

INTERNATIONAL COHERENCE IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

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1. INTRODUCTION

Calls for greater coherence in the international community's support for security sector reform (SSR) have become commonplace. This reflects frustration at the stovepiped contributions that frequently seem to characterise international SSR engagement. Perhaps more damaging, incoherent approaches may only be the visible symptom of a more profound problem – the inability or unwillingness of the international community to engage collectively with complex political dynamics when designing and implementing SSR programmes. The nexus between difficult SSR politics and incoherent SSR support has multiple dimensions. On the one hand, an SSR process may challenge (or reinforce) inequities in power relations that exclude certain groups and interests. Competing interests therefore provide a sub-text to any reform process. On the other hand, SSR assistance from external actors is itself highly political (and is certainly viewed as such by 'recipients'). This tension is reflected in harmful accusations that SSR represents a Trojan horse for the imposition of foreign values and influence. By failing to acknowledge these political sensitivities in SSR policies and programmes, external interventions can at best have a marginal impact on national security dynamics. This Horizon Paper therefore attempts to provide additional clarity to the concept of coherence and its utility in supporting more effective SSR.

Coherence is a guiding principle of internationally accepted good practice in the area of security and development. Through its association with broader policy initiatives to 'deliver as one' or develop 'whole of government' and 'whole of system' approaches, SSR has become a prominent issue within wider efforts to promote greater coherence. One reason for this is the rapid rise of the SSR concept up the international policy agenda and its (admittedly slower) translation into programming approaches. If coherence is intuitively 'a good thing', SSR offers the attraction of demonstrating concrete actions that put meat on the bones of right-sounding policy prescriptions. However, scratching beneath the surface, coherence is understood in very different ways, from ambitious aspirations to manage complex interdependencies to more modest objectives related to anticipated economies of scale.¹ This Horizon Paper does not subscribe to a maximalist definition of coherence that would seek to bind a plethora of actors and activities together in a formalised way. Political sensitivities as well as the sheer diversity of security providers, management and oversight bodies found in different contexts would clearly make such an approach unrealistic in the SSR field. Rather, it argues for the need to reduce the duplication, rivalries and inconsistencies that can undermine the effectiveness of reforms.

The SSR approach makes coherence a challenge because of the involvement of numerous stakeholders across multiple levels of engagement (see Box 1). Big picture

¹ For a useful discussion of different understandings of coherence in relation to peace operations see: Cedric de Coning and Karsten Friis, 'Coherence and Coordination: The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach', *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011) 243-272.

payoffs commonly identified as flowing from improved coherence include the ability to sequence activities according to common goals and to realise synergies through the exploitation of comparative advantage. If these valuable outcomes are often unrealised in practice, it would be wrong to assume that results may be sub-optimal simply because of the complex nature of the challenge. National interests are closely guarded in the security field and present a major obstacle to the kind of give-and-take necessary for joined up approaches. This holds true both within states undergoing reform and in relation to the support offered by the wider international community. Thus, a combination of improved programming procedures and the leveraging of political will are required in order to improve the coherence of international support for SSR.

Box 1: Locating coherence in SSR

- At the strategic policy level to ensure coherence of actors within a donor government/multilateral organisation;
- In the interface between headquarters and field operations to provide adequate support to the latter;
- Across the range of external actors operating in a given theatre through effective mechanisms for policy and operational coordination;
- Between different strands of a field mission (or different parts of a donor government/multilateral organisation) to ensure coherence across its post-conflict peacebuilding commitments in a given theatre;
- At the points of interaction between external actors and national authorities to develop meaningful political and operational coordination.

This paper explores why coherence is a problem for internationally supported SSR and proposes ways to move forward. It begins by addressing the importance of mainstreaming core objectives and values underpinning the SSR approach. It then considers the imperative to develop integrated SSR programmes. This relates both to delivering on a 'holistic' SSR agenda but also to how post-conflict SSR can contribute to wider peacebuilding efforts. Opportunities are identified to bridge gaps between policy commitments and genuine behaviour change. The paper concludes with some observations on future directions that may support improved coherence in practice.

2. A COMMON LANGUAGE?

From its origins within international development policy circles in the 1990s, the SSR concept has demonstrated its relevance to the work of development, democracy promotion and security communities. The OECD DAC has been highly influential in developing and promoting a common SSR language across the international community. Between 2001 and 2007,² successive DAC Guidelines and the OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform laid down many of the principles and tenets associated with internationally supported SSR (see Table 1, p.9). The success of this mainstreaming process is apparent in the consistency found across various bilateral donor countries' SSR strategies, the European Union concept papers on SSR as well as the United Nations Secretary General's Report on SSR.³

In policy terms it is apparent that a level of consensus has been achieved on the key elements of the SSR agenda. Succinctly put, this emphasises a holistic approach that seeks to promote the effective and efficient provision of state and human security within a framework of democratic governance.⁴ Guiding principles include the need for in-depth appreciation of local contexts, commitment to local ownership and a focus on improving human security. On the ground, common understandings of SSR have been less apparent. Different interpretations of the scope and objectives of SSR are evident in how policies have been translated into operational programmes. As field-based research into UN integrated peacekeeping missions has shown, overlapping or contradictory mandates have resulted in improperly allocated resources, compartmentalised activities and confused priorities.⁵ This lack of coherence has undermined the ability of these missions to assist national authorities in reforming their security sectors and thus to transition from post-conflict recovery to longer term development.

It is important to recall that security sector reform is not a priority in certain contexts while in others this is a strictly national process where international assistance is neither wanted nor needed. This Horizon Paper focuses only on internationally-supported SSR. One critique of international SSR efforts has been the prevalence of technocratic reforms in state security sector institutions.

² OECD DAC, Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century (OECD DAC, 1997); OECD DAC, The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict (OECD DAC, 2001); OECD DAC, 'Security System Reform and Governance'; DAC Guidelines and Reference Series (OECD DAC, 2004); OECD DAC, OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform, Supporting Security and Justice (OECD DAC, 2007).

³ See, for example: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Security Sector Reform, Security System Reform: France's Approach, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, (Paris: 2009); Council of the European Union, EU Concept for ESDP Support to Security Sector Reform, 12566/4/05 REV 4 (Brussels 13 October 2005); European Commission, a Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform, COM (2006)253 Final (Brussels, 24 May 2006); Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on a Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform, 2736th General Affairs Council Meeting (Luxembourg, 12 June 2006); United Nations Report of the Secretary-General, "Securing Peace and Development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform," S/2008/39 (23 January 2008).

⁴ Heiner Hänggi, 'Security Sector Reform', in Vincent Chetail (ed.) Post-Conflict Peacebuilding - A Lexicon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 337.

⁵ Heiner Hänggi and Vincenza Scherrer (eds.), Security Sector Reform and United Nations Integrated Missions: Experience from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Kosovo (Munster: LIT, 2008) p.229.

Table 1: The evolution of OECD DAC norms and principles for SSR⁶

| DAC publication | Norms | Operating principles |
|--|---|--|
| 1997: Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21st Century | Nascent SSR concept based on good governance; Strong democratic accountability component; Security as precondition for development. | Understand security as element of justice reform; Emphasis on training; Take a whole of government approach. |
| 2001: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners | SSR anchored in broad concept of human security; Key importance of security-development nexus; Emphasis on accountability and legitimacy more explicit. | Increase dialogue among broad range of stakeholders; Apply public sector management principles; Address SSR supply-demand gap; Improve ad hoc implementation; Link SSR to broader peacebuilding agenda. |
| 2004: Security System Reform and Governance | People-centred security; Security-aid effectiveness link; Increased importance of non-state actors; SSR grounded in democracy/human rights; Effectiveness, management and democratic governance concerns intertwined. | Set partner-country participation within coherent framework; Understand local contexts and framing conditions; Be flexible in implementation; Coordination through whole of government approaches; Undertake multi-sectoral programming. |
| 2007: Handbook on Security System Reform | Local ownership as imperative; Non-state actors key to security and justice provision; Sustainability/long-termism essential | Close supply-demand gap; Address political nature of SSR; SSR implementation as multi-layered service delivery; Coordinate donor support; Focus on outcomes not outputs. |

International support continues to place disproportionate emphasis on re-building more effective security providers without relating this effort to the level of security actually experienced by people. In other words, the human dimension of SSR tends to get lost (see Box 2, p.10). Applying an approach to SSR that takes into account state and human security needs means changing how programmes are designed and implemented.

As discussed above, while coherence is often flagged as a pre requisite to more effective SSR, this notion may mean different things to different people. This is understandable given the multi-layered, multi-actor nature of SSR. Promoting shared values, objectives and work practices can help to promote collective action and thus contribute to more efficient, effective SSR. The following section explores ways to develop coherent approaches to activities and actors in order to improve the impact of SSR.

⁶ Source: Alan Bryden, 'From Policy to Practice: the OECD's Evolving Role in Security System Reform'; DCAF Policy Paper No. 22 (2007) p.5.

Box 2: Public perceptions and human security in Liberia and Sierra Leone⁷

How people deal with insecurity in post-conflict Liberia and Sierra Leone offers important insights to the relationship between state and non-state security provision. Common to both cases is that ordinary citizens suffered at the hands of government and opposition forces during periods of civil war as well as enduring high levels of violence and criminality in the aftermath of armed conflict. Both countries receive significant international support for SSR while Liberia benefits from the continued presence of a UN peacekeeping force. A lack of state policing capacity in both contexts and the security vacuum resulting from the withdrawal of UN forces in Sierra Leone led to the burgeoning of community based watch teams as well as private security companies used by wealthier citizens. Current SSR efforts focus squarely on reinforcing state security structures, ignoring peoples' de facto reliance on non-state security providers. Yet with or without external assistance it is extremely unlikely that the police will be able to deliver security across the national territories. This suggests that national level SSR programmes which build synergies between state and non-state security providers will offer greater returns in terms of the security of individuals and communities while reducing the dependency on international support over the longer term.

⁷ Adapted from: Judy Smith-Hohn, 'Transformation through Participation: Public Perceptions in Liberia and Sierra Leone', in Alan Bryden and 'Funmi Olonisakin (eds), Security Sector Transformation in Africa (Munster: Lit Verlag, 2010).

3. JOINING THE DOTS: ACTIVITIES, ACTORS AND END GOALS

This section begins by focusing on the need for coherence across related activities. It then considers the importance of joined up approaches by different actors engaged in SSR. Finally, the challenge of ensuring coherence between discrete activities and desired endgoals is addressed. This refers to the importance of applying a values-driven approach in which activities contribute positively to the enhancement of democratic security sector governance.

3.1 ACTIVITIES

The SSR concept recognises security provision, management and oversight as intrinsically related (see Table 2). In practice, assessments of current donor practice point to significant deficiencies in support for the security sector governance dimension.⁸ Certain actors ‘cherry pick’ by adopting the SSR label while simply training and equipping security forces. This flies in the face of reality - the emergence of the SSR approach was at least in part a response to traditional technical assistance for security bodies which in some cases only exacerbated existing insecurities. Another common criticism is that many SSR interventions adopt a ‘cookie cutter’ approach based on experience drawn from quite different environments to the context in question. This is despite the fact that the likelihood of success as well as the potential for unintended consequences will be contingent on the extent to which these local political, security and socio-economic realities are understood.

Table 2: Overview of SSR and related activities⁹

| (1) Overarching activities (e.g. security sector reviews, needs assessments, development of SSR strategies and national security policies) | | |
|--|--|--|
| (2) Activities related to security and justice providing institutions | (3) Activities related to civilian management and democratic oversight | (4) SSR-related activities in post-conflict contexts |
| Defence reform Intelligence reform Border security reform Police reform Justice reform Prison reform Other activities | Executive management and control Parliamentary oversight Judicial review Oversight by independent bodies Civil society oversight | DDR SALW control Mine action Transitional justice Other activities |
| (5) Cross-cutting activities (e.g. gender equality, child protection) | | |

⁸ Dylan Hendrickson, ‘Key Challenges for Security Sector Reform: A Case for Reframing the Donor Policy Debate’, GFN-SSR Working Paper (Birmingham: University of Birmingham 2009).

⁹ Source: Hänggi and Scherrer (2008), 15.

The implementation of a holistic approach to SSR requires the development of synergies between sectoral reforms – such as police and corrections reform – that have tended to be conducted separately in the past. More broadly, as part of efforts to ensure more coherent approaches in post-conflict contexts, the benefits are increasingly recognised of pursuing synergies between SSR activities and closely related issues such as transitional justice, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants, or small arms and light weapons control. Harmonising programmes in practice has proved more challenging. Both policy making and operational activities are often conducted in parallel rather than in ways that promote mutually reinforcing synergies.¹⁰ Knowledge gaps accentuate this problem since good practice guidelines that can inform joint programming decisions remain under-developed. To take one example, DDR has an extensive body of guidance, notably the UN's Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) which draws on the UN's long term engagement in DDR.¹¹ By contrast, SSR doctrine development is an emerging field. This inhibits modes of behaviour within programmes that cut across these different areas. If one consequence of an imbalance in doctrine is the absence of shared understandings between DDR and SSR actors, this gap is much wider in relation to transitional justice. Transitional justice proponents have traditionally been wary of engaging with the security community. In parallel, certain SSR donors have shied away from the perceived political risks of supporting transitional justice initiatives.¹² Normative concerns as well as fear of political liabilities thus compound the effects of gaps in knowledge across these areas.

Significantly, these knowledge gaps are starting to be addressed. A new module within the IDDRS provides practical guidance for policy makers, operational planners and practitioners on the nexus between DDR and SSR. A similar module on the DDR-transitional justice relationship has also been developed. Ongoing work on linkages between SSR and armed violence reduction offers further opportunities to build synergies from a people-centred perspective.¹³ In terms of the politics of coherence, the focus of the guidance development process currently being undertaken by the United Nations SSR task force represents a potentially significant evolution. The topics being elaborated do not focus only on the technical aspects of SSR. They seek to develop new knowledge in areas such as peace processes or national security policy frameworks in which political concerns feature prominently.¹⁴ This focus can help to foster coherence by placing additional emphasis on the ways that international SSR assistance interacts with national security sector governance dynamics.

¹⁰ Alan Bryden & Heiner Hänggi, 'Reforming and Reconstructing the Security Sector', in *Security Governance and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, (Munster; LIT, 2005), 34-35.

¹¹ See: www.unddr.org

¹² Paul van Zyl, 'Promoting Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Societies', in Bryden & Hänggi (2005), 209-231.

¹³ This work builds on OECD DAC, *Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development* (Paris: OECD DAC, 2009).

¹⁴ Guidance notes under development or recently completed include: *Democratic Governance of Security Institutions*; *National Security Policies and Strategies*; *SSR and Peace Processes*; *SSR and National Ownership*; *Coordination of UN SSR Support*.

3.2 ACTORS

The onus of the SSR approach on linking different discourses creates tensions exactly because it pushes together different stakeholder groups. Even within one government or organisation, work practices, priorities and interests will differ significantly. ‘Badges, boots, suits and sandals’ do not necessarily make for comfortable bedfellows.¹⁵ Yet a degree of alignment is necessary since an inter-agency culture at the national level will provide the building blocks for how international engagement takes place. Clarifying roles and responsibilities will not solve the problem of actors pursuing policies that reflect their own interests. But it may lower the transaction costs for more coherent SSR interventions. Certainly, the all too visible costs of not addressing a dysfunctional security sector make arguments to support SSR on the basis of comparative advantage rather than competition ever more compelling.

Bridging stakeholder groups and fostering synergies has been the rationale for ‘whole of government’ and ‘whole of system’ approaches.¹⁶ The need for greater coherence across international SSR support has also been prominent in wider efforts to improve international responses to conflict and fragility. The ‘3C’ initiative is one example (see Box 3).¹⁷ Promoting ‘coherent, coordinated and complementary’ approaches in the area of security and justice forms one of the key recommendations in the 3C Roadmap adopted by 35 countries and organisations at an international conference held in Geneva in March 2009.¹⁸

As the demand for SSR support has risen, a range of different service providers have emerged to support this work. Beyond bilateral actors and multilateral organisations, a growing number of private sector organisations, non-governmental organisations and individual consultants operate within the SSR field. The increasing prominence of the private sector has focused attention on the responsibility to apply robust contracting procedures and ensure that activities are consistent with core SSR principles. Initiatives to regulate private military and security companies (PMSCs) highlight innovative efforts to match service provision with the normative SSR agenda.¹⁹ The Montreux Document and related series of regional seminars is one such effort.²⁰ This joint initiative by the Swiss Government and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to address the international humanitarian law (IHL) obligations of PMSCs has been strongly supported by civil society actors. The

¹⁵ Rory Keane and Mark Downes, ‘The Security-Development Nexus – coordinating “badges, boots, suits and sandals”’, *Revista española de desarrollo y cooperación* No 26 (2010) pp. 39-50.

¹⁶ See: Alan Bryden and Rory Keane, ‘Security System Reform: What Have We Learned?’ (Paris: OECD, 2010).

¹⁷ The 3C Conference hosted by the Government of Switzerland and held in Geneva between 19-20 March 2009 brought together members of defence, development, diplomatic, finance and economic, humanitarian and justice and police communities. See: www.3C-conference2009.ch

¹⁸ The 3C Roadmap can be found in Annex to this paper.

¹⁹ See DCAF, ‘Private Military and Security Companies: Future Challenges in Security Governance’, Working Paper No.3, DCAF Horizon 2015 series.

²⁰ The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict was signed in September 2008 and currently has 35 endorsing States.

Box 3: The 3C initiative

The 3C initiative promotes whole of government and whole of system approaches to fragility and conflict. It builds on the earlier 3D concept (diplomacy, defence and development) through emphasising the need for the international community to work in a joined up manner to improve the impact of efforts to support security and development goals in different contexts.

A 3C conference hosted by Switzerland and co-convened by the United Nations, OECD, the World Bank and NATO was held in Geneva on 19-20 March 2009. The conference agreed a 3C Roadmap outlining recommendations in 6 areas:

- Strengthening national ownership and national capacities;
- Responding in a timely and appropriate manner to the evolving situation in the partner country;
- Strengthening mutual accountability of partner countries and international actors;
- Reducing the burden of aid management on partner country capacity;
- Making efficient use of limited resources and avoiding duplication and funding gaps;
- Improving and deepening joint learning and increasing response capacities.

The 3C Conference was followed by an Austrian Government initiative to set out principles of engagement for relations between governments and non-governmental actors in peacekeeping missions (the Vienna 3C Appeal). As part of its commitment to implementing the 3C approach, the Swiss Government is also focusing on the key role of civil society in situations of fragility.

International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers is also significant.²¹ The process to develop a set of minimum standards for industry personnel has been characterised by strong engagement from industry, states from different world regions and civil society experts. This commitment continues in the implementation phase as these different groups develop governance and oversight mechanisms to support the Code's implementation. Multi-stakeholder initiatives that bring together states, industry and civil society point to new ways of doing business in the security governance field. The importance of finding and building on common interests in order to generate political will for collective action seems to be a particularly significant aspect of this dynamic.

Despite these developments, available human resources remain lopsided. The acknowledgement that SSR is first and foremost a nationally-driven political process has not in all cases been transformed into either sufficient personnel equipped to address the political dimensions of SSR or to a clear commitment to mentoring approaches that support national capacity building. Instead, there is a continued tendency for external actors to work with their own home state nationals rather than with expertise from the regions in which their activities are focused. In other words, the principle of local ownership still needs to be applied in how the pool of SSR expertise is further developed and deployed.

²¹ For more on both the Montreux Process and the ICOC see: www.privatesecurityregulation.net

3.3 END GOALS

Matching activities to intended end goals is not only important but an obligation in line with international commitments such as the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the subsequent Accra Agenda for Action²². Specifically, donors are committed to align their security and development programming with a coherent national vision for the role, priorities and values that should underpin the security sector. This objective often founders in the face of a combination of structural and political deficits: outdated or inappropriate national security architectures are compounded by the close control of security decision making by political and security elites. In short, a major obstacle to realising the goal of a new national vision is the prevalence of domestic security cultures geared to preserving the regime in power rather than safeguarding the state and its citizens.

It is important to acknowledge that harmful dynamics of security sector mal-governance can be exacerbated by inappropriate or misguided international support. Moving towards the 'big picture' SSR end goal of enhancing the security of the state and its citizens therefore requires attention at both domestic and international levels. A focus on end goals highlights the central importance of re-orienting the mission, role and values of the security sector. Despite the evident challenges, in a number of cases national seminars and consultations have taken place that build on local cultures of consensus building in order to promote a transformative SSR agenda. As lessons from South Africa show, this can form a basis for revisiting national security strategies and clarifying the wider governance framework for specific reforms (see Box 4). Critically, the South African case exemplifies a national process that developed and evolved over months and years. Appropriate international support needs to respect this organic character, move beyond short term project-oriented approaches and commit to supporting national processes over the long term.

Of course, setting out agreed objectives and priorities for SSR is only a first step. Gaps between activities and end goals become critical in the implementation phase. The vision needs to be translated into a viable programme within which external expertise (if required) reinforces national SSR efforts.²³ In some cases, coherent programming has been facilitated by specialised joint working committees on sectors including police, justice and defence. Such initiatives can help to ensure symmetry between means and ends. They can also facilitate transparency, allowing a two way dialogue between national authorities and international partners on priorities and funding.

The establishment of a coherent framework for individual reforms needs to be accompanied by confidence building. Thus, enabling different groups within society

²² The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was endorsed on 2 March 2005 by over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agency and other senior officials. The Accra Agenda for Action was drawn up in 2008 and builds on the commitments contained in the Paris Declaration. See: www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html

²³ The DAC Peer Review Process provides a useful tool to gauge donor implementation in this area and assess effectiveness against agreed criteria. See: www.oecd.org/dac/peerreviews

to buy into the reform process is essential. Broad participation in decision making may take some of the heat out of sensitive political issues and provide locally generated understandings of security needs. Reinforcing the management and oversight roles of government ministries, parliaments, the judiciary and civil society can play an important part in building trust through improving the transparency and accountability of security sector reforms. Again, international support needs to reinforce and not undermine this process. As a first step, this means ensuring due attention to security sector governance concerns within SSR programmes. On a more fundamental level, national political processes need to be respected, even when slow and convoluted in the eyes of external actors. Thus, while UK-supported SSR in Sierra Leone offers many positive lessons for donor-home state collaboration, the tensions within the process are at least as instructive. Key issues of concern at different stages have included the difficult balancing of executive versus advisory functions, diverging perspectives on the nature and substance of the defence reform process, disagreements over funding modalities and the temptation to force change by bypassing national decision-making structures. Efforts by Sierra Leoneans and UK supporters to work through these challenges are particularly useful in demonstrating concretely how due attention to process and respect for national ownership is essential if sectoral reform efforts are to support the wider end goal of building sustainable, legitimate security institutions.²⁴

Box 4: Human security, participation and SSR in South Africa²⁵

Reforming the security sector, as the central instrument of repression during the Apartheid era, represents a major element of South Africa's transformation from a state embodying regime security as its *raison d'être* to one founded on the human security of its citizens. The South African defence review process began in 1994 and produced a White Paper (1996), Defence Review (1998) and Defence Act (2002). The process was marked throughout by a strong commitment to consultation within government, the security community and, in particular, across a broad range of civil society actors including NGOs, academics, businesses and communities. The drafting committee for the development of the White Paper, led by a well-known researcher and activist, included senior members of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the civilian Defence Secretariat. The draft was revised as a result of public consultations before being presented to the Parliamentary Defence Committee. A commitment to consensus within this body proved decisive in shaping a final version that balanced technical realism, constitutionality, core values and priorities.

Principles characterising the defence review process included: respect for national and international law; transparency; subordination to parliament and the executive; political neutrality and non-discrimination; promotion of regional and international security; and respect for the human rights of armed forces personnel. National security was defined as a means to secure the rights and needs of South Africa's people.

The Defence White Paper provided a vital launch pad for subsequent elements of the defence review process. The South African experience is thus particularly instructive for other African reform contexts as a result of the way that these key principles were embedded in a process-based approach. This ensured that specific measures reinforced the transformation of the ministry of defence and national defence forces as entities that were integrated and cohesive at cultural, political and organisational levels.

²⁴ For an instructive analysis of ten years of SSR in Sierra Leone from the perspectives of both Sierra Leonean and UK stakeholders, see: Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson (eds.), *Security Sector Reform in Sierra Leone 1997-2007: Views from the Front Line* (Munster: Lit, 2010). Available at www.dcaf.ch

²⁵ This box draws on two sources: Nathan, L. *No Ownership, No Commitment: A Guide to Local Ownership of Security Sector Reform*, (University of Birmingham, 2007); and Williams, R. 'Human Security and the Transformation of the South African National Security Environment from 1990-2004', *Journal of Security Sector Management* (Shrivenham: GFN-SSR, March 2005).

4. BRIDGING THE POLICY-PRACTICE GAP

Like all right-sounding precepts, coherence requires ‘teeth’ in order to measure and change behaviour. This section first considers how new approaches to institutionalise coherent approaches among SSR stakeholders can contribute to this goal. It then focuses on the importance of increased networking within the SSR field. Finally, innovative SSR programming approaches are explored that can contribute to more coherent SSR practice.

4.1 INSTITUTIONALISING COHERENCE

International, regional and national mechanisms are being developed to support more effective SSR service delivery. Underlying these different initiatives is the recognition that working towards common outcomes will require changes to how programmes are planned, sequenced, evaluated and resourced. Several good practice examples do exist that can contribute to more coherent SSR engagements.

4.1.1 CROSS-GOVERNMENT MECHANISMS

A number of bilateral donors have created multi-disciplinary cross-government structures to support SSR. Prominent examples include Canada, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK. In all these cases, policy frameworks have been agreed that seek to impose joined up approaches that clearly establish the roles and responsibilities of different actors. The emergence of a Swiss approach to SSR demonstrates the importance of careful sequencing. A first mapping of Swiss SSR capacities initiated in 2004 fed into an initial discussion paper. Building on this work, cross-departmental consensus was forged around the subsequent drafting of a Swiss SSR concept paper and the institutionalisation of an SSR working group (IDAG-SSR). The IDAG-SSR is now responsible for ensuring coherence across Swiss SSR support at headquarters and actively promotes joined up programming approaches on the ground.²⁶ In the SSR field, Canada’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) and the UK Stabilisation Unit²⁷ are perhaps the most elaborated donor mechanisms geared towards ensuring coherence across policy and operations. Both START and the Stabilisation Unit have maximised available human resources through a combination of standing capacities and expert rosters. Moreover, as with all the bilateral actors mentioned above, they benefit from drawing down the services of the


²⁶ See: ‘Swiss Experiences in the Field of Security Sector Reform – assessment in the Light of a 3C and WGA Approach’, Swiss Background Paper for the 3C Conference 2009. Available at: http://www.3c-conference2009.ch/en/Home/Conference_Papers/General_Session_Specific_Papers

²⁷ See: www.international.gc.ca/start-gtsr/index.aspx and www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk

International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) and its multi-disciplinary roster of experts (see below).²⁸

The availability of adequate, timely and sustained SSR funding is a critical enabler of coherent programming. Canada and the UK have developed pooled funding mechanisms in which official development assistance (ODA) and non-ODA budgets are combined. This imbues programmes with predictability through ensuring that resources are in place so that immediate security-related activities can feed into longer term development initiatives.²⁹ Pooled funding mechanisms have contributed to more coherent cross-government engagement – there is an evident positive correlation between pooled funding and wider coherence in the Canadian and UK cases. However, these examples are more the exception than the rule. The clarification of the scope of ODA to include a wide spectrum of SSR activities has certainly increased available resources (see Figure 1). But this has not been matched by rapid dispersal or longer term programmatic approaches across the SSR donor community.

Figure 1: Reported ODA expenditure on SSR 2004-2008.³⁰



4.1.2 REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS

Regional organisations can offer important comparative advantages in addressing patterns of insecurity that pay no respect to national borders. Regional security frameworks provide an alternative entry point for SSR that can bypass resistance at the national level. In Africa, the process to develop an African Union (AU) SSR strategy provides the potential for a continental framework to highlight and promote African-focused approaches to SSR. This is important for both external

²⁸ For more information see: www.dcaf.ch/issat

²⁹ Downes & Keane (2010).

³⁰ Taken from Bryden & Keane (2010) p.16.

partners and AU member states. Ratification will result in pressure to reflect these principles in national constitutions and laws, thus reinforcing efforts in this direction by domestic change agents.

There are evident political and practical (notably resource) challenges to realising a continental process of SSR policy alignment. The AU's SSR capacity remains under-developed and some African governments are resistant to any supra-national involvement in 'national' security decision-making. Coherent policy engagement that links the AU with bilateral donors and international organisations will be important if the organisation is to overcome these challenges and punch its weight in this field. This multi-stakeholder dynamic is perhaps the most promising aspect of a nascent AU-UN strategic partnership which is supported by sympathetic donors and benefits from the commitment of African expert networks.

4.1.3 INTERNATIONAL CAPACITIES

One of the most innovative developments at the international level over recent years has been the creation of ISSAT within the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). On one level, ISSAT fulfils a force multiplier role by reinforcing the capacity of its membership in the areas of advisory field support, operational guidance development, training and knowledge services. However, if ISSAT's primary purpose is to generate additional SSR capacity, it is also an international forum designed to facilitate coherence. Within the ISSAT Governing Board, bilateral donors and multilateral organisations come together to support SSR programming in a joined up manner. Coherence is fostered through a transparent approach to mission planning and implementation across the membership as well as a commitment to multi-donor engagement in a given context.³¹ Lessons learned are then disseminated more widely through an online ISSAT community of practice. ISSAT also provides an alternative to ad hoc and project based SSR funding. Financial contributions from members are made into a common pool, thus reducing the complexity of financing arrangements.³² DCAF's status as an ODA-eligible organisation provides an additional incentive to support SSR in this way.

4.2 NETWORKING AND COORDINATION

A significant development is the increased networking of actors and capacities. In particular, transnational civil-society-driven expert groups are emerging to support SSR in different world regions. These actors have become increasingly prominent contributors to post-conflict and democratic transitions. The consolidation of

³¹ Current members include: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK as well as the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the OECD DAC Secretariat, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Department for Political Affairs (DPA) and the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). See: www.dcaf.ch/issat

³² For more detailed information on pooled financing, see 'Mapping of Donor Modalities and Financing for Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention and Security System Reform', DCD/DAC/INCAF (OECD-DAC, April 2009), 2.

regionally-focused SSR networks such as the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) means that the international community can deliver on a key recommendation from the Accra Forum on Aid Effectiveness by drawing more readily on national and regional expertise (see Box 5).

Important networking dynamics are also apparent in the field of SSR training. Consolidating good practices is essential in order to maximise SSR capacities and knowledge across the international community. One way that SSR training is being improved has been through the work of the Association for SSR Education and Training (ASSET). This voluntary association founded in 2008 provides a platform to mainstream good practice and make it more readily available to governments, security sector institutions, international/regional organisations and civil society.³³ Significantly, ASSET links training organisations from North and South, thus pooling knowledge from different regions.

Box 5: The African Security Sector Network (ASSN)

The ASSN is a pan-African expert network working on security sector reform in Africa and other parts of the world, where it shares the experiences of African contexts through South-South dialogue. Originally formed to synthesise the work of civil society organisations operating in the area of security sector reform and governance, and facilitating regional and continental networking, the ASSN also seeks to build African capacity and ownership, and even the playing field vis-à-vis donors and externals in this sensitive sovereign domain. The network has diverse individual and institutional members, and fosters partnerships across the world. It has carried out policy development support for individual countries as well as regional organisations.

The ASSN's principle objective is to bridge the often substantial gap between different stakeholders, not least academics and practitioners, and between civil society organisations and state-based actors, 'while harnessing their collective expertise, and enabling experiences from different traditions of security organisation and practice (anglophone, francophone and lusophone) to be shared'³⁴. The diverse composition of its membership means that the ASSN is uniquely placed to work beyond the scope and reach of conventional civil society actors. As a multidisciplinary network consisting of academics, think-tanks, civil society organisations, security practitioners (active and retired) and members of parliament, the ASSN is able to produce policy-relevant knowledge while gaining access to channels of influence in policy arenas where its work can effect change in real time. This attribute is perhaps the single most important factor that enables the network to partner directly with national and regional security institutions while retaining a valuable knowledge base on security issues.

Taken together, these networks form an emerging SSR community of practice. Leveraging expertise from within and across different regions can lend credibility as well as comparative experience to specific reform efforts. Through various partnering arrangements they are becoming more fully engaged as a complement to the operational capacities being developed by states, regional and international organisations. Greater visibility of these networks means that there is no longer any excuse for the range of SSR expertise being under the radar screen of bilateral donors and multilateral organisations.

³³ Membership as of May 2011 includes 23 member organisations spanning the Americas, Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East. See: www.asset-ssr.org

³⁴ ASSN Vision Document (2010). Available at: www.africansecurity.org

4.3 PROGRAMMING ‘HOLISTICALLY’

Mapping relevant (state and non-state) security actors, management and oversight bodies can help ground programmes within a given context. For example, it has been argued that the lack of knowledge of the political as well as the economic influence of the various armed groups in Afghanistan was one major contributing factor to programmes designed to an unrealistic state-centric model (see Box 6). Subsequent activities consistently failed to take into account informal and traditional actors central to the country’s security dynamics,³⁵ undermining the ability of SSR programmes to address insecurities faced by individuals and communities. This kind of contextual nuance is only possible if the range of necessary expertise is located within assessment teams. Drawing on regional knowledge and local language skills is particularly important.

Box 6: Contextual determinants for addressing illegal armed groups in Afghanistan

The Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups Programme (DIAG) – launched in 2005 as the successor to an earlier Afghan DDR programme – was intended to set out and implement requirements for voluntary, negotiated or enforced disarmament of illegal armed groups. At the community level, a strategy was put in place offering development incentives in the form of cash grants for locally generated projects in order to undermine support for armed groups. However, this approach was based on a false premise of positive community-armed group relations. Instead, the relationship of armed groups to communities has been in many cases predatory and criminally motivated. These groups had no interest in potential development benefits for the community flowing from development linked weapons collection. Their main concern was retaining a stranglehold on the (much higher) rewards of the illicit economy.³⁶ Emphasis should have been placed on customised approaches that distinguish ‘habitual’ membership of armed groups from criminal or anti-government motivations that are less susceptible to development incentives. The reported relapse into insurgency of compliant districts³⁷ further demonstrates the need to combine community development activities with SSR initiatives to protect communities from the re-emergence of these groups.

Programme design and implementation need to address explicitly how international support can be aligned to national SSR processes. As discussed above, an SSR vision document can provide a solid entry point for political dialogue between donors and national authorities. This can form a basis from which to develop clear, locally-generated SSR benchmarks. Process is key. Such agreements must be developed in a transparent manner that does not bypass formal and informal actors with a stake in security sector oversight and accountability.

The absence of effective monitoring and evaluation is a widespread concern. Monitoring and evaluation can play a vital role in gauging the impact of SSR and catalysing adjustments to policies and programmes. Mid-term reviews are increasingly

³⁵ Mark Sedra, ‘Afghanistan’, in Alan Bryden and Vincenza Scherrer (eds.), *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform - Lessons from UN Experience in Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (Munster: LIT, 2012).

³⁶ Mark Sedra, ‘Afghanistan’ in Bryden & Scherrer (2012).

³⁷ Nations Development Programme, *United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) Annual Project Report 2010*, 19. Available at: <http://www.undp.org.af>

recognised as one useful mechanism to assess the impact of activities, reconsider priorities and make necessary changes to ongoing programmes.³⁸ However, quantitative statistics that measure figures such as soldiers trained etc. remain prevalent. This is at the expense of qualitative criteria that would address the impact and effectiveness of SSR on how people experience security. A more insightful approach would require greater emphasis on this human dimension. This perspective would also help ensure individual activities are being implemented in a mutually supportive manner.

Box 7: Strengthening SSR coordination in Burundi³⁹

In Burundi, the large number of international actors engaged in supporting SSR led to numerous coordination challenges. In 2006, the DDR/SSR unit of the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) recognised the need to improve coordination and identified as a first step the importance of gaining an overview of relevant actors and activities. This was done by mapping current and planned SSR support by international actors in order to minimize overlaps and identify gaps. The mapping was divided by categories of support and included applicable implementation timelines. Results were regularly distributed to the wider international community. Several bilateral actors recognised the value of this initiative and highlighted that the unit had a comparative advantage in fulfilling this role because of the necessary human resources to undertake such efforts. While coordination challenges among such a large number of actors are inevitable, ONUB's efforts have contributed to a more structured dialogue on these issues within the international community in Burundi, thus leading to more meaningful engagement with national authorities.

In sum, the implementation of a holistic approach to SSR will only be realised if embedded within assessments, programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. SSR assessments can provide a basis for coherent SSR programming. However, recent analysis shows that an over-reliance on sectoral assessments is perverting the intensity and order in which reforms are undertaken.⁴⁰ More time is needed to develop a comprehensive picture of the reality on the ground (see Box 7). The breadth of the SSR agenda requires burden sharing among international partners. Coordination is therefore closely linked to coherence – bilateral strategies need to feed into multilateral action.

³⁸ O.J. Greene & Simon Rynn, 'Linking and Coordinating DDR and SSR for Human Security After Conflict: Issues, Experience and Priorities'; Center for International Cooperation and Security (July 2008), 49.

³⁹ This box is drawn from Laurent Banal and Vincenza Scherrer, 'ONUB and the Importance of Local Ownership: The Case of Burundi' in Hänggi & Scherrer (eds.) (2008).

⁴⁰ Bryden & Keane (2010), 10.

5. CONCLUSION

This paper addresses a number of current preoccupations surrounding the need for more coherent approaches within the SSR field. It identifies innovative tools and evolving approaches in this area. However, the central message is that coherence needs to be understood in political as well as technical terms. Joined up SSR policy frameworks have in some cases resulted in little tangible change to the conduct of activities on the ground. Political will has been lacking to apply the key normative principles of SSR in practice. Hard security imperatives frequently trump concerns of democratic security sector governance. This has profound implications for international support. Regardless of the level of cross-government or cross-organisational coherence in personnel, funding, planning or programme roll out, the impact at point of delivery will be superficial (or even counter-productive) without international approaches that are coherent in their sensitivity to national cultural, political and security dynamics affected by their interventions.

From the perspective of improving coherence in practice, it is clear that the implications of taking the politics of SSR seriously have not been fully digested. Three points may be particularly important in advancing this agenda:

- Local ownership has not been mainstreamed in practice. One step in this direction would be to insist on national stakeholders measuring donors' programme support for national SSR processes. This could provide an effective way to gauge impact based on the perceptions of different local actors while also addressing concerns over external imposition of SSR. Only through a dynamic process that requires political will and practical commitment by donors and reforming states, will real progress be made.
- Respect for context may imply fundamentally changing our frame of reference. Because SSR activities cannot be disentangled from the interests of SSR supporters, applying a values-based approach to supporting SSR may mean re-evaluating the sequencing, priorities and even the rationale for engagement. Respecting the 'do no harm' principle could mean that external actors should be prepared to not intervene at all in a given context or at least not within the framework of SSR.
- Recognising the complexity of security governance arrangements means moving beyond a focus on the state in a narrow sense to addressing relevant actors at regional, state and sub-state levels and acknowledging this in programming options. Security across the world is provided (for better or worse) by non-state actors in cases where the state is unwilling and/or unable to provide security to its citizens. If we are serious about enhancing the human security of individuals and communities then defaulting simply to SSR efforts that seek to reinforce state structures is insufficient.

In conclusion, the central challenge for coherent international approaches to SSR is to move away from approaches based on technical assistance to embrace the political nature of the endeavour. This is highly sensitive because at their heart the issues involved are about unequal power relations. The security sector continues to be treated very differently from other public service providers not only in authoritarian regimes but in many democratising states that have a robust civil society and free media. Coherence therefore needs to be understood in terms of addressing this exceptionalism through promoting inclusive approaches that unite actors, activities and end goals. Without a focus on healing rifts between the state, security sector and citizens, security sector reforms will be built on sand.

3C Roadmap



Improving results in conflict and fragile situations

The 3C Conference, meeting in Geneva on 19-20 March 2009, brought together members of the defence, development, diplomatic, finance and economic, humanitarian, and justice and police communities.

The Conference:

1. Reaffirmed individual and collective responsibilities for the advancement of stable, effective and accountable states, as well as of long-term sustainable peace, security, development and human rights, in conflict and fragile situations;
2. Emphasized that it is crucial to address the nexus between peace, security, human rights and development, to help prevent conflict and to successfully achieve recovery, state-building and peace-building objectives, and to address the root causes of conflicts;
3. Recognized that the international response in fragile and conflict situations would benefit from increased coherence, coordination and complementarity between actors responsible for defence, diplomatic, justice, finance and economic affairs as well as development and, where appropriate, humanitarian assistance and others; this would increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the support provided by the international community;
4. Recognized also that this need for increased coherence, coordination and complementarity calls for improved approaches by both bilateral donors (Whole of Government approaches) and multilateral actors (Whole of System approaches); noting further that a Whole of Government approach should also be implemented as much as possible by partner countries' governments!;
5. Reaffirmed the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, and reiterated that independence means the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from political, economic, military or other objectives;
6. Stressed that, where governments demonstrate the political will to foster peace, security, human rights and development, the international community should seek to align with partner countries' national strategies and priorities to address the challenges of fragility and conflict;
7. Recognized in this connection the importance of the national budget as a tool for the partner government for setting priorities, coordinating actions and accounting for results;
8. Recalled and underlined the importance of existing political commitments^[1] that underpin a 3C approach and recognized the importance of the many practical steps^[2] already adopted by participants to encourage a 3C approach;

The Conference reached the following conclusions and recommendations, referred to as the 3C Roadmap:

3C Principles

A coherent, coordinated and complementary (3C) approach is needed to improve the effectiveness of support to countries and communities affected by conflict and fragility. Coherence, coordination and complementarity require both Whole of Government and Whole of System approaches. 3C is understood as collaborative and mutually reinforcing approaches by international actors and partner countries, including civil society, to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of their support to peace, security, and development in situations of conflict and fragility. The 3C Roadmap is intended to reinforce related ongoing international processes, such as those led by the 3C conference co-convenors, the UN, the WB, the OECD and NATO, and to promote synergy amongst them.

Against this background, the Conference agreed that the following principles should be given particular attention:

1. Strengthening national ownership and national capacities;
2. Responding in a timely and appropriate manner to the evolving situation in the partner country.

¹ The term partner country in this document is used to designate countries in situations of fragility and/or conflict.



3. Strengthening mutual accountability of partner countries and international actors
4. Reducing the burden of aid management on partner country capacity
5. Making efficient use of limited resources and avoiding duplication and funding gaps
6. Improving and deepening joint learning, and increasing response capacities

Recommendations

The Conference encouraged all parties to strive to implement the following recommendations in order to achieve coherent, coordinated and complementary (3C) approaches in conflict and fragile situations:

1. *To strengthen national ownership and national capacities*
 - a. Systematically associate partner countries' authorities and relevant stakeholders at all levels, including civil society, in assessing needs, in analysing root causes of conflict and fragility, and in identifying priorities to strengthen national and local ownership and in contributing to confidence building and reconciliation.
 - b. Give priority to strengthening partner countries' institutions and capacities at all levels, including the local level; to enable the state to fulfil its core functions. Priority functions include: ensuring security and justice, mobilizing revenue and managing budget and public finances, establishing an enabling environment for basic service delivery, strong economic performance and employment generation. Support to these areas will in turn strengthen citizens' confidence, trust and engagement with state institutions. Civil society has a key role both in demanding good governance and in service delivery.
2. *To respond in a timely and appropriate manner to the evolving situation in the partner country:*
 - a. Encourage regularly updated joint assessments and analysis of the evolving situation, challenges and trends, including crisis and risks dynamics. These joint assessments should initially be as light and rapid as possible, including partner countries wherever appropriate, and progressively become more comprehensive. They should involve those responsible for security, political and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development and humanitarian assistance and other policy areas, as appropriate.
 - b. Using these assessments as a basis, partner countries and international actors, as appropriate, should develop shared and realistic peace-building, state-building and recovery objectives that are sensitive to the changing environment, as well as strategies that address the root causes of conflict and fragility and help ensure the protection and the participation of the population. These strategies should promote gender equality, social inclusion and human rights; and should progressively be adjusted to the evolving situation. The critical path of priority actions, their sequencing and how they mutually reinforce each other should be identified at the outset, with enough flexibility for periodical readjustment. They should make use of the comparative advantages of all different actors, while preserving the humanity, independence, neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian aid. In this context, where a peace operation with a Security Council mandate has deployed, ensure that it is part of a whole of system approach to peacebuilding which helps to create the conditions for a sustainable and lasting peace. The positive socio-economic impact of the peace operations should be optimized, taking into account their security objectives.
 - c. Foster the use of shared tools and methodologies for assessment, planning, monitoring and evaluation which address the needs of all actors to encourage coherence, coordination and complementarity.
 - d. The international community, as a matter of priority, should deploy demand-driven resources in support of local capacities, wherever possible; it also should stand ready to provide direct support for the delivery of priority activities for critical state functions and for early and sustained recovery when national capacity is seriously lacking, mindful of the need to systematically support national implementation capacity and rely upon it increasingly as it develops. It also should foster the development of capacities at the international level that can support state-and peace-building objectives; in some cases this requires building new capacities to tackle these complex tasks, in others it is about recognizing where those capacities currently exist and providing adequate training.
3. *To strengthen the mutual accountability of partner countries and the international community:*
 - a. Maintain a continuous dialogue between the partner country and the international community to ensure that their shared objectives are reflected in appropriate mutual accountability mechanisms where relevant, such as comprehensive frameworks detailing actions and resources required, associated with mutually endorsed benchmarks, and submitted to regular mutual assessment reviews.
 - b. Where governments demonstrate the political will to foster peace, security, human rights and development,



but lack capacity, the international community should seek to align assistance with country strategies. Where this is not possible because of particularly weak governance or violent conflict, they should seek opportunities to maximize alignment with plans developed in a participatory and inclusive manner at the sectoral or regional level.

- c. Donor agencies, including multilateral agencies, should ensure full transparency in their support, including funding through non-government channels. Partner countries' governments should ensure full transparency in the national budgets and in the use of national resources.
4. *To reduce the burden of aid management on partner countries capacities:*
 - a. Simplify and harmonize aid management to the extent possible, by reducing the number of aid coordination mechanisms and aid channels, and agreeing common business practices. Each donor should try to adapt its representation in the field in line with partner countries' needs, and define clear lines of authority for its various activities; practical approaches could take the form of joint offices, agreed division of labour, delegated cooperation agreements, multi-donor trust-funds and common reporting and financial requirements.
 - b. Recognizing the critical role of the United Nations in conflict and fragile situations, clarify in the context of the ongoing reform processes, the division of roles and responsibilities within the UN, and between the UN, the international financial institutions and other donors, to ensure a coherent and coordinated approach.
5. *To make efficient use of limited resources, to avoid duplication and funding gaps:*
 - a. Provide flexible, rapid and predictable long-term funding, including pooled funding where appropriate; funding should be adequate and commensurate with pledges made, and be made available in a timely manner to sustain progress in stabilisation and address recovery and peacebuilding needs.
 - b. Develop and maintain a clear understanding of all commitments and investments made, as well as of all capacities available at both the national and international community ends, with a view to optimizing their utilization, based on comparative advantages, identifying clear but sometimes shifting priorities, and aiming to avoid duplication of efforts and to bridge critical gaps.
6. *To improve and deepen our joint learning and increase our capacities:*
 - a. Promote more systematic joint learning, training and capacity development activities across agencies within donor governments, as well as among the various international organizations operating in conflict and fragile situations; in this context, the insights gained and best practices identified by relevant international, regional and sub-regional organizations and bodies should be promoted and disseminated; moreover, the expertise of the international, national and local civil society should be fully mobilized.
 - b. Carry out joint monitoring and evaluation of activities, including real-time evaluations, more systematically, to the extent possible; these joint efforts should involve all relevant departments/ministries/agencies of both the international community – bilateral donors as well as international organizations -the partner country and its civil society as appropriate; they should also ensure that the respective perspectives of all these actors are duly taken into account, and reflect the partner country's priorities and strategies.

Follow-up

The Conference invited all participants to take this agenda forward in accordance with their individual mandates. The Chair will bring the outcomes of the 3C meeting to the attention of the different policy communities represented, with a view to taking this agenda forward through all relevant on-going international processes, including in the follow-up to the UN SG's report on 'Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict' and in OECD's implementation of the Ministerial Declaration on Policy Coherence for Development.

A number of participants also entered into individual and joint commitments in support of these principles and recommendations. A consolidated list of these commitments will be made available with the conference report, and would subsequently be annexed to the Roadmap.

The Conference also agreed that stock should be taken of individual and collective efforts made and results obtained in these areas by 2011, in a way to be determined.

The 3C Roadmap was adopted at the 3C Conference 2009 on a coherent, coordinated, complementary approach in situations of conflict and fragility, 19-20 March 2009, Geneva, Switzerland, www.3C-Conference2009.ch.



[1] Existing commitments include but are not limited to:

- The UN 2005 World Summit Outcome, acknowledging the interlinkage of peace and security, development and human rights, and emphasizing the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace (A/RES/60/1 para.9 and para.97)
- The civil-military coordination, including as set forward in the March 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to support UN Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies and the “Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies” endorsed by the IASC in 2008
- The Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (paragraph 21) (2008)
- OECD Ministerial Policy Commitment to improve development effectiveness in fragile states (DCD/DAC(2007)29), OECD DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (DAC/DCD(2007)29) and OECD Ministerial Statement on Security System Reform (2007)
- OECD Ministerial Declaration on Policy Coherence for Development (approved by Ministers of OECD countries at the Ministerial Council, on 4 June 2008)
- The Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative
- 2007 European Council Conclusions on Fragile Situations, and 2007 European Council Conclusions on Security and Development

[2] Examples of practical steps already undertaken are:

- The undertaking of thematic meetings in the framework of the OECD-DAC to enhance coordination and complementarity, including whole of government/whole-of-system approaches (e.g. Development, Diplomacy and Integrated Planning (11-12 February 2008, Oslo); Whole-of-Government Approaches in Public Financial Management (17-18 March 2008, Paris); Security System Reform (9-10 April 2008, The Hague);
- The International Dialogue with partner countries to define shared statebuilding and peacebuilding objectives launched at the Accra High-Level Forum 2008
- The development of joint frameworks for analysis and mechanisms to facilitate common and coherent understandings of fragile, conflict and post-conflict situations (e.g. Post Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNA) and Transitional Results Frameworks (TRF));
- The promotion of funding and reporting mechanisms to avoid duplication and enhance a complementary approach -including shared standing capacities, multi-donor trust funds and basket/pooled-funding.
- The creation of innovative organizational units and processes that combine civil-military competencies to better respond to the challenges of stability and development under conditions of conflict.
- The follow-up processes on the implementation of the UNSC Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security and UN SC Resolution 1612 on Children in Armed Conflicts.

ABOUT THE SERIES

We will be obliged in the years to come to broaden our analytical horizons way beyond current SSR and SSG approaches. There is a growing urgency to move beyond the first revolution in this area that led to the “whole of government” approach towards a second revolution, one that leads to a fully integrated security sector approach that reaches beyond established state structures to include select private companies – and thus permit, what we might call, a “whole of issues” approach.

Horizon 2015 working papers provide a short introductions to live issues on the SSG/SSR agenda. The papers, of course, do not seek to solve the issues they address but rather to provide a platform for further work and enquiry. As such, they ask many more questions than they answer. In addition to these working papers, the project has published an occasional paper – *Trends and Challenges in International Security: An Inventory* – that seeks to describe the current security landscape and provide a background to the project’s work as a whole.



The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is one of the world's leading institutions in the areas of security sector reform and security sector governance. DCAF provides in-country advisory support and practical assistance programmes, develops and promotes appropriate democratic norms at the international and national levels, advocates good practices and conducts policy-related research to ensure effective democratic governance of the security sector.

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