CIAO DATE: 04/2009
March 2009
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Drawing on al-Qa`ida in Iraq's own lessons-learned documents, Dysfunction and Decline identifies a number of structural weaknesses that contributed to AQI's decline, including creating unrealistic expectations among foreign fighters, weak indoctrination and training mechanisms, and command and control structures that diluted command authority within the group.
The lessons of AQI's failure are only partially applicable elsewhere. In Afghanistan and Pakistan there are several circumstances that mitigate the types of weaknesses that made AQI vulnerable. First, al‐Qa`ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan has a relatively secure safe haven in parts of Pakistan, which both makes it more difficult to target directly, but also allows al‐Qa`ida to build systems that are more resistant to disruption even when leadership strikes are effective. Second, al‐Qa`ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan has subtly infiltrated tribal groups over twenty years and generally eschews the imperious leadership style that turned so many Iraqis against AQI. Third, al‐Qa`ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan has used far fewer large‐scale attacks on civilians.
Resource link: Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned From Inside al-Qa'ida in Iraq [PDF] - 3.6M