Columbia International Affairs Online: Working Papers

CIAO DATE: 02/2015

Transition in Afghanistan: Losing the Forgotten War?

Anthony H. Cordesman

January 2015

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Abstract

The US role in Afghanistan formally transitioned from a combat role to one of supporting the Afghan government at the end of 2014. It is far from clear, however, that Afghanistan can develop the level of effective political unity, governance and security forces, or viable economy for this transition to work. Moreover, the US faces significant challenges in dealing with Pakistan, and developing a new strategic posture in Central Asia. The Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS is issuing a new report on the successes and failures of Transition in Afghanistan and the broader challenges in reshaping US strategy in Pakistan and Central Asia. This report is entitled Transition in Afghanistan: Losing the Forgotten War? It is available on the CSIS web site at http://csis.org/files/publication/150109_Losing_Forgotten_War.pdf This report builds on more than a decade’s worth of reporting and analysis of the Afghan war. It examines the recent trends and problems in Afghan governance, the trends in the fighting, progress in the Afghan security forces, and what may be a growing crisis in the Afghan economy. It raises serious questions about the political unity of the country and the effectiveness of its government, provides a detailed analysis of the problems resulting fromthe recent election, a growing Afghan budget crisis, and critical problems with power brokers and corruption. The report indicates that the military situation is far worse than the US Department of Defense and ISAF have reported, and provides detailed graphs and maps showing the real risks of the current security situation. It also provides a detailed analysis of the problems in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the limits in their capability, as well as the weaknesses in past and planned US and allied force development and training efforts. The report suggests that President Obama’s insistence on rapid cuts in the US advisory presence and its near elimination by the end of 2016 could cripple the Transition effort, and that a large and longer conditions-based effort may be critical to success. Once again, the analysis is supported by a wide range of maps and charts, showing the course of the fighting, the problems in ISAF and DOD reporting, and strengths and weaknesses of the ANSF. A similar analysis is made of the Afghan economy and what seems to be a developing crisis as aid and military spending are cut, narcotics become an even more critical part of the economy, and the Afghan government takes on roles formerly managed and funded by foreign donors. Detailed graphs and tables show the scale of the problem drawing extensively on work by the World Bank, IMF, and Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR). In both the cases of the ANSF and the need to help Afghanistan through it economic problems, it is suggested that the US needs to take a more realistic approach to aid and supporting the Afghan government if it wants Transition to succeed. The final chapters focus on the challenges posed by Pakistan and Afghanistan’s other neighbors, and the need for new US strategies in dealing with Central Asia and South Asia. Key charts and tables illustrate the rising level of violence in Pakistan, the problems in dealing with Central Asia states, and US policy priorities in South Asia. More broadly, the report also raises key questions about the need for strategic triage, and US priorities in Afghanistan and the region, relative to other US strategic interests and requirements.