their experiences in Afghanistan, other organizations like NATO are increasingly moving towards a more comprehensive approach. For all the challenges of integration, the UN has a strong history of integrated deployments into complex post-conflict environments, especially when compared to other actors in the peace and security arena. And while the UN continues to implement necessary improvements, it is arguably at the forefront of international practice in integration and represents a model, from which others can learn. Increased exposure of uniformed personnel to integrated UN structures and practices could therefore have far-reaching utility.

As UN peacekeeping looks to the future, it must continue to strengthen its partnership and interoperability with regional actors and other security organizations. At the end of the day, however, the staying power and legitimacy of the UN is unique. UN peacekeeping did not end in 2000 and shows no sign of doing so now. However, if the international community wants to be able to rely on UN peacekeeping as its instrument of choice, and, oftentimes, its instrument of last resort, it must ensure that peacekeeping is buttressed by universal participation. This means sharing the burden of mandate implementation and forging a peacekeeping partnership that is truly representative of the UN's global membership, from East, West, North, and South.

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5   See A. Hoeffler, S. Shahbano Ijaz, and S. von Billerbeck, "Post-Conflict Recovery and Peacebuilding", World Development Report Background Paper, October 2010; and V. Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War*, Princeton University Press, 2008.

Improving the Effectiveness of Peace Operations through Strategic Oversight

Lieutenant-General Babacar Gaye

Addressing the issue of strategic oversight of peace operations is a challenge because there is no real agreement on the definition of the term oversight. There has also been a greater interest shown by the Security Council and member states on oversight responsibilities and benchmarking. Third, the Military Adviser has no specified position in the UN chain of command as this flows from the Secretary-General down to the Under-Secretary-General (USG) for peacekeeping, and then down to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). On a daily basis, the Military Adviser is in contact with Force Commanders in the field and in the headquarters, forms part of the senior management advising the USG for peacekeeping. Formally speaking, the Military Adviser has an advisory role, but there are increased expectations from the Security Council and member states to provide strategic oversight. At the same time, the Military Adviser has limited scope or executive authority for "punishment and reward" as a higher HQ to deployed formations.

Definition

As we progress in the evolution of peacekeeping, old concepts are re-energized, yet there is often no concurrence as to exactly how these are to be achieved. Transition, benchmarking and oversight have dictionary-defined meanings but are not clearly articulated or understood in the peacekeeping context. Let me first try to offer my definition of "strategic oversight": "Strategic oversight is the process to systematically and continuously monitor and evaluate the effectiveness, efficiency and integrity of mission components in the execution of mandated tasks to include progressive reporting on reaching mandate or contextual benchmarks, particularly during crises and after major incidents, in accordance with relevant UN policies, doctrines, guidelines and standard operating procedures (SOPs[1])." That said, there is a mismatch between the needs of the Security Council and those of the

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1   Standard Operating Procedures.

Secretariat. The Security Council has a primary focus on the end-state of an operation, whereas the Secretariat is concerned with the best use of resources and safety and security.

Security Council Oversight

The primary focus of the Council is the end-state. Yet, there are instances where there is no clear end-state, and there are examples where resolutions are relatively vague regarding some specific mandated tasks. These have recently been more detailed and, for the military in particular, more clearly defined. However, the Security Council is often called upon to adjust mandates in light of events on the ground, altering the strategic direction it provides. This requires the Secretariat to back brief on requisite changes in the Concept of Operations, force requirements and Rules of Engagement. Some of these detailed requirements, though useful for the military and police components from an oversight perspective, may not be suitable for other components simply because of the delicate and sometimes sensitive issues that these have to cover. The thematic resolutions of the Security Council, for example on protection of civilians and sexual violence in conflict, also form part of its overall strategic direction guiding various components of a mission.

The Security Council has also increased its engagement with specific components in order to be able to enhance and deepen its oversight role. For instance, for the third year, the Security Council has requested interaction with the Heads of Military Components (HOMCs) during their annual conference at the end of July in New York. Furthermore, several Security Council fact-finding missions have interacted with the Force Commander and Police Commissioner in the field to identify some of the related issues or implied tasks that result from resolutions passed.

General Assembly Oversight

The General Assembly, through its Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, is also very eager to improve oversight in the organization. Indeed, the Special Committee often stresses that peacekeeping operations should not be used as a substitute for addressing the root causes of conflicts, but should respond to these causes in a coherent, well-planned, coordinated and comprehensive manner, using political, social and developmental instruments. In that sense, the Special Committee is adamant that peacekeeping operations be provided with clearly defined mandates, objectives and command structures, adequate resources based

on realistic assessments of the situation and secure financing, in support of our efforts to achieve peaceful solutions.

To achieve these goals, the Special Committee often reminds the organization and the various stakeholders that successful oversight requires, but is not limited to, the principles of unity of command and integration of efforts at all levels, both in the field and in headquarters. More specifically, the Committee insists on the importance of the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) and the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) as mechanisms to help coordinate and prioritize the activities undertaken by the UN, and the need for all actors engaged in peace-keeping and related peacebuilding efforts to coordinate closely, particularly with host countries.

Finally, the Committee regularly reminds the organization of the importance of generating lessons learnt and requests the Secretariat to report on how these lessons have been taken on board in order to ensure a smooth transition from peacekeeping operations to other configurations of the UN presence.

Secretariat Oversight

The chain of oversight is linked to command and control. The Security Council acts as a kind of "supreme commander". Command and control (C2) for UN peacekeeping is complex in terms of states of command as well as C2 relation-ships and arrangements. The UN operational authority over forces deployed in a field mission is vested in the Secretary-General within the limits of the mandate, time and geographical area. The Secretary-General delegates the authority vested in him by the Security Council to the Under-Secretary-General (USG) for peace-keeping operations. This authority is further delegated to the SRSG for purposes of control and strategic direction. The USG exercises his oversight function mainly through high-level engagements between the Mission and the UN Headquarters leadership. The main purpose is to ensure compliance with the direction provided by both the Security Council and the Secretariat; streamline processes and proce-dures; facilitate timely and accurate decision-making as well as ensuring that mission contingency plans are feasible and up-to-date.

While command lines in UN peacekeeping may appear more complicated than in classical military structures, it must be understood that UN peacekeeping operations are not military operations in the classic sense. They are multi-dimen-sional operations aimed at achieving a complex set of political and security goals.

Hence, the command line moves through the SRSG, who has authority over the Force Commander, Police Commissioner and a range of civilian components. The need for such a comprehensive approach has been recognized more broadly by other organizations deploying military assets into environments requiring complex political transitions.

Furthermore, multinational and multilateral deployments always bring with them a tension between the command of the force and national links to specific contingents (caveats, etc.). This is not unique to the UN. The chain of strategic oversight is in some respects carried out indirectly by these Secretariat offices, including the Military Adviser, but with no direct command relationship. As mentioned earlier, the oversight is exercised through visits, follow up on reports and support by UNHQ, be it in strengthening missions by deploying staff support teams, studies and reviews or encouraging new TCCs through operational advisory visits or following up on end of assignment reports and key UN leadership visit reports. All these add to the better situational awareness that is required, including to answer media negative light on peacekeeping due to the apparent lethargic response from the field. In short, UNHQ support to our missions is an integral part to the earlier definition of strategic oversight.

Stakeholders – Troop Contributing Countries and Police Contributing Countries (TCCs/PCCs)

The TCCs/PCCs, as key stakeholders, are concerned for the safety and security of their troops and individually deployed military and police officers, and civilian nationals, amongst other issues. For a mission to succeed, the TCCs/PCCs must share the overall strategic intent and support it. This is why early and frequent interaction between the TCCs/PCCs, Secretariat and Security Council is so important, especially in mandating cycles. At the TCC/PCC level, Ambassadors, Military and Police Advisers frequently visit DPKO/DFS to express views and concerns and raise detailed security related questions during TCC/PCC meetings.

By definition, UN peacekeeping has many stakeholders and to ensure that the strategic oversight is effective, it is essential that all, especially the TCCs/PCCs, share the same view. This is particularly so on the more sensitive aspects of peacekeeping, such as on mandated tasks that require the highest level of performance or carry the highest risk. We all must show the will and capability to execute the mandate to the maximum extent possible.

"New Horizon" Non-Paper Initiatives

In what other areas can we improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations through strategic oversight? A new project that is being pursued by the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) proposes generic organizational structure and equipment tables for the infantry battalion, field hospital and standards for Military Staff Officers. These are proposed as standards that would allow for more account-ability and for TCCs to know what the minimum standards are in terms of robust peacekeeping and preparation of requisite training material. The hope is to have an initial draft manual completed by December 2011 for further consultation.

In addition, the OMA ran three regional conferences (in Abuja in August 2010, Buenos Aires in December 2010, and Jakarta in March 2011) consulting with TCCs on how to tackle robust peacekeeping, the use of force and operational readiness. The underlying goal is to develop and release guidance materials on the conduct of robust peacekeeping as requested by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. In this context operational readiness is important. The aim is to improve our ability to support TCC pre-deployment preparations to ensure that we attain the requisite capability and mindset that the TCC fully understands and supports. Once deployed in theatre we can then validate the capability and develop our guidance material further. This support would be in the form of operational advisory visits to capitals and regional training centres, and would evaluate the effectiveness of deployed capabilities against the specific mission requirements. A legitimate question is whether dealing with units in the field such as battalions is part of strategic oversight or micro-management. The answer is that it is indeed strategic oversight, as the infantry battalion with its subunits forms the core of our work, and failure or inaction quickly hits the front pages of the *New York Times*. Military circles are familiar with the concept of the "strategic corporal" – the junior commander whose action – or indeed inaction – can have strategic significance.

Benchmarking

The emphasis on reporting results related to achievement of the end-state as an oversight mechanism has meant more frequent briefings to the Military Staff Committee, as well as Security Council direct involvement with the HOMCs and the use of benchmarks to try to articulate indicators on achieving the end-state. A recent workshop on benchmarking identified that many aspects of the inter-

national community are present in a country but with distinct roles, objectives and time horizons. These differences can exacerbate a situation where reform by different, but interdependent components, progresses at different and incongruent paces that can inhibit the achievement of benchmarks. Benchmarks may be linked to drawdown or other phases of the mandate implementation. These benchmarks, though good for the nation and for Security Council decisions, may not be appropriate for tracking a mission's performance. However, ultimately benchmarks should be conditions-based, avoid being too technical in nature and agreed upon between the Government and the UN to include the country team, that is likely to remain well after the peacekeeping mission has withdrawn.

Integrated Mission Planning

Linked to benchmarking, particularly for integrated missions, is the need to have an Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) that forms an oversight framework that is agreed to not only by the mission and UNHQ but also the funds, programmes and agencies.

From the perspective of peacekeeping, for example, there have been settings in which host governments want to see peacekeepers leave as soon as possible, even before peace and security have been fully consolidated. The drawdown of MONUC in the DRC is a classic example where identified benchmarks did not echo with the Government's political requirements. There are other settings in which host governments want the peacekeeping mission to stay as long as possible, partly because of the international attention and support that it brings.

Internal Oversight

Internally, both DPKO and DFS need to ensure that they are working smarter and not just harder. As desired by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) in its various audit reports, DPKO entities have reviewed their strategic guidance documents, including the Concepts of Operations; Rules of Engagement; Police Directives on the use of force to name a few. The revision has improved the alignment of strategic intentions with operational level objectives, and facilitated the development of operational level instruments such as the Operational Orders, and Head of Mission or Force Commanders Directives. This has led to better interface between mission and headquarters thereby enabling smooth decision-making which is critical to command and control.

Conclusion

This short article has outlined some of the challenges that strategic oversight poses to the command and control functions where the Secretariat is responsible for the efficient and effective use of resources to reach a desired end-state while recognizing the safety and security concerns of its personnel, for which the member states will hold it accountable. A few innovative projects have also been articulated, which resulted from extensive consultations following the release of the "New Horizon" non-paper.

There have also been far more defined mandates, particularly in relation to security issues, and this has led to more interaction not only with the Security Council in New York but also in the field and to requests for briefings to the Military Staff Committee. In line with the more defined mandates, the identification of benchmarks should help in achieving the desired end-states, although benchmarks are sometimes disturbed by host nations' aspirations or disagreement on timelines and achievements. We continue to try to ensure that these are incorporated through sound integrated planning at all levels. Hopefully the examples of our own internal oversight projects demonstrate that we do indeed keep the system honest and on its feet.

What Capabilities to Bridge the Expectations Gap? For a More Realistic Approach to Peacekeeping Mandates

Alan Doss

The number of UN peacekeeping missions deployed over the last decade increased significantly. Multidimensional in character, these missions have been mandated by the UN Security Council to undertake a wide array of tasks ranging from peacemaking to peacebuilding, requiring an expanded range of capabilities which the UN has struggled to meet.[1] Today, most peacekeeping mandates go well beyond the traditional "monitor, observe and report" type of mandate that characterized almost all of the UN peacekeeping missions launched from 1947 to 1990. The protection of civilians against violence has become a central focus of contemporary mandates, creating unmet expectations of protection among those who are directly affected as well as in the international community.

This evolution in peacekeeping has created huge capability challenges for the UN. The organization has now to source and deploy peacekeepers – military, police and civilian – often within short timeframes, and with a very diverse mix of experience, skills, and logistics needed to implement increasingly complex mandates.

The Capabilities Conundrum

The capability conundrum lies in finding an adequate balance between the demands of ambitious mandates and the limited means available to implement them. In seeking to resolve this conundrum, the UN faces several challenges.

Matching the Means to the Mandate

While each mission has country-specific responsibilities, which may evolve over time, there are some generic tasks that can be found in the mandates of nearly all the missions. Typically, they comprise:

- Assistance to peace facilitation (negotiation and mediation);

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1   For an analysis of these challenges see "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping", DPKO/DFS, United Nations, 2009.

- Support to peace agreements (monitoring the cessation of hostilities; surveillance of arms embargos; disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement; elections, etc.);

- Protection of civilians (especially women, children affected by armed conflict, internally displaced persons and refugees), of UN personnel, and of humanitarian actors;

- Peacebuilding (rule of law, security sector reform, deployment of the state administration, promotion of human rights, early recovery, and capacity development of democratic institutions – legislatures, media, civil society).

The drafting of mandates is an inherently complicated process, involving extensive consultation, negotiation and compromise among members of the Security Council, the UN Secretariat and other interested parties, including the host country, regional organizations and civil society. The result can be mandates that are quite expansive, well intentioned but sometimes beyond the capabilities of missions to implement them.

A recurring example of this "capability overstretch" can be found with the implementation of sanction regimes voted by the Security Council. In several resolutions, peacekeepers have been called upon to monitor arms embargos "including by inspecting… the cargo of aircraft and of any transport vehicle using the ports, airports, airfields, military bases and border crossings",[2] and even to seize illegal weapons. This is a huge task that may well require physical protection for arms inspectors who might face violent obstruction, and probably one that is not feasible without dedicated, real time intelligence gathering capabilities to point the inspectors in the right direction. But mandates routinely include such directives without a thorough assessment of mission capability to implement them.

Fortunately, the Security Council has started to establish priorities in some of the more expansive mandate resolutions, emphasizing protection as the first priority call on mission resources.[3] Nevertheless, most of the mandate renewals roll over language from one resolution to another. From time to time, it would be good to drop, as well as add, items.

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2   See for example para.2(g) of UNSC resolution 1756, 15 May 2007; similar provisions have been adopted in other resolutions as relates the trafficking of natural resources.
3   See for example para.5 in UNSC resolution 1906, 23 December 2009.

The diversity of mandated tasks is an implicit recognition that peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding cannot be easily separated out in conflict and post-conflict situations, even though there may be institutional reasons for doing so. But the questions remain: do missions have the capabilities needed to implement such a wide array of responsibilities? And if not, how can the gap between capability (the means) and the mandate (the expectations) be bridged?

The Capability Gap

The concern about capability has led DPKO and DFS, with the encouragement of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), to embark on the capability-driven approach to UN peacekeeping,[4] with the aim of achieving a more coherent and effective match between capabilities and mandates. Hopefully, the capability approach will represent a sustained effort to get more out of what the UN does have, rather than a prescription for doing more with what it does not have.

Numbers count, particularly when civilian protection is involved, because a visible and effective security presence on the ground is vital to protection.[5] But how mission personnel – military, police and civilian – are selected, prepared, trained, equipped, deployed and managed has a powerful influence on the mission's ability to implement its mandate. In the past, missions have been found wanting, unable to field the right kind of resources, at the right time.

This applies as much to civilian as uniformed personnel. The recent report to the Secretary-General on "Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict"[6] highlights a number of shortcomings and makes recommendations for improving civilian capabilities, some of which are directly relevant to UN peacekeeping operations.

Transforming Capacities into Capabilities

Capacities are not the same thing as capabilities, and sometimes there is confusion between the two. Mandate resolutions authorize the number and type of UN forces (and other categories of personnel, uniformed and civilian) to be deployed by a mission. These are the base line capacities but not necessarily front line capabilities.

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4   See Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, 2011.

5   See Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, S/2010/579, United Nations, November 2010, para.36.

6   Report of the Senior Advisory Group to the UN Secretary-General, "Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict", United Nations, A/65/747-S/2011/85, 22 February 2011.

Policy and procedural constraints can impede or hinder a mission's ability to transform a *latent capacity* into an *operational capability*.

As an example of this dilemma, one can cite the difficulties that missions often run into when they need to quickly activate or redeploy their military capacities to meet emerging operational threats. Although present on the ground, in the theatre of operations, the forward use of those capacities (such as infantry units or helicopters) may be stymied by provisos that stipulate how, where, and in what conditions they can be employed or redeployed, even if there is an emergency (as was the case in Sierra Leone in the summer of 2000 when the peacekeeping mission faced a resurgence of violence from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel group, and, more recently, in the Eastern Congo during the Kivu crisis in late 2008).

Some national caveats on the use of resources seem unavoidable (caveats are common in other multinational forces[7]). But they should be narrowed as much as possible and made known upfront, before deployment, to allow field commanders enough latitude to respond quickly to emergencies and changes in the operating environment. If the caveats are likely to severely compromise the operational performance of forces on the ground, the UN should seriously consider whether or not to accept the troop offer.

Caveats are just one example of how bureaucratic obstacles can devalue mission capabilities. There are others, some of them due to the "bipolar" nature of UN peacekeeping, which is both a civilian and military undertaking. Apart from contingent owned equipment, logistical support (including airlift, base construction and supply) is managed by the civilian side of the mission. In recent years there has been consistent (and generally productive) effort to bridge the gap between the civilian and military components. Still the operational demands of the military (and police) and UN administrative policies and procedures do not always sit well together and this impacts on the capability of the mission, particularly in an emergency.

Capability, of course, has cost implications not all of which are predictable. In October 2008, when the UN operation in the DRC (MONUC) had to intensify its action in the Eastern areas of the country to deal with the deteriorating security situation, some contingents that had not budgeted for contingencies, found themselves running out of critical supplies. The mission also struggled to manage the cost implications of the frequent troop and civilian redeployments dictated by emerging threats.

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7   For an illustration of this point see the statement of Robert Gates, outgoing US Secretary of Defence, speaking at NATO about ISAF, and stating that "The war effort has been hobbled by national caveats that tied the hands of allied commanders in sometimes infuriating ways", reported in the *International Herald Tribune*, 11-12 June 2011.

Capabilities for Protection

The protective role of peacekeepers has brought the capability debate into sharp focus. Protection is now a standard feature of almost all of the major peacekeeping missions. Because of past disappointments, frustrations, and misconceptions (highlighted in the Brahimi Report, and more recently in the DPKO/OCHA study on Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations)[8], there has been an intense debate on how to better match capabilities with protection expectations.

Protection mandates usually give instruction and guidance on *who* is to be protected but not necessarily *how*. There is often a general call for the protection of civilians, accompanied by the listing of specific groups or categories of civilians (women threatened by sexual violence; children used for armed conflict; the internally displaced and refugees; UN personnel; humanitarian actors and human rights defenders).

When it comes to the *how*, the standard language (first used in 1999 in the UNAMSIL mandate in Sierra Leone)[9] speaks of protecting civilians under the "imminent threat of physical violence", but with the caveat that this should be within the "mission's capabilities and its areas of deployment". In at least two cases (MONUSCO in the DRC and United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire [ONUCI]) the mandates authorize the missions "to use all necessary means" to ensure protection. This kind of language leaves room for a lot of interpretation but also misunderstandings as to the level of protection that peacekeepers can provide.

Here again a concrete example illustrates the problem. In December 2008, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)[10] attacked and massacred more than three hundred people in very remote areas of North East DRC. This came in response and retaliation to an offensive launched by Ugandan and Congolese forces against LRA hideouts in the Garamba National Park. MONUC at that time had a small deployment in the general area (a region half the size of France) where the LRA was (and still is) operating, mainly for the purpose of protecting an airport that was the principal entry point for urgent humanitarian supplies. But the mission was not in any way involved in the planning or execution of the offensive. Nevertheless, MONUC was denounced in some media and advocacy circles for having failed to protect people against the LRA. This charge echoed around the world, ignoring the capabilities and deployment caveats. Nor was there any recognition that mission resources were more than fully

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8   V. Holt and G. Taylor, "Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations. Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges", Independent Study, DPKO and OCHA, New York, 2009.
9   UNSC resolution 1270, 22 October 1999.
10   An extremely violent group of rebels originally based in Northwest Uganda who moved into remote areas of the DRC, Southern Sudan and the Central African Republic.

committed to dealing with the collapse of the Congolese army in North Kivu and the very great threat that the CNDP[11] rebellion posed to the strategic Kivu provinces.

So what level of civilian protection should be expected from the peacekeepers, and do they have the capabilities to meet those expectations?

As previously indicated, protection mandates are usually crafted in terms of who is to be protected. But the causes of insecurity, and the type of protection needed in consequence, can be quite varied and shift over time. Criminal gangs, armed militias, rebel groups and even national security personnel can all be sources of violence. If the violence against civilians results from an armed insurrection or insurgency, that will require a very different set of capabilities and responses (including the use of force) than a breakdown of law and order. Each threat has to be evaluated on its own terms, and the military, political and judicial capabilities required to handle these threats shaped accordingly.

The Eastern Congo has suffered from multiple causes of insecurity. In order to maximize the protection impact of available resources, the mission adjusted and adapted to the situation on the ground, with operational innovations such as forward operating bases, joint military-civilian protection teams, community liaison officers, market patrols, violence mapping, protection handbooks and joint prosecution cells (to facilitate speedy action against abusive army personnel).

With these innovations MONUC was able to make better use of its available resources, but this was only a partial response to the capability (and credibility) problem. UN troops and police should have been better prepared and trained for protection duties before deployment (DPKO and DFS are now developing training modules to help TCCs and PCCs do that kind of pre-deployment training). Military forces are traditionally trained for force protection, not people protection. Getting troops out of their armoured personnel carriers in favour of foot patrolling in isolated, hard-to-reach villages, requires a doctrinal as well as a formative step-shift.

Even assuming such changes can be made, the configuration of forces on the ground has to fit the protection challenges of places like the Kivus and Orientale Province, where small groups of rebels, or rogue militias, create fear and inflict damage out of proportion to their numbers. Regular infantry battalions involved in area protection, important though they are, do not provide the whole answer; lacking is a strong special force capability with all weather, all terrain mobility, guided by real time tactical intelligence. Such capability would provide a more effective protection

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11   A militia composed largely of the Tutsi ethnic group.

instrument for tracking, isolating and dismantling the armed groups before they could attack civilians living in remote communities. A stronger armed police capability – a gendarmerie function – would also be more useful for dealing with the problem of post-conflict criminality, which surged even as political violence decreased.

But that is only part of the story. Violence against civilians in places like the Eastern DRC cannot (and will not) end without active national and sub-regional political and military cooperation to dismantle the armed groups and criminal gangs that have found cross border refuge and sustained themselves (in some cases) by illegal trading of natural resources. Local militias will also continue to prey on civilians if the state cannot assert its authority and establish the rule of law; abusive national security forces, poorly commanded and often unpaid, compound the difficulties of protection.

Civilian capabilities have to be built and deployed in lockstep with those of the uniformed components, enabling missions to assist conflict affected countries to resolve these political and rule of law dimensions of protection. The Secretary-General's Civilian Capacities Panel rightly emphasized the empowerment and use of national capacities, together with those available in the UN system at large. But we should recognize that capacity-building – especially in support of the rule of law and justice – is not a short-term exercise that can be easily or quickly accomplished, as development actors will attest. Nevertheless, missions need first class political and rule of law capabilities to help jump start the process but recognizing at the same time that UN missions cannot substitute national responsibility; what they can do is help governments create the space and time to implement vital reforms.

The UN is working on a general framework for conceptualizing the protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping. This will be a good, and much needed, starting point for designing country-specific protection strategies and for mapping the corresponding capabilities required to support those strategies. These strategies should identify not only the military and police capabilities needed for the protection of civilians, but also the political commitments and legal frameworks that can ensure that those capabilities are fully and effectively employed.

Capabilities provide the means of action but that is not enough – there must be a will to use them. So it is worth recalling the caution in the DPKO/DFS "New Horizon" non-paper that "the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop and police contributors must work towards a shared understanding and consensus on what can and should be done to protect civilians".

The process of consultation and consensus building with the TCCs/PPCs, the Council, the host country and the Secretariat is central to building that shared understanding and commitment, especially when the use of force is unavoidable. Only then, can a genuine unity of effort be assured, and that great expectations do not become great disappointments.

What Capabilities for What Peacekeeping? Comments on Alan Doss's Presentation

J. Arthur Boutellis

The issue of capabilities needs to be linked to two other key parameters highlighted by the former SRSG Alan Doss in his remarks. One of these parameters being that "even with the best capabilities, there must be the will to use them"; the other being that only "a genuine unity of efforts", achieved through consultations and consensus building between Troop and Police Contributing Countries (TCC/PCCs), the Security Council, and the host country, will create the conditions for a peacekeeping mission to achieve its mandate.

Peacekeeping Capabilities

The United Nations has called for a "capability-driven approach", which can only be welcomed in contrast to the traditional "numbers-driven approach". Over 100,000 uniformed military and police personnel that often lack adequate equipment (e.g. leitmotiv helicopters), are currently deployed in UN peacekeeping operations around the world.

The capability-driven approach is at the core of the 2009 "New Horizon" agenda and includes: (i) the development of standards (DPKO/DPET[1] and OMA[2]), guidance, capacity building, and training; (ii) initiatives to enlarge the peacekeeping partnership by increasing the pool of troop and police contributors (e.g. the development of Gap Lists by DPKO) and the improvement of the non-uniformed capacity of missions through the Civilian Capacity (CIVCAP) review,[3] which focuses on national ownership and building of partnerships; and finally (iii) a logistical and support dimension with the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS). There are many ongoing UN initiatives to improve the capabilities of peace-

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1   DPET: Division of Policy, Evaluation, and Training, DPKO.
2   OMA: Office of Military Affairs, DPKO.
3   See Report of the Senior Advisory Group to the UN Secretary-General, "Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict", United Nations, A/65/747-S/2011/85, 22 February 2011.

keeping missions and presumably to bridge the expectations gap; two questions, however, still need to be addressed.

First, it has been two years since the launch of the "New Horizon" agenda yet it is still unclear whether we are really departing from the traditional military and number-driven approach to peacekeeping. The UN Secretary-General recently proposed 7,000 Blue Helmets and 900 police for the new mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). How was this force requirement determined? Was it based on political or military concerns? Was the mission planning process focused on capabilities needed based on threat analysis and scenarios? Was this reflected in the final proposal of a 7,900 uniformed personnel mission?

Second, what is the timeframe for the implementation of this "capability-driven approach", and furthermore, how and who will evaluate the impact of these reforms? The UN admission of its peacekeepers' failure to protect civilians in Sudan's Abyei region during the early June 2011 fighting between Northern and Southern Sudan contrasts with the capabilities the UN drew on (including both UN attack helicopters and military support from the French operation *Licorne*) in Cote d'Ivoire. Additionally, there is no apparent positive correlation between better mandate implementation and the gain of more modern equipment (e.g. observation drones) by UN peacekeeping missions. This becomes the case particularly if the host country restricts the use of such assets or imposes restrictions of movements on the mission when it attempts to respond to an imminent threat on civilians that the equipment may have helped to identify.

The Will and Ability to Use Peacekeeping Capabilities

This leads to the first of the two issues addressed in these remarks: just as important as having such capabilities, are the will, as well as the ability (as illustrated in the above examples), to use them. The question therefore is: what creates the will and gives the mission the ability to use the capabilities when they are available to a UN mission?

Firstly, leadership in the field – meaning qualified and motivated senior mission leaders (in particular the SRSG, Deputy-SRSG, Force Commander, Police Commissioner, and Head of Mission Support) – can make a difference, particularly in situations where the mission is mandated to protect civilians and when

timely and non-risk-averse decision-making can make a difference. Mission leaders, however, need to be empowered to make such decisions: the CIVCAP review makes interesting recommendations in this regard, arguing both for better-trained leaders but also for greater say (and flexibility) for heads of missions in operational budgets, allowing missions to respond to crises and changing circumstances.[4]

The training budget of the UN has unfortunately been cut in the last few years, however, some interesting innovations in the field may provide useful lessons for how senior mission leaders can make better use of mission capabilities in response to a specific context in the future. For example, following the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, the UN operation (MINUSTAH) requested an additional military engineering unit that proved critical in the mission's contribution to the rubble-clearing and immediate reconstruction efforts. This also improved the credibility of the mission vis-à-vis the Haitian people and government. MINUSTAH was also exceptionally authorized to launch Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) for up to USD 100,000 each[5] and, under UN Security Council Resolution 1927 (2010), to provide logistical support to the government of Haiti in the year following the earthquake.

Secondly, an enabling political environment – i.e. realistic political visions for missions and sustained engagement from member states, particularly those members of the Security Council that have a privileged access to the host-country government officials – is equally essential. This is of particular relevance in cases where the host government may not have been forthcoming in giving its consent to the deployment of the UN mission (e.g. MINURCAT in Chad or UNAMID and UNMIS in Sudan) or may have withdrawn its consent along the way (e.g. UNMEE in Eritrea or, to a certain extent, MONUC/MONUSCO in the DRC). Indeed, no amount of human talent or military assets will deliver sustained political success in an environment where; (i) the Security Council is divided or lacks a strategic vision of how to resolve the conflict and/or (ii) where there is no genuine consent from the host government. In early 2011, the Security Council held a debate on this very issue of consent under the Brazilian presidency.

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4   See Report of the Senior Advisory Group to the UN Secretary-General, "Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict", United Nations, A/65/747-S/2011/85, 22 February 2011.
5   QIPs are usually limited to USD 25,000.

One example of the limits of peacekeeping capabilities caused by inadequate conditions is the UN mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT). MINURCAT was first authorized by the UN Security Council in the framework of tenuous host government consent and against the recommendation of the UN Secretariat and the DPKO, who, based on two assessment missions conducted in 2007, concluded that the basic conditions for a peacekeeping mission to deploy did not exist. When the government of Chad requested to discuss the modalities of the withdrawal of the mission in January 2010, the UN operation had not even reached its full deployment nor met the benchmarks set in UNSC Resolution 1861 (2009) as the exit strategy for the UN mission. The result of these discussions was a premature withdrawal of the mission at the end of 2010.

The Shared Responsibility of Matching Means and Mandates

Paraphrasing Clémenceau's famous quote, "war is too serious a matter to be left to the military", one could say that peacekeeping is too serious a matter to be left to peacekeepers and the UN Secretariat alone.

Indeed, although many recognize the need for greater capabilities to adequately address the challenges of modern peacekeeping, very few new assets have been made available to the UN by new troop contributing countries – particularly those Western countries that have been involved in military operations in Afghanistan for the last few years. The UN DPKO has therefore had to work with existing capabilities (even if this means continuing with the number-intensive approach), trying its best at "matching means and mandates".

Mandate-drafting is the Security Council's prerogative, and mandates have grown increasingly complex with the addition of the protection of civilians as tasks, which are very difficult to implement due to challenging field conditions and limited mobility. Certainly the UN should continue to argue for more realistic mandates with a limited number of achievable tasks, but in reality, peacekeeping missions will likely continue to be given complex mandates that more often than not include the task of protecting civilians against imminent threats.

The other side of the coin is resource mobilization. Only well-resourced missions equipped with the right set of people and tools will have the ability to address changing challenges. Such resource mobilization needs to be timely and of

quality. This is about mobilizing troops and police officers, but also about financing the rising bill of peacekeeping – now over USD 8 billion per year. To that end, the need for a more effective three-way consultation (Security Council, UN Secretariat, and TCC/PCCs) and for outreach by the UN has already been mentioned.

However, outreach cannot be the sole responsibility of the UN Secretariat. The UN Security Council has, according to the UN Charter, the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace". Does maintaining international peace include simply drafting mandates? Or, should it include helping to resource the missions? If MINUSTAH, for instance, was able to quickly receive a temporary surge in uniformed military and police personnel in the immediate aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake, this was surely not only because of the work of the UN Secretariat, but also because Security Council members got involved, some of whom even contributed uniformed personnel to MINUSTAH themselves within very short time periods.

The makeup of the current Security Council, which includes major TCC/PCCs (e.g. India, Nigeria, Brazil, and South Africa), may present an opportunity to improve that triad. However, in order to fill the capability gaps that UN missions are facing in the current economic context, contributing to peacekeeping will need to become a more attractive option. This is not only about fair cost reimbursement, as representatives of TCCs have already mentioned. Some current, large contributing countries may also withdraw some of their contributions to peacekeeping, as was recently seen with India's recall of some of its helicopters from UN missions in the DRC and Sudan because of their needs at home.

In conclusion, bridging the expectations gap is not only about improving peacekeeping capabilities, it is also about improving the UN ability to make adequate use of the capabilities, through, among other things, an empowered mission leadership and an enabling political environment.

In this context, have we really departed from the traditional military and number-driven approach to peacekeeping? Although some interesting experiments have been observed at the mission level, DPKO largely remains a military organization dependent on the capabilities that member states are willing to provide.

That said, the discussion on peacekeeping capabilities has made some progress over the last few years, with the CIVCAP report as the latest contribution, but

much more still needs to be discussed amongst the Security Council, the UN Secretariat/DPKO, and TCC/PCCs on possible alternatives to traditional number-intensive peacekeeping. While financial austerity should not guide responses, it may provide an opportunity to rethink the approach.

As peacekeeping missions are increasingly mandated to conduct statebuilding and protection of civilians (POC) tasks in support of host governments, a better balance between uniformed and civilian personnel, military enablers, and troops, all using inside expertise and partnerships with regional organizations or even the private sector among other partnerships may need to be found. Further discussion will, however, need to take place among these stakeholders in order to define the way forward for peacekeeping, as some member states continue to think of it as a primarily military endeavour, whereas others argue that early peacebuilding, including statebuilding functions, during the peacekeeping phase should be at the core of the mandate.

As the UN Secretary-General recently recommended the deployment of 7,000 troops for an overall cost of close to USD 1 billion per year for the new UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), one cannot help but think that there could be something more effective than the current military-intensive peacekeeping design.

MINUSTAH in Haiti: Lessons Learnt and Future Prospects

Edmond Mulet

This seminar was about the partnership that needs to be established between all stakeholders and that is indispensable to supporting peacekeeping mandates.

How do we achieve this partnership? How do we make sure that all stakeholders have the same understanding of what this mandate should be, and how best to implement it? How do we decide which resources we actually need, and identify those who will supply them? How do we also ensure that other partners address fundamental issues that a peacekeeping mission is neither mandated nor equipped to solve?

Trying to be as flexible as possible in responding to crises, working with the unique requirements and opportunities of each situation, we are seeking at the same time to strengthen our strategic direction and to develop policies and approaches that can be applied in many situations. For both aspects, we obviously need the support of our partners.

All peacekeeping missions are unique in nature and present their own sets of challenges. MINUSTAH in Haiti is no exception. Several factors make this mission a somewhat atypical peacekeeping operation: it was not created as a result of a peace agreement or cease fire; there are no belligerents, no ethnic or religious clashes; and it is the only peacekeeping operation in Latin America, with mainly Latin American TCCs and PCCs.

Haiti has also suffered multiple crises and disasters – food riots, repeated hurricanes, the 2010 earthquake, and the cholera outbreak, amidst political instability, weak rule of law, corruption, and violence. Not all countries in which peacekeeping operations are deployed have to endure so much at the same time.

Yet, we believe the Haitian case offers valuable lessons with regard to the issues discussed in this seminar.

Capacity of the National Authorities

The key partner for any peacekeeping operation is the host government, and the population of the host country. In Haiti, the government lacks resources, its work is often stymied by political instability and limited capacity, and, while this could also be said of many governments in countries where peacekeeping operations are deployed, the impact of the 2010 earthquake on Haitian institutions was also particularly devastating.

The UN and MINUSTAH enjoy a close collaboration with the government. In many ways, Haiti actually depends on the international community and its various elements, not only with regard to national security, but also economically.

One key objective of our work in Haiti therefore needs to be to strengthen the country's ability to break the umbilical cord with the international community and to achieve real "autonomy", including though its economic development.

Governance and the Rule of Law

Haiti has reached an important point now. With elections over and a new government in place, Haiti has the chance to move forward and tackle the many political, security, reconstruction and development challenges in earnest. Chief among them is the need to strengthen the rule of law. The absence of the rule of law has undermined the confidence of the people in their government, allowed corruption to flourish and is also a major contributing factor to political instability.

Rule of law means having police, prisons, justice, but also a land registry, a birth registry, construction and building codes, and commercial laws. It is the capacity of the state to collect taxes, to guarantee a level of legal security to promote entrepreneurship, investments, job creation, and to facilitate economic development. Drawing up a rule of law compact, based on wide-ranging consultations with all strata of Haitian society, would be an important first step in moving ahead with the rule of law reform agenda.

Such governance, based on the rule of law, is fundamental to political stability, the protection of citizen's rights, and the establishment of a regulatory framework conducive for investment. This of course, is a fundamental principle to avoid any relapse into conflict, consolidate peace and lay solid foundations for sustainable development. It is as true in Haiti as it is in Liberia, in Timor, or in South Sudan

Security

Haiti is also a case that demonstrates the close inter-linkages between security, political stability and economic development. In that regard, it also raises the question of "how far" a UN peacekeeping mission should go in extending its efforts into the recovery or development arena. In the case of MINUSTAH, several member states, especially Latin American countries, have been keen for the Mission to become more engaged in reconstruction efforts, for example through the Mission's engineering contingents. We know successful examples of such activities from other missions, for example UNMIL (Liberia), and we welcome MINUSTAH's efforts in this direction. Again, these lessons will be applied in other cases: the contribution of peacekeeping contingents to the construction of infra-structures is likely to be key, for example, in South Sudan.

At the same time, we need to strengthen Haiti's self-sufficiency also with regard to security. A comprehensive assessment of the security situation in Haiti has been undertaken to provide the basis for recommendations on the adjustment of MINUSTAH's military and police component, which will be included in the next report of the Secretary-General ahead of the renewal of MINUSTAH's mandate on 15 October 2011.

Political Outlook

With regard to political developments, the last elections were a challenging process. The new government will need to build a strong and forward-looking legislative agenda to introduce the reforms that the Haitian people were promised during the campaign.

As a first step, the constitutional amendments approved by Parliament on 9 May 2011 will need to be promulgated. They include the creation of a constitutional court, a simplification of the procedure for the establishment of a Permanent Electoral Council, and they open the door to double citizenship – an important element for the diaspora.

Haiti's continued democratic evolution will require that the Government and its international partners remain focused on long-term institution-building. The international community needs to capitalize on the successful democratic transi-tion of power, and remain committed and coordinated to address Haiti's needs.

In sum, Haiti taught us again that political inclusiveness, effective response to the population's principal needs, and checks and balances are key elements of stability and socio-economic progress. The lesson however needs to be learnt over and over again.

Coordination among the International Community

In all of these situations, a united international community, speaking with one voice, has been a key element in helping Haitians dealing with crisis. In the end, it matters what happens on the ground, in the countries where we serve. In Haiti, the response to the earthquake in January 2010 has been a prime example of the various arms of the UN, as well as key member states, TCCs, PCCs, donors, and countries in the region, NGOs as well as national authorities and the civil society, coming together for a joint objective. I can proudly say that, in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, I saw the UN and the international community at its best.

Within the UN in general, we have made progress with our integration agenda, to help us structure our collaboration and benefit from the many synergies we can create by aligning our work. It is important that we preserve the spirit that guided us in the first months of 2010 in Haiti.

The same spirit should infuse our relationship with member states in our regular interactions with them. It is sometimes not as easy without the overwhelming urgency of attending to a country devastated by a natural disaster. But significant progress was made, within the "New Horizon" framework, in strengthening consultations with member states on mission-specific as well as general issues. TCCs and PCCs are now routinely briefed before mandate renewals, for example. We meet with relevant member states before and after assessment missions, to seek their views and discuss outcomes. We consult with them on specific issues, including in crisis situations.

In any event, we still have a lot of work ahead of us, in Haiti and in the other countries we serve. I hope this workshop has contributed to advancing our common objectives and bringing us closer together.

Seminar Programme

New York, 16-17 June 2011

Venue: Trygve Lie Center for Peace, Security and Development, International Peace Institute (IPI)

Thursday, 16 June 2011

	Opening Reception
Welcome Remarks	Mr Warren HOGE, Vice President for External Relations, IPI
Introductory Remarks	Ambassador Gérard ARAUD, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations
Keynote Address	Mr Alain LE ROY, Under-Secretary-General, UNDPKO "Looking Forward: Peace Operations in 2020"
Closing Remarks	Ambassador Fred TANNER, Director, GCSP

Friday, 17 June 2011

Introductory Remarks	Ambassador Fred TANNER, Director, GCSP Mr Warren HOGE, Vice President for External Relations, IPI
	Session 1: Traditional and New Contributors to UN Operations: What Strategic Motivations?
Chair	Ambassador Hardeep Singh PURI, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations
Speaker	Professor Antonio Jorge RAMALHO, University of Brasilia
Discussant	Dr Alhaji Sarjoh BAH, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, New York University's Center on International Cooperation and AU Consultant
	Session 2: Western States and UN Peacekeeping: What Participation in a Post-Afghan Era?
Chair	Ambassador Fred TANNER, Director, GCSP
Speaker	Mr Emmanuel BONNE, Political Counsellor and Security Council Coordinator, Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations
Discussant	Mr David HAERI, Head of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, UNDPKO

Session 3: Improving the Effectiveness of Peace Operations through Strategic Oversight

Chair	Mr Warren HOGE, Vice President for External Relations, IPI
Speaker	Lieutenant General Babacar GAYE, Military Adviser, UNDPKO
Discussant	Colonel Mike REDMOND, Military Adviser, Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations

Session 4: What Capabilities to Bridge the Expectations Gap? For a More Realistic Approach to Peacekeeping Mandates

Chair	Professor Ian JOHNSTONE, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford
Speaker	Mr Alan DOSS, Visiting Fellow, GCSP, and former SRSG in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Discussant	Mr Arthur BOUTELLIS, Senior Policy Analyst, IPI

Closing Session

Chair	Ambassador Paul SEGER, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations
Speaker	Mr Edmond MULET, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, UNDPKO Former Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) "The MINUSTAH in Haiti: Lessons Learnt and Future Prospects"

Closing Remarks by Ambassador Paul SEGER

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Mr Benjamin Ziga, Advisor, Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the United Nations

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