Crisis management the Finnish way –
A state of the art report on practice and research

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by

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(All comments welcome!)

Contents

Crisis: defined and approached

The *purpose* of this report[1] is to analyse the *threat perceptions, organisational contexts, practices as well as the "reflectiveness" of crisis management in Finland*. The emphasis is on the overall situation, not on concrete historical crises. It is part of the groundwork for a project on the subject at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA). The report is also an outgrowth of the participation of the FIIA since March 1999 in the evolving co-operation amongst European academics and practitioners in the field of crisis management[2].

"Crisis management" is not a new concept, but it has gained increasing practical as well as scholarly attention in the 1990's in particular. *"Crisis"* is defined as a situation or a stage where important values are threatened, limited time is available and circumstances are marked by a great deal of uncertainty. The values on the line may include independence and territorial integrity of a state, or potential damage to its people or property. 'Uncertainty' refers to inadequate information, which typically impairs the chances to know enough of the situation and possible effects of decisions[3]. This definition is a broad one, for it covers cases from political-military situations of high tension, threat of war, low-intensity societal violence and military peace operations to large-scale civilian disasters or accidents. The management of crises in turn comprises such structures and activities, which aim at and work for the termination, resolution, control, prevention and after-care of such situations.

Is the approach adopted above too broad? This usage has in any case been authoritatively approved by practitioners in Finland[4]. Furthermore, it seems to be largely in line with both the

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[1] This is a revised version of a report prepared for the conference "The Future of European Crisis Management" in the Hague, November 7-9, 1999, jointly organised by the Crisis Research Centre of the University of Leiden and the Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning (ÖCB). For this report, background interviews were conducted with the following persons: Mikko Jokela, Director of the Research and Planning Unit at the Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; Veikko Peltonen, Director at the Rescue Department of the Ministry of the Interior; Sauli Feodorow, Deputy Director General at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; Colonel Kari Siiki, Chief of the National Defence Courses; Kari Lehtola, Director of the Accident Investigation Board (AIB); Pirjo Valkama-Joutsen, Administrative Director of AIB; and Lars Backström, Director for Humanitarian Affairs at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The author has the sole responsibility for all interpretations made in this report. Therefore, no part of the text should directly be attributed to any of the interviewees. Warm thanks are extended to each of them, and for several anonymous persons interviewed, for a rewarding learning experience, which is still incomplete. I am also grateful for the commentaries on earlier drafts by, besides some of the above mentioned persons, also Tuomas Forsberg, Christer Pursiainen and Pekka Visuri, all from the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA).

[2] The issues and topics have been structured on the basis of a questionnaire, which was sent to the participants of the conference mentioned previously.

[3] Bengt Sundelius, Eric Stern with Fredrik Bynander, *Crisis Management the Swedish Way – in theory and practice*, s.l. & a. p. 7-8.

[4] In the case of Finland, see e.g. "Valtioneuvoston selvitys Eduskunnan ulkoasiainvaliokunnalle kriisinhallinnan siviilivalmiuksien kehittämisestä 13.6.1997", *Ulkoasiainministeriön julkaisuja*, 16, 1997, Edita: Helsinki 1997, p. 7-8. In the 1999 Finnish Council of Defence 1999 document *Varautuminen yhteiskunnan häiriötiloihin ja poikkeusoloihin, Ohje*, Helsinki 25.8.1999, "crisis" seems to be the umbrella concept. Kari Möttölä in his "Vakauspolitiikka, konfliktinhallinta ja pelotepuolustus" (*UM taustat* 1/1995, p. 25-30) prefers "conflict management" as the umbrella concept and hence adopts a more limited view on "crisis management". See also *The European*

extensive concept of security widely adopted in the post-Cold War period and also with the more traditional notion of "total defence", used in e.g. in Sweden and Finland. The above understanding of crisis is also an influential one amongst Swedish and Dutch scholars[5]. Furthermore, to the extent that the admittedly wide range of potentially relevant cases share the characteristics defined, the approach has the virtue of being amenable to the rich theorising on and concrete studies of crises[6]. It seems that the shared features are rather accentuated in the late modern societies.

One could of course require as an additional criterion that crises and their management examined should be of concern on the national level. This is in fact often implicitly done, when one at the less intensive or extensive level of crises distinguishes "large" accidents or disasters as a category worthy of examination in the connection with more severe challenges to security. However, the line here is drawn in water, since some aspect of (m)any accidents is typically of wider societal interest. In any case, sharp delimitations on the level of definitions are unnecessary. Moreover, the scale of an accident becomes clear only afterwards, and in many accidents there is a potential for greater catastrophe. Last but not least, "crises" are created, perceived, by relevant actors and decision-makers. This is the reason for terms and concepts to be a constantly a contested territory and subject to change.

Obviously, crisis management is embedded in and dependent on structures of perceptions and institutions: how potential and actual problems are framed and what organisational and rule-based capacities and competencies are available. These affect performance but of course do not determine it. Problems concerning co-ordination or inappropriate or inadequate resources are well known in this context. In addition we have to ask, how the competencies are located on different levels of governance with respect to the problems faced or envisaged. Equally, crisis management is based on information and knowledge, as already implied by the definition of crisis. Management is guided by an extensive system of preparatory processes, planning, and use of expertise and investigations, both in the form of specialised inquiries and academic research. It is a well-established tradition both in Finland and also e.g. in Sweden, that policy-making should be well justified and in major issues based on investigations. Underlying is an assumption of an "analytically" oriented policy-making process, which can be rationally pursued and improved. In contrast with this predominant tradition of thinking, which is influential in practice and research, another approach emphasises that the production and use of (various types of) knowledge faces manifold institutional and cognitive limitations[7]. This is likely to apply, although in varying degrees, to the typically stress-laden conditions of crisis, but equally to preparatory processes.

With these starting points, I shall approach the structural-contextual problem complex by first examining the kinds of crises to which attention has been paid in Finland. I aim to do this by looking at the crisis perceptions of the authorities and media, which helps to situate the country in its risky environment. Secondly, the organisation of crisis management is outlined

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Security Development and Finnish Defence, Edita: Helsinki, 1997, (Report by the Council of State to Parliament on 17 March 1997), ch. 2.4.

[5] Ibid., loc.cit.

[6] For overviews of this field of studies, see Ole R. Holsti, "Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy: Realism and Its Challengers", in *Controversies in International Theory, Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, ed. by Charles W. Kegley Jr., St. Martin's Press: New York 1995, p. 47-56; Sundelius, Stern with Bynander, op.cit., p. 10-35.

[7] "Institutions" are rule-bound orders; cognitive perspective in turn pays attention to how we look at the world and how we use information – mostly in limited ways.

formally and in more practical situational contexts. An overall assessment is also made on the priorities of crisis management. Thirdly, the issue-area is structured by levels of governance - from sub-national and provincial to national and international – which justifies some conclusions on their relative potencies and dilemmas. This section ends with a preliminary analysis of some perceived and more generally likely impacts of institutional and cognitive factors on crisis management.

As mentioned above, the analysis of information is an essential part of crisis management – in planning, decision-making and in evaluations. The "reflectiveness" of Finnish crisis management is dealt with in the final chapter, which starts with the identification of current practices in accumulating systematic knowledge and in evaluating performance. In this connection, the role of research is analysed, and a partial assessment of the impact of evaluations is given. Secondly, co-operation and dialogues between academics and practitioners with respect to crisis management is discussed, taking into account the obstacles and possibilities.

The report incorporates knowledge derived from texts as well as views of some practitioners and academics interviewed. The latter part of the report in fact partly reflects a dialogue by the author with several practitioners.

Major contingencies and crises perceived

The Finnish security concerns have broadened in the post-Cold War period, due to a combination of changes in the Finnish security environment, international institutions and the shared security discourse. The threat of major wars in Europe has receded but because of the risks of political instabilities and regional conflicts, Finland wants to maintain a "credible" national defence. A novel development is the active participation of Finland in the steadily developing euro-atlantic co-operation in crisis management. Above all, Finland is now a member of the EU, and an active participant in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme of NATO. Nevertheless, Finland wants to stay non-allied in order to maintain stability in the north of Europe, while keeping the alignment option open. An important priority of the Finnish defence policy, as a result of international trends, is to modernise the Defence Forces technologically and organisationally in order to become more effective in terms of international crisis management as well as national defence. The need to enhance the civil dimension of Finnish crisis management has also been recognised and consequently been subjected to wide-ranging authoritative reviews covering both national and international dimensions.

The growing internationalisation of the Finnish economy and the opening of the borders entail increased economic sensitivity, vulnerability and problems for the security of supplies, as well as new security threats in the form of spreading crime, drug trafficking and potentially even terrorism. The recent economic depression in 1990-94, the worst one during the country's peace-time history and worse than in any other industrialised country since the Second World War, is still in fresh national memory. Vulnerabilities are accentuated by the dependence of the present-day Finland on complex organisational, technological and information systems. Finland is in many ways, and especially in international comparison, an "information society", and this perspective has also been given prominence in evaluations of the concomitant risks. In the circumstances of a more complex infrastructure, its control becomes

more difficult, risks tend to grow and the repercussions of accidents and disasters tend to be wider.

Vulnerabilities are furthermore caused by the continuing concentration of population and production facilities in the southern part of Finland and in bigger cities. New challenges for securing adequate crisis readiness are also resulting from the privatisation and commercialisation of public services and functions. Moreover, the need to economize and rationalize public administration sets narrow constraints financially, too. The rather extensive reorganisation of the Finnish provincial administration has also been one reason for reforming the regional structures of the civil[8] and military defence. Constant changes in society cause insecurity and make it more difficult to create arrangements capable of working in all circumstances.

Media perceptions

The contingencies and crises, which have been considered relevant in Finland, can be outlined from two perspectives: preferences are shaped firstly by the *media* and secondly they are specified by the *authorities responsible* for the management of crises in Finland. The first review offers a complementary rich perspective to the contemporary experiential world of crises, albeit coloured by concrete events.

A systematic survey of two Finnish newspapers and a major magazine[9] from the beginning of October 1998 till early September 1999, complemented by searches in library data bases, shows that *media attention* has prominently been paid to: 1) the Kosovo crisis and war and European crisis management in general, 2) risks connected with the "Y2K" problem, 3) the possibility of reactor accidents in the vicinity of Finland, 4) the sudden influx of about 1.000 Roma asylum seekers from Slovakia in 1999, 5) the vulnerabilities of the Finnish economy, as well as 6) 'information warfare' and computer data safety.

In the area of *military-political* crisis management, the Kosovo crisis and war was the single most important and long-lasting news item especially from the end of 1998 till July 1999 - also in comparison with the other topics mentioned above. Finland was intimately involved through President Martti Ahtisaari, as a venue of negotiations, and as the EU President. President Ahtisaari, as a representative of the EU, took part in the drafting of the peace plan and in the successful mission to secure Belgrade's approval for the plan. Finland also acted as observer in the military-technical negotiations and hosted part of the negotiations on resolving the dispute about Russian participation in the Kfor. Kosovo has been a preoccupation of the Finnish EU presidency from its inception: Finland had a major role in both organising the Sarajevo international stability summit at the end of July and chairing the meeting. In August a Finnish battalion was deployed in Kosovo as a part of Kfor.

Finland has supported the development of EU defence policy and autonomous military capability, but one limited to crisis management. The latter stand accords with the 1996 joint initiative of Sweden and Finland, included in the Amsterdam Treaty, containing the "Petersberg tasks" (humanitarian, rescue, peace-keeping and peace-making missions).

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[8] Veikko Peltonen, "Aluehallinnon muutokset ja väestönsuojelun johtojärjestelmä", *Pelastusosaston tiedotuksia* 4/1998, www.intermin.fi/sm/pelastus/index.html.
[9] The sources are: *Helsingin Sanomat*, *Demari* and *Suomen Kuvalehti*.

Especially during the Kosovo crisis and war and also thereafter the amending of the Finnish peacekeeping law of 1995 was debated. At present the law excludes Finnish participation in peace-enforcement (more active and extensive use of force). The Finnish Defence Forces want a revision, but there is a rather widespread opposition to any change, which probably includes a majority of the current parliament. The training for peace operations was given also much publicity in connection to a Nordic exercise, "Nordic Peace", organised in Finland "in the spirit of the PfP" in September 1999. Altogether 1.200 soldiers from the host country, Denmark, Norway and Sweden took part in the event. For the first time the role of civilian authorities (i.a. rescuers) and NGOs was emphasised in the exercise.

Possible *"Y2K" crises* have attracted a fair amount of attention in Finland. The nation has been told that experts do not know what exactly is going to happen, but that problems will not amount to any chaos, and that consequences are likely to vary from one country to another. Some disruptions are expected in the fields of energy, telecommunications, banking and medical services; false nuclear weapon attack alarms might occur in Russia, but they are jointly monitored by the Americans and Russians. A new economic crisis could start from countries experiencing capital flight caused by increased risks due to negligence in handling the Y2K problem. In Finland, some enterprises might face difficulties in computer-based accounting, invoicing and logistics; security systems might not function, either. It has been evaluated that Finnish firms have used about 10 bn FIM (1,7 bn euros) for removing or minimising the year 2000 problems. Insurance companies are expected to pay for some damages caused by the problem but their policies seem to vary. One major insurance company alone has used some 120 person-years to try to solve the problem. Extensive preventive work has been carried out in the energy sector, tests have been conducted and additional control personnel will be put in place during the turn of the millennium.

The safety hazards of *nuclear power plants* in Lithuania (Ignalina), Russia (Sosnovy Bor and the Kola peninsula plants) and Ukraine (Chernobyl), which do not meet Western standards, have been a subject of regular media attention in Finland. The attention increased as a result of the Finnish EU presidency and the associated visits by high-ranking political decision-makers. In addition, Finnish authorities have been involved in efforts to assist in improving nuclear safety alongside Sweden and the EU. Besides the interest in safety, issues involved include the dependence on the plants of the countries concerned, the need for outside aid to finance improvements, repairs and – in the case of closure - new energy sources as well as, in the case of Lithuania, the controversial linkage to the country's EU membership. Allegedly, EU assistance has in some cases been only slowly released for project implementation.

A sudden *influx of Roma* in search for better life caught the Finnish authorities and public by surprise. The largest wave came at the end of June 1999, numbering several hundred within a short time span. Altogether about a thousand Roma asylum seekers arrived during the year.

"New crises are threatening", read the headline of a full-page article in the leading newspaper of Finland in early April 1999[10], dealing with problems connected with *economic security*. The threats mentioned include computer viruses and the "Y2K" problem, sea transport when Finnish cargo vessels or passenger ferries could be (and are already being) registered elsewhere and possibly moved out during times of a European crisis and war which could destabilise northern Europe as well. However, the growing international ownership of Finnish enterprises cannot easily be stopped, it is concluded. Besides the traditional solution of storing

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[10] *Helsingin Sanomat*, April 3, 1999, p. E1.

strategic materials, the means of the concerned national authorities to counter potential problems, include international co-operation and agreements with new owners. An economic risk of substantial magnitude is caused for the entire Finnish economy by the emerging dependence on one nationally and internationally prominent telecommunications giant, which directly or indirectly contributes to employment of around 36.000 Finns and accounts for over a quarter of Finnish exports[11]. Continuing interest was finally shown also in the Russian economic crisis, which was exacerbated since August 1998 and which did not seem to come to an end; Finnish exports to Russia dropped to a lower level soon after the start of the crisis and have only partially recovered.

Images of *information warfare* were aroused, when Serb computer 'terrorists' targeted Western organisations in retaliation to Kosovo bombing war. Information warfare and the overlapping policy area of *data protection* are issues of increasing interest and concern in Finland. The former encompasses such activities as incapacitating opponent's or enemy's information systems, causing damage to them or acquiring confidential information. A related phenomenon is the use of computer communication for propaganda purposes, for instance to support an armed struggle. Data protection aims at shielding the systems and databases against illegal and unauthorised access and use. Further examples of related topical events in 1999 included the tense relations between China and Taiwan spreading to computer intrusions to both directions in the summer of 1999, and Indonesian institutions being threatened by computer virus attacks, if the referendum on the status of East Timor were not allowed to proceed democratically. Furthermore, it was noted that the Internet could challenge censorship and authoritarian governments, thus possibly increasing the potential for conflicts.

In the Finnish Defence Forces, awareness of the emerging threats connected with information warfare and of the need to tackle them was clearly evident. Tension between trade interests and security concerned Finland in the case of encryption technology, due to the expanding Finnish information technological and communications industry. The Wassenaar Arrangement countries agreed in December 1998 on export controls of encryption technology, following security political concerns and the United States' standpoint. Finland supported a liberal policy, but went along with the agreement because of some compromise features in its contents (e.g. the interim character)[12].

The above categories of cases more or less all contain an *international* dimension. What about *domestic* events that would tend to maintain or even to increase awareness these kinds of contingencies? Many *incidents or accidents* did occur in 1998-99. An extremely cold winter in Finland was about to cause a major local emergency at the end of January 1999, when in a record low temperature (-51,5 $^{\circ}$C) some 1.000 households were left without electricity and heating for several hours, due to a breakdown of a power-line[13]. In April 1999 a derailed oil transport train coming from Russia caused a large oil spill and fire in Vainikkala[14]. An explosion occurred at a factory of Finnish Chemicals in Äetsä (June 1999) causing one death

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[11] "Kriisi 2002", is the title of an associated scenario, published in *Helsingin Sanomat*, verkkoliite, March 1999 (in Finnish).
[12] See also Eero Aho, "Wassenaar-järjestely ja salausteknologian vientivalvonnan kehitys", Kauppapolitiikka 2/99, 11-13.
[13] "Tuhat taloutta tunteja ilman sähköä Inarissa", *Helsingin Sanomat*, January 28, 1999, www.helsinginsanomat.fi/uutisarkisto.
[14] "Öljyvaunuista suurpalo Vainikkalan ratapihalla", *Helsingin Sanomat*, April 8, 1999, www.helsinginsanomat.fi/uutisarkisto.

but no environmental damage[15]. An ammunition depot in Ähtäri was destroyed completely by a fire and the associated explosions, causing no other damage or casualties (July 1999). About 120.000 litres of combustible hydrogen gas was accidentally released into the air at the Loviisa nuclear power plant, but no danger was caused to people nor to the environment (October 1999)[16]. None of the above cases was classified as a major accident or emergency by the official investigators. Only two other cases were identified as "major" ones; the first occurred in Jyväskylä in March 1998, when ten people died in a train derailment accident[17], and the second in April 1999 in Heinola, where three persons died as a bus drove off the road[18]. Mostly in the above cases, with the exception of the Jyväskylä accident, public attention seems to have been rather limited temporally, focusing on the events as well as later on the accident investigation reports.

Authoritative views and models

The *authorities* responsible for crisis management have updated the crisis scenarios since the end of the Cold War. The most important recent official reports and documents include the following ones: *Security in a Changing World* of 1995, *European Security and Finnish Defence* of 1997, *Report by the Council of State to the Foreign Policy Committee of the Parliament on the development of civil preparedness in crisis management*, likewise finalised in 1997, *Development of rescue services and civil defence for large disasters and exceptional circumstances* and *Preparing for societal disturbances and exceptional circumstances*, both adopted in 1999[19]. The first, second and the last document have been considered the most important ones, since they reflect the Finnish foreign and security policy, defence policy and overall governmental perspectives, respectively.

In the last mentioned report, the Finnish Defence Council has outlined "situational models" for activities aiming at preparing the nation for *"disturbances during normal times"* and for *"exceptional circumstances"*.

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[15] "Äetsän räjähdyksen syy ilmeisesti reaktorissa", *Helsingin Sanomat,* June 11, 1999, www.helsinginsanomat.fi/uutisarkisto.

[16] "Hydrogen leak at Loviisa nuclear plant – no danger to reactors", *Helsingin Sanomat*, international edition, October 6, 1999, www.helsinginsanomat.fi.

[17] "Kymmenen kuoli ja 47 loukkaantui Jyväskylän junaturmassa", *Helsingin Sanomat*, March 7, 1999, www.helsinginsanomat.fi/uutisarkisto.

[18] "Bussiturmassa loukkaatuneista enää yksi tehohoidossa", *Helsingin Sanomat*, April 19, 1999, www.helsinginsanomat.fi/uutisarkisto.

[19] "Security in a Changing World, Guidelines for Finland's Security Policy, Report by the Council of State to the Parliament 6 June 1995", The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Helsinki 1995, *Publications of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs* 8/1995; *The European Security Development and Finnish Defence*, Edita: Helsinki, 1997 (Report by the Council of State to Parliament on 17 March 1997); "Valtioneuvoston selvitys Eduskunnan ulkoasiainvaliokunnalle kriisinhallinnan siviilivalmiuksien kehittämisestä 13.6.1997", *Ulkoasiainministeriön julkaisuja* 16/1997, Helsinki 1997 (in Finnish); "Pelastustoimen kehittäminen suuronnettomuuksia ja poikkeusoloja varten. Selontekotyöryhmän muistio", *Sisäasiainministeriö Inrikesministeriet. Pelastusosaston julkaisu* 1/1999 (in Finnish); *Varautuminen yhteiskunnan häiriötilanteisiin ja poikkeusoloihin*, Puolustusneuvosto, ohje, Helsinki 25.8.1999 (in Finnish). In addition, a fairly authoritative textbook or "manual", offering basic facts on the organisation and functioning of the preparedness planning, is *Tietoja maanpuolustuksesta 1996* (Information on national defence), Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu: Jyväskylä 1996. It is updated regularly.

"Disturbances during normal times" include such situations as (a) uncontrolled mass immigration, (b) extensive environmental damage due to pollution, (c) risks connected with increasing connectedness to international trade as well as (d) the expansion of international crime and the growing dangerousness of its working methods. A new threat model during normal conditions contains (e) disturbances caused by malfunctioning of the increasingly interconnected data systems.

"Exceptional circumstances" refer to conditions which do not allow management by normal measures; these types of situations include (1) an increasingly tense international situation, (2) war or threat of war between foreign nations or a corresponding event constituting a serious threat to the foundations of national survival and well-being, (3) a serious violation of the Finnish territorial integrity, (4) threat of war directed to Finland, (5) armed aggression and war (including a strategic strike, large-scale war and information warfare), (6) a post-war situation, (7) major disaster and (8) economic crisis (caused mainly by a disruption of trade). With the exception of "armed aggression and war", all others seem to be relevant for crisis management. Crises taking place *in or between foreign countries do not* seem to fit well into these models, unless they are considered belonging to type (1). In any case foreign crises are "our own" to the extent that the principles of active participation in the organisations of international security, responsibility and solidarity as well as longer-term interests are taken seriously. Indeed, the prevention and limitation of crises, already before they affect Finland, has been added to the objectives of the Finnish security policy. Participation in military crisis management has been termed as the "outer circle" of Finnish national defence – a kind of "remote defence".[20]

The report on the "development of rescue services and civil defence" further specifies the category of threats termed *"major disasters"* (see above) which entail extensive losses or damage. These include (7i) risk of radiation caused by accidents at nuclear power plants in Finland or in neighbouring countries or those connected with the storage and handling of nuclear weapons, (7ii) disasters caused by hazardous materials (in particular chemicals), (7iii) fires, (7iv) dike accidents and floods, (7v) traffic accidents and (7vi) natural disasters (e.g. storms). The *two first* mentioned could be judged to be the most serious, though the probability of the second type is greater than the first one. With respect to fires, causes for concern are the increasing number of arson cases, possibilities of defects in technical systems and increasing propensity for risk-taking. Furthermore, in traffic, with generally increasing speed, also the risk of large disasters is growing. Overall, although risks connected with the above types of disasters have not changed dramatically, societal vulnerability has been deemed to have increased.

Overall, there is a public awareness of the kinds of crises potentially facing Finland, as reflected by the media and authorities. Both frame the hazards and contingencies in a way that emphasises the international dimension, although it seems to be more accentuated in media reporting. Risk analyses and scenarios are routinely and regularly outlined by the authorities. A feature of the 1990's has been the perceived diversification of the kinds of threats identified. Whether all the types have been adequately analysed is unclear. The relatively novel and topical contingencies relevant in the current stage fall under "disturbances under

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[20] Juhani Kaskeala: Suomen osallistuminen kansainvälisiin kriisinhallintatehtäviin", *Maanpuolustus* 64, 1998, p. 11. See also Markku Arola: "Varautumisen uusi vuosituhat", *Maanpuolustus* 67, 1999, 18, where, it seems, foreign crises are in fact mentioned in connection with "political instabilities, regional and internal conflicts and nationality disputes"; *Varautuminen yhteiskunnan häiriötilanteisiin ja poikkeusoloihin* 1999, op.cit., p. 6, 10; and Security in a Changing World 1995, op.cit., ch. II.1.

normalcy" and in part under "major disasters". In addition I have singled out "foreign crises" as a separate category. Models and types under "exceptional circumstances" and "major disasters" seem to reflect in part continuity of analyses, although the contents also indicate perceptions of late modern conditions. The rule has been and is that readiness planning covers all significant eventualities. It is now acknowledged that there is no clear line between normalcy and exceptional circumstances, and that the former affects the latter. However, it seems to be the latter that are emphasised in preparedness planning.

Organisation and practice of crisis management in Finland

Crisis management is carried out in Finland in a relatively complicated organisational setting. Greater clarity to this complexity will be pursued by ordering the involved organisations by administrative sector and by examining the potentially most active bodies according to types of contingencies and crises identified earlier.

Formal structures

The most central parts of the Finnish government in crisis planning include: 1) the Council of State, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Defence Council; 2) the Ministry of Defence, Defence Staff, Defence Courses, and the Planning Commission for Defence Information (MTS); 3) the Rescue Department as well as the Directorate of Immigration, the Police, and the Frontier Guard under the Ministry of the Interior; 4) the National Board of Economic Defence (PTS), the National Emergency Supply Agency (HVK) and the Safety Technology Authority (TUKES) within the Ministry of Trade and Industry; 5) the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) and the Insurance Supervision Authority (ISA) under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health; 6) the Finnish Environment Institute and the regional environment centres under the Ministry of the Environment; 7) the Information Management unit and 'steering group for information security' within the Ministry of Finance; and 8) the Bank of Finland as well as the Financial Supervision Authority (FSA). Both of the last mentioned have an autonomous status, although the FSA works in connection with the Bank of Finland and the latter under the supervision of the Parliament.[21]

The *Council of State*, which is the highest executive authority in Finland and is composed of ministers, steers, supervises and co-ordinates the preparations for disturbances and exceptional circumstances. A relatively new and important medium of political planning and steering is a report of the Council of State on Finnish defence to the parliament, which also gives the opportunity obtain the consent of the latter to the defence plans. The 1997 report on "European Security and Finnish Defence" is a model, which will be followed by similar reviews in regular intervals.

The *Defence Council* has been a high-level consultative and planning body and has served as the President's advisory council in defence policy matters, composed of *inter alia* ministers

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[21] In fact, the organisation of crisis management is somewhat more complex. For instance, the Frontier Guard co-operates closely with the Finnish Police, the Customs and the Maritime Administration in performing its duties. In co-ordinating the monitoring of radiation, The Ministry of the Interior is co-operating with, besides the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, also with the Defence Forces, the Finnish Meteorological Institute, Institute of Seismology and the Laboratory of Radiochemistry.

and representatives of the Defence Forces. In August 1999 the Council adopted the revised and updated comprehensive guidelines for preparing for societal disturbances and exceptional circumstances[22]. The Defence Council is likely to be abolished in 2000, and its duties will be assigned to the Foreign and Security Policy Committee of the Council of State as well as to the Ministry of Defence. Attached to the latter, a new 'Committee for Security and Defence Affairs' will be established, which will consist of the secretaries general of key ministries on the non-military side. The Committee will co-ordinate the preparatory activities in total defence matters across administrative sectors. This reform will in principle strengthen the role of the Ministry of Defence[23].

Each ministry is in turn responsible for directing and controlling preparatory activities in its area of administration. In every one of them there is a so-called 'readiness chief' (usually the secretary general of the ministry), assisted by a special 'readiness committee'. The co-ordination of the ministries' preparations is secured by the *'Chiefs of Readiness Meeting'*. Political and military crises abroad fall centrally within the purview of the President, the *Council of State*, its *foreign and security policy committee,* and *the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.*

The Ministry of Defence and the Defence Forces[24] are both oriented toward preparing the country for exceptional circumstances by monitoring events in the environment, by planning and developing the Finnish military defence, by implementing the agreed defence policy and contributing to the total defence of the country. The Finnish Defence Forces (and the Defence Staff as a part of it) are under the administrative direction of the Ministry of Defence. Within the Ministry, the Defence Policy Department has an important role in crisis management, for it is responsible *inter alia* for planning and implementation of the overall defence preparedness and the national defence policy, participation in international co-operation on defence policy and for peace-keeping operations[25]. The *UN Training Centre Finland* (UNTC) trains, besides Finns, also military observers from other Nordic countries and nationals of other countries for peace-keeping operations. The Defence Forces can also be called upon to assist in rescue operations. Information security and war are areas of increasing interest to the defence branch of the government[26].

An important means of integrating crisis preparedness efforts and contributing to their effectiveness through education and exercises is the well-established institution called *Defence Courses*, which are organised on the nation-wide and regional level and have high status. The courses are attended by a wide variety of senior decision-makers (e.g. high-level civil servants, managers of business firms and leading persons in the media, politicians, representatives of research institutions) and are administered by the Defence Forces. During

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[22] *Varautuminen yhteiskunnan häiriötilanteisiin ja poikkeusoloihin* 1999, op.cit.

[23] See "Puolustusneuvoston tehtävien uudelleen järjestäminen. Työryhmän mietintö, Lokakuu 1999, Puolustusneuvostotyöryhmä", *Valtioneuvoston kanslian raportteja* 4, 1999.

[24] Information in English on the Ministry of Defence can be accessed at www.vn.fi/plm/elink-01.htm and the Defence Forces (likewise in English) at www.mil.fi/tiedotus/julkaisut/taskutieto/index_en.html.

[25] Plans are afoot to transfer the administration of peace-keeping activities from the Ministry of Defence to the Defence Forces. This stand, which corresponds to views within the latter, has been agreed to by a governmental committee. See *Rauhanturvaamistyöryhmän mietintö 1999*, PLM KD NRO 980/4200/99/KE, 1999 p. 26.

[26] See e.g. Heikki J. Hakala, "Pertti Suominen varautuu maanpuolustukseen verkossa", *Internet maailma* 3/1999, p. 16-18.

the courses, the participants learn to know the basics and each other, which may contribute to preparedness in encountering crises.

The *Planning Commission for Defence Information* (MTS) under the Ministry of Defence is a permanent government committee composed of representatives of parties represented in the Finnish Parliament. Its duties include, besides information activities and research, also planning of defence information and training during normal times and in exceptional circumstances.

The *Rescue Department* within the Ministry of the Interior is the highest responsible authority for rescue services and civil defence. The integration of the latter into the rescue services of normal times has now been completed. The Department also co-ordinates the monitoring of radiation in close co-operation with other authorities. A special international rescue troop, *"Finnrescueforce"* (FRF), has been formed to make possible Finnish aid abroad in crises and catastrophes. The FRF has three rescue companies totalling about 200 rescuers. The phased combining of the police, fire and health service emergency response centres into fewer regional ones (excluding the metropolitan region) is going ahead. The aim is to improve service and to make effective functioning possible also during exceptional conditions.[27] Also, a pioneering project on constructing "VIRVE", a national digital radio network for the use of authorities is now under way[28].

The *Directorate of Immigration* and the *Frontier Guard*, both subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior, have important functions in controlling immigration to Finland. The former processes and resolves immigration and refugee matters, and the latter manages border checks at crossing points, ports and airports. In addition the Frontier Guard takes part in maritime rescue operations and in national defence by guarding Finnish borders.[29] The *Police*, besides co-operating with other authorities of the Ministry of the Interior while discharging its duties in crime prevention, has made its members available in UN civilian police operations (e.g. in the former Yugoslavia), for which training courses have been arranged[30].

Defence in the economical sphere is the responsibility of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The *National Emergency Supply Agency* (HVK)[31] is the operative arm of the Ministry in developing and maintaining the security of supply. The HVK also functions as the secretariat of the *National Board of Economic Defence* (PTS), which plans and co-ordinates preparations for exceptional circumstances, and is composed of representatives of major enterprises, interest organisations, as well as ministries and other public bodies. The PTS is divided into a fairly large number of sub-committees and "pools" according to the sectors of the administration or the economy. Within the Ministry of Trade, a specialised expert organisation is involved in mainly preventive activities: the *Safety Technology Authority* (TUKES) takes part in preparing laws and regulations on technical safety and maintains also

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[27] For more information on the Finnish rescue services in English in the Internet, see www.intermin.fi/sm/pelastus/esite/esite_eng/index.html.

[28] Information in English on VIRVE is available through http://www.intermin.fi/sm/pelastus (choose the icon "Virve" and change language).

[29] On the Directorate of Immigration in English, see www.uvi.fi/englanti/index.html, and on the Frontier Guard, www.intermin.fi/raja/uk-frameset.htm.

[30] Internet address of the Finnish Police is: www.poliisi.fi/english/index.htm (in English).

[31] The web site of HVK is www.nesa.fi/English&ruo/engl/index.htm (in Finnish).

surveillance in this area. Its supervision and inspection activities cover for instance dangerous chemicals and safety equipment[32].

The *Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority* (STUK) under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health aims at preventing and limiting harmful effects of radiation. Its activities cover nuclear energy production and all activities that make use of radiation or radioactive substances. STUK sets safety requirements and verifies compliance with them. Currently there are four plants in Finland and one research reactor, but the Authority also co-operates actively to improve the safety of the Leningrad (Sosnovy Bor) and Kola nuclear power plants bilaterally and multilaterally. STUK maintains an emergency preparedness in co-operation with other authorities, with an alarm and contact system. A nation-wide radiation monitoring network comprising about 300 automatic measuring stations is responsible for continuous surveillance.[33] Due to its connections to the public social welfare policy, the *Insurance Supervision Authority* (ISA) is located under the Ministry of Social Affairs. ISA contributes to the prevention of excessive risks of insurance companies, by regulations and inspections, in order to safeguard the interests of policyholders[34].

The Finnish Environment Institute, together with the regional environment centres under the Ministry of the Environment, is the most central expert and operational organ in the prevention and management of risks and accidents. They contribute to developing and applying the regulatory, monitoring, readiness and practical capacity (*inter alia* equipment and technical methods) for this purpose in the public administration. The Institute maintains an emergency alarm system for major oil disasters and other environmental accidents, in co-operation with other authorities and supported by a system of researchers on duty.[35]

Information security is an increasingly important governmental task: interests involved include *inter alia* national security concerns, guarding secrecy of certain documents, preventing crime and solving the Y2K problems. The central operative responsibility rests with the *Information Management unit* within the Public Management Department of the Ministry of Finance. A special 'steering group for information security' co-ordinates the activities across ministries and governmental organisations. A fairly large number of norms and guidelines have been adopted.[36] Furthermore, specialised Y2K working groups and campaigns seem to have proliferated in all major sectors of the public, semi-public and private organisations since 1996 (as in the case of the energy distribution) but mostly from 1998 onward.[37]

The *Council of State* and the *Ministry of Finance* are of course centrally involved in the management of any economic crises. Moreover, they are assisted *inter alia* by the *Bank of*

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[32] On TUKES in English, see www.tukes.fi/english/general/index.htm.

[33] Information on the STUK in English in the internet can be obtained at www.stuk.fi/english.

[34] "An Act and Decree on the Insurance Supervision Authority", *STM tiedottaa, Bulletin* 23/1999, www.vn.fi/stm/english/insurance/insurance_fset.htm (in English); for more general background information, see "Insurance supervision in Finland", www.vn/fi/stm/insurance/insurance_fset.htm (in English).

[35] See www.vyh.fi/vahinko/, in Finnish. More general information in English: www.vyh.fi/eng/moe/moe.html.

[36] For an English introduction, see www.vn.fi/vm/english/public_management/index.html.

[37] "Ministry of Finance, Finland, Working Group on Year 2000 Computing Problems, 1999-09-10, Summary of Efforts to Solve the Year 2000 Computing Problems Within Different Sectors in Finland" is available at www.vn.fi/vm/kehittaminen/tietohallinto/summary.htm in English.

Finland[38] and the *FSA*[39]. The former monitors the Finnish economy with a view of the goal of maintaining price stability and acts as a link to the ECB. The latter, in co-operation with ISA, mentioned above, is tasked to hold the risks incurred by financial institutions manageable and their activities stable.

Finally, there are many non-governmental organisations, which have long been connected with the authorities in assisting in crisis management. These include *inter alia* voluntary defence and rescue unions (e.g. the Finnish National Rescue Association, the Finnish Lifeboat Society) as well as the Finnish Red Cross and Finnchurchaid.

Crisis management in practical contexts

In outlining *the most active parts* of the government in de facto crisis response, I limit myself to a few "situational models", combining the crisis and contingency categories presented above, from the point of view of past experiences and most probable cases in the current context. (See also Annex).

In *foreign crises*, say the ones in Bosnia or Kosovo, which may be construed as potential or incipient forms of types 1) and 2) above, typically involve foreign policy leadership (the president, prime minister, the foreign minister), the foreign and security policy committee of the Council of State, the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry and the latter's region-specific units (divisions). Key experts from the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Staff are also engaged, when the crisis has military dimensions. The role of the defence branch of government increases when a military operation is required. Due to the likely need for humanitarian aid, the Department for International Development Cooperation within the Foreign Ministry as well as the key humanitarian organisations are usually involved. Crisis management in broad terms, including conflict prevention, is in principle but also in many operational respects part of the mission of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; this is the case with the Finnish development assistance as well. In crises, co-ordinating groups may be established in the Ministry engaging relevant officials. In the somewhat unexpected mission of the president to facilitate the efforts to find a political solution to the Kosovo war, a partially ad hoc group was mobilised to assist him, consisting of senior officials from his staff, from the Foreign Ministry's Political Department and from the Ministry of Defence.

In practically all cases of *major disasters* (types 7i to 7vi), the rescue services form the backbone of the Finnish response. However, radiation accidents (7i) are likely to engage centrally also the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) and the Defence Forces; maritime rescue operations (7v) the Frontier Guard; and disasters caused by hazardous materials (7ii) the Environment Institute and the regional environment centres. The Defence Forces can also be called upon to give assistance in disasters, for instance in forest fires (7iii).

In *disturbances* during normal times, response is of course as a rule the responsibility of each Ministry and the subordinated organs as part of their ordinary activities. However, the situational models presented above emphasise the role of certain organisations. Thus, in the case of uncontrolled mass immigration (a), the Frontier Guard and the Directorate of

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[38] The web pages of the Bank of Finland in English start at: http://www.bof.fi/env/startpage.htm.
[39] More information is available at www.rata.bof.fi/english/index.html (in English).

Immigration take the central stage; and environmental accidents (b) may call for a response from the rescue services and the environment administration. Grave economic crises (c), like the one in 1990-94, engage the cabinet, the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Finland, the financial supervisory bodies (FSA and ISA) as well as major commercial banks and federations of business, industry and trade unions. The president was a player in the crisis mentioned, but this may be connected to personality, since President Mauno Koivisto was a former governor of the Bank of Finland.[40] The role of the latter may have decreased somewhat as a result of birth of the EMU and the ECB. The Finnish police is of course tasked to fight international crime (d). Especially the Finnish Security Police (Supo) monitors extremist groups, terrorism and organised crime, notably from the East, and collects information on them[41]. Finally, threats to information security (e) can be briefly looked upon in the light of the Y2K problem. The Information Management unit and 'steering group for information security' within the Ministry of Finance have had a co-ordinating role. However, all the ministries and their sub-units have been active, including *inter alia* the National Board Economic Defence (PTS), the National Emergency Supply Agency (HVK) and major non-governmental organisations, by disseminating guidelines, arranging seminars and monitoring preparations[42].

It seems that military crisis management has high *priority* amongst the political decision-makers in Finland. This is witnessed by the authoritative government standpoints contained in the 1997 report and by the overt support amongst the Finnish politicians, some of whom have abandoned their previous critical stances. The importance of crisis management abroad is seen in the reform of the force structure and training, and in the expanding international defence co-operation. It is furthermore reflected indirectly in the development of military defence expenditure, as the Defence Forces have retained their share, despite tighter state finances[43]. The high priority of defence can be accounted for at least in part by the perceived national interests involved and the rather high status of the national defence in Finland[44]. In partial contrast, the priority of the civil crisis management has perhaps not been as high as that of the military; for instance the planning and economic resources available for preparing for exceptional circumstances have been scarcer than earlier[45].

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[40] Jaakko Kiander & Pentti Vartia, *Suuri lama*. Suomen 1990-luvun kriisi ja talouspoliittinen keskustelu. ETLA & Taloustieto: Helsinki 1998, passim.

[41] "The Finnish Security Police, English Summary", www.poliisi.fi/supo/summary.html.

[42] See "Ministry of Finance, Finland, Working Group on Year 2000 Computing Problems" 1999, op.cit.

[43] "Statistics on Defence Expenditures", www.mil.fi/tiedotus/julkaisut/taskutieto/s53_en.html, in English.

[44] In opinion polls, the share of those who have supported defending the country against attack in all circumstances, has in 1992-1998 varied between 76-80%. See *Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunnittelukunta MTS, Tiedotteita ja katsauksia* 2/1998, 16.11.1998, Table "puolustustahto".

[45] Pelastustoimen kehittäminen suuronnettomuuksia ja poikkeusoloja varten 1999, op.cit., p 4. In most EU countries, civil protection in particular is perceived to have a relatively low priority; see "Evaluation of the Community Action Programme in the Field of Civil Protection, March 1999, Peter Hayward Associates, London, UK", p. 40; it can be accessed through www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg11/civil/prote/cp01_en.htm.

Levels of governance and crisis management

The perspective of levels of governance locates Finnish crisis management in organisational structures of varying extensiveness: from sub-national units and provinces to the state and international system. I shall focus on the relative significance of the levels and draw some conclusions on the problems connected with institutional framing of crisis management.

Predominance of national level – with qualifications

Crisis management, both military and civilian, is a *national* issue in Finland. It forms normatively and organisationally a relatively comprehensive and integrated whole, which has been developed since the first years of independence and in part even earlier[46].

The generally updated national legislation obliges the authorities on all levels to take care of preparedness and gives them powers to carry out their duties in emergencies and exceptional circumstances. Certain norms and obligations concern private organisations and citizens, too. The role of the central governmental level seems to be rather strong with respect to resources and supervision. These observations pertain to rescue services and civil defence, too. The proceeding creation of new regional emergency response centres and the possible transfer of rescue services to the state would emphasise this state of affairs. Municipalities are rather tightly bound by legislation in the fields mentioned[47]. Wider interests of security and equality of different areas in the face of scarce municipal resources may override local concerns.

The domain of crisis management in the sense of preparedness is conceived to be a comprehensive one, covering in principle all sectors of the Finnish society. Co-operation between different sectors of society is furthermore perceived to be of great importance, due to the growing degree of interconnectedness as well as organisational and technical complexity. A close connection is also seen between preparedness for disturbances in normal times and for exceptional circumstances; the latter in turn warrant a comprehensive view due to the grave threats identified as well as the principle of preparing for all eventualities. In major emergencies, when greater or more specialised resources are required, and when political or military concerns are involved, the central governmental level is likely to be dominating or important. The Defence Forces are furthermore strictly hierarchically organised, as is the Frontier Guard; both have an interest in maintaining a relatively integrated and comprehensive view of Finnish defence. As mentioned above, the Defence Courses have an important integrative function in crisis preparedness efforts.

On the intermediate level, state provinces (now numbering six large ones) have their own rescue and civil defence administrations, but they are state authorities; provinces as social, cultural or administrational entities (which number 20) do not have yet strong distinct identities of their own, not to speak of autonomy.

The observations above must, however, be refined and qualified in several respects. Despite the comprehensiveness of Finnish crisis management, the system of decision-making and

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[46] Voluntary fire brigades and even sea rescue associations were born already in the middle of the 19th century.

[47] Pentti Partanen, "Pelastustoimen kehittämisnäkymät", *Maanpuolustus* 66, 1999, p. 31-32.

leadership has been also decentralised. Within certain limits, the state provincial authorities and municipalities should be able to operate on their own. This structure is also visible in defence education, which is organised on three levels, nation-wide, provincial and municipal. In minor accidents or other kinds of emergencies of such a scale, local or regional level authorities can usually cope with the situations. The local authority bears the primary responsibility for responding to emergencies and accidents in its area of authority. Indeed, it is the local multi-purpose *fire brigades* in municipalities (sometimes shared by several neighbouring municipalities), which form the core and backbone of the Finnish rescue services. The problem, as mentioned above, is the inadequacy of the municipalities' resources, due to very tight budgets, and they are not able therefore to maintain sufficient inspection and rescue services everywhere in the country. The municipalities are also responsible for organising civil defence locally. In the environmental administration, regional environment centres have operational duties (especially in oil spills), and are usually co-operating with other rescue authorities.

The regime of obligations is probably not one of unconditional compulsion but is during normal times implemented with reasonableness, by information and resource guidance, training, inspections, and taking a long-term perspective. Obviously, furthermore, the development of the Finnish society has been mainly determined by the needs of normal conditions, and the requirements of more exceptional circumstances have only partially been taken into account[48]. Especially the market-related imperatives and economic players have made crisis management more challenging. An interesting trend in Finland is contained in the new law (1999) on rescue services, which emphasises the responsibility of those causing risks[49]. The changes adopted in this respect have, however, not yet been very substantial. Overall, the "mental" readiness has been regarded as rather high, although its translation into plans has been more varied.

The basic principle is that preparing for emergencies and exceptional conditions is in a way already 'decentralised' to existing organisations and personnel as much as possible during normal times. Whether this succeeds, depends much on the motivation, internalisation and identity as well as information upholding these from the side of the concerned authorities.

Growing internationalisation

The prevalent doctrine in Finland still emphasises the responsibility for preparing for emergencies and exceptional circumstances mainly on an independent basis. However, the trend is towards an ever stronger willingness and practice to take part in *international activities* as well as an acknowledged need to do so. This is due to the changed and changing circumstances: international dependencies and vulnerabilities, EU membership, new emerging threats and the foreign policy doctrine prioritising a broad concept of security and participation in crisis management.

Crisis management "the Finnish way" is becoming *more internationalised*. At least this is the on-going project at present. It is acknowledged that "we" are not and cannot do it "alone" anymore.

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[48] See *Varautuminen yhteiskunnan häiriötilanteisiin ja poikkeusoloihin* 1999, op.cit., p. 5.
[49] Partanen, op.cit., p. 30.

This trend is indeed witnessed by the multifarious international contacts and co-operation the authorities are engaged in. Even though it is difficult to gauge and evaluate them as a whole without extensive archival research and interviews, the structure and the main forms are rather clear: international contacts oriented to 1) *neighbouring countries* and areas (the other Nordic countries individually and as a whole, Russia, and the Baltic states), 2) the *EU* and the related European organisations, 3) organisations with a *broader geographical base*, and notably NATO, the OSCE and the UN. Relatively novel features for Finland in the 1990's are the increasing duties brought by the membership of the EU, active assistance to alleviate and facilitate the removing of the risks and hazards in Russia and the Baltic States, and the increasing co-operation within the extended NATO framework. A handicap at least in the rescue services sector has been the inadequacy of resources for international co-operation, but that problem is probably shared with other authorities as well. In the following, I shall give some examples of the forms which the Finnish international co-operation has taken.

Nordic co-operation in peacekeeping has rather long traditions and is well established. In 1996 a special arrangement called "Nordcaps" was agreed on to improve co-operation. The personnel of peace-keeping is jointly trained on the basis of division-of-labour, Finland being responsible for military observers. The training has taken place at the UNTC Finland; countries outside the Nordic area have used its services as well.

In addition in 1996 a new kind of readiness training for international crisis management was commenced. The Finnish stand-by force is now in one month's readiness, but the Defence Forces want to shorten even this time[50]. Some difficulties have recently been experienced in recruiting personnel, though[51]. Finnish participation is tied to an authorisation by the UN or the OSCE. There has been a debate on the revision of the Finnish peacekeeping law, which restricts the use of force, as mentioned earlier. The "Nordic Peace" exercise mentioned earlier is an example of co-operation in training. A joint Nordic stand-by force is a longer-term objective.

Agreements on rescue co-operation with the other Nordic countries have been concluded. The Finnish and Swedish municipalities along the Tornio River valley have organised joint rescue services; similar arrangements exist in the north between Finnish and Norwegian border areas. In the area of security of supply, Finland and Sweden have agreed on economic co-operation in crisis situations. The Finnish Frontier Guard and the Swedish Coastal Guard co-operate in surveillance in the northern Baltic Sea and in the Gulf of Bothnia.

Finland has concluded an agreement with the Russian Federation on rescue co-operation, and the Finnish border municipalities have given small-scale aid to Russia. The Frontier Guard is in charge of border issues with Russia, and contacts are very frequent. The most important targets of assistance of the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority are the Russian nuclear power plants near Finland's borders: Leningrad (Sosnovy Bor) and Kola. Co-operation with Russia is not considered easy, due to lacking transparency, legal framework, resources, as well as difficulties with the customs regulations. But neither is impossible, nor progress unattainable, assuming great patience.

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[50] "Kenraali Gustav Hägglund: valmiusjoukkojen lähtönopeutta on parannettava", 20.9.1999, www.mil.fi/tiedotus/tiedotteet/20_9_1999_1.html (in Finnish).
[51] This is reportedly due *inter alia* to the increasing demand (and scarcity) of qualified technically educated personnel, reduced strength of the Defence Forces in the wake of the Great Depression, and to the good overall employment situation.

Finland has participated in a programme of training and equipping a Baltic peace-keeping battalion (BALTBAT) in co-operation with the other Nordic countries. Finland's assistance to Estonia has included training and expert assistance as well as military equipment, and the two countries have also concluded an agreement on rescue co-operation. Finland has supported development of border control in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania by expert assistance, training and material support. A tripartite co-operation arrangement between Finland, Estonia and Russia has been established in border control matters; joint exercises have also been organised. Similar co-operation has been started with Norway and Russia in the Arctic area. The Baltic Sea Region Border Control co-operation was launched in 1997 at the instigation of Finland.

The Ministry of the Environment has extensive international co-operation covering the Baltic and Arctic areas; it supports numerous projects in the North-west of Russia, the Baltic States and Poland. In 1999 Finland took part in a Baltic oil spill combating exercise (the Balex Delta '99) in Lithuania and organised a similar one in Kotka.

The *EU* is an important arena of co-operation and decision-making as well as a source of funding for practically speaking all the Finnish authorities. The Frontier Guard, for instance, takes part in working groups dealing with border control issues and illegal immigration of the EU and Schengen; Euratom is a major partner of STUK.

Finland participates in the rescue services co-operation of the Union (DG XI/C.3). This area does not belong to community competence, but instead it is inter-governmental co-operation, with the resulting limitations or even weaknesses. It includes exchange of information, expert seminars, and it is based on an action programme, which has been of a short-term character and of relatively small scale with an uncertain financial basis[52]. Co-operation is seen in Finland as necessary but still in need of further development. It is, however, not self-evident that there would be willingness for major increases of the Union's competence, unless the new missions are well grounded. Pressures from the development of the overall and especially of the political-military crisis management under way might change this cautiousness. A further perceived problem of the EU is that the relevant activities are fragmented: not only DG XI but in five other DGs programmes are related to civil protection[53].

A similar weakness of the EU seems to apply to the area of security of supplies; an exception is the norms for emergency reserves of oil. The position of the financial and insurance inspectorates (FSA and ISA) is basically no different. With the internationalisation and integration of the markets concerned in Europe, their supervision has become increasingly difficult and the same goes for the prevention and management of crises; financial crises are possible in the future, which is bad news for the Finns, recalling the banking crisis during the first half of the 1990's. In any case, the importance of international co-operation is now strongly underlined[54].

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[52] A new action programme for civil protection co-operation, to be adopted by the end of the Finnish Presidency, does not contain any major novelties, except the longer time-frame, five years, which should make it possible to avoid past financial disruptions and attain a more continuous and systematic approach.

[53] "Evaluation of the Community Action Programme in the Field of Civil Protection" 1999, op.cit., p. 46.

[54] Valtioneuvoston selonteko eduskunnalle pankkituesta 16.11.1999, VNS 4/1999vp, Edita: Helsinki 1999, p. 40-41.

In political and military crisis management, the renewed determination of the EU to develop its own capacities is widely supported in Finland, provided it is limited to the "Petersberg tasks"; in this case, however, only the first textual and rhetorical steps have been taken by the Union. Overall, more seems to be expected in Finland from the EU in the future.

The Kosovo conflict showed to the EU decision-makers that both its political-military and civilian crisis management needed a major upgrading. The Cologne European Council in June 1999 tasked the Finnish Presidency to work forward with the Cologne Conclusions, Declaration and Presidency Report dealing with the subjects. This the Finnish Presidency has done, adopting a pragmatic approach. In the political-military area, Finland has focused on developing decision-making capabilities by improving security policy co-ordination and the relevant mechanisms in crisis management. On the civilian side, the overall aim seems to be to create bases for a more coherent and co-ordinated approach; ideas presented include studies identifying the member states' capabilities and efficient practices for co-operation, a co-ordinating body and a rapid reaction capability. The European Council meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 adopted relevant documents on the two subjects. The Council went a step further than envisaged in advance by *inter alia* accepting the target of setting up of a European Crisis management force by 2003[55].

European crisis management is now seen to be concentrated almost wholly on the utilisation of the operationally ready military and political machinery of *NATO*[56]. Finland takes part in the EAPC activities, the PfP programme, the PARP process[57], and has troops in the Sfor and Kfor operations. Membership of NATO is, however, excluded for the moment, due to a lack of support amongst the public opinion[58] and the political elite, to the concern over stability in the northern area and the expanding possibilities for participation in the concrete activities of the alliance. The EAPC and PfP have opened possibilities for co-operation in the field of rescue services and security of supply, too. The OSCE is still officially mentioned in Finland as an organ, which could authorise peace-keeping operations, but in practice the organisation is not able to do so in Bosnian and Kosovo-type operations. In crisis management, the OSCE is now more specialised in a more limited peace-building role through promoting democracy and human rights, monitoring elections and helping to organise them, through its resident missions and confidence and security building measures (CSMBs, which are of interest in Finland also to the Defence Forces). Finland has continued to participate in the OSCE activities in various ways, e.g. by recruiting personnel.

The *UN* is still an important organisation for Finland: of the nine peace-keeping operations in which 1.794 Finns participated in October 1999, six were UN operations. In the area of rescue services, the so-called "Quintet", consisting of the Nordic countries (among them Finland) and the UK has been developing service packages for the UN. As was mentioned earlier, Finland has a capacity to contribute to civilian police operations under *inter alia* the UN, and has done so. A Finnish role in the Kosovo operation, however, was largely prevented by a dispute over wages.

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[55] See "Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions", paragraphs 25-29 and Annex IV, at presidency.finland.fi/netcomm/News.

[56] Kaskeala 1998, op.cit., p. 12.

[57] "Planning and Review Process", aiming above all at enhancing the interoperability of the PfP partners.

[58] The support for Finland's NATO membership was 29% in a poll in the autumn of 1998, but had dropped to 18% in May 1999. See *Maanpuolustustiedotuksen suunnittelukunta MTS. Tiedotteita ja katsauksia* 1/1999, 30.6.1999, p. 1.

Finland furthermore participates in the activities of the OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). It seems that international organisations and states alike are beginning to appreciate the OCHA, and that it is starting to show its value; an example cited is its operation in East Timor. Indeed, it is often mentioned as the lead institution in its sphere. A possible competitor or in the best case a complementing body is the EADRCC (Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre), attached to the EAPC and NATO and established at Russia's instigation. Also its has proved already useful in individual cases. The doctrine now is that the two (OCHA and EADRCC) co-operate closely; but a division-of-labour sometimes mentioned would be based on the north-south divide. The role of the EU is somewhat uncertain and undefined in this structure at the present. Certainly even within the Union there is an opinion that supports a substantial strengthening of its position in civilian crisis management also vis-à-vis the other organisations[59], but the support seems to vary.

The scale of problems, the related difficulties and the role of each international organisation vary of course from one case to another. The problem of ambiguous international co-ordination seems to have prevented the offered participation of the Finnrescueforce in assisting the Albanian refugees of the Kosovo war[60]. Then again, the challenges facing in particular the UNHCR were enormous there.

In the area of security of supply, Finland joined the 'international energy programme' in 1991, implemented by the IEA, which aims at securing the supply of oil in crisis situations. With respect to the AIB, the international co-operation in the complex network amongst accident investigators is regarded as a necessary part of its activities, in particular as a source of standards and experience used for ascertaining the quality of the Finnish practices.

Finally, the above mentioned 1997 Report by the Council of State on the development of civil preparedness in crisis management indicated an increased willingness of the government to promote the *civilian crisis management*, which the successful efforts by the Finnish EU Presidency also bear witness to. Inventories on available Finnish resources and capabilities of the various authorities have been compiled, taking into account NGOs as well. A co-operation group has been functioning under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in order to enhance co-ordination and preparedness for international operations. Attention has been paid to the adequacy and compatibility of civilian components in military crisis management operations.

Overall, although international contacts and co-operation are increasing, the international structures taking care of them seem to be relatively weak and perhaps underdeveloped. The *perception* is that especially the civil side is poorly co-ordinated, and that there are many organisations with uncertain and overlapping jurisdictions and activities. There is a need and readiness for expanded international co-operation, which have been rather clearly expressed in Finland, although they seem to vary somewhat by sector.

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[59] Cf. "Evaluation of the Community Action Programme in the Field of Civil Protection" 1999, p. 28, 47.
[60] Tero Paasiluoto, "Kasvavat kansainväliset haasteet pakottavat tarkistamaan myös FinnRescueForcen toimintaperiaatteita", *Pelastusosasto tiedottaa* 2/1999, www.intermin.fi/sm/pelastus.

Institutional and cognitive factors matter

As I noted at the beginning, a major approach to crisis management looks at it as surrounded by constraints resulting from *institutional and cognitive* structures. Do these appear in Finland? To answer this question, one would need more focused in-depth research, which by and large does not exist. Therefore, I have to approach the problem indirectly.

Some practitioners are somewhat puzzled by this sort of question (though by no means negative), which does not seem to be a dominant part of common organisational discourse, not at least towards 'outsiders'. In official texts, the rhetoric of repeated encouragement of co-operation between the various authorities and players seems in any case to reveal that there could be a problem. The discussion above about the international co-operation questions revealed many institutional dilemmas. It is the usual involvement of more than one organisation with their differing organisational rules, informal and formal, cultures and established missions, which may cause friction.

Indeed, my evidence seems to show that there is not an absence of an institutionally oriented memory amongst some practitioners, reflecting on experiences, although these views cannot be focused on specific crises. Thus a "moderate optimistic practitioner" argues that the EU membership has significantly socialised civil service towards a more active mode of operation, future contingencies are now reported and analysed, the Finnish administration is relatively open, and that the civil society has an important role to play. However, our moderate optimist recognises many institutional obstacles in the management of foreign crises. A major problem is the political level (the cabinet), which is not easily mobilised, unless there is already a severe crisis situation. A swift response tends to become impossible, if it contains elements that belong to the jurisdiction of several ministries, and if in particular money is involved. Administrative functional segmentation in a ministry tends to make co-ordination and consistent policies more difficult.

One recent "macro" crisis has been studied to a greater extent than any other: it is the *"Great Depression"* of 1990-94. Although analysed by economists using predominantly various economic theories[61], their texts offer material for interesting reinterpretations in the present context. Institutions and perceptions were indeed relevant when Finland was sliding into the worst economic crisis since its independence. These included for instance the liberalisation of the foreign capital movements, the publicly shared and relatively uncontested belief in the policy of fixed and strong currency without devaluations and the concomitant avoidance of debate and hesitation as well and the disposition for defending positions of authority. But in addition several other factors were influential: clash of personalities (not necessarily always of institutions), absence of "crisis awareness", ambiguities in the information available to the decision-makers, and finally the contemporary domestic semi-political constraints ("bank parties", for instance). Of course, environmental factors (like falling oil price, the collapse of the Soviet Union and German unification) played a role as well.

In addition, a limited look at the reports by accident investigation boards, namely those dealing with the sinking of an armoured troop-carrier (1991), a factory fire (1993), an explosion at a factory producing explosives (1993), the capsizing of MV Estonia (1994), the

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[61] Kiander & Vartia, 1998, op.cit.

steel tank downfall (1996), air traffic control incidents (1997), and a train accident (1998)[62], seems to show that institutional factors were background reasons for all three accidents and in many cases hampered partly the rescue-operations. Factors involved include deficiencies in training, in regulations and instructions as well as attitudes to their observation; other relevant reasons have been inadequate personnel (due to pressures to economize) and insufficient control of work. In the third case, the contributing reasons for the accident comprise an entire product development history.

Finally, going beyond crises or emergencies proper, institutional constraints were involved also in the drafting of a new law on regional emergency response centres, as the concerns of the Ministry of Finance ('no new costs') as well as those of police and fire brigades ('can the new centres serve professionally both?') caused some discord[63].

The observations above are mostly preliminary. However, their coverage is sufficient to make the cognitive-institutional perspective plausible in analysing crisis decision-making.

Knowledge of crisis management: evaluation and dialogue

Policy-making in Finland is based on an administrative tradition of collection of experiential knowledge and investigations at least in the case of major issues. To what extent does this hold true of crisis management and how and to what extent does one go about pursuing grounded policies in this issue-area? Do evaluations have any impact on practices? Of interest is also the role of academic research and the problems connected with its co-operation with practitioners. I limit myself mostly to examining the civilian crisis management.

Investigating civil crises: practice and impact

Accidents and disasters are studied in Finland officially and *systematically*: there is one permanent body in charge, and investigations are an established convention with a wide coverage of cases. The main organisation responsible is the *Accident Investigation Board*

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[62] "Tutkintaselostus Taipalsaarella 14.6.1991 tapahtuneesta miehistönkuljetuspanssarivaunun uppoamisesta, Oikeusministeriö, Taipalsaaren miehistönkuljetusvaunuonnettomuuden tutkintalautakunta", *Suuronnettomuuden tutkintaselostus* N:o 2/1991, Helsinki 1992; *Tutkijalautakunnan raportti: Kuljetinjärjestelmän palo Kuusankoskella 8.5.1993*, s.l. 1993; "Räjähdysonnettomuus Oy Forcit Ab:n tehtaalla Hangossa 7.6.1993", *Onnettomuustutkintakeskus, Tutkintaselostus* 1/1993; *Final report on the capsizing on 28 September 1994 in the Baltic Sea of the ro-ro passenger vessel MV Estonia*, The Joint Accident Investigation Commission of Estonia, Finland and Sweden & Edita: Helsinki 1997; "Massasäiliön kaatuminen Valkeakoskella 27.3.1996", *Onnettomuustutkintakeskus, Tutkintaselostus*, B 1/1996 Y; "ATC incidents near Vihti VOR radio beacon on 25.10.1997 and 20.8.1997, Finland", *Accident Investigation Board Finland, Aircraft Incident Report*, B 8/1997 L, B 8a/1997 L; "Junaonnettomuus Jyväskylässä 6.3.1998", *Onnettomuustutkintakeskus, Tutkintaselostus* A 1/1998 R, Edita: Helsinki 1999 (with an English summary), available also at www.edita.fi/aib_finland/#eng.
[63] See Keijo Himanen, "Kädenvääntöä hätäkeskuslaista", *Helsingin Sanomat*, September 21, 1999; Heikki Saksa, "Hälytyksen perillemeno hidastuu", *Helsingin Sanomat*, September 28, 1999; Saara Larkio: "Tampereen pelastuslaitos vastustaa hätäkeskusuudistusta, *Aamulehti*, November 4, 1999. See also Rauno Sairinen et al., *Suomen ympäristöpolitiikan tulevaisuuskuvat*, Gaudeamus: Helsinki 1999; the book hardly speaks about crises, but of "problems"; however, the institutional and cognitive dilemmas involved in management are given ample space, based on a large number of elite interviews.

Finland (AIB)[64]. The Board, which is located in the Ministry of Justice, investigates all major accidents regardless of their nature, and all aviation, maritime and rail accidents and incidents (risky situations). Aiming at improving safety and preventing future accidents, investigations focus on the history, cause, consequences of the accident as well as the rescue operations. A report is prepared which includes also recommendations. Other authorities can set up enquiries in cases of accidents, particularly minor ones. Thus fires have been investigated by boards nominated by the Ministry of the Interior[65], and accidents in the Defence Forces by its own teams[66]. Also TUKES is an authority, which has established enquiries[67] and STUK investigates all exceptional events in the Finnish nuclear power plants[68]. However, the AIB has to right to take over, if it deems that the accident is severe enough or the case has significance from the point of view of public security.

The examples of investigations the author has studied have been very detailed with equally specific recommendations. They are very technical, but do not omit human or institutional settings. However, the focus is on the immediate and proximate "micro-environment". In any case, no explicit conceptual framework is used, which is natural in view of the limited objectives of the investigations.

The investigative boards seem to have been composed of mainly expert civil servants: representatives of the Accident Investigation Board, rescue services, the police, and the authority concerned in each case, such as the Defence Forces or the Railways. The principal role of *academic research* is one of assisting the investigations through nominated experts or commissioned studies on very specific problems. In the latter case, as a rule the *Technical Research Centre of Finland* (VTT) is relied on; this organisation is mainly oriented to applied research in technical fields of science. In recent years, also behavioural scientists (notably psychologists) have been employed, which is a relatively novel development. This practice is an outgrowth of the experience, gained at some investigations, that some of the background reasons for accidents derive from problems connected with the management or organisational culture. Another stimulus has been the emergence of expertise close to the AIB for the problem areas mentioned.[69]

The impact of evaluations on crisis planning is not easily identifiable in an unambiguous manner. However, the reports, which are of rather high quality, contain detailed recommendations and receive often publicity, too, are taken seriously into account in and by

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[64] See www.edita.fi/aib_finland/#eng. All reports of the Board are published in Finnish with English summaries; a few of the most important are wholly in English. Many of the newer ones are available at the web site mentioned.

[65] For example *Tutkijalautakunnan raportti: Kuljetinjärjestelmän palo Kuusankoskella*, 1993, op.cit.

[66] See e.g. the fire at a weapons depot in Ähtäri: "Ähtärin asevarikon paloa selvittämään asetettiin tutkijalautakunta, 20.7.1999", www.mil.fi/tiedotus/tiedotteet/20_07_1999_2.html.

[67] One case: the explosion and fire at the Finnish Chemicals factory in Äetsä in June 1999. See "Pelastustoimen uutisia, Äetsän räjähdysonnettomuus tutkitaan", 6.11.1999, www.intermin.fi/sm/pelastus.

[68] At the web site of STUK one can find a table on the occurred incidents in 1994-98, see www.stuk.fi/stuk.

[69] The reason given to the technical nature of accident investigations is the model of aviation cases, the inquiries into which are well developed, based on international obligations and have been – and still are – largely technical. However, Finland is said to have been in the forefront internationally in taking into account organisational and management issues in the 1990's; in investigations of aviation incidents and accidents human factors were paid attention to already since the 1980's.

the respective administrations - for instance in the rescue services; they are even called as "obliging", are studied, and lead to measures for developing organisations and practices – at least those recommendations which are considered "realistic". Thus there is naturally some variance with respect to the response. A particular sense of responsibility has been shown by the Finnish railway operator and the railway authority with which the AIB holds annual review meetings. Besides authorities, also private enterprises or entire sectors of economy have often shown an interest in taking corrective measures – in order to safeguard their reputation and avoid future costs; in general, the more internationalised are the enterprises, the greater is their willingness to do so. A follow-up survey is under way at the AIB to gain insights into the follow-up and implementation of the recommendations. The Board as such possesses no sanctions, except the soft ones of publicity, the contents of reports of good quality drawing the attention of the interested parties (e.g. lawyers) and an obligation of the organisations involved to give information on the implementation upon request. The AIB also trains accident investigators by arranging courses.

"Best practice" is an approach, which is nowadays often recommended as a good instrument for promoting organisational learning. This mode of thinking is known in Finland. However, not only successful rescue operations are important, it is thought, but also those where problems have been encountered. The fact that the rescue services have been able to avoid any significant failures in operations is taken as proof of practices being rather satisfactory. For example the train accident in Jyväskylä, mentioned above, is one by and large successful case, for which the leader of rescue operations was decorated. Something resembling "best practice" thinking is the idea of establishing a "quality system" for the services, which is being discussed, and also a "quality prize" is in on the agenda. The environmental administration is already developing "best available techniques" for preventing accidents[70].

Systematic knowledge on crisis management is accumulated by the *Rescue Department.* They have already for a longer time (nearly two decades) had large databases on accidents and resources ("ONTI", "ONTIKA", "RESU"), which are currently being combined into a large new unified and up-to-date database called "PRONTO"[71]. These databases contain information e.g. on the events themselves, on the causes, rescue services, materials used, buildings as well as resources. The current databases are, and the new one will be as well, in principle available for legitimate academic research. Other authorities have their own databases, as does the Environment Institute on environmental accidents[72].

Research co-operation with the authorities has to large extent been dominated by the technical and natural sciences, as mentioned above. Amongst the most important research institutions are VTT, STUK, and the "Fire research council", associated with the National Rescue Association[73]. Also the HVK commissions research for the development of the security of supply and in particular protective technology. Within the Ministry of Defence, scientific-technical research is co-ordinated and funded by the Scientific Advisory Board for Defence

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[70] See "Ympäristöasioiden hallinnan menetelmät", www.vyh.fi/ympsuo/hallinta/hallinta.htm (in Finnish).

[71] See Olli Lopmeri, "PRONTO – pelastustoimen resurssi- ja onnettomuustilastojärjestelmä", *Pelastusosaston tiedotuksia* 4/1998, www.intermin.fi/sm/pelastus/index.html.

[72] "Huomattavimmat alusöljyvahingot vuosina 1969-1999", www.vyh.fi/vahinko/torjunta/tilasto.html (in Finnish).

[73] The web address of the Technical Research Centre, VTT, is www.vtt.fi (in English); the Fire research council 's ("Palotutkimusraati") site is at www.spek.fi/raati/index.htm (in Finnish).

(MATINE)[74]. Its projects focus on crises, too, and include subjects like information security and security of supply. The Defence Forces furthermore have their own technological research institutions. Finally, risk assessment and accident management preparedness have been among the research topics of the Environment Institute[75].

Poverty of social science research

In social sciences there has been very little research on the *Finnish* crises. There are only two studies worth mentioning: Raimo Väyrynen: "Conflicts in Finnish-Soviet Relations: Three Comparative Case Studies" (1972) and Marco Krogars: "Verkostoilla kriisinhallintaan" (crisis management through networks; 1995). On the other hand, Dr Pekka Visuri has, in many of his studies, - e.g. "Totaalisesta sodasta kriisinhallintaan" (From total war to crisis management, 1989, and "Turvallisuuspolitiikka ja strategia" (Security policy and strategy, 1997) - dealt with the general theory of crisis management as well as the development of both military defence and civil preparedness of Finland. Above all, the institutional-cognitive theorising on crisis decision-making has not at all found space in the Finnish research. The only piece of research that relies in part on this tradition is the doctoral dissertation of Christer Pursiainen, "Beyond Sovietology", written at the FIIA, but its empirical referent is Russia – not Finland.[76]

Interest seems to be increasing slightly in the social sciences in individual cases. First of all there is at least one social psychologist specialised in "catastrophe psychology"[77]. Indeed, Liisa Eränen's book on the subject is an example of co-operation between authorities and academics, for it was initiated by the Rescue Department and supported by an advisory working group. However, the book does not contain very much on the dynamics of crisis decision-making. In economics, I above mentioned research done by economists on the 1990-94 "Great Depression" in Finland[78]. Now there is also a large joint cross-disciplinary research project of the Academy of Finland under way: *"Depression of the 1990's in Finland"*. This three-year project (1998-2000) promises a multi-perspective analysis of the politics, economics, social policies and history of the depression; however, the research plans do not seem to include crisis-theoretical approaches of the IR studies.[79]

Research conducted at the FIIA as well as the Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI)[80] is relevant only indirectly. At the FIIA, for example, research done on humanitarian interventions and European security architecture, Russian or Chinese political developments,

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[74] For information on MATINE, see www.vn.fi/plm/eha-mat.htm (in English).

[75] For a list of illustrative publications, see www.vyh.fi/ympsuo/hallinta/halljulk.htm#riskjulk (some in English).

[76] Full bibliographical information: Raimo Väyrynen, Conflicts in Finnish-Soviet Relations: Three Comparative Case Studies, *Acta Universitatis Tamperensis*, Ser. A, Vol. 47, Tampereen yliopisto: Tampere 1972; Marco Krogars, *Verkostoilla kriisinhallintaan*, Ankkurikustannus: Vaasa 1995; Pekka Visuri, *Totaalisesta sodasta kriisinhallintaan: puolustusperiaatteiden kehitys läntisessä Keski-Euroopassa ja Suomessa vuosina 1945-1985*, Otava: Helsinki 1989; Pekka Visuri, *Turvallisuuspolitiikka ja strategia*, WSOY: Helsinki 1997; Christer Pursiainen, *Beyond Sovietology*, Ulkopoliittinen instituutti: Helsinki 1998; a more extensive analysis of the Finnish IR research on crises can be found in *Crisis decision-making the Finnish way: A project proposal* (FIIA 1999-05-11).

[77] Liisa Eränen, *Katastrofipsykologia*, Sisäasiainministeriö, Pelastusosasto: Helsinki 1991.

[78] Kiander & Vartia, op. cit. 1998.

[79] For an introduction in Finnish: see www.vatt.fi/lamatutkimushanke/main.html.

[80] See www.uta.fi/laitokset/tapri/pub.html.

European Union and its Northern Dimension, or global management, all have more or less a crisis management perspective and Finnish potential or actual concerns ultimately in mind; rhetorically expressed: European crises are increasingly "Finnish crises", too, if one takes the principle of "solidarity" seriously. Both the FIIA and TAPRI produce in part theory-informed research. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (the Research and Planning Unit of the Political Department as well as the Department for International Development Cooperation) commissions some research on crises abroad. The interests of the Ministry are primarily practical, though, save the fulfilling research objectives of the Ministry, no restrictions are placed on the researchers. At the Department for Strategic Studies of the National Defence College, published research shows a keen interest in crises in particular in the Finnish environs, with concrete analyses dominating (though not exclusively so[81]).

Co-operation and dialogue: difficult but possible

Multiple channels can be and are used for the *dissemination* of knowledge in Finland by researchers. Some of them are quite conventional: interviews and articles in newspapers, interviews for television, and articles in periodicals, some of which reach a wider readership, such as "Ulkopolitiikka" (Foreign Policy) of the FIIA. Researchers take actively part in discussion on the "opinion" pages of newspapers. They are also used as lecturers by public authorities and occasionally serve on government committees as members or experts. The scientific societies often join both academics and practitioners. Seminars, such as those organised at the FIIA, are well attended by the latter, too. The Internet is an expanding channel of disseminating knowledge, as is witnessed by the footnotes of this report.

Projects commissioned by the Foreign Ministry facilitate the development of a co-operative culture between the Ministry and researchers; feedback discussions and seminars have been organised on the basis of finished reports. Especially the Finnish EU Presidency has been assisted by a special support group of researchers and through relevant studies, too. As is clear from what was earlier said, all the major projects of the FIIA have in fact a practical dimension. All this does not yet, however, amount to any focused co-operation efforts in the area of crisis management.

There are many obstacles to a dialogue between practitioners and academics. One is the problem of *"two cultures"[82]*. The needs of the administrators with respect to research are typically very practical and concrete, as they involve looking for solutions to specific problems. Time pressure and the imperative of contributing to the formulation of goals and action give the role of a practitioner a distinct character. Researchers in turn appreciate their theories and are inclined to focus on more general developments. The practitioners e.g. in the Foreign Ministry do know much about emerging crises: they do not necessarily see a role for academics here. All this tends to make it less probable that academic research is read and

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[81] Cf. Tomas Ries, "War and the Return of History", *Tiede ja ase* N:o 56 1998, Suomen Sotatieteellinen Seura: Joensuu 1998, p. 106-158; Pekka Sivonen, "Tulevaisuuden ennakointi kansainvälisen turvallisuuden tutkimuksen kohteena". *Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Strategian laitos, Strategian tutkimuksia, Julkaisusarja 1*, N:o 11, Helsinki 1998.

[82] Cf. Christopher Hill, "Academic International Relations, The siren song of policy relevance", in *Two worlds of international relations, Academics, practitioners and the trade in ideas*, Ed. by Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff, Routledge & LSE: London and New York, 1994, p. 3-25.

absorbed, even when it is commissioned[83]. From a responsive attention there is furthermore a long way to practical policies. Difficulties in proper utilisation of academic studies are strengthened by the increased workload of civil servants due above all to the EU membership. Some civil servants may appreciate innovative, challenging and more comprehensive perspectives, but on the other hand may often lack the capacity to evaluate their plausibility from the academic perspective.[84]

Undoubtedly, giving research the mission of analysing the broader context and offering alternative critical perspectives is indeed a legitimate assignment. However, both a technical and a contextual-critical approach tend to be located outside the policy-making process and be mostly unconcerned by it.

A constant question arises about the *"value added"* that would be produced by, say, the cognitive-institutional theoretical perspective, when every public organisation monitors its own activities and attempts to develop them almost continuously with the assistance of its e.g. its own planners, committees and working groups and also by commissioning (mostly technically or concretely oriented) analyses. Academic research is in a competitive position with other sources of information.

There is also the problem of unequal access to certain *sources of information* (like documents and persons), placing researchers in a somewhat disadvantaged position. This aspect may also often serve to create anticipatory prejudices amongst the researchers who sometimes unnecessarily curtail their efforts to try to make their way to the practitioners. However, the asymmetry is certainly relative in the sense that the practitioners' use of "facts" or "data" may imply a somewhat limited perspective, while a researcher usually searchers for broader contextual evidence.

The differences between academic research and pragmatic administrational work are not the only tension structuring attitudes and debates. In particular in important and highly conspicuous issues (such as acceptance of military intervention, responding to environmental hazards, or regulating international capital movements), the policy-community and the scholars alike are themselves divided according to broadly shared *beliefs*. Then we could have several coalitions, which would each have their own sympathetic researchers, media etc. Research may then be used for legitimising and justifying purposes, which does not augur well for joint learning across coalitions, save for secondary aspects, unless fora or brokers of sufficient authority exist and persuasive evidence can be accumulated.[85]

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[83]   However, this does not mean that commissioned studies are not read and used at all; they are, but the extent varies.

[84]   For a perceptive discussion on some of these issues, see Christer Pursiainen: "Tutkimus konfliktien ehkäisijänä ja ratkaisijana", *Ulkopolitiikka* 4, 1996, 69-73.

[85]   This problem has been studied extensively e.g. by Paul A. Sabatier, "An advocacy coalition framework of policy change and the role of policy-oriented learning therein" *Policy Sciences* 21, 1988, 129-168; and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, "Analytical debates and policy learning: analysis and change in the federal bureaucracy", *Policy Sciences* 21, 1988, 169-211. See also Paul A. Sabatier, "The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for Europe", *Journal of European Public Policy* 5:1, March 1998, 98-130. The role of "beliefs" is discernible in the analysis of the "Great Depression", see Kiander & Vartia 1998, op.cit., e.g. p. 182-183, 205, 207.

A standard answer to a query on whether there is a *dialogue* in progress between the academic and the practitioner communities on the topic of crisis management, would be negative. No major exchanges of an organised, direct and sequential nature have been going on to derive common lessons and using in particular social science perspectives in such undertakings[86]. However, public debates of a more indirect and partial kind have been taking place. Once again, a full account of such phenomena would require more thorough analyses of, not only the dominant media, but also of more specialised fora (such as profession-specific periodicals).

Perhaps the most intensive debate in Finland in 1998-99, with contributions from the academic community, has dealt with the management of European political-military crises with a special focus on the Kosovo crisis and war, the NATO membership of Finland and the proposed revision of the Finnish law on peace-keeping. The debate has been given new impetus by the crisis in East Timor and the renewed war in Chechnya. The difficult issues include: was the Kosovo intervention unavoidable although deplorable, as the Finnish political leaders have suggested, or was the intervention a case of illegal use of force with harsh human consequences?[87] Should Finland join NATO in order to guarantee a voice and assistance in future grave armed conflicts, or would that endanger the nation's security in the northern region? This debate has also been about the relative importance of various threats to Finnish security.[88] Furthermore, should the law on peace-keeping be changed in order to guarantee a more effective participation in operations, corresponding to the practice elsewhere, or does an amendment of the law entail increased dangers to Finland's position and perhaps to the its soldiers as well?[89]

A second major debate, which has not been as intensive as that on the previous theme, has centred on economic management, reflecting lessons of the "Great Depression" and analysing the future challenges for the Finnish decision-makers and EMU regime as well. Some of the interventions have indicated for instance that new economic crises are a distinct and unpredictable possibility, that lessons from the Depression were yet to be drawn in 1998 (four years since the crisis) and that the ECB would not be of any greater assistance in crisis management respect, since it does not seem to be keen on managing shorter-term instabilities[90]. A third topic concerns the management of globalisation: does this trend have the allegedly adverse effects on environment, the welfare state, the poor and democratic

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[86] A now past possible exception - at least in part – could be the courses called "The Programme for Developing a National Strategy", organised in 1991-98 under the auspices of the Prime Minister's Office. Being a kind of civilian counterpart to the national Defence Courses, they discussed and outlined national strategies for survival and success and had an academic contingent participating as well. See *Kansallisen strategian kongressi 1998*, HAUS: Helsinki, 1998.

[87] On the Finnish debate on Kosovo, see *Ulkopolitiikka*, Special Issue on Kosovo 1999, *Ulkopolitiikka* 3, 1999, p. 83-133, and *Ydin* 3, 1999.

[88] "Suomen Nato-linja toimii, jos maailma pysyy rauhallisena" (Tomas Ries); Esko Aho: "Suomen ei pidä liittoutua", both in *Helsingin Sanomat*, December 1, 1999, p. A7.

[89] "Suomella valmius omiin rauhanturvaajiin", *Helsingin Sanomat* May 7, 1999, p. A8; Juhani Kaskeala: "Kriisinhallinta kuuluu puolustusvoimille", *Helsingin Sanomat* May 21, 1999, p. A2; and "Kosovon operaatio voi asettaa rauhanturvalain koetukselle", *Helsingin Sanomat* August 9, 1999, p. A9.

[90] "Toimitusjohtaja Pentti Vartia, ETLA, Suomen varauduttava uusiin kriiseihin", *Sampovisio* 5/1998, 7-9; Pentti Haaparanta: "Talouskriisejä ei voi ennustaa", *Helsingin Sanomat*, October 30, 1998, A2; Jouko Paunio: "Euroopasta puuttuu suhdannepolitiikka", *Helsingin Sanomat*, September 6, 1999, A2.

governance, and self-determination of nations in the world or doesn't it?[91]. A fourth topic has been the Finnish (and European) refugee and asylum policy: should Finland curb the flow of asylum seekers or has the policy rather been too tight and bureaucratic?[92] To the best of my knowledge, no public discussion of any more extensive kind has been going on in 1998-99 on civil crisis (accident and disaster) management in Finland, not even in the wider sense of including preventive measures, where academics had taken part among others[93].

There certainly is potential for *enhancing co-operation* between practitioners and scholars: channels or possible fora exist and the attitude of practitioners is in principle positive. However, co-operation should preferably be focused and sustained, lasting for several years. The ideal would be well-supported projects that do not only serve decision-makers, but also motivate good researchers appreciating also their theoretical perspectives and their independence; a culture of genuine dialogue, that deepens and widens the perspectives of decision-makers and increase the understanding of the "secrets" of everyday crisis management[94]. This is of course a demanding concept, if one takes into account the limitations and differences of approaches, discussed earlier. But the latter *do not amount to any "iron law" of opposition* but could be mitigated through communication, by building a culture of co-operation. The attitude of civil servants does not seem to be averse to co-operation, but on the contrary often favourable[95]. Not only research projects could build bridges but also e.g. including researchers in boards investigating accidents, in governmental delegations travelling to crisis areas or deliberating on international responses to crises.

Challenges ahead: practical and academic

Crisis management in Finland is facing growing challenges. Although the probability of individual types of contingencies may not be very high, the increasing overall vulnerability makes the risks a very important concern. There is a tension between the national, rather well organised work for maintaining preparedness, and the increasingly limited or problematic practical possibilities across the whole range of eventualities. Therefore, while the national

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[91] Sairinen et al.1999, op.cit.; Anu Kantola et al., *Maailman tila ja Suomi*, Gaudeamus: Helsinki, 1999; Raimo Väyrynen, *Suomi avoimessa maailmassa, Globalisaatio ja sen vaikutukset*, Taloustieto: Helsinki, 1999, p. 181-279.

[92] See e.g. *Ihmisoikeusraportti* 1, 1998, 2, 1998, and 1, 1999; Kantola et al. 1999, op.cit., p. 307; Väyrynen 1999, op.cit., p. 235-239.

[93] An exception seems to be an article by professor Jouko Tuomisto, who in his article "Riskinarviointia heikoin perustein" (risk assessment on poor grounds) criticised perceptions of risks amongst the Finnish parlamentarians and media and called for a more comprehensive perspective on the issue; see *Helsingin Sanomat*, April 22, 1999, A2.

[94] See Pursiainen 1996, op.cit., p. 73, where co-operation of the more demanding kind, based not only on commissioned research, is called for. A rather similar point of view has been taken by Christopher Hill (1994, op.cit., p. 20), who emphasises the independence of the adacemics, their longer-term mission and the difference (though not a total irreconcilability) of their role compared to that of the practitioner. There is, however, merit in attempts to bridge the gap in indirect ways between these two roles, advocated above all by Alexander George; see his "Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy", in New Thinking in International Relations, *The Yearbook of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs 1994-1995*, Ed. by Rutger Lindahl & Gunnar Sjöstedt, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs: Stockholm, 1995, p. 195-208.

[95] See e.g. Hannu Mäntyvaara, "Kohti luontevaa käytännön yhteyttä, Tutkimus ja ulkopolitiikka – yhdessä vai erikseen?", *Ulkopolitiikka* 4, 1997, p. 76-84.

level is still the main arena for managing crises, increasing attention is now paid to international co-operation by all the relevant Finnish authorities. However, the current international arrangements for managing the task are still rather deficient. In particular the EU capabilities are seen as inadequate at present. There is in Finland generally a perceived need to enhance practical co-operation in international crisis management.

Investigations on accidents and emergencies are rather advanced in Finland. Databases are also being developed. Academic researchers are also involved but mainly from the technological and natural sciences. The explicit perspectives and contribution of social sciences are largely absent, with very few exceptions. Blame is to be shouldered also by the latter, for they have only to a minor extent cultivated theoretically informed research on crises: by and large only indirectly relevant research is available. In particular this outstanding contribution pertains to the institutional-cognitive analysis of crisis decision-making. On the other hand the latter's importance and promise seem to be borne out by the emerging investigation practices in Finland, our preliminary observations and research projects elsewhere in Europe. Fora and channels are available for fruitful co-operation between practitioners and academics, but no explicit dialogues between the parties have been going on in any demanding sense; relevant debates have been generally indirect, diffuse and not necessarily productive. The reason is not any general ill will but perhaps the somewhat differing cultures. Obstacles do exist, but in general there is space and willingness for breaking ground, for building new structured and focused dialogues between practitioners and academics, and engaging specifically the latter from the social sciences.

Annex: Organisation of crisis management

President

Council of State

exceptional circumstances

MFA

Min. of Defence

Defence Forces

Ministry of Finance

Bank of Finland

FSA

Inform. Manag. unit

Min. of Trade

HVK

TUKES

Min. of the Interior

Immigration

Police

Frontier Guard

Rescue Services

Min. of Soc. Aff.

STUK

ISA

immig

econ. crises

internat. crime

inform. security

environm. accidents

Min. of the Environm.

Environm. Institute

Environm. Centres

maritime accidents

hazardous substances

radiation

major disasters

internationalisation

severity

32