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Denmark’s Fifth EU-Referendum: In Denmark nichts Neues?
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Danish Institute of International Affairs
December 17, 1996
Like the previous referenda the Amsterdam debate largely centered on issues, such as Danish EU-membership and the danger of ‘little Denmark’ being swallowed by the ‘big EU’. Notwithstanding this continuity, this article presents the case that the Amsterdam referendum also contains a number of substantial changes. First, it demonstrates how the yes-side broke new ground: presenting the EU as a political and not just an economic project. Second, it shows how the 1998-referendum also presents a substantial shift in voting behavior. On the basis of these changes it discusses whether a new Danish EU-policy is in the making.
I. Introduction
For a short period in May 1998, Denmark once again found itself in the European limelight. After the Danish no to the Maastricht Treaty in June 1992, European governments held their breath when the Danes were called to the ballot box on the 28th of May to accept or reject the Treaty of Amsterdam. A quick glance at the actual debate and the final result could easily leave the impression that everything was business-as-usual. Just like in 1972, 1986, 1992 and 1993 the debate largely centered around broad issues, such as the pros and the cons of Danish EU-membership and the danger of ‘little Denmark’ being swallowed by the ‘big EU’. The final outcome of the referendum also looked familiar: Although 55.1 per cent of the Danish population voted in favor of the Treaty, a large minority continued to give an EU-Treaty their thumbs-down (44.9 per cent) (cf. table 1).
Notwithstanding this strong continuity, this article will argue that the Amsterdam referendum also contains a number of substantial changes, which will affect Denmark’s future relationship to the EU. First of all, we will present the case that the referendum debate broke new ground. Quite significantly, the EU was for the first time pictured as a political and not just an economic project. On top of this the yes-side constructed the political project in such a way that it was not a threat to ‘little Denmark’ but simply a spreading of Danish values and policy-traditions to the EU as a whole. Secondly, the article will argue that also the continuity in terms of yes- and no-votes is challenged by important underlying shifts in voting behavior.
| 1972 | 1986 | 1992 | 1993 1 | 1998 | |
| Yes | 63.3% | 56.2% | 49.3% | 56.7% | 55.1% |
| No | 36.7% | 43.8% | 50.7% | 43.3% | 44.9% |
| Turn out | 90.1% | 75.4% | 83.1% | 86.5% | 74.8% |
Table 1: From 1972 to 1998: Referendum results and turn out.
II. The Context of the Debate
The decision to hold yet a referendum on the fate of an EU-Treaty was taken in the immediate aftermath of the Amsterdam Summit in June 1997. In fact, many politicians from both the yes- and the no-side had already during the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) argued for a referendum. With four referenda in the Danish EU-history book, this instrument simply seemed to have established itself as the (informal) rule of the game when confronted with a new EU-treaty. Any decision not to hold a referendum could consequently be pictured as an undemocratic attempt to block thorough debate and hence public legitimization. In reality, the decision to hold a referendum was therefore not so much tied to the actual content of the Treaty (cf. also Nehring, 1998: 65). Even if the Treaty had not fulfilled the constitutional condition for holding a referendum - the transfer of sovereignty in specific areas (art. 20 in the Danish constitution) - a referendum might very well have been called. 2
The actual date for the referendum was set on the 7th of October 1997 by the social democratic Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen. The chosen date - 28th of May 1998 - was seen as providing sufficient time for a ‘thorough debate’ (Nyrup Rasmussen in DUPI-DOK, 1997: 61). However, a number of events, some of which were self-inflicted by the government, soon limited the time for debate. The fall of 1997 was thus dominated by municipal elections in November; the period February-March 1998 by early General Elections - elections, which secured Poul Nyrup Rasmussen and his coalition government compromised of the social democratic and the Danish Social Liberal Party a new term. 3 Not surprisingly the immediate period after the General Elections was characterized by a certain election-fatigue. The unwillingness to plunge right into the deep waters of the Amsterdam campaign was only strengthened by the fact that both the no- and yes side were conducting a ‘wait-and-see-policy’ due to the pending verdict of the Danish Supreme Court on the Maastricht Treaty. In August 1996, Denmark’s (sole) Supreme Court had thus very surprisingly accepted to rule upon the no-movements case that the ratification of Maastricht was un-constitutional. If the Court, on the 6th of April 1998, came to the conclusion that this was indeed the case, the ratification of the follow-up Treaty could have been postponed - or even cancelled (for the Danish Maastricht-case, cf. Rasmussen, 1998).
Even the clear statement from the Court (that Maastricht was in compliance with the constitution) did not pave the way for the actual debate on the Amsterdam Treaty. Soon after the judgement the unions’ and the employers’ organizations started to rattle their sables; threatening to take industrial action due to serious disagreements in their ongoing collective bargaining process. In late April, the two parties made good of their promises and plunged Denmark into an all-encompassing strike. In reality, the actual debate on the Amsterdam Treaty only started after the government had called an end to the strike - on the 7th of May, leaving less than 20 days for the campaign.
The shortest referendum campaign in Denmark’s EU-history was characterized by an unprecedented amount of campaign material. Instead of sending the actual Treaty to every citizen (as was done with the Maastricht Treaty) the government published a whole series of pamphlets on the different chapters of the Treaty; pamphlets which were also released on the inter-net. The no-side followed suit by publishing their (if not as many) pamphlets. 4 Despite these many attempts (which were supplemented by almost daily TV- and radio programs) opinion polls throughout the entire campaign indicated that the public wanted ‘more information’ and that the Treaty was an unintelligible piece of Euro-speak. 5
Just like in the previous campaigns an overwhelming parliamentary majority argued for a yes. In the final vote on the Treaty on the 7th of May in the Danish Parliament (Folketing) six parties (the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, the Christian People’s Party, the Center Democrats, the Social Liberal Party and the Conservative People’s Party) voted in favor, whereas four parties voted against (the Socialist People’s party, The Danish People’s Party, the Progress Party and the Red-green Alliance). 6 In terms of mandates this amounted to 146 out of 179 parliamentarians pledging for a yes. Mirroring the picture from 1992-1993, the core no-opposition (in campaign-terms) came from two movements outside the Folketing the June-movement (Junibevægelsen) and the People’s Movement against the EC-Union (Folkebevægelsen mod EF-Unionen). As a novelty these rather left-wing movements were joined by a conservative, right-wing movement, The Europe of the Nations (Nationernes Europa)
III. Continuity & Change in the Danish EU-Debate
Once the actual debate finally got up and running, there was a marked sense of deja-vu. Like in all the previous campaigns a core theme was ‘little Denmark’ vs. the ‘large and ever-growing EU’. Politicians from the no-side thus claimed that the EU was about to develop into a superstate and that Denmark would soon become a ‘municipality in Europe’ (Bonde, 1998). The ‘victim’ of this process would be the well-developed Danish democracy. 7 In order to protect Denmark one should therefore vote no. Or to quote the slogan of the Danish People’s Party: vote Danish, vote no. In fact, the need to protect ‘little Denmark’ was more pronounced than ever before. According to especially the right wing Danish People’s and Progress Party Amsterdam was namely about to abolish the Danish-German border. What was alluded to here was Schengen. Although the membership of Schengen requires only the abolition of border controls - and despite the fact that Denmark had already ratified the Schengen convention and obtained an opt-out with regard to its (future) supra-national part - the right-wing presented the abolition of the border as their key argument for a rejection of the entire Amsterdam enterprise (for the Schengen-debate, see below).
Not surprisingly, the yes-side tried to counter the above views by downplaying the federalizing tendencies of the Amsterdam Treaty. The core idea behind Amsterdam was not ‘more Union’, but a ‘better Union’, seeing that Amsterdam dealt more extensively with issues such as environment and employment. Apart from that, the yes-side argued, everything would still not be roses if Denmark were able to detach itself from the EU. Even outside the EU, Denmark would still be affected by EU-policies and especially also the overall globalization process.
A second ‘classic’ in the debate centered on the Danish welfare state. Following the cue from the previous campaigns, especially the People’s Movement Against the EC-Union made the case that the Danish state pension system (folkepension) was threatened by the EU. In a harmonized EU Denmark would simply not be able to keep its generous system (Folkebevægelsen mod EF-Unionen, 1998). In similar vein, the no-side argued that the Danish environmental standards would be negatively affected. 8
A third continuous element was the argument that the EU was a project for the elite, and definitely not the People. During the entire campaign the no-movement pictured the yes-politicians as remote from the general public (cf. Krarup, 1998), whereas the yes-side fought back by characterizing the ‘professional no-sayers’ (lawyers, academics etc) as being equally elitist.
Where the previous ‘classics’ mostly refer to the no-side, the yes-side was also partial to old arguments. Just like in the previous campaigns the yes-side focused heavily on the negative consequences of a no. This time it was however not the economic, but the political consequences which were at the heart of the argument. After a no Denmark would thus soon find itself on the ‘sidelines’ of the European integration process (Nyrup Rasmussen, Aktuelt, 22.5). Unlike in 1992 it would not make sense to ask for yet another set of Danish exemptions - considering that the Amsterdam Treaty, according to the government, was very much a Danish inspired Treaty (with its stress on environment, transparency etc.). A re-negotiation of the entire Treaty was completely ruled out. Hence, a likely outcome for Denmark after a no would be a ‘Norwegian’ solution, i.e. an EEA-like agreement (ibid).
Besides the repercussions for Denmark, the yes-side (and here especially the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Niels Helveg Petersen) argued that a Danish no would ‘at the best postpone the enlargement negotiations [with Central and Eastern Europe] and at the worst block them for a very long period’ (Politiken, 20.5). The no-side, on their part, used the same tactic as during the previous campaign: accusing the yes-side of running a ‘scare campaign’. According to the no-side a no was anything but scary. Quite the contrary. Since any new Treaty requires unanimity in order to come into force a Danish no would simply mean that the Amsterdam Treaty would have to be re-opened right away and yet another IGC convened. This IGC would provide Europe with a window of opportunity to create a ‘better Europe’ (i.e. more intergovernmental); a Europe with room for the Central and Eastern European countries. 9 Since Amsterdam according to the no-side had nothing to do with eastern enlargement - due to the limited preparations made for enlargement - the no-side also dismissed the claim that a no could jeopardize enlargement. On the contrary, the Socialist People’s Party argued that the Danes should vote no, in order to help Central and Eastern Europe and prevent the emergence of ‘new dividing lines’ (SF, 1998). 10
A second classic from the yes-side was the tendency to downplay the future development of the integration process. Where the no-side saw this Treaty as yet another move towards ‘more Union’, the yes-side pictured Amsterdam as a turning point. After Amsterdam the integration train would come to a halt and the future scenario for Europe was therefore not ‘more Union’, but ‘less Union’. Especially Prime Minister Nyrup Rasmussen seemed here to follow in the footsteps of his predecessors. In the 1972 referendum PM J.O. Kragh had thus painted the future of the EU in purely economic colors, arguing that political integration would not materialize. In 1986, PM Schlüter made the case that the Single European Act implied that [political] ‘Union was stone-dead’. In 1998 Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, with clear reference to future enlargement, argued as follows:
‘... the fact that there will be many more members in the future... also implies that the co-operation cannot be much deeper than it already is today. Instead we will have to go down in pace...I do not see the important new questions in the EU, which will require new Treaties. There will not be a major pressure to change the Amsterdam Treaty’ (Weekend-Avisen, 28.5; author’s translation). 11
Where the above could easily leave the impression that 1998 was simply a re-run of 1972, 1986 and 1992-93, important innovations were also at play. More specifically, one can point to five novelties. The most radical break with the past was the yes-side’s decision to picture the EU as a political project. Precisely because the EU could be perceived as a threat to ‘little Denmark’s’ well-developed democracy, the yes-side had earlier refrained from selling the EU as a political project with a ‘common (bright) future’ as it was done in for instance Spain and Portugal. On the contrary, Danish government(s) always tried to convince the public that the EU was only an economic project. It was about bacon (enabling Denmark to export its agricultural products), not about politics. In 1998 the yes-side changed its tune. The core reason for this must be sought in the fact that economic lines of argument ran aground with the Maastricht referendum. With proposals like EMU, European citizenship and common foreign and security policy on the agenda it became very clear that the EU was indeed a political project.
The decision to repackage the EU in more political terms was however anything but unproblematic. Analyses of the Maastricht referendum had clearly indicated that it was precisely the realization that the EU was a political project, which triggered many no-votes (Siune et al., 1992). As a consequence, the yes-side had to present the public with a different, attractive political project. Instead of staking everything on one throw of the die, the government chose a dual strategy: first, it underlined that the purpose of the integration process was indeed political - to create peace and stability in Central and Eastern Europe. In 1998, EU integration was therefore not an ideological project; but a very practical project intended to stabilize Denmark’s immediate neighbors to the east. The second part of the strategy aimed at bridging the classic dichotomy in the Danish EU-debate - ‘little Denmark’ vs. the ‘big EU’. What the government argued this time was indeed quite the opposite: Danish values were not threatened; what Amsterdam did was simply to spread these values to the entire Europe. Or to quote the social democratic mantra - ‘The Danish Road is now also the road of the EU’. Not surprisingly, it was especially Amsterdam’s stress on the environment, consumer protection, employment and transparency which triggered the argumentation that the EU was becoming more ‘Nordic’. The EU was simply no longer a project just for Merchants and Bankers; now it had a political superstructure, which aimed at balancing market forces and protecting the environment. 12
In continuation with the above, one can also point to a new Danish missionary-like role. Yes, the EU was getting ‘better’, i.e. more Danish and Nordic, but there was still a long road to travel. As a ‘pioneer-country’ (to use the label, which the present government has launched) Denmark could ‘help’ the rest of Europe to reach similar high standards, for instance on environment. At the end of the campaign this pioneer-role was supplemented by a watch-dog-role:
‘We have to reduce the high-handedness of Brussels. Some of the high-ranking officials in the Commission...should get out of their bathtubs and meet the ordinary Danes’ (Nyrup Rasmussen in Weekendavisen, 28.5.1998; Author’s translation).
In the yes-side’s strategy, such critical tones were obviously not arguments to reject the Treaty. Rather the strategy seems to have been to tell the Danish public that Denmark could be counted on as a forceful actor in the attempt to change the system. Further-more, a critical attitude could show skeptical, but potential yes-sayers that not even the Prime Minister was a starry-eyed Euro-enthusiast!
The overall change of strategy of the yes-side, exchanging the economic with a political project, triggered yet another novelty: for the first time in Denmark’s EU-history, EU-skepticism seemed to mirror the European ‘party-landscape’. In the Amsterdam debate, the left wing became more positive, whereas the right wing turned more negative. As hinted, this so-called ‘normalization’ was directly tied to the yes-side’s new strategy: precisely because the EU (like in most other member states) was now pictured as a way of controlling market forces - and not just as a pure economic project - the EU was suddenly far more attractive to the left than the right. As a matter of fact, right-wing parties were for the first time significant players in a referendum. Suddenly, debates were taking place where the left-wing argued that the EU was a ‘social democratic project’ and where the right-wing exactly because of this change argued for a no. 13
The entry of the right-wing on the no-side also created what was quickly referred to as an ‘unholy alliance’: politicians from the far right and the far left argued for the same cause, although not with the same arguments. Despite the fact that the left-wing stood for a different no, it had great difficulties in completely disentangling itself from the right - a fact, which created accusations that the left-wing’s no was also a nationalistic no. This was especially the case with regards to Schengen, where both sides argued that Denmark should leave this co-operation. In principle, their arguments were very different. The left-wing basically argued that Schengen would lead to an unacceptable ‘Fortress Europe’; preventing any refugee or immigrant from ever entering. The right-wing side, conversely, argued that Schengen would quickly turn into a Schlaraffenland for refugees and criminals - hence, triggering an increase in the amount of ‘foreigners’ entering Denmark. Despite these clear differences, also the left-side did however play on the fear that Schengen would ‘abolish’ the border. And what was more: by launching part of their campaign under slogans - welcome to 40 millions Poles and there has to be a border - especially the June-movement contributed to the confusion in finding a clear dividing line between the two ‘no’s’.
The fourth novelty in the Amsterdam debate is connected to the simple fact that Sweden and Finland had joined the EU in 1995. Precisely because this was so, the no-side no longer pointed to Nordic co-operation as a superior alternative to the EU. Instead the no-movement rediscovered a loosely pan-European co-operation as a preferable alternative. This alternative had actually played a role since 1972, where the no-movement pictured the EU as a ‘closed shop’ and a ‘Rich Man’s Club’. With eastern enlargement now in the pipeline the no-movement did however have some difficulties in giving this line of argument a credible renaissance. This was also due to the following: the applicants were not at all interested in a new pan-European organization; they wanted the real thing.
The final and fifth novelty only materialized in the final days of the campaign. For the first time several question marks were put behind the referendum instrument. Did it really make sense to put such a complex but not very far-reaching Treaty to a referendum, when it was very clear that the debate rarely focused on the actual Treaty? Was it fair of the politicians to leave the public with the final decision - especially when it was not clear what the consequences of a no was? Unlike in the previous campaigns the general view that referenda create legitimacy was indeed challenged by the argument that referenda enable politicians to run away from their duty - and hence contribute to Politikverdrossenheit. Not surprisingly, the ‘referendum-fatigue’ was more pronounced on the yes- than the no-side. Where the government launched the view that not all changes - for instance the forthcoming institutional changes in the run-up to enlargement - had to be put to a referendum, the no-side took the opposite view: the government should already now promise to hold a referendum on precisely the institutional issue. 14
IV. Judgement Day 28th of May - Continuity & Change
On first sight the actual result on 28th of May also signaled continuity: a large part of the Danish population rejected an EU-Treaty (44.9 per cent). However also here there are more than immediately meets the eye. The first (preliminary) analysis of the referendum result thus indicates that important changes took place beneath the surface of numerical continuity (Mandag Morgen, 1998). The core point is that the no- and yes-vote remained stable, whereas this was not the case for the actual voters.
Strikingly the first analysis shows how the 1998-referendum was far more determined by social status and education than any of the previous referenda. Indeed, for the first time the electorate seemed polarized: the highly educated, high-level white collar-workers and students tended to vote yes, whereas the working class, low-level white collar workers, unemployed and pensioners tended to reject the Treaty. More specifically, the yes-vote among high-level white collar workers increased by 10 percentage point and by 25 percentage points among students compared with 1993. Conversely, the no-vote increased by 15 and 10 percentage points among workers and pensioners. In practice, what the Amsterdam result indicates is that Denmark also in this way is becoming ‘more normal’. The French referendum - and for that matter also the Norwegian one - revealed a clear social polarization. In Denmark, however, (up to Amsterdam) it was difficult to trace a significant social polarization (Siune et. al, 1992)
The importance of social status is confirmed, when the focus is moved to the turn-out. Not only was the turn-out low for Danish standards (74.8%; see table 1); it was mainly the working class, low-level white collar workers and the unemployed who stayed home in their armchairs (ibid, 6).
Finally, two additional changes deserve attention. For the first time since 1972 a majority of the social democratic voters supported an EU-Treaty; emphasizing that the rhetoric about a different, more social democratic Union probably bore fruit. 15 As can be seen from table 2 - which compares the 1998 referendum with 1992 and 1993 - this rhetoric did not deter the voters from the Conservative and Liberal Party.
Table 2: 1992 vs. 1993 vs. 1998: Selected Danish Parties and their voters 16
Just as interesting was the fact that gender for the first time seemed to play an insignificant role. Indeed, the yes-vote among the traditionally highly critical women increased from 52 percentage in 1993 to 54 per cent in 1998, whereas the yes-vote among men fell from 62 to 58 per cent. Although one should be careful not to jump to rash conclusions it is tempting to argue along the following lines: the strong focus on a ‘better, more Danish Union’ and the enlargement-peace project probably appealed more to women than the economic oriented project of 1972, 1986 and 1992-93.
V. A New EU-Policy in the Making?
The mixture between old and new tunes in the referendum obviously begs the question of whether Danish EU-policy will simply continue down the trodden path or whether a new policy is actually in the making. The most valid answer is here that the ball is still very much up in the air. On the one hand it seems clear that Denmark - due to the strong statements that the integration train has come to an halt - will have great difficulties in accepting a substantial deepening of the integration process in the (near) future; also in the slipstream of enlargement. 17 On the other hand, the Amsterdam-debate also indicates that the ‘fit’ between the Danish identity and the EU project has improved quite considerably. Suddenly, the EU is pictured as an extension of Denmark. Whether Denmark is in for a change in policy will therefore in the last resort depend on the following: will the argument for a ‘better, more Danish and enlarged Union’ outweigh the traditional concerns about ‘more union’ - that ‘little Denmark’ is being swallowed by Union? Judging from the EU’s Cardiff Summit in mid June-1998 (with another IGC in the making) the litmus test is just around the corner
References
Bonde, J.P. (1998), ‘Skal Danmark være en slags amt i Europa?’ (‘Should Denmark become a kind of country in Europe?’), Aktuelt, 7.5.
DUPIDOK (1997) Dansk Udenrigspolitisk dokumentation (Danish Foreign Policy Documentation), Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1998
Folkebevægelsen mod EF-Unionen (1998), ‘Folkepensionens fremtid i EU’ (The state pension’s future in the EU)
Haahr, J. H. (1993), Looking to Europe. The EC Policies of the British Labour Party and the Danish Social Democrats, Århus: Århus University Press
Justitsministeriet (1998), ‘Justitsministeriets redegørelse for visse forfatningsretlige spørgsmål i forbindelse med Danmarks ratifikation af Amsterdam-Traktaten’ (report by the Ministry of Justice on constitutitional aspects of Denmark’s ratification of Amsterdam), Copenhagen: Ministry of Justice
Krarup, O. (1998), ‘Oprør mod eliten’ (‘Revolt against the elite’), Information, 6.maj
Lawler, P. (1997), ‘Scandinavian Exceptionalism and European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 35, no. 4
Mandag Morgen (1998), ‘Øget social polarisering ved EU-afstemningen’ (‘Increased social polarisation in the EU-referendum’), 8. juni.
Nehring, N.J. (1998), ‘The Illusory Quest for Legitimacy’, G. Sørensen & H-H. Holm (eds.): And Now What, Århus: Politica, pp. 60-82
Petersen, N. (1996), ‘In the strategic triangle: Denmark and the EU’, in R. Bideleux & R. Taylor (eds.): European Integration and Disintegration, London: Routledge, pp. 93-111
Petersen, N. (1998), ‘Denmark, the IGC and the future of the European Union’, in B. Heurlin & H. Mouritzen (eds.): Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1998, pp. 43-61
Siune, K. et al. (1992) Det blev et nej, (‘It was a no’), Århus: Politica
SF (1998), ‘For mere Europa og mindre union’ (‘For more Europe and less Union’), Socialist People’s Party
Rasmussen, H. (1998), ‘Denmark’s Maastricht-Ratification Case: The Constitutional Dimension’, The Irish Jurist
Notes
*: The author wishes to thank Anna Murphy, Niels-Jørgen Nehring, Jess Pilegaard and Marlene Wind for their valuable criticism. The usual disclaimer applies. Back.
Note 1: In 1993 the Danish public was asked to vote on the Edinburgh Agreement, i.e. the Maastricht Treaty minus the four opt-outs which the Danish government obtained in the aftermath of the Danish no in 1992 (cf. Petersen, 1996). Back.
Note 2: That Amsterdam, as a matter of fact, did fulfil the constitutional criteria became clear when the Danish Ministry of Justice submitted a report in Spring 1998. Here it argued that Amsterdam implied a transfer of sovereignty concerning three areas: 1) the non-discrimination clause, art. 6A, 2) consumer protection, art. 129A, 2) the membership suspension clause, art. F.1 (Justitsministeriet, 1998). Back.
Note 3: The General Election campaign was almost silent on the EU-issue. A clear division of labour seemed to be at play: the General Election would deal with domestic issues; the referendum with EU-related issues. For the referendum, however, it was arguably important that the social-democratic-social liberal coalition was re-elected. Hence, it was the same government which had negotiated the Treaty, which could ‘sell’ it to the public. Furthermore, the general perception seemed to be that Poul Nyrup Rasmussen had better chances of convincing the sceptical part of the electorate than the for Danish standards very pro-EU opposition leader, former minister of foreign affairs, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen. Back.
Note 4: Money-wise the yes-side was far better equipped than the no-side. According to calculations the yes-side had around 1.9 mio. pounds at their disposal; the no-side 740.000 pounds. Unlike the Irish government in their Amsterdam referendum, the Danish government also spent quite a considerable amount. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs for instance spent more than 440.000 pounds on information material (Jyllandsposten, 8. April, 1998). The government also set up a EU-Task force, which was supposed to monitor the EU-debate and in general work for a yes (Euroman, 1998: 39-42). Back.
Note 5: Arguably the confusion was strengthened by the fact that Denmark (together with Ireland) were the only countries truly debating Amsterdam, whereas the rest of Europe focused on Economic and Monetary UnionDenmark entered the IGC with the goal of cementing its opt-outs, including the one on EMU (for Denmark’s IGC-strategy, cf. Petersen, 1998). Throughout the entire campaign the yes-side upheld the view that Amsterdam had indeed fulfilled this objective. Hence, the four opt-outs played a limited role in the campaign, although the no-side argued that the exemption concerning justice and home affairs had been eroded by Denmark’s membership of Schengen. Back.
Note 6: The Socialist People’s Party was not as one on the Amsterdam Treaty. Four MP’s supported the Treaty and ran their own yes-campaign in opposition to the Party’s overall no-campaign. In the Conservative Party, MP Frank Dahlgaard broke party-ranks and ran his own no-campaign. In brackets it should be added that only one party had changed its position compared to Maastricht, namely the small Christian People’s Party. Two new parties - which had not been represented in the Folketing in 1992 (the Danish People’s Party and the Red-Green Alliance) - joined the no-camp. Back.
Note 7: As explanations for the above threat-perception of the EU, scholars have pointed to several factors: the size of Denmark, the fact that Denmark is one of the oldest constitutional states in Europe, one of the few homogenous nation-states and that Denmark (together with Sweden) has developed a strong welfare state (for an overview cf. Fawler, 1997) Back.
Note 8: Just like in 1986 and 1992 a large part of the entire debate centred on the ‘environmental guarantee’ (former art. 110a, 4). This time, the no-side argued that Amsterdam’s revised guarantee was a step in the wrong direction, whereas the yes-side took the opposite view; arguing that the guarantee had been strengthened and clarified. Back.
Note 9: As can be seen from the above the ambition was not to get Denmark out of the EU, but to reform the entire EU. Back.
Note 10: The new dividing lines refer to the enlargement protocol of the Amsterdam Treaty, which could be interpreted in such a way that only five countries were able to join the EU before yet another IGC has to be launched (cf. SF, 1998). Back.
Note 11: The new leader of the Liberal Party Fogh Rasmussen argued along similar lines (Information, 27.5). It should however be said that Nyrup Rasmussen opened for future ‘technical adjustments’ to the EU’s institutions in connection with enlargement. Back.
Note 12: Although the strategy to picture the EU as a political project was indeed novel, it should be said that some steps in this direction had already been taken in 1992. With reference to the introduction of QMV in environmental matters the social democratics had thus argued that the EU had departed from being a pure market oriented project (cf. Haahr, 1993). Back.
Note 13: Due to the fear of alienating more conservative voters, especially PM Rasmussen took care not to play the social democratic card too excessively - more stressing the fact that the EU was a ‘Danish project’. Back.
Note 14: Even if the government should manage to break with the referendum-rule at the next IGC, referenda will undoubtedly still play a major role. In connection with the referendum on the Edinburgh Agreement - and the four Danish opt-outs - the government thus promised that none of the opt-outs could be lifted without yet another referendum. In practice, one could therefore very well imagine that the public will be asked to vote on Danish EMU-membership in 2002-3. Unlike the Amsterdam-campaign, such a referendum would however have a clear (economic) focus - and hence also enable the public to judge between two clear alternatives - EMU-membership or a continuation of the opt-out. Back.
Note 15: The above should not be seen as if the social democratic party has solved its entire EU problem. After all, 45 percentage of its voters still broke party-ranks and rejected the Treaty (cf. table 2). Quite importantly, the social democratic party does however now mirror the situation in the entire country - 55% for; 45 against. In other words: The social democratic party does no longer have a special EU-problem. This very fact could trigger some changes in the party’s EU-policy - opening for a less cautious policy. Back.
Note 16: The above table is adapted from the weekly Mandag Morgen. It is based on a Gallup poll from May 1998 and two analyses of the 1992 and1993-referendum, conducted by Jørgen Goul Andersen and Karen Siune et al. (1992). Please note that the 1992 and 1993 per cents for the Danish People’s Party refer to the Progress Party. In 1995 a major faction of the Progress Party established the People’s Party. Statistical reservations should be taken - especially due to the limited number of respondents from the smaller parties. In 1992 the sample for the Social Liberal Party was indeed so limited that no clear conclusions could be drawn. Back.
Note 17: The more socially polarised electorate could also play a role here. At least it seems likely that a large part of the no-votes were protest-votes of Danish society in general - a protest-vote linked to economic welfare, which will not change overnight. Hence, the reservoir for Euro-scepticism will remain. Back.
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