

1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036

Anthony H. Cordesman
Phone: 1.202.775.3270

Email: acordesman@gmail.com

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Afghan Forces on the Edge of Transition– II: *Sharply Contradictory Data on Levels of Violence*

By: Anthony H. Cordesman

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2014*

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
**Facing a Continuing War Zone
Without Eliminating Pakistani
Sanctuaries or Major Progress
in Security**

The Uncertain Structure of Security

- **Data on Afghan Surge show had little or no lasting impact.**
- **NATO/ISAF stopped all meaningful reporting on security trends after EIA fiasco.**
- **No maps or assessments of insurgent control or influence versus limited data of 10 worst areas of tactical encounters.**
- **No maps or assessments of areas of effective government control and support and areas where government is not present or lacks support.**
- **Shift from direct clashes to high profile and political attacks makes it impossible to assess situation using past metrics, but HPAs sharply up.**
- **UN casualty data and State Department START data on terrorism highly negative.**
- **No reason for insurgents to engage NATO/ISAF or ANSF on unfavorable terms before combat NATO/ISAF forces are gone.**


World Bank Ranking of Violence and Rule of Law Highly Negative and Rising

Afghanistan



World Bank Rankings of Governance Shows Very Uncertain Trends

Afghanistan





The Limited to Negligible Impact of of the US Surge in Afghanistan

United Nations Department of Safety and Security Estimate of Security Incidents Per Month




Source: ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN. 2014 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION—STAFF REPORT; PRESS RELEASE; AND STATEMENT BY THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14128.pdf>, p. 33.

Failed Surge in Afghanistan vs. Surge in Iraq



Enemy-Initiated Attacks Recovered Before ISAF Ceased to Report



Rising Violence and Casualties


**The US/ISAF Focus on Tactical
Clashes Does Not Provide an
Honest Picture of a Steadily
Intensifying Conflict**

Afghanistan is Still Very Much at War

- **Taliban not popular, but with so many Afghan government challenges, people focus on survival.**
- **No evidence that the “surge” has defeated Taliban. Won’t know the balance of power until US and ISAF military are largely gone and a new government is in place – i.e., 2015 campaign season.**
- **Pakistan sanctuaries and ISI are still in place.**
- **US and allies rushing to meet 2014 deadline – about 2-4 years before ANSF is fully ready to assume all security responsibilities.**
- **ANSF is an awkward mix of army, national police, local police. Cutting force mix early is very dangerous.**
- **Money has been the most important single aspect of transition in past cases, keeping government forces active, supplied, sustained.**
- **Next most important is proving high-level enablers and training/advisory presence in the field. 9,500-13,500 seem minimal. Costs uncertain, but transition below \$4 billion annually uncertain. May need \$6-7 billion.**

Top 10 Most Violent Districts 1/4/13 to 9/15/13 (4/2014)

Top 10 Districts (01 Apr 2013 to 15 Sep 2013)				
Top 10 Districts in EIA	Province	RC	% of Total Population	% of National EIA in Date Range
1 Nahr-e Saraj	Helmand	RC-SW	0.4%	4%
2 Sangin	Helmand	RC-SW	0.2%	4%
3 Nad 'Ali	Helmand	RC-SW	0.3%	4%
4 Musa Qal'ah	Helmand	RC-SW	0.2%	4%
5 Panjwaī	Kandahar	RC-S	0.3%	3%
6 Sayyidabad	Wardak	RC-E	0.4%	3%
7 Now Zad	Helmand	RC-SW	0.2%	2%
8 Maiwand	Kandahar	RC-S	0.2%	2%
9 Pul-e 'Alam	Logar	RC-E	0.4%	2%
10 Darah-ye Pech	Kunar	RC-E	0.2%	2%
Date range: 01 Apr 2013 to 15 Sep 2013			Total: 3.1%	31%



“But, This was irrelevant”

- Long war
- War for control of space and population, not tactical outcomes
- Taliban can pick and choose area and method of attack. Strike weakest link.
- Win if dominate people and/or allies and NGOs leave.
- Value of Pakistani sanctuary/ISI support
- Morale, public support, leadership critical.
- Peace negotiations can be war by other means

Shift from Tactical clashes to High Profile Attacks in 2012-2014

April 1 – September 15, 2012 vs. April 1 – Sept 15, 2013.

Metric	EIAs	HPA	Direct Fire	IED Events	IED/Mine Explosions	Complex/ Coordinated Attack	IDF
% YoY Change	-6%	1%	-1%	-22%	-5%	5%	-18%

October 1, 2012 – March 13, 2013 vs. October 1, 2013 – March 13, 2014.

Metric	EIA	HPA	Direct Fire	IED Events	IED/Mine Explosions	Complex/ Coordinated Attack	IDF
% YoY Change	-2%	43%	5%	-24%	-11%	-8%	-15%

April 1, 2013 – August 31, 2014, compared to April 1 – August 31, 2014

Metric	Enemy Initiated Attacks	High Profile Attacks	Direct Fire	IED/ Mine Explosions	Complex/ Coordinated Attacks	Indirect Fire Attacks
Percentage Year Over Year Change	-27%	16%	-23%	-34%	-31%	-37%

Concentration of Violence 1/4/14 to 8/31/14 (10/2014)

- **From April 1 through August 31, 2014, violence remained highly concentrated with 80 percent of nationwide EIAs occurring in regions where only 46 percent of the population lives**
- **(including Kabul District with approximately 13 percent of the population).**
- **Fifty percent of nationwide EIAs occurred where approximately 13 percent of the population lives.**
- **The ten most violent districts in Afghanistan account for approximately just over three percent of the population and 21 percent of the violence nationwide.**

State Department Country Data: Afghanistan 2013

More than half of all attacks in Afghanistan in 2013 (56.7%) were attributed to a perpetrator group, and nearly all of these (98.6%) were attributed to the Taliban.

Two attacks in Afghanistan in 2013, the assassination of Indian author Sushmita Banerjee and a suicide attack targeting the Indian consulate in Jalalabad, were attributed specifically to the Haqqani Network.

Unlike in 2012, when attacks against military targets were 24.3 percent more prevalent in Afghanistan than around the world, in 2013 the percentage of attacks against military targets globally increased and was approximately the same as that in Afghanistan (5.2%).

Attacks against police targets were especially common in Afghanistan in 2013. In fact, 44.6 percent of all attacks in Afghanistan in 2013 primarily targeted the police, especially checkpoints, patrols, and security forces. This is 80.6 percent higher than the percentage of attacks that targeted police globally.

Like in Iraq, suicide attacks continued to be especially frequent in Afghanistan. More than 9 percent of attacks in Afghanistan in 2013 were classified as suicide attacks, compared to 5.3 percent globally.

Terrorist attacks in Afghanistan took place throughout the country in 2013.

Nearly one-quarter of all attacks (21.6%) took place in Helmand and Kandahar provinces in the South; however, 24 other provinces experienced more than 10 attacks in 2013.

Taliban and Insurgent Tactics Have Become Lethal and More Challenging


- ISAF/US reporting on cover tactical events, not outcomes and is essentially meaningless, if not dishonest, in showing relative areas of government and insurgent presence and influence.
- UNAMA reporting shows casualty levels never dropped significantly as a result of the surge and got far worse in the first six months of 2014 as ISAF forces withdrew.
- UNAMA reports that targeted attacks by Anti-Government Elements against mullahs (religious leaders) they accused of supporting the Government and in mosques tripled in 2013 and rose again in the first six months of 2014.
- In the first half of 2014, the armed conflict in Afghanistan took a dangerous new turn for civilians. For the first time since 2009 when UNAMA began systematically documenting civilian casualties in Afghanistan, more civilians were found to have been killed and injured in ground engagements and crossfire between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan national security forces than any other tactic. In previous years, the majority of civilians were killed and injured by improvised explosive devices.
- Between 1 January and 30 June 2014, UNAMA documented 4,853 civilian casualties, (1,564 civilian deaths and 3,289 injured) recording a 17 per cent increase in civilian deaths, and a 28 per cent increase in civilians injured for a 24 per cent overall increase in civilian casualties compared to the first six months of 2013.³
- UNAMA attributed 74 per cent of all civilian casualties to Anti-Government Elements, nine per cent to Pro-Government Forces⁵ (eight per cent to Afghan national security forces, one per cent to international military forces) and 12 per cent to ground engagements between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan national security forces in which a civilian casualty could not be attributed to a specific party.
- UNAMA attributed four per cent of civilian casualties to explosive remnants of war, and the remaining one per cent to cross-border shelling from Pakistan into Afghanistan.
- Compared with the first six months of 2009, when UNAMA began to monitor civilian casualties, the number of civilians killed by Anti-Government Elements doubled in 2014 (from 599 to 1,208), while the number of civilians killed by Pro-Government forces has been cut by half (from 302 to 158), almost entirely due to reduced civilian casualties from aerial operations of international military forces.

Source: UNAMA/UNHCR, **Afghanistan Midyear Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict:**

2014 http://unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=m_XyrUQDKZg%3d&tabid=12254&mid=15756&language=en-US, July 2014, pp. 1-2.

In spite of “Surge,” Civilian Killed and Wounded Rose Through End 2013

**UN Estimate of Civilian deaths and Injuries:
January to December 2009-2013**




- UNAMA documented 8,615 civilian casualties (2,959 civilian deaths and 5,656 injured) in 2013, marking a seven per cent increase in deaths and a 17 per cent increase in injuries compared to 2012.

- The rise in civilians killed and injured in Afghanistan’s armed conflict in 2013 reverses the decline reported in 2012 and is similar to record high numbers of civilian casualties documented in 2011. Since 2009, the armed conflict has claimed the lives of 14, 064 Afghan civilians and injured thousands more.

- While improvised explosive devices used by Anti-Government Elements remained the biggest killer of civilians in 2013, increased ground engagements between Pro-Government Forces and Anti-Government Elements emerged as the number-two cause of civilian casualties with rising numbers of Afghan civilians killed and injured in cross-fire. Both factors drove the escalation of civilian casualties in 2013.

Civilian Killed and Wounded Rose 24% in First Half of 2014

UN Estimate of Civilian Deaths and Injuries January to June 2009 - 2014



While civilian casualties caused by IEDs also increased to unprecedented levels over the same period in 2013, deaths and injuries caused by mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire in ground engagements jumped dramatically as the frequency and intensity of these incidents increased in 2014, particularly in areas with concentrated civilian populations.

“The nature of the conflict in Afghanistan is changing in 2014 with an escalation of ground engagements in civilian-populated areas...The impact on civilians, including the most vulnerable Afghans, is proving to be devastating.”


From 1 January to 30 June 2014, UNAMA documented 4,853 civilian casualties, up 24 per cent over the same period in 2013. Included in the toll were 1,564 civilian deaths (up 17 per cent) and 3,289 injuries (up 28 per cent).

Ground engagements caused two of every five civilian casualties in 2014 accounting for 39 per cent of all civilian casualties: 1,901 in total, up 89 per cent from 2013, with 474 civilians killed and 1,427 injured.

Total child civilian casualties increased 34 per cent in the first six months of 2014 to 1,071, including 295 killed and 776 injured, while total women civilian casualties increased 24 per cent to 440, including 148 killed and 292 injured. Ground engagements took the lives of 112 children and injured 408, with the total 520 child casualties, an increase of 110 per cent over 2013. Ground engagements killed 64 Afghan women and injured 192, with the total 256 women casualties, up 61 per cent over 2013.

Taliban and Insurgent Killing Power Has Been Rising

UN Estimate of Civilian deaths by Parties to the Conflict: January to December 2009-2013



- UNAMA's report found that Anti-Government Elements continued to deliberately target civilians across the country and carried out attacks without regard for civilian life, causing 6,374 civilian casualties (2,311 civilian deaths and 4,063 injured), up four per cent from 2012.

- Indiscriminate use of IEDs by Anti-Government Elements increased in 2013 and remained the leading cause of civilian deaths and injuries. UNAMA recorded 2,890 civilian casualties (962 civilian deaths and 1,928 injured) from IEDs, up 14 per cent from 2012.


- Within civilian casualties from IEDs, UNAMA noted an 84 per cent rise in civilian deaths and injuries from radio-controlled IEDs and a 39 per cent decrease in civilian casualties from indiscriminate victim-activated pressure-plate IEDs. Anti-Government Elements continued to detonate IEDs in public areas used by civilians such as roads, markets, Government offices, bazaars, in and around schools, and bus stations

- Suicide and complex attacks caused 1,236 civilian casualties (255 killed and 981 injured) in 73 incidents in 2013. While the number of attacks was similar to 2012, an 18 per cent decrease in civilian casualties from these attacks was noted

Source: UNAMA, CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN AFGHAN CONFLICT RISE BY 14 PER CENT IN 2013, http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/Feb_8_2014_PoC-report_2013-PR-ENG-final.pdf, February 8, 2014, pp. 1-2, 7

Violence Reaches Major New Peak in 2014

UN Estimate of Civilian deaths by Parties to the Conflict: January to June 2009-2014




Between 1 January and 30 June 2014, UNAMA documented 4,853 civilian casualties, (1,564 civilian deaths and 3,289 injured) recording a 17 per cent increase in civilian deaths, and a 28 per cent increase in civilians injured for a 24 per cent overall increase in civilian casualties compared to the first six months of 2013.

UNAMA attributed 74 per cent of all civilian casualties to Anti-Government Elements, nine per cent to Pro-Government Forces (eight per cent to Afghan national security forces, one per cent to international military forces) and 12 per cent to ground engagements between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan national security forces in which a civilian casualty could not be attributed to a specific party. UNAMA attributed four per cent of civilian casualties to explosive remnants of war and the remaining one per cent to cross-border shelling from Pakistan into Afghanistan.

Compared with the first six months of 2009, when UNAMA began to monitor civilian casualties, the number of civilians killed by Anti-Government Elements doubled in 2014 (from 599 to 1,208), while the number of civilians killed by Pro-Government forces has been cut by half (from 302 to 158), almost entirely due to reduced civilian casualties from aerial operations of international military forces.


Steadily Increasing Impact of Taliban and Insurgents with 24% Rise in 2014

Civilian Deaths and Injuries by Anti-Government Elements
January to June: 2009 - 2014




Expanding National Coverage of Taliban Attacks Goes Far Beyond 10 Districts

Civilian Deaths and Injuries: IEDs by region January to June 2009 - 2014



Increasing Lethality of Targeted Attacks

Civilian Deaths and Injuries by AGE Targeted and Wilful Killings January to June: 2009 - 2014




Targeted killings accounted for nine per cent of all civilian casualties in the first half of 2014. UNAMA documented 263 civilian deaths and 165 injured (428 civilian casualties) from targeted killings, a 10 per cent drop from the same period in 2013.

Of the 428 civilian casualties from targeted killings, 95 per cent – 405 civilian casualties (247 deaths and 158 injured) – were attributed to Anti-Government Elements. These included killings of tribal elders, civilian Government officials, mullahs and civilian justice officials.

Of the 428 civilian casualties from targeted killings, the Taliban claimed responsibility for 39 separate incidents of targeted killings which resulted in 82 civilian casualties (54 civilian deaths and 28 injured), more than doubling the civilian casualties claimed by the Taliban in 2013.

Ground Combat Continues to Intensify - I

Civilian deaths and injuries by tactic and incident type January to June 2014



The sharp increase in civilian deaths and injuries in 2014 resulted from escalating ground engagements between Anti-Government Elements and Afghan national security forces particularly in civilian-populated areas. In the first half of 2014, increasing numbers of Afghan civilians were killed and injured in ground combat. For example, civilian deaths from mortars, rockets and grenades more than doubled from the same six-month period in 2013.

UNAMA documented 1,901 civilian casualties (474 civilian deaths and 1,427 injured) from ground engagements alone, up 89 per cent from 2013.9 Ground combat was the leading cause of civilian casualties in the first half of 2014, accounting for 39 per cent of all civilian deaths and injuries. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used by Anti-Government Elements – the second highest cause of civilian casualties – also killed and injured Afghan civilians at unprecedented levels.



Between 1 January and 30 June 2014, UNAMA documented 1,463 civilian casualties (463 civilian deaths and 1,000 injured) a seven per cent. In the first six months of 2014, suicide and complex attacks caused 583 civilian casualties which killed 156 civilians and injured 427, a seven per cent decrease in civilian casualties from such attacks compared to the first six months of 2013. Suicide and complex attacks were the third leading cause of civilian deaths and injuries in the first half of 2014, after ground engagements and IEDs.

Together, ground engagements and IED tactics, which included suicide and complex attacks, accounted for 81 per cent of all civilian casualties in the first six months of 2014. Targeted killings accounted for nine per cent of all civilian casualties. Between 1 January and 30 June 2014, UNAMA documented 428 civilian casualties (263 civilian deaths and 165 injured) from targeted and willful killings (or attempts to kill), a 10 per cent decrease from the same period in 2013.20 These included killings of tribal elders, civilian Government officials, mullahs and civilian justice officials.

Ground Combat Continues to Intensify - II


Civilian Deaths and Injuries: All Ground Engagements by region January to June 2009 - 2014

Civilian Deaths and Injuries: Ground Engagements by Party to the Conflict January - June 2014




**US State Department
START Data Base Shows
Sharp and Continuing Rise
in Terrorism**

Afghanistan – terrorist incidents




Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd

Afghanistan - perpetrators




Afghanistan – attack type




Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd

Afghanistan – target type




Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd

Afghanistan – weapon type




Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd

Afghanistan - casualties




Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd

Afghanistan - fatalities



Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd

Afghanistan - injuries



Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd

Pressure from the Deteriorating Situation in Pakistan


Uncertain Impact of Political Shifts and Pakistani Campaign in FATA

- **US and Pakistani military relations improving; less concern ISI remains a threat, backs Taliban and Haqqani network.**
- **Pakistani claims of major against in FATA area and are expanding campaign in border area.**
- **Ashraf Ghani making real effort to improve US and Pakistani relations**
- **But, assessments of success of Pakistani campaign remain high uncertain. See see did little more than create civilian refugees – some going to Afghanistan – disperse rebels. No official US assessments.**
- **Some experts see ISI remains a major problem. Taliban and Haqqani network still have de facto sanctuary in Pakistan.**
- **US State Department terrorism data show sharp and continuing rise in overall level of violence in Pakistan.**
- **World Bank rates Pakistani governance, including levels of violence, at near failed state level.**


World Bank Estimate of Weak Governance and Lack of Security in Pakistan

Income Group, Region, or Country: Pakistan


Voice and Accountability




Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism




Government Effectiveness




Regulatory Quality



Rule of Law



Control of Corruption



State Department Ranking of Ten Most Violent States in Terms of Terrorism in 2012

Country	Total Attacks	Total Killed	Total Wounded	Average Number Killed per Attack	Average Number Wounded per Attack
Pakistan	1404	1848	3643	1.32	2.59
Iraq	1271	2436	6641	1.92	5.23
Afghanistan	1023	2632	3715	2.57	3.63
India	557	231	559	0.41	1.00
Nigeria	546	1386	1019	2.54	1.87
Thailand	222	174	897	0.78	4.04
Yemen	203	365	427	1.80	2.10
Somalia	185	323	397	1.75	2.15
Philippines	141	109	270	0.77	1.91
Syria^[2]	133	657	1787	4.94	13.44

Source: Bureau of Counterterrorism, Statistical Annex, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2012*, US State Department, April 2013, pp. 16-17. For trend graph through 2013, see <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=overtime&search=Pakistan>.

State Department Ranking of Ten Most Violent States in Terms of Terrorism in 2013

Country	Total Attacks	Total Killed	Total Wounded	Average Number Killed Per Attack	Average Number Wounded Per Attack
Iraq	2495	6378	14956	2.56	5.99
Pakistan	1920	2315	4989	1.21	2.60
Afghanistan	1144	3111	3717	2.72	3.25
India	622	405	717	0.65	1.15
Philippines	450	279	413	0.62	0.92
Thailand	332	131	398	0.39	1.20
Nigeria	300	1817	457	6.06	1.52
Yemen	295	291	583	0.99	1.98
Syria[2]	212	1074	1773	5.07	8.36
Somalia	197	408	485	2.07	2.46

Source: Bureau of Counterterrorism, Statistical Annex, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2013*, US State Department, April 2014, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224831.htm> n.

State Department Country Data: Pakistan

The total number of terrorist attacks reported in Pakistan increased 36.8 percent between 2012 and 2013. Fatalities increased 25.3 percent and injuries increased 36.9 percent.

No specific perpetrator organization was identified for 86.2 percent of all attacks in Pakistan. Of the remaining attacks, nearly half (49%) were carried out by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Attacks attributed to the TTP killed more than 550 and wounded more than 1,200 in 2013.


Twenty other groups, including a number of Baloch nationalist groups such as the Baloch Republican Army, the Baloch Liberation Army, the Baloch Liberation Front, and the Baloch Liberation Tigers, carried out attacks in Pakistan, particularly in Balochistan.

More than 37 percent of all attacks in Pakistan took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, 28.4 percent took place in Balochistan, and 21.2 percent took place in Sindh province. The proportion of attacks in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) decreased from 19.6 percent in 2012 to 9.4 percent in 2013.

The most frequently attacked types of targets in Pakistan were consistent with global patterns. More than 22 percent of all attacks primarily targeted private citizens and property, more than 17 percent primarily targeted the police, and more than 11 percent primarily targeted general (non-diplomatic) government entities.


However, these three types of targets accounted for a smaller proportion of attacks in Pakistan (51.1%) than they did globally (61.7%). Instead, terrorist attacks in Pakistan were almost twice as likely to target educational institutions (6.4%) and more than three times as likely to target violent political parties (4.4%), organizations that have at times engaged in both electoral politics and terrorist violence.

State Department Estimate of Trend in Number of Terrorist Incidents in Pakistan




Source: GTD, Global terrorism Data Base, "Pakistan,"
<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=overtime&search=Pakistan>.

USIP Map of Widening Areas in Terrorist Incidents in Pakistan




Source: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW93-Mapping_Conflict_Trends_in_Pakistan.pdf

Pakistan – terrorist incidents



Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd


Pakistan - perpetrators



- Muttahida Qami Movement
- Lashkar-e-Islam (Pakistan)
- Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan


Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd

Pakistan – attack type




Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd

Pakistan – target type




Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd

Pakistan – weapon type




Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd

Pakistan - casualties




Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd

Pakistan - fatalities



Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd


Pakistan - injuries




Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd

US Estimate of Static Levels of Afghan Trust in ANSF and Fear of Taliban

Percentage of Survey Respondents that have a *Very Favorable* or *Somewhat Favorable* View of the Afghan Government, Afghan Security Forces, and the Taliban



Survey Respondent Answers to Question of “Who Most Brings Security to Your Area?”



**Asia Foundation 2014 Polls of
Levels of Afghan Trust in ANSF
and Attitudes Towards Taliban
and Other Armed Opposition
Groups (AOGs)**

Key Results on Perceptions of Security - I

- In 2014 a majority of Afghans (65.4%) report always, often, or sometimes fearing for their safety or security or that of their family. Fear for safety has increased since 2013 (59.0%), and since 2006 fear for safety has been on an overall upward trend. The provinces reporting the highest levels of fear for personal safety are Faryab (92.1%), Wardak (89.2%), Farah (87.5%), and Kunduz (87.5%). Three provinces most likely to report never or rarely experiencing fear are Panjshir (98.5%), Badakhshan (81.7), and Bamyan (74.9%).
- Around three quarters of Afghans say they would be afraid when traveling within Afghanistan (76.4%). A clear majority would be afraid to participate in a peaceful demonstration (69.4%), run for public office (70.8%), and encounter international forces (76.6%).
- Afghans who say they have experienced violence or crime this year (15.6% of all respondents) are significantly more likely to report feeling fear for their personal safety than those who have not. The percentage of Afghans who report suffering violence or crime is highest in Logar (39.0%), Ghor (37.5%), and Helmand (37.0%) provinces. Provinces with the fewest reports of experience with violence or crime are Panjshir (1.5%), Badakhshan (2.3%), and Bamyan (1.0%).
- A majority of people who experienced violence or crime say they reported it (69.0%), and overall, a majority of Afghans (58.9%) say that if they were to experience a crime and reported it, they have some or a lot of confidence that the guilty party would be punished. This is a higher level of confidence than was reported in 2013 (45.8%) but the level of confidence has varied widely over the past five years.
- The percentage of Afghans who agree that the ANP are efficient at arresting those who have committed crimes has increased in recent years, from 70% in 2010 to 82.1% in 2014.
- When asked which forces are most responsible for providing security in their area, 50.4% of Afghans cite the ANP, 24.2% cite the ANA, and 21.7% cite the Afghan Local Police (ALP). Afghans in urban areas are more likely to say the ANP, and Afghans in rural areas are more likely to credit the ANA and ALP.
- Using a composite measure of overall confidence, 86.5% of Afghans are confident in the ANA, and 73.2% are confident in the ANP. Overall perceptions of the ANA and ANP have improved over time, and more so for the ANA than the ANP. However, 55.7% of Afghans still say they think that the Afghan National Security Forces (of which the ANA and ANP are a part) need foreign support to do their job properly.

Concerns Over Security Show a Rising Trend, But Presence of Taliban is Down

BIGGEST PROBLEM: NATIONAL LEVEL BY YEAR

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
INSECURITY / ATTACKS / VIOLENCE / TERRORISM	27	46	36	36	37	38	28	30	34
CORRUPTION	19	16	14	17	27	21	25	26	28
UNEMPLOYMENT	32	27	31	35	28	23	27	25	26
POOR ECONOMY	24	19	17	20	11	10	11	10	11
LACK OF EDUCATION / SCHOOLS / LITERACY	10	11	9	11	11	10	10	9	8
POVERTY	13	5	8	11	10	12	9	9	7
PRESENCE OF TALIBAN	6	13	13	8	8	4	8	7	7
SUICIDE ATTACKS	-	-	-	4	5	4	5	9	6

FIG. 1.11: Q-5A/B. *In your view, what is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan as a whole? (Q-5A and Q-5B responses combined)*

Respondents from all regions rank insecurity, corruption, and unemployment interchangeably as the three biggest problems facing Afghanistan. Insecurity is cited most often in the West (42.0%) and least often in the North East (24.5%). The presence of the Taliban is cited most frequently in the West (13.8%) and least frequently in the South West (4.9%). People in the East region are most likely to say corruption is the biggest problem facing Afghanistan (34.1%) and people in the Central/Hazarajat region are the least likely (22.4%). Meanwhile, unemployment is cited most often in the Central/Kabul (35.9%) region and least often in the South East (19.7%) region.

Sharp Variation by Region as to Perceptions of Whether Moving in the Right Direction on Security and ANSF

REASONS FOR RIGHT DIRECTION: BY REGION

	CENTRAL / KABUL	EAST	SOUTH EAST	SOUTH WEST	WEST	NORTH EAST	CENTRAL / HAZARAJAT	NORTH WEST
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
RECONSTRUCTION / REBUILDING	40	34	28	29	24	44	30	44
GOOD SECURITY	36	28	22	36	24	35	52	39
IMPROVEMENT IN EDUCATION SYSTEM	18	12	18	20	10	13	20	11
DON'T KNOW	17	5	9	10	13	9	32	10
HAVING ACTIVE ANA AND ANP	5	16	19	15	10	8	1	9
ECONOMIC REVIVAL	10	10	7	12	10	7	6	5
DEMOCRACY / ELECTIONS	14	7	10	5	8	8	4	7
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS	7	14	15	5	7	7	4	5
SCHOOLS FOR GIRLS HAVE OPENED	8	6	10	9	11	7	2	4

FIG. 1.4: Q-2A/B. (Ask if answered "1 - Right direction" to Q-1) What are two reasons that Afghanistan is going in the right direction? (Q-2A and Q-2B responses combined)

Perceptions of Afghan Forces Are Mixed But More Positive than Negative




FIG. 2.10: Q-18A. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement: a) The ANP is honest and fair with the Afghan people; b) The ANP helps improve security in Afghanistan. (percentage who "strongly agree")




FIG. 2.11: Q-17A. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with each statement: a) The ANA is honest and fair with the Afghan people; b) The ANA helps improve security. (percentage who "strongly agree")

Respect for Afghan Forces Does Not Mean Many Afghans Do Not Fear Them

LEVEL OF FEAR BY ACTIVITY

ACTIVITY	NO FEAR	SOME FEAR	A LOT OF FEAR	REFUSED	DON'T KNOW	TOTAL
	%	%	%	%	%	%
VOTING IN A NATIONAL / PROVINCIAL ELECTION	54	37	9	0	0	100
PARTICIPATING IN A PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION	28	45	25	1	2	100
RUNNING FOR PUBLIC OFFICE	25	45	26	1	3	100
ENCOUNTERING ANP	54	33	12	0	1	100
ENCOUNTERING ANA	58	29	12	0	1	100
TRAVELING FROM ONE PART OF AFGHANISTAN TO ANOTHER PART OF THE COUNTRY	23	50	26	0	1	100
ENCOUNTERING INTERNATIONAL FORCES	22	44	32	0	1	100

FIG. 2.3: Q-31. *I will read you a list of different activities that you could participate in. Please, tell me whether you would participate in the following activities with no fear, some fear, or a lot of fear?*

Corruption in ANSF and Impact on Daily Life

EXPOSURE TO CORRUPTION

	ALL OF THE TIME	MOST OF THE TIME	SOME OF THE TIME	NONE OF THE TIME	HAD NO CONTACT	DON'T KNOW	TOTAL	CORRUPTION RATE
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY	2	7	10	38	42	1	100	33
ADMISSIONS TO SCHOOLS / UNIVERSITY	2	8	13	35	41	1	100	39
AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE	3	9	16	33	38	1	100	45
STATE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY	3	9	14	30	43	1	100	47
CUSTOMS OFFICE	3	9	10	25	52	1	100	47
PUBLIC HEALTHCARE SERVICE	3	13	21	37	26	0	100	49
PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR'S OFFICE	3	10	15	27	45	0	100	51
WHEN APPLYING FOR A JOB	4	11	16	27	41	1	100	52
JUDICIARY / COURTS	5	11	15	24	44	1	100	55
OFFICIALS IN THE MUNICIPALITY / DISTRICT OFFICE	6	13	13	25	42	1	100	55

FIG. 5.9: Q-28. *Thinking back to your interactions in the past 12 months, please tell me how often you had to give money, a gift or perform a favor for these organizations or in these situations? Was it all of the time, most of the time, some of the time, or none of the time? If you had no contact with the organization, please tell me so. a) Officials in the Municipality/District office, b) Provincial governor's office, c) Customs office, d) Afghan National Police, e) Afghan National Army, f) Judiciary/courts, g) State electricity supply, h) Public healthcare service, i) When applying for a job, j) Admissions to schools/university. (Note: the corruption rate represents the percentage who say they experienced corruption some, most, or all of the time, among those who say they had contact with each institution or situation)*


When asked how often they had paid a bribe, given a gift, or performed a favor for a list of different authorities and situations, 57.6% of Afghans in 2014 say they encountered corruption in their interaction in at least one authority or in a least one situation in the past year, including 67.4% of Afghan men and 49.0% of Afghan women ”

This is overall rate of exposure to corruption has ranged from a low of 50.6% of Afghans in 2008, to 65.5% in 2011. Figure 5.9 lists the rate of corruption experienced by Afghans who report contact with each institution.

Over half (54.7%) of Afghans who had contact with the judiciary or courts in the past year say they had to pay a bribe, exchange a gift, or perform a favor. A key issue in President Ashraf Ghani's presidential campaign platform was judiciary reform, including a reduction in corruption.

A similar percentage (55.1%) experienced corruption in their interaction with municipal or district authorities. Law enforcement and national defense, including the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), performed comparatively well. Only a third (32.8%) of Afghans who reported coming into contact with the ANA say they experienced corruption (.

Sympathy for AOGs is Down But Varies by Region



SYMPATHY FOR ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS



FIG. 2.15: Q-57. *Thinking about the reasons why armed opposition groups have been fighting during the past year, in general, would you say that you have a lot of sympathy, a little sympathy, or no sympathy at all for these groups? (percentage who say “a lot” or “a little” sympathy)*

Perception of Armed Opposition Group Motives

Afghans gave a number of reasons why they believe AOGs are fighting the Afghan government (Fig. 2.16). The most frequently cited reason, reported by 16.4% of Afghans surveyed, is the presence of international forces, while 15.5% of Afghans say it is to fight the Afghan government, 9.4% say it is because they are supported by Pakistan, and 5.6% say it is because there is too much corruption in the government.




FIG. 2.16: Q-56. *In your opinion, what is the main reason that the armed opposition groups are fighting against the Afghan government? (percentage of respondents by reason given)*

Key Results on Perceptions of Security - II

- Nearly three-quarters of Afghans (72.6%) say that the reconciliation efforts between the Afghan government and armed opposition groups (AOGs) can help stabilize the country. Confidence in reconciliation efforts is lowest in Panjshir (22.3%), Daikundi (48.0%), Balkh (56.4%), and Wardak (58.3%) provinces. Confidence is highest in Jawjzan (92.8%), Badghis (89.1%), and Nangarhar (87.4%).
- A higher percentage of men (76.8%) than women (68.7%) believe reconciliation efforts can be effective in stabilizing the country.
- Approximately one in three (32.0%) Afghans say they have a lot (6.6%) or a little (25.4%) sympathy with armed opposition groups (AOGs). Afghans in the East, South East, and South West regions have the highest concentration of sympathy for AOGs. A higher percentage of men (34.8%) express some level of sympathy with AOGs than women (29.5%). Residents of rural areas sympathize with AOGs at a higher rate (35.0%) than residents of urban areas (22.4%). Men from highly insecure areas who were polled using targeted intercept interviews report significantly higher levels of sympathy: 14.7% say they have a lot of sympathy, and 35.4% say they have some sympathy for AOGs.

The Need to Deal with an Ongoing War

- **Taliban not popular, but with so many Afghan government challenges, people focus on survival.**
- **No evidence that the “surge” has defeated Taliban. Won’t know the balance of power until US and ISAF military are largely gone and a new government is in place – i.e., 2015 campaign season.**
- **Pakistan sanctuaries and ISI are still in place.**
- **US and allies rushing to meet 2014 deadline – about 2-4 years before ANSF is fully ready to assume all security responsibilities.**
- **ANSF is an awkward mix of army, national police, local police. Cutting force mix early is very dangerous.**
- **Money has been the most important single aspect of transition in past cases, keeping government forces active, supplied, sustained.**
- **Next most important is proving high-level enablers and training/advisory presence in the field. 9,500-13,500 seem minimal. Costs uncertain, but transition below \$4 billion annually uncertain. May need \$6-7 billion.**

The Challenge of Post-2014 Security

Key Warfighting Challenges

- **Acceptance that as long as Taliban and others have sanctuary in Pakistan, war will last as long as it lasts.**
- **End focus on tactical clashes, focus on political-military control and protection of key populated areas and LoCs.**
- **Responding to the changing threat in a Political-Military War.**
 - **Tests of 2015 campaign season: “Coming out of the sanctuary closet.”**
 - **Threat ability to choose time and place, intensity and persistence of operations.**
 - **New forms of high profile attacks, political-military structures at urban and district level, focus on ANSF, officials, advisors, and NGOs.**
 - **LOC and commercial threats.**
 - **New role of narcotics, power brokers, corruption in poorer economy**
- **Ensuring popular support of government and ANSF is critical. Deal with Security vs. hearts and minds dilemmas on Afghan terms.**
 - **Reshaping role of US and other “partners,” advisors, “enablers” to win popular support.**

There is some hope that an adequately resourced ANSF layered defense and US “four quarter” advisory strategy could succeed in provide the necessary security in key populated areas and for key lines of communication, even if Pakistan continues to provide Taliban sanctuaries and comes to dominate less populated areas in the east and South.

Afghanistan is, however, very much a nation at war and success is extremely uncertain given the limited size and duration of the US advisory effort.

ISAF and the US government have stopped all detailed reporting on actual success in war for more than a year. ISAF no longer reports maps or metrics, and the semi-annual Department of Defense 1230 report stopped such reporting in late 2012 and has not been updated since July 2013.

It is clear from a wide range of media reporting, however, that the transition to Afghan forces in 2013 gradually extended ANSF responsibility to many areas still dominated by the Taliban and other insurgents

There has been no meaningful net assessment of the success of Afghan government/ANSF efforts versus those of the Taliban and other threats.

The ANSF will have to cover a large country with a highly dispersed population and 18 major population clusters. Some do not face major threats, but many do face serious risks.

Protecting key lines of communication will be a major challenge – both in terms of available forces, force quality and loyalty, and the ability to maintain key routes.

Both security and post-transition trade patterns present serious uncertainties.

The World Bank already ranks Afghanistan as having some of the worst challenges in terms of violence and rule of law of any country in the world.

The ANSF must start with none of the internal resources Iraq had from its oil revenues, and with nothing like the success the surge in Iraq presented before Transition.

Even the ISAF's carefully chosen metric – enemy initiated attacks – failed to reflect significant success before ISAF ceased to report all metrics on the success of the fighting.

The ANSF has, however, increased significantly in total force strength, and began to bear the brunt of enemy attacks and casualties by October 2012.

Past reports show that the ANSF still faces key problems in the MoD and MoI, sustainment, and with corruption. It is also important to note that only roughly half of the 352,000 personnel often cited as the force goal are actual military and serious paramilitary forces. Force composition and force quality present far more critical problems than the issue of total manning.

The ANSF also suffers from rapidly changing force goals, rapid turnover in advisors, overambitious efforts to force it to “do it our way,” a force-rush to meet the transition deadline of end-2014, and sudden peaks and cuts in funding.

The only meaningful recent reporting on the ANSF has been by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR). That reporting is too complex to summarize, but has identified many continuing weaknesses first identified in past public ISAF and DoD reporting. A key example of critical shortfalls in reliable reporting on actual manning makes this clear.

The Afghan police present critical problems in leadership, force quality, corruption, actual manning, and turnover.

Surveys do, however, indicate that the elements of the ANSF are winning far more support in most areas than the Taliban and other insurgents.

General Dunford on “Resolute Support” and on Post-2014 Mission

- **In anticipation of a signed BSA and NATO SOFA, ISAF continues to plan for the Resolute Support train, advise, assist mission.**
- **This mission will focus on the four capability gaps at the operational/institutional and strategic levels of the ANSF that will remain at the end of the ISAF mission: 1) Afghan security institution capacity, 2) the aviation enterprise, 3) the intelligence enterprise, and 4) special operations.**
- **In accordance with NATO guidance, ISAF is planning on a limited regional approach with 8,000 - 12,000 coalition personnel employed in Kabul and the four corners of Afghanistan.**
- **Advisors will address capability gaps at the Afghan security ministries, army corps, and police zones, before eventually transitioning to a Kabulcentric approach focused on the Afghan ministries and institutions.**
- **Due to delays in the completion of the BSA, and at the recent direction of NATO, we will begin planning for various contingencies in Afghanistan while still continuing to plan for Resolute Support.**

Layered Defense: A Concept that May Work with Adequate US and Allied support

- **Concentrate ANSF in layered elements to defend population and key lines of communication.**
- **ANA defends, deters, defeats active Taliban and insurgent forces; ANP plays paramilitary role, with ALP forward in key sensitive areas.**
- **Accept Taliban and insurgent presence and control in less populated parts of East and South,**
- **Continued Pakistani sanctuaries unless Pakistan fundamentally changes tactics.**
- **Support with US advisory presence down to at least level of each of six Afghan corps, key enablers, limited COIN element plus drone and air support.**
- **German and Italian presence in populated but less threatened areas in the North.**
- **Support with governance and economic aid.**


Afghanistan's Divisive Demographics

- **Total population: 31,822,848 (July 2014 est.)**
 - Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%
 - Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 19%, other 1%
- **Population 0-14 years: 42% (male 6,793,832/female 6,579,388); 15-24 years: 22.2% (male 3,600,264/female 3,464,781)**
- **Urban population: 23.5% of total population (2011)**
- **Rate of urbanization: 4.41% annual rate of change (2010-15 est.)**
- **Young men and women reaching employment age annually: 392,116 males (5% of labor force), 370,295 females (2010 est.) 30-40% unemployment in 2008**
- **Agriculture employs 79% of population for only 20% of GDP?**
- **Services employ 15.7% of population for 54.4% of GDP?**


“Layered Defense” – Where is the Population for the ANA, ANP, and ALP Must Protect?

AFGHANISTAN Central Statistics Organization (CSO) Estimated Population 2012-2013

The Population Estimation has been done on the basis of the data obtained from the 1381-1384 (2003-05) Household Listing (HHL).



“Layered Defense” – From “New Silk Road” to LOC Survival



Russian Military Scenario Analysis of Probability of Success or Failure

The Main Intelligence Directorate of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation



REPORT


made by Lieutenant General
Igor Sergun

SUBJECT:

**"Probable scenario of further developments in Afghanistan
after foreign military withdrawal"**



Major contingencies in Afghanistan after 2014




Preserving the status quo in limited foreign military presence

Seizure of power by the Taliban

Collapse of Afghanistan into national enclave

Preserving the status quo in limited foreign military presence




Preserving the status quo in limited foreign military presence



Seizure of power by the Taliban




Seizure of power by the Taliban



Seizure of power by the Taliban



Collapse of Afghanistan into national enclaves



Collapse of Afghanistan into national enclaves



ISAF withdrawal

To withdraw before 2015:




about 40000 of personnel;




over 40000 units of materiel incl. armored vehicles and transport;



over 300 helicopters



Main lines of communication (LOC) used by NATO to withdrawal ISAF




ISAF withdrawal

To withdraw before 2015:




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
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Main lines of communication (LOC) used by NATO to withdrawal ISAF




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Main lines of communication (LOC) used by NATO to withdrawal ISAF

