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# **Afghan Forces on the Edge of Transition– IV:**

## ***Progress in Afghan Force Development***

**By: Anthony H. Cordesman**

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
Burke Chair  
In Strategy

*Revised November 17,  
2014*

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**Slow and Erratic Past Build-  
Up of ANSF of the ANSF**

# The ANSF: Racing to 352,000 For What?




Force Element	Manpower Goal End 2012	% of Total
<b>MOD</b>	<b>NA</b>	<b>NA</b>
<b>ANA</b>	<b>172,055</b>	<b>49%</b>
<b>AAF</b>	<b>7,639</b>	<b>2%</b>
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>195,000</b>	<b>51%</b>
<b>MOI</b>	<b>NA</b>	<b>NA</b>
<b>ANCOP</b>	<b>14,451?</b>	<b>4%</b>
<b>AUP</b>	<b>110,279</b>	<b>31%</b>
<b>ABP</b>	<b>23,090</b>	<b>7%</b>
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>157,000</b>	<b>45%</b>
<b>CNPA</b>	<b>2,986?</b>	<b>0.8%</b>
<b>ALP-Militias</b>	<b>30,000-40,000</b>	<b>NA</b>
<b>APPF</b>	<b>11,000-23,000</b>	<b>NA</b>

# Equally Late and Erratic Efforts to Create Effective Afghan National Security Forces – Part One


## Erratic US Aid Funding of Afghan Security Forces Cripples Development

Delays between appropriation by Congress and ability to spend effectively in Afghanistan mean that major US funding only had an impact from 2010 onwards and then dropped sharply after 2011.

ASFF APPROPRIATED FUNDS BY FISCAL YEAR  
(\$ BILLIONS)



ASFF FUNDS, CUMULATIVE COMPARISON  
(\$ BILLIONS)



Source: SIGAR, *Quarterly Report to Congress*, July 30, 2014, p. 76.

## Suitable ANSF Force Growth and Adequate Training Capacity Do Not Occur Until 2011

ANSF: Training Capacity: 9/2009-11/2010




Source: NTM-A, *Year In Review, November 2009 to November 2010*, p. 8.

According to the Washington Post, US forces will only be based in Kabul and Bagram air base after end 2015. They will be further reduced in size by end 2017 to an advisory component at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, “most likely numbering several hundred.”

# Equally Late and Erratic Efforts to Create Effective Afghan National Security Forces – Part Two


## Only Doubling the Army Force Goal After 2008: Air Force Readiness Left to 2016

The ANA force goal was revised to 171,600 personnel for 2011. As shown below, growth occurred in spite of high attrition levels, much of which came from experienced fighters who left after not being given leave or retraining.



Source: *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress in accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, November 2010, p. 23.

## Critical Shortfalls in ANSF Trainers Existed Before Decision to Create Effective ANSF Forces in 2010 and Continued Through 2012



### Only 32% of Trainers Actually in Place on September 1, 2010

Authorized	In Place	Pledged	Shortage
2,796	896	980	920

Following the September 23, 2010 NATO Force Generation Conference, in-place trainers and pledges increased by 18 percent and 34 percent, respectively, which decreased the remaining shortage of trainers by 35 percent. The total requirement in CJSOR v10 is 2,796, a net growth of 471 personnel.

To address the NATO CJSOR v10 shortfall temporarily, the United States is providing an additional 868 personnel with skills not found in the deployed units. For the fielded ANSF Force, the current shortfall is 16 Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and 139 Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (POMLTs). In 2011, the shortfalls will increase with the departure of the Canadian brigade in Kandahar and the additional growth of the ANSF. By 2011, the shortfall is projected to be 41 OMLTs and 243 POMLTs.

Source: *NTM-A, Year In Review*, November 2009 to November 2010, p. 25; *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, Report to Congress in accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended, November 2010, p. 20-21

**Department of Defense 1230  
and ISAF Command  
Summary of Status of ANSF in  
Late 2014**

# Key Force-wide Challenges

- Responding to the changing threat in a Political-Military War.
- Transitioning from “their way” to “our way:” new chain of command, supply and sustainment, role of NCOs, O&M, etc.
- New Top Down Leadership: New President, Mol, MoD to District level.
- Evolution of effective overall command structure.
- Funding and management of resource; effective flow of money.
- Redefining force structure and force plans.
- Reshaping C3I/BM, IS&R, ensuring force cohesion and responsiveness
- Role of ANA vs. ANP and ALP, rule of law
- Promotion, enlistment
- Leave and recovery. AWOL and attrition.
- National, regional, ethnic, and sectarian politicization.
- Training cycle: Shifting from “force generation” to “force effectiveness.”
- Reshaping role of US and other “partners,” advisors, “enablers.”



# **General Dunford on Key Challenges to ANSF**

**ISAF forces are in the process of re-orienting from combat advising at the unit level to functionally-based advising at the Afghan security ministries, the six army corps, and the police zones. In this new role, advisors are focusing on tasks that will build the ANSF's long-term sustainability to make the progress that has been made to date enduring.**

**At the security ministries, advisors are focusing on building ministerial capacity in planning, programming, budgeting, and acquisition. Advisors are also working to improve integration between the different security pillars— army, police, and intelligence service – at all levels.**

**In the fielded force, advisors will focus on capability gaps like the aviation, intelligence, and special operations. They will also focus on developmental shortfalls in areas like logistics, medical, and counter-IED. At all levels, our advisors will work to improve Afghan transparency and accountability of donor resources, and reduce casualties and overall attrition. In total, our shift to functionally-based advising is putting the ANSF on a path to sustainment.**

**Despite our advisory efforts in 2014, four capability gaps will remain after the ISAF mission ends. I assess that without the Resolute Support mission, the progress made to date will not be sustainable. A limited number of advisors will be required in 2015 to continue the train, advise, and assist mission. These advisors will address gaps in 1) the aviation enterprise, 2) the intelligence enterprise, 3) special operations, and 4) the security ministries' capacity to conduct tasks such as planning, programming, budgeting, acquisition, and human resource management so they can provide tactical units the support they require to function. These advisors will put the Afghans on the path to sustainment that the Afghans can further develop after Resolute Support concludes.**



# **October 2014 1230 Report on Aid to ANSF in Operation Resolute Support - I**

Overall, the ANSF have proven capable of leading operations at the tactical and operational levels, demonstrating tactical superiority over insurgents with some assistance from U.S. and coalition partners through the elections and fighting season. Afghan forces plan and execute nearly all combat operations, and continue to improve their capacity to execute large, joint combat operations across the country with coalition advice and assistance. By the end of this reporting period, the ANSF led 99 percent of conventional operations and 99 percent of special operations. The only unilateral operations that ISAF now conducts are for force protection, route clearance to maintain freedom of movement, and retrograde and redeployment activities.

The coalition's role remains critical in supporting ANSF development, which will be the focus of the Resolute Support mission. During this reporting period, ISAF continued to develop ANSF capabilities in intelligence, aviation, and logistics to mitigate the loss of some coalition support in these areas after 2014. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) continues to receive and integrate new aircraft while developing its ability to conduct various missions, including close air support (CAS); casualty evacuation (CASEVAC); human remains recovery; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and support to civil authorities. In August 2014, the DoD began procuring 12 armored and armed MD-530 helicopters and modifying five already in the Afghan inventory, with the goal of providing all such airframes by the middle of 2015 as a partial stopgap until the A-29 light air support fleet is fully operational in 2018.

Special operations are another critical capability gap, but the Afghans have narrowed this gap significantly over this reporting period. The Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) has fielded all subordinate units, with the Military Intelligence *Kandak* and General Support *Kandak* both reaching initial operating capability this reporting period. The General Command of Police Special Units (GCPSU), Special Mission.

<sup>9</sup>Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 30, 2014, pp. 5-6.

# **October 2014 1230 Report on Aid to ANSF in Operation Resolute Support - II**

Wing (SMW), and ANASOC commandos displayed improvements, such as routinely executing short-notice, intelligence-driven operations. Such operations included fairly sophisticated night operations of Mi-17 rotary-wing insertions supported by Afghan-manned PC-12 ISR platforms and effective combined operations with supporting NDS, ANA, and ANP units.

The Resolute Support mission will focus on improving the capacity of the MoD and MoI to execute functions such as planning, programming, budgeting processes, resource management, and procurement. Both ministries lack qualified and experienced leadership and suffer from low institutional prioritization of planning and budget functions, in part because the coalition provided the skills for these functions in the past. Enhanced advisory support for sustainment, specifically in transparency, accountability, and oversight procedures, was a key focus for ISAF during this reporting period, and will be an important facet for ensuring continued international community support of the ANSF. Finally, it will be important to continue efforts to make clear the importance of the ASI's respect for the rule of law.

The Department of Defense is committed to complying with the DoD Leahy Law<sup>7</sup> in Afghanistan and fostering respect for human rights by the ANSF. DoD has engaged with the Afghan government to promote accountability for abuses by Afghan military and police personnel. An ANSF that operates effectively and respects human rights is central to the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan, as these traits are integral to the ANSF's ability to provide security for Afghanistan and retain public support.

During this reporting period, ISAF shifted its focus from combat advising to “functionally based security force assistance.” Advisors now align with Afghan components performing eight essential functions and associated sub-functions.

# **October 2014 1230 Report on Aid to ANSF in Operation Resolute Support - III**

The eight essential functions include:

- 1) Plan, program, budget, and execute;
- 2) Transparency, accountability, and oversight;
- 3) Civilian governance of the ASI and adherence to rule of law;
- 4) Force generate;
- 5) Sustain the force;
- 6) Plan, resource, and execute effective security campaigns;
- 7) Develop sufficient intelligence capabilities and processes; and
- 8) Maintain internal and external strategic communication capability.

The focus of capacity development efforts on eight essential functions is intended to develop the long-term sustainability of the Afghan security institutions and security forces. The drawdown of U.S. and coalition forces reflects the ANSF's progress over the last decade. In preparation for the post-2014 mission, U.S. forces have continued to decrease their footprint, going from fewer than 32,500 personnel at the beginning of the reporting period to fewer than 24,000 personnel by the end of this reporting period. As forces have redeployed, ISAF has closed, de-scoped, or transferred tactical infrastructure—ranging from large bases to small combat

outposts—to the Afghan government.

Force protection remains paramount to the mission. Insurgents continued to attempt high-profile attacks against U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces, as well as DoD civilians, in part to garner media attention. Coalition and Afghan forces have undertaken numerous security measures to reduce the risk of insider attacks (in which Afghan forces attack U.S. or coalition forces), including improved vetting and screening counterintelligence, and are constantly refining their approach....Although insider attacks have decreased against U.S. and coalition forces since their peak in 2012, the threat of insider attacks continues to be a challenge for the ANSF and will require continued close coordination.

# October 2014 1230 Report on ANSF Challenges

During this reporting period, ISAF continued to address ANSF capability gaps in close air support; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; special operations; maintenance; and logistics. ISAF also continued to plan for focusing on further developing these capabilities during the Resolute Support mission.

Developing sustainment capacity within the Ministries of Defense and Interior and their forces is one of the most critical challenges that ISAF is addressing with the Afghan government and security forces. Past efforts have resulted primarily in development of appropriate policy and guidance without building the entire end-to-end logistics system down to the operational and tactical levels. To ensure ANSF could participate in operations, ANSF relied on coalition forces logistics and resupply, substituting for development of ANSF capability. With the drawdown of coalition forces and the end of the coalition combat mission, this will no longer be possible. Thus, DoD deployed teams during this reporting period to focus on addressing these organizational shortfalls and to ensure the ANSF would have systems and processes in place to conduct—with appropriate advisory assistance—logistics planning, supply and commodity forecasting, inventory management, scheduled logistics, contract management, and medical support. This will include linking the ANSF supply system to the DoD supply system and life cycle sustainment of ANSF major end items to DoD program managers through foreign military sales (FMS) cases.

Although many aspects of ministerial capacity are improving, much work remains. The ministries need to continue developing capacity in the eight essential functions as prescribed in the NATO Resolute Support mission. The ministries have limited capability in the areas of logistics, procurement, acquisition, budget, and finance, and continue to lack comprehensive oversight mechanisms.

<sup>12</sup>Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 30, 2014, pp. 27.

# **Commander, International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces Afghanistan**

## **General John F. Campbell on Transition and ANSF: October 2, 2014 - I**

The insurgents have had minimal effects on the elections. They did conduct a total of 761 attacks, but only about 174 of those were effective, effective meaning it hurt, did damage to someone or something. Throughout the entire election process, the ordered recount in a fighting season we've been in a close air support business. The intelligence surveillance reconnaissance business, the quick reaction force business, helping with command and control, advisers and some sustainment support..

...this year, the Taliban have failed to achieve tactical superiority over the ANSF. They have matched

some forces in a few provinces districts, but they were not able to hold them. They were beaten back. By the way, the -- their initiated attacks are down this year from around 24,000 to 18,000.

...the Haqqani Network is one of the many threat streams that continue to affect us here in Afghanistan. And as you know, Haqqani Network is focused more on the high profile attack like the large vehicle borne explosives, those types of attacks.

Right now, the efforts of the ANSF are very focused on that. There's also the SOF component focused on the Haqqani. And again, we are in the enabler business in supporting what the ANSF does. Basically, there's about six today about six threat streams based on that network trying to work their way into Kabul. They're very Kabul-centric. Obviously, as you mentioned, the border -- the do come in from the east. They are fractured. They are fractured like the Taliban is. That's based pretty much on the Pakistan ops and North Waziristan this entire summer-fall. That has very much disrupted their efforts here and has caused them to be less effective in terms of their ability to pull off an attack here in Kabul.

...Helmand is pretty much based on the Marines, retrograde from the north down to Central Helmand, exposed Sangin, Nauzad, Kajacki. That whole area which began end of June, beginning of July was right after the runoff. Some of the checkpoints have been -- that were established for the election have been abandoned. They did get to make some inroads in terms of the district center, principally in Sangin. But through a collaborative effort of the ANSF, early July, mid-July all that was retaken. There's been a couple different movements there by different pillars, including commandos and some other assets there that got involved throughout the course of the summer. But to maintain the security there under the efforts of the 215<sup>th</sup> Corps, the ANCOP, the border police and the uniformed police.

So that -- that was an evolving, ongoing thing post-runoff which in the end, again, the ANSF did retake control, regain control. It did take -- it did take a couple of weeks and it take a lot of assets. It took a lot of ISR. It took a lot of enablers, but that sorted itself out by -- by end of the summer and that remains the case there now with General Malouk and the 215th Corps heavily in control of northern Helmand. He's repositioned some forces and they've maintained that ability now into here in

**November.**

Source DoD News Transcript, November 5, 2014,

<http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5534>

# **Commander, International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces Afghanistan**

## **General John F. Campbell on Transition and ANSF: October 2, 2014 - II**

But quite candidly, the last couple years, there's been some impediments to them, based on maybe some political decisions within their own country that prevented them from even going further. And now, with a new administration in, with President Ghani, who has embraced the military here, that will probably change some of the directives that were out there that may have inhibited the military. I believe that they'll continue to grow.

The Afghan military is the most respected institution in Afghanistan. Every poll taken in the last two years, they're at the very, very top. what you'll see in Helmand is that the Taliban do not own any of the ground that they've tried to get, and that they'll end the fighting season '14 here very discouraged, and that their leadership continues not even to be in Afghanistan and that their morale of the Taliban continues to be low.

They have, quite frankly, won the information war because I think – all of you back there -- Taliban have made success, and they haven't. And so, we have not done a good job in telling that story. But I'm here to tell you in the six weeks I've been on the ground, I've been very, very confident of what the Afghan security forces can do. We'll continue to provide ISR close air support. Some of those things that we will build up their capabilities, but we're not there yet. And that's why we'll continue to do the train, advise, assist as part of resolute support in both '15 and into '16.

...on the casualty piece, there has been an uptick in the number of casualties that the Afghan security forces have taken. But that was expected because they're in the lead....There's much greater percentage rate on the police because that's really the first line of defense. The police are not trained. They're not equipped the same level that the Afghan army and the special operating forces are equipped. So they've probably taken the brunt of those casualties. ...But the number of casualties for the Afghan security forces for the summer of '14 is just slightly higher, actually, than '13. But the last month or so, that percentage has gone up to kind of get it to where it was in '13. But that's because they've been in the lead almost completely this summer, more so than they were last year.

...Will we be in a position to provide air support, medevac to the Afghans in '15? The number of platforms that we have, the amount of ISR, the amount of CAS, the amount of medevac we'll have will be greatly diminished from what we have today, in proportion to where we're going with the 12.5. We continue to work through the Afghans what we will be able to provide and what we won't be able to provide to the Afghans starting on 1 January. And I have to have that discussion both with President Ghani, Mr. Abdullah. And I have to have that discussion with General Austin out of CENTCOM and General Breedlove, SACEUR

# **Commander, International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces Afghanistan General John F. Campbell on Transition and ANSF: October 2, 2014 - III**

.... Now, we're not going to be out in numbers that we were in the past, so we won't have the touch points out in the brigades, kandaks. We'll continue to have that at the corps, and we're actually increasing the numbers that we've ever had in the ministries. And because of that, I think that will really help us in really the central function number one which is plan, program, budget and execution -- really, the PPBE system which is, you know, really hard for U.S. to understand as well. But I think we've been working that very well with the Afghans.

We are trying to do something else that will help us, and that's really build up the civilian positions inside both ministries. The MOI is a little bit better than the MOD at this point, but to bring in young people that really understand the programming, the budgeting, and that execution, and to bring in that young talent as civilians so they continue to grow and have continuity.

The MOI has embraced that. I've had discussions with the MOD. I believe they will embrace it as well. And I think that also will help us with our transparency and the accountability oversight.

. ..We have not been patrolling with the -- at the kandak, or brigade, level really since late last summer because they've taken over the lead of the security piece. There are some patrols that we've been partnered with, them, in and around COPs and FOBs, and what that really does is provide for our own force protection. But really our best force protection is by, through and with, and layered with our Afghan partners. But we have not been out on those kind of patrols for the most part for at least a year here. But, again, at the special operating forces level, with the commandos, with some of the other SOF forces they have in Afghanistan, we continue to do train, advice and assist at a much lower level.



# ISAF Joint Command Commander Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson on ANSF: November 5, 2014 - I

...(Overall capability) the Afghan national security forces are winning, and this is a hugely capable fighting force who have been holding their ground against the enemy. We've described 2014 as the year of change. That seems to be the only thing that's been constant here, has been change. The Afghan national security forces, remain about 352,000. It's about a 156 army, 155 police split. They have secured all of the election process and maintained a steady operational tempo throughout this fighting season.

...executed 940 total operations this year, which is -- they're averaging four to five more times attacks per week than last year, very, very significant

...The ANSF has sustained about a 6.5 percent increase in casualties this year, 46-34 this year versus 43-50 killed in action last year. We expected that actually to be much higher based on the role they've played and where they've been. So overall, fairly stable in comparison to last year.

...(Resolute Support) The mission is not done. What Resolute Support is all about is trying to get the Afghans above the tactical level to the operational and strategic level. The advisers will focus on the ministerial and institutional levels to work systems, processes, and professionalize the force. We focused those efforts along eight essential functions. That's everything from planning, programming, budgeting, execution, to sustainment, to planning. The keys are going to be the cross- (inaudible) -- coordination between the army, the police and the NDS, working their intelligence systems and processes, and the continued development of the Afghan air force. Strategic issues remain forecasting logistical requirements and the budgeting process.

...examples are been what the ANSF in fact has been in terms of their security operations. So they've been able to secure the major road networks. They've worked the border crossings and they've kind of worked a layered ebb and flow based on all the different events that have transpired since the summertime. But they've worked a layered approach to protect Kabul. But I think -- I think the successes, the finds they've made in the -- in the -- how they prevented the large vehicles explosives from getting in here and been able to put an attack together.

((Overall capability) ) They've demonstrated in Doha, Visserat, Sangin, many different district centers, that they have the capability to go back in and reclaim ground. They've done that -- estimates vary from 6-10 times since the summer in a variety of places from Helmand, Nangarhar, Ghazni, et cetera. So they've demonstrated their ability to do that. But along with that, they're also trying to ensure presence back to that layer, defense I was just explaining about the Haqqani piece, about how they're trying to ensure that they maintain freedom of movement, places like Highway 1 and Wardak, Ghazni and in some of the more contested areas, Northern Helmand, Northern Zabul, Southern Ghazni, Kunar, Kunduz and some of those provinces. So they've been able to do that multiple times since this summer.

# ISAF Joint Command Commander Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson on ANSF: November 5, 2014 - II

Remember in 2015, the ANSF has full responsibility. So as they keep working their MI-17 program, their MI-35 program, the MD-530s, the A-29s, all the things that they're trying to complement, supplement, air weapons teams, that will be their version of close air support. What's yet to be defined explicitly will be coalition assets in support of ANSF, based on what types of operations they're doing and, again, what the strategic consequences may be based on where they find themselves, what situations they get into, based on what the enemy threat evolves into here for 2015.

...So medevac, casevac, 88 percent of all medevac-casevac right now is done by the ANSF. That's not necessarily by air, though. That's a combination of air and ground. But we provide very limited, very limited support to them and the casevac, essentially since summer time on. And they -- they -- they have full responsibility for that essentially now.

(Delay in BSA) ...I don't think (the delay in signing the BSA) set them back operationally, but set them back strategically from the ministerial platform. It's cost them a lot of money. It's cost them time to get their systems in place. That's everything from pay rolls to contracts, to budgets, to logistical forecasting. So it's been all that process cost them more money. It cost them more time. But what it did demonstrate time and time again through all the security -- way back from the loya jurga back in November of '13 to the Ghazni Islamic festival, (inaudible), the opening of parliament, election, run-off, audit process, the presidential inauguration, through all of those major events throughout the year, they maintained steady and capable in the midst of a fighting season non-stop. So I -- I don't think it set them back. It made them all the more better in terms of command and control, combined arms integration. We talked about medevac, casevac a little while ago -- fires, integration of air, sustainment, intelligence, all categories have improved based on all those things they did all year.

So the -- the part that they've lost was a development -- institutionalization. It cost them people going to school. It cost professional development and all those systems I described earlier. That's what resolute support will provide next year to enhance that capability at the ministerial level and from those core platforms where the -- where the core headquarters are as the center of the ANSF in each of those regions to build those systems processes, organizations. But the tactical operational piece, a very solid steady performance throughout 2014.

...(Foreign advisors) The 9,800 number is the number and that's the number that we're moving towards on December 31<sup>st</sup>. The 9,800 does not include special operations forces. They -- whatever numbers they are would be in addition to 9,800....the 9,800 hundred is all U.S., and then the coalition issue will be 2,500 to 2,700 -- whatever the troop-contributing nations finalize, up to about 12,500 is the combined 26-nation and U.S. number; 9,800 of which is the U.S., which does include the CT numbers.

# ISAF Joint Command Commander Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson on ANSF: November 5, 2014 - III

...(Afghan training) The institutional process is going to take they kind of got a gap. They've got the senior -- the senior corps of guys who've been around a long time and you've got this very young, up and coming young junior officer field. They're National Defense University out there, which consists of their -- their basic. They have -- they're a combination of officer candidate school-equivalent, a U.S. military academy-equivalent, and a Sandhurst equivalent.

So you go to university and go for one year and get commissioned, versus four years military versus taking -- taking college practical application and going through a modified program to get commissioned, normally with prior service enlisted service. So they have all those combinations. They have a sergeant major's academy. They have all -- they have all the equivalent schools that we have in our country, and they are trying to enhance, expand and make them as meaningful, effective, and as best qualified as they can for their force...that we have in our country, and they are trying to enhance, expand and make them as meaningful, effective, and as best qualified as they can for their force.

So there are -- there are advisers that are going to -- you asked what types of people are going to be here, there are people specifically here just for the institutional training piece to help all the different schoolhouses from police, from the army, all the basic courses. Those types of programs are going to be alive and well and there will be people dedicated just to that. Then there will be advisers at the core platforms, which again are going to be a combination primarily of combat arms-type people who help work them through their operational-type stuff. But then there will be specialists coming in for sustainment, budget, installation, infrastructure, management, contracting, personnel systems. And the Afghan human resource information management system called ARIMS is being fielded, which helps them account for people.

It makes direct pay. It actually -- when soldiers get paid now, it goes right to a bank, versus through anybody's hands. So it helps with corruption, accountability. Lots of those systems' processes are all going to take certain specialties to help move these -- move the core platforms and the ministerial interior, defense, move them along further here in the capital.

So it will be a variety of -- and of course, then you're going to have your standard intel personnel here working with, you know, at reduced intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance. There's going to be airmen here, joint tactical air controllers doing as we were talking about earlier, the close-air support and helping with the -- with the Afghan air force, with the fielding of the -- a lot of the A-29 training will occur in the States. But the fielding of that equipment here in the next year or two, but getting air -- Afghan air traffic controllers, air tactical controllers, air liaison officers -- all those different fields will be included in these -- in these, as we say, these regional core platforms and the Kabul-centric platform.

# ISAF Joint Command Commander Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson on ANSF: November 5, 2014 - IV

(Funding) ...the countries that are coming in as the framework nations, the Germans, the Italians, the Turks, obviously the Americans, and what we're doing on each of these platforms here in the north, the west, the south, the east here in Kabul, all contribute to the security arena, the \$5.2 billion to sustain the ANSF, and then all the other things that are going on in terms of supporting particular aspects of their development, training, professionalization, if that makes sense.

(Impact of Ashraf Ghani) ...the generals have all been engaged with their new leadership. President Ghani has been -- he's gone out and congratulated them. He's empowered them. He's gone to hospitals to go see the wounded. He's popped in police stations at 11 o'clock, midnight to see what folks are doing on duty. But he's been very grateful and thankful of the ANSF for all those things I described, what they've accomplished here this past year. And he's been very engaged, heavily engaged with the leadership of the police, of the army, in dialogue with corps commanders, provincial chiefs of police. He addressed each of the ministers' conferences a couple weeks ago and the combined conference between the police and the army. So there's been a lot more enhanced dialogue, a lot more communication, and a lot more support of their efforts to enhance security here in the country.

(casualties) the data I gave you, it was -- it was killed in action, 4,350 for 2013 and 4,634 for 2014. Those are -- those are killed in action. No, this is not sustainable. So the issue they're having between attrition, they're averaging around -- their goal is a 1.4 percent AWOL rate between the army and police. The army's gone down some. The police have gone up some.

But the bottom line, their first priority right now is to get their recruiting back up and to -- you'll hear lots of talk about organizational restructure, the tashkils, make it to the -- which is their manning document, to get their manning document filled to their numbers. The police are about 89 percent and the army is about 81 percent fill.

So, they're reorganizing their headquarters. They're working how they're recruiting and they have to also work everything fundamentally, particularly on the police side, their tactics, techniques, procedures for how they protect them self with their equipment, with their counter-IED, that -- that's their individual protective equipment. That's their counter-IED equipment to make sure they have less casualties due to IEDs. It's a -- it's a combination of all of the above.

But they do need to decrease their casualty rate. They've done -- as we talked earlier about their MEDEVAC capabilities, how you continue to improve quality of care at the point of injury all the way through evacuation to a hospital. All those things have to continue to improve to reduce those numbers because those numbers are not sustainable in the long term.

# **Progress in Manning But Still Serious Issues – see Sections on ANA and ANP for More Detail**

# Regular Forces were 45% of Total Authorized and Actual ANSF Strength in May 2014

## ANSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, MAY 2014

ANSF Component	Current Target	Status as of 5/2014	Difference Between Current Strength and Target End-Strength Goals
Afghan National Army	187,000 personnel by December 2012	181,439 (97%)	-5,561 (3%)
Afghan National Police	157,000 personnel by February 2013	152,123 (97%)	-4,877 (3%)
Afghan Air Force	8,000 personnel by December 2014	6,731 (84%)	-1,269 (16%)
<b>ANSF Total</b>	<b>352,000</b>	<b>340,293 (97%)</b>	<b>-11,707 (3%)</b>

**However, ANA strength continues to include 9,647 civilian personnel.**



# ANSF Total Force Strength 8.2014

## ANSF ASSIGNED FORCE STRENGTH, AUGUST 20, 2014

ANSF Component	Current Target	Status as of 8/2014	Difference Between Current Strength and Target End-Strength Goals
Afghan National Army	187,000 personnel by December 2012	181,439 (97%)	-5,561 (-4.1%)
Afghan National Police	157,000 personnel by February 2013	152,123 (97%)	-4,877 (-2.4%)
Afghan Air Force	8,000 personnel by December 2014	6,731 (84%)	-1,269 (-5.9%)
<b>ANSF Total</b>	<b>352,000</b>	<b>340,293 (97%)</b>	<b>-11,707 (-3.4%)</b>
ANA Civilians	8,004 personnel authorized	8,749 (109.3%)	745 (8.5%)
AAF Civilians	278 personnel authorized	227 (81.7%)	51 (-22.5%)
<b>ANSF Total with Civilians</b>	<b>360,282</b>	<b>349,546 (97.0%)</b>	<b>10,736 (-3.1%)</b>

Source: DOD, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, 12/2012, p. 56; CSTC-A response to SIGAR data call, 10/2/2014; SIGAR analysis 10/2/2014.

## CIVILIANS COUNTED TOWARD ANA STRENGTH

	Q2 2012	Q3 2012	Q4 2012	Q1 2013	Q2 2013	Q3 2013	Q4 2013	Q1 2014	Q2 2014	Q3 2014
Civilians Included in Force Strength?	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Number of Civilians Included?	NA	NA	NA	NA	7,806	8,698	9,336	9,486	9,647	0

Note: Reflects calendar-year quarters; NA = unknown.

Source: CSTC-A responses to SIGAR data calls, 10/2/2014, 7/1/2014, 3/31/2014, 1/6/2014, 10/1/2013, 7/2/2013, 4/1/2013, 1/2/2013, 10/1/2012, and 7/2/2012.



# **Major Cuts in Unclassified ANSF Readiness Data in Late 2014: Loss of Transparency**

# Regional Command ANSF Status Report (RASR)


Rating Definition Levels (RDLs)	Corps/ Div HQ	IN Bde	Corps ENG KDK	Corps SIG KDK	Corps/ DIV MI KDK	OCC-R	AUP Type-A HQ	ABP Zone HQ	ANCOP Bde HQ	MSF KDK*	Total RASR Assessed Units
Fully Capable	1	10	0	0	1	0	2	1	2	0	17
Capable	6	13	3	2	2	6	3	5	2	2	44
Partially Capable	0	0	2	2	1	1	2	0	1	0	9
Developing	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
Established	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not Assessed	0	1	0	1	3	0	0	1	2	2	10
Awaiting Fielding	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Total	7	24	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	85

OCC-R: Operational Coordination Center- Regional

MSF: Mobile Strike Force

ANCOP: Afghan National Civil Order Police

\* IJC RASR assigns "Awaiting Fielding" status to units who have completed CFC but have not yet graduated from ABS, thus have 3 MSF KDKs waiting. ISAF defines fielding IAW Tashkil 1392 as all units who completed CFC, thus assigns only 2 MSF KDKs "Awaiting Fielding" status.



# **Sharply Limited New ANSF Regional Command ANSF Status Report (RASR) System**

Since 2010, ISAF employed a centralized system of unit assessments to evaluate these ANSF units over time. The latest iteration of this assessment system is the Regional Command ANSF Status Report (RASR), which is better adapted to Security Force Assistance Advisor Team (SFAAT) resource constraints as well as the growing need for focused cross-pillar assessments of corps unit clusters.

Previous RASR reports have focused on assessing 85 key ANA and ANP headquarters and units. The SFAATs/RCs assess and rates the key ANA and ANP unit capabilities utilizing a unit-specific set of rating definition levels (RDLs).

With the reduction in SFAAT coverage, ISAF modified the RASR to a “RASR-lite” construct. The “RASR-lite” construct maintains assessments of all ANP units (i.e., ABP, AUP, and ANCOP) with one primary modification: the report limits the ANCOP assessment to the headquarters and does not address individual brigades or specialty *kandaks* within the ANA corps.

This report provides ANA unit assessments at the corps level, maintains the use of narratives, and provides assessments for Regional Operation Coordination Centers (OCC-Rs), Regional Logistics Support Centers (RLSCs), and Regional Corps Battle Schools (RCBS).

# Revised ANSF Regional Command ANSF Status Report (RASR) – 9/2014

September 2014 RASR - ANSF										
Rating Definition Levels (RDLs)	Corps/Div	OCC-R	RLSC	RMTC/RCBS	MSF Bde	NEB	AUP Type-A HQ	ABP HQ / Zone	ANCOP HQ	Total ANA Units
Fully Capable	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	4
Capable	7	6	3	2	1	0	4	5	1	29
Partially Capable	0	0	1	2	1	0	1	1	0	6
Developing	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Established	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Not Assessed	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	3
Awaiting Fielding	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>43</b>

Of the 40 units assessed, 33 (83 percent) are rated as *capable* or *fully capable*, which is in line with the six-month average of 85 percent (see figure 21 above). The 215th Corps' RLSC was the only ANA unit not assessed. Additionally, ABP Zone 604 and AUP Helmand were the only ANP units not assessed.

The SFAATs for these units, both in RC-Southwest, are no longer present to provide assessments. For the future Resolute Support mission, ISAF is in the process of developing a different reporting scheme to focus on the eight essential functions.

# **SIGAR: ANSF Assessment's Classification Raises Concerns for Transparency and Oversight**

The ANSF capability assessments prepared by the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) have recently been classified, leaving SIGAR without a critical tool to publicly report on development of the ANSF. This is a significant change. SIGAR has routinely reported on assessments of the ANA and ANP as indicators of the effectiveness of U.S. and Coalition efforts to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF.

These assessments provide both U.S. and Afghan stakeholders—including the American taxpayers who pay the costs of recruiting, training, feeding, housing, equipping, and supplying Afghan soldiers—with updates on the status of these forces as transition continues and Afghanistan assumes responsibility for its own security.

ISAF uses the Regional ANSF Status Report (RASR) to rate the ANSF.<sup>7</sup> According to the IJC, the RASR provides a monthly operational-level update on readiness, long-term sustainability, and associated shortfalls of the ANA and ANP.

From its inception until this quarter, the RASR executive summary, which provides a high-level overview of ANSF corps-level units across several operational effectiveness pillars, was unclassified. The remainder of the RASR, which assessed individual units in a more qualified and detailed way, was classified. From the RASR's foreword: "The [then unclassified] EXSUM presents a synthesized analysis of observations and identified shortfalls, highlighting main findings and most pressing issues that hamper ANSF long-term sustainability."

SIGAR's reporting has been taken from the executive summary at an aggregated corps level, not at an operational or tactical level that might be of use to Afghan insurgents' attack planning. It is not clear what security purpose is served by denying the American public even high-level information.

SIGAR will continue to press for explanations of the classification change and seek some modification of this serious obstacle to its oversight role in the security area of reconstruction. Until such time as parts of the ANSF assessment are again unclassified, SIGAR will report on developmental progress and/or shortfalls from other sources.

# ANSF: Overall Lack of Weapons Accountability

- ...missing information concerning when 50,304 weapons were shipped out of the U.S. or when they were received by CSTC-A in Afghanistan. ...had serial numbers for 2,461 weapons that were entered into the database two or more times, which resulted in duplicative records.
- 14,822 serial numbers that were required to be documented in ...did not have corresponding records ...
- Of the 474,823 total serial numbers recorded ..., 203,888 weapons (43 percent) were missing information and/or were duplicative.
- SCIP contained 59,938 serial numbers with no shipping or receiving dates.<sup>11</sup>
- 22,806 serial numbers in SCIP and 24,520 serial numbers in were repeated two or three times.
- 410,911 (87percent) of the 474,823 data entries we reviewed in ...did not contain a title transfer date.
- Does not include substantial unaccountability for vehicles, ammunition, and wide range of other equipment.

# **The Challenge of the ANA**



# Key ANA Transition Challenges

- **Set real-world Afghan limits to corruption and waste. Effective pay, contracting, fiscal management**
- **Defining real needs for post-Transition force structure based on emerging post-2014 military requirements, funding, and force management needs.**
- **Converting from force generation mode to war fighting capability mode.**
  - **Combat effectiveness and order of battle vs. resource measures**
  - **Top down strategic focus as well as bottom up tactical forces.**
  - **Intelligence-based, civil-military operations. Limiting impact of power brokers.**
  - **Sustainability, O&M, repair, supply push vs. demand pull, medical, mobility.**
- **Converting from outside shaped structure and systems to doing it the Afghan way.**
  - **AWOL, attrition, stable personnel.**
  - **Recruitment, promotion, pay and privileges.**
  - **Role of junior officers and NCOs.**
  - **Civil-military interface.**
  - **Medical services/medevac, post-trauma support.**
- **Shifting to effective training/recovery and leave cycles.,**
- **Creating fully effective MOD, Corps, other higher command, procurement, logistic, training structures.**

# Core Force Structure Very Light, Few Enablers

**Afghan National Army (ANA)** 179,000

5 regional cmd.

## **FORCES BY ROLE**

### **SPECIAL FORCES**

1 spec ops div (1 SF gp; 2 cdo bde (total: 5 cdo bn))

### **MANOEUVRE**

#### **Mechanised**

2 mech bde HQ

5 mech inf bn (2 more forming)

#### **Light**

1 (201st) corps (1 cdo bn, 2 inf bde, 1 mech bde, 1 EOD coy)

3 (207th, 209th & 215th) corps (1 cdo bn, 3 inf bde, 1 EOD coy)

2 (203rd & 205th) corps (1 cdo bn, 4 inf bde, 1 EOD coy)

1 (111st Capital) div (2 inf bde)

### **COMBAT SUPPORT**

1 int bn

1 sigs bn

### **EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**APC** 673

**APC (T)** 173 M113A2<sup>†</sup>

**APC(W)** ε500 MSFV (inc variants)

**TOWED** 109: **122mm** 85 D-30<sup>†</sup>; **155mm** 24 M114A1<sup>†</sup>

**MOR** **82mm** 105 M-69<sup>†</sup>

**MSL • SSM** SS-1 *Scud*<sup>†</sup>

**MW** Bozena

**Afghan Air Force (AAF)** 6,800

### **EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

#### **AIRCRAFT**

**TPT** 37: **Medium** 2 C-130H *Hercules*; **Light** 35: 6 Cessna 182; 26 Cessna 208B; 3 PC-12

**TRG** 2 L-39 *Albatros*<sup>†</sup>

#### **HELICOPTERS**

**ATK** 11 Mi-35

**MRH** 46+: 6 MD-530F; 40+ Mi-17

**Paramilitary** 152,350

Afghan National Police 152,350

Under control of Interior Ministry. Includes 85,000

Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), 15,000 Afghan

National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), 23,000 Afghan

Border Police (ABP), Police Special Forces (GDPSU) and

Afghan Anti-Crime Police (AACP).

# **Key ANA Political Challenges**


- Ensuring key elements like SOF and ANCOPs and best units do not become either coup-oriented or tools of President and political control.
- Limiting corruption and role of power brokers.
- Preventing emergence of local “war lords.”
- Ensuring tight limits on treatment of civilians, focus on effective civil-military relations. Focus on popular “strategic communications,” trust, and respect.
  - Rules of engagement. Limit civil casualties, tensions, and conflicts.
  - “Hearts and minds” is not just a cliché, it is a critical reality.
- Provincial and District civil-interface.
- Lead role in making layered defense effective – relations and controls over with elements of police and ALP.
- Limits to internal ethnic, tribal, regional, and sectarian tensions – elitism.
- Forcing effective cooperation, combined operations across unit and command lines.
- Accountability

**1B Coalition oversight  
1A Department or  
institution capable of  
autonomous operations.**

MDB Results - As of 31 December 2013						
Assessed Area	Current CM Rating	Expected Date of CMIB		Assessed Area	Current CM Rating	Expected Date of CMIB
Ministry of Defense	CM1B	1Q 2012		CoGS	CM2A	Post 2014
First Deputy MoD	CM2A	Post 2014		Vice CoGS	CM2A	Post 2014
AMoD S&P (Prog & Analysis)	CM3	Post 2014		VCoGS-Air	CM2B	Post 2014
AMoD Strategy & Policy (S&P)	CM2B	4Q 2014		Sergeant Major of the Army	CM2B	3Q 2014
AMoD Intelligence	CM2B	Post 2014		Director of General Staff (DoGS)	CM2A	Post 2014
AMoD Acquisition Tech & Logistics	CM2B	3Q 2014		GSG1 Personnel	CM2B	Post 2014
Acquisition Agency	CM2B	1Q 2014		GSG2 Intelligence	CM2B	2Q 2014
AMoD Personnel	CM1B	3Q 2013		GS G3 Operations	CM2A	Post 2014
AMoD Education	CM2B	3Q 2014		GS Engineer	CM3	Post 2014
AMoD Reserve Affairs	CM2B	3Q 2014		GSG4 Logistics	CM2B	3Q 2014
AMoD Chief of Legal Dept.	CM3	Post 2014		GSG5 Policy & Planning	CM1B	1Q 2013
MoD Chief, Finance	CM2B	Post 2014		GSG6 Communications	CM1B	4Q 2013
MOD Chief, Construction & Property Management Division (CPMD)	CM2B	1Q 2014		GS G6 Comm. Support Unit	CM1A	1Q 2012
MoD Inspector General	CM2B	2Q 2014		GSG7 Force Structure, Training & Doctrine	CM2A	Post 2014
Director Strategic Communications	CM2B	1Q 2014		GSG8 Finance	CM2A	Post 2014
MoD Chief, Parl, Soc. & Public Affairs	CM1B	1Q 2012		Chief Religious & Cultural Affairs (RCA)	CM2B	3Q 2014
(CFA) Gender Integration	CM3	Post 2014		GS Inspector General	CM2A	Post 2014
(CFA) Civilianization	CM2B	3Q 2014		GS Legal Department	CM2A	Post 2014
				ANA Recruiting Command (ANAREC)	CM1B	4Q 2011
		CM4		CM2B		CM1B
		CM3		CM2A		CM1A

# MoD Readiness: June 2014 (No update in October 1230 Report)

**DOD reported no improvements occurred in developing MOD and MOI capacity to perform critical functions in Q2 of 2014**



This quarter, SIGAR was provided CM ratings for 35 MOD staff sections and cross-functional areas, down from 37 last quarter and 46 in quarters prior.

Six offices were rated CM-1B; the others are not expected to attain this rating until after 2014.

The only office that had achieved the top rating of CM-1A as of last quarter, the Communications Support Unit, did not retain that rating this quarter

# October 2014 1230 Report on MoD Challenges - I

Coalition advisory efforts continued to focus on addressing shortfalls in MoD human capital; contracting and procurement; and transparency, accountability and oversight. President Ghani has signaled that improvements in these areas across the government will be a focus of his administration.

MoD hiring practices sometimes rely on patronage networks rather than qualifications when filling positions of authority. The MoD has a dearth of competent officers in positions of authority; however, a number of senior officers constrain advisors' ability to develop the capacity of the individual offices and to design and implement needed reforms. The budgetary system is overly bureaucratic, which inhibits the MoD's ability to resource the force properly, and overly restrictive laws increase the workload associated with contracting and procurement.

Continued assignment of junior officers with the requisite training and skills, coupled with the recruitment of appropriately trained and experienced civilians, will help mitigate these shortfalls in the near term. Long-term progress hinges on the continued growth and development of midlevel employees in these offices.

...A weakness in bottom-up requirement identification and demand-based forecasting continues. From the ministerial to the corps level, there are opportunities for training and education in this area to further the ANA's ability to sustain its force and manage limited budget resources.

The MoD continues to struggle in developing transparency, accountability, and oversight procedures. During this reporting period, the MoD established eight additional Transparency and Accountability Committees to counter-corruption. However, the committees are still developing administrative capabilities to properly oversee and report on transparency and accountability issues.

. ISAF continues to leverage financial controls, such as its fiscal year commitment letter that is designed to ensure MoD compliance with financial budgeting requirements agreed upon by GIRoA and the coalition. The letter incorporates controls to potentially delay or reduce direct contributions based on MoD

<sup>35</sup>Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 30, 2014, pp. 31-32.

# **October 2014 1230 Report on MoD Challenges -**

## **II**

**compliance with the agreement. The MoD has responded positively to these controls and has submitted financial commitment letter for the execution of its budgetary requirements for the upcoming fiscal year. Overall, the process of establishing financial controls is intended to build ANSF ministerial capacity to manage and execute funds while developing acquisition and procurement capabilities.**

<sup>36</sup>Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 30, 2014, pp. 31-32.



## **MoD and MOI Readiness Reporting on Hold and No Recent Improvements: SIGAR October 2014**

The assessment process for Afghan ministries is on hold until January. The DOD reported this quarter that the ministerial-development planning process for the MOD and MOI is undergoing a complete rewrite. The objective is to have the new process in place to perform ministerial assessments for the period October–December 2014.

The final assessments under the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system, as reported last quarter, reflected no rating improvements in developing MOD and MOI capacity to perform critical functions... To rate the operational capability of these ministries, NTM-A used this system to assess staff sections (such as the offices headed by assistant or deputy ministers) and cross-functional areas (such as general staff offices) using four primary and two secondary ratings.

...The last quarterly CM ratings were for 35 MOD staff sections and cross functional areas, down from 37 in prior quarters. 218 Six MOD offices attained the second-highest rating of CM-1B. 9

Thirty-one staff sections at MOI were assessed. Three attained the highest rating of CM-1A: the Chief of Staff Public Affairs Office, the Deputy Minister for Security Office of the Afghan National Civil Order Police, and the Deputy Minister of Security for Force Readiness. In addition, 15 MOI staff sections had attained a CM-1B rating.

The United States has provided \$1.2 million for the MOD and \$1.5 million for the MOI for ministry development... ISAF has 191 personnel assigned to or supporting it for advising the MOD, and another 231 for advising the MOI...

In a special project report released last year, SIGAR found that CSTC-A had not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment of the capabilities of the MOD and MOI to manage and account for U.S. direct-assistance dollars, of which \$4.2 billion has been committed and nearly \$3 billion disbursed.

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
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# ANA Force Generation Readiness 12/2013



Note: Bde = Brigade

Source: LIC, Regional ANSF Status Report, December 2013.

Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report (RASR) rates ANA brigades in six areas: • Combined Arms (planning and conducting joint operations using multiple types of weapons), • Leadership, • Command & Control, • Sustainment, • Training (conducting training), • Attrition

# ANA Attrition by Corps/Division March 2014

ANA	Attrition*
201 Corps	1.6%
203 Corps	1.8%
205 Corps	2.0%
207 Corps	2.6%
209 Corps	2.1%
215 Corps	4.1%
111 Div	1.2%
SOF	0.9%
EAC****	0.7%
<b>ANA Total</b>	<b>1.8%</b>

- High attrition rate continues to be a challenge, but has remained stable over 2013.
- Causes of attrition are assessed as high op tempo, sustained risk, soldier care/ quality of life, and leave issues.
- Though combat losses are a relatively low percentage of total attrition- it likely contributes to morale issues

\*ANA attrition decreased slightly from 3.3 percent (Feb) to 1.8 percent (march) in Solar Month March 14.

\*\*\*\*EAC- Echelon Above Corps includes a number of organizations; MP Guard Brigade; HSSB; Army support Command; Logistics Command; ANATC; ANAREC; Medical Command; ANDU; Ministry of Defense; General Staff; Ground Forces Command; and Mobile Strike Force.



# ANA & AAF Manning by Corps Q1, Q2 2014

## ANA STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE

ANA Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q1 2014	Q2 2014	Quarterly Change	Q1 2014	Q2 2014	Quarterly Change
201st Corps	18,130	18,130	None	17,489	17,606	117
203rd Corps	20,798	20,798	None	20,029	22,114	2,085
205th Corps	19,097	19,097	None	17,891	18,534	643
207th Corps	14,879	14,879	None	13,806	14,204	398
209th Corps	15,004	15,004	None	14,554	14,674	120
215th Corps	17,555	17,555	None	16,310	16,999	689
111th Capital Division	9,174	9,174	None	8,921	8,356	-565
Special Operations Force	12,149	11,013	-1,136	10,458	10,649	191
Echelons Above Corps <sup>a</sup>	34,866	36,002	1,136	29,727	36,610	6,883
TTHS <sup>b</sup>	-	-	-	24,356 <sup>c</sup>	12,299 <sup>d</sup>	-12,057
Civilians	-	-	-	9,236	9,394	158
<b>ANA Total</b>	<b>161,652</b>	<b>161,652</b>	<b>None</b>	<b>182,777</b>	<b>181,439</b>	<b>-1,338</b>
Afghan Air Force (AAF)	7,097	7,370	273	6,513	6,478	-35
AAF Civilians	-	-	-	250	253	3
<b>ANA + AAF Total</b>	<b>168,749</b>	<b>169,022</b>	<b>273</b>	<b>189,540</b>	<b>188,170</b>	<b>-1,370</b>

Notes: Quarters are calendar-year; Q1 2014 data is as of 3/31/2014; Q2 2014 data is as of 5/31/2014.

<sup>a</sup> Includes MOD, General Staff, and Intermediate Commands

<sup>b</sup> Trainee, Transient, Holdee, and Student; these are not included in counts of authorized personnel.

<sup>c</sup> Includes 4,701 cadets

<sup>d</sup> Includes 5,157 cadets

Source: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 3/31/2014 and 7/1/2014.

# ANA & AAF Manning by Corps Q2, Q3 2014

## ANA STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE

ANA Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q2 2014	Q3 2014	Quarterly Change	Q2 2014	Q3 2014	Quarterly Change
201st Corps	18,130	18,205	75	17,606	17,401	(205)
203rd Corps	20,798	22,520	1,722	22,114	21,057	(1,057)
205th Corps	19,097	19,116	19	18,534	18,128	(406)
207th Corps	14,879	15,089	210	14,204	13,761	(443)
209th Corps	15,004	15,214	210	14,674	14,566	(108)
215th Corps	17,555	18,329	774	16,999	17,106	107
111th Capital Division	9,174	9,410	236	8,356	8,866	510
Special Operations Force	11,013	10,746	(267)	10,649	9,827	(822)
Echelons Above Corps <sup>a</sup>	36,002	37,713	1,711	36,610	38,248	1,638
TTHS <sup>b</sup>	-	13,359	13,359	12,299	10,908	(1,391)
Civilians	-	7,726	7,726	9,394	8,749	(645)
<b>ANA Total</b>	<b>161,652</b>	<b>187,427</b>	<b>25,775</b>	<b>181,439</b>	<b>178,617</b>	<b>(2,822)</b>
Afghan Air Force (AAF)	7,370	7,552	182	6,478	6,695	217
AAF Civilians	-	278	278	253	227	(26)
<b>ANA + AAF Total</b>	<b>169,022</b>	<b>195,257</b>	<b>26,235</b>	<b>188,170</b>	<b>185,539</b>	<b>(2,631)</b>

Note: Quarters are calendar-year; Q2 2014 data as of 5/31/2014; Q3 2014 data as of 8/2014.

<sup>a</sup> Includes MOD, General Staff, and intermediate Commands

<sup>b</sup> Trainee, Transient, Holders, and Student; these are not included in counts of authorized personnel; Q2 Assigned includes 4,701 cadets; Q3 Assigned includes 5,157 cadets

# ANA & AAF Manning by Corps Q2, Q3 2014

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Note: Quarters are calendar-year; Q2 2014 data as of 5/31/2014; Q3 2014 data as of 8/2014.

<sup>a</sup> Includes MOD, General Staff, and Intermediate Commands

<sup>b</sup> Trainee, Transient, Holders, and Student; these are not included in counts of authorized personnel; Q2 Assigned includes 4,701 cadets; Q3 Assigned includes 5,157 cadets



# **ANA Strength, attrition, Killed, and Wounded in August 2014**

As of August 20, 2014, the overall end strength of the ANA was 195,257 personnel (187,427 Army and 7,830 Air Force), according to ISAF.<sup>235</sup> However, as noted previously, this quarter ISAF reported separate authorizations for ANA military and civilian positions:

- Military: 195,000
- Civilian: 8,004
- Total: 203,004

The above end strength includes a total of 8,976 civilians (8,749 ANA and 227 Air Force civilians). Overall, the total assigned is 96.5% of the combined end-strength goal. However, the ANA civilian count exceeds its authorization target by 9%; refer to Table 3.10 for details. All components except for the special-operations forces (SOF) had a modest authorization increase.

Most components, however, experienced a decrease in the number of assigned personnel... Personnel absent without official leave (AWOL) increased from 5,746 last quarter to 8,610 this quarter, but were still significantly less than the 10,292 reported AWOL in the last quarter of 2013.

The decrease in SOF strength does not bode well, but simply increasing SOF numbers would not necessarily improve the ANSF's ability to conduct special operations. The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) said in a DOD-commissioned, independent assessment released earlier this year, "Afghanistan has a significant need for SOF, but the ANSF cannot support more SOF." CNA also said "ANA SOF currently depends on the U.S. and ISAF for logistics, intelligence, and air mobility. Simply increasing the number

of ANA SOF personnel without addressing these support requirements would not increase the overall capability of SOF to disrupt insurgent and terrorist networks."

...Attrition continues to be a major challenge for the ANA. Between September 2013 and August 2014, more than 36,000 ANA personnel were dropped from ANA rolls.<sup>241</sup> The ANA continues to suffer serious losses from fighting. Between March 2012 and August 2014, more than 2,850 ANA personnel were killed in action (KIA) and 14,600 were wounded in action (WIA).

# **SIGAR and 1230 Reports Contain Key Warnings on Readiness & Sustainability**

- CSTC-A stated that “the ANA counts those personnel ‘in the field’ or actively engaged in combat operations as unavailable, with present for duty only representing those personnel ‘in barracks.’”
- This explains the low present-for-duty numbers for Corps actively engaged in operations. This quarter, the percentage of ANA personnel “unavailable” ranged from 70.1% (215th Corps) to 20.5% (209th Corps). About 1.7% of the Afghan Air Force’s 6,529 personnel were unavailable.
- Although details to account for the 126,658 personnel assigned to the ANA’s combat forces this quarter were limited, SIGAR determined that these forces included personnel in the following categories:
  - Present-for-Duty or “Combat Strength”: 62,753 (50%)
  - Unavailable (including personnel in combat and on leave but not AWOL): 54,862 (43%)
  - Absent Without Official Leave (AWOL): 9,043 (7%)

# US Investment in ANA Equipment

## CUMULATIVE U.S. COSTS TO PROCURE ANA EQUIPMENT (\$ MILLIONS)

	Weapons	Vehicles	Communications	Total
April 2013	\$878.0	\$5,556.5	\$580.5	<b>\$7,015.0</b>
July 2013	622.8	5,558.6	599.5	<b>6,780.9</b>
October 2013	447.2	3,955.0	609.3	<b>5,011.5</b>
December 2013	439.2	4,385.8	612.2	<b>5,437.2</b>
March 2014	461.2	4,385.8	670.3	<b>5,517.3</b>
July 2014	461.2	4,385.8	670.3	<b>5,517.3</b>
September 2014	522.3	4,638.9	688.2	<b>5,849.4</b>

Source: CSTC-A, responses to SIGAR data calls, 4/1/2013, 7/2/2013, 10/1/2013, 12/30/2013, 3/31/2013, 7/1/2014, and 9/29/2014.

## COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANA WEAPONS, VEHICLES, AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT

Type of Equipment	Procured	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons	\$522,336,282	\$13,803,951
Vehicles	4,638,861,237	38,124,578
Communications	688,157,101	31,010,799
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$5,849,354,620</b>	<b>\$82,939,328</b>

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/29/2014.

# ANA Weapons & Equipment Summary 4.14: Part I

ANA Weapon: Status Summary							
Item	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered		
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/ AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)
NATO Individual Weapons	221,072	1,788	212,492	(10,368)	202,205	11,147	(9,508)
NATO Crew Served Weapons	12,667	493	10,563	(2,597)	10,488	441	(2,231)
NATO Indirect Fire Weapons	140	921	1,168	107	1,168	20	127
Non-NATO Standard Weapons	7,453	13	54,518	47,052	54,518	57,975	105,027
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>241,332</b>	<b>3,215</b>	<b>278,741</b>	<b>34,194</b>	<b>268,379</b>	<b>69,583</b>	<b>93,415</b>

Item	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered			LOCATION OF VEHICLES DELIVERED			
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/ AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)	US PORT READY TO BE CALLED FWD	JAX PORT	IN TRANSIT	AUTL
Light Tactical Vehicle	17,834	70	18,781	877	17,463	(369)	(810)	0	0	1318	336
Mobile Strike Force Vehicles	0	623	623	0	476	0	(147)	57	0	97	0
Medium Tactical Vehicle	6,310	218	7,447	919	7,288	(326)	434	62	62	71	63
HMMWV Variants	9,021	270	11,191	1,900	9,854	(407)	156	1260	1260	401	67
Heavy Vehicles & Fire Equipment	894	1	869	(26)	869	40	14	0	0	0	15
Engineer Equipment	1,424	150	1,783	209	1,293	(2)	(283)	0	0	241	2
Trailers	5,301	25	6,065	739	6,021	(74)	621	0	0	181	28
Material Handling Equipment	819	2	859	38	757	39	(25)	0	0	0	29
People Haulers	1,184	4	1,351	163	918	142	(128)	0	0	377	11
Other	1,161	45	2,175	969	1,743	(830)	(293)	1	1	1	46
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>43,948</b>	<b>1,408</b>	<b>51,144</b>	<b>5,788</b>	<b>46,682</b>	<b>(1,787)</b>	<b>(461)</b>	<b>1380</b>	<b>1380</b>	<b>2687</b>	<b>597</b>



## ANA Weapons & Equipment Summary 4.14: Part II

ANA Comm: Status Summary							
Item	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered		
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/ AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)
HF Radios	11,615	2,334	12,268	(1,681)	12,101	9	(1,839)
VHF Radios	72,082	121	71,538	(665)	71,337	1,567	701
VHF/UHF Radios	2,231	250	3,318	837	3,318	0	837
Night Vision Device	9,896	443	12,497	2,158	10,830	252	743
Other Comm	269	12	283	2	283	0	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>96,093</b>	<b>3,160</b>	<b>99,904</b>	<b>651</b>	<b>97,869</b>	<b>1,828</b>	<b>444</b>
ANA EOD: Status Summary							
ANA EOD Item	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered		
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/ AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)
Binoculars	15,430	0	15,430	0	15,430	0	0
Blasting Machine M34	373	0	470	97	470	0	97
EOD Bomb Suit (SM + MED) w/Helmet	528	0	676	148	669	0	141
Firing Cable & Reel	543	0	2,631	2,088	2,631	0	2,088
M2 Crimper	268	0	298	30	237	0	(31)
Mine Detector (Vallon & CEIA)	5,748	552	6,300	0	6,300	0	0
Pigstick w/ Stand	528	0	696	168	634	0	106
MMP-30 Robot	528	0	707	179	503	0	(25)
Symphony Jammer	1,286	0	1,261	(25)	1,261	0	(25)
Test Set, M51 Blasting Cap	378	0	635	257	333	0	(45)
Hook & Line Kit PT 1&2	264	0	400	136	400	0	136
EOD Tripod	264	0	343	79	318	0	54
PIPPERS	7,202	0	7,202	0	7,202	0	0
Mine Rollers	526	0	526	0	526	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>33,866</b>	<b>552</b>	<b>37,575</b>	<b>3,157</b>	<b>36,914</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2,496</b>

# ANA Equipment Progress: August 2014 - I

ANA Weapon Status Summary	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered		
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)
NATO Individual Weapons	221,072	1,788	217,911	(4,949)	208,707	11,155	(2,998)
NATO Crew Served Weapons	12,667	493	12,916	(244)	10,563	487	(2,110)
NATO Indirect Fire Weapons	140	969	1,173	64	1,173	20	84
Non-NATO Standard Weapons	7,453	13	55,291	47,825	55,291	54,835	102,660
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>241,332</b>	<b>3,263</b>	<b>287,291</b>	<b>42,696</b>	<b>275,734</b>	<b>66,497</b>	<b>97,636</b>

ANA Vehicle Status Summary	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered		
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)
Light Tactical Vehicle	17,834	70	18,781	877	17,970	(369)	(303)
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle	0	220	50	(170)	28	0	(192)
Mobile Strike Force Vehicle	0	623	623	0	614	0	(9)
Medium Tactical Vehicle	6,310	218	7,447	919	7,347	(536)	283
HMMWV Variants	9,021	270	13,166	3,875	13,169	(351)	3,527
Heavy Vehicle and Fire Variants	894	1	869	(26)	869	40	14
Engineer Equipment	1,424	205	1,838	209	1,425	(2)	(206)
Trailers	5,301	25	6,065	739	6,118	(84)	708
Materiel Handling Equipment	819	2	859	38	757	39	(25)
Buses	1,184	4	1,383	195	1,224	142	178
Other	1,161	45	2,175	969	1,747	(830)	(289)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>43,948</b>	<b>1,683</b>	<b>53,256</b>	<b>7,625</b>	<b>51,268</b>	<b>(1,951)</b>	<b>3,686</b>

ANA Comm Status Summary	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered		
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)
HF Radios	11,615	313	14,047	2,119	15,367	9	3,448
VHF Radios	72,082	121	71,563	(640)	71,816	1,567	1,180
VHF/UHF Radios	2,231	250	3,318	837	3,318	0	837
Night Vision Device	9,896	443	12,497	2,158	10,830	252	743
Other Comm	269	12	283	2	283	0	2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>96,093</b>	<b>1,139</b>	<b>101,708</b>	<b>4,476</b>	<b>101,614</b>	<b>1,828</b>	<b>6,210</b>


# ANA Equipment Progress: August 2014 - II

ANA EOD Status Summary	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered		
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)
Binoculars	15,430	0	15,430	0	15,430	0	0
Blasting Machine M34	373	0	470	97	470	0	97
EOD Bomb Suit w/ Helmet	528	0	676	148	669	0	141
Firing Cable and Reel	543	0	2,631	2,088	2,631	0	2,088
M2 Crimper	268	0	298	30	237	0	(31)
Mine Detector (Vallon & CEIA)	5,748	552	6,300	0	6,300	0	0
Pigstick w/ stand	528	0	696	168	634	0	106
MMP-30 Robot	528	0	863	335	503	0	(25)
Symphony Jammer	1,286	0	1,261	(25)	1,261	0	(25)
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Hook & Line Kit PT 1&2	264	0	400	136	400	0	136
EOD Tripod	264	0	343	79	318	0	54
PIP PERS	7,202	0	7,202	0	7,202	0	0
Mine Rollers	526	0	526	0	526	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>33,866</b>	<b>552</b>	<b>37,731</b>	<b>3,313</b>	<b>36,914</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2,496</b>



# ANA: Lack of Weapons Accountability

## Afghan Army Extra Weapons




Created with [Datavrapper](#)

Source: [SIGAR analysis of CSTC-A data](#); Chart: [LINDSEY COOK](#), [Get the data](#)

**Does not include substantial unaccountability for vehicles, ammunition, and wide range of other equipment.**

Source: Tom Risen, "U.S.-Supplied Weapons Vulnerable After Afghanistan Withdrawal Weapons given to Afghanistan have gone missing before, and it may, happen again," [USN&WR](#), July 28, 2014 | 12:01 a.m. EDT and SIGAR, "Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Weapons Accountability," SIGAR 14-84 Audit Report, July 2014.


# Maturing ANA Infrastructure 4/2014




## Project Status

Force	Complete	In Progress	Acquisition	Planned	TOTAL
111	11	10	0	0	21
201	13	2	0	0	15
203	13	7	0	0	20
205	14	6	0	1	21
207	13	2	0	0	15
209	24	4	0	1	29
215	11	4	0	0	15
AAF	21	10	0	1	32
Ministry	2	1	0	1	4
SOF	20	13	2	0	35
Support	102	6	0	2	110
Training	37	13	1	5	56
<b>Feb (SM)</b>	<b>281</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>373</b>
<b>Jan (SM)</b>	<b>268</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>374</b>

# ANA Attrition & Recruitment March 13-Feb 14



# ANA Attrition & Recruitment August 2013 - August 2014



	Aug-13	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14	Mar-14	Apr-14	May-14	Jun-14	Jul-14	Aug-14
Actual	180,593	181,077	179,783	182,585	182,256	183,262	178,076	175,850	173,231	170,758	169,972	167,622	164,906
Goal	187,630	187,630	187,630	187,630	187,630	187,630	187,630	187,630	187,630	187,630	187,630	187,630	195,204

Following extensive work with the GSG1 staff, civilian personnel occupying civilian designated Tashkil positions have been separated from the military strength data. Following the issue of Tashkil 1393-2014, there are 8,004 ANA civilian billets within the 203,004 total Tashkil strength. GSG1 now reports the civilian strength separately within their monthly Personnel Accountability Strength Report (PASR). Strength above is ANA - AAF + Cadets + Civilians.

\* Total Losses (Attrition) encompass unplanned and planned losses.

\*\* Total Gain - this data includes all gains to ANA strength during the reported period. This includes new recruits to training, returned from the Dropped From Rolls (DFR) population, and re-contracts.

\*\*\* Retention numbers are accounted for in strength and gain figures.

# ANA Readiness 6/2014

REGIONAL ANSF STATUS REPORT - ANA ASSESSMENTS, QUARTERLY CHANGE																				
	Fully Capable				Capable				Partially Capable				Developing				Not Assessed			
	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-
Combined Arms Operations	8	8	0		12	14	2		3	2	-1		0	0	0		1	0	-1	
Leadership	15	16	1		6	6	0		2	2	0		0	0	0		1	0	-1	
Command & Control	9	12	3		14	12	-2		0	0	0		0	0	0		1	0	-1	
Sustainment	6	5	-1		11	14	3		6	5	-1		0	0	0		1	0	-1	
Training	6	6	0		13	14	1		3	3	0		1	1	0		1	0	-1	
Attrition	1	5	4		9	8	-1		0	0	0		14	11	-3		0	0	0	

Notes: Numbers represent brigades. Attrition assessment is based on the following monthly attrition rates: 0-1.99% = Fully Capable; 2-2.99% = Capable; 3%+ = Developing. Quarters are calendar-year.

Sources: IJC, March 2014 RASR Status Report, Executive Summary, 4/9/2014; IJC, June 2014 RASR Status Report, Executive Summary, 6/1/2014.


Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report (RASR) rates ANA brigades in six areas: • Combined Arms (planning and conducting joint operations using multiple types of weapons), • Leadership, • Command & Control, • Sustainment, • Training (conducting training), • Attrition

For the ANA, the latest RASR report provides assessments of 24 brigades (22 brigades within corps and two brigades of the 111th Capital Division). Of those, 92% were “fully capable” or “capable” of planning and conducting joint and combined-arms operations. This is an increase from the 87% assessed at those levels last quarter. This was due to one brigade improving from “partially capable” to “capable” and one brigade, not assessed last quarter but earlier deemed “capable,” being assessed as “capable.” In most assessment categories, the ANA’s capability showed some improvement.

Significant improvement was reported in attrition with 54% of brigades rated “fully capable” or “capable,” an increase over the 42% rated last quarter. Forty-six percent of brigades were still considered “developing,” meaning that attrition in these brigades is 3% or more per month. However, this is a notable improvement from the last two quarters, when 58% and 71% were rated as “developing.” In other areas, most ANA brigades were rated “fully capable” or “capable,” including leadership (92%), command and control (100%), sustainment (79%), and training (83%).



# ANA Readiness by Location 3/2014



# ANA SOF: February 2014

ANASOC RDLs (Rating Definition Levels)	HQs	Units		Total Units & HQs
	DIV/BDEs	KDKs	SPT Units	
Fully Capable	0	0	0	0
Capable	0	4	2	6
Partially Capable	3	5	5	13
Developing	0	0	0	0
Not Assessed	0	0	0	0
Totals	3	9	7	19

Operational Category	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14
ISAF SOF Unilateral Ops (Total)	5	12	5	1	0	4
GDPSU & ANASF/CDO Unilateral Ops (Total)	126	111	219	228	211	249
ISAF Advised Ops (with ANSF in lead)	163	93	136	70	50	82
ANSF- Led ISAF Enabled Ops	199	185	244	217	253	133
ISAF - Led Partnered Ops	3	1	2	19	27	0
Total Partnered, Enabled, or Advised SOF Ops (Total)	365	279	382	306	330	215
Total Ops	496	402	606	535	541	468
Total ISAF Led Ops	8	13	7	20	27	4
Total ANSF Led Ops	488	389	599	515	514	464
% of Total Ops Led by ISAF	2%	3%	1%	4%	5%	1%
% of Total Ops Led by ANSF	98%	97%	99%	96%	95%	99%

Note: Special operations recorded above include operations carried out by ISAF SOF, GDPSU, and ANASF/CDO units, but do not include operations conducted by TF 94-7.1 Effective May 2013 ANA SF CDO ops were added to this table. Previously, only ISAF SOF and GDPSU ops were included. Effective June 2013, National Directorate of Police Security (NDS) were added into this table.

NDS = National Directorate of Security; GDPSU = General Directorate of Police Special Units; CDO = commandos; Ktah. Khas = specialized Afghan commandos in the ANASF.

Color scheme: Combined is purple, ANSF is green, coalition is blue, summary statistics are orange.

## ANA Ethnicity- Tajik Impact: February 2014

	Pashtun	Tajik	Hazara	Uzbek	Others
Officer	41.4%	39.6%	8.0%	4.5%	6.5%
Officer Delta	-2.6%	14.6%	-2.0%	-3.5%	-6.5%
NCO	38.3%	31.8%	12.5%	9.9%	7.5%
Soldier	38.8%	30.9%	10.1%	12.5%	7.8%
Total Force	39.0%	32.4%	10.7%	10.4%	7.5%
Delta	-5.0%	7.4%	0.7%	2.4%	-5.5%
ANA Ethnic Breakout Goal	44%	25%	10%	8%	13%



## ANA Ethnic Balance: August 2014

	Pashtun	Tajik	Hazara	Uzbek	Others
Officers	42.5%	40.9%	8.2%	4.7%	3.5%
Officer Delta	1.5%	15.9%	-1.8%	-3.3%	-9.5%
NCOs	37.0%	34.0%	12.3%	9.5%	7.0%
Soldiers	40.3%	28.7%	10.0%	12.6%	7.8%
Total Force	39.7%	32.7%	10.6%	10.2%	6.8%
Delta	-4.3%	-7.7%	0.6%	2.2%	-6.2%
ANA Ethnic Breakout Requirement	44%	25%	10%	8%	13%

# **The Challenge of the ANAF**

# The Challenge of the ANAF

The ANAF presents the problem that it was never supposed to be ready before 2016. It also raises the issue that close air support is one of the few rapid reaction tools that can deal with a crisis in land combat, land medevac can be too slow in many areas, and air mobility is another asset that save a unit under fire, provide a key tactical advantage. Or deal with serious terrain distance issues.

There is no current public plan for dealing these issues or to indicate whether any US and other ISAF air enablers will be present after 2014. There is no indication of how the afghan could manage air assets effectively, or deal with the problem of civilian casualties that became serious for ISAF. ANAF contracts have also been a source of corruption and waste in the past.

The key challenges affecting the ANAF are listed on **Page 74**.

The status of the ANAF as of December 2013 is summarized on **Page 75**.

# ANAF Status in October 2014

Between FY 2010 and FY 2014, the United States provided more than \$6.5 billion to support and develop the 6,922-person Afghan Air Force, including over \$3 billion for equipment and aircraft. In addition, DOD requested more than \$925 million, including \$21.4 million for equipment and aircraft, in FY 2015 for the Afghan Air Force.

According to CENTCOM and the NATO Air Command–Afghanistan, as of October 11, 2014, the Afghan Air Force inventory consisted of 101 aircraft:

- 56 Mi-17 transport helicopters (down from 58 after two combat losses; includes three on loan to the Special Mission Wing)
- 26 C-208 light transport planes
- Six C-182 fixed-wing training aircraft
- Five MD-530F rotary-wing helicopters
- Five Mi-35 attack helicopters
- Three C-130H medium transport aircraft


Twelve additional MD-530F helicopters equipped with air-to-ground attack capability are on contract, as is conversion of five existing MD-530F helicopters to air-to-ground attack capability, thereby providing the AAF with 17 attack helicopters.

Beginning in the fourth quarter 2015, the first of 20 A-29 Super Tucanos, a light attack aircraft for counterinsurgency, close air support, and aerial reconnaissance, will be deployed to Afghanistan following the training in the United States, beginning in February 2015, of pilots and the initial maintenance cadre. Four Super Tucanos will be delivered each year in 2015, 2016, and 2017; and eight in 2018.<sup>267</sup> The planes are intended to replace aging Mi-35 aircraft.


The Afghan Air Force has 131 fully trained pilots. All pilots are officers who have attended the Air Academy or a similar officer training program and completed undergraduate pilot training. The AAF capability perform casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) missions has steadily increased over the last three years:

- 2012: 391 missions
- 2013: 1,540 missions (128/month; 394% increase)
- 2014: 1,295 missions YTD (162/month); assuming this trend continues through
- December, a total of 1,944 missions this year is expected (150% increase)

# ANAF Attrition & Recruitment March 13-Feb 14



# AAF Attrition & Recruitment August 2013- August 2014



	Aug-13	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14	Mar-14	Apr-14	May-14	Jun-14	Jul-14	Aug-14
Actual	6,853	6,778	6,790	6,752	6,839	6,850	6,763	6,780	6,786	6,731	6,730	6,683	6,695
Goal	7,800	7,800	7,800	7,800	7,800	7,800	7,800	7,800	7,800	7,800	7,800	7,800	7,800

\* Attrition encompass unplanned and planned losses.

\*\* Total Gain includes all gains to AAF strength during the reported period, which comprises new recruits commencing initial training, returnees who had previously been Dropped From Rolls (DFR) due to AWOL, re-accessions (personnel who re-join the AAF having previously left on end of contract) and new cadets. During SM Aug the AAF reported total gains of 0 personnel.

\*\*\* Retention numbers are accounted for in strength and gain figures.

Data Period: Solar Month Aug 14 (Asad)

# US Investment in ANAF Equipment

U.S. FUNDING TO SUPPORT AND DEVELOP THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE, 2010–2015 (\$ THOUSANDS)						
Funding Category	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2015 (request)
Equipment and Aircraft	\$461,877	\$778,604	\$1,805,343	\$111,129	\$2,300	\$21,442
Training	62,438	187,396	130,555	141,077	164,187	123,416
Sustainment	143,784	537,650	571,639	469,230	520,802	780,370
Infrastructure	92,200	179,600	113,700	53,000	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$760,299</b>	<b>\$1,683,250</b>	<b>\$2,621,237</b>	<b>\$774,436</b>	<b>\$687,289</b>	<b>\$925,228</b>

Source: DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, Justification for FY 2012 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 2/2011, pp. 8, 19, 30, and 44; DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, Justification for FY 2013 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 2/2012, pp. 5, 13, 19, and 32; DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2014, Justification for FY 2014 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 5/2013, pp. 5, 11, 20, and 37; DOD, Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, Justification for FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, 6/2014, pp. 10, 24, 26, and 29.



# SIGAR Questions About ANAF Growth

SIGAR has questioned the Afghan Air Force's ability to fully utilize the aircraft that the United States has provided at a considerable cost to the American taxpayer. For example, after DOD provided the Afghan Air Force with two C-130H medium transport aircraft, SIGAR questioned DOD plans to deliver two additional C-130Hs after an audit raised concerns about the Afghan Air Force's ability to absorb the new aircraft.

As a result, DOD this quarter concurred with SIGAR's recommendation to defer the decision on delivering a fourth aircraft until a review of Afghan Air Force requirements is completed, for a potential savings of \$40.5 million. A third aircraft will be delivered to mitigate the risk to Afghan air capabilities should one of the aircraft become unavailable.

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...During an ongoing review, SIGAR learned that the Defense Logistics Agency had scrapped 16 G222 aircraft that had been delivered to Afghanistan but saw little usage and were ultimately grounded due to safety concerns and their inability to fully meet operational requirements. Scrap metal from those 16 aircraft—now shredded but originally valued at nearly \$390 million in acquisition and sustainment costs—were sold for approximately 6 cents a pound or \$32,000 for all 16 aircraft.

SIGAR has not been notified of any decision regarding the ultimate disposition of the remaining four G222 aircraft in Germany.



# Uncertain Plans for ANAF Future

With the AAF's FY 2015 budget in excess of \$900 million, aggressive cost cutting was needed to bring the budget in line with the estimated donor nation funding of \$450 million by FY 2017 as agreed to at the Chicago Summit in 2012.

A joint Secretary of the Air Force-International Affairs and Department of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) team was assembled to assist NATO Air Training Command–Afghanistan (NATC-A) in creating a construct and mechanism to reduce to overall cost and improve AAF self-sufficiency. After three weeks of research in a combat environment, the team proposed changes in four main areas:

- Increase capacity for maintenance training.
- Decrease the number of Western contract logistics support (CLS) contractor personnel.
- Consolidate each individual CLS supply system into one AAF aviation supply depot.
- Reduce aviation maintenance redundancies.

Using these concepts, the team proposed 65 major changes in the contracts supporting the AAF's Mi-17, Mi-35, PC-12, C-130, C-208, C-182, MD-530, and A-29 programs. They estimated that if all of the 65 requested changes were adopted, programmed FY 2014–FY 2019 cost savings would be \$895 million. These efforts, combined with a potential reduction in medium airlift acquisition, and the accelerated consolidation of CLS support to the Kabul International Airport, met COMISAF's directed \$450 million budget cap in FY 2017.

According to DOD, these results will be factored into planning that is currently under way to determine sustainment requirements for DOD-fielded aircraft. The costs may be adjusted following this more in-depth review of these requirements. Encouraged by the team results, CSTC-A adopted the methodology to resolve issues with its ANA wheeled-vehicles program

# Key ANAF Transition Challenges

- Defining real needs for post-Transition force structure based on emerging post-2014 military requirements, funding, and force management needs.
- Converting from outside shaped structure and systems to doing it the Afghan way.
  - Real-world close-air support, rear area, interdiction needs.
  - IS&R, Targeting damaging assessment.
  - Civil-military impact and rules of engagement.
  - Role of air mobility, Medevac.
  - Revised command and C3I/BM system.
  - Affordable readiness, sustainment, and procurement
  - Defining rotary and fixed wing roles and modernization
- Workable and responsive structure for joint warfare.
- Limits to corruption and waste.
- Command effectiveness and accountability.

# **Special Missions Wing Status in October 2014**

**The Special Mission Wing (SMW), while not part of the AAF, provides aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability to support counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations, and—aside from two**

**Afghan Air Force crews—is the only ANSF unit to be night-vision goggle qualified for air-assault and fixed-wing ISR capability.**

**The SMW has 266 members, of which 76 are pilots.**

**Of SMW missions flown during FY 2014, 26% have been counterterrorism related, and 74% counternarcotics related.**

**MOI, MOD, and National Directorate of Security leaders signed the SMW air charter on May 14, 2014, outlining the creation of a new Joint Command and Control Coordination Center (JCCC) to facilitate priority SMW support.**

**Both MOD and MOI special operations forces will have liaison officers to the JCCC.**

**The AAF is to provide personnel, recruiting, and other administrative (non-operational) support to SMW. The SMW commander meets weekly with special operations unit leaders to discuss pending operations and synchronize requirements and priorities.**

# **The Challenge of the ANP**

# The Challenge of the ANP

The ANP makes up roughly half of the ANSF, but Page only the small ANCOP portion of the force is fully trained and equipped to lay a paramilitary role in COIN. The MoI and most elements of the ANP – except for the ANCOPs – also present major problems in terms of overall competence, corruption, leadership, extortion and civil abuses, and ties to powerbrokers and narco-traffickers. Some elements make deals with insurgents.

The ANP presents additional problems because it is not supported by an effective justice system in most of the country, courts are also corrupt, the legal system is slow and unresponsive, detention methods lead to abuses, and detention facilities are poor or lacking.

These issues are addressed in depth in the DoD 1230 report and various SIGAR reports, as well as in human rights and other reports. The corruption and inefficiency within elements of afghan Border Police also limits the flow of a key source of revenue to the government. However, it is unclear what overall structure the ANP will have after the end of 2014, what kind of training efforts will exist after Transition, and what types of outside aid will be provided. Key issues involve:

- The range of challenges to ANP forces are shown.
- The trends in Afghan's low ranking in terms of the rule of law and stability.

- The structure and manning of the ANP.
- The highly optimistic estimate of the readiness of the MoI.
- The readiness, build-up, and attrition levels of the ANP. Attrition has generally been lower than in the ANA because the ANP is locally recruited and deployed, but could change radically if the ANP becomes a steady source of casualties.
- As is the case with the ANA, readiness varies sharply by unit even using force generation methods of effectiveness.
- As is the case with the ANA, ethnic structure is a problem, and Tajiks make up roughly 50% of the officers but are only 20% of the population. Few Southern Pashtun are in the ANA and the number in the ANP is limited..
- As is the case with the ANA, readiness varies sharply by region and does not reflect threat levels and priorities.



# **October 2014 1230 Report on ANP Challenges**

**The focus of the Afghan National Police this reporting period has been to build the force and continue to ensure that all personnel are trained. The recruiting directorate recruited sufficient numbers to maintain the force structure at an average of 152,000 personnel during the reporting period.**

**However, the ANP lacks a system to track retention rates by career fields or specialties, and lacks a mechanism to establish recruiting or attrition goals by career field.**

**In addition, the ANP lack a robust development program to grow NCOs and officers. The ANP would benefit from more targeted retention and better career paths.**

**ANP command and control continues to be a significant challenge. Progress, while slow, is being made toward issuing new policy regarding the AUP headquarters structure.**

# Key ANP Challenges

- **Set real-world Afghan limits to corruption and waste. “Fix” MoI.” Ensure effective pay, contracting, fiscal management**
- **Define real needs for post-Transition force structure based on emerging post-2014 paramilitary military requirements, funding, and force management needs.**
- **Define role in making layered defense effective – role of MoI, relations with ANA and controls over with elements of police and ALP.**
- **Redefine role of police in terms of paramilitary functions vs. rule of law.**
  - *Ties to effective, timely, and responsive overall justice system: detentions, courts, prisons, reintegration*
- **Accept that police will go “local.” But, set real-world Afghan limits on role power brokers, creation of local power clusters and warlords – ties to local leaders and elements of Taliban.**
  - **Ensure accountability, flow of revenues to government.**
- **Ensure tight limits on treatment of civilians, focus on effective police and civil governance relations. Focus on popular “strategic communications,” trust, and respect.**
  - **Rules of engagement. Limit civil abuses, tensions, and conflicts.**
  - **“Hearts and minds” is not just a cliché, it is a critical reality.**
- **Provincial and District civil-interface.**
- **Limits to internal ethnic, tribal, regional, and sectarian tensions – elitism.**

# Mol Readiness: December 2013

## CM RATINGS

**4** The department or institution exists but cannot accomplish its mission.

**3** Cannot accomplish its mission without significant coalition assistance.

**2B** Can accomplish its mission but requires some coalition assistance.

**2A** Department or institution capable of executing functions with minimal coalition assistance; only critical ministerial or institutional functions are covered.


**1B** Coalition oversight  
**1A** Department or institution capable of autonomous operations.

Ministry of Interior Overall Rating	Current CM	Projected 1B Date
<b>CM2A</b>		
<b>Chief of Staff / Special Staff</b>		
Public Affairs	1A	Achieved
Inspector General	3	1Q, 2015
Legal Advisor	1B	Achieved
Legal Affairs	1B	Achieved
Intelligence	2A	2Q, 2014
Democratic Policing	3	N/A
Gender Affairs	2B	4Q, 2014
<b>DM Counternarcotics</b>		
Counternarcotics	2A	4Q, 2014
<b>DM Strategy and Policy</b>		
Strategic Planning	1B	Achieved
Policy Development	1B	Achieved
Force Management	1B	Achieved
<b>DM Support</b>		
Logistics	2B	2Q, 2015
Finance & Budget	2B	1Q, 2015
Facilities & Installation	2B	2Q, 2015
Surgeon Medical	2A	3Q, 2014
Info, Comms & Technology	2B	4Q, 2014
Acquisition & Procurement	2B	3Q, 2014
<b>DM Admin</b>		
Personnel Management	2B	2Q, 2015
Civil Service	2A	3Q, 2014
Training Management	1B	Achieved
Recruiting Command	2B	4Q, 2014
<b>DM Security</b>		
Afghan Uniform Police	1B	Achieved
Fire Services	2B	1Q, 2014
Afghan Border Police (ABP)	2A	4Q, 2014
GDPSU	1B	Achieved
Anti-Crime Police	1B	Achieved
ANCOP	1A	Achieved
Afghan Local Police (ALP)	2A	3Q, 2014
Plans & Operations	1B	Achieved
Force Readiness	1A	Achieved
Counter-IED	2A	2Q, 2014
<b>DM Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF)</b>		
APPF	2B	4Q, 2014

Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2013, p. 30  
[http://www.defense.gov/pubs/April\\_1230\\_Report\\_Final.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/pubs/April_1230_Report_Final.pdf), p. 34.

# Mol Readiness: June 2014 (No update in October 1230 Report)

DOD reported no improvements occurred in developing MOD and MOI capacity to perform critical functions in Q2 of 2014



All 32 staff sections at the MOI were assessed; 10 progressed and none regressed since last quarter, according to CENTCOM.

However, the projected date for three staff sections to achieve CM-1B was extended from one quarter to one year.

Three MOI staff sections are rated CM-1A: the Chief of Staff Public Affairs Office, the Deputy Minister for Security Office of the Afghan National Civil Order Police, and the Deputy Minister of Security for Force Readiness. In addition,

MOI staff sections have attained a CM-1B rating; an increase of six since the last reporting period

# **October 2014 1230 Report on Mol Challenges**

**Decision-making and accountability inside the Mol still need to be developed further. Mol's critical support functions are slowly improving; however, it still has limited capabilities in the logistics, procurement, and finance departments.**

**The Mol continues to rely on coalition assistance in many areas, but is striving to become capable in self-sustaining equipment, infrastructure, and forces with available resources. It is necessary to develop forecasting, requisition, acquisition, and procurement processes that will ensure that the right supplies are in the right place at the right time. ISAF advisors and trainers are focusing currently on facilities management, maintenance, and logistic system functions; these areas will continue to be priorities for the Resolute Support mission.**

**The Mol transitioned from a coalition-administered bulk fuels contract to an Afghan administered two-year, indefinite-delivery indefinite-quantity contract. The first orders were placed with vendors in May 2014 to support the ANP units across the country. The Procurement Directorate is accomplishing its basic procurement mission by obtaining goods and services for the Mol's budgetary units (e.g., Facilities Directorate, Logistics Directorate) and the provinces.**

**...However, the Mol budgetary units and provincial units still do not provide timely or accurate resource requirements to facilitate procurement actions.**

**Due to unpaid obligations from CY 1392 operations, Mol will have to prioritize paying some of its past obligations with its CY 1393 budget. This will more than likely create an unfunded requirement list that will need to be addressed so that Mol can get out of a cycle of using funds in the current budget to satisfy past obligations. Paying its debts shows that the Mol is making an effort to be financially responsible and accountable. In addition, doing so will re-establish trust with its vendors and build confidence with the international community.**

## **MoD and MOI Readiness Reporting on Hold and No Recent Improvements: SIGAR October 2014**

The assessment process for Afghan ministries is on hold until January. The DOD reported this quarter that the ministerial-development planning process for the MOD and MOI is undergoing a complete rewrite. The objective is to have the new process in place to perform ministerial assessments for the period October–December 2014.

The final assessments under the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system, as reported last quarter, reflected no rating improvements in developing MOD and MOI capacity to perform critical functions... To rate the operational capability of these ministries, NTM-A used this system to assess staff sections (such as the offices headed by assistant or deputy ministers) and cross-functional areas (such as general staff offices) using four primary and two secondary ratings.

...The last quarterly CM ratings were for 35 MOD staff sections and cross functional areas, down from 37 in prior quarters. 218 Six MOD offices attained the second-highest rating of CM-1B. 9


Thirty-one staff sections at MOI were assessed. Three attained the highest rating of CM-1A: the Chief of Staff Public Affairs Office, the Deputy Minister for Security Office of the Afghan National Civil Order Police, and the Deputy Minister of Security for Force Readiness. In addition, 15 MOI staff sections had attained a CM-1B rating.

The United States has provided \$1.2 million for the MOD and \$1.5 million for the MOI for ministry development... ISAF has 191 personnel assigned to or supporting it for advising the MOD, and another 231 for advising the MOI...

In a special project report released last year, SIGAR found that CSTC-A had not conducted a comprehensive risk assessment of the capabilities of the MOD and MOI to manage and account for U.S. direct-assistance dollars, of which \$4.2 billion has been committed and nearly \$3 billion disbursed.



# ANP Manning & Attrition: 3/2013-2/2014




	Mar-13	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13	Aug-13	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14
<span style="color: yellow;">■</span> Actual	151,766	151,227	151,824	152,191	152,498	152,657	152,336	150,688	149,466	150,683	151,793	153,269
<span style="color: red;">■</span> Attrition*	-1,973	-1,580	-2,301	-2,019	-2,892	-2,154	-3,173	-3,114	-3,021	-2,377	-2,724	-2,182
<span style="color: green;">■</span> Total Gain**	1,748	1,199	2,223	1,911	2,376	1,227	1,690	942	1,478	1,419	1,720	3,658
<span style="color: black;">—●—</span> Goal	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000
Retention %	44%	46%	43%	51%	58%	60%	50%	67%	51%	71%	71%	74%
Mo. Attrit'n %	-1.3%	-1.0%	-1.5%	-1.3%	-1.9%	-1.4%	-2.1%	-2.0%	-2.0%	-1.6%	-1.8%	-1.4%
Attrit'n last 12 mos								-18.8%	-19.3%	-19.7%	19.1%	-19.5%

# ANP Attrition By Command: 1/2014

ANP Unit	Attrition <sup>^</sup>
AUP Kabul Central	0.42%
AUP Asmaye HQ (101)	0.41%
AUP Shamshad PHQ (202)	1.56%
AUP Pamir PHQ (303)	1.35%
AUP Maiwand PHQ (404)	2.97%
AUP Spinghar PHQ (505)	1.61%
AUP Ansar PHQ (606)	1.37%
AUP Lashkargah PHQ (707)	2.05%
ABP HQ	1.61%
ABP Quick Reaction Unit	1.37%
ABP Kabul Airport	2.05%
ABP Customs Unit	0.00%
Nangarhar ABP (Central) (1st)	2.33%
Gardez ABP (East) (2nd)	4.57%
Kandahar ABP (South) (3rd)	0.62%
Herat ABP (West) (4th)	2.53%
Balkh ABP (North) (5th)	1.60%
Helmand ABP (Southwest) (6th)	5.25%
ANCOP HQ	1.07%
ANCOP 1 <sup>st</sup> BDE (Kabul)	7.00%
ANCOP 2 <sup>nd</sup> BDE (Nangarhar)	6.10%
ANCOP 3 <sup>rd</sup> BDE (M-e-S)	5.48%
ANCOP 4 <sup>th</sup> BDE (Kandahar)	6.49%
ANCOP 5 <sup>th</sup> BDE (Gardez)	4.36%
ANCOP 6 <sup>th</sup> BDE (Herat)	4.64%
ANCOP 7 <sup>th</sup> BDE (Helmand)	4.18%
<b>ANP Total*</b>	<b>1.81%</b>

# ANP Attrition & Recruitment August 2013- August 2014



	Aug-13	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14	Mar-14	Apr-14	May-14	Jun-14	Jul-14	Aug-14
Actual	152,657	152,336	150,688	149,466	150,683	151,793	149,080	151,281	151,446	152,123	153,021	150,506	153,317
Goal	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000	157,000

\*Attrition and Retention totals are already included in the Actual total reported strength.

\*\*Total Gain was previously reported as "Recruitment" and reflected only those recruits shipped to training. Starting Feb 14, this data includes all gains to ANP strength during the reported period in order to capture the totality of losses and growth to reach the reported end strength.

# ANP Manpower: Q3 2013 to Q3 2014

ANP STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE						
ANP Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q3 2013	Q4 2013	Quarterly Change	Q3 2013	Q4 2013	Quarterly Change
AUP	110,369	110,369	None	109,574	106,784	-2,294
ABP	23,090	23,090	None	21,399	20,902	-497
ANCOP	14,541	14,541	None	14,516	13,597	-919
NISTA <sup>a</sup>	6,000	6,000	None	4,905	5,333	+428
<b>ANP Total</b>	<b>154,000</b>	<b>154,000</b>	<b>None</b>	<b>150,394</b>	<b>146,616</b>	<b>-3,282</b>
CNPA	2,247	2,243	-4	2,759	2,850	+91
<b>ANP + CNPA Total</b>	<b>156,247</b>	<b>156,243</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>153,153</b>	<b>149,466</b>	<b>-3,191</b>

ANP STRENGTH, QUARTERLY CHANGE						
ANP Component	Authorized			Assigned		
	Q2 2014	Q3 2014	Quarterly Change	Q2 2014	Q3 2014	Quarterly Change
AUP <sup>a</sup>	122,644	120,003	(2,641)	113,385 <sup>b</sup>	113,515 <sup>c</sup>	130
ABP	23,573	22,955	(618)	21,667	21,643	(24)
ANCOP	13,106	15,223	2,117	12,731	14,881	2,150
NISTA	3,000	3,000	-	4,313	2,492	(1,821)
Standby <sup>d</sup>	-	-	-	27	786	759
<b>ANP Total</b>	<b>162,323</b>	<b>161,181</b>	<b>(1,142)</b>	<b>152,123</b>	<b>153,317</b>	<b>1,194</b>

According to CSTC-A, unlike the ANA, the MOI does not report ANP personnel who are on leave, AWOL, sick, or on temporary assignment in its personnel reports. For this reason, it is not known what the actual operational strength of the ANP is at any given time.

Source: Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report, January 30, 201



# **ANP Status in September 2014**

**As of September 30, 2014, the United States had obligated \$17 billion and disbursed \$16.2 billion of ASFF funds to build, equip, train, and sustain the ANP.**


**...the overall strength of the ANP totaled 153,317 personnel, including 113,515 Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), 21,643 Afghan Border Police (ABP), 14,881 Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), 2,492 students in training, and 786 “standby” personnel awaiting assignment.**

**Of the 113,515 personnel in the AUP, 25,512 were MOI headquarters staff or institutional support staff. Overall, the ANP’s strength increased 1,194 since last quarter.**

**From 2008 through September 30, 2014, the U.S. government had provided \$1.32 billion, paid through the LOTFA, to pay ANP salaries, food, and incentives (extra pay for personnel engaged in combat or employed in specialty fields), CSTC-A reported. An additional \$158.5 million has been provided since 2010 for the Afghan Local Police and subject-matter experts’ salaries and incentives, which are not funded from LOTFA.**

**According to CSTC-A, when the ANP reaches its final strength of 157,000 personnel, it will require an estimated \$483 million per year to fund salaries (\$263 million) and incentives (\$220 million). This is a decrease of \$38.2 million from last quarter’s estimate, based on a foreign-exchange rate of 56 afghanis to one U.S. dollar. Beginning in fiscal year 1394 (December 21, 2014), food costs are no longer covered by CSTC-A**

# ANP Force Generation Readiness 12/2013



Notes: AUP = Afghan Uniform Police; ABP = Afghan Border Police; ANCOP = Afghan National Civil Order Police

Source: IJC, Regional ANSF Status Report, December 2013.

Regional Command ANSF Assessment Report (RASR) rates ANA brigades in six areas: • Combined Arms (planning and conducting joint operations using multiple types of weapons), • Leadership, • Command & Control, • Sustainment. • Training (conducting training), • Attrition



# ANP Readiness 6/2014

## REGIONAL ANSF STATUS REPORT - ANP ASSESSMENTS, QUARTERLY CHANGE

	Fully Capable				Capable				Partially Capable				Developing				Not Assessed			
	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-	Q1	Q2	+	-
Law Enforcement Operations	5	2	-3		10	10	0		3	5	2		0	1	1		3	4	1	
Leadership	10	6	-4		6	8	2		2	2	0		0	0	0		3	6	3	
Command & Control	5	5	0		9	10	1		4	3	-1		0	0	0		3	4	1	
Sustainment	4	1	-3		12	12	0		2	5	3		0	0	0		3	4	1	
Training	5	2	-3		9	8	-1		3	6	3		1	2	1		3	4	1	
Attrition	7	10	3		4	5	1		0	0	0		9	7	-2		1	0	-1	

Notes: Numbers represent brigades. Attrition assessment is based on the following monthly attrition rates: 0–1.99% = Fully Capable; 2–2.99% = Capable; 3%+ = Developing. Quarters are calendar-year.


For the ANP, the latest RASR report provides assessments of 18 of 22 regional ANP components—the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), and the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)—in seven different zones.

IJC notes the four components were not assessed due to reduced Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams coverage. 1 Of the 18 that were assessed, 67% were “fully capable” or “capable” of carrying out law-enforcement operations. The RASR defines law-enforcement operations as “making arrests and prosecuting those arrested.” The common shortfalls are lack of investigative, evidence collection, and crime-scene processing skills. IJC noted that ANP rates of materiel readiness or equipment levels are generally similar to the previous reporting period.

Attrition has improved, but continues to be a challenge for the ANP as 32% of regional components are considered “developing,” meaning attrition in these units is 3% or more per month. That is a reduction since last quarter, when 45% of regional components were considered “developing.” In other areas, the ANP regional components are mostly “fully capable” or “capable”: leadership (88%), command

and control (83%), sustainment (72%), and training (56%). Notwithstanding the RASR assessments, General Joseph F. Dunford, Commander of ISAF and USFOR-A, has told the Congress that the ANSF will need continued support after 2014: “If we leave at the end of 2014, the Afghan security forces will begin to deteriorate, the security environment will begin to deteriorate, and I think the only debate is the pace of that deterioration.”

# ANP Readiness by Location 3/2014



# ANP Ethnicity: July 31, 2013

**Total Population      42%      27%      9%      9%      13%**

	<b>Pashtun</b>	<b>Tajik</b>	<b>Hazara</b>	<b>Uzbek</b>	<b>Others</b>
<b>Ethnic Target</b>	44.0%	25.0%	10.0%	8.0%	13.0%
<b>Officer</b>	13.2%	49.7%	14.9%	7.3%	3.3%
<b>NCO</b>	24.2%	53.5%	33.7%	20.8%	3.9%
<b>Patrolmen</b>	62.6%	35.9%	51.4%	71.8%	7.3%
<b>Officer Delta*</b>	-25.7%	24.7%	-4.9%	-4.9%	-9.7%
<b>Total Force Delta*</b>	-2.1%	18.5%	-4.2%	-2.1%	-7.3%

**\*The Delta represents the difference between the ethnic target and the actual percentage**

## ANP Ethnicity- January 2014


Rank	Pashtu	Tajik	Hazara	Uzbek	Others
Officer	13%	15%	16%	7%	12%
NCO	26%	39%	36%	23%	27%
Patrolmen	61%	46%	48%	70%	61%
Total % of Force	41%	43%	5%	6%	5%
Ethnic Target	44%	25%	10%	8%	13%

## ANP Ethnic Balance: August 2014

	Pashtun	Tajik	Hazara	Uzbek	Others
Total Percentage of Officer Force	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Total Percentage of NCO Force	35%	43%	9%	8%	5%
Total Percentage of PM Force	41%	34%	7%	8%	10%
Ethnic Target (based on census)	44%	25%	10%	8%	13%

# Maturing ANP Infrastructure 4/2014

## Expenditure



## Project Status

Facilities	Complete	In Progress	Acquisition	Planned	Total
AUP	392	55	3	0	450
ABP	100	30	0	0	130
ANCOP	26	7	1	0	34
AACP	21	9	0	0	30
I&S	41	13	2	0	56
Ministry	7	2	2	0	11
Agents	35	0	3	0	38
Feb (SM)	622	116	11	0	749
Jan (SM)	614	124	6	0	744



# US Investment in ANP Equipment as of 9/2014

COST OF U.S.-FUNDED ANP WEAPONS, VEHICLES, AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT		
Type of Equipment	Procured	Remaining to be Procured
Weapons	\$187,251,477	\$4,093,066
Vehicles	2,046,681,026	2,385,261
Communications	211,062,672	544,573
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$2,444,995,175</b>	<b>\$7,022,900</b>

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, 9/29/2014.

As of September 30, 2014, the United States had obligated and disbursed \$3.6 billion of ASFF funds for ANP equipment and transportation. Most of these funds were used to purchase weapons and related equipment, vehicles, and communications equipment. More than 83% of U.S. funding in this category was for vehicles and vehicle-related equipment

# ANP Equipment Progress: August 2014 - I

ANP Weapon Status Summary	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered		
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)
Standard Individual Weapons	97,437	1,925	91,580	(7,782)	87,587	10,328	(1,447)
Non-NATO Standard Weapons	256,671	2,541	112,782	(146,430)	112,432	144,736	(2,044)
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>354,108</b>	<b>4,466</b>	<b>204,362</b>	<b>(154,212)</b>	<b>200,019</b>	<b>155,064</b>	<b>(3,491)</b>

ANP Vehicle Status Summary	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered		
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)
Light Tactical Vehicle	25,611	384	26,133	138	26,133	173	311
Medium Tactical Vehicle	1,627	79	1,900	194	1,875	381	550
HMMWV Variants	5,511	66	6,178	601	6,180	243	846
Heavy Vehicles	376	1	417	40	309	5	(63)
Trailers	1,614	0	1,695	81	1,667	227	280
Materiel Handling Equipment	170	0	224	54	224	(9)	45
Motorcycles/ATVs	3,904	36	3,603	(337)	3,603	372	35
Covert Vehicles	7,085	0	6,233	(852)	5,665	852	(568)
Busses	598	46	1,153	509	1,153	(329)	180
Other vehicles	451	13	458	(6)	418	62	16
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>46,947</b>	<b>625</b>	<b>47,994</b>	<b>422</b>	<b>47,227</b>	<b>1,977</b>	<b>1,632</b>


ANP Comm Status Summary	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered		
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)
HF Radios	4,530	467	5,497	500	5,391	0	394
VHF Radios	78,344	822	88,505	9,339	88,505	0	9,339
VHF/UHF Radios	6,604	30	6,881	247	6,945	0	311
Night Vision Device	5,499	240	5,857	118	2,022	0	(3,717)
Biometrics	1,455	18	1,749	276	1,749	0	276
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>96,432</b>	<b>1,577</b>	<b>108,489</b>	<b>10,480</b>	<b>104,612</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6,603</b>

# ANP Equipment Progress: August 2014 - II

ANP EOD Status Summary	Total Required		Total Acquired		Total Delivered		
	Tashkil 1391v2 (plus float)	Enabler/AR2VP	ASFF Acquired	Over/Under (Required)	ASFF Delivered	Transferred	Over/Under (Required)
Binoculars	194	0	3,457	3,263	3,457	0	3,263
Blasting Machine M34	97	0	125	28	125	0	28
EOD Bomb Suit w/ Helmet	194	0	276	82	276	0	82
Firing Cable and Reel	194	0	289	95	289	0	95
M2 Crimper	97	0	135	38	135	0	38
Mine Detector (Vallon & CEIA)	8,082	1,206	9,288	0	9,288	0	0
Pigstick w/ stand	194	0	254	60	176	0	(18)
MIMP-30 Robot	194	0	268	74	170	0	(24)
Symphony Jammer	111	0	111	0	111	0	0
Test Set, M51 Blasting Cap	97	0	502	405	319	0	222
Hook & Line Kit PT 1&2	97	0	160	63	160	0	63
EOD Tripod	97	0	125	28	125	0	28
Mine Rollers	25	0	25	0	25	0	0
PIPPERS	0	3,555	3,555	0	3,555	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>9,673</b>	<b>4,761</b>	<b>18,570</b>	<b>4,136</b>	<b>18,211</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3,777</b>

# ANP: Lack of Weapons Accountability

## Afghan Police Extra Weapons



**Does not include substantial unaccountability for vehicles, ammunition, and wide range of other equipment.**

Source: Tom Risen, “U.S.-Supplied Weapons Vulnerable After Afghanistan Withdrawal” Weapons given to Afghanistan have gone missing before, and it may, happen again,” *USN&WR*, July 28, 2014 | 12:01 a.m. EDT and SIGAR, “Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Weapons Accountability,” SIGAR 14-84 Audit Report, July 2014.

# **The Challenge of the ALP**

# The ALP

The use of local forces is always a high risk given the problems in controlling them, making them effective, dealing with abuses and corruption, and their potential to turn on the government or create links with insurgents.

The 1230 report indicated in October 2013 that ALP expansion was expected to reach 28,500 by February, 2014 and 30,000 by December, 2014. It reported that the ALP appeared to be one of the most resilient institutions in the ANSF. It was heavily targeted by EIAs resulting in the highest casualty rate, while recording one of the lowest monthly attrition rates of all ANSF.


As of January 4, 2014, Afghan Local Police (ALP) comprised 25,477 personnel. There were 30,000 personnel by the end of December 2014. The ALP operates in 126 districts in 29 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces..

Capability varied sharply by area, and there were reports of civil abuses and tensions with the ANP and Government. The ALP with US SOF training did, however, generally make ALP units at least somewhat and all ALP units were to fully transfer to the Afghan government by October 2014.

It is not clear how the Afghan Local police or other paramilitary forces like the APPF will be integrated into a post 2-104 structure or what their effectiveness will be.



# ALP Locations and Development: 2/2014



Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, April 2014, p. 54.

# **The Uncertain Status of the ALP in October 2014: SIGAR**

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) is under MOI authority and functions under the supervision of the district Afghan Uniform Police (AUP). ALP members are selected by village elders or local power brokers to protect their communities against Taliban attack, guard facilities, and conduct local counterinsurgency missions.

As of September 14, 2014, the ALP comprised 28,814 personnel, all but 4,298 of whom were fully trained, according to the NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A). The current goal is to have 30,000 personnel in 150 districts by the end of December 2014, assigned to 3,120 checkpoints across 29 provinces.

As of September 29, 2014, \$409.2 million of the ASFF had been obligated and expended to support the ALP. According to NSOCC-A, the ALP will cost \$121 million per year to sustain once it reaches its target strength. 6 To date the United States has provided the ALP with equipment such as rifles, machine guns, light trucks, motorcycles, and radios. According to NSOCC-A, between October 1, 2013, and September 30, 2014, the ALP had a retention rate of 93%. During that period, NSOCC-A reported a 1.6% attrition rate (losses not including casualties) while 6.4% of the force were killed or wounded in action.

The Afghan government has not determined the final disposition of the ALP or its funding source. However, NSOCC-A noted that post-transition funding depends on when transition takes place. According to DOD, U.S. government policy on funding the ALP has not yet been determined.

According to an independent assessment released last quarter, public perceptions of ALP's value to community security are positive overall, although there is room for improvement.

A second assessment, conducted by NSOCC-A based on data provided by Eureka Research and Evaluation focus group surveys in ALP districts, is under way. This second assessment will in part evaluate if actions recommended in the first assessment were implemented and had the desired effect. Those recommendations were:


- support and supervision from the ANP
- transparent, locally-owned recruitment processes
- balanced tribal representation
- regular information exchanges between community leaders and ALP commanders

# Key ALP Challenges

- **Accept that the key is to pay for support and loyalty where it is most needed. *“Bribe your way to victory.”***
- **Define role in making layered defense effective – role of MoI, and controls over with elements of police and relations with ANA .**
- **Set real-world Afghan limits to corruption and waste. “Fix” MoI.” Ensure effective pay, contracting, fiscal management, Provincial and District civil-interface.**
- **Define real needs for post-Transition force structure based on emerging post-2014 paramilitary military requirements, funding, and force management needs.**
- **Redefine role of ALP in terms of paramilitary functions vs. rule of law.**
  - *Ties to effective, timely, and responsive overall justice system: detentions, courts, prisons, reintegration*
- **Set real-world Afghan limits on role power brokers, creation of local power clusters and warlords – ties to local leaders and elements of Taliban.**
  - **Ensure accountability, flow of revenues to government.**
- **Ensure tight limits on treatment of civilians, focus on effective police and civil governance relations. Focus on popular “strategic communications,” trust, and respect.**
  - **Rules of engagement. Limit civil abuses, tensions, and conflicts.**
  - **“Hearts and minds” is not just a cliché, it is a critical reality.**
- **Limit internal ethnic, tribal, regional, and sectarian tensions.**


# **The Challenge of ANSF Corruption and Abuses**

# World Bank Ranking of Violence and Rule of Law Highly Negative



# Who Takes Bribes: The ANA Got Worse

## Prevalence of bribery, by public official receiving the bribe, Afghanistan (2009 and 2012)



Source: General population survey 2009 and general population survey 2012

The likelihood of bribes being paid to a particular type of public official depends on how frequently citizens interact with them.

But since different types of official have different types of exposure to citizens, it is important to estimate the probability of a certain type of official receiving a bribe when he or she is contacted, independently from the frequency of interaction. This is measured by means of the prevalence of bribery in relation to each type of public official.

According to this indicator, four types of official (prosecutors, teachers, judges and customs officials) are the most likely to receive bribes when dealing with citizens.

While there has been little change in prevalence rates since 2009 in relation to prosecutors, judges and customs officials, the vulnerability to bribery of teachers has increased dramatically in the past three years.

Other officials particularly vulnerable to bribery in Afghanistan are tax/revenue officials and police officers, while there has also been a notable increase in the vulnerability of members of the Afghan National Army.



# **UN Warnings About ANSF Abuses**

**With Afghan national security forces leading military operations country wide, UNAMA reinforced the need for improved implementation of directives and rules of engagement mandating civilian protection, and for permanent structures in the Ministries of Defence and Interior to investigate reports of civilian casualties by Afghan forces, initiate remedial measures and take follow-up action. UNAMA's report also called on the Government of Afghanistan to investigate any allegations of human rights violations by Afghan forces as required under Afghan and international law.**

**Despite reports of improved security due to the presence of Afghan Local Police (ALP), from many communities across Afghanistan, UNAMA recorded 121 civilian casualties (32 civilian deaths and 89 injured) by ALP, almost tripling civilian casualties attributed to ALP from 2012.**

**Most of these involved ALP members in certain areas committing summary executions and punishments, intimidation, harassment and illegal searches.**

**The ALP Directorate in the Ministry of Interior reported it investigated more than 100 cases against ALP members in 2013, referring 59 cases to military prosecutors. Despite these encouraging steps, information on any prosecutions, convictions, suspensions or other action taken was not available. UNAMA called for increased efforts to provide accountability for violations by Afghan Local Police.**

**The UNAMA 2013 report recorded 39 incidents of human rights abuses including killings carried out by Pro-Government armed groups resulting in 55 civilian casualties (18 civilian deaths and 37 injured). The majority of incidents occurred in areas where armed groups held considerable power and influence, including in Uruzgan, Kunduz, Faryab, Baghlan and Jawzjan provinces.**

**The report urged the Afghan Government to speed up efforts to disband and disarm such groups**

# **October 2014 1230 Report on ANSF Corruption**

**Corruption undermines confidence in the economy, security, and government legitimacy, posing a strategic threat to long-term economic development and to the stability of Afghanistan.**

**Additional factors, such as ineffective program monitoring, budget shortfalls at all levels, an inability to generate revenue, and limited public financial management capacity continue to plague the national government.**

**Within the ANSF, reports of corruption range from ANP extortion at illegal checkpoints to higher-level corruption in the Afghan security institutions (e.g., pay-for-position schemes, taking bribes from contractors, and “land grabbing”).**

**All of these activities have hurt the reputation and efficiency of the security ministries. DoD continues to tighten its controls over the funds provided to the MoD and MoI to pay salaries and purchase supplies in response to these concerns.**

# **State Department Warnings About ANSF and Afghan Government Abuses - I**

**The most significant human rights problems were torture and abuse of detainees; increased targeted violence and endemic societal discrimination against women and girls; widespread violence, including armed insurgent groups' killings of persons affiliated with the government and indiscriminate attacks on civilians; and pervasive official corruption.**

**Other human rights problems included extrajudicial killings by security forces; poor prison conditions; ineffective government investigations of abuses and torture by local security forces; arbitrary arrest and detention, including of women accused of so-called moral crimes; prolonged pretrial detention; judicial corruption and ineffectiveness...**

**There were several credible reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. For example, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that in January an Afghan Local Police (ALP) commander and several ALP members broke into a home in the Chardara District of Kunduz Province and killed a 65-year-old man and two women before stealing valuables from the home and fleeing. NGOs, UNAMA, and media reports continued to allege that Kandahar provincial chief of police Abdul Raziq facilitated extrajudicial killings.**

**there were widespread reports that government officials, security forces, detention center authorities, and police committed abuses. NGOs reported that security forces continued to use excessive force, including torturing and beating civilians.**

**NGOs, UNAMA, and media reports continued to allege that Kandahar provincial chief of police Abdul Raziq facilitated the torture of detainees. UNAMA reported systematic torture at several ANP detention facilities and one Afghan Border Police Station in Kandahar Province. The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) found multiple individuals detained by the ANP in**

# State Department Warnings About ANSF and Afghan Government Abuses - II

Kandahar who claimed mistreatment and torture while in ANP custody. Detainees reportedly were tortured at official and unofficial locations, including ANP check posts, ANP headquarters, and other ANP facilities in Kandahar. Methods of torture included beatings with fists and electric cables; kicking; choking; electric shock; and squeezing of testicles.

UNAMA reported that it found “sufficiently reliable and credible” incidents of torture at 10 National Directorate of Security (NDS) facilities as well as at 15 ANP facilities. For example, UNAMA reported systematic torture at the NDS detention facility in Kandahar Province and NDS Department 124 (counterterrorism) in Kabul. A government delegation assigned to investigate the claims made by UNAMA in its January report also found that officials tortured detainees at NDS Department 124, including with electric shocks, beatings, and threats of sexual violence. During its monitoring visits, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) also continued to find instances of torture and abuse of detainees who were held at NDS Department 124.

UNAMA also found instances of torture or other mistreatment of detainees held in Afghan National Army (ANA) and ALP custody prior to transfer to the NDS or ANP. Similarly, the government found that 48 percent of detainees interviewed for its investigation (284) had been tortured.

.... Nevertheless, human rights problems persisted, and observers criticized the inadequate preparation and lack of sensitivity of local security forces. Human rights institutions expressed concerns about the limited oversight and accountability that existed for security institutions, especially the ALP, although the Ministry of Interior took some measures at the end of the year to increase accountability of the ALP. For example, the Ministry of Interior worked with the ICRC to increase human rights training for ALP recruits.