

# **Security and Stability in Northern Europe – A Threat Assessment**

*Jochen Prantl*  
*St Antony's College*  
*UK – Oxford OX2 6JF*

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## Contents

<b>Abbreviations</b>	3
<b>Introduction</b>	4
Methods and research design	
Northern Europe: Defining the region	
<b>I. The Relevance of the North</b>	8
The relevance of Northern Europe	
The question of Nordic identity	
Regionalisation as instrument to secure stability	
<b>II. Identification of security threats</b>	14
Hard versus soft security threats: How to address them?	
The question of "Russian minorities"	
The role of international organisations and national actors	
<b>III. The EU's role in the region</b>	29
The importance of EU instruments	
Shortcomings in EU policies and actions	
<b>Conclusion: Policy implications for the European Union</b>	34
<b>Appendix</b>	37

**Abbreviations**

BEAC	Barents Euro-Arctic Council
CBSS	Council of Baltic Sea States
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces
DK	Denmark
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EU	European Union
FIN	Finland
N	Norway
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEI	Northern Europe Initiative
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PHARE	Poland, Hungary: assistance for economic reconstruction
S	Sweden
TACIS	Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
U.S.	United States
USA	United States of America
WEU	Western European Union

## **Introduction**

The accession of Finland and Sweden as well as the ongoing enlargement process, which offers the perspective of EU membership to the Baltic States, has put the question of security and stability in Northern Europe on the Agenda of the European Union.

The Northern region is at the crossroads of the relations between the EU and Russia. Although the successor state of the Soviet Union is still an ambitious power with quite a considerable military potential it hardly poses – at the moment – a serious hard security threat in the region. However, there is still a residual security threat, especially when looking at Russia's future political development, which has a considerable potential of destabilising the overall security situation in the North.

Consequently, today's problems in Northern Europe are more of a non-military nature, which result, on the one hand, from the yet unfinished economic and societal transformation in various Baltic Sea States. On the other, they are the legacy of the demise of the Soviet empire. These problems concern, for instance, nuclear safety, including the treatment of nuclear fuels and waste, minority issues, water pollution, narcotics trade, international organised crime like penetration of state structures by trans-national criminal organisations, corruption and fraud within state administrations, or disparities of living standards in general. To tackle the whole spectrum of those multi-faceted (soft) security risks the European Union needs to find more effective responses.

The international research programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, jointly conducted by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (Helsinki/Finland) and the Institut für Europäische Politik (Bonn and Berlin/Germany) aims at promoting the awareness of those issues within the European Union by analysing the current situation and projecting some scenarios as well as policy advice for the future.

## **Methods and Research Design**

This threat assessment is based upon an evaluation of a questionnaire that was sent to 120 decision-makers, international and academic institutions throughout the European Union, the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, and the United States. The return flow rate turned out to be at 25%. Completed questionnaires were received from Austria, the Baltic states, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands,

Norway, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Commission: Over 90% belong to the academic field, the remaining part are decision makers in international institutions, foreign ministries and embassies. Around 50% of the total replies are from Finland, Germany, and the United Kingdom, whereby each of those countries does have an equal share.

The rather modest return flow rate of 25% can be explained – to some extent – with the comprehensive and detailed nature of the questionnaire, which demanded from the respondents considerable commitment and time to answer the questions in a proper way. However, the fact that virtually none of the Southern European member states replied, i.e. Greece, Italy, and Spain, can also be evaluated as straight answer to the question on the awareness or relevance of the Northern Dimension in the South: It reflects the low priority of Northern Europe, which ranks on the very bottom of the policy agenda in those countries.

The questionnaire was designed by a project team which has been set up in the framework of the international research programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP.<sup>1</sup> It shall further the thinking on two critical issues: What are the main hard and soft security threats in the Northern region? What can the European Union do about it? After the breakdown of the bi-polar system the EU is forced to identify the current (or remaining) and future problems and risks in this region, which is or is becoming an integral part of the European Union.

Thus, discussing acute and potential threats in the Northern region helps to further the debate on "the nuts and bolts" of the Northern Dimension initiative, including policy recommendations for the European Union. As it is always the case, this questionnaire, too, does not and cannot claim to have addressed all relevant problems.

However, wherever it seemed appropriate (cf. questionnaire in the Annex), the project team provided space for additional comments to qualify the given answers. Those flexible elements proved to be a valuable instrument since quite a considerable number of respondents used it to complete the picture. The threat assessment takes therefore into account both the multiple choice answers and the individual comments as stated by the respondents.

The study mirrors the structure of the questionnaire consisting of three major parts. Chapter I identifies the general importance or relevance of the Northern region. Furthermore, it analyses the relevance of Northern Europe in comparison with other regions asking whether

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<sup>1</sup> The questionnaire is attached as Appendix to this study.

the countries involved are bound by a common "Northern identity". Chapter II identifies the security threats of the region in general. It is important to note that although it is possible to elaborate some ranking of security threats this should not disregard the fact that certain security threats of genuinely no or low importance have, nevertheless, the potential to become of high or of vital importance in combination with others. In this context, the insecurity with regard to Russia's future has got the potential to tip the scales. Furthermore, the Chapter deals with the question of "Russian minorities" and the respective role of national actors and international organisations in closer detail. Chapter III concentrates on the role of the European Union in the Northern region analysing the relative importance of various EU instruments and the perceived shortcomings in EU policies and actions. Chapter IV concludes with some policy implications and recommendations for the European Union.

The questionnaire shall be brought to a wider public in the form of a discussion paper. Furthermore, it is intended to discuss the paper in the context of a workshop in Brussels and to publish the results within the publication series of the research programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP.

### **Northern Europe: Defining the region**

There is a critical underlying question implicit in the title of the study on 'Security and Stability in Northern Europe' which should be raised at the very beginning: Which states belong to Northern Europe, and do they constitute a coherent region?

Looking from a historical angle, it makes perfectly sense to treat North-eastern Europe as a regional entity since the Baltic Sea states have had very close economic links.<sup>2</sup> The role the Hanseatic League played in the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries has always been a prominent example to explain the economic and political integration process between those countries. This close interconnectedness ended with the emergence of the Cold War creating a rather artificial division of Europe. In consequence, traditional trade patterns and political links were weakened, with most severe implications for the Baltic states.

The breakdown of the bipolar system changed again the conditions re-establishing the former trade patterns and regional as well as sub-regional ties. Like other Central and Eastern European countries the Baltic states shifted their trade towards (EU-) Europe; for the

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<sup>2</sup> The following account draws on an Independent Task Force Report by the Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy Toward Northeastern Europe, Council on Foreign Relations, April 1999, <http://www.foreignrelations.org/public/pubs/baltics.html>, 12/02/2000.

Baltics this meant a reevaluation of economic links especially with the Nordic countries. At the same time, bilateral ties have also been strengthened. While Estonia, for instance, has established a special relationship with Finland, Lithuania developed a very close co-operation with Poland. Apart from the EU's Northern Dimension initiative, the United States launched a Northern Europe Initiative (NEI) in 1997 to promote stability in the Baltic Sea Region: It puts a special emphasis on regional, cross-border co-operation for U.S. Government activities and programmes<sup>3</sup>. Another important factor which should be taken into consideration is the dense net of well-functioning regional and sub-regional institutions. The Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), and the Nordic Council have contributed to re-establish regional co-operation and stability. Both the CBSS and the BEAC include Russia, trying to integrate the country into the regional framework of co-operation.

The question on the future role of Russia will heavily affect the development of Northern Europe as a region: Should the Russian Federation be seen as *inside* or *outside* of it? A short look into history books reveals that both Nordic and Baltic states have had established close economic relations with cities in the North-western part of Russia, for example, St. Petersburg, Murmansk, and Novgorod. On the other hand, the development of Russia's political, social, and economic system is significantly lagging behind its neighbourhood: Democracy and market economy have far weaker roots compared with the Nordic and Baltic neighbours. The pace of economic reform in Russia is very slow, and the lack of a strong legal framework rather prevents Western foreign direct investment.

This circumstance contributes to the overall *problématique* of how to synchronise the Northern Dimension initiative and the Common Strategy on Russia, both aiming at involving the Russian Federation into co-operative structures. Apart from that, there are already initiatives like the U.S. government's NEI to integrate North-west Russia into the same regional network in order "(...) to promote democratic, market-oriented development in Russia as well as to enhance Russia's relations with its northern European neighbours<sup>4</sup>." All those efforts to integrate Russia into the region will increase the likelihood to temper Russian reservations about the Baltic states' desires to become closely associated with, or even members of NATO in the long run.

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. Northern Europe Initiative. Fact Sheet released by the Bureau of European Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, January 10, 2000, [http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/nei/fs\\_000110\\_nei.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/nei/fs_000110_nei.html): The initiative targets the following countries; Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Northern Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, North-west Russia and Sweden; cf. also Dmitri Trenin & Peter van Ham, *Russia and the United States in Northern European Security, Programme on the Northern Dimension*, vol. 5, Helsinki 2000.

It is crucial that Russia's foreign policy perceives the Baltic region rather as an opportunity, i.e. as a gateway to enforced co-operation and integration into European structures. The local authorities in North-western Russia in particular are very keen to co-operate on a regional level and to attract Western investment: Those initiatives are able to further regional development. However, the central authorities are very reluctant to support those initiatives since this could undermine their power and foster separatist tendencies. And this analysis especially applies to Kaliningrad.

Taking the longer perspective, the greater devolution of power to the regions seems to be one possible consequence of current developments. On the other hand, the actors involved have to avoid any impression that they support disintegration tendencies to the detriment of the Russian Federation.

In conclusion, the coherence of Northern Europe as a region will depend a great deal on the capability to integrate Russia and to accommodate Russian concerns without making unacceptable sacrifices with regard to the national interests of the other actors involved. Chapter II.3 and III will show that the European Union is perceived as the most important and capable actor to achieve those policy goals.

## **I. The Relevance of the North**

### **The relevance of Northern Europe**

Part I of the questionnaire addresses the general relevance of Northern Europe on the European Union map: The first question asked was to assess the relevance of problems in Northern Europe in comparison with those originating in other geographical regions like Southern Europe/Mediterranean or South-eastern Europe. In general, the distribution of answers exposes the North-South split within the European Union. The geographical proximity or distance to the North shapes the perception of the relative importance or non-importance of the region. And this pattern even prevailed against the background of the non-participation in answering the questionnaire of experts from Southern countries like Greece, Italy, and Spain.


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<sup>4</sup> Cf. Northern Europe Initiative, *op.cit.*



For 1999, the clear majority of respondents (72%) attributed low or medium importance to the problems of the Northern region when they are placed in an overall EU context (cf. Table 1). However, this perception changed when it comes to a long term perspective. For 2010, 70% allocated medium or high importance to the same problems with a significant increase (from 20% to 35%) in the latter category. Although this perception might be somewhat distorted by the 1999 Kosovo war and the subsequent decision on the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, nevertheless, the significant increase can be explained due to the high potential of insecurity deriving from Russia’s future political development. As some respondents pointed out in the comments: In the extreme case that Russia collapsed, Northern Europe would become a vital interest of the European Union.

**Table 1: Relevance of problems in Northern Europe compared with other regions, e.g. Southern Europe/Mediterranean, South-eastern Europe (in % of total answers)**



This underlying perception is mirrored with regard to the question of assessing a possible commitment of the European Union in the region (cf. Table 2). The highest share of answers was allocated to the suggestion that the EU should be committed to Northern Europe due to its overall political and strategic interests, i.e. integrating Russia into a region where the European Union has common borders with the Russian Federation: While 59% considered this task as highly or of vital importance for 1999, this number increased to 70% for the year 2010. The chance of economic benefits and the obligation to deal with ecological damage followed well behind with 31% and 39% (1999), and 56% and 50% respectively (2010).

**Table 2: What is the relevance of the North in the EU context? How do you assess a possible EU commitment in the region?**

As a *Chance*: due to **economic** benefits (great natural resources etc.)

year	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance	vital
1999	-	20%	49%	24%	7%
2010	-	7%	37%	42%	14%

As a *Task*: due to **political** and **strategic** interests (integrating Russia, region as the only geographical link with the Russian Federation, etc.)

year	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance	vital
1999	-	7%	34%	49%	10%
2010	-	3%	27%	46%	24%


As an *Obligation*: e.g. due to the **ecological** damage

year	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance	vital
1999	-	12%	49%	35%	4%
2010	-	7%	43%	43%	7%

Table 3 distillates the given answers into a more analytical framework by summarising the shares which were allocated under the column "of high importance" or "vital": It offers a

picture with regard to current perceptions (1999) on the reasons for a possible commitment of the European Union in Northern Europe and projects a scenario into the future (2010).

**Table 3: Reasons for a possible EU commitment in Northern Europe 1999 and 2010 (in % of total answers which were assessed as vital or of high importance)**



### The question of Nordic identity

An overwhelming majority (almost 90%) supported the suggestion of a continuing and lasting Nordic identity after the breakdown of the bi-polar system. Only few respondents questioned its overall concept. Being asked to assess the most important factor/s in forming a common Nordic identity, the following picture emerged from the given answers (cf. Table 4).

Concentrating on the factors which were perceived as highly important allows to establish a ranking deducted from the answers given. On the top appears the notion of sharing the same patterns of social behaviour, which was subscribed to by 67% of the respondents. Having a common history and having intense commercial and/or economic relations ranked on the second and third place respectively, whereby 52% supported the former and 45% the latter suggestion. Interestingly, the factor of having basic security interests in common appears

clearly behind the top three with 38%. On the very bottom ranks the notion of having a common religion, which was subscribed to by only 7%.

**Table 4: What do you see as the most important factor/s in forming a common Nordic identity?**

Factor	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance
having (in part) a common history	-	7%	41%	52%
having a common religion/s	3%	45%	45%	7%
sharing the same patterns of social behaviour	-	-	33%	67%
having a similar form of government	-	16%	52%	32%
having intense commercial and/or economic relations with each other	-	3%	52%	45%
having basic security interests in common	-	14%	48%	38%

However, two caveats emerged in the comments to this question:

- 1) Some respondents pointed to the future of Nordic identity in the light of European integration and questioned the durability of that concept: Nordic identity might be fading partly because of Nordic reorientation to being more "European" than Nordic. The Nordic region is becoming more heterogeneous since it is reinventing itself through the Baltic Sea – Barents Sea co-operation. Others observed the emergence of a "new north" in economic terms consisting of the Baltic states, Poland, Northwest Russia and Northern Germany.
- 2) Other comments raised the question – without offering an answer - that has been already mentioned in the Introduction to this study: To which countries does the concept of Nordic identity eventually apply? Are there one or multiple Nordic identities?

This somewhat ambivalent picture is reproduced when looking at the follow-up question asked in the questionnaire whether common roots like history, culture or language are able

to contribute to promoting security and stability in the North: This view was generally supported by 76% of the respondents.

Additional comments to qualify the given answers revealed the prevailing perception that common roots are able to create a sense of common responsibility among political elites in the region. The feeling of "sitting in the same boat" offers the chance of developing similar patterns of values. Those common patterns will help to find compromises.

However, some respondents qualified their general support by hinting to the following aspect: Although common roots may constitute an underpinning for successful co-operation, they need to be enforced on a political level since promoting security and stability depends on more pragmatic measures than the somewhat vague concept of common roots.

In conclusion, the analysis of the answers given in the questionnaire, again, raises the question of the applicability of the concept of common roots. It can certainly be applied to those countries that form the Nordic group; however, it raises more questions than it answers when it comes to the Baltic states and the North-west of Russia.

### **Regionalisation as an instrument to secure stability**

The question whether regionalisation is an appropriate instrument to secure stability in the North still remains a highly contentious issue. Although the vast majority (66%) supported the overall concept of regionalisation, some important caveats emerged in the comments stated by respondents:

- 1) The concept of regionalisation as instrument to secure stability is strictly limited to soft security threats: In those policy areas it can promote cross-border co-operation, and it is able to create some added value. Furthermore, it downplays the importance of the (hard) security discussion and elevates less contentious topics in the foreground. However, the question of hard security should be rather seen in a wider Euro-Atlantic context, whereby – at least from the current point of view – NATO still remains the key player to provide the region with a security guarantee.
- 2) Russia as key player: The concept of regionalisation has to include Northwest-Russia. Only if Russia is seen as part of the region it will create some added value.

- 3) Engaging Russia: In this context, some referred to the possibility of co-operation on a sub-regional level, e.g. the Council of Baltic Sea States, as a way to engage Russia (cf. Chapter II.3). Others stressed the need for enhanced co-operation with Russian regional or federal authorities.
- 4) Geopolitical dimension: According to some observers, the general concept of regionalisation is questionable since the only choice of a Nordic security region is either being subordinated to Russian superior power or being linked to an all-European counterweight.
- 5) Implications for high politics: Some caveats were expressed regarding the Kola Peninsula since the high politics of this area may make it difficult to develop sub-regional patterns that go beyond confidence-building measures. In this case regionalisation is then confined to other fields of co-operation like trade, ecology etc.

## II. Identification of security threats

### Hard versus soft security threats: How to address them?

The breakdown of the bipolar system has greatly improved the overall security situation in Northern Europe since a direct threat against security in the North no longer exists. Those threats less prominent in the Cold War period (e.g. environmental damage) become more important today. Nevertheless, *nearly two thirds* subscribed to the suggestion that the era after bipolarity has introduced, indeed, new threats and new insecurities in the North. The general thrust of arguments as stated in the comments was as follows:

- Since Russia's future remains uncertain this means less predictability from the Russian pole due to political, economic, and social instability. The inherent danger of collapse as well as the lack of governability in Russian regions exacerbate this scenario. Some refer to potential spill-over effects into the wider region due to the common border with Russia. Others point to new environmental threats or damages, especially since ecological issues range low on Russia's priority list.
- Those Nordic countries that are not members of the Western institutions might be left in a "grey zone" in terms of security, economy, and ecology.

- The minority issues in the Baltics might have an escalating potential which affects the overall security and stability in the Northern region.
- Soft security issues like nuclear waste, arms trade or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, inter- and trans-national organised crime, and migration are referred to as the "new security threats" of the post bi-polar era.

The perception of hard and soft security threats somewhat mirrors what has already been stated in the previous chapter: It clearly reflects the high potential of insecurity vis-à-vis Russia's future political development. Consequently, the question on the assessment of Russia's future development has to be explored before starting with an in-depth analysis of the perceived hard and soft security threats in Northern Europe, since this is the breeding ground for all related perceptions.

Being asked whether Russia is to be perceived as a military threat in the North, respondents clearly made a difference between the current situation and the future potential of insecurity (cf. Table 5).

**Table 5: Do you perceive Russia as a military threat in the North?**

year	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance
1999	28%	44%	24%	4%
2010	14%	28%	48%	10%

For 1999, 72% assessed a potential military threat spreading from the Russian Federation as not important or of low importance, while 28% of the respondents perceived it as of medium or high importance. However, this assessment changes when looking into the future: For 2010, the picture looks much more pessimistic since the allocation of added answers in the two former columns decreased to 42%, while they increased in the two latter columns to 58%.

Table 6 completes the picture by outlining how the respondents ranked the probability of selected scenarios concerning the future of the Russian Federation.

**Table 6: Concerning future developments in Russia, which of the following scenarios is the most realistic one? (in % of total answers)**

Scenario	Degree of probability						
	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
a) muddling through the reform process, eventually developing a relatively stable democracy and market economy	-	7%	3%	11%	49%	27%	3%
b) continued weakening of the state and society in which neither the reformers nor their opponents prove capable of forging a new system	-	-	14%	3%	43%	40%	-
c) a general resurgence of authoritarianism, either individual or bureaucratic, in response to the frustrations of the first scenario or the fears of the second	-	3%	22%	11%	43%	21%	-
d) 'managed disintegration'	3%	12%	33%	30%	12%	7%	3%

key: -3 = impossible; -2 = absolutely unrealistic; -1 = unrealistic; 0 = do not know; +1 = realistic; +2 = very/quite realistic; +3 = certain to happen

A majority of 79% believed that the current muddling through the reform process, with eventually developing a relatively stable democracy and market economy is realistic, quite realistic, or even certain to happen also in the future. At the same time, 83% conceived a continued weakening of the state and society in which neither the reformers nor their opponents are going to succeed as realistic or quite realistic, while 64% saw a general resurgence of authoritarianism in response to the frustrations of the first scenario or the fears of the second.


The most contentious scenario is, however, the development towards "managed disintegration": About *two thirds* of the respondents remained either undecided or perceived it as unrealistic. However, the allocation of the remaining answers goes in both directions. 12% assessed the scenario of "managed disintegration" either as realistic or, at the other side of the spectrum, as absolutely unrealistic.




This diverse picture should be taken into account when analysing the importance or non-importance of hard and soft security threats. On the one hand, answers reflect those diverging expectations with regard to Russia's future. On the other, the still undecided political fate of the Russian Federation underlines that any identification or qualification of threats remains premature against this background: Under changed conditions, a considerable number of threats of genuinely low or medium importance has the potential to affect the vital interests of the actors involved. And this assessment does not apply exclusively to the regional actors, but also – due to potential spill-over-effects – to the European Union as a whole.

The questionnaire asked, therefore, to assess the importance of hard security threats in Northern Europe: For 1999, two thirds of the respondents assessed the hard security threats in the North as not important or of low importance, while 31% perceived it as of medium importance (cf. Table 7). However, the projection of the future is far more pessimistic since 52% perceived the same threats as of medium or high importance in 2010, with 17% in the latter category (cf. Table 8).

**Table 7: Importance of hard and soft security threats in 1999 (in % of total answers)**



**Table 8: Importance of hard and soft security threats in 2010 (in % of total answers)**

As the impact of a further regionalisation in North-west Russia is concerned, the policy suggestion of economic regionalisation was very much welcomed as positive, very positive or vital step by 89% (1999) and 96% (2010) of the respondents. Only 11% saw a negative impact for the year 1999. This number further decreases in the longer perspective, i.e. to 4% (2010).

Furthermore, from the current perspective (1999) the clear majority (66%) saw also positive or very positive implications in the strategic and military field. And this perception even slightly increased to 73%, when taking the long term view (2010). 34% (1999) and 27% (2010) of the respondents assessed the further regionalisation in North-west Russia with regard to the strategic and military implications as negative or very negative.

**Table 9: How do you assess the impact of a further regionalisation in North West Russia?****(a) as regards economy**

year	very negative	negative	positive	very positive	Vital
1999	-	11%	55%	30%	4%
2010	-	4%	52%	33%	11%

**(b) as regards strategic and military implications**

year	very negative	negative	positive	very positive	Vital
1999	4%	30%	62%	4%	-
2010	4%	23%	62%	11%	-


The answers given in the questionnaire offer the conclusion that the clear majority of the respondents seems to favour a co-operative security approach<sup>5</sup> as instrument to deal with Russia and the problems of the region in general.

Following this line of argument one could argue, moreover: Since a wide spectrum of different institutions and actors is involved in the region, there is a desperate need for some overall co-ordination to bundle the activities. The European Union could take over such a comprehensive role by incorporating related co-ordinating mechanisms into the Action Plan on the Northern Dimension initiative.

Coming to the identification of soft security threats, Table 10 offers a ranking of threats that are perceived as vital or highly important. Although the picture is somewhat blurred reflecting the diverging perceptions on the importance of those threats, nevertheless, an overwhelming majority placed the issue of nuclear safety, including the treatment of nuclear fuels and waste on the top of all soft security threats (1999: 80%; 2010: 79%).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Olav F. Knudsen, *Cooperative Security in the Baltic Sea Region*, Chaillot Papers 33, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, Paris, November 1998.

**Table 10: Ranking of vital and highly important soft security threats (in % of total answers)**



As second and third most important soft security threats follow with considerable gap the penetration of state structures by trans-national criminal organisations as well as corruption and fraud within state administrations. The issue of migratory pressure appears on the bottom of this list. However, the perception prevails that the importance of this issue will increase in the future. Whereas in 1999 only 7% of the interviewed hold the view that migratory pressure is an important soft security threat, 27% of the respondents believed that it will become a more pressing issue in 2010.

In conclusion, the answers in the questionnaires support the view that nuclear safety is *the* political challenge for the region both in general terms as well as in the context of enlargement<sup>6</sup>. And this threat does not affect exclusively the Baltic region but also North-west Russia, i.e. the Kola-Peninsula with its nuclear powered submarines, which are stored under very poor conditions. The importance of the issue – as the evaluation of the questionnaires has shown again – brings existing policy suggestions back on the table underlining the need for a joint energy strategy which should have a two-fold policy goal: First, to identify the need of future energy and, second, to reduce the dependency on imports of Russian gas<sup>7</sup>. With regard to North-west Russia especially the nuclear waste and spent fuel issues should be addressed via the Common Strategy on Russia, as it has been decided at the European Council in Cologne on 3 and 4 June 1999<sup>8</sup>. Heads of State or Government agreed to encourage and to support "(...) the secure storage of nuclear and chemical waste and the safe management of spent fuel, in particular in Northwest Russia<sup>9</sup>." However, very much depends on the question if the gap between declaratory and operational policy can be closed. And this caveat is particularly visible when it comes to the allocation of resources.

Based upon the identification of soft security threats in the Northern region the Questionnaire asked to mark some preferences concerning measures and aims to protect against those threats. The answers allow a ranking dividing into first and second priority measures and aims. The former have had a strong allocation of answers tending to vital or high importance, the latter tending to medium or high importance. They are outlined in Tables 11 and 12.

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. Sven Arnsward, *EU Enlargement and the Baltic States – Implications and Challenges*, Occasional Paper, Institut für Europäische Politik, August 1999; Panel of High-Level Advisors on 'Nuclear Safety in CEE and in the NIS. A Strategic View for the Future of EU's Phare and Tacis programmes', <http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg1a/nss/index.htm>, 20/02/2000.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Sven Arnsward, *op.cit.*

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3 and 4 June 1999, Annex II, Part 2, para. 4.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

Table 11

<b>First priority aims and measures to protect against security threats in the North</b>	
<b>1.</b>	<b>... that Russia not collapse into civil war or revert to authoritarianism.</b>
<b>2.</b>	<b>... that Russia persists in its transition to pluralism, democracy and a market-based economy.</b>
<b>3.</b>	<b>Preventing fissile material/nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist or criminal groups</b>
<b>4.</b>	<b>... that Russian nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material be kept under secure control.</b>
	<b>Promoting the acceptance of international rules of law and mechanisms for resolving disputes.</b>
<b>5.</b>	<b>Reversing environmental degradation.</b>
<b>6.</b>	<b>Suppressing, containing, and combating terrorism, transnational crime, and drugs.</b>

Several conclusions can be drawn from this ranking: The first priority aims and measures clearly underline the importance of engaging Russia in the broadest possible sense: In this context, the Common Strategy on Russia should be certainly on the top of the political agenda of the European Union. The policy goal that Russia does not collapse into civil war or revert to authoritarianism serves as an indicator that engagement is the preferred strategy. Closely associated is the aim that the Russian Federation stays on track towards democracy and market-based economy. Furthermore, the ranking reveals some considerable pressure to make the common strategy work in the future; and, again – as already outlined above – this should also have some impact with regard to the future allocation of financial resources.

The second priority measures and aims are of a more general nature, but seem to support an overall strategy of co-operative security which means, *inter alia*, developing strong capabilities in preventive diplomacy as well as supporting and strengthening international institutions for the peaceful settlement of conflict.

Another important second priority measure referred to is the more effective allocation of foreign assistance to support both democratic and economic development. This point is raised again more specifically in the context of perceived shortcomings of EU policy (cf. Chapter III.2).

**Table 12**

<b>Second priority aims and measures to protect against security threats in the North</b>	
<b>1.</b>	<b>Developing a strong capability in preventive diplomacy.</b>
<b>2.</b>	<b>Reformulating (foreign) assistance to provide more effective support for democratisation and longer-term economic development based on free market principles.</b>
<b>3.</b>	<b>Strengthening political ties.</b>
<b>4.</b>	<b>Supporting and selectively strengthening institutions that can mitigate and resolve disputes, incl. UN, OSCE.</b>
<b>5.</b>	<b>Ensuring commercial, political and military access to and through the region.</b>

## **The question of "Russian minorities"**

The question of Russian minorities has always been of quite a complex nature since it covers an internal and external dimension, which is mutually reinforcing: (1) the integration of Russian-speaking people into the societies of the Baltic states; (2) the protection of Russian minorities, i.e. to protect the rights of Russian or Russian-speaking people living outside the Russian Federation, as one central foreign policy goal of the Russian Federation. Especially affected by Russian minorities are Estonia and Latvia. In Lithuania, there is no 'minority problem' as such, since its society is much more homogeneous than in the two other cases, i.e. 82% being Lithuanians<sup>10</sup>. Consequently, the integration of the Russian-speakers, which make up only 8% of the total population, causes no domestic problems there. The situation in Estonia and Latvia is far more complicated since the Russian speakers make up about 28% of the population in the former and 32% in the latter case.

Consequently, on the question whether protecting the rights of "Russian minorities" offers Moscow a convenient rationale for military pressure, the respondents delivered a somewhat ambiguous picture: While one third supported this notion in general, 40% opposed it, and 25% remained undecided. The answer to this question, too, heavily depends on the future development in Russia.

However, as some respondents outlined in their comments, open military pressure as a policy option is rather unlikely, except if NATO accession was offered to the Baltic states, i.e. the "red line" (offering NATO membership to the Baltic states) was crossed. Furthermore, other military priorities, i.e. Caucasus or Kosovo, will be prevailing and keep Russia engaged: Therefore, the limited military and budgetary capacities will constrain and contain its policy options. Others pointed out that despite the more pragmatic policy of the new rulers in Moscow and despite their interest in a stable Baltic region, the minority issue has been and will be instrumentalised as a bargaining chip vis-à-vis the European Union (taking into account, for example, Russia's reactions with regard to the outcome of the Helsinki summit concerning Latvia and Lithuania).

On the other hand, one can argue that the importance of this bargaining chip will decrease with the implementation of credible minority rights for the Russian-speakers. And it could lose further importance if the European Union – as outlined above – is willing and able to accommodate Russian concerns with regard to other issues like the Kaliningrad Oblast.

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<sup>10</sup> Cf. Sven Arnsward, *EU Enlargement and the Baltic States – Implications and Challenges*, op.cit.



## The role of international organisations and national actors

Analysing the overall importance of international organisations the questionnaire asked to assess their importance to guarantee security and stability in the region. The respondents had to choose between a potpourri of international organisations, including a selection of their activities (cf. Table 13).

**Table 13: How do you assess the importance of international organisations in the region to guarantee security and stability? (hard and soft)**

Organisations and their Activities						
		not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance	vital
<b>NATO</b>	<b>1999</b>	-	<b>19%</b>	<b>30%</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>15%</b>
	<b>2010</b>	-	<b>23%</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>15%</b>
- PfP	1999	-	8%	40%	44%	8%
	2010	4%	28%	24%	36%	8%
- EAPC	1999	7%	26%	37%	30%	-
	2010	11%	26%	33%	30%	-
- NATO Enlargement	1999	11%	23%	42%	16%	8%
	2010	11%	19%	46%	11%	11%
- NATO-Russia Council	1999	4%	29%	34%	29%	4%
	2010	8%	20%	36%	28%	8%
<b>European Union</b>	<b>1999</b>	-	<b>4%</b>	<b>40%</b>	<b>40%</b>	<b>16%</b>
	<b>2010</b>	-	-	<b>20%</b>	<b>44%</b>	<b>36%</b>
- CFSP	1999	8%	29%	37%	22%	4%
	2010	-	11%	41%	37%	11%
- Enlargement Policies	1999	-	8%	29%	48%	15%
	2010	4%	4%	33%	44%	15%
- Partnership and Co-operation	1999	-	19%	35%	38%	8%
	2010	-	11%	27%	47%	15%
<i>to be continued on next page ...</i>						

<i>continued ...</i>						
		not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance	vital
- Financial aid	1999	-	15%	46%	28%	11%
	2010	-	20%	46%	23%	11%
- Humanitarian aid	1999	4%	28%	52%	16%	-
	2010	-	44%	44%	12%	-
- Technical assistance	1999	8%	11%	46%	31%	4%
	2010	8%	19%	38%	31%	4%
<b>WEU</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>32%</b>	<b>44%</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>-</b>
	<b>2010</b>	<b>48%</b>	<b>24%</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>-</b>
- CJTF	1999	38%	23%	27%	8%	4%
	2010	38%	19%	31%	8%	4%
- Joint Exercises	1999	22%	30%	30%	14%	4%
	2010	22%	22%	34%	18%	4%
<b>Nordic Council</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>54%</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>4%</b>
	<b>2010</b>	<b>4%</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>46%</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>4%</b>
<b>OSCE</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>48%</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>-</b>
	<b>2010</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS)</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>4%</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>46%</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>-</b>
	<b>2010</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>38%</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>4%</b>
<b>Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC)</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>10%</b>	<b>32%</b>	<b>32%</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>4%</b>
	<b>2010</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>37%</b>	<b>30%</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>-</b>
<b>Baltic Council</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>40%</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>-</b>
	<b>2010</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>40%</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>4%</b>
<b>Arctic Council</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>48%</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>22%</b>	<b>-</b>
	<b>2010</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>43%</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>4%</b>

It is hardly surprising that both NATO and the European Union were perceived as the most important actors on the wide spectrum of international institutions involved, i.e. WEU, Nordic Council, OSCE, Council of the Baltic States (CBSS), Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), Baltic Council and Arctic Council. This perception does not significantly change between 1999 and 2010.

However, comparing the perceived importance of the European Union and NATO the picture is somewhat changing in the longer perspective. For 1999, around 50% perceived the two organisations as of high or vital importance, well ahead of all other international organisations mentioned in the questionnaire. For 2010, the assessment of NATO remained unchanged while the percentage of answers that allocate high or vital importance to the European Union increased to 80%.

Consequently, the European Union, indeed, is perceived as being at the centre of the future development of the Northern region. However, this development depends on the scenario that the hard security threat emerging from Russia remains in the lower margins also in the future. In case of a Russian foreign policy shift NATO is still seen as the guarantor of hard security for the region.

As other international organisations are concerned, around 80% saw the OSCE as an actor of medium to high importance clearly ranking behind EU and NATO. On the very bottom of this potpourri of international institutions remains the WEU: 75% allocated no or low importance to the organisation: This assessment applies to 1999 and 2010.

Interestingly, the answers do not necessarily support the prominent role of the Council of Baltic Sea States as envisaged in the European Commission's Draft Action Plan on the Northern Dimension. Taking the long term view, the majority of respondents see the role of the CBSS rather in decline than perceiving it as an important factor to identify the priorities and, this is the most crucial point, to finance projects which are related to the Northern Dimension.

As part of the same question it was also asked to rank the importance of national actors to guarantee security and stability in the region (cf. Table 14): Here, there is a clear-cut hierarchy to observe. On the top of the list appears Russia as central actor followed by the United States, the Nordics (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden), Germany, the Baltic states and Poland. Beside the centrality of Russia, which is hardly surprising, the ranking

underscores the guardian function of the United States, i.e. the perception that any potential Russian threat will provoke an answer from the American side.

Thus, the United States are perceived as "the actor of last resort in matters of fundamental importance (...)"<sup>11</sup>. The relative importance of the Nordic countries certainly can be explained with the high degree of affectedness, but also that they are advocates of the interests of the region. And this is exactly the reason why Germany ranks behind those states due to its more reluctant political engagement in the Northern region, especially when it comes to the Baltic states.

**Table 14: How do you assess the importance of national actors in the region to guarantee security and stability? (hard and soft)**


National Actors						
		not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance	vital
<b>USA</b>	1999	-	-	15%	55%	30%
	2010	-	8%	22%	33%	37%
<b>Russia</b>	1999	-	-	8%	48%	44%
	2010	-	-	4%	52%	44%
<b>Germany</b>	1999	-	11%	41%	48%	-
	2010	-	8%	26%	55%	11%
<b>Nordics (DK, N, S, FIN)</b>	1999	-	8%	15%	51%	26%
	2010	-	4%	29%	41%	26%
<b>Poland</b>	1999	4%	28%	41%	19%	8%
	2010	-	22%	48%	19%	11%
<b>Baltic States</b>	1999	4%	26%	22%	37%	11%
	2010	4%	19%	30%	32%	15%

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Michael Reisman, The United States and International Institutions, in: *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 4, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 62-80, here p. 63.


### III. The EU’s role in the region

The previous Chapter has already pointed to the prevailing perception that the European Union has a comparative advantage to deal with the prominent (soft) security issues in the Northern region. And this advantage grows over a mid-term or long-term perspective. This growing importance goes hand in hand with the perception of an increasing affectedness by today’s (soft) security threats from the North (cf. Table 15).

**Table 15: How is the EU affected by hard and soft security threats from the North? (in % of total answers)**



While a rather modest 29% assessed for 1999 that the European Union is highly affected by those threats, this number doubled to 58% in the longer perspective of 2010. Based on this assessment, 52% suggested that the EU should place a high, 40% a medium, and 8% a low priority on this region (cf. Table 16).


**Table 16: Assessment on the priority the European Union should place on Northern Europe (in % of total answers)**

Especially respondents from EU institutions tended to the last policy option due to the current top priority of South-eastern Europe and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe respectively. However, this raises the question if the European Union can afford to conduct a low profile policy in Northern Europe because of other pending commitments. Since especially the Baltic region is the litmus test of Eastward enlargement and future relations with Russia in general the European Union should act accordingly.

### **The importance of EU instruments**

Translating the medium or high priority to do something into policy instruments for action the analysis of the questionnaires offered the following ranking (cf. Table 17): On the top of the list ranks political dialogue (94%) as a means to promote security and stability followed by enlargement policies. However, the instruments of financial assistance, trade policies, technical assistance and transfer of know-how were, by and large, perceived as of equal importance. On the bottom remain CFSP instruments and security guarantees.


**Table 17: Ranking of EU instruments (in % of total answers)**



Analysing the ranking allows to draw some conclusions which are three-fold:

- 1) The rather low perception of hard security threats significantly decreases the need to have security guarantees. This does not mean that these are obsolete. However, they stay in the background. Political dialogue, which can also be translated into confidence-building measures to engage Russia, was perceived as the most important instrument of the European Union.
- 2) The ranking reflected, furthermore, the fact that the European Union does not have, at least from the current point of view, the means to provide a hard security umbrella for the region.
- 3) The reasons for this are certainly to be found in the up to now rather weak construction and performance of the CFSP, which has, however, a strong potential to improve in the future: Consequently, 77% ranked the CFSP as an instrument of medium with a strong tendency to high importance in 2010. This growing importance was also reflected in the assessment of the overall role of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union nowadays and in the future, i.e. a "Northern Dimension of the CFSP" in comparison with other regions (cf. Table 18). In the perspective of 2010, those who allocated a high importance to the CFSP doubled from 21% to 42%.

**Table 18: How important is the role of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU in the North nowadays and in the future? (in % of total answers)**





## **Shortcomings in EU policies and actions**

As potential shortcomings of EU policies and actions are concerned, most points were raised in the answers and comments from the Nordic countries. They can be summarised as follows:

- 1) The European Union does not pay enough attention to the region due to lack of political will and low-level commitment. Furthermore, there is a constant competition of priorities, i.e. between the Northern and the Southern dimension of the European Union. The awareness is underdeveloped that the region provides an opportunity for Europe as a whole.
- 2) There was an overall perception that EU policies and actions in the region show little coherence. Instead of treating the Northern region as a whole the European Union concentrates too much on bilateral agreements with the countries concerned.
- 3) Despite the 'Common Strategy on Russia' the prevailing perception was that the European Union does not have a clear policy towards the Russian Federation.
- 4) The allocation and administration of TACIS programmes was perceived as extremely bureaucratic and needs to be streamlined accordingly.
- 5) There is a lack of expertise within the European Union on specific problems in the region.
- 6) EU policies should aim to enforce transnational links between Russia and the Baltic states, e.g. via the compatibility of Phare and Tacis projects.

## **Conclusion: Policy implications for the European Union**

The question whether the challenge of promoting security and stability in the Northern region will strengthen or weaken the European Union very much depends on its problem solving capacity. Furthermore, success or failure also depends on the EU's capability to include Russia in its programmes: The Russian Federation can be integrated in the 'new Europe' by clear participation in the 'Baltic sea region networks'. The European Union has to struggle between a greater level of engagement (e.g. enlargement, Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe, Southern Dimension etc.) versus over-straining its resources. The capability of the European Union to find a way through Scylla and Charibdes will eventually decide upon the question whether it will be strengthened or weakened by those new challenges.

Nevertheless, the European Union *is* perceived at the centre of the future development of the Northern region, although this scenario depends on the caveat that the hard security threats emerging from Russia remain in the lower margins also in the future. Should Northern Europe face a Russian foreign policy shift NATO is still seen as *the* guarantor of hard security for the region. As other international organisations are concerned they stay clearly in the background. Although there are some merits in the European Commission's suggestion – as outlined in the Draft Action Plan - to undertake a transfer of responsibilities to the Council of the Baltic Sea States, which is expected to address priority areas or to finance projects of the Northern Dimension, it is certainly not a compensation or replacement for the comprehensive role the European Union should play and the comprehensive strategy it should develop for Northern Europe as a whole.

Further regionalisation is seen as an appropriate instrument to integrate North-west Russia into a network of co-operative security in the broadest possible sense. The wealth of regional initiatives, however, desperately needs some overall co-ordination to bundle the activities of the institutions involved. The European Union could be the roof under which those actions are taking place. In this context, it should incorporate such a commitment and related mechanisms into the Action Plan on the Northern Dimension initiative.

The litmus test of all regionalisation efforts will certainly be the answer to the question of how to deal with the Kaliningrad Oblast, especially in the context of EU enlargement. If the EU is seriously concerned about the stability of the region it has to work out a credible flanking strategy that tempers the potentially exacerbating consequences of enlargement policies and harmful effects on the process of regionalisation.

The latter dimension has been generally addressed in a recent report by a joint Reflection Group of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (European University Institute, Florence) and the Forward Studies Unit of the European Commission: "The progressive inclusion of new member states from Central and Eastern Europe into the EU is transforming the nature of the borders, and thus the relations between states. What had hitherto been a 'hard', external border between the EU and its Central and East European neighbours will become a 'softer', internal one; while the borders between the new member states and their neighbours to the east are already becoming 'harder'."<sup>12</sup> Since Kaliningrad is Russia's only remaining warm-water port in the Baltic region, it is obvious that there is not much room-for-manoeuve on the Russian side. From this point of view it is extremely important that the Northern Dimension initiative incorporates a commitment that Kaliningrad is to become a Russian enclave – with special status – *inside* and not *outside* the European Union: This means that the openness of borders with the neighbouring countries, which is of vital importance for Kaliningrad's existence, should be maintained.

Furthermore, the analysis of the answers given in the questionnaires underlined the crucial importance of making the common strategy on Russia work. The policy goal that Russia must not collapse into civil war or revert to authoritarianism appears on the top of the first priority aims and measures. Engaging Russia is, therefore, the pre-condition to reduce the unpredictability of its future development. The strategy should be perceived as a long-term priority issue of the European Union which reaches well beyond the initial period of four years. And this does also imply the allocation of substantial financial resources to the region. The European Union should put more resources behind its policy: With the common strategy, the EU has set an ambitious agenda, but many of the policy goals are unlikely to be achieved unless they are followed up and sufficient resources are devoted to implementing them.

As nuclear safety is concerned, which was addressed as the most pressing current and future soft security threat, at this stage, it is important to look beyond the decommissioning of nuclear power plants. The next step should be the identification of the energy resources needed in the years to come and to develop a common energy strategy for the Baltic region: A successful strategy will reduce the dependency of the region on gas imports from Russia. With regard to the secure storage of nuclear waste and the management of spent fuel in North-west Russia, the EU has addressed those threats via the common strategy on Russia; however, the gap between declaratory and operational policy has to be narrowed.

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<sup>12</sup> Cf. Final Report of the Reflection Group on The Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement. The Nature of the New Border, The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (European University Institute) with the Forward Studies Unit (European Commission), European University Institute, April 1999, p.56.

This threat assessment has pointed to the pressing need for an overarching strategy to deal with the problems of Northern Europe. However, to make this strategy work the member states concerned have to develop greater support for the Northern Dimension among their partners. France, Greece, Italy and Spain and Portugal rather advocate the concentration on the Southern Dimension of Europe. The Northern countries, including Germany should take a leading role in framing a package deal, which is likely to be accepted as politically feasible. Strengthening the Northern Dimension in the sense of operational policy beyond summit declarations, will also require further substantial research from the academic side in parallel with considerable diplomatic efforts.

**Appendix**

**Security and Stability in Northern Europe –  
A Threat Assessment**

***Questionnaire***

## PART I: THE RELEVANCE OF THE NORTH

**1. What is the relevance of problems in Northern Europe in comparison with those originating in other geographical regions (e.g. Southern Europe/Mediterranean, South Eastern Europe etc.)?**

year	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance	vital
1999					
2010					

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**2. What is the relevance of the North in the EU context? How do you assess a possible EU commitment in the region?**

As a *Chance*: due to **economic** benefits (great natural resources etc.)

year	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance	vital
1999					
2010					

As a *Task*: due to **political** and **strategic** interests (integrating Russia, region as the only geographical link with the Russian Federation, etc.)

year	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance	vital
1999					
2010					

As an *Obligation*: e.g. due to the **ecological** damage

year	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance	vital
1999					
2010					

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**3. Please rank the importance of the Northern region**

1. for your country

- a) vital
- b) important
- c) secondary
- d) minor
- e) irrelevant

2. in the EU context

- a) vital
- b) important
- c) secondary
- d) minor
- e) irrelevant

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**4. Is there a continuing and lasting perception of Nordic identity after the end of bipolarity?**

yes

no

yes, but \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

no, but \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**5. What do you see as the most important factor/s in forming a common Nordic identity?**

Factor	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance
having (in part) a common history				
having a common religion/s				
sharing the same patterns of social behaviour				
having a similar form of government				
having intense commercial and/or economic relations with each other				
having basic security interests in common				
other factors, namely...				

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**6. Do you think that common roots (history, culture, language) can contribute to promoting security and stability especially in the North?**

yes, because \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

no, because \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

do not know

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**7. Do you see a possible conflict between "the North" and "Brussels", stemming from a possible antagonism 'West-Europeanisation' versus 'Nordification'?** (i.e., the Nordic countries/Nordic cooperation as a credible alternative to a centralistic Brussels, to the idea of a federal Europe?)

yes, because \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

no, because \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

do not know

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

**8. Do you think that regionalisation is an appropriate instrument to secure stability in the North?** (based on the assumption that in Cold War times regionalisation in the North was impossible due to the overwhelming role of the Soviet Union)

yes, because \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

no, because \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

do not know

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_



**PART II:  
IDENTIFICATION OF  
SECURITY THREATS**

**9.** Do you think that the new era after bipolarity introduces new threats and new insecurities in the North?

yes, because \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

no, because \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

do not know

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**10.** How do you assess the importance of hard security threats in the North (military threat potential, etc.)?

year	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance
1999				
2010				

**11.** How do you assess the importance of soft security threats in the North (e.g. environment, migration, international organised crime)?

year	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance
1999				
2010				

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**12.** Can these problems be addressed in concert, i.e. do you see effects of synergy or the need to list priorities?

yes, because \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

no because, \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

do not know

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**13. Do you perceive Russia as a military threat in the North?**

year	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance
1999				
2010				

**14. How do you assess the impact of a further regionalisation in North West Russia?**

**(a) as regards economy**

year	very negative	negative	positive	very positive	Vital
1999					
2010					

**(b) as regards strategic and military implications**

year	very negative	negative	positive	very positive	Vital
1999					
2010					

**15. Please rank the importance of the following measures or aims to protect against security threats in the North (please, insert additional measures, if you wish)**

Measure/Aim	year	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance	Vital
prevent, deter, and reduce the threat of the use of nuclear and/or biological weapons	1999					
	2010					
prevent the regional proliferation of NBC weapons and delivery systems	1999					
	2010					
promote the acceptance of international rules of law and mechanisms for resolving disputes	1999					
	2010					
prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon	1999					
	2010					
that loose Russian nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material be kept under secure control	1999					
	2010					
prevent nuclear material/ weapons falling into the hands of terrorist or criminal groups	1999					
	2010					
that Russia not collapse into civil war or revert to authoritarianism	1999					
	2010					
that Russia persists in its transition to pluralism, democracy and a market-based economy	1999					
	2010					
reverse environmental degradation	1999					
	2010					

suppress, contain, and combat terrorism, transnational crime, and drugs	1999					
	2010					
<b>Measure/Aim</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>not important</b>	<b>of low importance</b>	<b>of medium importance</b>	<b>of high importance</b>	<b>Vital</b>
ensuring commercial, political and military access to and through the region	1999					
	2010					
strengthen political ties	1999					
	2010					
reformulate (foreign) assistance to provide more effective support for democratisation and longer-term economic development based on free market principles	1999					
	2010					
develop a strong capability in preventive diplomacy	1999					
	2010					
support and selectively strengthen institutions that can mitigate and resolve disputes, incl. UN, OSCE...	1999					
	2010					
another 'regional' table for the region sensible	1999					
	2010					
	1999					
	2010					
	1999					
	2010					
	1999					
	2010					

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**16. Please rank the importance of soft security threats**

Threat	year	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance	Vital
migratory pressure	1999					
	2010					
international organised crime	1999					
	2010					
<i>continued...</i>						
Threat	year	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance	Vital
narcotics trade	1999					
	2010					
environmental damage in general	1999					
	2010					
water pollution	1999					
	2010					
nuclear safety	1999					

permeable borders	2010					
	1999					
treatment of nuclear fuels and waste	2010					
	1999					
disparities of living standards	1999					
	2010					
proliferation	1999					
	2010					
penetration of state structures by transnational criminal organisations	1999					
	2010					
corruption and fraud within state administrations	1999					
	2010					

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**17. Concerning future developments in Russia, which of the following scenarios is the most realistic one?**

Scenario	degree of probability						
	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3
a) muddling through the reform process, eventually developing a relatively stable democracy and market economy							
b) continued weakening of the state and society in which neither the reformers nor their opponents prove capable of forging a new system							
c) a general resurgence of authoritarianism, either individual or bureaucratic, in response to the frustrations of the first scenario or the fears of the second							
d) 'managed disintegration'							

*explanation:* -3 = impossible; -2 = absolutely unrealistic; -1 = unrealistic; 0 = do not know; +1 = realistic; +2 = very/quite realistic; +3 = certain to happen

**18. Do you think that protecting the rights of the "Russian minorities" offers Moscow a convenient rationale for military pressure on the Baltic states if political cost is deemed commensurate with probable gain?**

yes, because \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

no because, \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

do not know

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**19. How do you assess the importance of other international organisations and actors in the region to guarantee security and stability? (hard and soft)**

<b>Organisations and their Activities</b>						
	<b>year</b>	<b>not important</b>	<b>of low importance</b>	<b>of medium importance</b>	<b>of high importance</b>	<b>Vital</b>
<b>NATO</b>	1999					
	2010					
- PIP	1999					
	2010					
- EAPC	1999					
	2010					
- NATO Enlargement	1999					
	2010					
- NATO-Russia Council	1999					
	2010					
<b>European Union</b>	1999					
	2010					
- CFSP	1999					
	2010					
- Enlargement Policies	1999					
	2010					
- Partnership and Co-operation	1999					
	2010					
- Financial aid	1999					
	2010					

<i>continued...</i>	<b>year</b>	<b>not important</b>	<b>of low importance</b>	<b>of medium importance</b>	<b>of high importance</b>	<b>Vital</b>
- Humanitarian aid	1999					
	2010					
- Technical assistance	1999					
	2010					
<b>WEU</b>	1999					
	2010					
- CJTF	1999					
	2010					
- Joint Exercises	1999					
	2010					
<b>Nordic Council</b>	1999					
	2010					
<b>OSCE</b>	1999					
	2010					
<b>Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS)</b>	1999					
	2010					
<b>Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC)</b>	1999					
	2010					
<b>Baltic Council</b>	1999					
	2010					
<b>Arctic Council</b>	1999					
	2010					

<b>National Actors</b>						
	<b>year</b>	<b>not important</b>	<b>of low importance</b>	<b>of medium importance</b>	<b>of high importance</b>	<b>Vital</b>
<b>USA</b>	1999					
	2010					
<b>Russia</b>	1999					
	2010					
<b>Germany</b>	1999					
	2010					
<b>Nordics (DK, N, S, FIN)</b>	1999					
	2010					
<b>Poland</b>	1999					
	2010					
<b>Baltic States</b>	1999					
	2010					

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

## PART III: THE EU'S ROLE IN THE REGION

**20.** How is the EU affected by *today's* security threats from the North? (soft and – possibly – hard security threats)

Year	not affected	little affected	highly affected
1999			
2010			

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**21.** The EU should place

- high  
 medium  
 low

priority on this region.

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**22.** Please rank the importance of the instruments employed by the *European Union* in the Northern region (cf. also question No 19)

Instrument	year	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance	Vital
Financial assistance in general	1999					
	2010					
- PHARE	1999					
	2010					
- TACIS	1999					
	2010					

Instrument	year	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance	Vital
Technical assistance, know-how transfer	1999					
	2010					
Political dialogue	1999					
	2010					
Security guarantees	1999					
	2010					
CFSP-instruments	1999					
	2010					
Participation of non-members in CFSP	1999					
	2010					
Association policies	1999					
	2010					
Enlargement policies	1999					
	2010					
Trade policies	1999					
	2010					
Participation of EU in international, regional fora (e.g. CBSS, BEAC)	1999					
	2010					
Opening of Community programmes for non-members	1999					
	2010					
	1999					
	2010					

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**23.** In your opinion, how important is the role of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU in the North nowadays and in future (i.e. a "Northern Dimension of the CFSP") in comparison with other regions

year	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance
1999				
2010				

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**24.** Do you think that the non-aligned countries in the region might hamper the development of the CFSP (including a common defence)?

yes, because \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

no because, \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

do not know

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**25.** Any additional point you wish to make on the EU's and the CFSP's future policies in the region?

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**26.** Where do you see shortcomings in EU policies and actions for/in the region? (e.g. weak or no synergies, little coherence in EU's policies and actions in the region)

\_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**27.** Will the problems in the region strengthen or weaken the EU's role as a regional power/as a global player?

a) more likely to strengthen, because \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

b) more likely to weaken, because \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

**28.** Thinking of a possible regionalisation with regard to Northern Europe, do you think there is already some sort of subregionalisation and labour division discernible within the EU?

yes, because \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

no because, \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

do not know

**29.** In concluding, how do you perceive the future of the region on the overall map of the EU's interests?

year	not important	of low importance	of medium importance	of high importance	Vital
1999					
2010					

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\*

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\*

*Please return the completed questionnaire as soon as possible to:*

Sven Arnswald  
 Institut für Europäische Politik  
 Bachstrasse 32  
 D-53115 Bonn  
 Tel.: +49-228-729 00 50  
 Fax: +49-228-69 84 37  
 e-mail: IEPAR\_Bonn@compuserve.com

*Thank your very much for your co-operation!*