Greenland during the Cold War
Danish and American Security Policy 1945-68 _*

Danish Institute of International Affairs
December 17, 1996

Preface

This summary is a translation from the Danish of the concluding chapter of the report “Greenland during the Cold War. Danish and American Security Policy 1945-68”. The report is in two volumes. Volume 1 (614 pp.) contains the analysis, whereas volume 2 (473 pp.) consists of documents copied from Danish and American archives, together with relevant treaty texts.

The report was commissioned by the Government on 8th August 1995 from the newly established Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI) and was submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 17th January 1997. As stipulated in the mandate DUPI's task was to produce a historical review (White book) of US overflights of Greenland with nuclear weapons, and the role of Thule Air Base in that connection. The period to be covered was 1945 to 1968. The Government also requested that the report deal with the decision-making process at that time, as well as the general situation during the period in the fields of security policy and international relations.

At its first meeting in October 1995 DUPI's new Board accepted the assignment after having concluded that it would be possible to accomplish the task in a professionally justifiable manner. The acceptance was based on the assumption that DUPI would be given access to all relevant official material in Danish archives. It was further assumed that subsequently other researchers would be granted access to the same material.

DUPI's access to material in Danish archives has, in general, been satisfactory. DUPI has also conducted extensive research in US archives, but has not had privileged access to them. A list of the sources for the report, including archives and archival material as well as interviews, is given in vol. 1 of the Danish edition.

Acknowledgements to persons who in various ways have helped with assistance and advice in the process are to be found in the preface to the Danish edition.

The research was conducted in DUPI's Department of Analysis by a group headed by DUPI's Director, Niels-Jørgen Nehring, and the Director of the Department of Analysis, Svend Aage Christensen. The other members of the group were Senior Research Fellow, dr.phil. Frede P. Jensen, DUPI, Assistant Professor Thorsten Borring Olesen, Department of History, University of Aarhus, Professor Nikolaj Petersen, Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Senior Research Fellow Lars P. Poulsen-Hansen, DUPI, and two graduate students, Jens Peter Bjerg and Jesper Segelcke Thomsen, both DUPI. Jette Olsen, DUPI, carried out secretarial functions to the group. The report was prepared by Svend Aage Christensen, Frede P. Jensen, Niels-Jørgen Nehring, Thorsten Borring Olesen and Nikolaj Petersen.

The report has been discussed at several meetings with the Board of the Institute. In accordance with the law establishing the Danish Institute of International Affairs the report was submitted on the responsibility of the Board.

The members of the Board are the following: Professor, Jur.Dr.h.c. Ole Due (Chairman); Professor Nikolaj Petersen (Vice-Chairman); Deputy Permanent Under-secretary of State Per Carlsen; Senior Advisor Per Fischer; Senior Research Fellow, dr.phil. Frede P. Jensen; Political Director, Ambassador Per Poulsen-Hansen; Associate Professor Niels Erik Rosenfeldt; Professor, dr.oecon. Claus Vastrup, and Senior Research Fellow Ole Wæver.

The report was finalized on 17th December 1996.

 

Summary and Conclusions

The following is a translation of chapter 18 of the Danish language edition of the report “Grønland under den kolde krig. Dansk og amerikansk sikkerhedspolitik 1945-68”. It contains a summary of the report, together with the most important conclusions that can be drawn from it.

The cardinal concerns of the report are: American and Danish security policy regarding Greenland, as well as Danish policy regarding Greenland with particular emphasis on the American military presence. The gravitational centres of this report are the points at which these three sets of problems meet. The summary is arranged according to these points of gravity and the intervening periods: the Agreement of 1951 relating to the Defence of Greenland and its antecedents, the period between 1951 and 1957, the H.C. Hansen document of 1957 — which gave the green light for the stationing of nuclear weapons in Greenland, the period between 1957 and 1968, and finally the crash of the American bomber at Thule in 1968.

The summary starts out with emphasizing that present-day conceptions cannot always be used as a yardstick in the evaluation of decisions and events that took place up to fifty years ago.

After the summary follows a section on American policy throughout the periodunder consideration, including a survey of the most important weapons and aircraft which were operative in and over Greenland. The chapter concludes with a survey and analysis of the Danish policy, with particular emphasis on its underlying assumptions, its actual content and its administrative implementation.

 

Introduction

Barely three weeks after the crash of an American B-52 long-range strategic nuclear bomber at Thule on the 21st of January 1968, the Danish Parliament passed a resolution that attempted to regulate the American military presence in Greenland, but which simultaneously put a stop to further discussion of this question internally in Denmark. The resolution reads as follows:

“In that Parliament takes it that the Government, by procuring absolute guarantees that no nuclear weapons are stored in Greenland, and by ensuring, in order that Greenland airspace remains a nuclear weapon-free zone, that Danish nuclear policy is upheld in all parts of the Kingdom and Danish sovereignty respected, the Assembly moves on to debate the Finance Bill for 1968-69.”

A few months later these guarantees were provided through an exchange of notes between the Danish and American governments. As far as international law was concerned, the exchange of notes was considered an amendmentto the Agreement of 1951 which regulated US military activities in Greenland. Following an American request the exchange of notes was not made public, but the contents of the exchange were the subject of a press release issued by the Danish government on 31st May 1968. The press release closed with the words: “The result of the discussions in Washington establishes accord between the Greenland Defence Agreement of 1951 and Danish nuclear policy, thereby ensuring that this policy is respected in Greenland under international law.”

These developments showed that attention was concentrated on the present and the future. The question of a possible discordance between American activities in Greenland and Danish nuclear policy was not raised, even though the crash might well have offered an opportunity for this. The fact that for years prior to 21st January 1968 the flight of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons over Greenland had been a daily occurrence, slid out of sight.

The absence of any discussion of opening an investigation into the past was first and foremost a consequence of the Cold War. According to the prevailing view such an investigation would have been self-destructive, since it would have uncovered facts and calculations which might have placed Denmark in an exposed position in relation to the Soviet Union. Ever since Denmark had become a member of NATO every effort had been made to tone down anything which — rightly or wrongly — might be interpreted as showing offensive intent. This policy had a dimension entirely its own as far as American activity in Greenland was concerned.

The period under consideration in the present report, 1945 to 1968, coincides almost exactly with the period called the First Cold War, where the antagonism between East and West arose, taking on a form which was to become the dominant framework for most international relations. For a country the size of Denmark, and situated as it is, the Cold War was a daily reminder of exposure. The Cold War and, in the case of Denmark, the sense of being exposed left its mark very clearly on foreign and security policy, both regarding content and the manner in which the policies were designed. To ignore these factors would give a completely misleading picture of the course of events that has been delineated in this report, the most important elements of which are recorded in the following.

Just as it would be impossible to fully understand and evaluate the policy practised in this period without holding it up against the backcloth of the Cold War, and the pressure it imposed on those who had to make the decisions, it is also necessary to make allowances for the shift of perspective that has taken place during the last 30 to 50 years in other regards. There has, for example, been a democratization of foreign policy in the intervening years. In the 1950s and 1960s one kept closer to the letter of the Constitution, by which foreign policy is a matter for the Government, whereas the role of Parliament — via the Foreign Policy Committee — is to be consulted on matters of greater scope. Several circumstances — the general internationalization and, not least, membership of the European Community/European Union — have contributed to a development whereby Parliament today follows developments in foreign policy far more closely, and plays a far larger role in the process. In this connection the press and public opinion are more actively involved in the foreign policy process.

Another area in which one must take into account a shift in perspective, is the position of Greenland in the Kingdom, and the general thinking on this. At the beginning of the period covered in this report, Greenland had the status of a colony. This was altered in the Constitution of 1953, which gave Greenland the status of a Danish county. With the introduction of the Home Rule arrangement in 1979 Greenland was granted self-rule in a number of administrative areas. However this did not include foreign policy, which remained a matter for the Danish government. With regard to the period in question, however, foreign and security policy matters gradually became a field of interest for the population of Greenland and its representatives, and today there is agreement between the Danish and Greenland authorities on maintaining a high level of dialogue and consultation on these questions.

 

The Agreement Of 1951 Concerning The Defence Of Greenland

The agreement which the Danish Minister in Washington, Henrik Kauffmann, signed with the American government on 9th April 1941, gave the United States almost unlimited rights to establish bases and military installations in Greenland. With the end of the Second World War the Americans had made use of this right at 17 different locations, including Narsarsuaq and Sondrestrom, where they had established large air bases. The American concern was initially to prevent the Germans getting a foothold in Greenland. With the US entry into the war the meteorological information gathered in Greenland was to become of vital importance for transatlantic air and sea communications. At the same time the bases functioned as stepping stones for aircraft from North America on its way to the European war zone.

At its first peacetime meeting, on 16th May 1945, the Parliament ratified the 1941 Agreement. Appreciation of the American contribution to the war was undoubtedly an important part of the background for this act. Furthermore, Henrik Kauffmann's contribution was approved by making him a member of the National Liberation Government as Minister without Portfolio. But the ratification of the 1941 Agreement was also a means of emphasizing Danish sovereignty over this distant part of the Kingdom, which had been out of reach for the duration of the war. Soon, however, deliberations began on how to regain full control of Greenland. In October 1946 Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmussen declared from the rostrum of Parliament that the conditions for a termination of the Agreement of 1941 were now at hand. In the text of the Agreement it was laid down that it should “remain in force until it is agreed that the present dangers to the peace and security of the American Continent have passed.”

American thoughts were moving in a different direction, however. Under the impressions formed during the onset of the Cold War they were increasingly focused upon a more permanent presence in Greenland. In the surveys of the need for American bases that were being constantly updated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Greenland together with Iceland and the Azores was, in 1946, singled out as an area of “the utmost importance.” In a certain sense the background was the same as before, apart from the fact that it was no longer Germany but the Soviet Union that they were defending themselves against. It was of course important that the Soviet Union should not, at some later phase, be able to gain a footing in Greenland. But more immediately it was the stepping stone function for aircraft crossing the Atlantic to airbases in Britain, North Africa and the Middle East that was crucial. These bases had now become essential to the American policy of containment of the Soviet Union.

The years from 1945 to 1949 formed a period of conflicting interests. After the war there was a widespread expectation in American society of enjoying the peace dividend, while expenditure on overseas bases was a particularly burdensome item in the defence budget. This was also true of the bases in Greenland, where expenditure soared due to the climatic conditions. But at the same time developments in strategic thinking were pointing towards a heightened role for the polar regions in the future. This situation was the basis for the US desire both to meet what were considered to be the immediately pressing needs, while at the same time ensuring that long-term American interests could be met.

From a Danish point of view the American presence in Greenland was part of a complex of problems that was difficult to handle. This was particularly true of the plans to extend and enlarge this presence. Quite early on a pattern appeared in the contradictory considerations that were to decide the course of Danish policy throughout the period that is covered by this report. During the first post-war years relations with the Soviet Union, which had troops stationed on Bornholm until April 1946, played a considerable role. One argument against granting the Americans the right to permanent bases in Greenland was the fear that it might lead to the Russians staying on or returning to Bornholm. On the other hand the worsening international situation in the years that followed urged the showing of greater consideration towards the interests of the United States, the potential protector. At the same time, however, Danish public opinion was expecting a return to full control of Greenland. Through intense contacts with the American administration, the Danish government received a clear impression of the great interest of the United States in Greenland, and was even presented with a proposal for the sale of Greenland to the US. On the basis of this consultations were held between the Government and the opposition, though with the exception of the Communists.

The many levels in the American governmental apparatus which were active in relation to Greenland made it difficult for the Danish policy makers to gain an overall understanding of an American policy which often appeared self-contradictory. At the same time as an increased American interest in the polar regions could be registered, the need for budget reductions resulted in pressure being laid on Denmark to take over the running of the American weather stations. In this situation the Danish aim became on the one hand to obtain the greatest possible clarity as to American intentions, and on the other to prepare for a lengthy process which could gradually lead to regaining of control over Greenland, chiefly through the taking over of American facilities. In 1947 an interministerial committee “for the Coordination of various Tasks in Greenland” was set up as an instrument for gaining a more comprehensive view of the situation. Already that same year, under the aegis of this committee, the Government received a report from Ambassador Kauffmann on American strategic thinking according to which Greenland and the entire Arctic region would come to play a significant, though largely defensive, role in a future conflict with the Soviet Union.

Greenland was an important element in considerations of Denmark's alliance policy in the period up to 1949. It was hardly likely that overseas areas like Greenland would be encompassed by a Scandinavian defence arrangement. In such a case the two parts of the kingdom — Denmark and Greenland — would each have different defence status. The fact that Greenland would, under any circumstances, be attached to the North American defence became an element which, both in the United States and in Denmark, argued for Danish membership of NATO.

With NATO membership from 1949 the possibility arose that the difficult question of the American military presence in Greenland could be placed in a multilateral framework. From a Danish point of view — which was marked by concern about sovereignty over Greenland, the broader NATO frame seemed a more reassuring starting-point than a straightforward bilateral arrangement where Denmark would have to face the American superpower alone.

Whereas Danish-American defence relations had so far been limited to Greenland, NATO membership meant that Southern Denmark was now included. This created the possibility for linkage between these two facets of Danish security policy, since one could play upon the security policy advantages that access to the Greenland area offered USA. This linkage, normally termed “the Greenland card”, has played a role for both Danish and American policy makers throughout the various phases described in this report.

In October 1949 the Americans opened negotiations with the wish to acquire long-term rights to a number of existing facilities in Greenland, together with the possibility of establishing new ones. This gave Copenhagen a certain clarity as to American plans. When, at the end of October, Prime Minister Hans Hedtoft informed the Foreign Policy Committee of the American wishes, he used the Greenland card, specifically linking the question of concessions to the Americans in Greenland with the guarantees one could obtain for the defence of Southern Denmark. This took place at a time when the integrated military structure of NATO was not yet in place, and when there was considerable uncertainty in Denmark regarding the scope of the security guarantee of the Alliance. When the Greenland card was used subsequently it was usually in its rather softer version: that when evaluating the Danish defence effort — which was felt by many to be too modest — the base rights in Greenland should be included as perhaps Denmark's most important contribution to the Alliance.

In the dialogue that followed the American opening, the Danish side adopted a positive wait-and-see attitude. The crucial point was to establish the fact of Danish sovereignty over Greenland beyond all possible doubt. For that reason the Agreement of 1941 with its almost unlimited American rights had to be revoked. Other important elements were the acknowledgement of a Danish commander-in-chief for the NATO defence forces in Greenland, together with the creation of a precedent for the possibility of American military facilities being taken over by Denmark when the possibility for this arose. At the top of this list of wishes stood the Grønnedal naval base.

In actual fact a number of bases and installations were handed over to Denmark, particularly in the course of 1950, during a lull in American pressure for a new agreement. The most important of these was the handing over of Sondrestrom Air Base, which took place on the condition that the Americans could return to it in a time of crisis.

The pause in negotiations was due to internal American deliberations, the most important of which dealt with an altered strategy in regard to the Soviet Union, which had tested its first atomic bomb in 1949. The new thinking, which gradually gained ground, meant that the so-called Perimeter Strategy was supplemented and subsequently replaced by a Polar Strategy. The former was based on retaliation against the Soviet Union being launched from bases on the periphery of Soviet land areas, including from Great Britain. For this the airbases in Southern Greenland served for intermediate landings. The Polar Strategy, which was a consequence of Soviet possession of nuclear weapons and the development of intercontinental bombers, was based on retaliation against the Soviet Union being carried out by means of the shortest direct route, i.e. over the polar regions, if need be with refuelling of the bombers while airborne. This brought about a shift of interest from Southern to Northern Greenland.

About the turn of the year, 1950/51, the Americans were ready to do business. Denmark first became aware of the change in American policy in connection with Nato's planning activity for the North Atlantic area, where a new and far more comprehensive list of the American need for bases was presented in January 1951. These needs, and particularly the desire to build a large airbase at Thule, now became part of negotiations towards an agreement with Denmark, which suddenly speeded up. There can be little doubt that the increased American interest in Greenland must be seen in the light of the worsening international situation in connection with the outbreak of war in Korea in the summer of 1950, and of concern as to whether US advance bases in Europe could be held in a war against the Soviet Union. Furthermore the present report documents that the American policy was finally determined somewhat later than has been formerly supposed, and that it was the political leadership of the Air Force that put pressure on the Strategic Air Command (SAC), which was afraid that forcing through the building of Thule might delay other high priority base projects.

For Denmark the American move was something of a surprise. The Danish take-over of American facilities, the most important being Sondrestrom, had given the impression that matters were moving in the opposite direction. To this must be added the fact that the Danish security perspective was narrower than the American, and for this reason the Danes did not have any real insight into the background for the change in strategy with which they were now faced. As far as formalities were concerned the Danes would have preferred negotiations to have taken place under the auspices of NATO, but had to accept that the negotiations were in fact bilateral, though based on the defence planning of the Alliance.

During the short period of actual negotiations, which took place while the Americans — with Danish permission — began to prepare the groundwork for the building of Thule Air Base, the Danes tried to maintain the principles that had been followed in the earlier phase, which is to say the question of sovereignty and, in connection with that, termination of the Agreement of 1941. There was also the perspective of further take-overs, and here they energetically persisted in their wish to take over Grønnedal. Even though it became clear during negotiations that a Danish Commander-in-Chief would never be given operational tasks in relation to the American forces in Greenland, e.g. air forces using Thule, for symbolic reasons the concept of a Danish “Island Commander Greenland” was maintained.

Taking into account that the American involvement in Greenland, which was already considerable, was about to be increased, the process of political approval moved rather smoothly. This was in no small way thanks to the manner in which the matter was presented by the leading political parties: the Social Democrats, who were in power from 1947 to 1950, and the Liberal and Conservative parties who took over the reins of government in October 1950. During a meeting in the Foreign Policy Committee prior to the negotiations Hans Hedtoft recommended, on behalf of the Social Democrats, that one tried to involve the Americans as much as possible in Greenland. This was said with reference to the economic cost of the defence of Greenland. At the meeting in the Committee, in which what was in essence the completed agreement was presented, discussion hardly moved beyond a technical explanation, and never touched the geo-strategic role of Greenland. Foreign Minister Ole Bjørn Kraft, in his explanation for why Thule had suddenly been included in the negotiations, emphasised the need for air transport of American-Canadian forces for the defence of Northern Greenland.

In the lengthy process before and during the actual negotiations the Americans had, on several occasions, provided information as to the role of Greenland and, in particular, Thule in the new strategic picture. But it is also clear that American thinking and the American plans were evolving rapidly in this period, so that the picture that was given the Danish delegation may have been difficult to interpret. From the sparse material that has been found of internal Danish deliberations on this point it is clear, however, that they had understood that the role of the Thule base went beyond defensive measures. The picture that was presented to the public, however, emphasized only the defensive aspects of US tasks in Greenland.

On the first of June 1951 the agreement was ratified by Parliament, though the secret annex which defined the defence areas in Greenland, together with two confidential protocols, were not presented. The Danes could now rejoice over the fact that the unlimited freedom of movement for the Americans in Greenland that was embodied in the Agreement of 1941 had been transformed into limited rights and specified locations, and that the provisions that were to emphasize Danish sovereignty were included in the final text.

During the ratification debate in Parliament the Communist Aksel Larsen, who was extremely critical of the Agreement, was practically the only member to dwell on the role of Greenland in the strategic deterrence of the Soviet Union. Here Aksel Larsen quoted from an article in “Life” magazine, where the role of the polar regions in a future war was discussed, with emphasis on Greenland. For that reason he warned of the impression that the “surrender of Greenland” would make on the Soviet Union. The Government rejected this as speculation, and instead underlined the defensive nature of the Agreement. This fitted well into the use of the term “the defence of Greenland” throughout the process of negotiation, which ultimately became the title of the Agreement, although it was only partially correct.

Subsequent interest has concentrated on what rights the Agreement granted the Americans with regard to stationing and overflights with nuclear weapons. The formulations in the Agreement which have drawn particular interest in this connection are the right “to store supplies” (Article II, 3b) and to “fly over and land in any territory in Greenland” (Article V, 3). During the negotiations the question of nuclear weapons was never raised. DUPI's research has shown that the Americans had considered including this question in their negotiations for base rights in Allied countries, but that this possibility was rejected by the Atomic Energy Commission, which had control of American nuclear weapons. The Commission pointed out that this question should be negotiated separately when the need arose. This decision should presumably also be seen in connection with the fact that including the question of nuclear weapons would have complicated the negotiations. Nor was the question raised by the Danish delegation, and there do not seem to have been any deliberations in Copenhagen on the issue. The wording of the Agreement, which neither expressly permitted the presence of nuclear weapons, nor forbade them, contained a possibility for interpretation that would later turn out to be of great significance.

 

Between 1951 And 1957

The building of Thule Air Base from the summer of 1951 to the summer of 1952 was an exceptionally demanding construction task, not least considering the difficult climatic conditions. There was already a civilian Danish scientific station on the site, which included a weather reporting facility and a magnetic observatory. The station was managed by a mixed Danish-American crew, and the Americans had laid out a landing strip near the station for the landing of provisions for this and other weather stations, and for expeditions. This rather modest facility now became the bridgehead for the building of the base.

From its completion and during the years that followed the personnel stationed at Thule numbered some 5,000 to 7,000 men, including civilian personnel. The decisiveness and the haste with which the construction project was carried out was a mark of how important this base was considered to be. In all lists of American bases in the following years Thule held a prominent position.

Even before the base was fully operational in 1954, it served as an important link in the United States' — and thereby NATO's — defence planning, and already in the autumn of 1952 training programmes were carried out for the tasks that Thule was expected to handle. These tasks changed in the course of time in keeping with developments in weapons technology and strategy. The decisive differences between the role of Thule in the 1950s and 1960s is discussed below. But even in the very early phase the introduction of new types of aircraft caused changes in the tasks planned for the Thule base in peacetime and in war.

The immediate main task of Thule was to be a staging base for a groupof heavy B-36 long-range strategic bombers, or alternatively a wing of B-47 medium-range bombers. Even in peacetime a certain rotation and thereby spreading of the aircraft took place, but in the event of war the aircraft would be spread to such staging bases in order to secure greater likelihood that a retaliatory strike could be carried out. Subsequently, when the B-36 bombers were phased out in preference to the B-47 medium-range bombers, Thule also served as base for the airborne tankers that were to carry out refuelling of the B-47 aircraft. There was also a reconnaissance version of the B-47, the RB-47, which was equipped to undertake weather reconnaissance, electronic reconnaissance, or photo-reconnaissance. A number of these aircraft operated from Thule in the years 1956-1959. Their missions were naturally surrounded by great secrecy. But the available information shows that the RB-47 aircraft, operating out of Thule, carried out photographic and electronic reconnais-sance not only along the borders of the Soviet Union, but also inside Soviet airspace.

Thule did not function as a base for fighter aircraft whose mission it was to escort bombers. However a number of fighter-interceptors were stationed at Thule right up until the mid-1960s for the defence of the base itself. From 1953 the air defence also included anti-aircraft artillery and, from 1959, surface-to-air missiles (Nike Hercules).

Organizationally the Thule base was part of the American North East Air Command, with headquarters on Newfoundland. This continued until 1st April 1957, when the base was placed directly under Strategic Air Command, SAC. Right from the beginning, however, SAC already had important assignments at Thule, related in particular to exercises, and from 1954 a local SAC headquarters was set up on the base in support of the many SAC aircraft that were, by then, passing through Thule.

The change in strategy that had brought about the building of the Thule base meant radical changes for the two other Greenland bases. Sondrestrom, which had been handed over to Denmark in 1950, was reactivated as an auxiliary American base for Thule already in 1951, and from April 1957 it was transferred together with Thule to SAC, as a potential staging base for B-47 aircraft in a crisis or in the event of war, and as a base for air-refuelling tankers. Later it also became an support base for the DEW Line that was set up in the years after 1958. The significance of Narsarsuaq as atransit base for air traffic across the Atlantic, on the other hand, diminished with technological developments until it was abandoned by the Americans in 1957-58, and finally closed down as a defence area in 1964.

The Danes must of course have been aware that in the event of war NATO's nuclear retaliation strategy would also involve the American bases in Greenland. But in the years immediately after the Agreement of 1951 this question was dealt with just as cautiously as it had been during the negotiations prior to the Agreement. Added to this, the Americans in this period still considered nuclear weapons to be “special weapons”, which were under a civilian controlling body and, moreover, treated with the greatest discretion.

Visible evidence of the possible use that Thule could be put to within the nuclear strategy was provided when, in the summer of 1954, a specially protected depot was built at Thule for the storage of nuclear weapons. This information came from the Danish liaison officer through whom the authorities in Copenhagen were able to gain a certain insight into American activities on the base. In a report from January 1955 to Island Commander Greenland he drew particular attention to the building of this weapon arsenal. There is, however, no direct evidence that it was actually used for the storage of nuclear weapons. It is probable, however, that this storage facility was used during the months in 1958 when the Americans, according to the information they provided to the Danish Government in 1995, had four nuclear weapons placed in Thule.

Among the American activities the building and running of Thule held a special place. But the Americans had other wishes and plans regarding a number of locations in Greenland. The Agreement of 1951 ensured a clear geographical delimitation of the defence areas, and thereby the framework for the American presence. The details were enclosed in the so-called Technical Schedule to the Agreement, the contents and existence of which were classified “Secret” until 1967. A pliable and discreet procedure was also agreed upon for eventual alterations to the delineations of the defence areas. A corresponding procedure applied for granting permission for American activities outside these areas.

As a consequence of technological developments and strategic needs in the following years, the Danish authorities were faced with having to deal with a stream of applications for facilities and activities, or to participate in deliberations about them. A number of projects were carried out. Weather stations were set up, as well as radar stations and Loran stations (navigational support). Other projects never got beyond the discussion stage. This was true inter alia of plans for building a new base in the strategically interesting North-eastern Greenland. After a process during which the Danes felt themselves to have been insufficiently informed as to the American objectives and, as a result of insufficient technical and financial possibilities, hampered in following the American activities, the matter ended with the building of an emergency landing-strip in connection with the Danish weather station at Station Nord, which had in fact been established in order to keep the Americans out of North-East Greenland.

Other deliberations were of a more speculative and unofficial nature. This was true of an October 1957 news story which, in reaction to the Soviet lead in missile technology, recommended that intermediate-range ballistic missiles should be stationed in North-East Greenland, since it was possible to strike targets deep inside the Soviet Union from there. This suggestion, which Denmark was bound to consider aggressive and dangerous, was vigorously rejected.

Generally the Danish authorities adopted a pragmatic approach to American wishes. The course followed was that they expressed misgivings about the establishment of new defence areas, whereas flexibility was shown in regard to other wishes, including the extension of existing defence areas. When permission was sought to begin preliminary investigations an attempt was made to have Danes involved in the work while at the same time stressing the point that permitting such an investigation did not imply ultimate authorization. At times, when it was financially possible, the projects were carried out as Danish projects, and were later made available for Danish-American collaboration. It gradually became regular practice to insist on the use of Danish contractors and labour wherever possible. And with equal consistency the demand was made that, wherever possible, sites should be situated where personnel had as little contact as possible with the population of Greenland.

The most controversial example of the procedures for alterations to the Agreement of 1951 was the annexation of the so-called Koloni Peninsula (Mount Dundas Peninsula) into the Thule defence area. An American wish to set up air defence positions on this location, combined with an already existent Danish desire to move the settlement that was situated there, resulted in the settlement being re-sited in 1953. The prospect of getting the Americans to cover the cost of this transfer played its part in the decision that was taken. This question dominated the Danish-American discussions of the matter. However in order to avoid criticism of the American presence in Greenland, the transfer was explained to the public at large by referring to the worsening living conditions at Thule, and by pointing out that the Greenlanders themselves were in favour of the transfer.

In the 1950s in particular, the Americans carried out extensive military and scientific investigations in Greenland. In each case, Danish permission was granted. Even though a scientific adviser was appointed to the liaison officer in Thule from 1954, it was difficult to obtain an overview of these varied activities.

While the US planning and actual activities in Greenland were part of a strategic context, which was ultimately aimed at nuclear retaliation, no conclusive evidence has been found of the storage/stationing of nuclear weapons in Greenland in this period — up to and including 1957. It cannot be excluded that overflights of Greenland, with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, took place in the early period (1952-55), possibly including landings with such weapons, e.g. as emergency landings or in connection with manoeuvres, but the earliest (imprecise) indications of overflights with nuclear weapons which DUPI has found date only from December 1956, when very large scale air activity took place in the Arctic area, and with air-refuelling from Thule, in connection with the Hungarian and Suez crises and the related alerts. A more certain indication stems from a manoeuvre in mid-1957. Added to which there was an incident in October 1957, when a B-47 medium-range bomber made an emergency landing at Station Nord. The bomber may have been carrying nuclear weapons, in which case they would still have been on board when, some days later, the aircraft was directed to Thule. The more routine Airborne Alert programme with nuclear weapons was, however, only initiated in 1958.

 

The H.C. Hansen Document

1957 was the year in which USA paved the way for a general nuclearization of NATO defences. This was based on the assumption that the NATO countries were inferior with regard to conventional weapons. This notion of inferiority in relation to the Soviet Union grew dramatically with the launching of Sputnik in October 1957, confirming that the Soviet Union, unlike the USA, was in possession of missiles with intercontinental range.

The offer of tactical nuclear weapons to the European NATO countries, in the shape of surface to air missiles (Nike), surface to surface missiles (Honest John), together with nuclear ammunition for artillery and missiles for aircraft, was meant to compensate for this inferiority in the sphere of conventional weapons. The United States itself attempted to compensate for the apparent Soviet lead in the strategic area by developing an airborne alert for its bombers, by speeding up the development of the intercontinental missiles, and by trying to place medium range missiles at locations in Europe from which they could strike at the Soviet Union.

This nuclearization of the Alliance was to be adopted at the NATO summit in December 1957.

In Denmark a sceptical attitude to nuclear weapons was beginning to make itself felt in the political debate. This was particularly true of the Social Democratic Party, who during the election campaign prior to the elections of May 1957, had stressed their opposition to the stationing of nuclear weapons in Denmark. The refusal to accept any eventual offer of the stationing of nuclear weapons was included in the written agreement between the Social Democrats, the Social Liberal Party, and the Justice Party (Danish Georgists), which formed the basis of a coalition Government; and it was also confirmed by Prime and Foreign Minister H.C. Hansen when he presented the policy of the new Government in Parliament, by rejecting the possible offer once again, but adding “under the present circumstances.”

Prior to this, in March 1957, the Social Democratic minority Government led by H.C. Hansen accepted in principle an American offer for the delivery of both Nike and Honest John missiles, but bearing conventional warheads. A few days later a threatening letter was received from the Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin. The letter contained a warning that “for countries the size of Denmark, the granting to foreign powers of the possibility of establishing bases would, in the event of the outbreak of an atomic war, be synonymous with suicide.” The letter went on to refer directly to Greenland which had been “transformed into a military base for the United States, and is in fact no longer under the control of Denmark.” This claim was denied in a reply from the Prime Minister with reference to Denmark's non-aggressive intentions, and to the already published Greenland Defence Agreement. But everything points to the serious impression made by the Soviet démarche.

When, on 13th November 1957, the Prime Minister was approached by the American Ambassador, who asked whether the Danish Government would wish to be informed in the event of USA placing nuclear weapons on Greenland, and thus, in reality, be put in the position of having to accept such a stationing of nuclear weapons, he found himself in a difficult situation. The difficulties stemmed from three circumstances which have been dealt with earlier:

In the first case the matter was likely to further jeopardize Denmark's relations to the Soviet Union. Soviet watchfulness of and pressure on Denmark was a source of permanent anxiety, and the Bulganin letter was still fresh in everyone's mind. The letter was probably the result of suspicions that the missiles Denmark had agreed to accept in a conventional version could one day be equipped with nuclear warheads, and that the Danish nuclear policy in general would prove to be frail if it came under pressure. Press coverage of the stationing of nuclear weapons in Greenland would undoubtedly lead to Soviet reactions.

Secondly, H.C. Hansen was the chairman of a party that had gone to the polls rejecting any stationing of nuclear weapons on Danish territory, and the leader of a Government which had adopted this as official policy. This Government also included a party — the Social Liberals — whose attitude was even more rejectionist. It is true that Greenland had not been thought of when the nuclear proviso was formulated. This became very clear when, in January 1958, the Prime Minister informed Parliament about the NATO summit that had been held in December 1957. He told Parliament that the reason for the Danish nuclear proviso was the unusual degree of attention with which Eastern European states followed defence arrangements “in the region to which Denmark belongs”. This conception that different conditions as regards security policy might apply to Greenland and to the rest of Denmark was not new. The 1953 reservation against the stationing of foreign forces in Denmark was formulated simultaneously with an increase in activities at the American bases in Greenland. The difficulty involved was that public debate on the stationing of nuclear weapons in Greenland would inevitably raise the question of how appropriate it was to have one nuclear policy for Denmark, and another for Greenland, while at the same time arousing what would, in the eyes of the Government, be an unwelcome debate on the American presence in Greenland.

In the third place the Prime Minister would, within a matter of weeks, be participating in NATO's summit in Paris on overall nuclear policy, at which he would be officially informing the allies on the Danish nuclear proviso. Denmark, which felt itself in a particularly exposed position in relation to the Soviet Union, and for that reason extremely dependent on solidarity within the Alliance, could expect heavy criticism for its lack of solidarity.

But even from an American point of view the situation was a difficult one. DUPI's research has uncovered internal deliberations, among others between the State Department and the American Defence Ministry, prior to the approach to the Prime Minister. At this point in time the US Administration seems to have held the view that the Agreement of 1951, which said nothing on the subject, was broad enough to allow such stationing/storage. Their discussions centred entirely on whether it might be a wise move, for political reasons, to ask the Danes. The Ambassador in Copenhagen, who had followed the internal Danish debate on nuclear weapons, was included in these discussions. The Ambassador's advice was that one should ask, but that the question — to be asked of the Permanent Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs — should turn on whether the Danish Government wished to be informed if the Americans stationed nuclear weapons in Greenland. By asking in this manner, and avoiding a request for permission to station nuclear weapons, one would intimate that this permission was already contained in the Agreement of 1951.

After further deliberations in Washington, where at one point those involved were most inclined to station the weapons without contacting the Danes, they decided to follow the model that the Ambassador had suggested, and which he himself would have to carry out, though the approach was to be made to the Prime Minister. It is probable that the Permanent Secretary of State Nils Svenningsen had been contacted in advance on the matter.

As regards the background for the wish to station nuclear weapons in Greenland, the American Ministry of Defence had, in the summer of 1957, drawn attention to the need for storing “SAC and air defence weapons in Thule”. The desire to strengthen the air defences of the base seem here to be more readily explicable than to store “SAC weapons”, by which was probably meant atomic or hydrogen bombs. Thule did not really function as a base for bombers, and this part of the storage is probably first and foremost an expression of the general nuclearization of the American airbases. As mentioned earlier, Thule was placed under SAC from 1st April 1957. But the weapons may also have been intended for an aircraft unit planned for stationing at Thule.

The result of the Ambassador's conversations with the Danish Prime Minister on 13th and 18th November 1957 are described in the American documents. These documents make it clear that the Danish Prime Minister had taken note of the matter “on a strictly personal basis”, and had made no other comment. This led to the conclusion in the State Department that the Americans were now in a position to go ahead with the deployment. The Ambassador had also reported that “the Prime Minister was “adamant” that there would be no publicity of any kind about this matter now or later.”

The desire for secrecy is presumably the reason that no known Danish minutes or similar papers on the discussions exist. The only known contemporary Danish document on the affair is a paper which, in a hand-written note made by Permanent Secretary of State Svenningsen, is entitled: “Statement (informal) from H.C. Hansen to the American Ambassador Val Peterson.” and which carries the date 16th November 1957. This document, the existence of which for many years had only been known by a narrow circle, was the subject of much attention when it was brought to light in 1995, and has been called the H.C. Hansen letter or, in this report, the H.C. Hansen document. It is one of two copies. The other, which was handed to the American Ambassador, has not been found by DUPI in the American archives.

The document reads as follows:

“During your visit here some days ago you made some remarks about the possible storing of supplies of munition of a special kind in the defence areas in Greenland. I gathered that your Government did not see any problem in this matter, which in its opinion was covered by the Agreement of April 27, 1951, according to which each Government will take such measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry out their responsibilities in Greenland and the U.S. Government is entitled to store supplies, provide for the protection of the area etc. and all materials, supplies etc. shall be permitted entry into Greenland free of inspection. You did not submit any concrete plan as to such possible storing, nor did you ask questions as to the attitude of the Danish Government to this item. I do not think that your remarks give rise to any comments from my side.”

As already mentioned, we are dealing with a text that very carefully avoids answering any questions. The greater part of the text presents itself as an interpretation of the Agreement of 1951, and the result of that interpretation is equivalent to the American one. The caution which must have been invested in the formulation of this answer is on a par with the very painstaking American deliberations that preceded the approach to the Danish Prime Minister. But these discussions can only have been carried out by a very narrow circle, probably consisting of no other participants than the Prime Minister and the Permanent Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Nils Svenningsen.

While there is a great deal of uncertainty attached to the precise circumstances of the drawing up of the H.C. Hansen document, there is a certain amount of evidence as to how it was understood, and what it led to.

In connection with the NATO summit in December 1957, at which Denmark had feared criticism due to the nuclear weapon proviso, Secretary of State Dulles personally expressed his gratitude to the Danish Prime Minister for “the helpful arrangement that had been made for United States establish-ments in Greenland.” The stationing of nuclear weapons began in the following year.

There are few Danish references to the H.C. Hansen document. It appears regularly, however, as a key foreign policy document in the internal lists of significant documents on Danish nuclear policy relating to Greenland which were drawn up by the Foreign Ministry in some cases in the period up to 1968. Nothing is said in these lists as to the content of the document, but it is given the designation “Cosmic” (which according to the classification in use was the highest degree of secrecy). The “need to know” principle which is applied in such cases assured, in advance, that only a very limited circle had access to the document.

Sources with a direct reference to the content of the H.C. Hansen document are even more rare. Jens Otto Krag, who was appointed Foreign Minister in October 1958, wrote in his diary entry for 25th August 1959:

“Uneasy about H.C.'s, Svenningsen's silent green light for storage of US nuclear weapons in Greenland — in November 1957. There was no Government decision behind them (sic!), and nothing was mentioned to Foreign Policy Committee. I have said to H.C. that we ought to put things right as regards Government and Committee. He will consider it. The difficulty is that two years have passed. Could I perhaps try to get some information in Washington on what has actually happened and present whatever information that turns up?”

There is, however, no evidence that Krag investigated the matter.

Press reports in these years, which more than hinted that there were nuclear weapons in Greenland, led to discussion in the Foreign Ministry as to how such questions from the press could be dealt with. It is evident that this work was carried out by a group in which no one, or at most only very few individuals, had knowledge of the exact contents of the H.C. Hansen document. A document dated 4th June 1959, which appears as the draft for a response, possibly if the Minister were to be asked a question in the Foreign Policy Committee, bears witness to knowledge of the essence, at least, of the H.C. Hansen document.

Themain text of the document of 4th June 1959 reads as follows:

“There is nothing in the Agreement (of 1951, ed.) stating that the US must inform Denmark as to which steps America feels called upon to take to safeguard the areas. That is not to say that we could not obtain the information, since the Danish authorities have not relinquished their natural right to move freely throughout Greenland (cf. Article II 3.b.), but we know that the United States puts great weight on being able to place its nuclear ammunition in the greatest secrecy, and that the safety of the West — including that of Denmark — depends to a high degree on the fact that these stores of nuclear weapons cannot be destroyed by attack or sabotage, and that their location must therefore be surrounded by the greatest possible secrecy. For that reason — meaning that this is also in the interests of Denmark — the Government has not felt that it should investigate whether nuclear ammunition is stored now and then — or permanently — within the special American-run defence areas in Greenland.”

There has been found no evidence that the contents of this paper have been communicated to the Foreign Policy Committee, the press or others, and this must be considered unlikely. On the other hand, it must be considered highly probable that Foreign Minister Krag has seen it. To the extent that it has been otherwise known, e.g. among a limited circle of staff at the Ministry, and irrespective of the fact that it was not permitted to make use of it externally, the material has functioned as an authoritative treatment and interpretation of the H.C. Hansen document.

The H.C. Hansen document came into being at a difficult juncture between on the one hand American deliberations which, despite an implicit assumption that they had the right to station nuclear weapons in Greenland according to the 1951 Agreement, ended with them finding it politically wise to ask whether Denmark desired to be informed, and on the other hand Danish deliberations which, for the reasons named above, were marked by the wish to avoid a public discussion of the matter. The form and secret status of the document were a direct result of this.

The H.C. Hansen document formed a framework for the coming years, both for the Americans and for the Danes. No comparable Danish-American contacts on matters of principle related to this subject occurred until 1968.

 

Between 1957 And 1968

Just a few months after the approach to H.C. Hansen the stationing of nuclear weapons in Greenland began. For a short period, from February 1958 and approximately eight months on, a small number of atomic or hydrogen bombs were stored at Thule, that is to say weapons that were included in the plans for the strategic offensive. The placing of the other nuclear weapons that were situated in Thule until 1965 was designed to strengthen the defences of the base.

The transition to the 1960s, with the greater vulnerability that resulted from the improved accuracy and range of Soviet nuclear weaponry meant that the roles of Greenland and of Thule moved increasingly over to the strategic-defensive area. In step with this, warning and communications systems were developed, including the most advanced models which made use of the new satellites. Among the largest construction efforts in the period from 1958 to 1961 was the building of the so-called DEW Line. This was composed of four stations designed to warn of attacking bombers, placed in a line across Southern Greenland, in extension of a similar line across Canada, and with connections on to Iceland and Scotland. Of even greater importance was the big BMEWS radar at Thule, that was active from 1960. This was the most important link in a chain of three radar stations in all, from Alaska to Great Britain, which could give warning of incoming missiles. From then on Thule's most important tasks consisted of acting as host to the BMEWS radar, and functioning as emergency landing place for the nuclear-weapon carrying B-52 long-range strategic bombers that made daily overflights of Greenland from 1961 as part of the Airborne Alert programme. One of these flight missions, which passed over the Thule base, the so-called Thule Monitor Mission, was also given the task of keeping in touch with the radar in order to verify that it was intact and had not been put out of action by attack or sabotage. It was a B-52 aircraft, flying the Thule Monitor Mission, that crashed in January 1968. The main route, however, went across central Greenland, with its approach a little north of Sondrestrom and the turning point on the East coast.

Although the H.C. Hansen document had been instrumental in preventing, for the time being, the question of nuclear weapons in Greenland being involved in the general discussion on the newly formulated nuclear proviso, critical questions on the matter did appear in the press. The daily newspaper “Information”, in a leading article on 20th April 1959, called the Government's nuclear policy “dubious”, since “nuclear weapons can already be found on Danish territory in Greenland”, and because Denmark had no hesitations about being defended by the nuclear weapons of her allies. As already mentioned, discussions were under way in the Foreign Ministry as to how such questions could be answered. The difficulties involved in finding a satisfactory formulation was chiefly caused by the fact that a decision had been reached at the highest level, but that this must not be made known.

It was somewhat easier to refute various rumours that appeared now and then in the American press, e.g. on the positioning of medium-range missiles in Greenland. In these cases energetic denials served to calm both Danish public opinion and the Soviet Union. DUPI's research has however shown that Greenland was actually included in some discussions of this nature. A rather fantastic project, “Iceworm”, on the placing of medium-range missiles in covered tunnels in the ice-cap, was discussed in American military circles and at the highest levels in the State Department, and was mentioned in vague terms in popular scientific articles. There was a clear connection between these ideas and the extensive research projects which USA carried out at the end of the 1950s at Camp Fistclench, Camp Tuto, and Camp Century, and which also included research into atomic energy as a source of energy for facilities on the ice-cap.

Public interest, which in these years was marked by a growing scepticism as regards atomic weapons, naturally revolved first and foremost around the many questions connected to Danish participation in the NATO defence, and in particular its nuclear aspects. The final rejection of nuclear warheads for the Nike-Hercules and Honest John missiles already delivered came in 1960, after further discussions at home and with the Allies. Later the American idea of a multilateral force, MLF, raised new and difficult questions. The creation of BALTAP in 1961, with its close collaboration between Danish and German defence forces, was the subject of much discussion.

The Soviet Union followed the Danish debate closely and exerted a pressure that was a source of deep concern. The years from 1958 to 1962 were marked by Soviet confrontational policy with recurrent crises over Berlin, the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and the Cuban Crisis in 1962. Given the overriding fear of war it made a deep impression when the Soviet Union addressed “warnings” directly to Denmark. The Bulganin letter of March 1957, which has been mentioned earlier, was just one link in a chain of such “warnings”, which could take the form of letters, memoranda, personal approaches by the Soviet Ambassador, and special articles in the Soviet media. The cancellation of a planned visit by Khrushchev in August 1959 could be seen in this light.

The Soviet inclusion of Bornholm in the controversy was particularly worrying. The prospect of the Warsaw Pact countries, while claiming special status for Bornholm, launching an isolated operation that would confront Denmark and NATO with a fait accompli, was a scenario that played a certain role in Danish thinking. The Soviet diplomatic activity slackened off after 1962, but resumed again around 1967 when the moment for a decision on whether to give up membership of NATO approached.

Denmark's reactions to the Soviet warnings and accusations always took the same form. The reaction consisted usually of a rejection accompanied by assurances that the measure that had been criticized was entirely defensive in nature. Furthermore, on many occasions emphasis was laid on the fact that permission would never be granted for Danish territory to be used as a base for aggression against the Soviet Union. As part of this diplomatic counter-offensive Denmark took the remarkable initiative at the United Nations of suggesting, in September 1960, that Greenland should be opened for inspection as part of a mutual and balanced arrangement for international weapon inspection. Even though the suggestion was supported by the United States, the general opinion was that it could not be realized.

At the meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council in April 1960 the Danish nuclear weapon proviso was made note of by the Alliance, and with the defence settlement of 1960 it is possible to say that it became a constituent part of Danish policy. The reason given in Parliament 21st January 1958 was Soviet interest in defence arrangements in “the region to which Denmark belongs”. Later the reason normally given for the nuclear weapon proviso was consideration for “the Nordic balance”. The reasoning behind this argument was that the Scandinavian countries with their separate alliances formed together a unique area of balance between the two blocks, which was marked by a low level of tension. If one of these countries obtained or accepted the stationing of nuclear weapons that balance would be destroyed.

The refusal to station nuclear weapons could be contested by considerations of solidarity to the Alliance. It was therefore considered important that the overall NATO nuclear policy and strategy were never put in question, nor any veto laid down against initiatives even if they were considered problematic. This was, for example, true of the MLF project, the idea of creating a European force of Polaris submarines armed with nuclear weapons. The project, which was discussed for several years, was never put into effect. The Danish attitude was that one would neither participate nor allow the entry of the vessels involved into Danish harbours, but on the other hand no action would be taken to prevent endorsement. The Soviet inspired idea of the creation of a nuclear weapon free zone in Scandinavia was seen as harmful for several reasons, especially because it could give the impression that Denmark was no longer covered by the nuclear protection afforded by the Alliance. These projects, in various disguises, were the subjects of debate throughout the first half of the 1960s.

The geographic argument for the nuclear proviso showed that Greenland had not been directly in mind. But this was allowed to appear unresolved in the public eye; and the H.C. Hansen document meant that this situation became fixed. But this of course did not mean that the public stopped putting questions. On 26th June 1961 Member of Parliament O. Mathiasen (Socialist People's Party) put the following question to Viggo Kampmann, who had become Prime Minister on the death of H.C. Hansen in 1960: “Will the Prime Minister clearly refute the rumours that have appeared in the press, “Information” for example, that nuclear weapons have already been placed on Danish territory?” The Prime Minister's reply: “On this matter I can inform you that no nuclear weapons are placed on Danish territory, and that no such placement is under consideration.” But later, on 3rd July, he made known to the Foreign Ministry that his answer also included Greenland, and that this could be passed on. The Foreign Ministry then informed the Danish embassies abroad, “that the Prime Minister's Office has informed the Foreign Ministry that the Prime Minister's statement also includes Greenland.” DUPI's research has unearthed no evidence that the Prime Minister's statement was based on concrete knowledge, and it was, in any case, factually incorrect. However this statement established the manner in which future questions could be answered.

The question of nuclear weapons in Greenland was occasionally the object of official discussion or announcements in the years following. At the Cabinet meeting on 23rd October 1962 the question was briefly touched on in connection with a discussion of the Cuban Crisis. The Prime Minister (Krag), the Foreign Minister (Per Hækkerup) and the Defence Minister (Poul Hansen) answered — according to the minutes — “that as far as they knew there were no nuclear weapons in Greenland, and that it was unlikely there would be any.” In a confidential Foreign Ministry report of 27th May 1963 on “possible stationing of foreign forces and nuclear weapons in Denmark” it says briefly regarding Greenland “that there are no nuclear weapons located there, just as there are only stationed a relatively limited number of American forces at the Danish-American defence areas established according to the Agreement of 27th April 1951 concerning the defence of Greenland.” This formulation was later used in Per Hækkerup's book “Danish Foreign Policy” from 1965. During the discussions in Parliament in the following years only occasional sporadic remarks about nuclear weapons in Greenland arose.

The existence of Airborne Alert, in which American bombers were in the air day and night, carrying full wartime armament, was well known. It was in fact included in the American plan for deterrence of the Soviet Union that the existence of these flights should be known. But the routes and the circumstances of the flights had to be held secret. In Greenland the daily overflights were visible, but of course it was not possible to know whether these aircraft were carrying nuclear weapons. At the same time there was a certain shift of interest in public opinion at home. Those circles that were particularly critical of the American military presence in Greenland focused their interest in these years on Vietnam.

Emergency landings began to present a serious problem, however. When an aircraft carrying nuclear weapons made an emergency landing, special and extensive security procedures were set in, under the code name “Broken Arrow”. Such incidents were normally included in the Danish liaison officers' monthly reports, which were forwarded via Island Commander Greenland and the Naval Command to the Defence Ministry, and from there on to the Foreign Ministry. In both Ministries the monthly reports circulated to the relevant offices, and younger members of staff wrote notes on the basis of them. In several instances the emergency landings with nuclear weapons were registered in these notes, and the notes together with the relevant monthly report were laid before the Permanent Under-Secretary and the Minister in the Ministry of Defence, and in the Foreign Ministry they were seen by the Permanent Under-Secretary at the very least, which must be taken to have meant that the Foreign Minister was also informed. In four cases there is documentary evidence that the Foreign Minister saw reports of the emergency landings. On one occasion, on 18th January 1965, the Broken Arrow alarm was not connected to an emergency landing of an aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, but to a fire in a Nike Hercules missile battery. The liaison officer's registration of this does not seem to have found its way to the above-mentioned notes. This clear indication of nuclear weapons on Thule was therefore probably never passed on to the political and administrative leaders. The same is apparently also true of a similarly clear indication of nuclear weapons for the F-102 air defence fighters that were stationed in Thule. The liaison officers at both Thule and Sondrestrom also observed the quite frequent Broken Arrow exercises. In a three year period from 1959 to 1962 at least 30 to 40 of these exercises were registered in their monthly reports.

On 13th January 1964 a B-52 long-range strategic bomber carrying two nuclear weapons crashed in the state of Maryland in the USA. This accident led to a discussion between the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Greenland, Eske Brun, and the American Ambassador in Copenhagen on the likelihood of something similar occurring in Greenland. The Ambassador had tried to reassure Eske Brun by saying that if something similar happened in Greenland, one should point out that the American activities were serving the cause of the free world, and refer otherwise to the Agreement of 1951. According to the American minutes of this discussion, Brun had not commented on these remarks, and this the Americans later turned to account.

Brun however contacted the Foreign Ministry and asked whether there was a Danish-American “understanding” about US aircraft not carrying nuclear weapons during practice flights over Greenland territory. The question led to both the Foreign Ministry and the Defence Ministry investigating the matter. A note was drawn up in the Foreign Ministry listing five earlier documents on nuclear weapons in Greenland, beginning with a reference to the H.C. Hansen document. A reference to Prime Minister Kampmann's statement as communicated on 8th July 1961 followed, together with three Foreign Ministry notes. The answer Brun received was that as far as could be seen a special restriction of practice activities over Greenland territory had never been negotiated, and that the Danish authorities had no knowledge as to whether SAC aircraft with nuclear weapons came anywhere near Greenland territory. The person handling the matter did not think that Denmark would be willing to raise the question with the Americans at this time. This answer from the Foreign Ministry could only be interpreted as an intimation that the question should not be taken any further.

Several emergency landings with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons at Thule took place in the years from 1962 on. In 1967 there were as many as three emergency landings, namely on 8th March, 13th May and 3rd July. That this was felt as a burden can be seen by the fact that the Foreign Ministry carefully considered the principles involved. A note from November 1967, which discussed the problem, resulted in the recommendation that the emergency landings be considered acceptable, and for that reason not at odds with official nuclear policy. The argumentation referred to the lack of airfields in the Arctic area. This first comprehensive analysis of the overflight problem had been difficult because of what was by now a large gap between declared nuclear policy and the actual situation. Even though political acceptance of the emergency landings would offer a certain relief on this account, the situation was unpleasant. This could also be seen in the request by the Foreign Ministry that the liaison officers' information on emergency landings should no longer be reported in the ordinary dispatches, but should go through a more rapid procedure that involved a more restricted circle of recipients.

 

The Aircrash At Thule

The crash at Thule on 21st January 1968 of an American B-52 bomber with four hydrogen bombs on board was a disaster that required immediate measures to safeguard the population. Already on 22nd January it was decided in Copenhagen to send a crew of Danish scientists to Thule to join the American investigation team that had been directed to the site of the accident immediately after the crash. It was also at once clear that the Danish Government found itself in a politically difficult situation.

The difficulties arose as soon as the public was informed of the accident. The Americans would have preferred the immediate issuing of an American-Danish communiqué. But the Danes had to take other matters into account. Since the accident would inevitably give rise to discussion about nuclear policy, it was important to avoid creating further difficulty through inappropriate wording. Added to this was the fact that elections were to be held two days after the accident, on 23rd January, and there was therefore a risk that the question would be brought into the election campaign. For these reasons the Danes tried to delay the publication of the communiqué, and also demanded that it should be purely American. The fact that the plane had crashed while attempting an emergency landing must also be stressed.

Already at this point the Government decided to say directly to the Americans that Greenland was also encompassed by the nuclear policy, and that overflights with nuclear weapons must be a thing of the past. It soon became apparent that the manner in which they chose to do this was likely to expose the disparity between the American and the Danish views of the situation. On the afternoon of 22nd January, following a sober bulletin from the Foreign Ministry, which Foreign Minister Tabor followed in a slightly sharper form, Prime Minister Krag issued the following statement:

“It is a well-known fact that, in agreement with the policy of the Government, no nuclear weapons are located on Danish territory. This is also true of Greenland, and there can therefore be no overflights of Greenland by aircraft carrying atomic bombs. It cannot however be excluded that American aircraft may attempt to land in Greenland in an emergency.”

The word “can”, which implied that any flights of this nature which might have taken place were unauthorized, angered the Americans who referred to the Agreement of 1951, and to the understanding reached with H.C. Hansen in 1957.

Krag's statement was also contradicted by the press, who carried the information that the crashed B-52 aircraft had been on a routine flight over Thule. This naturally elicited questions from political quarters. In order to be able to reply to these questions, the embassy in Washington was told to enquire about the plans and routes for the American flights, in the hope that this would uncover information that would lead to satisfactory answers. But these endeavours were brought up short by the American principle of never giving information as to the precise placing of nuclear weapons. American statements containing information about the routes that the B-52 aircraft followed would not be forthcoming. For this reason the Americans could not accept the issuing of a statement to the effect that there were no flights over Greenland territory. They could go no further than to state that the crashed aircraft was not scheduled to land at Thule.

On 26th January the Government informed the chairmen of the political parties of the situation on this basis. In his speech Tabor also touched on the validity of the Danish nuclear policy in relation to Greenland. He did not enter into the Foreign Ministry analyses of this question, which had been occasioned, among other things, by the emergency landings of the year before. Instead he asserted that already in 1957 Danish nuclear policy had been announced to the Allies in NATO, who had accepted it, and it was “obvious” that the nuclear policy meant a limitation of the conditions in the Greenland Defence Agreement in regard to the American right to overflights. Some criticism was voiced that the Government's briefing about the accident had come too late, but the above mentioned interpretation of nuclear policy was not contradicted. The meeting closed with the acting Government promising to do what it could to get to the bottom of the matter.

This view of Danish nuclear policy in no way corresponded to how the Americans saw the situation. It was crucial for them to make it clear that they had always acted within a framework that the Danes had accepted. In a note which had the character of a personal message, and which Ambassador Rønne was requested to hand to Prime Minister Krag, a comprehensive survey of the American nuclear activities in Greenland was given, together with the formal basis for them. The main thrust was to criticize the Danish position and to give the reasons why the Americans could not just accept it out of hand. Three sources were referred to: the Agreement of 1951, the conver-sation with H.C. Hansen in 1957, and the conversation between Permanent Under-Secretary Eske Brun and the then American Ambassador to Copenhagen in 1964. The note stated that at the point of writing no nuclear weapons were stored in Greenland, and no overflights carrying nuclear weapons took place.

In the light of the crisis looming in Danish-American relations, Krag decided to send Tabor to Washington. This possibility had already been touched upon in the meeting with party leaders. When this suggestion was met with a negative American reaction, it was decided instead to allow Ambassador Rønne to seek an audience with the American Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Rønne was requested not to touch upon the above-mentioned American note, but if the matter was raised, he was to dismiss it as historical reflections having no relevance for the situation under discussion. In reality this was a renouncement of the earlier Danish interpretation of the Greenland Defence Agreement and H.C. Hansen's acceptance.

The conversation with Dean Rusk was quite open-hearted. By way of opening Mr. Rusk surmised that the two countries were in agreement that Danish security policy rested on nuclear deterrence, which was, among other means, sustained through Airborne Alert 24 hours a day. As far as the required declaration was concerned, he had nothing against the Danish Government confirming that no nuclear weapons were located in Greenland, and that no overflights took place. But he would not be able to accept that the declaration contained a reference to contacts with the American Government.

Faced with this, Krag — who was only to remain Prime Minister for a few more days — chose to give in. On 29th January the following press release, after due discussion with the Americans, was issued: “In regard to current reports that overflights of Greenland are taking place by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, the Government confirms that there are no nuclear weapons stored in Greenland and no overflights of Greenland with nuclear weapons.” One hour before the press release was issued the Prime Minister had informed the party leaders on the matter, including the contacts which had taken place with the Americans but which could not be mentioned in the press release.

When the non-socialist three-party coalition Government took office on 2nd February 1968 it “inherited” the Thule affair. The limits for how the new Government could choose to handle the affair had however already been laid down during the negotiations of 28th and 29th January between the three parties on the basis for the new Government's policy. In a document from these negotiations the following is said of foreign and security policy: “The Government will insist that Denmark must be nuclear-free, and that this includes the airspace over every part of Danish territory, including Greenland.”

The nuclear-free status of Greenland was also mentioned in Prime Minister Baunsgaard's speech in Parliament on his accession to office, 6th February 1968. The Prime Minister stated: “It is the policy of the Government that no nuclear weapons are to be located on Danish territory. This is also true of Greenland and the airspace of Greenland.”

On the next day, 7th February, Foreign Minister Hartling informed the Foreign Policy Committee on the Thule affair. Here he said that during the recent course of events the Americans had confirmed that no nuclear weapons were situated in Greenland, and that no overflights with nuclear weapons took place. They had also given assurances that this situation would not be altered without prior consultation. The problem was that the Agreement of 1951 did not contain sufficient legal guarantee that this would also be the case in the future. The Government would therefore open negotiations with the Americans in order to create such legal guarantees.

On the following day, 8th February, Parliament held a debate on the budget which was also a debate on the Prime Minister's speech on his accession to office, and this offered a new opportunity to discuss the Thule affair. The debate, during which the socialist parties SF and VS argued for the closing of American bases in Greenland, ended with the adoption of a Social Democratic proposal for a motion which the Government parties supported. The resolution read as follows: “In that Parliament takes it that the Government, by procuring absolute guarantees that no nuclear weapons are stored in Greenland, and by ensuring, in order that Greenland airspace remains a nuclear weapon-free zone, that Danish nuclear policy is upheld in all parts of the kingdom and Danish sovereignty respected, the Parliament moves on to debate the Finance Bill for 1968-69.” This was the starting signal for negotiations with the Americans.

During a discussion with Secretary of State Dean Rusk on 27th February Ambassador Rønne delivered the Danish wishes in a note that referred to the resolution adopted in Parliament. Rønne was authorized to say that the legal guarantee desired could be either in the form of an amendment to the Agreement of 1951, or an exchange of notes which referred to the Agreement. Denmark would prefer that the new agreement be published, the Danish public would in any case have to be informed. Rusk had laid particular weight on the fact that the US could not agree to specific details about where nuclear weapons were or were not located. But he gave an assurance that the matter would now be investigated.

On 11th May, after several Danish promptings, the Americans concluded their deliberations. They suggested that the mutual understanding which already existed, according to which Greenland and the airspace of Greenland would be nuclear-free unless the two governments jointly took another decision, should be expressed in an exchange of notes which should be classified as secret. The concrete textual suggestion, which was put on the table, opened with the words: “The United States Government assures the Government of Denmark that, notwithstanding the provisions of the 1951 Agreement....”

Seen with Danish eyes, the American suggestion was not satisfactory because it was a unilateral American declaration. Moreover the expression “notwithstanding the provisions of the 1951 Agreement” was unacceptable, because it could be read as a very heavy-handed acknowledgement that the Agreement had given the Americans the right to store nuclear weapons in Greenland, and to overfly Greenland with nuclear weapons.

The Danish counter-suggestion built on a true mutuality in the exchange of notes. As a conclusion to the American text it was suggested that the following sentence be added: “This note and your reply constitute an agreement between our two Governments and are to be considered an integral part of the Defence Agreement.” It was also desired that the reference to the 1951 Agreement should be formulated differently. Instead of the formulation “notwithstanding the provisions of the 1951 Agreement,” came the suggestion “in the exercise of its rights and duties, as contained in the provisions of the 1951 Agreement”. With the latter phrasing one avoided having to commit oneself on the implications of the 1951 Agreement as regards nuclear weapons. Finally it was suggested that the remark about the two governments being able to take another, joint, decision to abolish the nuclear-free status was unnecessary, and should therefore be dropped. The Danish counter-suggestion was accompanied by a remark on it being acceptable that the text of the exchange of notes was not made public, and that no mutual announcement of the result of negotiations be made.

The Danish counter-suggestion was, in the main, acceptable to the Americans. However they still wanted the text to give the possibility of re-introducing nuclear weapons in an extraordinarily critical situation, and by mutual understanding. In a new version it was formulated in such a way that this could not happen without the agreement of the Danish Government. Since this was a Danish veto the suggestion was acceptable, and the text was now agreed upon.

Apart from the signing of the documents, there now remained the question of bringing the matter to the knowledge of the general public. This was done in the shape of a press release which was to be issued on the same day that the exchange of notes took place, 31st May 1968. Out of regard to the Americans there was no direct mention of the amendment in this short release, but only a reference to “consultations in Washington” which “created accordance between the Greenland Defence Agreement of 1951 and Danish nuclear policy, and thus guarantee in international law that this policy be respected in Greenland.” Information about the amendment itself and thereby the manner in which the named accordance had been shaped, was restricted to a secret meeting in the Foreign Policy Committee.

The period after the Thule crash and the signing of the agreement on 31st May 1968 was marked by great care taken both by the Americans and by the Danes. The liaison officer at Thule constantly requested — which was something quite new in comparison to the situation before the crash — information about the continued operations of B-52 aircraft in the vicinity of Greenland, and received quite detailed information which showed that the operations programme which was to replace Airborne Alert did not include flights over Greenland territory. DUPI's investigation, which rests on a wider documentary basis than was available in 1968, shows that the provisions of the agreement in all probability were respected, and that there were no further overflights of Greenland with nuclear weapons.

 

American Policy

The position of Greenland, situated just beyond the North American continent, with its southern area approximately midway on the direct flight route from the US to Western Europe, and its northern area midway on the direct route over the polar region to the Soviet Union occasioned massive American interest. Certainly in any critical or war situation the role of Greenland as part of the American sphere of interest would become evident. This was the lesson of the Second World War. This was also recognized in Copenhagen and Moscow. It is remarkable that the Russians, who throughout the period under investigation must be presumed to have appraised themselves of Greenland's role in Western strategy, only exploited this to a limited extent politically and for propaganda purposes. The fact that Denmark felt the role of Greenland to be something of a burden in relation to the Soviet Union is a different matter, and it was one of the chief causes for the covertness surrounding this aspect of security policy.

After the Second World War it soon became apparent that the Americans wished to maintain their military presence in Greenland. For this reason it was really only the extent of this presence and the conditions involved that were up for discussion. Since the Americans were in Greenland right from the start, they had a far better starting point for developing their presence here than in other places around the world where, particularly in the early 1950s, they negotiated base rights as part of the policy of containment of the Soviet Union.

Because of its strategic location Greenland came to experience most of the developments in the Cold War. This was due to changes in weapon technology and strategy. Many of these phenomena had direct consequences for Greenland. This was particularly evident with the shift of interest from Southern Greenland to Northern Greenland in connection with the gradual phasing out of the Perimeter strategy in favour of a Polar strategy in the first half of the 1950s, concurrent with the ever-increasing range of bomber aircraft, and the development of aerial refuelling technology. The other watershed which can, with a certain adjustment, be said to lie at the transition from the 1950s to the 1960s, carried with it a certain change of role for Greenland, from the strategic offensive to the strategic defensive, in pace with the development of missile technology and the related increase in the need for warning. A number of measures aimed at compensating for what was seen as an increased vulnerability to the Soviet threat came to mark the American military presence in Greenland. The DEW Line and in particular the huge BMEWS radar became cornerstones of American involvement in this period. The air defence of the Thule base in the years 1959 to 1965, with its nuclear weaponry, together with the intensive overflying programmes carrying nuclear weapons over Greenland territory in the years from 1958 to 1968 should be seen in this light.

In Greenland, and at the Thule base in particular, a long line of weapons systems and other military material were stationed over the years to satisfy the changing military needs. In the years up to 1955, as part of the continuous exercise activity, units of B-36 long-range strategic bombers landed regularly for short stays. From 1955 Thule hosted KC-97 tankers which carried out aerial refuelling of B-47 medium-range bombers. From 1957 exercises involving the refuelling of B-52 bombers began. At the same time, from 1956 to 1959, between two and four RB-47 reconnaissance aircraft were almost permanently stationed at Thule. The activities of the tankers from Thule and Sondrestrom were gradually reduced in the years from 1959 to 1964. Apart from the large aircraft, fighter-interceptor aircraft were already stationed at Thule from 1952, most often numbering twelve at any one time. These aircraft were withdrawn from the base in 1965, together with the Nike Hercules missiles.

As far as nuclear weapons are concerned there were, according to American infomation to the Danish Government in the summer of 1995, four bombs situated for a period of eight months at the Thule base in 1958. In the period from 1959 to 1965, according to the same source, there were 48 nuclear warheads for the Nike Hercules surface to air missiles at Thule. DUPI's research shows that there were also a number of Falcon air to air missiles with nuclear warheads located at Thule in the beginning of the 1960s designed for use by the F-102 fighter-interceptor aircraft. Finally, as mentioned earlier, Greenland was daily overflown by B-52 bombers carrying nuclear weapons as part of the Airborne Alert programme. On one of the routes — Thule Monitor Mission — the crew were given the added task of ensuring that the BMEWS radar was intact. Some of these aircraft made emergency landings, and one crashed with its bomb-load.

The legal basis for the American military presence in Greenland throughout the period under investigation was, first, the Agreement of 1941 entered into with Ambassador Kauffmann, and thereafter the Agreement of 27th April 1951 between the Governments of Denmark and the United States of America on the Defence of Greenland. This Agreement is still in force with the changes that followed upon the Amendment of 31st May 1968.

Whereas the Agreement of 1941 gave the Americans almost unlimited right of movement in Greenland, this right was restricted in 1951 to special, precisely delineated defence areas. No restrictions were laid on the right to overflights, however. American movements and American activity outside the defence areas required permission from the Danish authorities. It is the general impression that the Americans have kept to these rules. But in many instances the relationship was unequal. The Danish problem in this respect was particularly that due to limited resources it was difficult to follow and to gain an overview of the many forms of American activity. Some of these activities, among others those in the area of research, were the result of the constant consideration of many different possibilities as a basis for the American strategic planning. A number of these were based on very ambitious, even fantastic ideas. When such deliberations or ideas leaked to the public, this was extremely problematic from the official Danish perspective. The ideas about the placing, in Greenland, of medium-range missiles aroused particular Danish concern, and prompt repudiation.

It was a general American policy which prevented the question of nuclear weapons being raised during the negotiations that led to the Agreement of 1951 with Denmark, despite the fact that this had been considered. This outward caution was the consequence of an internal view of nuclear weapons as quite extraordinary weapons, which were at the time placed under the stringent supervision of a civilian authority, the Atomic Energy Commission. This viewpoint gradually changed during the 1950s, and in the last half of the decade a general nuclearization of the American defence forces and of NATO took place. The approach to H.C. Hansen in November 1957 on the placing of nuclear weapons in Greenland can be said to be an extension of this. The particular form of this approach was in part due to an awareness of the general Danish attitude to nuclear weapons, and in part to the strong desire to avoid receiving “no” for an answer. Since the reply was as wished for it became part of the American legitimization for subsequent steps, alongside the 1951 Agreement. This juridical procedure, which was generally a hallmark of the American policy, stood out very clearly when a Danish-American discussion arose on the question of authorization after the aircraft crash in 1968 in Greenland.

A special element in the American nuclear policy was the principle of neither confirming nor denying the presence of actual weapons at a particular location. This “neither confirm nor deny policy”, which served to lessen the vulnerability of the specific weapon against destruction by war or sabotage, was upheld as an unalterable principle. This was also convenient for states whose acceptance of the presence of American nuclear weapons on their territory depended on secrecy. When, in 1968, Denmark demanded guarantees against the presence of nuclear weapons in Greenland, including Greenland airspace, and wanted an explicit American declaration on the matter — which would be made public — the “neither confirm nor deny policy” was a hindrance.

In a number of other contexts the American policy was marked by considerable openness, which meant that in several instances it was in glaring contrast to the Danish security policy regarding Greenland. This American openness, expressions of which were to be found in the issuing of press releases on the introduction of new weapon systems, and in a rather open debate on futuristic military measures, was part of a tradition comprising an element of technological fascination, and a need to keep the taxpayers informed. But this openness was also practised for the sake of deterrence.

 

Denmark's Policy — Conditions And Content

Among the considerations that were decisive for Danish policy regarding the US military presence in Greenland there are particular reasons for focusing on three of them. The first concern was Danish-American relations, in which Greenland was only one element, though a very important one. The relationship between the United States on the one side — the dominant power in the international system — and on the other Denmark, was and still is clearly asymmetrical. How much more so, then, in relation to Greenland where the American interests, in the period which this survey covers, were felt to be a matter of the United States' own security and survival. These interests were faced by the Danish interests in Greenland, which belonged on another plane entirely. Denmark's own security interests had been mirrored in the decision to become a member of NATO, thereby obtaining an American guarantee for Danish security. As the Cold War escalated this guarantee took on ever greater importance. At the same time, due to its membership of the Alliance, Denmark was faced with a number of demands and expectations which it found difficulty in living up to. The essential precondition in considerations of this situation was that membership of NATO must be maintained, and that Denmark would have to live up to the minimum obligations that this entailed. The problem this presented lay partly in the fact that it was at times difficult to estimate where the lowest threshold lay. The dialogue that took place regarding these questions between USA and Denmark in the respective roles of the active and reactive players was especially marked by the great difference between the US global perspective, and the narrow Danish perspective, with its point of gravity centred on the situation in areas adjacent to it.

The second concern was relations to the Soviet Union, which was coloured by Denmark's geographical situation placed, as it was, in the proximity of overwhelmingly large Soviet military forces, and adjoining the Soviet sphere of influence. Denmark tried to compensate for this situation through NATO membership, but this brought with it the fact that Denmark had chosen sides in the confrontation between East and West. The Soviet Union disputed this choice and tried to prevent or minimize the implications of Denmark's membership of NATO, not least in the nuclear sphere. These efforts, that occasionally found expression in a powerful and direct pressure on Denmark, were supplemented by active Soviet diplomacy which carefully followed public debate in the country and played skilfully upon Danish anxieties and doubts. In these years such fear was nurtured not least by the intervention against the Hungarian revolt in 1956, the recurrent crises on Berlin up to 1961, and the Cuban Crisis of 1962. Bornholm was the object of particular Soviet interest, and thereby of matching Danish concern. Emphasizing the purely defensive nature of Danish defence preparations was a regular and central element in Denmark's policy regarding the Soviet Union. For the same reasons it was a matter of constant concern that US activities in Greenland could embarrass Denmark in relation to the Soviet Union. It should however be added that Soviet diplomatic activity was seldom aimed at Greenland. Even in the Bulganin letter, mentioned earlier, there were no claims about the existence of nuclear weapons in Greenland. Despite the sincerely felt fear of the Soviet Union, references to it were in all probability used in the argumentation against American demands that the Danes did not wish to accept, for reasons of sovereignty for instance.

The third concern was the relationship to public opinion, which found difficulty in relating to the logic of the Cold War, and which for many years after Denmark's entry into NATO continued to be influenced by a tradition of neutrality. That the Social Democrats decided on NATO membership for Denmark was decisive, but for a long time opinion was divided on the matter in party ranks. The Social Liberals, who had shared power in the years from 1957-1964, and again from 1968, had originally voted against Denmark's entry into NATO, and had refrained from voting for the ratification of the Agreement of 1951. To this should be added parties and groups who on an essentially ideological basis had a critical attitude to NATO and the United States, and therefore also to US presence in Greenland. Concern about public opinion was however primarily a question of relations to the great majority of people, representing all shades of opinion, who only understood the logic and strategy of the atomic age to a limited extent, and who were not particularly helped by the politicians, presumably because the cost of doing so was considered to be too great. More traditional concepts of the terms “offensive” and “defensive” were well-known, naturally, and these terms were frequently referred to in the public debate. The problem was, however, that these terms had lost their traditional meaning because modern strategy was largely based on preventing war through military deterrence.

These three considerations — of Danish-American relations, of the Soviet Union, and of public opinion at home — form together a field of tension within which the decisions dealt with in this report were made. The relative strength of the three considerations, together with changes — over time — in their respective importance is the most significant explanatory factor in this report.

In the process that led up the Agreement of 1951 Danish-American relations were in an unusual situation, and this came to mark the framework that was agreed upon for the continued American presence in Greenland. US interest in being able to include Greenland in the strategic planning was extremely strong, since it was considered to have a direct link with US security. Furthermore the American wishes were being formulated against the advantageous background that the Americans already were in Greenland, and that it was generally held that they would continue to stay there whether Denmark accepted the fact or not. On their part the Danes were interested both in underlining Danish sovereignty through restrictions on the liberal provisions that had applied for the American presence, and to arrange for the Americans to contribute to the defence of Greenland. However these two interests pulled in different directions. Added to this the major Danish interest — to bind the US to its undertaking to defend Denmark — was a further incentive to show pliancy towards American wishes in regard to Greenland.

Consideration of relations to the Soviet Union was directly emphasized when the Agreement of 1951 was to be ratified in Parliament And the fact that throughout the process great weight was laid upon the defensive character of the new Agreement is linked to this consideration, and to Danish public opinion too. The clearest expression of this was the phrasing, chosen on a Danish initiative, in the title of the agreement: “on the defence of Greenland.”

During the negotiations in 1951 the Americans offered some information which, given the correct interpretation, revealed their further strategic plans in Greenland. Certainly the Danish decision makers must be presumed to have had some idea of them. The question of nuclear weapons was not included in the negotiations. The Americans had, however, considered this question internally in connection with the series of negotiations on bases that were held during these years, but had reached the conclusion that the question should not be raised. No sign that the Danish delegation had considered the question in this context has been found. During the negotiations the major Danish drive was to confirm Danish sovereignty in the most unequivocal manner, and to create instruments for its implementation.

The process connected to the 1951 Agreement can be summarized as follows: the Americans in reality got what they asked for, which is to say a sufficiently wide framework to satisfy their strategic needs in the years following. Denmark for its part achieved optimal results as far as its most important and realistic negotiating objective was concerned: the question of sovereignty. The picture given to the public, with its one-sided emphasis on the limited and strictly defensive nature of the Agreement, was however only partially cor-rect.

There is not full clarity as to precisely which military needs, apart from the air defence of the base at Thule, were the grounds for the American approach to H.C. Hansen in November 1957. On the other hand we do know about the political considerations the Americans had regarding the approach, and the form it should take. This is not true of the Danish participants, where the matter was treated with the utmost discretion because of its delicate nature. For that reason the H.C. Hansen document in itself, and the consequences it gave rise to, are the ultimate sources for an understanding.

At that moment in time, the year after the uprising in Hungary, and shortly after the launching of the Sputnik, there was a powerful drive to safeguard the solidarity of the Alliance in NATO. Nevertheless the Social Democrats decided to go half way to meet the growing opposition to nuclear weapons through the introduction of the policy of “no to nuclear weapons under present conditions.” Since this policy was included in the groundwork of the coalition Government, problems could be expected in relation to NATO and the Americans in particular, since during these years they were pressing for a general nuclearization of the Alliance. Already at the Nato summit in December 1957 Denmark could expect to be accused of breaking the solidarity of the Alliance.

With the Bulganin letter of March 1957 the Soviet Union had announced its views in a menacing form. The letter, which had also mentioned Greenland, made an impression, and in the official reasons for the nuclear policy direct reference was made to the risk of Soviet reactions. These arguments also showed that the geographic area in mind was Southern Denmark.

The Americans chose to ask H.C. Hansen about the stationing of nuclear weapons in Greenland, but they asked in such a way as to make it difficult to say no, namely by presupposing that a right to such stationing already existed, so that what had to be decided on was only whether the Danes desired to be informed of the concrete placements. H.C. Hansen's answer, which was probably prepared together with Nils Svenningsen, and perhaps also with the Americans, entered into this line of reasoning. The document, which claims to be a non-answer to a question that has not been put, appears, when taken in combination with the situation in which it took place, to be an interpretation of the 1951 Agreement which does not contradict the American understanding of it. There is nothing to suggest that H.C. Hansen or Svenningsen knew that the Americans had quite deliberately avoided raising the question of nuclear weapons at the negotiations for the 1951 Agreement, and that questions could have been raised as to the American interpretation.

When approached by the American Ambassador, H.C. Hansen's situation can only be described as a dilemma, since the considerations that weighed most could not all be met at one and the same time. Regard for the United States, Denmark's partner in the Alliance, must weigh heavily in the climate of international politics at that time. But this consideration contained a complication, for the newly defined Danish nuclear policy could be seen to be in conflict with the country's minimum obligations towards the Alliance. As to relations with the Soviet Union at this point in time, they were the subject of an insistent Soviet interest that aroused concern. A discussion with the Americans about nuclear weapons in Greenland would, both in regard to the Soviet Union, and to Danish public opinion, be politically awkward.

The solution which the H.C. Hansen document is an expression of was presumably considered to be the only one possible. The very unusual form chosen bears witness to the difficulty experienced in deciding upon it. Great care was taken when it was drawn up in order that the document could not be read as permission to station nuclear weapons. According to the document's own logic, it does not give permission or acceptance in the normal sense of the words, which is to say the creation of the possibility of doing something that could not have been done earlier. The fact that one can argue that the H.C. Hansen document constitutes an acceptance is due to the fact that the American procedure put H.C. Hansen in a position where he could have said no. One can only understand the document fully when it is seen in the light of the American documents and one therefore knows the precise American question that it was an answer to. Seen on its own, the letter was formed in such a way that it masked the fact that an acceptance was given. In this way one ensured that there was some room for interpretation, if there was a need for it subsequently.

In summary the process surrounding the H.C. Hansen document can be described as allowing the Americans to achieve what they wanted, namely access to stationing of nuclear weapons in Greenland without further consultations with the Danes; but this concession could only be obtained under conditions of secrecy. In return the Danish Prime Minister gained two important advantages. Firstly the Soviet Union was not given occasion for further pressure, and secondly he avoided politically impossible discussions about the new nuclear policy at a time when this did not have full backing, either at home or abroad.

Precisely what influence H.C. Hansen's indirect acceptance had on the Danish-American relationship, and whether, for example, it contributed to American understanding for the nuclear weapon proviso is difficult to say. But H.C. Hansen was himself given proof that the Americans appreciated it in the course of a conversation with the American Secretary of State at the NATO summit in December 1957. The secret form of the acceptance was however, in the years following, to cause increasing difficulty for the Danish decision-making system.

In connection with the air-crash in Thule in January 1968, the significance of the three concerns which have been seen as the most important during the period under consideration were weighed one against the other, and the balance was found to have changed. Regard for public opinion weighed far more heavily in this situation. The crash, which — it will be recalled — followed earlier crashes of SAC aircraft carrying nuclear weapons in other parts of the world, had unsettled the population of Greenland and Denmark, and it would not have been possible to close the matter without having obtained guarantees that this could not happen again. But American interests had also changed character. A decisive shift had taken place in the means of deterrence of the Soviet Union: from the fleet of bombers to strategic missiles, and the need for flights carrying nuclear weapons was gradually waning.

In summary the weighing of interests one against the other can be described as easier in this situation than in the two situations described earlier, as a result of the shifting of the major concerns in relation to each other. For this reason a solution was soon found to the question that was so essential for Denmark: guarantees against overflights carrying nuclear weapons in the future. The problems that arose were connected to the presentation of this solution. Firstly, the Americans could not accept that the new situation should be made to appear as if it were the result of negotiations to which the Government of the United States had been party. This was due to the principle, consistently adhered to in the policy of deterrence, that the placement of nuclear weapons at any given moment was never divulged. As party to the same system of deterrence, Denmark had to accept this even though, for domestic political reasons, it would have been desirable to refer directly to the Americans. Secondly, the Prime Minister's public statements after the crash, which could be interpreted as an accusation that the Americans had not respected Danish nuclear policy, created problems. A direct American question to Denmark as to whether America had violated existing agreements was not replied to, and energy was concentrated instead on finding a solution for the future.

The fact that Denmark, free of charge, had placed bases in Greenland at the disposal of the United States was a concession that was worth many a return favour. This relation of interests which is normally referred to as the Greenland card, has played a role either expressly or implicitly in many phases of Danish-American relations in the period under study. The picture this raises of a contribution by Greenland to Danish security and economy must be weighed against the security-political cost of the American activity in Greenland in relation to the Soviet Union.

It has already been described how the Greenland card was played most forcefully in connection with the negotiations prior to the Agreement of 1951, namely as the explicit expectation of receiving guarantees for the defence of Denmark in return for base rights in Greenland. It is also known to have played a role in the internal American deliberations in the mid 1950s on whether to drop the Arms Aid programme to Denmark. In the difficult discussions which took place in relation to the American approach to H.C. Hansen in November 1957, both on the part of the Danes and the Americans, the Greenland card was played in what was probably the most subtle manner. There is reason to believe that on the part of the Danes, in any case, the deliberations included the consideration that an acceptance of nuclear weapons in Greenland could contribute to American understanding for Danish nuclear policy. Added to which the base rights were considered by the Danish decision makers generally as a protective screen against Allied criticism of Denmark's relatively modest contribution to NATO in general. There can hardly be any doubt that it has played a positive role in the on-going Danish-American political dialogue which was, periodically, burdened by critical Danish attitudes to the US role in the Vietnam War, for example.

Although in the past there has been a tendency to consider Danish nuclear policy as something fixed and limited, the reality was quite different. Nuclear policy was formed in a gradual and largely reactive process, which was not least marked by uncertainty regarding the extent to which reservations in this area were compatible with membership of the Alliance. The more precise limitation of the nuclear policy, also in the geographical sense, was particularly the object of such a gradual development. The phraseology of the Social Democratic election manifesto in the spring of 1957, which was later included in the governmental basis for the Coalition Government, was occasioned by the possibility of Denmark being offered nuclear ammunition for the heavy artillery and the new Honest John and Nike-Hercules rockets, which is to say land-based nuclear weapons. It was not clear until the NATO meeting in the spring of 1960 that the Danish nuclear proviso would be accepted by the United States and the other Allies, and in the period up until then the question had been the subject of debate in Denmark.

The formulation of nuclear policy in 1957 had not aimed at Greenland, and the H.C. Hansen document managed largely to keep this question out of the debate. It was not until 1961, in the follow-up to an answer in Parliament by Prime Minister Viggo Kampmann, that it was expressly declared,although only to the Danish embassies abroad, that the nuclear policy also applied to Greenland. But the question was not taken up by the Americans who subsequently, in 1968, referred to the 1951 Agreement and to the H.C. Hansen document.

One can therefore say that in the period from 1961 to 1968 Denmark had two nuclear policies as far as Greenland was concerned, a real but secret policy, and an official policy which one mentioned as little as possible, and certainly did not communicate directly to the Americans. In relation to this, the period from 1957 to 1961 can be described as a grey zone.

 

Denmark's Policy — Design And Implementation

The duality in Danish policy on US military presence in Greenland goes back beyond the H.C. Hansen document. During the negotiations that resulted in the Agreement of 1951 the Americans produced information on their plans for Greenland that only to a limited extent came further than a narrow circle of negotiators and leading politicians. Out of fear of putting Denmark at some risk with relation to the Soviet Union, and of going against public opinion (which was still attached to a neutralist tradition and a stranger to the concept of modern strategy based on military deterrence with its reliance on nuclear weapons) the American involvement was toned down and described in purely defensive terms. The title of the Agreement, “concerning the defense of Greenland” was a direct consequence of this policy, but it offered an incomplete reflection of reality. The direction was thus laid down for the handling of this aspect of Danish security policy in the coming years.

Out of the wish to associate oneself as little as possible with the military activities of the Americans in Greenland, and avoid the problems involved in having to explain them, a practice of decision-making and the handling of individual cases was developed in this area which was distinct from the general treatment of foreign and security policy questions in that it was secretive to the point of being tabooed.

Externally, in relation to the Americans, the 1951 Agreement had established a basis for further cooperation. The Agreement had created a system that respected the upholding of Danish sovereignty outside the defence areas, but which gave the Americans very great freedom of action within their boundaries. This freedom of action was not disputed by the Danes. The Danish liaison officers at Thule and Sondrestrom were officers of comparatively low rank, and their function was in the main to ensure the smooth functioning of cooperation with the Americans. Although they carried out qualified functions in following and reporting on the American activities, the scope of these activities was so huge that the burden of work was almost insurmountable. Added to this, their reports became part of a routine procedure and do not seem to have been included to any great extent in analyses within the Danish decision-making environment. Nor did the authorities in Copenhagen put any indiscreet questions. Apart from the situation that followed after the crash in 1968, only two high-level inquiries were addressed to the Americans on their plans in the period under investigation. On the first occasion, in 1953, the background for the inquiry was the American interest in North Eastern Greenland, which had been difficult to interpret. The second occasion was in 1964, after the crash of a B-52 in Maryland, when Eske Brun asked the American Ambassador in Copenhagen whether such an accident could happen in Greenland.

After the shooting down of an American U-2 aircraft in the Soviet Union in May 1960 the Minster for Defence stated in Parliament that airfields on Danish territory must not be used for such spying missions. It was also stressed that this also included Greenland. After the Soviet shooting down of a RB-47 reconnaissance aircraft over the Barents Sea a month later the Government decided that the Americans should be informed of the Danish view. However this did not result in a diplomatic approach to the American Government. On the contrary, a very noncommittal means of expression was chosen, in which the Foreign Ministry asked the Naval Command to inform the liaison officers at Sondrestrom and Thule to inform the American base commanders of the Danish position. It was specifically pointed out that the approach to the Americans should be of an informal and unofficial nature.

No questions were asked by the Danes, but then there was also no desire to be asked. A discussion in 1952 on the question of to what extent US use of its bases abroad as a launching pad for offensive operations presupposed an acceptance on the part of the host country, was the occasion for deliberations in the Foreign Ministry sketching out the problems of accountability in connection with the decision to carry out such an attack, even though one in reality would have had no influence on that decision. The view that it might in general be preferable for a small country, in certain cases, not to be consulted was voiced at a Cabinet meeting in October 1962, during a discussion of the Cuban Crisis. In answering a member of the Government who had expressed criticism of the American action, the Prime Minister (Krag) said, “Denmark would be placed in an extremely difficult situation if, prior to the action, we were asked to express an opinion.” The clearest example of this was, however, the H.C. Hansen document, the essence of which was that Denmark did not wish to be asked prior to the stationing of American nuclear weapons in Greenland.

Internally the discretion in regard to the American involvement in Greenland was reflected both within the Government and among the civil servants in their dealings with the Parliament, the Foreign Policy Committee and, not least, with regard to the general public.

Most cases were handled internally in the ministries which they belonged under, i.e. the Foreign Ministry, Defence Ministry and the Prime Minister's Office — as the appropriate department for Greenland — and subsequently the Ministry for Greenland. Apart from a short period from 1947, no inter-ministerial co-ordinating agency was set up, for which reasons the Foreign Ministry became responsible for most contacts with the Americans. The most sensitive cases were therefore dealt with by the different ministers, together with a small circle of their most trusted civil servants. Apart from certain routine procedures, contacts between the ministries were largely carried out on an ad hoc basis. This is reflected in the fact that matters dealing with the American presence in Greenland only found their way relatively seldom to Cabinet meetings. When the question of building American facilities in Greenland was discussed among the ministers, it was most often due to the wish to ensure Danish participation in the construction involved. Difficult security political deliberations, like the American approach to H.C. Hansen in 1957, were — as mentioned above — not presented to the Government.

Nor did the Parliament have much to do with questions of security policy in relation to Greenland after the ratification of the 1951 Agreement. During the period covered by DUPI's research there were no separate debates in the Parliament on this subject before those connected with the crash in 1968, and the subject was seldom touched upon at question time in the House. For these reasons contact between the Government and Parliament took place in the Foreign Policy Committee, where confidential discussions could be held. In some cases where it was difficult to gather the Committee, meetings with the party chairmen were used.

In a number of instances the formal procedures have been supplemented by informal contacts. It is known that in certain situations such contacts took place between leading politicians, in particular from “the four old parties” or between the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the Conservatives. It must be presumed that such contacts took place in a number of other cases. It is moreover a common feature that between these three parties there seems to have been considerable agreement both on the content of the policy and its design.

There seems, then, to be no difference between the manner in which the Social Democratic Government under Hans Hedtoft, and the Liberal/Conservative Government which followed dealt with the matter of entering into the Agreement of 1951. On the contrary, the negotiating process gives the impression of there having been close understanding between the three parties on the subject. This would balance well with the fact that it was precisely these three parties who together had invested political capital in a new direction for Denmark's security policy.

The above-mentioned features of an overriding political understanding can be found again in the situation following the crash at Thule in 1968. Here too the events took place on either side of a change of government: this time from Krag's Social Democratic minority Government to the non-socialist coalition Government under the Social Liberal Hilmar Baunsgaard. The exposure of a lack of accordance between the declared nuclear policy and the actual situation could have given grounds for discord. There was a certain amount of discussion about the manner in which the Krag Government had reacted immediately after the crash. But there was unity concerning the main outlines. This was true with regard both to obtaining guarantees for the cessation of overflights, and to avoiding insistence on further consequences for the American presence in Greenland, which the left-wing parties were demanding.

When the Social Democratic Party introduced its nuclear policy in 1957 a period of disagreement began between the three old NATO parties on an important question of security policy. In the years following this policy was the object of discussion both internally in Denmark and with the Allies. But in 1960 there was a clarification of the matter in that NATO, at the meeting of the Ministerial Council in April, took cognizance of the Danish policy. That same year a new Danish defence structure came into force which meant a strengthening of conventional weapons but with the exclusion of nuclear weapons. From then on the renunciation of nuclear weapons can be said to have been generally accepted.

The major cause for the fact that Social Democratic nuclear policy from 1957 did not lead to lasting division over security policy, is to be found in the acceptance of this policy, in spite of everything, by the Allies. If it had been considered in conflict with membership of the Alliance, matters would have been very different. But this was a matter of concern for the Social Democrats too, and there is no doubt that precisely the consideration of living up to NATO obligations was crucial for the Social Democratic leaders, many of whom had a strong personal involvement in NATO policy and a feeling of friendship for the United States.

The H.C. Hansen document played an important role in this scenario, because it can be presumed that the concession to the Americans regarding nuclear weapons in Greenland also contributed to an acceptance of the Danish proviso. This supposition cannot be put to the test, but there can hardly be any doubt that disagreement with the Americans in this situation would have provoked a difficult internal discussion in Denmark which could have had far-reaching consequences for security policy.

The fact that, for several years, Denmark could have a concrete yet secret nuclear policy parallel to that which was officially declared to be its policy, raises a number of questions as to how this could be done in a political and administrative system that was otherwise characterized by considerable openness.

The answer to this question must be looked for in the manner in which the policy was generally formed, i.e. at a great distance, inwardly as well as outwardly, to the matter as a complex whole. This created a kind of dynamism of its own: if, for example, one did not seek information, or use the information one had, then one ended up knowing less and less. It cannot therefore be excluded that the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Defence Minister, of whom at least the Prime Minister (Krag) knew the H.C. Hansen document, were acting in good faith when, at a Cabinet meeting in October 1962, in answer to a question from the Minister of Transport on nuclear weapons in Greenland, they said “that, as far as they knew, there were no nuclear weapons there, and that it was unlikely there would be any.”

It has already been described how the authorities in Copenhagen, simply on the basis of the reports from the liaison officer at Thule, could have worked out that there were nuclear weapons at the base. But these reports were apparently not analysed with regard to precisely this point. As the emergency landings with nuclear weapons occurred and were registered, however, the above three ministers and a number of their civil servants gained knowledge in this limited area. Prime Minister Krag and a number of prominent civil servants from the Prime Minister's Office and the Foreign Ministry were given an insight into the overflights with nuclear weapons during their visit to SAC's headquarters in 1966. And yet when civil servants at the Foreign Ministry, towards the end of the period under investigation, in connection with the air-crash ascertained with an air of resignation that the basis for a description and analysis of the American air activities in Greenland was insufficient, it was undoubtedly a true reflection.

The framework set up for working procedure was, however, essentially politically inspired. Not only the Agreement of 1951 in itself, and its title, but also the handling of the Agreement in Parliament sent a very powerful signal as to how these matters should be considered and spoken of in the years following. The understanding between H.C. Hansen and the Americans in November 1957, in spite of the secrecy surrounding the manner in which it was brought about, had to be communicated to a small circle of politicians and civil servants in order to have an effect that was in agreement with its content. By this means a somewhat larger group has received an impression, albeit rather imprecise: and it has been left to them to work out how this could agree with Prime Minister Kampmann's declaration in 1961 that his statement about there being no nuclear weapons on Danish territory also included Greenland. The somewhat sarcastic remark that is said to have been someone's way of briefing a young member of staff in the Foreign Ministry: “The Prime Minister has decided that there are no nuclear weapons in Greenland” must have mirrored a view held by many. The fact that the declared nuclear policy was introduced gradually, and that supposedly nobody, at least in the beginning, imagined that it also applied to Greenland, also contributed to the blurred picture. Added to this, most people, regardless of what degree of knowledge or supposition they were in possession of, have probably felt that it was important that no doubt could be raised externally regarding Danish policy in this area. Many variations of this message were also repeated on the part of politicians.

American discretion about the placing of nuclear weapons, together with the special conditions that were gradually created around the shaping of the Danish policy meant that few people had direct knowledge of the Americans having located nuclear weapons in Greenland and overflying Greenland with nuclear weapons, and even fewer had any precise knowledge as to the background for this.

On the other hand the circle that suspected that this was going on was very large and may in fact have included all those who in one way or another came into contact with this aspect of Danish security policy, or who were stationed on one of the bases in Greenland.

The spectrum from direct knowledge about the presence of nuclear weapons in and over Greenland to surmises about the matter was very wide. The reply that Eske Brun received to his inquiry to the Americans after the crash in Maryland in 1964, contained in reality a briefing on the fact that nuclear weapons were carried during American overflights of Greenland or that, at the very least, this could be expected to occur. At the other end of the spectrum could be found just about anyone who knew about the daily overflights of Greenland by B-52 bombers. By comparing this knowledge with the readily accessible information on the Airborne Alert programme, anyone could ask themselves why the overflights were taking place, and put two and two together.

With the amendmentof 31st May 1968 the duality in Danish nuclear policy, as far as Greenland was concerned, disappeared. This brought relief to the little circle of politicians and civil servants who, until then, for example in connection with the emergency landings, had increasingly felt that the situation was untenable. For the majority, however, interest centred on the fact that overflights with nuclear weapons ceased. These flights were gravely compromised after the crash at Thule. In all probability there is no reason to doubt that the agreement was adhered to, and that no further overflights of Greenland with nuclear weapons occurred. An evaluation of the interests involved leads to the same conclusion. Whereas the duality in the Danish nuclear policy in relation to Greenland can be seen as a consequence of what was considered the impossibility of uniting two opposing considerations, namely to the alliance with USA and to Danish public opinion, it was now possible to unite them. The strategic picture had changed. Flights carrying nuclear weapons were no longer necessary, and the land-based nuclear weapons for air defence had already been withdrawn in 1965. USA's dominant interest in Greenland was now the warning and communication facilities, in particular the BMEWS radar.

The H.C. Hansen document was no longer operative in the Danish-American relationship, but it remained controversial both in domestic politics and in relation to the Soviet Union. Without raking up the past it was replaced in the archives, to be forgotten, it seemed.

 

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Notes

*: The main report with ISBN 87-601-6921-4 is available in Danish under the title Grønland under den kolde krig. Dansk og amerikansk sikkerhedspolitik 1945-68. Bind 1 og 2 (bilag). Price: DKR 395,- Back.