1616 Rhode Island avenue NW Washington, DC 20036

Anthony H. Cordesman Phone: 1.202.775.3270 Email: acordesman@gmail.com Web version:

www.csis.org/burke/reports



# Gulf Security, Stability, and Terrorism: Country Rankings

**Anthony H. Cordesman** 

acordesman@gmail.com



Burke Chair in Strategy

November 14, 2014

www.csis.org |



#### Introduction

There is no one way to measure the level of security and stability in given countries, the conditions of life, or the rising threat posed by internal; and domestic terrorism. This analysis provides a wide range of metrics from reporting by the World Bank, UN, and US government. It focuses on trends and it will be immediately clear to the reader that it does not always reflect the shattering impact of the violence and upheavals that have taken place in some countries since 2011.

The data do, however, serve as an indication of progress over time, key problems and issues in given countries, and the rising impact of the threat posed by sectarian and ethnic tension, religious violence, and terrorism. Some additional data are also provided on Syria and Iraq to illustrate the nature of instability as measured in terms of refugees and internally displaced persons – a critical byproduct of religious and sectarian civil wars.

The analysis deliberately does not compare countries for given metrics. A review of the data warns that it is far better to examine the full range of metrics for given countries that affect stability, security, and terrorism than compare a range of national metrics in a few given indices. It should also be stressed that no amount of quantified analysis is a substitute for a full analysis of the issues involved, although the failure to focus on numbers and metrics and substitute narrative judgments presents equal problems.

This analysis provides exceptional coverage of the metrics in the US State Department START data base on terrorism because of the growing threat extremism poses, but it should be noted that it does not attempt to measure the full impact of civil wars and insurgencies. It is equally important to note that the data bases provides as detailed chronology of key incidents that warns against over-simplistic definitions of terrorism and statements about its causes.

Finally, the reader that is not used to international statistics should be aware that many are rough estimates, not fully comparable, affected by national politics, and suffer from other problems – the most serious of which is an almost universal failure to provide parametric analysis and honest estimates of uncertainty. The reader will need to examine the validity of any given datum in depth before making detailed judgments and comparisons.



#### **The Metrics Used in Country Scoring**

This analysis compares a range of metrics for measuring the quality of governance, rule of law corruption, security, and violence in the Gulf and nearby states. It draws on three major sources:

### The World Bank estimate of World Governance Indicators (WGIs) for the period from 1996-2013

The WGI authors define governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. The WGI measure six broad definitions of governance capturing the key elements of this definition:

- 1. **Voice and Accountability**: the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.
- 2. **Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism**: the likelihood that the government will be destabilized by unconstitutional or violent means, including terrorism.
- 3. **Government Effectiveness**: the quality of public services, the capacity of the civil service and its independence from political pressures; and the quality of policy formulation.
- 4. **Regulatory Quality**: the ability of the government to provide sound policies and regulations that enable and promote private sector development.
- 5. **Rule of Law**: in and abide by the rules of society, including the quality of contract enforcement and property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.



6. **Control of Corruption**: the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

The full explanation and history of such measures can be found on the world Bank web site at <a href="http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc">http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc</a>.

#### The UN Human Development Index

The UN Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions.

The health dimension is assessed by life expectancy at birth component of the HDI is calculated using a minimum value of 20 years and maximum value of 85 years. The education component of the HDI is measured by mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. Mean years of schooling is estimated by UNESCO Institute for Statistics based on educational attainment data from censuses and surveys available in its database. Expected years of schooling estimates are based on enrolment by age at all levels of education. This indicator is produced by UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Expected years of schooling is capped at 18 years. The indicators are normalized using a minimum value of zero and maximum aspirational values of 15 and 18 years respectively. The two indices are combined into an education index using arithmetic mean.

The standard of living dimension is measured by gross national income per capita. The goalpost for minimum income is \$100 (PPP) and the maximum is \$75,000 (PPP). The minimum value for GNI per capita, set at \$100, is justified by the considerable amount of unmeasured subsistence and nonmarket production in economies close to the minimum that is not captured in the official data. The HDI uses the logarithm of income, to reflect the diminishing importance of income with increasing GNI. The scores for the three HDI dimension indices are then aggregated into a composite index using geometric mean. Refer to Technical notes for more details.



The HDI does not reflect on inequalities, poverty, human security, empowerment, etc.. The HDRO offers the other composite indices as broader proxy on some of the key issues of human development, inequality, gender disparity and human poverty.

- The IHDI takes into account not only the average achievements of a country on health, education and income, but also how those achievements are distributed among its population by "discounting" each dimension's average value according to its level of inequality. The IHDI is distribution-sensitive average level of HD. Two countries with different distributions of achievements can have the same average HDI value. Under perfect equality the IHDI is equal to the HDI, but falls below the HDI when inequality rises. The difference between the IHDI and HDI is the human development cost of inequality, also termed the loss to human development due to inequality. The IHDI allows a direct link to inequalities in dimensions, it can inform policies towards inequality reduction, and leads to better understanding of inequalities across population and their contribution to the overall human development cost. The Coefficient of human inequality, a new measure of inequality in HDI, is calculated as an average inequality across three dimensions.
- Gender inequality remains a major barrier to human development. Girls and women have made major strides since 1990, but they have not yet gained gender equity. The disadvantages facing women and girls are a major source of inequality. All too often, women and girls are discriminated against in health, education, political representation, labor market, etc. with negative repercussions for development of their capabilities and their freedom of choice. The GII measures gender inequalities in three important aspects of human development—reproductive health measured by maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rates; empowerment, measured by proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by females and proportion of adult females and males aged 25 years and older with at least some secondary education; and economic status expressed as labor market participation and measured by labor force participation rate of female and male populations aged 15 years and older.



• Like development, poverty is multidimensional — but this is traditionally ignored by headline money metric measures of poverty. The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), published for the first time in the 2010 Report, complements monetary measures of poverty by considering overlapping deprivations suffered by people at the same time. The index identifies deprivations across the same three dimensions as the HDI and shows the number of people who are multi-dimensionally poor (suffering deprivations in 33% of weighted indicators) and the number of deprivations with which poor households typically contend with. It can be deconstructed by region, ethnicity and other groupings as well as by dimension, making it an apt tool for policymakers.

A full description of the technical details of the Human Development Index can be found at <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi">http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi</a>

### The US State Department National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Data Base on Terrorism

This report provides the full range of metrics for each country developed by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). It provide the first set of official comparative metrics on extremism and terrorism and highlights the rising threat in the region.

The statistical annex to the US State Department Country Reports on Terrorism for 2013 responds to the fact that Title 22, Section 2656f of the United States Code requires the Department of State to include in its annual report on terrorism "to the extent practicable, complete statistical information on the number of individuals, including United States citizens and dual nationals, killed, injured, or kidnapped by each terrorist group during the preceding calendar year."



The definition found in Title 22 of the US Code provides that terrorism is "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents." From 2004 to 2011, the data for the Annex of Statistical Information were collected by the National Counterterrorism Center, part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, through the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS).

Beginning in June 2012, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) contracted with the US Department of State to collect a Statistical Annex dataset and provide a report to include in the State Department's annual Country Reports on Terrorism. Since 2001, START has maintained the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), an unclassified event database compiled from information in open-source reports of terrorist attacks. The first version of the GTD was released in 2006 and included information on worldwide terrorism from 1970 to 1997. START routinely updates and improves the accuracy of the data. The full GTD (1970-2012) and accompanying documentation are available to the public at <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd">www.start.umd.edu/gtd</a>. The GTD staff compiled the Statistical Annex dataset to include violent acts carried out by non-state actors that meet all of the GTD inclusion criteria: [1]

The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal;

The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims; and

The violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law insofar as it targeted noncombatants.

These data represent START's best efforts to report the most comprehensive, valid information on terrorism, based on the availability of open-source data and resources. The GTD research staff continually evaluates and enhances the methodology to promote comprehensive, accurate, and systematic data collection. In particular, in 2012 START developed data collection tools that expand the number of sources available for analysis and automate the selection of potentially relevant articles from which GTD staff identify unique attacks and record their specific details.



Due to the evolution in data collection methodology with respect to both WITS and prior versions of the GTD it is important to note that the data presented here are not directly comparable with data from either of these sources prior to 2012. In general, comparisons of aggregate statistics over time and between locations should be interpreted with caution due to considerable variation in the availability of source materials.

This Annex of Statistical Information is a guide to worldwide terrorist activity as reported by unclassified sources. We hope that these data will be useful for improving knowledge about patterns and characteristics of terrorism, and helpful for maintaining global awareness of the threat it poses.

The Annex of Statistical Information is provided for statistical purposes only. The statistical information contained in the Annex is based on reports from a variety of open sources that may be of varying credibility. Nothing in this report should be construed as a determination that individuals associated with the underlying incidents are guilty of terrorism or any other criminal offense. As with all records in the Global Terrorism Database, the information may be modified, as necessary and appropriate, if new information becomes available.

Any assessments and descriptions, including those regarding the nature of the incidents or the factual circumstances thereof, are offered only as part of the analytic work product of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and may not reflect the views of the United States Government.

#### The US Census Bureau International Data Base

There are major uncertainties in all population estimates, but the US Census Bureau estimate tracks closely with UN estimates and provides a good metric on population pressure and the size of the "youth bulge" affecting education, employment, services, and infrastructure over time.



The U.S. Census Bureau states that it provides both short- and long-term technical assistance on a wide variety of topics related to censuses, surveys, and information systems. Over the past six decades, the U.S. Census Bureau has worked in over 100 countries, and as such is uniquely endowed with experience in every major region of the world. More than 10,000 individuals from developing countries have participated in its training programs.

A full description of its International data base can be found at <a href="http://www.census.gov/population/international/">http://www.census.gov/population/international/</a>.



### The GCC States




## **Bahrain**

#### **Bahrain: Key Trends**

- Low level of transparency and declining "voice and accountability."
- Serious and growing problems with political stability and violence driven by Sunni vs. Shi'ite tensions.
- Moderate to good governance.
- Moderate rule of law and control of corruption.
- Good overall ranking in UN human development indicators, but not data on adjustment for inequality.
- The START data base shows sharply rising patterns of terrorism and violence, with Iran playing some role.
- Serious demographic pressure increased by reliance on foreign labor at expense of lower income natives and Shi'ites.
- CIA estimates significant ethnic differences: Bahraini 46%, Asian 45.5%, other Arabs 4.7%, African 1.6%, European 1%, other 1.2% (includes Gulf Co-operative country nationals, North and South Americans, and Oceanians) (2010 est.)
- Similar religious differences but no Sunni vs. Shi'ite estimate or figure for size of Shi'ite majority.
- CIA estimates labor force at 716,500, and 44% of the population in the 15-64 age group is non-national (2013 est.).

# Bahrain: World Bank Governance and Security Indicators: 1996-2013




The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2010), The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues
The Worldwide Governance Indicators are available at: <a href="https://www.govindicators.org">www.govindicators.org</a>


#### **Bahrain: UN Human Development Indicators: 2014**



#### **Bahrain – terrorist incidents**




#### **Bahrain - perpetrators**




- Al Ashtar Brigades
- February 14th Movement
- Hizballah
  - Islamic Front for the ...
- Organization of the So...
- Popular Resistance Bri...
- Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain
- Organization of the Sons of Occupied Territories
- Popular Resistance Brigades

### Bahrain – attack type






### Bahrain – target type




Business Government (General) Police Military Abortion Related Airports and Aircraft Government (Diplomatic) **Educational Institution** Food or Water Supply Journalists, Media Maritime NGO Other Private Citizens, Pro... Religious Figures/Inst... Telecommunication Terrorists/Non-state M... Tourists Transportation Unknown Utilities **Violent Political Party** 


#### Bahrain – weapon type







#### **Bahrain - casualties**







#### **Bahrain - fatalities**






### **Bahrain - injuries**





#### **Bahrain: Demographic Pressure**

Bahrain midyear population (thousands)




1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

Demographic Indicators	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Population	-	77		-	_	_	-	_	_	-		-		7	-	_			_	_	
Midyear population (in thousands)	115	130	157	191	220	259	348	423	506	582	655	916	1,180	1,347	1,505	1,580	1,639	1,700	1,758	1,806	1,847
Growth rate (percent)	(NA)	3.8	3.3	2.5	2.2	7.4	3.0	2.4	2.0	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.4						
Fertility	-	-	-	-		_	-		-	_	_						_		-	-	-
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	(NA)	4.1	3.5	3.1	2.8	2.2	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.7						
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	29	26	24	22	17	15	14	13	12	12	12	12	11	11						
Births (in thousands)	(NA)	12	13	14	14	16	18	18	19	19	19	20	20	20	20						
Mortality	-	-	-			-			-	_	-						_			-	_
Life expectancy at birth (years)	(NA)	69	71	73	75	76	78	79	79	80	81	81	82	82	82						
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	32	25	20	16	13	11	9	8	7	7	6	5	5	5						
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	39	30	24	19	16	13	11	10	9	8	7	6	6	5						
Crude death rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	5	5						
Deaths (in thousands)	(NA)	2	2	2	2	3	3	4	4	5	5	6	7	8	10						
Migration	-	-		-			-		_	_	_				-		_		-	-	-
Net migration rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	13	11	4	3	60	17	13	11	-1	-2	-1	-1	-2	-1						
Net number of migrants (in thousands)	(NA)	5	5	2	2	55	21	18	16	-2	-3	-2	-2	-3	-3						

Source: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php

#### **Bahrain: Youth-Employment Pressure**



0															
0	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050	
<del></del> 0-24	224891	256194	280183	297363	370947	433296	475596	505853	511267	516130	521813	521193	520561	523873	
15-24	84149	92553	100920	108706	155463	188889	213255	228127	225008	225029	230539	225957	220301	221792	

**—**0-24 **—**15-24

Source: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php




## **Kuwait**

#### **Kuwait: Key Trends**


- Poor and declining "voice and accountability."
- Moderate problems with political stability and violence driven by Sunni vs. Shi'ite tensions.
- Moderate to good governance.
- Moderate rule of law, but declining control of corruption.
- Good overall ranking in UN human development indicators, but no progress since 2000, applies only to citizens.
- The START data base shows some issues with terrorism, but no major threat. Are Sunni Islamist movements and has been funding of outside extremist groups.
- Limited demographic pressure increased by reliance on foreign labor at expense of lower income natives and Shi'ites.
- CIA estimates significant ethnic differences: Kuwaiti 31.3%, other Arab 27.9%, Asian 37.8%, African 1.9%, other 1.1% (includes European, North American, South American, and Australian) (2013 est.)
- Religious differences, and some signs of Iranian support for Shi'ite factionalism, but no Sunni vs. Shi'ite estimate or figure for size of Shi'ite majority.
- CIA estimates labor force at 2.38, and non-Kuwaitis represent about 60% of the labor force (2013 est.)

#### **Kuwait: World Bank Governance and Security Indicators:**




The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.


#### **Kuwait: UN Human Development Indicators: 2014**



#### **Kuwait – terrorist incidents**




#### **Kuwait - perpetrators**




- Arab Communist Organiz...
- Arab Revolution/Libera...
- Black September
- Hizballah
- Islamic Holy Star
- Popular Front for the ...
  - Supreme Council for Is...
- United Arab Revolution
- Arab Communist Organization
- Arab
   Revolution/Liberation
   Vanguard Organization
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
- Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)


#### Kuwait – attack type



### Kuwait – target type





#### Kuwait – weapon type




Biological
Chemical
Radiological
Nuclear
Firearms
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
Fake Weapons
Incendiary
Melee
Vehicle (not to includ...
Sabotage Equipment
Other


#### **Kuwait - casualties**






#### **Kuwait - fatalities**






### **Kuwait - injuries**





#### Kuwait demographic pressure




Demographic Indicators	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Population	_		_	_																	
Midyear population (in thousands)	145	187	292	476	748	1,007	1,370	1,733	2,131	1,664	1,972	2,257	2,543	2,789	2,994	3,169	3,331	3,482	3,623	3,751	3,863
Growth rate (percent)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	4.4	-54.5	5.4	2.8	2.7	2.1	1.6	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5
Fertility		-								_					_	-				-	
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	4.4	2.5	3.1	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.9
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	32	19	25	21	23	22	20	18	17	17	16	16	15	14
Births (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	55	40	41	42	51	- 55	56	54	55	56	57	56	55	54
Mortality							100														
Life expectancy at birth (years)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	72	74	73	74	76	77	78	79	79	80	81	81	82	82
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	19	14	12	11	10	8	7	7	6	5	5	5	4	- 4
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	23	17	15	14	12	10	9	8	7	6	6	5	5	5
Crude death rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	4	4
Deaths (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	- 5	5	4	4	5	5	6	7	8	9	10	12	14	16
Migration	200000	110000	and all transfer		- I		acricus; G														
Net migration rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	15	-561	32	9	6	- 1	-2	-3	-4	-5	-5	-5	-5	-6
Net number of migrants (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	26	-1,196	53	18	15	4	-4	-10	-14	-16	-17	-17	-18	-18

Source: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php

#### Kuwait youth-employment

#### **Kuwait Youth Population**



0														
O	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
<del></del> 0-24	942173	1080250	794784	891243	966843	1060892	1130268	1175286	1202358	1220943	1225000	1230325	1238024	1242757
15-24	296605	354727	247692	321496	371046	400153	424209	447996	479848	500133	495909	488750	492437	503420


**—**0-24 **—**15-24

## **Oman**

## **Oman: Key Trends**


- Very low level of transparency and declining "voice and accountability."
- Growing problems with political stability and violence that government tries to downplay and conceal.
- Moderate to good governance, rule of law and control of corruption.
- Good overall ranking in UN human development indicators, but no data on adjustment for inequality. Education a problem.
- Rising patterns of terrorism and violence, but Oman is only regional country for which no START data are available.
- Serious demographic pressure increased by reliance on foreign labor.
   Immigrants make up 30% of population.
- CIA does not estimate ethic differences. Identifies key groups as Arab,
   Baluchi, South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi), African.
- Religious differences but unclear is source of tension and violence.
  Muslim (official; majority are Ibadhi, lesser numbers of Sunni and Shia))
  85.9%, Christian 6.5%, Hindu 5.5%, Buddhist 0.8%, Jewish <.1, other 1%,
  unaffiliated 0.2% Approximately 75% of Omani citizens, who compose
  almost 70% of the country's total population, are Ibadhi Muslims; the
  Omani government does not keep statistics on religious affiliation (2013)
  (2010 est.)</li>
- CIA estimates labor force at 968,800, and about 60% of the labor force is non-national (2007)

#### Oman: World Bank Governance and Security Indicators: 1996-



The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

#### **Oman: UN Human Development Indicators: 2014**





#### **Oman: Terrorism**

# NO DATA IN START DATA BASE – COUNTRY REPORT HAS LITTLE CONTENT

**Overview:** Oman is an important regional counterterrorism partner and worked actively to prevent terrorists from conducting attacks within Oman and using the country for safe haven or to transport terrorists, weapons, and materiel. The Omani government actively sought training and equipment from U.S. government and commercial entities as well as from other countries to support its efforts to control its land and maritime borders. At the request of the Government of Bahrain, Omani authorities arrested three members of the alleged terrorist group "Army of the Imam" in February, according to regional press reports. Oman used U.S. security assistance to improve counterterrorism tactics, techniques, and procedures. Omani officials engaged regularly with U.S. officials on the need to counter violent extremism and terrorism.

...Although there was strong U.S.-Omani cooperation, there was little interagency coordination among the many Omani agencies with jurisdiction over counterterrorism. Roles and responsibilities between law enforcement and the armed forces were not clearly delineated.

The Government of Oman recognizes the need to improve its capabilities and participated in the State Department's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program in 2013. FY 2012 was to be the final year of funding for the ATA program in Oman, but as a result of the growing security challenges in the Arabian Peninsula, the program was extended. Priorities for the ATA program in Oman are to build border security capacity and enhance investigative capacity. U.S. Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) training included land border training for Omani security forces responsible for securing Oman's border with Yemen.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Oman is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. A 2010 Royal Decree, number 79/2010, is the country's main legislation on Anti-Money Laundering/ Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT). The Royal Oman Police Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), a member of the Egmont Group, is responsible for enforcing AML/CFT laws and regulations. Oman has increased the funding for its FIU. However, the country lacks any statistics on the number and nature of its suspicious transaction reports and has not had any apparent investigations or prosecutions for money laundering or terrorist financing.



#### Oman demographic pressures

Oman midyear population (thousands)



 $1950 \ 1955 \ 1960 \ 1965 \ 1970 \ 1975 \ 1980 \ 1985 \ 1990 \ 1995 \ 2000 \ 2005 \ 2010 \ 2015 \ 2020 \ 2025 \ 2030 \ 2035 \ 2040 \ 2045 \ 2050$ 

Demograpino e terrien e autom																					
Demographic Indicators	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Population																					
Midyear population (in thousands)	489	540	601	682	783	920	1,185	1,497	1,794	2,139	2,432	2,697	2,968	3,287	3,635	3,981	4,305	4,601	4,879	5,147	5,402
Growth rate (percent)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	2.9	2.3	1.9	2.0	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.0	0.9						
Fertility																					
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	5.4	4.0	3.0	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.1	2.0	2.0						
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	31	26	23	24	24	23	21	18	17	16	15	15						
Births (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	67	64	62	71	80	84	82	79	76	76	78	79						
Mortality																					
Life expectancy at birth (years)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	70	71	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	81						
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	25	22	19	16	14	12	10	9	8	7	7	6						
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	34	29	25	21	17	15	13	11	10	9	8	7						
Crude death rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	5						
Deaths (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	9	9	10	10	11	12	13	14	16	18	21	25						
Migration																					
Net migration rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	2	0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1						
Net number of migrants (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	4	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-2	-2	-3	-4	-4	-4						


Source: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php



15-24

#### Oman youth-employment pressures

#### Oman Youth Population






## **Qatar**

## **Qatar: Key Trends**

- Very low level of transparency and declining "voice and accountability."
- High level of political stability and violence.
- Good governance, rule of law and control of corruption. Some limits to regulatory quality.
- Good overall ranking in UN human development indicators, but no data on adjustment for inequality. No progress since 2007 in spite of massive wealth.
- The START data base shows low patterns of terrorism and violence.
   One of few countries with no post-2010 rise in START data base.
- Limited demographic pressure which could be quickly eased by reducing reliance on foreign labor. Immigrants make up 30% of population.
- Ethnic differences minimal among citizens. CIA estimate population as Arab 40%, Indian 18%, Pakistani 18%, Iranian 10%, other 14%.
- Religious differences but unclear are source of tension and violence.
   Muslim 77.5%, Christian 8.5%, other (includes mainly Hindu and other Indian religions) 14% (2004 est.).
- CIA estimates labor force at 1.424 million (2013 est.). No estimate of portion of labor force that is non-national.

#### **Qatar: World Bank Governance and Security Indicators:**



The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

#### **Qatar: UN Human Development Indicators: 2014**




Source: UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/QAT

+ Health

+ Education


+ Inequality

#### **Qatar – terrorist incidents**



Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd

## **Qatar - perpetrators**




Organization of Soldie...The Organization for t...


- Organization of Soldiers of the Levant
- The Organization for the Return of Legality

Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd


### Qatar- attack type




### **Qatar**— target type




## Qatar- weapon type




#### **Qatar - casualties**






Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/qtd


#### **Qatar - fatalities**






Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/qtd

## **Qatar - injuries**



#### Qatar demographic pressure

Qatar midyear population (thousands)



1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

Demographic Overview - Custom Region - Qatar

Demographic Indicators	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Population																					
Midyear population (in thousands)	25	35	45	70	113	165	229	342	433	510	640	973	1,719	2,195	2,444	2,563	2,596	2,574	2,550	2,548	2,559
Growth rate (percent)	(NA)	3.6	3.0	4.9	15.1	8.8	3.1	1.4	0.5	0.0	-0.3	-0.1	0.0	0.1							
Fertility																					
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	(NA)	4.4	3.6	2.9	2.3	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8							
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	25	20	18	14	11	10	9	9	9	9	9	9	9							
Births (in thousands)	(NA)	11	10	11	13	18	22	23	23	23	23	23	23	23							
Mortality																					
Life expectancy at birth (years)	(NA)	73	75	76	77	78	79	79	80	81	81	82	82	83							
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	16	11	9	8	7	6	6	5	5	4	4	4	4							
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	22	16	13	11	9	8	7	7	6	5	5	5	4							
Crude death rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2							
Deaths (in thousands)	(NA)	1	1	1	2	3	3	4	4	5	5	6	6	6							
Migration																					
Net migration rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	14	12	33	139	79	22	6	-2	-7	-10	-8	-6	-5							
Net number of migrants (in thousands)	(NA)	6	6	21	135	135	49	16	58	-18	-26	-20	-16	-13							

Source: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php

#### Qatar youth-employment pressure





**—**0-24 **—**15-24




## Saudi Arabia

## Saudi Arabia: Key Trends


- Extremely low level of transparency and "voice and accountability" with no positive trends.
- Serious problems in political stability and violence rating, driven largely by terrorism with some Sunni vs. Shi'ite tension and pressure from Yemen.
- Moderate governance, rule of law and control of corruption with no recent positive trends.
- Best regional ranking in positive improvements in UN human development indicators, but no data on adjustment for inequality. Education very good
- The START data base shows growing patterns of terrorism and violence since 2010, and clear reasons for Saudi crackdown on extremism, but not approaching levels in 2003-2005.
- Serious demographic pressure which has not been eased by past attempts to reduce reliance on foreign labor. Immigrants make up 30% of population.
- Ethnic differences minimal among citizens. CIA estimate population as 90%, 10% Afro-Indian.
- Religious differences with some indications Iran is seeking to exploit Sunni-Shi'ite tensions. CIA estimates that Muslim (official; citizens are 85-90% Sunni and 10-15% Shia), other (includes Eastern Orthodox, Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, and Sikh) (2012 est.).
- CIA estimates labor force at 8.412 million (2013 est.). About 80% of the labor force is non-national (2013 est.). Immigrants make up more than 30% of the total population, according to UN data (2013) (July 2014 est.)

#### Saudi Arabia: World Bank Governance and Security Indicators:




The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

#### Saudi Arabia: UN Human Development Indicators: 2014






#### Saudi Arabia – terrorist incidents



Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd


## Saudi Arabia - perpetrators




- Al-Haramayn Brigades
  Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia
  Al-Qa`ida in the Arabi...
  Generation of Arab Fury
  Hizballah
  Huthis
  Jaish al-Mukhtar
  Union of the Peoples o...
- Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
- Union of the Peoples of the Arabian Peninsula

Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd


## Saudi Arabia- attack type




## Saudi Arabia – target type



## Saudi Arabia- weapon type




#### Saudi Arabia - casualties






Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd

#### Saudi Arabia - fatalities




## Saudi Arabia - injuries



#### Saudi Arabia demographic pressure

Saud Arabia midyear population (thousands)




Demographic Overview - Custom	_																				
Demographic Indicators	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Population																					
Midyear population (in thousands)	3,860	4,243	4,718	5,327	6,109	7,208	10,022	13,330	16,061	18,755	21,312	23,642	25,732	27,752	29,819	31,877	33,825	35,614	37,250	38,781	40,251
Growth rate (percent)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	2.9	2.3	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.7						
Fertility	-																				
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	5.0	3.9	2.9	2.4	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0						
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	30	26	22	19	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	13						
Births (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	568	559	514	500	514	530	537	529	516	511	515	524						
Mortality																					-
Life expectancy at birth (years)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	80	81						
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	25	22	20	17	14	12	10	9	8	7	6	6						
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	30	26	23	19	16	14	12	10	9	8	7	6						
Crude death rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	4	4	4	3	3	3	4	4	4	5	5	6						
Deaths (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	77	79	83	86	92	102	114	131	152	177	207	241						
Migration																					
Net migration rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	3	0	0	-1	-1	-0	-1	-1	-1	-1	-0	C						
Net number of migrants (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	54	7	2	-16	-15	-11	-20	-24	-24	-19	-9	F						

Source: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php

#### Saudi Arabia youth-employment pressure





**—**0-24 **—**15-24




# UAE

# **UAE: Key Trends**


- Low level of transparency and "voice and accountability" with no positive trends.
- World Bank estimates limited problems with political stability and violence, with no rising trend.
- Moderate to good governance and rule of law ranking, and very good control of corruption.
- Good ranking in in UN human development indicators, but no data on adjustment for inequality. Education very good
- The START data base shows sporadic incidents of terrorism and violence with limited rise in recent years.
- Ethnic differences minimal among citizens. CIA estimates is very dated: Emirati 19%, other Arab and Iranian 23%, South Asian 50%, other expatriates (includes Westerners and East Asians) 8% (1982) Less than 20% are UAE citizens (1982)
- No clear religious tensions, but significant Iranian population. Muslim (Islam; official) 76%, Christian 9%, other (primarily Hindu and Buddhist, less than 5% of the population consists of Parsi, Baha'i, Druze, Sikh, Ahmadi, Ismaili, Dawoodi Bohra Muslim, and Jewish) 15%. About 85% of the population consists of noncitizens (2005 est.)
- CIA estimates labor force at 4.885 million (2013 est.). About 85% of the labor force is non-national (2013 est.).

#### **UAE: World Bank Governance and Security Indicators: 1996-2013**




The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

#### **UAE: UN Human Development Indicators: 2014**




Source: UNDP, <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ARE">http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/ARE</a>


## **UAE – terrorist incidents**




# **UAE - perpetrators**




## **UAE**– attack type







# **UAE**– target type




# **UAE**– weapon type




#### **UAE - casualties**




### **UAE - fatalities**






# **UAE** - injuries



#### UAE demographic pressure

UAE midyear population (thousands)




Demographic Overview - Custom Region - United Arab Emirates
---

Demographic Indicators	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Population																					
Midyear population (in thousands)	72	83	103	144	249	523	1,000	1,363	1,826	2,458	3,219	4,087	4,976	5,780	6,495	7,063	7,484	7,773	7,948	8,024	8,019
Growth rate (percent)	(NA)	(NA)	5.8	5.6	5.2	4.4	3.6	2.6	2.1	1.3	1.0	0.6	0.3	0.1	-0.1						
Fertility																					-
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	(NA)	(NA)	4.7	3.1	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.8						
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	29	20	17	16	16	15	15	14	14	13	13	13	12						
Births (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	52	49	54	66	80	89	96	99	102	103	102	101	99						
Mortality																					-
Life expectancy at birth (years)	(NA)	(NA)	71	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	80	81	81	82						
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	24	20	17	14	12	11	9	8	7	6	6	5	5						
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	29	24	20	17	14	12	11	9	8	7	7	6	€						
Crude death rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2						
Deaths (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	6	6	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	14	15	16	17						
Migration																					
Net migration rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	33	39	37	30	22	12	9	1	-2	-6	-8	-10	-11						
Net number of migrants (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	60	97	120	123	108	71	55	.8	G <sup>-13</sup>	-45	-60	-80	-89						

Source: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php

#### **UAE** youth-employment pressure

#### **UAE Youth Population**






# Iran, Iraq, and Yemen

# Iran

# Iran: Key Trends


- Very low level of transparency and "voice and accountability" with no positive trends.
- Serious and growing problems with political stability and violence.
- Low governance and rule of law ranking, and poor control of corruption.
- Rising ranking in in UN human development indicators to good level, but inequality is a problem. Education very good
- The START data base shows terrorism and violence are lower than during period after revolution and 1990-1995, but still suffers from attacks, particularly Baluchis in East. .
- Ethnic differences lead to some tension and violence. CIA estimates population as Persian 61%, Azeri 16%, Kurd 10%, Lur 6%, Bloch 2%, Arab 2%, Turkmen and Turkic tribes 2%, other 1%
- No clear religious tensions. Muslim (official) 99.4% (Shia 90-95%, Sunni 5-10%), other (includes Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian) 0.3%, unspecified 0.4% (2011 est.)
- CIA estimates labor force at 27.72 million (2013 est.). High direct unemployment at 16%.

#### Iran: World Bank Governance and Security Indicators: 1996-




The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

#### Iran: UN Human Development Indicators: 2014






### Iran – terrorist incidents




# Iran - perpetrators




- Armenian Secret Army f...
- Forqan Group
  Jundallah
  - Kurdistan Free Life Party
- Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)
  - al-Ahwaz Arab Peoples...
- Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
- Al-Ahwaz Arab People's Democratic Front

# Iran- attack type




## Iran – target type







## Iran – weapon type



### Iran - casualties




#### Iran - fatalities






# Iran - injuries



#### Iran demographic pressure

Iran - Total Midyear Populations (thousands)




1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

Demographic Overview - Custom																					
Demographic Indicators	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Population																					
Midyear population (in thousands)	16,357	18,739	21,600	25,040	28,994	33,467	39,709	48,619	58,100	64,217	68,632	72,283	76,923	81,824	86,543	90,481	93,458	95,772	97,685	99,181	100,045
Growth rate (percent)	(NA)	4.5	1.4	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.1							
Fertility																					
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	(NA)	5.6	3.4	2.3	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7							
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	38	25	19	19	19	18	16	14	12	11	11	11	11							
Births (in thousands)	(NA)	2,230	1,592	1,331	1,339	1,425	1,472	1,399	1,238	1,120	1,098	1,116	1,116	1,069							
Mortality																					
Life expectancy at birth (years)	(NA)	62	65	66	68	70	71	72	74	75	76	77	78	78							
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	78	64	59	50	43	38	34	30	26	23	19	17	15							
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	123	100	90	74	63	54	47	41	36	30	26	22	19							
Crude death rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	9	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	8	9	10							
Deaths (in thousands)	(NA)	551	447	422	429	457	486	515	551	605	679	770	871	976							
Migration																					
Net migration rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	16	-4	-1	0	-0	-0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0							
Net number of migrants (in thousands)	(NA)	952	-240	-91	2	-3	-6	10	010	0	0	0	0	0							

Source: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php

#### Iran youth-employment pressure

#### Iran Youth Population






# Iraq

# Iraq: Key Trends


- World Bank ranks Iraq so low that it is a failed state in transparency and "voice and accountability," political stability and violence, governance, rule of law ranking, and poor control of corruption.
- Some progress in UN human development indicators, but overall ranking remains very low by regional standards.
- Economic data do not reflect impact of rising civil conflict after 2011, current war with Islamic State.
- Serious demographic problems with increasing water problems. No foreseeable economic solution.
- The START data base shows a massive rise in terrorism and violence during civil war triggered by Maliki, and has since risen sharply because of Islamic State.
- Ethnic differences lead to serious tension between Arab and Kurd and violence in dealing with minorities. CIA estimates population as Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian, or other 5%.
- Major religious tensions and serious Shi'ite-Sunni violence. Muslim (official) 99% (Shia 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian 0.8%, Hindu <.1, Buddhist <.1, Jewish <.1, folk religion <.1, unaffiliated .1, other</li>
   <.1</li>
- CIA estimates direct unemployment at 16% in 2012. Poverty level at 25% in 2008.


#### Iraq: World Bank Governance and Security Indicators: 1996-



The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.


#### Iraq: UN Human Development Indicators: 2014






Source: UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/IRQ


# **Iraq – terrorist incidents**



# Iraq - perpetrators




# Iraq - Perpetrators (Islamic State of Iraq)




This chart only shows attacks carried out by the Islamic State of Iraq. It does not include attacks by the group after it renamed itself the Islamic State.

Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd


## Iraq- attack type




### Iraq-target type




### Iraq – weapon type



# Iraq - casualties




# Iraq - fatalities





# Iraq: Rise in Civil War Casualties



Economist.com/graphicdetail

The number of civilians killed in July was 1,186 (including 106 civilian police), while the number of civilians injured was 1,511 (including 177 civilian police). A further 551 members of the Iraqi Security Forces, including Peshmerga and SWAT, were killed and 467 were injured (not including casualties from Anbar operation)...According to information obtained by UNAMI from the Health Directorate in Anbar, the total civilian casualties in Anbar up to 31 July inclusive were 198 killed and 611 injured, with 71 killed and 179 injured in Ramadi and 127 killed and 432 injured in Fallujah.

Source: VOX, <a href="http://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-crisis-irag">http://www.vox.com/a/maps-explain-crisis-irag</a>; www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com\_k2&view=item&id=2300:un-casualty-figures-for-july-2014-anbar-province-excluded&Itemid=633&lang=en

Injured

#### Iraq demographic pressure

Iraq midyear population (thousands)




1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

Demographic Indicators	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
opulation																					
Midyear population (in thousands)	5,163	5,903	6,822	7,971	9,414	11,118	13,233	15,694	18,140	19,564	22,679	26,076	29,672	33,310	36,889	40,387	43,831	47,207	50,459	53,516	56,316
Growth rate (percent)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	-2.7	3.1	2.9	2.7	2.4	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.1	0.9
ertility																					
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	6.1	5.5	4.9	4.3	3.8	3.3	3.0	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.1
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	38	37	35	32	29	26	23	21	20	19	17	16	15
Births (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	697	716	794	847	873	872	862	862	872	879	880	872	861
Mortality																					
Life expectancy at birth (years)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	67	67	67	69	70	72	73	74	75	77	77	78	79
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	67	63	63	51	43	36	30	25	21	18	15	13	11
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	83	79	79	64	53	44	37	31	25	21	18	15	13
Crude death rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	7	6	6	6	5	5	4	4	4	5	5	5	6
Deaths (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	127	127	146	143	146	150	157	170	190	215	247	285	329
Migration																					
Net migration rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	-59	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Net number of migrants (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	-1,067	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php



# Iraq: Humanitarian Snapshot as of 11.10.14



#### Iraq demographic pressure

Iraq midyear population (thousands)




1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

Demographic Indicators	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
opulation																					
Midyear population (in thousands)	5,163	5,903	6,822	7,971	9,414	11,118	13,233	15,694	18,140	19,564	22,679	26,076	29,672	33,310	36,889	40,387	43,831	47,207	50,459	53,516	56,316
Growth rate (percent)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	-2.7	3.1	2.9	2.7	2.4	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.1	0.9
Fertility																					-
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	6.1	5.5	4.9	4.3	3.8	3.3	3.0	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.1
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	38	37	35	32	29	26	23	21	20	19	17	16	15
Births (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	697	716	794	847	873	872	862	862	872	879	880	872	861
Mortality																					-
Life expectancy at birth (years)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	67	67	67	69	70	72	73	74	75	77	77	78	79
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	67	63	63	51	43	36	30	25	21	18	15	13	11
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	83	79	79	64	53	44	37	31	25	21	18	15	13
Crude death rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	7	6	6	6	5	5	4	4	4	5	5	5	6
Deaths (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	127	127	146	143	146	150	157	170	190	215	247	285	329
Migration																					-
Net migration rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	-59	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Net number of migrants (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	-1,067	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php

#### Iraq youth-employment pressure





0													
O	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
<b></b> 0-24	12157784	13008929	14517270	16025114	17391462	18582195	19673326	20363335	20757377	20978016	21137411	21282810	21387986
15-24	3800877	4236232	4955982	5612483	5991451	6502444	7257939	7849603	8188431	8294506	8304308	8360094	8479041

0-24 \_\_\_\_15-24




# Yemen

# **Yemen: Key Trends**


- World Bank ranks Yemen so low that it is a failed state in transparency and "voice and accountability," political stability and violence, governance, rule of law ranking, and poor control of corruption.
- Some progress in UN human development indicators, but overall ranking remains very low by regional standards, and does not reflect impact of sharply worsening civil conflicts in 2014. Education and life expectancy data very poor.
- The START data base shows a massive rise in terrorism and violence during Yemen's civil war. This violence has grown far worse since 2011. Iran has played some role in Sunni-Shi'ite tensions, but Sunni on Sunni violence is greater.
- Massive demographic problems with increasing water problems. No foreseeable economic solution.
- Ethnic differences minor, but serious tribal differences.
- Major religious tensions and serious Shi'ite-Sunni violence. CIA estimates Muslim 99.1% (official; virtually all are citizens, an estimated 65% are Sunni and 35% are Shia), other 0.9% (includes Jewish, Baha'i, Hindu, and Christian; many are refugees or temporary foreign residents) (2010 est.).
- CIA estimates direct unemployment at 35% in 2005. Poverty level at 45.2% in 2003.


#### Yemen: World Bank Governance and Security Indicators: 1996-2013




The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

#### **Yemen: UN Human Development Indicators: 2014**






#### Yemen – terrorist incidents



Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd

# Yemen - perpetrators




Al-Qa`ida in the Arabi...
 Al-Qa'ida in Yemen
 Huthis
 Southern Mobility Move...


- Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
- Southern Mobility Movement

Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd


# Yemen- attack type




## Yemen- target type



## Yemen- weapon type




#### Yemen - casualties






Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd

#### **Yemen - fatalities**




# Yemen - injuries



### Yemen demographic pressure

Yemen midyear population (thousands)




1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

Demographic Indicators	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Population																					
Midyear population (in thousands)	4,777	5,265	5,872	6,510	7,098	7,934	9,133	10,540	12,416	14,832	17,236	20,003	23,210	26,737	29,884	32,822	35,660	38,437	41,142	43,709	46,081
Growth rate (percent)	(NA)	(NA)	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.5	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.0							
Fertility																					
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	(NA)	(NA)	7.3	6.6	5.8	4.8	3.9	3.2	2.7	2.4	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.0							
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	43	42	39	35	30	26	23	21	20	18	17	16							
Births (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	644	715	786	810	802	771	751	746	750	749	736	722							
Mortality																					
Life expectancy at birth (years)	(NA)	(NA)	58	60	61	63	65	67	69	70	72	73	74	75							
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	80	75	65	57	49	42	36	30	26	22	19	16							
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	113	102	88	76	64	54	46	38	32	27	23	19							
Crude death rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	11	10	8	7	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	(							
Deaths (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	170	171	170	168	168	169	173	183	197	214	236	264							
Migration																					
Net migration rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	-2	-2	-0	1	1	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-(							
Net number of migrants (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	-26	-30	-10	23	27	-6	-6	-6	-6	-6	-6	-F							

Source: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php

#### Yemen youth-employment pressure

#### Yemen Youth Population



**—**0-24 **—**15-24



# **Key Nearby States**




# **Egypt**

# **Egypt: Key Trends**


- World Bank ranks Egypt very in transparency and "voice and accountability," political stability and violence, governance, rule of law ranking, and poor control of corruption. Ratings declined steadily through 2013.
- Some progress in UN human development indicators, but overall ranking remains low by regional standards, and does not reflect impact of sharply worsening civil conflicts. Per capita income very low, inequality high.
- The START data base shows a massive rise in terrorism and violence since 2011, exceeding levels during early to mid-1990s. Clear grew worse in 2014.
- Serious demographic problems and "youth bulge" problems.
- Ethnic differences minor.
- Major religious tensions. CIA estimates population is Muslim (predominantly Sunni) 90%, Christian (majority Coptic Orthodox, other Christians include Armenian Apostolic, Catholic, Maronite, Orthodox, and Anglican) 10% (2012 est.)
- CIA estimates direct unemployment at 13.5% in 2013. Poverty level at 22% in 2008.


#### **Egypt: World Bank Governance and Security Indicators:**




The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

#### **Egypt: UN Human Development Indicators: 2014**






# **Egypt – terrorist incidents**




Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database. See www.start.umd.edu/gtd


# **Egypt – perpetrators**




# Egypt – attack type




# Egypt – target type




## Egypt – weapon type




# **Egypt - casualties**



## **Egypt - fatalities**




## **Egypt - injuries**



### Egypt demographic pressure

Egypt - total population (thousands)




1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050

Demographic Indicators	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Demographic indicators	1930	1955	1960	1903	1970	1973	1900	1903	1990	1993	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2023	2030	2033	2040	2045	2030
opulation																					
Midyear population (in thousands)	21,198	23,856	26,847	30,265	33,574	36,952	42,634	50,052	54,907	58,945	65,159	72,544	80,472	88,487	96,260	103,742	111,057	118,256	125,242	131,822	137,873
Growth rate (percent)	(NA)	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.8	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.0	0.8									
Fertility																					
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	(NA)	3.5	3.2	3.0	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.2									
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	27	27	25	23	21	19	18	18	17	16	15									
Births (in thousands)	(NA)	1,762	1,927	2,013	2,026	2,001	2,006	2,046	2,090	2,107	2,091	2,075									
Mortality																					
Life expectancy at birth (years)	(NA)	69	71	72	74	75	76	77	78	79	79	80									
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	39	32	26	22	18	15	13	11	9	8	7									
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	48	39	32	26	21	18	15	12	11	9	8									
Crude death rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	7									
Deaths (in thousands)	(NA)	341	364	390	422	464	516	580	650	728	811	903									
Migration																					
Net migration rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0									
Net number of migrants (in thousands)	(NA)	-24	-17	-17	-17	-17	-17	-17	-17	-18	-17	-17									

Source: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php

#### Egypt youth-employment pressure





0	0 2000 2005										
0	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
<del></del> 0-24	37588638	39942440	41706509	43826753	45928037	47748083	48881042	49546130	50102463	50676563	51185582
15-24	14135180	15374420	15320554	15605993	16720608	18278188	19279431	19562754	19548172	19692137	20090755


**—**0-24 **—**15-24

## Jordan

## **Jordan: Key Trends**


- World Bank ranks Jordan poor in transparency and "voice and accountability."
- Moderate rankings in political stability and violence, governance, rule of law ranking, and poor control of corruption. No meaningful progress after 2003.
- Progress in UN human development indicators, and overall ranking is high for country without petroleum wealth.
- The START data base shows no major rise in terrorism and violence since 2011. Overall control of extremism and terrorism is good..
- Demographic problems and "youth bulge" problems.
- Ethnic differences minor.
- No major sectarian tensions, but Sunni Islamist extremism is becoming a growing problem. CIA estimates population is Muslim 97.2% (official; predominantly Sunni), Christian 2.2% (majority Greek Orthodox, but some Greek and Roman Catholics, Syrian Orthodox, Coptic Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Protestant denominations), Buddhist 0.4%, Hindu 0.1%, Jewish <.1, folk religion <.1, unaffiliated <.1, other <.1 (2010 est.).</li>
- CIA estimates direct unemployment at 14% in 2013. Poverty level at 14.2% in 2002.

#### **Jordan: World Bank Governance and Security Indicators:**



The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.


#### Jordan: UN Human Development Indicators: 2014






Source: UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/JOR

### Jordan – terrorist incidents



## **Jordan - perpetrators**




- Abu Nidal Organization...
   Al-Qa`ida in Iraq
   Black September
   Black September II
   Jordanian Revolutionar...
   Popular Front for the ...
- Jordanian Revolutionary and Military Committee


Tawhid and Jihad

 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)


## Jordan- attack type




## Jordan- target type




## Jordan- weapon type



#### **Jordan - casualties**




#### **Jordan - fatalities**






## Jordan - injuries



#### Jordan demographic pressures

Jordan midyear population (thousands)




Demographic Overview - Custom Region - Jordan

Demographic Indicators	_			1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Demograpme marcators		1000	1000	1000	1010	1010	1500	1000	1000	1000	2000	2000	2010	2010	2020	2020	2000	2000	2040	2040	2000
Population																					
Midyear population (in thousands)	561	687	849	1,061	1,503	1,803	2,163	2,630	3,267	4,176	4,688	5,245	6,407	6,623	7,278	7,945	8,611	9,282	9,954	10,614	11,243
Growth rate (percent)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	4.1	3.7	11.6	2.5	2.2	2.3	2.2	1.6	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.1
Fertility																					-
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	7.7	6.7	5.4	4.4	3.7	3.6	3.4	3.3	3.1	3.0	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.5
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	43	40	36	32	28	28	27	26	24	22	21	20	19	18	18
Births (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	93	106	116	135	133	149	173	170	174	176	181	187	193	196	197
Mortality																					-
Life expectancy at birth (years)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	68	71	74	77	79	80	80	81	81	82	82	82	83	83	83
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	60	47	37	28	22	19	17	14	12	10	9	8	7	6	5
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	76	59	46	33	25	21	19	16	13	11	10	8	8	7	6
Crude death rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	6	5	4	3	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	5	5
Deaths (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	14	13	12	11	11	13	17	19	22	25	29	34	41	48	57
Migration																					-
Net migration rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	4	1	84	-4	-4	-3	-3	-6	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2
Net number of migrants (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	9	4	276	-18	-18	-18	-18	-43	-18	-18	-18	-18	-18	-18	-18

Source: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php

#### Jordan youth-employment pressure

#### Jordan Youth Population




0-24 \_\_\_\_15-24

## Lebanon

## **Lebanon: Key Trends**


- World Bank ranks Lebanon poor in transparency and "voice and accountability," and very poor in stability and violence.
- Moderate to poor rankings in governance. Poor and declining rank in rule of law, and very poor control of corruption.
- Moderate and static progress in UN human development indicators. Inequality a problem.
- The START data base shows a return to near civil war levels of terrorism and violence since 2011. Overall control of extremism and terrorism is poor.
- Native demographic problems and "youth bulge" problems, but refugees a major burden and source of instability.
- Ethnic differences are limited. CIA estimates native population is Arab 95%, Armenian 4%, other 1%. Palestinians and refugees are a growing source of tension.
- Sectarian tensions remain serious and Sunni Islamist extremism is becoming a growing problem. CIA estimates population is Muslim 54% (27% Sunni, 27% Shia), Christian 40.5% (includes 21% Maronite Catholic, 8% Greek Orthodox, 5% Greek Catholic, 6.5% other Christian), Druze 5.6%, very small numbers of Jews, Baha'is, Buddhists, Hindus, and Mormons. 18 religious sects are recognized (2012 est.)
- CIA estimates labor force at 1.481 million, not including up 1 million foreign workers.

## Lebanon: World Bank Governance and Security Indicators: 1996-2013



The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.


#### Lebanon: UN Human Development Indicators: 2014






Source: UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/LBN

### **Lebanon – terrorist incidents**



## **Lebanon – perpetrators**



Abdullah Azzam Brigades
 Abu Nidal Organization...
 Front for the Liberati...


Hizballah

Lebanese National Resi...


Palestine Liberation O...
 Popular Front for the ...

- Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners
- Lebanese National Resistance Front
- Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)


## Lebanon – attack type




## **Lebanon – target type**




## Lebanon – weapon type




#### **Lebanon - casualties**






### **Lebanon - fatalities**




## **Lebanon - injuries**





#### Lebanon youth-employment pressures



#### Lebanon demographic pressures

Lebanon midyear population (thousands)




 $1950 \ \ 1955 \ \ 1960 \ \ 1965 \ \ 1970 \ \ 1975 \ \ 1980 \ \ 1985 \ \ 1990 \ \ 1995 \ \ 2000 \ \ 2005 \ \ 2010 \ \ 2015 \ \ 2020 \ \ 2025 \ \ 2030 \ \ 2035 \ \ 2040 \ \ 2045 \ \ 2050$ 

Demographic Overview - Custom Region - Lebanon

Demographic Indicators	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Population																					
Midyear population (in thousands)	1,364	1,561	1,786	2,058	2,383	2,691	2,899	3,171	3,440	3,654	3,791	3,892	4,125	4,151	4,243	4,307	4,335	4,330	4,298	4,240	4,155
Growth rate (percent)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	2.7	1.0	1.8	1.8	2.5	0.9	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.0	-0.1	-0.2	-0.3	-0.5
Fertility																					
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	5.5	4.8	4.1	3.4	2.9	2.4	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	35	32	29	27	24	20	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	10	10	10
Births (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	83	86	85	84	83	74	66	61	62	60	57	52	48	45	43	42	40
Mortality																					
Life expectancy at birth (years)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	67	68	68	69	69	71	72	74	75	76	77	78	79	79	80	81	81
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	49	45	41	37	34	28	24	20	16	14	12	10	9	8	7	6	E
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	65	56	48	42	37	31	26	21	18	15	13	11	10	9	8	7	E
Crude death rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	8	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	8	8	9	10	11	12
Deaths (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	18	19	19	20	21	22	23	24	27	29	31	33	36	39	42	46	50
Migration																					-
Net migration rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	0	-15	-5	-3	7	-6	-5	-5	-2	-4	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2	-2
Net number of migrants (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	0	-40	-14	-9	25	-20	-20	-19	-10	-15	-10	-10	-10	-10	-10	-10	-10

Source: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php

#### Lebanon youth-employment pressures






# **Syria**

## **Syria: Key Trends**


- World Bank rankings were poor before 2011. Syria is now at failed state level in every metric for transparency and "voice and accountability," political stability and violence, governance, rule of law ranking, and poor control of corruption. Situation worsened in 2014.
- Poor ranking in UN human development indicators, and trend analysis is not credible. Should show serious drop after 2011.
- The START data base shows a critical rise in terrorism and violence since 2011. Civil war now dominates violence.
- Demographic problems and "youth bulge" problems.
- Ethnicity is Arab 90.3%, Kurds, Armenians, and other 9.7%. Serious rise in violence against minorities.
- Critical sectarian tensions, and Sunni Islamist extremism is becoming a growing problem. CIA estimates population is Muslim 87% (official; includes Sunni 74% and Alawi, Ismaili, and Shia 13%), Christian (includes Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian) 10% (includes Orthodox, Uniate, and Nestorian), Druze 3%, Jewish (few remaining in Damascus and Aleppo).
- CIA estimates direct unemployment at 18% in 2013. Poverty level is serious but no estimate. No reliable statistics since 2011.

#### Syria: World Bank Governance and Security Indicators: 1996-2013



The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.

#### Syria: UN Human Development Indicators: 2014







Source: UNDP, <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/SYI">http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/SYI</a>

Reputation strail (millions) 21.9

## Syria – terrorist incidents




## Syria – perpetrators




- Ahrar al-Sham
  Al-Nusrah Front
  Arab Revolution/Libera...
  Free Syrian Army
  Islamic State of Iraq ...
  Muslim Brotherhood
  - Arab Revolution/Liberation Vanguard Organization
  - Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant


#### Syria – attack type




#### Syria – target type




## Syria – weapon type




## **Syria - casualties**







## **Syria - fatalities**




## Syria - injuries








# Syria: 9.3 Million of Concern: 2.9 Million Refugees Outside Country; 6.5+ Million IDPs = 52% of Total of 17.9 Million



Statistical Snapsho	t*
Residing in Syrian Arab Republic [1]	
Refugees [2]	149,292
Asylum Seekers [3]	2,495
Returned Refugees [4]	140,761
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPS) [5]	6,520,800
Returned IDPs [6]	0
Stateless Persons [7]	160,000
Various [8]	0
Total Population of Concern	6,973,348
Originating from Syrian Arab Republic [1	1
Refugees [2]	2,468,369
Asylum Seekers [3]	41,038
Returned Refugees [4]	140,761
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPS) [5]	6,520,800
Returned IDPs [6]	0
Various [8]	9,400
Total Population of Concern	9,180,368
Notes •	As at January 2014




## Syrian Refugees to 14.10.14



Source: UNHCR, Reliefweb (Figures up to 14 October 2014)

#### Syria demographic pressures

Syria midyear population (thousands)




Demographic	Overview -	<ul> <li>Custom</li> </ul>	Region -	Syria
-------------	------------	----------------------------	----------	-------

Demographic Indicators	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Population																					
Midyear population (in thousands)	3,495	3,938	4,533	5,326	6,258	7,407	8,752	10,466	12,500	14,449	16,471	18,563	22,198	22,879	24,744	26,536	28,224	29,804	31,257	32,551	33,658
Growth rate (percent)	(NA)	3.6	3.9	2.7	2.5	2.3	2.0	1.4	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.6						
Fertility																					-
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	(NA)	7.1	5.9	4.9	4.3	3.6	3.0	2.6	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0						
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	44	38	33	31	28	24	22	20	18	17	16	15	14	13						
Births (in thousands)	(NA)	458	480	484	507	512	543	500	487	476	472	467	464	455	447						
Mortality																					-
Life expectancy at birth (years)	(NA)	65	69	70	72	73	74	76	77	78	78	79	80	81	81						
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	51	32	27	23	19	16	14	12	10	9	8	7	6	6						
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	65	40	33	27	23	19	16	14	12	10	9	8	7	6						
Crude death rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	7	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	6	6						
Deaths (in thousands)	(NA)	75	65	65	67	71	82	84	92	103	118	137	161	188	218						
Migration																					
Net migration rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	-1	6	-2	-2	-1	-1	-4	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1						
Net number of migrants (in thousands)	(NA)	-6	70	-26	-27	-16	-27	-102	-27	-27	-27	-27	-27	-27	-27						

Source: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php

#### Syria youth-employment pressures






# **Turkey**

#### **Turkey: Key Trends**


- World Bank rankings are poor for such a developed country. Turkey is now at very poor level for political stability and violence. Mediocre in governance, rule of law ranking, and poor control of corruption.
- Steadily rising ranking in in UN human development indicators.
- START data show critical rise in terrorism and violence since 2011.
   Civil war now dominates violence.
- Demographic pressure and "youth bulge" problems.
- Ethnicity is critical problem because of conflict between Turks and Kurds: Turkish 70-75%, Kurdish 18%, other minorities 7-12% (2008 est.). Turkish Alawites are a growing issue along with refugees.
- No meaningful sectarian tensions, but Sunni Islamist extremism is becoming a problem. CIA estimates population is Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), other 0.2% (mostly Christians and Jews).
- CIA estimates direct unemployment at 17.5% in 2013. Poverty level is serious but estimate of 16.9% dates to 2010.

#### Turkey: World Bank Governance and Security Indicators: 1996-2013




The inner, thicker blue line shows the selected country's percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner red lines show the indicate margins of error.


#### **Turkey: UN Human Development Indicators: 2014**



## Turkey – number of incidents




#### **Turkey – perpetrators**




- Dev Sol
- Devrimici Halk Kurtulu...
- Great Eastern Islamic ...
- Kurdistan Freedom Hawk...
- Kurdistan Workers Par...
  - Maoist Communist Party...
- Turkish Communist Part...
- Devrimici Halk Kurtulus Partisi Cephesi (DHKP/C)
- Great Eastern Islamic Raiders Front
- Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK)
- Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
- Maoist Communist Party (MKP)
- Turkish Communist Party (TKP)

#### Turkey – attack type




#### Turkey – target type






#### Turkey – weapon type




#### **Turkey - casualties**







#### **Turkey - fatalities**




# **Turkey - injuries**





#### Turkey demographic pressures

Turkey midyear population (thousands)




Demographic Overview - Custom Region - Turkey																					
Demographic Indicators	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Population																					
Midyear population (in thousands)	21,122	24,145	28,217	31,951	35,758	40,530	45,048	50,997	56,561	61,940	67,329	72,674	77,804	82,523	86,757	90,498	93,743	96,468	98,601	100,101	100,955
Growth rate (percent)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	2.6	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.2	0.1
Fertility																					
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	4.7	3.8	3.2	2.8	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.7
Crude birth rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	35	30	26	24	22	20	18	17	15	14	13	12	12	11	11
Births (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	1,579	1,532	1,486	1,458	1,463	1,459	1,422	1,362	1,312	1,265	1,236	1,204	1,163	1,126	1,080
Mortality																					
Life expectancy at birth (years)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	63	65	67	68	69	71	72	74	75	76	77	78	79	79	80
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	95	75	59	47	37	30	25	21	17	15	12	11	9	8	7
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 births)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	125	97	75	58	45	36	30	25	21	17	14	12	11	9	8
Crude death rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	9	8	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	7	7	8	8	9	10
Deaths (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	421	411	406	414	439	448	475	506	545	595	658	731	811	894	975
Migration																					
Net migration rate (per 1,000 population)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Net number of migrants (in thousands)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	35	24	12	32	52	47	41	36	31	26	21	15	11	5	0

Source: http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php

#### Turkey youth-employment pressures





**—**0-24 **—**15-24