

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW  
Washington, DC 20036

**Anthony H. Cordesman**  
**Phone:** 1.202.775.3270

**Email:** [acordesman@gmail.com](mailto:acordesman@gmail.com)

**Web version:**  
[www.csis.org/burke/reports](http://www.csis.org/burke/reports)

# **Afghan Forces on the Edge of Transition– III: *Measuring the Transition from ISAF to ANSF***

**By: Anthony H. Cordesman**

**CSIS**

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &  
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Burke Chair  
In Strategy

*Revised November 17,  
2014*

[csis.org](http://csis.org)

# **Cuts in ISAF Forces Moving Towards Transition**

# Regional ISAF Commands as of August 1, 2013



# ISAF Forces as of June 1, 2014

	Albania	72		Germany	2,695		Poland	968
	Armenia	121		Greece	10		Portugal	66
	Australia	356		Hungary	100		Romania	1,002
	Austria	3		Iceland	3		Slovakia	275
	Azerbaijan	94		Ireland	7		Slovenia	4
	Bahrain	0		Italy	2,000		Spain	247
	Belgium	147		Jordan	1,069		Sweden	219
	Bosnia & Herzegovina	53		Republic of Korea	50		The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia *	152
	Bulgaria	378		Latvia	31		Tonga	55
	Croatia	146		Lithuania	83		Turkey	457
	Czech Republic	250		Luxembourg	1		Ukraine	27
	Denmark	165		Malaysia	2		United Arab Emirates	35
	El Salvador	0		Mongolia	40		United Kingdom	5,200
	Estonia	20		Montenegro	25		United States	32,800
	Finland	95		Netherlands	200		Total	49,902
	France	177		New Zealand	2			
	Georgia	805		Norway	67			

# ISAF Forces as of September 3, 2014

	Albania	22		Germany	1,599		Poland	304
	Armenia	121		Greece	9		Portugal	37
	Australia	273		Hungary	101		Romania	327
	Austria	3		Iceland	2		Slovakia	277
	Azerbaijan	94		Ireland	7		Slovenia	2
	Bahrain	0		Italy	1,411		Spain	181
	Belgium	160		Jordan	626		Sweden	13
	Bosnia & Herzegovina	8		Republic of Korea	50		The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia *	152
	Bulgaria	320		Latvia	11		Tonga	0
	Croatia	153		Lithuania	84		Turkey	393
	Czech Republic	227		Luxembourg	1		Ukraine	10
	Denmark	145		Malaysia	2		United Arab Emirates	35
	El Salvador	0		Mongolia	40		United Kingdom	3,906
	Estonia	4		Montenegro	25		United States	28,970
	Finland	88		Netherlands	30		Total	41,124
	France	88		New Zealand	1			
	Georgia	755		Norway	57			

# ISAF Forces as of October, 2014

Nation	ISAF Personnel	Nation	ISAF personnel
Albania	11	Republic of Korea	0
Armenia	121	Latvia	18
Australia	271	Lithuania	72
Austria	3	Luxembourg	1
Azerbaijan	94	Malaysia	2
Bahrain	0	Mongolia	40
Belgium	55	Montenegro	25
Bosnia & Herzegovina	8	Netherlands	16
Bulgaria	320	New Zealand	1
Croatia	153	Norway	58
Czech Republic	227	Poland	65
Denmark	149	Portugal	57
El Salvador	0	Romania	317
Estonia	2	Slovakia	12
Finland	90	Slovenia	2
France	90	Spain	181
Georgia	755	Sweden	13
Germany	1,707	FYR of Macedonia	152
Greece	9	Tonga	0
Hungary	84	Turkey	367
Iceland	3	Ukraine	14
Ireland	7	United Arab Emirates	35
Italy	1,400	United Kingdom	2,839
Jordan	616	United States	24,050
		<b>NATO</b>	<b>32,265</b>
		<b>Non-NATO</b>	<b>2,247</b>
		<b>Total</b>	<b>34,512</b>

Numbers of personnel are approximate as they change daily.

# The Declining Role of US Airpower

## Combined Forces Air Component Commander 2010-2014 Airpower Statistics

UNCLASSIFIED


As of 31 August 2014

### OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM/International Security Assistance Force

#### Close Air Support

Sorties		Sorties with at least one weapon release	
2010	33,707	2010	2,517
2011	34,514	2011	2,678
2012	28,768	2012	1,975
2013	21,785	2013	1,407
2014	10,890	2014	746

#### Number of Weapon Releases

Less Activity  More Activity

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
2010	156	154	175	197	300	457	325	416	739	1,043	866	272	5,100
2011	405	341	337	339	426	610	695	516	597	663	308	174	5,411
2012	170	116	229	252	406	521	504	588	385	414	297	202	4,084
2013	193	297	248	284	368	337	256	158	232	189	118	76	2,756
2014	92	114	93	115	164	272	205	436					1,491

Afghanistan


United States Air Forces Central Command  
Combined Air and Space Operations Center

Combined Data

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Intel, Surveillance and Recon Sorties	28,747	38,198	34,937	31,049	22,231
Airlift Sorties	63,000	57,000	39,000	32,000	12,373
Airlift Cargo (Short Tons)	295,000	241,000	265,000	201,000	108,766
Airlift Passengers	1,368,000	1,233,000	749,000	506,000	152,305
OEF Supplies Airdropped (Pounds)	60,461,000	80,199,000	41,952,000	10,883,000	28,000
Tanker Sorties	17,296	19,469	16,007	12,319	6,971
Fuel Offloaded (Millions of Pounds)	1,050	1,095	980	723	476
Aircraft Refuelings	82,603	90,476	67,020	53,266	35,185
Casualty Evacuation Sorties	3,712	2,959	2,171	576	113
Saves	1,888	1,611	1,187	219	30
Assists	2,964	2,121	1,646	477	84


- Some figures may have changed due to data re-calculation and re-verification

# Sorties with Weapons Release



# Steadily Dropping Impact of Airpower on Civilian Casualties

## Civilian Deaths and Injuries by Aerial Operations 1 January to 30 June 2009 - 2014



# **The Impact of ISAF Cuts on Shifting the Burden to the ANSF Through Spring 2014**

# Challenges in Shifting from ISAF to the ANSF

The development of the ANSF has been rushed forward to meet a deadline of the end of 2014 for removing outside combat forces with less and less emphasis on the actual progress in the ANSF and “conditions based” criteria shaped by the outcome of the fighting and the potential post-transition strength of the Taliban and other insurgents.

ISAF and NTM-A have made it repeatedly clear that the transfer of responsibility for security is a formal one, and that the ANSF will need substantial outside assistance through at least 2016. The key challenges involved are summarized in **Page 37**.

The development of the ANSF presents much broader problems, however, in that **Pages 38 and 39** show more than 40% half of the force consists of police with little real paramilitary, much less intense warfighting capability. There have also been discussions of major cuts in the force – down to levels approaching 250,000 men for fiscal reasons before the ANSF had had to deal with the insurgent threat on its own for even one campaign season.


Moreover, even the Army is relatively lightly equipped and its real world mobility and maneuver capability away from fixed based and support facilities is limited. (Page 39.)

These has, however, been real progress in shifting the burden of the fighting to the ANSF, and this is shown in **Pages 40-43**.

# **General Dunford on “Resolute Support” and on Post-2014 Mission**


- **In anticipation of a signed BSA and NATO SOFA, ISAF continues to plan for the Resolute Support train, advise, assist mission.**
- **This mission will focus on the four capability gaps at the operational/institutional and strategic levels of the ANSF that will remain at the end of the ISAF mission: 1) Afghan security institution capacity, 2) the aviation enterprise, 3) the intelligence enterprise, and 4) special operations.**
- **In accordance with NATO guidance, ISAF is planning on a limited regional approach with 8,000 - 12,000 coalition personnel employed in Kabul and the four corners of Afghanistan.**
- **Advisors will address capability gaps at the Afghan security ministries, army corps, and police zones, before eventually transitioning to a Kabulcentric approach focused on the Afghan ministries and institutions.**
- **Due to delays in the completion of the BSA, and at the recent direction of NATO, we will begin planning for various contingencies in Afghanistan while still continuing to plan for Resolute Support.**

# ANSF Goes Up as US/ISAF Goes Down: Jan 2010-March 2013




# ANSF Goes Up as US/ISAF Goes Down: Jan 2002- November 2014

ISAF's primary focus has largely transitioned from directly fighting the insurgency to training, advising and assisting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in their efforts to hold and build upon these gains, enabling a U.S. force reduction of roughly 34,000 personnel—half the current force in Afghanistan—by February 2014.




# The Burden of Fighting and Casualties Shifts to the ANSF *(But High Casualties are not a Measure of Merit)*




Source: Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, July 2013, pp. 10-11.


## Percentage of Enemy Initiated Attacks Involving ANSF and ISAF Forces



# ISAF and ANSF Unilateral Operations




# ISAF and ANSF Led Operations



	Sep 13	Oct 13	Nov 13	Dec 13	Jan 14	Feb 14
ISAF Led Partnered (ANA)	75	70	87	80	97	39
ANA Led Partnered	189	182	153	12	9	22
ANA Led Enabled	274	490	121	40	64	88
ANP Led Enabled	67	220	93	38	38	0
ANSF Led Partnered/Enabled Ops (Total)	530	892	367	90	111	110

# Total ISAF and ANSF Led Operations



# Shifting Pattern of Partnership

## 3/2013-9/2013

Operational Category	Apr-13	May-13	Jun-13	Jul-13	Aug-13	Sep-13
ISAF Unilateral Military Ops	2,345	2,494	2,632	2,192	1,303	1,458
ISAF Unilateral Police Ops	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>ISAF Led Unilateral Ops (Total)</b>	<b>2,345</b>	<b>2,494</b>	<b>2,632</b>	<b>2,192</b>	<b>1,303</b>	<b>1,458</b>
ANA Unilateral	13,492	23,601	16,798	13,059	23,432	28,006
ANP Unilateral	16,391	25,025	22,275	18,440	25,565	20,496
<b>ANSF Led Unilateral (Total)</b>	<b>29,883</b>	<b>48,626</b>	<b>39,073</b>	<b>31,499</b>	<b>48,997</b>	<b>48,502</b>
ISAF Led Combined (ANA)	394	198	254	232	177	75
ISAF Led Combined (ANP)	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>ISAF Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</b>	<b>394</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>254</b>	<b>232</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>75</b>
ANA Led Combined	624	565	641	591	248	189
ANA Led Enabled	382	226	245	340	279	274
<b>ANA Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</b>	<b>1,006</b>	<b>791</b>	<b>886</b>	<b>931</b>	<b>527</b>	<b>463</b>
ANP Led Combined	0	0	0	0	0	0
ANP Led Enabled	427	442	384	272	251	67
<b>ANP Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</b>	<b>427</b>	<b>442</b>	<b>384</b>	<b>272</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>ANSF Led Combined/Enabled Ops (Total)</b>	<b>1,433</b>	<b>1,233</b>	<b>1,270</b>	<b>1,203</b>	<b>778</b>	<b>530</b>
<b>Total Ops</b>	<b>34,055</b>	<b>52,551</b>	<b>43,229</b>	<b>35,126</b>	<b>51,255</b>	<b>50,565</b>
<b>Total ISAF Led Ops</b>	<b>2,739</b>	<b>2,692</b>	<b>2,886</b>	<b>2,424</b>	<b>1,480</b>	<b>1,533</b>
<b>Total ANSF Led Ops</b>	<b>31,316</b>	<b>49,859</b>	<b>40,343</b>	<b>32,702</b>	<b>49,775</b>	<b>49,032</b>
<b>% of Total Ops that are ISAF Led</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>7%</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>3%</b>
<b>% of Total Ops that are ANSF Led</b>	<b>92%</b>	<b>95%</b>	<b>93%</b>	<b>93%</b>	<b>97%</b>	<b>97%</b>
	<b>Apr-13</b>	<b>May-13</b>	<b>Jun-13</b>	<b>Jul-13</b>	<b>Aug-13</b>	<b>Sep-13</b>

# Shifting Pattern of Partnership 9/2013-2/2014

Operational Category	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14*
ISAF Unilateral Military Ops	1,458	1,341	1,122	654	496	261
ISAF Unilateral Police Ops	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>ISAF Led Unilateral Ops (Total)</b>	<b>1,458</b>	<b>1,341</b>	<b>1,122</b>	<b>654</b>	<b>496</b>	<b>261</b>
ANA Unilateral	28,006	22,167	34,606	29,446	35,458	29,707
ANP Unilateral	20,496	19,375	18,868	22,209	19,691	12,834
<b>ANSF Led Unilateral (Total)</b>	<b>48,502</b>	<b>41,542</b>	<b>53,474</b>	<b>51,655</b>	<b>55,149</b>	<b>42,541</b>
ISAF Led Partnered (ANA)	75	70	87	80	97	39
ISAF Led Partnered (ANP)	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>ISAF Led Partnered Ops (Total)</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>39</b>
ANA Led Partnered	189	182	153	12	9	22
ANA Led Enabled	274	490	121	40	64	88
<i>ANA Led Partnered/Enabled Ops (Total)</i>	<i>463</i>	<i>672</i>	<i>274</i>	<i>52</i>	<i>73</i>	<i>110</i>
ANP Led Partnered	0	0	0	0	0	0
ANP Led Enabled	67	220	93	38	38	0
<i>ANP Led Partnered/Enabled Ops (Total)</i>	<i>67</i>	<i>220</i>	<i>93</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>0</i>
<b>ANSF Led Partnered/Enabled Ops (Total)</b>	<b>530</b>	<b>892</b>	<b>367</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>110</b>
<b>Total Ops</b>	<b>50,565</b>	<b>43,845</b>	<b>55,050</b>	<b>52,479</b>	<b>55,853</b>	<b>42,951</b>
<b>Total ISAF Led Ops</b>	<b>1,533</b>	<b>1,411</b>	<b>1,209</b>	<b>734</b>	<b>593</b>	<b>300</b>
<b>Total ANSF Led Ops</b>	<b>49,032</b>	<b>42,434</b>	<b>53,841</b>	<b>51,745</b>	<b>55,260</b>	<b>42,651</b>
<b>% of Total Ops that are ISAF Led</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>3%</b>	<b>2%</b>	<b>1%</b>	<b>1%</b>	<b>1%</b>
<b>% of Total Ops that are ANSF Led</b>	<b>97%</b>	<b>97%</b>	<b>98%</b>	<b>99%</b>	<b>99%</b>	<b>99%</b>
	Sep-13	Oct-13	Nov-13	Dec-13	Jan-14	Feb-14*

# Insider Attacks Decline Along with ISAF F Forces

## Insider Attacks Against CF Per Year

120

100

80

60

40


20

0

Since May 2007, coalition forces have suffered 120 confirmed insider attacks, which resulted in 161 killed-in-action and 251 wounded-in-action. Figure 5 shows the trend in insider attacks by year.

Comparing the period of April 1–September 15, 2014, with the same time frame last year, insider attacks slightly declined from five to four.

One such high-profile event took place at a Kabul training facility on August 5, 2014, when an ANA soldier killed U.S. Army Major General Harold Greene, the deputy commander of CSTC-A, and wounded 14 others.



\* 2014 covers 1 Jan to 15 Sep.

# UNAMA Warning that Reductions in ISAF Forces Are Not Compensated for by ANSF

UNAMA observed that the stark rise in civilian deaths and injuries in crossfire and ground engagements in the first six months of 2014 was mainly attributed to the changing dynamics of the conflict. Women and children casualties rose significantly as ground fighting between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan security forces in 2014 increasingly concentrated in civilian-populated areas.

The closure and transfer of more than 86 ISAF bases in the last half of 2013 also had an impact on civilian protection. In the first half of 2014, UNAMA observed a direct correlation between closures and a rise in civilian casualties in some areas – particularly from ground engagements. In previous years, the robust and well-armed presence of hundreds of ISAF Forward Operating Bases and Command Outposts often prevented the movement of Anti-Government Elements into the more populated areas of districts.


In response to an increased presence of Anti-Government Elements in some districts, Afghan forces initiated their own operations to protect territory, notably increasing check points and patrols, as well as responding to attacks launched against them. This resulted in an increase in fighting in civilian-populated areas, which often led to civilian casualties.

UNAMA also noted that the closure of international military bases and subsequent heavy demands placed on Afghan security forces, exacerbated by an environment of political uncertainty – pending electoral results and an unsigned Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between the United States and the Government of Afghanistan – opened up space for Anti-Government Elements in some areas to challenge Afghan forces for control of key routes and terrain. In some areas the perceived lack of control by Afghan security forces appeared to encourage Anti-Government Elements to bring together larger attack groups which resulted in higher civilian casualties. In other areas, Afghan forces were able – for a range of reasons – to hold territory after the closure of ISAF bases which resulted in fewer civilian casualties in those areas.

Both conflicting parties also increasingly relied on stand-off tactics such as mortars and rockets to avoid their own losses and repel the opposite side, which also resulted in civilian casualties.


# **Transition Tranches or Phases: 2008-2013**

# Afghanistan: Transition Phase One



- **28 August 2008:** Lead security responsibility for Kabul city transferred to Afghan forces.
- **19 November 2009:** President Karzai, having won a second presidential term, expresses his ambition to see the Afghan National Security Forces take the lead security responsibility across Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
- **20 July 2010:** Kabul Conference; the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) is established as the mechanism to assess districts and provinces for transition.
- **20 November 2010:** NATO Lisbon Summit; the *Inteqal* process is agreed between the Afghan government and NATO.
- **22 March 2011:** Afghan New Year; President Karzai announces the first set of Afghan provinces and districts to start the transition process.
- **17 July 2011:** First transition ceremony takes place in Bamiyan Province

# Afghanistan: Transition Tranche Two




- 27 November 2011: President Karzai announces the second set of Afghan provinces, districts and cities to start the transition process.

- The expansion, as is the case in the following tranches, is based loosely on the assessment of quality of governance, security forces, and the risk posed by insurgent forces.

Source NATO, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/forces/topic\\_s\\_87183.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/forces/topic_s_87183.htm),


# Afghanistan: Transition Tranche Three



- 13 May 2012
- President Karzai announces the third tranche of transition.
- President Karzai announced the third set of areas to enter the transition process, covering over 75 per cent of the Afghan population.
- This decision marked the beginning of transition in every one of the 34 provinces of Afghanistan, including every provincial capital, covering almost two-thirds of the country's districts.

Source NATO,  
[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_87183.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_87183.htm),


# Afghanistan: Transition Tranche Four



- 31 December 2012: President Karzai announces the fourth set of Afghan provinces, districts and cities to start the transition process.
- With this decision, 23 provinces out of 34 have fully entered transition and
- 87 per cent of the population now lives in areas where ANSF is in the lead for security.

Source NATO,  
[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_s\\_87183.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_s_87183.htm),

# ISAF Assessment of Transition Stages, March- December 2013




Stage 1:  
Local Support

Stage 2:  
Tactical Support

Stage 3: Operational Support

Stage 4:  
Strategic Support


# Afghanistan: Transition Tranche Five



- **18 June 2013:** Official ceremony during which President Karzai announces the fifth and final tranche of transition.
- With this decision, 23 provinces out of 34 have fully entered transition and 87 per cent of the population now lives in areas where ANSF is in the lead for security.
- Once this decision has been fully implemented, the 11 remaining provinces will fully enter into transition and Afghan forces will be in the lead for security across the whole country.

# Afghan Army and ISAF Field Forces as of August 1, 2013

The slide does not count personnel deployed to Afghan ministries, military headquarters, training centers and airbases.



Note: This slide shows the approximate number of Afghan Army and ISAF troops in the field. They should be taken as indicative as they change frequently.